## Supplementary Materials: <br> The Cultural Sources of the Gender Gap in Voter Turnout

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## Question wording

table 1: Question wording for political interest in EES surveys

| Survey years | Question wording |
| :--- | :--- |
| 1979 and 1984 | Not available. (The surveys did not include questions on general political <br> interest.) |
| $1989,1994,1999,2004$ | To what extent would you say you are interested in politics? Very, <br> and 2009 <br> somewhat, a little, or not at all? [answer options] 'Very'; 'Somewhat'; <br> 'A little'; 'Not at all'. |
|  | For each of the following statements, please tell me to what extent it <br> corresponds or not to your attitude or opinion. [item] 'You are very <br> interested in politics' [answer options] 'Yes, definitely'; 'Yes, to some <br> extent'; 'No, not really'; 'No, not at all'. |

Descriptive statistics
table 1: Descriptive Statistics

| Variable | Mean | Std. Dev. | Min. | Max. | $\mathbf{N}$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Turnout | 0.64 | 0.48 | 0 | 1 | 123398 |
| Female | 0.53 | 0.5 | 0 | 1 | 123398 |
| Age | 48.4 | 17.6 | 14 | 99 | 123398 |
| Postsecondary | 0.37 | 0.48 | 0 | 1 | 123398 |
| Working | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0 | 1 | 123398 |
| Unemployed | 0.43 | 0.49 | 0 | 1 | 123398 |
| Not working | 0.07 | 0.26 | 0 | 1 | 123398 |
| Working class | 0.26 | 0.44 | 0 | 1 | 123398 |
| Middle class | 0.64 | 0.48 | 0 | 1 | 123398 |
| Upper class | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0 | 1 | 123398 |
| EU membership bad | 0.12 | 0.32 | 0 | 1 | 120509 |
| EU membership neither good nor bad | 0.27 | 0.44 | 0 | 1 | 120509 |
| EU membership good | 0.61 | 0.49 | 0 | 1 | 120509 |
| Trade union member | 0.19 | 0.39 | 0 | 1 | 122589 |
| Attendance of religious services | 0.19 | 0.39 | 0 | 1 | 123252 |
| Closeness to a party | 0.65 | 0.48 | 0 | 1 | 123398 |
| Interest in politics | 0.49 | 0.31 | 0 | 1 | 123398 |
| Women parliament survey | 23.07 | 10.79 | 6 | 46.95 | 116198 |
| Women in parliament 18-21 | 14 | 10.18 | 0 | 46.8 | 118649 |
| EIGE | 61.99 | 9.02 | 45.9 | 82.60 | 88512 |
| EIGE (2005-2015 average) | 62.31 | 8.63 | 48.88 | 80.3 | 117996 |
| PISA | -0.02 | 0.01 | -0.04 | 0.01 | 98358 |
| TIMSS | -0.01 | 0.01 | -0.03 | 0.01 | 93357 |

## Non-Linear Decomposition

table 1: Non-Linear Decomposition of the Gender Gap in Voter Turnout

| Observations | 119610 |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| Probability to vote: Men | 0.660 |  |
| Probability to vote: Women | 0.633 |  |
| Gender gap | 0.027 |  |
| Explained | 0.044 |  |
| Unexplained | -0.016 |  |
| Factor | Contribution | Share of the gap |
|  | (Explained part) |  |
| Age | $0.003 * * *$ | $10.8 \%$ |
| Postsecondary | $0.001^{* * *}$ | $2.5 \%$ |
| Unemployed | $0.002^{* * *}$ | $7.5 \%$ |
| Not working | $0.000^{* * *}$ | $0.1 \%$ |
| Middle class | $-0.001^{* * *}$ | $-1.9 \%$ |
| Upper class | $0.001^{* * *}$ | $2.6 \%$ |
| EU membership neither good nor bad | $-0.001^{* * *}$ | $-5.3 \%$ |
| EU membership good | $0.006^{* * *}$ | $23.6 \%$ |
| Trade union member | $0.002^{* * *}$ | $6.6 \%$ |
| Attendance of religious services | $-0.004^{* * *}$ | $-13.0 \%$ |
| Closeness to a party | $0.007^{* * *}$ | $26.7 \%$ |
| Interest in politics | $0.033^{* * *}$ | $119.6 \%$ |
| 28 country dummies (total contribution) | -0.005 | $-16.7 \%$ |
| 7 election dummies (total contribution) | -0.001 | $-2.9 \%$ |

Note: Significance levels: *p<0.05, ** $p<0.01,{ }^{* * *} p<0.001$.

## Election-level differences in the effect of female

Figure 1: Random slope of female, by election


Note: Empirical Bayes estimates and $95 \%$ confidence intervals of random effect of female by election sample. Estimates from an ordered logit model to explain political interest. Only individual-level control variables are included.

Using the empirical bayes estimates of the random effect of gender (Figure 1), we can explore the association between the gender gap in political interest and gender differences in math scores in a bivarite way.

The graphs in Figure 2 show the bivariate correlation between the gender gap in political interest and the difference in math scores between boys and girls in the PISA (upper panel) and TIMSS dataset (lower panel). These graphs show a positive association between the random effect of gender and these two indicators of cultural gender inequality. While these bivariate associations are quite noisy - which is not surprising given the lack of controls - they show tentative evidence of the significant association that we find in the regression models.

Figure 2: Random slope of gender, by election


Note: Empirical Bayes estimates and $95 \%$ confidence intervals of random effect of female by election sample by gender gap in math. Estimates from mixed linear models to explain political interest. Individual-level control variables are included.

## Attitudinal measure of gender attitudes

To evaluate the validity of our measure of cultural gender attitudes (the difference in math scores between boys and girls), we incorporated in our data set a gender equality scale based on items from the European Value Survey (Waves from 1999 and 2008, variables: C001, D019, D056, D057, D058, D061, D062, D063, D064). The scale taps attitudes towards equality in the household and women's independence (i.e., the EVS variables D058 and D063 had the strongest loadings on our scale in the factor analysis). As shown in Figure 1, there is a consistent positive correlation between this survey indicator and mathematical performance (from PISA). The more respondents have attitudes favourable to gender equality, the smaller the traditional gap in mathematical performance.

Figure 1: Correlation: Gender Equality (EVS) Mathematical Performance (PISA)


European Value Survey 1999-2008.

Furthermore, as evident from the results in Table 1 and Figure 2, when we employ the explicit survey measure from the EVS instead of mathematical performance, the substantive results remain similar and both statistically and substantively significant. In more gender-equal countries, where more respondents believe that men and women should both contribute to the household income, there is a weaker gender gap in political interest.
table 1: Explaining Political Interest with gender attitudes

|  | $(1)$ | $(2)$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
|  | With the Netherlands | Without the Netherlands |
| Female | $-0.083^{* * *}$ | $-0.083^{* * *}$ |
| Gender Equality Scale (EVS) | $(0.003)$ | $(0.003)$ |
|  | -0.052 | -0.075 |
| Female $\times$ Gender Equality Scale (EVS) | $(0.035)$ | $(0.042)$ |
|  | $0.018^{* *}$ | $0.018^{*}$ |
| Age | $(0.006)$ | $(0.008)$ |
|  | $0.002^{* * *}$ | $0.002^{* * *}$ |
| Postsecondary | $(0.000)$ | $(0.000)$ |
|  | $0.096^{* * *}$ | $0.097^{* * *}$ |
| Unemployed | $(0.002)$ | $(0.002)$ |
|  | $-0.008^{* * *}$ | $-0.008^{* * *}$ |
| Not working | $(0.002)$ | $(0.002)$ |
|  | $-0.029^{* * *}$ | $-0.030^{* * *}$ |
| Middle class | $(0.003)$ | $(0.003)$ |
|  | $0.056^{* * *}$ | $0.056^{* * *}$ |
| Upper class | $(0.002)$ | $(0.002)$ |
|  | $0.102^{* * *}$ | $0.100^{* * *}$ |
| Closeness to a political party (a dummy) | $(0.003)$ | $(0.003)$ |
| Constant | $0.150^{* * *}$ | $0.153^{* * *}$ |
| $\sigma^{2}$ countries | $(0.002)$ | $(0.002)$ |
| $\sigma^{2}$ elections | $0.250^{* * *}$ | $0.251^{* * *}$ |
| $(N)$ countries/elections | $(0.013)$ | $(0.013)$ |
| $(N)$ individuals | 0.004 | 0.004 |

Note: Coefficients of random intercept linear probability models, random slope specified for gender. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$.

Figure 2: Average Marginal Effect of female on political interest, by gender attitudes


Note: Estimates and 90\% confidence intervals come from Table 1.

Ordered logit estimation
table 1: Explaining Political Interest, Contextual-Level Factors

|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Female | $\begin{gathered} \hline-0.578^{* * *} \\ (0.011) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \hline-0.639^{* * *} \\ (0.042) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \hline-0.646^{* * *} \\ (0.025) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.511^{* *} \\ (0.158) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \hline-0.509^{* * *} \\ (0.138) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \hline-0.435^{* * *} \\ (0.033) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \hline-0.470^{* * *} \\ (0.032) \end{gathered}$ |
| Age | $\begin{gathered} 0.015^{* *} * \\ (0.000) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.015^{* * *} \\ (0.000) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.018^{* * *} \\ (0.000) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.017^{* * *} \\ (0.000) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.015^{* * *} \\ (0.000) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.017^{* * *} \\ (0.000) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.016^{* * *} \\ (0.000) \end{gathered}$ |
| Postsecondary | $\begin{gathered} 0.639^{* *} \\ (0.012) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.633^{* * *} \\ (0.013) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.634^{* * *} \\ (0.012) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.592^{* * *} \\ (0.014) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.630^{* * *} \\ (0.013) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.597^{* * *} \\ (0.014) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.601^{* * *} \\ (0.014) \end{gathered}$ |
| Unemployed | $\begin{gathered} -0.059^{* * *} \\ (0.012) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.061^{* * *} \\ (0.013) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.053^{* * *} \\ (0.013) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.047^{* *} \\ (0.015) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.056^{* * *} \\ (0.013) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.047^{* * *} \\ (0.014) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.049^{* * *} \\ (0.014) \end{gathered}$ |
| Not working | $\begin{gathered} -0.202^{* * *} \\ (0.022) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.194^{* * *} \\ (0.022) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.203^{* * *} \\ (0.022) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.195^{* * *} \\ (0.025) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.190^{* * *} \\ (0.022) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.196^{* * *} \\ (0.024) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.194^{* * *} \\ (0.025) \end{gathered}$ |
| Middle class | $\begin{gathered} 0.379^{* *} \\ (0.013) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.374^{* *} \\ (0.013) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.372^{* * *} \\ (0.013) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.350^{* * *} \\ (0.016) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.379^{* *} \\ (0.013) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.357^{* * *} \\ (0.015) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.349^{* * *} \\ (0.015) \end{gathered}$ |
| Upper class | $\begin{gathered} 0.691^{* * *} \\ (0.021) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.688^{* * *} \\ (0.022) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.683^{* * *} \\ (0.022) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.632^{* * *} \\ (0.025) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.691^{* * *} \\ (0.022) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.662^{* * *} \\ (0.024) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.652^{* * *} \\ (0.024) \end{gathered}$ |
| Close to a political party | $\begin{gathered} 1.016^{* *} \\ (0.012) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.025^{* * *} \\ (0.013) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.011^{* * *} \\ (0.012) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.013^{* * *} \\ (0.014) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.021^{* * *} \\ (0.013) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.012^{* * *} \\ (0.013) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.027^{* * *} \\ (0.014) \end{gathered}$ |
| Women parliament survey |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.009 \\ (0.005) \end{gathered}$ |  |  |  |  |  |
| Female $\times$ Women parliament survey |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.003 \\ (0.002) \end{gathered}$ |  |  |  |  |  |
| Women in parliament 18-21 |  |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.004^{* * *} \\ (0.001) \end{gathered}$ |  |  |  |  |
| Female $\times$ Women in parliament 18-21 |  |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.005^{* * *} \\ (0.001) \end{gathered}$ |  |  |  |  |
| EIGE |  |  |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.005 \\ (0.009) \end{gathered}$ |  |  |  |
| Female $\times$ EIGE |  |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & -0.000 \\ & (0.003) \end{aligned}$ |  |  |  |
| EIGE (2005-2015 average) |  |  |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & 0.019^{*} \\ & (0.010) \end{aligned}$ |  |  |
| Female $\times$ EIGE (2005-2015 average) |  |  |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & -0.001 \\ & (0.002) \end{aligned}$ |  |  |
| PISA |  |  |  |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & -4.439 \\ & (6.462) \end{aligned}$ |  |
| Female $\times$ PISA |  |  |  |  |  | $\begin{gathered} 6.084^{* * *} \\ (1.481) \end{gathered}$ |  |
| TIMSS |  |  |  |  |  |  | $\begin{gathered} 5.723 \\ (10.063) \end{gathered}$ |
| Female $\times$ TIMSS |  |  |  |  |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & 7.274^{* *} \\ & (2.308) \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ |
| Cut 1 | $\begin{gathered} -0.266^{* *} \\ (0.087) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \hline-0.051 \\ (0.136) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.097 \\ (0.091) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.146 \\ (0.522) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.948 \\ (0.588) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline-0.154 \\ & (0.142) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.277^{*} \\ & (0.140) \end{aligned}$ |
| Cut 2 | $\begin{gathered} 1.553^{* * *} \\ (0.087) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.757^{* * *} \\ (0.136) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.733^{* * *} \\ (0.092) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.910^{* * *} \\ (0.522) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 2.753^{* *} \\ (0.588) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.657^{* * *} \\ (0.142) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.536^{* * *} \\ (0.141) \end{gathered}$ |
| Cut 3 | $\begin{gathered} 3.711^{* * *} \\ (0.088) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 3.916^{* * *} \\ (0.136) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 3.906^{* * *} \\ (0.092) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 4.042^{* * *} \\ (0.522) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 4.911^{* * *} \\ (0.588) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 3.807^{* * *} \\ (0.142) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 3.681^{* * *} \\ (0.141) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ |
| $\sigma^{2}$ countries | $\begin{aligned} & 0.165^{* *} \\ & (0.054) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline 0.147^{* *} \\ & (0.049) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.168^{* *} \\ & (0.055) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline 0.145^{* *} \\ & (0.053) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.148^{* *} \\ & (0.049) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline 0.178^{* *} \\ & (0.057) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.186^{* *} \\ & (0.061) \end{aligned}$ |
| $\sigma^{2}$ elections | $\begin{gathered} 0.145^{* *} \\ (0.022) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.128^{* * *} \\ (0.021) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.136^{* * *} \\ (0.021) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.099^{* * *} \\ (0.022) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.132^{* * *} \\ (0.021) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.089^{* * *} \\ (0.017) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.092^{* * *} \\ (0.018) \end{gathered}$ |
| $\sigma^{2}$ female |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.022^{* *} \\ (0.005) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.020^{* * *} \\ (0.004) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.026^{* * *} \\ (0.006) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.025^{* * *} \\ (0.005) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.018^{* * *} \\ (0.005) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.022^{* * *} \\ (0.005) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ |
| $N$ countries | 29 | 29 | 29 | 28 | 28 | 26 | 28 |
| $N$ elections | 113 | 119 | 75 | 114 | 90 | 84 | 90 |
| $N$ individuals | 123398 | 116198 | 118649 | 88512 | 117996 | 98358 | 93357 |

[^0] * $p<0.05,{ }^{* *} p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$.


[^0]:    Note: Coefficients of random intercept ordered logit models, random slope specified for gender. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels:

