**Online Appendices for:**

**“Party Institutionalization and Welfare State Development”**

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**Overview**

The appendices in this document contain the following material: Appendix A1 includes descriptions of the variables used for the analysis, and lists the sources from which they are drawn. A2 displays descriptive statistics for the observations included in different core models in Table 1 of the paper. A3 lists the country-year observations included in Model, Table 1.

The subsequent appendices contain additional robustness tests and extensions that are not reported in tables or figures in the paper. A4 displays our core specifications on alternative dependent variables, as well as specifications using different control variable sets. A5 replicates the indicator-specific tests from Table 2, disaggregating the components of the Party Institutionalization index, for other dependent variables than the V-Dem universalism indicator. A6 replicates the core robustness tests from Table 3 for the alternative dependent variables, and shows additional tests adding controls to our benchmark model. A7 replicates the split-sample tests from Table 4 for the other dependent variables. A8 displays the core regression specifications, but using an alternative version of our main independent variable (PI). A9 shows Placebo tests on outcomes we did not theoretically expect should be affected by PI. A10 includes a host of additional split-sample and interaction tests, further assessing the potential heterogeneity of the relationships between party institutionalization, on the one hand, and the different welfare state features, on the other.

We remark that the GSA specification displayed in A11, following the conventional usage of this technique, is run without country-fixed effects. Insofar as unmeasured confounders correlate strongly with these fixed effects (i.e., national cultural characteristics that are stable across time) they are not of relevance to these findings. The GSA thus tells us how strongly correlated other types of (time-varying within countries) confounders need to be with our core variables to possibly threaten our findings.

In general, the results suggest that any unmeasured such confounder would need to be very large relative to the plausible, measured confounders that we include in our benchmark for our results to turn statistically insignificant at the 5% level (t=1.96). The GSA, for instance, shows that a ommited variable that has a .39 semi-partial correlation (partial R-squared of 0.15) with the universalism index (our dependent variable) needs to have a higher than .31 semi-partial correlation (partial R-squared of 0.1) with the party institionalization index for results to turn insiginificant. Neither of our controls display such high correlations, either with the dependent variable or party institutionalization, except for one: This exeption is democracy, as measured by the Polyarchy index, which has a semi-partial correlation with party institutionalization at about 0.6 (partial R-square at about 0.4), *but* Polyarchy has a semi-partial correlation with our measure of welfare universalism of about 0.10.

In other words, an ommited third variable – and we here remind that we test a large number of plausible confounders in various tests pertaining to everything from trade to left government to state capacity – would need to display a stronger correlation with *both* welfare state universalism and party institutionalization than our included controls in order for the observed relationship to recive turn statistically insignificant. We can, of course, never guarantee that no such variable exists. Yet, given the results from the GSA and our comprehensive robustness tests on various plausible confounders that we could think of and measure, we find it unlikely that our results are largely an artifact of omitted variable bias.

## Appendix A1: Measures

Table A1. Variable definitions and sources for variables reported in the paper

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Variable: | Defintion | Source |
| Party organizations (v2psorgs) | How many political parties for national-level office have permanent organizations? A permanent organization connotes a substantial number of personnel who are responsible for carrying out party activities outside of the election season. Responses: (0) No parties. (1) Fewer than half of the parties. (2) About half of the parties. (3) More than half of the parties. (4) All parties. | V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2016) |
|  |  |  |
| Party branches (v2psprbrch) | How many parties have permanent local party branches? Responses: (0) None. (1) Fewer than half. (2) About half. (3) More than half. (4) All. |  |
|  |  |  |
| Party linkages (v2psprlnks) | Among the major parties, what is the main or most common form of linkage to their constituents? A party-constituent linkage refers to the sort of “good” that the party offers in exchange for political support and participation in party activities. Responses: (0) Clientelistic. Constituents are rewarded with goods, cash, and/or jobs. (1) Mixed clientelistic and local collective. (2) Local collective. Constituents are rewarded with local collective goods, e.g., wells, toilets, markets, roads, bridges, and local development. (3) Mixed local collective and policy/programmatic. (4) Policy/programmatic. Constituents respond to a party’s positions on national policies, general party programs, and visions for society. | V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2016) |
|  |  |  |
| Distinct platforms (v2psplats) | How many political parties with representation in the national legislature or presidency have publicly available party platforms (manifestos) that are publicized and relatively distinct from one another? In order to be counted in the affirmative, parties must have platforms that are both distinct (either in terms of content or generalized ideology) and publicly disseminated. This question is not intended to measure how much the public actually knows about these platforms or whether they are important in structuring policymaking. Responses: (0) None, or nearly none. (1) Fewer than half. (2) About half. (3) More than half. (4) All, or nearly all. | V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2016) |
|  |  |  |
| Legislative cohesion (v2pscohesv) | Is it normal for members of the legislature to vote with other members of their party on important bills? Responses: (0) Not really. Many members are elected as independents and party discipline is very weak. (1) More often than not. Members are more likely to vote with their parties than against them, but defections are common. (2) Mostly. Members vote with their parties most of the time. (3) Yes, absolutely. Members vote with their parties almost all the time. | V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2016) |
|  |  |  |
| Party institutionalization index | To what extent are political parties institutionalized. PI is aggregated by summing across standardized versions of v2psorgs, v2psprbrch, v2psprlnks, v2psplats and v2pscohesv. This sum is then normalized to 0–1 by using the cumulative density function.See main text for details. | V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2016) |
|  |  |  |
| Encompassingness | The number of major national welfare programs, within six risk areas, that are enacted. For a program to count as “major”, at least one out of a pre-defined set of relatively broad social groups needs to be covered. The relevant groups are the following: agricultural workers; industrial/production workers; small-firm workers; self-employed; students; employers; temporary/casual workers; family/domestic workers. See main text for details. | SPAW, Rasmussen (2017) |
|  |  |  |
| Universal programs | How many welfare programs are means-tested and how many benefit all (or virtually all) members of the polity? A means-tested program targets poor, needy, or otherwise underprivileged constituents. Cash-transfer programs are normally means-tested. A universal (non-means tested) program potentially benefits everyone. This includes free education, national health care schemes, and retirement programs. Granted, some may benefit more than others from these programs (e.g., when people with higher salaries get higher unemployment benefits). The key point is that practically everyone is a beneficiary, or potential beneficiary. The purpose of this question is not to gauge the size of the welfare state but rather its quality. Responses: (0) There are no, or extremely limited, welfare state policies (education, health, retirement, unemployment, poverty programs). (1) Almost all of the welfare state policies are means-tested. (2) Most welfare state policies means-tested, but a significant portion (e.g. 1/4 or 1/3) is universalistic and potentially benefits everyone in the population. (3) The welfare state policies are roughly evenly divided between means-tested and universalistic. (4) Most welfare state policies are universalistic, but a significant portion (e.g., ¼ or 1/3) are means-tested. (5) Almost all welfare state policies are universal in character. Only a small portion is means-tested. | V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2016) |
|  |  |  |
| Universalism Index | Additive index, aggregating across programs for six major areas of risk covered in SPAW. Each area is scored 0 if no program; 1 if program is means-tested according to some property criterion (income-based exclusions are not considered means-tested); 2 if one social group is covered by a contribution- or employment-based program; 3 if two groups are covered, etc. The social groups counted are agricultural workers; industrial/production workers; small-firm workers; self-employed; students; employers; temporary/casual workers; family/domestic workers. If the program automatically includes all citizens, 9 is given. | SPAW, Rasmussen (2017) |
| RR Sickness | Percentage of net average workers wages replaced by net unemployment benefits | Korpi and Palme (2007) |
|  |  |  |
| Coverage of labor force for sickness | Percentage of labor force insured for scikness in state legislated insurance | Korpi and Palme (2007) |
|  |  |  |
| Social expenditure | Total social transfer spending divided by GDP, as defined by the ILO | Armingeon et. al (2017) |
|  |  |  |
| Population | The population count, log-transformed | Miller (2015) |
|  |  |  |
| GDP per capita | Real, PPP-adjusted GDP per capita, log-transformed. | V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2016) |
|  |  |  |
| Polyarchy | Democracy index from V-dem, capturing “electoral democracy”: The electoral principle of democracy seeks to embody the core value of making rulers responsive to citizens, achieved through electoral competition for the electorate’s approval under circumstances when suffrage is extensive; political and civil society organizations can operate freely; elections are clean and not marred by fraud or systematic irregularities; and elections affect the composition of the chief executive of the country. In between elections, there is freedom of expression and an independent media capable of presenting alternative views on matters of political relevance. In the VDem conceptual scheme, electoral democracy is understood as an essential element of any other conception of (representative) democracy – liberal, participatory, deliberative, egalitarian, or some other | V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2016) |
|  |  |  |
| BMR democracy | Dichotomous democracy measure based on contestation and participation. Countries coded democratic have (1) political leaders that are chosen through free and fair elections and (2) a minimal level of suffrage. | Boix, Miller & Rosato (2013) |
|  |  |  |
| Electoral rules | What was the electoral system used in this election for the lower or unicameral chamber of the legislature? (MAJ, PR and Mixed) | V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2016) |
|  |  |  |
| Urbanization | The population living in areas classified as urban according to the criteria of  each area or country | V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2016) |
|  |  |  |
| Openness | Imports and exports divided by GDP | V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2016) |
|  |  |  |
| Income inequality (Gini) | Distribution of income within the population expressed as a Gini coefficient. | V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2016) |
|  |  |  |
| Family farms | What percentage of (cultivated) land area is comprised of family farms? | Vanhanen (2003) |
|  |  |  |
| Union density | Share of wage-and salary earners unionized | Rasmussen & Pontusson (2017) |
|  |  |  |
| Left | Left party control over the executive | Brambor et al.( 2014) |
|  |  |  |
| Inter-state. war | Did the country participate in an international armed conflict? Coded 1 if the country participated in an international armed conflict in a given year, 0 otherwise. | V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2016) |
|  |  |  |
| Civil war | Was there a civil war, if yes 1 and 0 otherwise. Civil war - at least one intra-state war with at least 1,000 battle deaths for each country-year. |  |
|  |  |  |
| Political corruption index | How pervasive is political corruption? The directionality of the V-Dem corruption index runs from less corrupt to more corrupt (unlike the other V-Dem variables that generally run from less democratic to more democratic situation). The corruption index includes measures of six distinct types of corruption that cover both different areas and levels of the polity realm, distinguishing between executive, legislative and judicial corruption. Within the executive realm, the measures also distinguish between corruption mostly pertaining to bribery and corruption due to embezzlement. Finally, they differentiate between corruption in the highest echelons of the executive (at the level of the rulers/cabinet) on the one hand, and in the public sector at large on the other. The measures thus tap into several distinguished types of corruption: both ‘petty’ and ‘grand’; both bribery and theft; both corruption aimed and influencing law making and that affecting implementation. | V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2016) |
|  |  |  |
| Impartial Administration | Are public officials rigorous and impartial in the performance of their duties? This question focuses on the extent to which public officials generally abide by the law and treat like cases alike, or conversely, the extent to which public administration is characterized by arbitrariness and biases (i.e., nepotism, cronyism, or discrimination). | V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2016) |
|  |  |  |
| Civil society participation index | Are major CSOs routinely consulted by policymaker; how large is the involvement of people in CSOs; are women prevented from participating; and is legislative candidate nomination within party organization highly decentralized or made through party primaries? | V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2016) |
|  |  |  |
| Women political participation index | Are women descriptively represented in formal political positions? Women’s political participation is understood to include women’s descriptive representation in the legislature and an equal share in the overall distribution of power. | V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2016) |
|  |  |  |
| Regions | In which politico-geographic region is this country located? | QOG Standard Dataset (Teorell et al. 2017) |
|  |  |  |
| Military Expenditure | Military Expenditure in percent of GDP | QOG Standard Dataset (Teorell et al. 2017) |
|  |  |  |
| Public order spending | Expenditures for Public order as share of GDP | GSRE (Lucas and Richter 2016) |
|  |  |  |

**Appendix A2: Descriptive statistics**

Table A2. Descriptive statistics calculated for set of observations included in different model specifications in Table 1

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Descriptive statistics model 2 | | | | |
|  | mean | sd | min | max |
| Encompassing SPAW | 3.872116 | 1.813163 | 0 | 6 |
| Party instit. | .6008432 | .2814032 | .0094183 | .9858114 |
| Population | 9.160203 | 1.32417 | 5.70711 | 13.82988 |
| GDP (Log) | 7.938213 | .9899841 | 5.315224 | 10.31559 |
| Polyarchy | .4381009 | .2825434 | .0451607 | .9434598 |
| Electoral rules | .5159246 | .6277793 | 0 | 2 |

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Descriptive statistics model 5 | | | | |
|  | mean | sd | min | max |
| Universalism v-dem | .4003045 | 1.256938 | -3.029935 | 3.232383 |
| Party instit. | .5906694 | .2813186 | .0094183 | .9858114 |
| Population | 9.101019 | 1.319481 | 5.70711 | 13.82988 |
| GDP (Log) | 7.899548 | .9911748 | 5.315224 | 10.31559 |
| Polyarchy | .4287395 | .2807155 | .0451607 | .9434598 |
| Electoral rules | .4968474 | .6210276 | 0 | 2 |

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Descriptive statistics model 7 | | | | |
|  | mean | sd | min | max |
| Universalism SPAW | 14.65765 | 9.710052 | 0 | 44 |
| Party instit. | .5572577 | .2858848 | .0094183 | .9858114 |
| Population | 9.125517 | 1.298291 | 6.045005 | 13.81357 |
| GDP (Log) | 7.807652 | .9138105 | 5.831149 | 10.2353 |
| Polyarchy | .3879448 | .262731 | .0460888 | .9385647 |
| Electoral rules | .5100671 | .615974 | 0 | 2 |

## Appendix A3: Sample

Table A3. Country years included in Model 1, Table 1

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Country: | Time Period | |
| Albania | 1914-2007 |  |
| Argentina | 1900-2007 |  |
| Armenia | 1992-2007 |  |
| Austria | 1918-1937\*1947-2007 |  |
| Azerbaijan | 1992-2007 |  |
| Belarus | 1992-2007 |  |
| Belgium | 1900-2007 |  |
| Benin | 1960-1999 |  |
| Bolivia | 1900-1999 |  |
| Brazil | 1900-2007 |  |
| Bulgaria | 1900-2007 |  |
| Burkina Faso | 1955-2007 |  |
| Burundi | 1950-1999 |  |
| Cameroon | 1961-2000 |  |
| Cape Verde | 1976-2007 |  |
| Central African Republic | 1961-2007 |  |
| Chad | 1961-2000 |  |
| Chile | 1900-2007 |  |
| Colombia | 1900-1999 |  |
| Congo | 1957-2000 |  |
| Costa Rica | 1900-2007 |  |
| Cote d'Ivoire | 1961-2000 |  |
| Cyprus | 1943-2007 |  |
| Czech Republic | 1994-2007 |  |
| Democratic Republic of Congo | 1961-2007 |  |
| Denmark | 1900-2007 |  |
| Dominican Republic | 1900-1931 |  |
| Ecuador | 1900-2007 |  |
| El Salvador | 1900-2007 |  |
| Estonia | 1920-1939\*-2007 |  |
| Finland | 1908-2007 |  |
| France | 1900-2007 |  |
| Gabon | 1961-2007 |  |
| Gambia | 1966-2007 |  |
| Georgia | 1992-2007 |  |
| German Democratic Republic | 1950-1989 |  |
| Germany | 1900-2007 |  |
| Ghana | 1958-2007 |  |
| Greece | 1900-2007 |  |
| Guatemala | 1900-2000 |  |
| Guyana | 1901-2007 |  |
| Haiti | 1900-2007 |  |
| Honduras | 1900-2007 |  |
| Hungary | 1919-2007 |  |
| Iceland | 1947-2007 |  |
| Ireland | 1919-1999 |  |
| Italy | 1900-2007 |  |
| Kenya | 1964-2007 |  |
| Latvia | 1920-1939\*1991-2007 |  |
| Liberia | 1900-2007 |  |
| Lithuania | 1920-1939\*1991-2007 |  |
| Mali | 1961-2007 |  |
| Mauritania | 1961-2000 |  |
| Mexico | 1900-2007 |  |
| Moldova | 1992-2007 |  |
| Netherlands | 1900-2007 |  |
| Nicaragua | 1900-2007 |  |
| Niger | 1955-2007 |  |
| Nigeria | 1942-2007 |  |
| Norway | 1900-2007 |  |
| Panama | 1904-2007 |  |
| Paraguay | 1900-2007 |  |
| Peru | 1900-2007 |  |
| Poland | 1920-2007 |  |
| Portugal | 1900-2007 |  |
| Romania | 1900-2007 |  |
| Russia | 1900-2007 |  |
| Rwanda | 1963-2000 |  |
| Senegal | 1953-2007 |  |
| Serbia | 1900-2007 |  |
| Slovak Republic | 1994-2007 |  |
| Slovenia | 1992-2007 |  |
| Spain | 1900-2007 |  |
| Sweden | 1900-2006 |  |
| Switzerland | 1900-2007 |  |
| Tanzania | 1949-2007 |  |
| Togo | 1953-2011 |  |
| Trinidad | 1901-1949 |  |
| Trinidad and Tobago | 1950-2007 |  |
| Uganda | 1963-2000 |  |
| Ukraine | 1992-2007 |  |
| United Kingdom | 1900-2007 |  |
| Uruguay | 1900-2007 |  |
| USA | 1900-2007 |  |
| Venezuela | 1900-2007 |  |
| Yugoslavia | 1920-2007 |  |

## Appendix A4: Additional analysis on different welfare measures – alternative control strategies

Table A4: Party institutionalization and measures of welfare state universality and generosity, using data from SCIP on sickness benefits programs (5-year panels).

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | |
| Dep. var. | Replacement Rates (level) | Coverage (level) |
| Model | (1) | ( 2) |
| Party Institutionaization | 1.63\*\*\* | 1.27\*\*\* |
|  | (8.03) | (5.40) |
| PR electoral system | 0.071 | -0.11\* |
|  | (1.26) | (-2.32) |
| Mixed electoral system | 0.12 | -0.025 |
|  | (1.95) | (-0.42) |
| Polyarchy | -0.54\*\*\* | -0.30\* |
|  | (-3.86) | (-2.10) |
| Pop. (ln) | -0.19\* | -0.041 |
|  | (-2.31) | (-0.38) |
| GDP p.c. (ln) | 0.018 | 0.25\*\*\* |
|  | (0.37) | (4.94) |
| Country FE | Yes | Yes |
| Year FE | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 263 | 267 |
| Countries | 20 | 21 |
| Time period | 1930-2000 | 1930-2000 |

\**p*<0.05, \*\**p*< 0.01, \*\*\**p*<0.001. OLS with panel corrected standard errors. T-values reported in parentheses. Constant, year dummies and country dummies not displayed.

Table A5. Party institutionalization and universalism (Coverage) and generosity (Replacement rates), using CEWD data on sickness benefits programs. Time series extend from 1970- 2004

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Dependent variable | RR for singles | RR for singles | RR for Couples | RR for Couples | Coverage | Coverage |
| Party inst. | 0.092\*\* | 0.045 | 0.075\* | 0.044 | 1.24\*\*\* | 1.20\*\* |
|  | (2.66) | (0.70) | (2.27) | (0.62) | (4.06) | (2.91) |
| Polyarchy |  | 0.10 |  | 0.16\* |  | -0.073 |
|  |  | (1.63) |  | (2.27) |  | (-1.09) |
| Population (logged) |  | 0.034 |  | 0.090 |  | -0.078 |
|  |  | (0.74) |  | (1.40) |  | (-1.38) |
| GDP (log) |  | 0.50\*\*\* |  | 0.19\*\* |  | 0.056 |
|  |  | (7.86) |  | (3.09) |  | (1.36) |
| PR |  | -0.087\*\*\* |  | -0.12\*\*\* |  | 0.021 |
|  |  | (-4.31) |  | (-4.13) |  | (1.13) |
| Mixed |  | -0.040\* |  | -0.045 |  | 0.028 |
|  |  | (-2.35) |  | (-1.88) |  | (1.89) |
| Country Dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year Dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 764 | 594 | 764 | 594 | 700 | 554 |

T-values (in parentheses) calculated with panel corrected standard errors.. \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001

Table A6. Replicating main models using the SPAW Universalism Index as DV

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| Level/Change DV | L | L | C |
| Party ints. | 2.63\*\*\* | 2.05\*\*\* | 0.061 |
|  | (7.29) | (5.24) | (0.40) |
| Polyarchy |  | 0.73 | 0.30 |
|  |  | (1.82) | (1.89) |
| Population (logged) |  | 1.12\*\*\* | 0.42\*\*\* |
|  |  | (3.52) | (3.51) |
| GDP (log) |  | 0.47\* | 0.19\* |
|  |  | (2.10) | (2.18) |
| PR |  | 0.53\*\* | 0.065 |
|  |  | (2.69) | (0.82) |
| Mixed |  | 1.90\*\*\* | 0.13 |
|  |  | (7.52) | (1.08) |
| LDV |  |  | -0.13\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (-9.93) |
| Country Dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year Dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 4056 | 4056 | 4056 |

T-values (in parentheses) calculated with panel corrected standard errors. \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001

Table A7. Replicating main models using public vs particularistic goods measure(v2dlencmps from V-Dem)

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| Level/Change | L | L | C |
| Party ints. | 1.54\*\*\* | 1.26\*\*\* | 0.22\*\*\* |
|  | (21.47) | (16.46) | (7.14) |
| Polyarchy |  | 0.57\*\*\* | 0.025 |
|  |  | (9.00) | (0.98) |
| Population (logged) |  | 0.17\*\*\* | -0.021 |
|  |  | (4.05) | (-1.33) |
| GDP (log) |  | 0.080\* | -0.017 |
|  |  | (2.56) | (-1.39) |
| PR |  | -0.052 | 0.0064 |
|  |  | (-1.50) | (0.50) |
| Mixed |  | -0.27\*\*\* | -0.025 |
|  |  | (-6.91) | (-1.59) |
| LDV |  |  | -0.093\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (-15.35) |
| Country Dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year Dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 7124 | 7124 | 7124 |

T-values (in parentheses) calculated with panel corrected standard errors. \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001

Table A8. Party institutionalization on various welfare state measures. Models without controls

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) |
|  | Encompassingn. | | Univ. V-dem | | Univ. SPAW | | RR | | Coverage | | Social exp. | |
| PI | 0.59\*\*\* | 0.11\*\*\* | 1.31\*\*\* | 0.11\*\*\* | 0.51 | 0.014 | 0.96\*\*\* | 0.26 | 0.93\*\*\* | 0.79\*\* | 5.95\*\*\* | 1.87\*\*\* |
|  | (8.80) | (4.35) | (30.73) | (9.34) | (1.51) | (0.14) | (9.12) | (0.85) | (7.41) | (2.97) | (4.62) | (2.60) |
| LDV |  | 0.90\*\*\* |  | 0.95\*\*\* |  | 0.92\*\*\* |  | 0.68\*\*\* |  | 0.61\*\*\* |  | 0.934\*\*\* |
|  |  | (178.53) |  | (352.32) |  | (113.47) |  | (12.15) |  | (6.23) |  | (69.71) |
| Country FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 9053 | 8878 | 16267 | 16089 | 5857 | 5678 | 334 | 232 | 338 | 236 | 1002 | 974 |

*T-values (in parentheses)* calculated with panel corrected standard errors.\* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001

Table A9. Party institutionalization on welfare state universalism measures holding welfare state size constant.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Dependent variable: | V-dem Universalism | | | SPAW Universalism | | |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Party instit. | 1.62\*\*\* | 1.48\*\*\* | 0.23\*\*\* | 0.20 | 1.41\*\*\* | 0.11 |
|  | (28.51) | (18.11) | (8.00) | (0.74) | (4.29) | (0.72) |
| Number of major welfare laws | 0.097\*\*\* | 0.046\*\*\* | -0.0023 | 3.07\*\*\* | 3.15\*\*\* | 0.78\*\*\* |
|  | (11.51) | (4.07) | (-0.52) | (53.33) | (37.11) | (14.74) |
| LDV |  |  | -0.092\*\*\* |  |  | -0.20\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (-13.74) |  |  | (-14.16) |
| Controls | No | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Yes |
| Country Dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year Dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 9053 | 6154 | 6143 | 5674 | 4055 | 3939 |

T-values (in parentheses) calculated with panel corrected standard errors. Constant, fixed time, country effects and controls (GDP [Log], population [Log], electoral rules and Polyarchy) excluded. \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001

## Appendix A5: Replicating indicator-specific tests (from Table 2 in paper) for all welfare measures

Table A10. Party institutionalization indicators on Encompassingess (from SPAW)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Party organizations | 0.049\*\*\* |  |  |  |  | -0.030 |
|  | (3.60) |  |  |  |  | (-1.53) |
| Party branches |  | 0.072\*\*\* |  |  |  | 0.050\* |
|  |  | (4.81) |  |  |  | (2.25) |
| Party linkages |  |  | 0.048\*\* |  |  | 0.031 |
|  |  |  | (3.10) |  |  | (1.70) |
| Distinct party platforms |  |  |  | 0.062\*\*\* |  | 0.040\* |
|  |  |  |  | (4.60) |  | (2.33) |
| Legislative party cohesion |  |  |  |  | 0.081\*\*\* | 0.076\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  | (4.91) | (4.36) |
| Pop | 1.20\*\*\* | 1.18\*\*\* | 1.19\*\*\* | 1.19\*\*\* | 1.20\*\*\* | 1.18\*\*\* |
|  | (27.50) | (27.04) | (27.33) | (27.37) | (27.63) | (27.00) |
| GDP | 0.19\*\*\* | 0.17\*\*\* | 0.18\*\*\* | 0.18\*\*\* | 0.17\*\*\* | 0.15\*\*\* |
|  | (5.11) | (4.79) | (4.83) | (4.97) | (4.74) | (4.15) |
| Polyarchy | -0.37\*\*\* | -0.39\*\*\* | -0.34\*\*\* | -0.39\*\*\* | -0.21\*\* | -0.36\*\*\* |
|  | (-5.36) | (-5.69) | (-4.83) | (-5.44) | (-3.03) | (-4.71) |
| PR | 0.56\*\*\* | 0.56\*\*\* | 0.55\*\*\* | 0.54\*\*\* | 0.58\*\*\* | 0.56\*\*\* |
|  | (16.42) | (16.48) | (15.63) | (15.72) | (16.48) | (15.66) |
| Mixed | 0.53\*\*\* | 0.52\*\*\* | 0.52\*\*\* | 0.51\*\*\* | 0.52\*\*\* | 0.51\*\*\* |
|  | (11.51) | (11.46) | (11.42) | (11.16) | (11.43) | (11.10) |
| Country Dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year Dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 6154 | 6154 | 6142 | 6142 | 6110 | 6110 |

T-values (in parentheses) calculated with panel corrected standard errors. \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001

Table A11. Party institutionalization indicators on SPAW Universalism Index

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Party organizations | 0.26\*\*\* |  |  |  |  | -0.16 |
|  | (3.72) |  |  |  |  | (-1.40) |
| Party branches |  | 0.48\*\*\* |  |  |  | 0.50\*\*\* |
|  |  | (5.98) |  |  |  | (3.95) |
| Party linkages |  |  | 0.23\* |  |  | 0.14 |
|  |  |  | (2.23) |  |  | (1.26) |
| Distinct party platforms |  |  |  | 0.39\*\*\* |  | 0.14 |
|  |  |  |  | (5.27) |  | (1.43) |
| Legislative party cohesion |  |  |  |  | -0.085 | -0.11 |
|  |  |  |  |  | (-0.91) | (-1.19) |
| Pop | 0.95\*\* | 0.77\* | 0.96\*\* | 0.84\*\* | 0.92\*\* | 0.66\* |
|  | (2.97) | (2.41) | (3.02) | (2.62) | (2.86) | (2.08) |
| GDP | 0.44 | 0.32 | 0.40 | 0.37 | 0.49\* | 0.28 |
|  | (1.94) | (1.37) | (1.74) | (1.62) | (2.14) | (1.19) |
| Polyarchy | 1.05\*\* | 0.67 | 1.37\*\*\* | 0.83\* | 1.44\*\*\* | 0.32 |
|  | (2.62) | (1.68) | (3.55) | (2.05) | (3.57) | (0.73) |
| PR | 0.65\*\* | 0.66\*\*\* | 0.56\*\* | 0.58\*\* | 0.65\*\* | 0.60\*\* |
|  | (3.26) | (3.33) | (2.78) | (2.92) | (3.24) | (2.96) |
| Mixed | 2.12\*\*\* | 2.11\*\*\* | 2.11\*\*\* | 2.11\*\*\* | 2.14\*\*\* | 2.13\*\*\* |
|  | (7.22) | (7.13) | (7.16) | (7.17) | (7.27) | (7.15) |
| Country Dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year Dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 4172 | 4172 | 4169 | 4169 | 4152 | 4152 |

T-values (in parentheses) calculated with panel corrected standard errors. \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001

Table A12. Party institutionalization on replacement rates for sickness insurance (from SCIP)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Party organizations | 0.30\*\*\* |  |  |  |  | 0.29\*\*\* |
|  | (7.32) |  |  |  |  | (6.91) |
| Party branches |  | 0.089\* |  |  |  | 0.025 |
|  |  | (2.45) |  |  |  | (0.78) |
| Party linkages |  |  | 0.11\*\*\* |  |  | 0.081\*\* |
|  |  |  | (3.52) |  |  | (2.80) |
| Distinct party platforms |  |  |  | 0.090\* |  | -0.027 |
|  |  |  |  | (2.14) |  | (-0.71) |
| Legislative party cohesion |  |  |  |  | -0.0020 | 0.014 |
|  |  |  |  |  | (-0.07) | (0.61) |
| Pop | -0.12 | -0.11 | -0.18\* | -0.15 | -0.14 | -0.15\* |
|  | (-1.62) | (-1.31) | (-2.16) | (-1.81) | (-1.56) | (-2.02) |
| GDP | 0.057 | 0.022 | 0.042 | 0.069 | 0.063 | 0.026 |
|  | (1.22) | (0.36) | (0.80) | (1.25) | (1.11) | (0.53) |
| Polyarchy | -0.31\*\* | -0.052 | -0.0036 | -0.10 | 0.10 | -0.34\* |
|  | (-2.69) | (-0.38) | (-0.03) | (-0.66) | (0.81) | (-2.47) |
| PR | 0.064 | 0.13 | 0.12 | 0.14 | 0.13 | 0.067 |
|  | (1.06) | (1.70) | (1.50) | (1.87) | (1.49) | (1.03) |
| Mixed | -0.0017 | 0.089 | 0.040 | 0.070 | 0.027 | 0.017 |
|  | (-0.03) | (1.10) | (0.49) | (0.85) | (0.32) | (0.25) |
| Country Dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year Dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 263 | 263 | 263 | 263 | 263 | 263 |

T-values (in parentheses) calculated with panel corrected standard errors. \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001

Table A13. Party institutionalization indicators on coverage rates for sickness insurance (from SCIP)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Party organizations | 0.31\*\*\* |  |  |  |  | 0.29\*\*\* |
|  | (6.36) |  |  |  |  | (5.89) |
| Party branches |  | 0.037 |  |  |  | -0.061 |
|  |  | (1.07) |  |  |  | (-1.93) |
| Party linkages |  |  | 0.13\*\*\* |  |  | 0.075\* |
|  |  |  | (3.66) |  |  | (2.25) |
| Distinct party platforms |  |  |  | 0.16\*\*\* |  | 0.060 |
|  |  |  |  | (3.46) |  | (1.32) |
| Legislative party cohesion |  |  |  |  | -0.058\* | -0.040\* |
|  |  |  |  |  | (-2.50) | (-1.97) |
| Pop | 0.016 | 0.0084 | -0.054 | -0.033 | 0.038 | -0.016 |
|  | (0.17) | (0.07) | (-0.51) | (-0.31) | (0.32) | (-0.17) |
| GDP | 0.28\*\*\* | 0.27\*\*\* | 0.26\*\*\* | 0.30\*\*\* | 0.30\*\*\* | 0.31\*\*\* |
|  | (5.84) | (4.68) | (5.12) | (5.62) | (5.35) | (6.01) |
| Polyarchy | -0.22\* | 0.14 | 0.080 | -0.17 | 0.18 | -0.31\* |
|  | (-2.05) | (1.09) | (0.77) | (-1.05) | (1.93) | (-2.12) |
| PR | -0.13\*\* | -0.066 | -0.077 | -0.043 | -0.12\*\* | -0.16\*\* |
|  | (-2.87) | (-1.62) | (-1.96) | (-1.09) | (-2.69) | (-3.09) |
| Mixed | -0.13\* | -0.075 | -0.086 | -0.025 | -0.12\*\* | -0.15\*\* |
|  | (-2.49) | (-1.37) | (-1.96) | (-0.52) | (-2.69) | (-2.64) |
| Country Dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year Dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 267 | 267 | 267 | 267 | 267 | 267 |

T-values (in parentheses) calculated with panel corrected standard errors. \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001

Table A14. Party institutionalization indicators on social security spending as share of GDP (from CPDS)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Party organizations | -0.067 |  |  |  |  | -0.24 |
|  | (-0.23) |  |  |  |  | (-0.75) |
| Party branches |  | -0.068 |  |  |  | 0.10 |
|  |  | (-0.21) |  |  |  | (0.27) |
| Party linkages |  |  | 0.52\* |  |  | 0.47 |
|  |  |  | (2.12) |  |  | (1.78) |
| Distinct party platforms |  |  |  | 0.12 |  | -0.026 |
|  |  |  |  | (0.44) |  | (-0.09) |
| Legislative party cohesion |  |  |  |  | 0.44\* | 0.39\* |
|  |  |  |  |  | (2.43) | (2.07) |
| Pop | -4.35\*\*\* | -4.40\*\*\* | -4.44\*\*\* | -4.39\*\*\* | -4.58\*\*\* | -4.53\*\*\* |
|  | (-5.38) | (-5.16) | (-5.36) | (-5.34) | (-5.12) | (-4.80) |
| GDP | 1.16 | 1.19 | 0.73 | 1.14 | 1.17 | 0.73 |
|  | (1.41) | (1.47) | (0.85) | (1.39) | (1.41) | (0.86) |
| Polyarchy | 3.36\*\* | 3.28\*\*\* | 2.88\*\*\* | 2.99\*\* | 2.99\*\*\* | 3.32\*\* |
|  | (3.02) | (3.39) | (3.29) | (2.99) | (3.50) | (2.78) |
| PR | -0.83 | -0.82 | -1.07 | -0.96 | -0.37 | -0.54 |
|  | (-1.42) | (-1.35) | (-1.87) | (-1.52) | (-0.58) | (-0.78) |
| Mixed | -1.57\*\* | -1.62\*\* | -1.82\*\*\* | -1.64\*\* | -1.24\* | -1.38\* |
|  | (-2.99) | (-2.86) | (-3.49) | (-3.00) | (-2.29) | (-2.30) |
| Country Dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year Dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 781 | 781 | 781 | 781 | 781 | 781 |

T-values (in parentheses) calculated with panel corrected standard errors. \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001

Table A15. Party institutionalization indicators on public goods measure (from V-Dem)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Party organizations | 0.23\*\*\* |  |  |  |  | 0.13\*\*\* |
|  | (15.86) |  |  |  |  | (6.53) |
| Party branches |  | 0.25\*\*\* |  |  |  | 0.14\*\*\* |
|  |  | (15.48) |  |  |  | (6.74) |
| Party linkages |  |  | 0.38\*\*\* |  |  | 0.34\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (25.87) |  |  | (22.23) |
| Distinct party platforms |  |  |  | 0.088\*\*\* |  | -0.17\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  | (5.66) |  | (-10.22) |
| Legislative party cohesion |  |  |  |  | 0.17\*\*\* | 0.11\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  | (11.09) | (7.33) |
| Pop | 0.23\*\*\* | 0.18\*\*\* | 0.21\*\*\* | 0.24\*\*\* | 0.25\*\*\* | 0.18\*\*\* |
|  | (5.69) | (4.38) | (5.19) | (5.66) | (6.02) | (4.62) |
| GDP | 0.096\*\* | 0.056 | 0.011 | 0.090\*\* | 0.079\* | -0.0034 |
|  | (3.05) | (1.81) | (0.37) | (2.86) | (2.48) | (-0.11) |
| Polyarchy | 0.66\*\*\* | 0.69\*\*\* | 0.66\*\*\* | 0.92\*\*\* | 1.32\*\*\* | 0.75\*\*\* |
|  | (10.55) | (10.99) | (10.53) | (14.15) | (21.19) | (11.53) |
| PR | -0.031 | -0.031 | -0.12\*\*\* | -0.048 | 0.0010 | -0.064 |
|  | (-0.89) | (-0.91) | (-3.37) | (-1.35) | (0.03) | (-1.94) |
| Mixed | -0.25\*\*\* | -0.26\*\*\* | -0.29\*\*\* | -0.28\*\*\* | -0.27\*\*\* | -0.27\*\*\* |
|  | (-6.53) | (-6.77) | (-7.47) | (-6.93) | (-7.04) | (-7.26) |
| Country Dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year Dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 7137 | 7137 | 7125 | 7125 | 7093 | 7093 |

T-values (in parentheses) calculated with panel corrected standard errors. \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001

## Appendix A6: Replicating core robustness tests (from Table 3 in paper) for all welfare measures, plus tests on alternative control sets

Table A16. Party institutionalization on Encompassingness (from SPAW)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) |
|  | Baseline | 5 year lag | 10 year lag | Socio-  econ. controls | Work. class controls | Instit. and civil society controls | First component  PI | Control linkages | Random effects model |
| Party Instit. | 0.42\*\*\* | 0.26\*\*\* | 0.29\*\*\* | 0.11 | 1.40\*\*\* | 0.44\*\*\* | 0.088\*\*\* | 0.39\*\*\* | 0.48 |
|  | (5.85) | (4.02) | (4.65) | (1.60) | (8.09) | (5.51) | (6.16) | (4.80) | (1.84) |
| Polyarchy | -0.44\*\*\* | -0.26\*\*\* | -0.21\*\*\* | -0.19\*\* | -0.41\*\* | -0.43\*\*\* | -0.45\*\*\* | -0.45\*\*\* | -0.47\*\* |
|  | (-6.30) | (-3.98) | (-3.36) | (-3.22) | (-2.84) | (-3.69) | (-6.26) | (-6.24) | (-2.72) |
| Population | 1.17\*\*\* | 1.21\*\*\* | 1.24\*\*\* | 0.75\*\*\* | 1.08\*\*\* | 1.23\*\*\* | 1.18\*\*\* | 1.17\*\*\* | 0.88\*\*\* |
|  | (26.99) | (27.79) | (27.32) | (11.19) | (10.22) | (26.75) | (27.26) | (26.97) | (6.77) |
| GDP | 0.18\*\*\* | 0.21\*\*\* | 0.22\*\*\* | 0.45\*\*\* | -0.028 | 0.12\*\* | 0.17\*\*\* | 0.18\*\*\* | 0.19 |
|  | (4.98) | (5.80) | (5.98) | (9.02) | (-0.30) | (2.89) | (4.63) | (4.86) | (1.19) |
| PR | 0.55\*\*\* | 0.52\*\*\* | 0.52\*\*\* | 0.17\*\*\* | 0.51\*\*\* | 0.53\*\*\* | 0.55\*\*\* | 0.55\*\*\* | 0.62\*\*\* |
|  | (16.22) | (15.55) | (15.40) | (4.58) | (7.20) | (13.86) | (15.94) | (15.67) | (4.55) |
| Mixed | 0.52\*\*\* | 0.46\*\*\* | 0.46\*\*\* | 0.15\*\* | 0.78\*\*\* | 0.46\*\*\* | 0.52\*\*\* | 0.52\*\*\* | 0.55\*\*\* |
|  | (11.37) | (10.90) | (10.82) | (2.77) | (8.35) | (9.60) | (11.26) | (11.30) | (3.85) |
| Urbaniz |  |  |  | -5.8e-09\*\*\* |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | (-9.01) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Openness |  |  |  | 0.0061\*\*\* |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | (3.31) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Income ineq. |  |  |  | 0.013\*\*\* |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | (9.00) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Fam. farms |  |  |  | 0.0035\*\*\* |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | (3.52) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Union Dens. |  |  |  |  | 0.0045\*\*\* |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | (4.09) |  |  |  |  |
| Left |  |  |  |  | -0.027 |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | (-0.80) |  |  |  |  |
| Inter-st. war |  |  |  |  |  | -0.088\* |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | (-2.15) |  |  |  |
| Civil war |  |  |  |  |  | -0.016 |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | (-0.36) |  |  |  |
| Corruption |  |  |  |  |  | -0.21 |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | (-1.62) |  |  |  |
| Imp. Admin. |  |  |  |  |  | 0.097\*\*\* |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | (4.95) |  |  |  |
| Female parti. |  |  |  |  |  | -0.92\*\*\* |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | (-10.31) |  |  |  |
| Civil society |  |  |  |  |  | -0.21\* |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | (-2.02) |  |  |  |
| Party linkages |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.013 |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (0.76) |  |
| Country Dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No |
| Year Dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 6154 | 6009 | 5796 | 3663 | 1496 | 5287 | 6110 | 6142 | 6154 |

T-values (in parentheses) calculated with panel corrected standard errors. \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001

Table A17. Party institutionalization on Universalism Index (from SPAW)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) |
|  | Baseline | 5 year lag | 10 year lag | Socio-  econ. controls | Work. class controls | Instit. and civil society controls | First component  PI | Control linkages | Random effects model |
| Party Instit. | 1.90\*\*\* | 1.24\*\*\* | 0.39 | -0.080 | 9.69\*\*\* | 2.02\*\*\* | 0.42\*\*\* | 1.75\*\*\* | 2.05 |
|  | (4.81) | (3.43) | (1.12) | (-0.19) | (4.22) | (4.65) | (5.33) | (4.00) | (1.36) |
| Polyarchy | 0.70 | 1.56\*\*\* | 1.95\*\*\* | 0.41 | -7.83\*\*\* | 0.68 | 0.81\* | 0.70 | 0.85 |
|  | (1.69) | (4.26) | (5.40) | (0.94) | (-3.49) | (1.02) | (2.03) | (1.70) | (0.62) |
| Population | 0.81\* | 0.88\*\* | 0.75\* | -0.17 | 4.96\*\* | 1.40\*\*\* | 0.86\*\* | 0.83\*\* | 0.82 |
|  | (2.56) | (2.82) | (2.36) | (-0.32) | (3.29) | (4.30) | (2.70) | (2.59) | (0.96) |
| GDP | 0.40 | 0.45\* | 0.34 | 1.29\*\*\* | -0.25 | 0.088 | 0.38 | 0.38 | 1.04 |
|  | (1.76) | (2.11) | (1.57) | (4.80) | (-0.20) | (0.36) | (1.67) | (1.65) | (1.08) |
| PR | 0.63\*\* | 0.51\*\* | 0.54\*\* | -0.24 | -0.96 | 0.79\*\*\* | 0.63\*\* | 0.60\*\* | 0.84 |
|  | (3.17) | (2.63) | (2.71) | (-1.01) | (-1.20) | (3.64) | (3.16) | (2.97) | (1.32) |
| Mixed | 2.13\*\*\* | 1.81\*\*\* | 1.91\*\*\* | 1.27\*\*\* | -1.20 | 2.42\*\*\* | 2.09\*\*\* | 2.12\*\*\* | 2.28\*\* |
|  | (7.22) | (7.66) | (7.92) | (3.68) | (-1.28) | (8.05) | (7.09) | (7.19) | (2.63) |
| Urbaniz |  |  |  | -0.000000060\*\*\* |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | (-11.43) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Openness |  |  |  | 0.043\* |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | (2.29) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Income ineq. |  |  |  | 0.0074 |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | (0.72) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Fam. farms |  |  |  | -0.0068 |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | (-0.97) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Union Dens. |  |  |  |  | 0.092\*\*\* |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | (5.06) |  |  |  |  |
| Left |  |  |  |  | 1.04\* |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | (2.29) |  |  |  |  |
| Inter-st. war |  |  |  |  |  | -1.24\*\*\* |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | (-4.82) |  |  |  |
| Civil war |  |  |  |  |  | 0.26 |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | (1.33) |  |  |  |
| Corruption |  |  |  |  |  | -1.58\* |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | (-2.13) |  |  |  |
| Imp. Admin. |  |  |  |  |  | 0.80\*\*\* |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | (6.95) |  |  |  |
| Female parti. |  |  |  |  |  | -1.23\* |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | (-2.07) |  |  |  |
| Civil society |  |  |  |  |  | -3.27\*\*\* |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | (-6.23) |  |  |  |
| Party linkages |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.091 |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (0.82) |  |
| Country Dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No |
| Year Dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 4172 | 4075 | 3930 | 2416 | 743 | 3512 | 4152 | 4169 | 4172 |

T-values (in parentheses) calculated with panel corrected standard errors. \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001

Table A18. Party Institutionalization on replacement rates for sickness insurance (from SCIP)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) |
|  | Baseline | 5 year lag | 10 year lag | Socio-  econ. controls | Work. class controls | Instit. and civil society controls | First component  PI | Control linkages | Random effects model |
| Party Instit. | 1.63\*\*\* | 0.19 | 0.077 | 1.57\* | 1.61\*\*\* | 1.76\*\*\* | 0.28\*\*\* | 1.57\*\*\* | 1.61\*\*\* |
|  | (8.03) | (1.77) | (0.88) | (2.27) | (8.41) | (6.48) | (6.08) | (7.21) | (3.30) |
| Polyarchy | -0.54\*\*\* | 0.038 | 0.095 | -0.32 | -0.33\* | -0.54\*\* | -0.41\*\* | -0.54\*\*\* | -0.52 |
|  | (-3.86) | (0.29) | (0.76) | (-1.09) | (-2.56) | (-3.28) | (-2.96) | (-3.84) | (-1.61) |
| Pop. (ln) | -0.19\* | -0.14 | -0.13 | -0.32\* | -0.10 | -0.28\*\* | -0.20\* | -0.19\* | -0.050 |
|  | (-2.31) | (-1.61) | (-1.56) | (-2.04) | (-1.28) | (-3.20) | (-2.41) | (-2.36) | (-0.95) |
| GDP pc (ln) | 0.018 | 0.038 | 0.049 | 0.043 | -0.034 | 0.040 | -0.00076 | 0.016 | -0.018 |
|  | (0.37) | (0.61) | (0.86) | (0.41) | (-0.72) | (0.70) | (-0.01) | (0.33) | (-0.15) |
| PR | 0.071 | 0.15 | 0.13 | -0.30\* | 0.033 | 0.13 | 0.17\* | 0.072 | 0.13\* |
|  | (1.26) | (1.76) | (1.53) | (-2.21) | (0.61) | (1.70) | (2.46) | (1.26) | (2.30) |
| Mixed | 0.12 | 0.051 | 0.035 | -0.20 | 0.080 | 0.17\* | 0.15\* | 0.12 | 0.19 |
|  | (1.95) | (0.61) | (0.41) | (-1.58) | (1.34) | (2.26) | (2.08) | (1.93) | (1.84) |
| Urbaniz. |  |  |  | 5.9e-10 |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | (0.33) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Openness |  |  |  | -0.0086\*\* |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | (-2.96) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Income ineq. |  |  |  | -0.00010 |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | (-0.06) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Fam. farms |  |  |  | -0.00088 |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | (-0.36) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Union dens. |  |  |  |  | 0.0054\*\*\* |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | (6.36) |  |  |  |  |
| Left |  |  |  |  | 0.0078 |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.41) |  |  |  |  |
| Corruption |  |  |  |  |  | -0.74 |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | (-1.73) |  |  |  |
| Imp. Admin. |  |  |  |  |  | 0.037 |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | (1.41) |  |  |  |
| Civil society |  |  |  |  |  | -0.047 |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | (-0.43) |  |  |  |
| Female parti. |  |  |  |  |  | -0.60\*\*\* |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | (-3.32) |  |  |  |
| Party link. |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.019 |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (0.60) |  |
| Country Dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No |
| Year Dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 263 | 261 | 261 | 182 | 250 | 263 | 263 | 263 | 263 |

T-values (in parentheses) calculated with panel corrected standard errors. \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001

Table A19. Party Institutionalization on coverage rates for sickness insurance (from SCIP)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) |
|  | Baseline | 5 year lag | 10 year lag | Socio-  econ. controls | Work. class controls | Instit. and civil society controls | First component  PI | Control linkages | Random effects model |
| Party Instit. | 1.27\*\*\* | 0.47\*\*\* | 0.24\*\* | 3.95\*\*\* | 1.24\*\*\* | 1.38\*\*\* | 0.26\*\*\* | 1.08\*\*\* | 1.26 |
|  | (5.40) | (3.52) | (3.14) | (5.06) | (5.57) | (5.00) | (5.16) | (4.28) | (1.80) |
| Polyarchy | -0.30\* | 0.021 | 0.18 | 0.22 | -0.095 | -0.38\* | -0.27 | -0.29\* | -0.33 |
|  | (-2.10) | (0.17) | (1.80) | (0.95) | (-0.76) | (-2.41) | (-1.93) | (-2.04) | (-0.90) |
| Pop. (ln) | -0.041 | -0.016 | -0.0024 | 0.35\* | 0.046 | -0.064 | -0.055 | -0.061 | -0.078 |
|  | (-0.38) | (-0.14) | (-0.02) | (2.47) | (0.43) | (-0.68) | (-0.51) | (-0.58) | (-0.85) |
| GDP pc (ln) | 0.25\*\*\* | 0.24\*\*\* | 0.25\*\*\* | 0.19\* | 0.23\*\*\* | 0.26\*\*\* | 0.23\*\*\* | 0.24\*\*\* | 0.23\* |
|  | (4.94) | (4.03) | (4.48) | (2.24) | (5.02) | (4.87) | (4.37) | (4.91) | (2.25) |
| PR | -0.11\* | -0.020 | -0.070 | -0.048 | -0.15\* | 0.025 | -0.031 | -0.11\* | 0.025 |
|  | (-2.32) | (-0.39) | (-1.60) | (-0.53) | (-2.55) | (0.49) | (-0.66) | (-2.40) | (0.27) |
| Mixed | -0.025 | -0.038 | -0.068 | 0.019 | -0.048 | 0.044 | 0.0095 | -0.029 | 0.062 |
|  | (-0.42) | (-0.68) | (-1.34) | (0.23) | (-0.72) | (0.81) | (0.16) | (-0.52) | (0.65) |
| Urbaniz. |  |  |  | -2.9e-09\* |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | (-2.05) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Openness |  |  |  | -0.00043 |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | (-0.19) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Income ineq. |  |  |  | -0.0016 |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | (-1.08) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Fam. farms |  |  |  | 0.00081 |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | (0.44) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Union dens. |  |  |  |  | 0.0050\*\*\* |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | (4.57) |  |  |  |  |
| Left |  |  |  |  | 0.027 |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | (1.43) |  |  |  |  |
| Corruption |  |  |  |  |  | 0.14 |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | (0.40) |  |  |  |
| Imp. Admin. |  |  |  |  |  | 0.13\*\*\* |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | (4.16) |  |  |  |
| Civil society |  |  |  |  |  | -0.13 |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | (-1.13) |  |  |  |
| Female parti. |  |  |  |  |  | -0.48\*\* |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | (-2.71) |  |  |  |
| Party link. |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.065 |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (1.77) |  |
| Country Dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No |
| Year Dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 267 | 265 | 265 | 186 | 254 | 267 | 267 | 267 | 267 |

T-values (in parentheses) calculated with panel corrected standard errors. \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001

Table A20. Party institutionalization on social expenditure as share of GDP (from CPDS)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) |
|  | Baseline | 5 year lag | 10 year lag | Socio-  econ. controls | Work. class controls | Instit. and civil society controls | First component  PI | Control linkages | Random effects model |
| Party Instit. | 3.69 | 1.91 | -0.079 | 6.96\*\* | -1.81 | -3.63 | 0.49 | 2.92 | 3.49 |
|  | (1.79) | (1.88) | (-0.11) | (2.91) | (-0.49) | (-1.37) | (1.35) | (1.47) | (0.69) |
| Polyarchy | 1.61 | 2.55\*\* | 3.12\*\*\* | -0.57 | 2.77 | 1.58 | 2.16 | 1.69 | 1.09 |
|  | (1.36) | (2.88) | (3.59) | (-0.42) | (1.64) | (1.06) | (1.88) | (1.45) | (0.36) |
| Pop. (ln) | -4.43\*\*\* | -5.32\*\*\* | -10.6\*\*\* | -5.07\*\*\* | -10.2\*\*\* | -3.59\*\*\* | -4.40\*\*\* | -4.48\*\*\* | -0.88\* |
|  | (-5.39) | (-5.10) | (-10.01) | (-5.09) | (-9.48) | (-4.77) | (-5.32) | (-5.36) | (-1.97) |
| GDP pc (ln) | 0.88 | 0.73 | -0.32 | -0.66 | -0.66 | -0.75 | 0.98 | 0.56 | 0.62 |
|  | (1.06) | (0.86) | (-0.37) | (-0.58) | (-0.75) | (-0.82) | (1.18) | (0.66) | (0.54) |
| PR | -1.29\* | -0.95 | -0.18 | -4.68\*\*\* | 0.83 | -2.81\*\*\* | -1.05 | -1.38\* | 0.097 |
|  | (-2.17) | (-1.60) | (-0.30) | (-5.82) | (1.19) | (-4.63) | (-1.83) | (-2.36) | (0.08) |
| Mixed | -1.70\*\* | -1.55\*\* | -1.23\* | -3.36\*\*\* | -0.39 | -2.49\*\*\* | -1.56\*\* | -1.87\*\*\* | -0.57 |
|  | (-3.26) | (-2.98) | (-2.41) | (-4.93) | (-0.69) | (-4.25) | (-3.02) | (-3.61) | (-0.34) |
| Urbaniz. |  |  |  | 0.000000092\*\*\* |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | (5.02) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Openness |  |  |  | -0.14\*\*\* |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | (-5.81) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Income ineq. |  |  |  | -0.029\* |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | (-2.28) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Fam. farms |  |  |  | -0.0042 |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | (-0.26) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Union dens. |  |  |  |  | 0.039\*\*\* |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | (4.24) |  |  |  |  |
| Left |  |  |  |  | -0.42\*\* |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | (-2.59) |  |  |  |  |
| Corruption |  |  |  |  |  | -16.3\*\*\* |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | (-5.75) |  |  |  |
| Imp. Admin. |  |  |  |  |  | -1.08\*\*\* |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | (-5.01) |  |  |  |
| Civil society |  |  |  |  |  | -2.92\*\* |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | (-3.23) |  |  |  |
| Female parti. |  |  |  |  |  | 7.35\*\*\* |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | (4.21) |  |  |  |
| Party link. |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.44 |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (1.83) |  |
| Country Dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Year Dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 781 | 777 | 772 | 741 | 704 | 775 | 781 | 781 | 781 |

T-values (in parentheses) calculated with panel corrected standard errors. \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001

Table A21. Party institutionalization on public goods (v2dlencmps from V-Dem)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) |
|  | Baseline | 5 year lag | 10 year lag | Socio-  econ. controls | Work. class controls | Instit. and civil society controls | First component  PI | Control linkages | Random effects model |
| Party Instit. | 1.26\*\*\* | 0.59\*\*\* | 0.12 | 1.10\*\*\* | 1.20\*\*\* | 0.95\*\*\* | 0.33\*\*\* | 0.59\*\*\* | 1.26\*\*\* |
|  | (16.51) | (8.10) | (1.65) | (11.90) | (6.63) | (13.62) | (21.77) | (7.42) | (3.36) |
| Polyarchy | 0.57\*\*\* | 0.94\*\*\* | 1.08\*\*\* | 0.86\*\*\* | 1.40\*\*\* | -0.27\*\* | 0.56\*\*\* | 0.49\*\*\* | 0.61\* |
|  | (8.96) | (15.07) | (17.24) | (12.34) | (9.78) | (-2.86) | (8.61) | (7.74) | (2.08) |
| Population | 0.16\*\*\* | 0.21\*\*\* | 0.26\*\*\* | 0.28\*\*\* | -0.43\*\*\* | 0.35\*\*\* | 0.19\*\*\* | 0.17\*\*\* | 0.11 |
|  | (4.05) | (4.84) | (5.71) | (4.16) | (-4.18) | (8.64) | (4.79) | (4.41) | (0.93) |
| GDP | 0.081\*\* | 0.050 | 0.073\* | 0.028 | -0.30\*\*\* | 0.045 | 0.038 | 0.013 | 0.084 |
|  | (2.59) | (1.54) | (2.18) | (0.66) | (-3.69) | (1.54) | (1.24) | (0.45) | (0.70) |
| PR | -0.050 | -0.039 | -0.039 | -0.11\* | 0.089 | -0.052 | -0.074\* | -0.12\*\*\* | -0.045 |
|  | (-1.44) | (-1.08) | (-1.03) | (-2.47) | (1.46) | (-1.70) | (-2.16) | (-3.55) | (-0.32) |
| Mixed | -0.27\*\*\* | -0.24\*\*\* | -0.26\*\*\* | -0.20\*\*\* | -0.16\*\* | -0.22\*\*\* | -0.30\*\*\* | -0.29\*\*\* | -0.27 |
|  | (-6.93) | (-5.95) | (-6.16) | (-4.77) | (-2.68) | (-6.50) | (-7.79) | (-7.64) | (-1.70) |
| Urbaniz |  |  |  | -3.6e-09\*\*\* |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | (-6.16) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Openness |  |  |  | 0.00080 |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | (0.42) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Income ineq. |  |  |  | -0.0031\* |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | (-2.29) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Fam. farms |  |  |  | 0.0071\*\*\* |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | (5.66) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Union Dens. |  |  |  |  | 0.00068 |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.63) |  |  |  |  |
| Left |  |  |  |  | 0.18\*\*\* |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | (5.61) |  |  |  |  |
| Inter-st. war |  |  |  |  |  | -0.094\*\* |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | (-2.87) |  |  |  |
| Civil war |  |  |  |  |  | -0.16\*\*\* |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | (-4.65) |  |  |  |
| Corruption |  |  |  |  |  | -1.89\*\*\* |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | (-17.69) |  |  |  |
| Imp. Admin. |  |  |  |  |  | 0.081\*\*\* |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | (4.95) |  |  |  |
| Female parti. |  |  |  |  |  | 1.30\*\*\* |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | (18.75) |  |  |  |
| Civil society |  |  |  |  |  | -0.058 |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | (-0.72) |  |  |  |
| Party linkages |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.33\*\*\* |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (20.27) |  |
| Country Dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No |
| Year Dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 7137 | 6975 | 6732 | 4208 | 1635 | 6116 | 7093 | 7125 | 7137 |

T-values (in parentheses) calculated with panel corrected standard errors. \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001

Table A22. Party institutionalization on coverage of major risks (Encompassingness, from SPAW) including one control at a time

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) | (13) |
| Party Instit. | 0.42\*\*\* | 0.43\*\*\* | 0.42\*\*\* | 0.16\* | 0.44\*\*\* | 1.20\*\*\* | 0.67\*\*\* | 0.41\*\*\* | 0.45\*\*\* | 0.42\*\*\* | 0.39\*\*\* | 0.47\*\*\* | 0.41\*\*\* |
|  | (5.85) | (5.83) | (5.91) | (2.23) | (6.05) | (7.25) | (5.28) | (5.63) | (6.28) | (5.69) | (5.50) | (6.19) | (5.68) |
| Polyarchy | -0.44\*\*\* | -0.44\*\*\* | -0.42\*\*\* | -0.30\*\*\* | -0.44\*\*\* | -0.35\*\* | -0.71\*\*\* | -0.44\*\*\* | -0.46\*\*\* | -0.44\*\*\* | -0.66\*\*\* | -0.30\*\*\* | -0.52\*\*\* |
|  | (-6.30) | (-6.24) | (-6.03) | (-4.74) | (-6.28) | (-2.81) | (-7.06) | (-6.11) | (-6.50) | (-5.99) | (-8.14) | (-3.77) | (-5.56) |
| Pop. | 1.17\*\*\* | 1.22\*\*\* | 1.20\*\*\* | 0.60\*\*\* | 1.17\*\*\* | 1.00\*\*\* | 1.18\*\*\* | 1.23\*\*\* | 1.19\*\*\* | 1.17\*\*\* | 1.19\*\*\* | 1.14\*\*\* | 1.16\*\*\* |
|  | (26.99) | (27.39) | (27.20) | (11.55) | (26.48) | (11.53) | (20.32) | (27.42) | (27.49) | (26.98) | (27.23) | (25.54) | (27.00) |
| GDP | 0.18\*\*\* | 0.23\*\*\* | 0.23\*\*\* | 0.32\*\*\* | 0.18\*\*\* | 0.11 | -0.37\*\*\* | 0.21\*\*\* | 0.20\*\*\* | 0.18\*\*\* | 0.16\*\*\* | 0.12\*\* | 0.18\*\*\* |
|  | (4.98) | (6.02) | (6.25) | (7.17) | (4.67) | (1.66) | (-5.40) | (5.30) | (5.47) | (4.94) | (4.33) | (2.96) | (5.00) |
| PR | 0.55\*\*\* | 0.54\*\*\* | 0.52\*\*\* | 0.23\*\*\* | 0.57\*\*\* | 0.45\*\*\* | 0.75\*\*\* | 0.55\*\*\* | 0.55\*\*\* | 0.55\*\*\* | 0.56\*\*\* | 0.52\*\*\* | 0.55\*\*\* |
|  | (16.22) | (15.64) | (15.52) | (5.51) | (16.38) | (7.00) | (14.32) | (16.12) | (16.24) | (16.25) | (16.55) | (13.47) | (15.63) |
| Mixed | 0.52\*\*\* | 0.52\*\*\* | 0.49\*\*\* | 0.21\*\*\* | 0.52\*\*\* | 0.42\*\*\* | 0.46\*\*\* | 0.54\*\*\* | 0.50\*\*\* | 0.52\*\*\* | 0.53\*\*\* | 0.45\*\*\* | 0.52\*\*\* |
|  | (11.37) | (11.41) | (11.35) | (3.55) | (11.12) | (6.36) | (7.15) | (11.41) | (11.46) | (11.41) | (11.47) | (9.24) | (11.23) |
| Urban |  | -3.7\*\*\* |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | (-6.61) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Openness |  |  | -0.0046\* |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | (-2.28) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Inc. ineq. |  |  |  | 0.014\*\*\* |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | (9.08) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Fam. farms |  |  |  |  | 0.0013 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | (1.40) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Union den. |  |  |  |  |  | 0.0048\*\*\* |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | (5.04) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Left executive |  |  |  |  |  |  | -0.092\*\* |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (-2.73) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Inter-state war. |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | -0.093\* |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (-2.33) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Civil war |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | -0.088\* |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (-2.21) |  |  |  |  |
| Corruption |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.0028 |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (0.03) |  |  |  |
| Imp. Admin. |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.078\*\*\* |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (5.13) |  |  |
| Women pol. |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | -0.72\*\*\* |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (-8.10) |  |
| Civil society |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.11 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (1.31) |
| Country FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 6154 | 6003 | 6052 | 3860 | 6051 | 1832 | 2449 | 5852 | 6140 | 6154 | 6154 | 5553 | 6154 |

T-values (in parentheses) calculated with panel corrected standard errors. \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001

Table A23. Party institutionalization and universalism (v2dlunivl, from V-Dem) including one control at a time.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) | (13) |
| Party Instit. | 1.30\*\*\* | 1.29\*\*\* | 1.32\*\*\* | 1.24\*\*\* | 1.25\*\*\* | 1.51\*\*\* | 1.35\*\*\* | 1.32\*\*\* | 1.30\*\*\* | 1.12\*\*\* | 1.25\*\*\* | 1.33\*\*\* | 1.31\*\*\* |
|  | (16.23) | (15.95) | (16.28) | (11.66) | (15.32) | (7.50) | (11.07) | (15.95) | (16.28) | (14.76) | (16.19) | (17.84) | (16.55) |
| Polyarchy | 0.35\*\*\* | 0.40\*\*\* | 0.33\*\*\* | 0.53\*\*\* | 0.43\*\*\* | 1.24\*\*\* | 1.37\*\*\* | 0.37\*\*\* | 0.33\*\*\* | 0.049 | -0.22\*\* | -0.074 | 0.43\*\*\* |
|  | (5.42) | (6.18) | (5.03) | (7.64) | (6.65) | (9.38) | (16.79) | (5.57) | (5.10) | (0.74) | (-2.84) | (-1.07) | (5.08) |
| Pop. | 0.10\* | 0.12\*\* | 0.11\*\* | 0.67\*\*\* | 0.090\* | -0.31\*\*\* | -0.66\*\*\* | 0.11\*\* | 0.11\* | 0.11\*\* | 0.14\*\*\* | 0.25\*\*\* | 0.11\*\* |
|  | (2.53) | (2.92) | (2.63) | (11.65) | (2.16) | (-4.32) | (-12.99) | (2.59) | (2.57) | (2.76) | (3.30) | (6.71) | (2.67) |
| GDP | 0.28\*\*\* | 0.30\*\*\* | 0.30\*\*\* | 0.38\*\*\* | 0.30\*\*\* | 0.64\*\*\* | 0.31\*\*\* | 0.29\*\*\* | 0.27\*\*\* | 0.23\*\*\* | 0.21\*\*\* | 0.29\*\*\* | 0.28\*\*\* |
|  | (9.74) | (10.46) | (9.76) | (12.71) | (9.66) | (11.19) | (5.67) | (9.43) | (9.18) | (7.96) | (7.40) | (9.97) | (9.67) |
| PR | 0.10\*\* | 0.094\* | 0.075 | -0.16\*\*\* | 0.068 | 0.53\*\*\* | 0.48\*\*\* | 0.093\* | 0.10\*\* | 0.10\*\* | 0.12\*\* | 0.11\*\* | 0.11\*\* |
|  | (2.65) | (2.47) | (1.93) | (-3.34) | (1.78) | (9.21) | (10.61) | (2.43) | (2.76) | (2.86) | (3.19) | (3.02) | (2.81) |
| Mixed | -0.14\*\*\* | -0.14\*\*\* | -0.16\*\*\* | -0.22\*\*\* | -0.15\*\*\* | 0.15\* | 0.41\*\*\* | -0.15\*\*\* | -0.14\*\*\* | -0.10\*\* | -0.14\*\*\* | -0.070\* | -0.14\*\*\* |
|  | (-3.80) | (-3.78) | (-4.02) | (-5.28) | (-4.01) | (2.20) | (8.00) | (-3.83) | (-3.78) | (-2.89) | (-3.53) | (-2.00) | (-3.66) |
| Urban |  | -2.9e-09\*\*\* |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | (-6.35) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Openness |  |  | -0.0029\* |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | (-1.97) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Inc. ineq. |  |  |  | -0.0037\*\* |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | (-2.67) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Fam. farms |  |  |  |  | 0.0029\*\*\* |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | (3.48) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Union den. |  |  |  |  |  | 0.0085\*\*\* |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | (8.18) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Left executive |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.13\*\*\* |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (4.97) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Inter-state war. |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | -0.040 |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (-1.13) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Civil war |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | -0.21\*\*\* |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (-6.02) |  |  |  |  |
| Corruption |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | -1.53\*\*\* |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (-15.34) |  |  |  |
| Imp. Admin. |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.21\*\*\* |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (14.80) |  |  |
| Women pol. |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 2.02\*\*\* |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (27.29) |  |
| Civil society |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | -0.11 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (-1.27) |
| Country FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 7137 | 6986 | 6987 | 4447 | 6981 | 1994 | 2604 | 6779 | 7122 | 7137 | 7137 | 6435 | 7137 |

T-values (in parentheses) calculated with panel corrected standard errors. \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001

Table A24. Party institutionalization and universalism (Universalism Index; SPAW) including one control at a time

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) | (13) |
| Party Instit. | 1.90\*\*\* | 1.87\*\*\* | 1.81\*\*\* | -0.42 | 2.11\*\*\* | 5.62\*\*\* | 7.02\*\*\* | 1.81\*\*\* | 2.07\*\*\* | 1.73\*\*\* | 1.74\*\*\* | 1.80\*\*\* | 2.06\*\*\* |
|  | (4.81) | (4.52) | (4.67) | (-0.99) | (5.34) | (3.34) | (8.07) | (4.45) | (5.33) | (4.43) | (4.45) | (4.12) | (5.22) |
| Polyarchy | 0.70 | 0.74 | 1.08\*\* | 0.27 | 0.60 | -2.47 | -5.79\*\*\* | 0.71 | 0.57 | 0.14 | -1.20\*\* | 0.37 | 1.66\*\* |
|  | (1.69) | (1.73) | (2.73) | (0.56) | (1.46) | (-1.92) | (-7.33) | (1.69) | (1.39) | (0.34) | (-2.60) | (0.79) | (3.04) |
| Pop. | 0.81\* | 1.00\*\* | 0.61\* | -1.37\*\* | 0.61 | 3.76\*\* | 2.06\*\*\* | 1.03\*\* | 0.87\*\* | 0.85\*\* | 0.93\*\* | 0.81\* | 0.92\*\* |
|  | (2.56) | (3.09) | (1.97) | (-2.64) | (1.92) | (3.06) | (4.69) | (3.20) | (2.75) | (2.67) | (2.94) | (2.48) | (2.86) |
| GDP | 0.40 | 0.67\*\* | 0.71\*\* | 0.89\*\*\* | 0.24 | -0.58 | -0.070 | 0.29 | 0.47\* | 0.35 | 0.16 | 0.35 | 0.41 |
|  | (1.76) | (2.86) | (3.07) | (3.43) | (0.98) | (-0.93) | (-0.11) | (1.20) | (2.12) | (1.53) | (0.69) | (1.43) | (1.79) |
| PR | 0.63\*\* | 0.51\* | 0.72\*\*\* | 0.063 | 0.72\*\*\* | 0.44 | -0.97\* | 0.61\*\* | 0.63\*\* | 0.61\*\* | 0.67\*\*\* | 0.58\*\* | 0.72\*\*\* |
|  | (3.17) | (2.51) | (3.78) | (0.24) | (3.63) | (0.70) | (-1.99) | (3.04) | (3.18) | (3.05) | (3.40) | (2.62) | (3.57) |
| Mixed | 2.13\*\*\* | 2.22\*\*\* | 2.14\*\*\* | 1.95\*\*\* | 1.93\*\*\* | -0.059 | 0.93\* | 2.30\*\*\* | 2.09\*\*\* | 2.13\*\*\* | 2.21\*\*\* | 2.07\*\*\* | 2.16\*\*\* |
|  | (7.22) | (7.42) | (8.22) | (4.64) | (6.50) | (-0.10) | (2.11) | (7.55) | (7.57) | (7.17) | (7.47) | (6.74) | (7.35) |
| Urban |  | -0.000000041\*\*\* |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | (-11.09) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Openness |  |  | -0.040\* |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | (-2.35) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Inc. ineq. |  |  |  | 0.022 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | (1.75) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Fam. farms |  |  |  |  | 0.0049 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.98) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Union den. |  |  |  |  |  | 0.065\*\*\* |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | (4.56) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Left |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.79\*\* |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (2.76) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Inter-st. war. |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | -1.16\*\*\* |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (-4.70) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Civil war |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | -0.076 |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (-0.44) |  |  |  |  |
| Corruption |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | -2.51\*\*\* |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (-4.38) |  |  |  |
| Imp. Admin. |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.72\*\*\* |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (8.68) |  |  |
| Women pol. |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.94 |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (1.59) |  |
| Civil society |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | -1.24\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (-2.83) |
| Country FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 4172 | 4049 | 4118 | 2570 | 4101 | 959 | 1339 | 3968 | 4162 | 4172 | 4172 | 3686 | 4172 |

T-values (in parentheses) calculated with panel corrected standard errors. \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001

Table A25. Party institutionalization and replacement rates for sickness insurance (from SCIP) including one control at a time

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) |
| Party Instit | 1.63\*\*\* | 1.39\*\*\* | 1.28\*\*\* | 1.46\* | 1.67\*\*\* | 1.61\*\*\* | 1.62\*\*\* | 1.44\*\*\* | 1.55\*\*\* | 1.63\*\*\* | 2.01\*\*\* |
|  | (8.03) | (6.87) | (5.95) | (2.18) | (8.12) | (8.39) | (8.06) | (5.98) | (7.85) | (8.04) | (8.18) |
| Polyarchy | -0.54\*\*\* | -0.34\* | -0.20 | -0.67\*\*\* | -0.59\*\*\* | -0.33\* | -0.53\*\*\* | -0.62\*\*\* | -0.62\*\*\* | -0.50\*\*\* | -0.41\*\* |
|  | (-3.86) | (-2.40) | (-1.26) | (-3.50) | (-4.07) | (-2.57) | (-3.83) | (-4.19) | (-4.05) | (-3.39) | (-2.89) |
| Pop. | -0.19\* | -0.050 | -0.087 | -0.34\* | -0.11 | -0.11 | -0.19\* | -0.23\*\* | -0.19\* | -0.17\* | -0.24\*\* |
|  | (-2.31) | (-0.60) | (-1.05) | (-2.16) | (-1.07) | (-1.29) | (-2.30) | (-2.72) | (-2.40) | (-2.14) | (-2.83) |
| GDP | 0.018 | 0.056 | 0.100 | 0.0011 | 0.0071 | -0.033 | 0.016 | 0.044 | 0.032 | -0.0026 | 0.012 |
|  | (0.37) | (1.20) | (1.61) | (0.01) | (0.14) | (-0.70) | (0.32) | (0.82) | (0.62) | (-0.05) | (0.24) |
| PR | 0.071 | 0.052 | 0.023 | -0.20 | 0.081 | 0.035 | 0.066 | 0.088 | 0.11 | 0.093 | 0.069 |
|  | (1.26) | (0.90) | (0.37) | (-1.77) | (1.40) | (0.65) | (1.15) | (1.38) | (1.73) | (1.49) | (1.18) |
| Mixed | 0.12 | 0.096 | 0.081 | -0.12 | 0.13\* | 0.080 | 0.12 | 0.15\* | 0.14\* | 0.14\* | 0.12 |
|  | (1.95) | (1.47) | (1.15) | (-1.17) | (2.00) | (1.35) | (1.92) | (2.16) | (2.14) | (2.07) | (1.88) |
| Urban |  | -3.4e-09\*\*\* |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | (-6.50) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Openness |  |  | -0.0082\*\*\* |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | (-5.76) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Inc. ineq. |  |  |  | -0.0012 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | (-0.63) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Fam. farms |  |  |  |  | 0.0021 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | (1.48) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Union den. |  |  |  |  |  | 0.0054\*\*\* |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | (6.36) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Left |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.019 |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (0.88) |  |  |  |  |
| Corruption |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | -0.75 |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (-1.87) |  |  |  |
| Imp. Admin. |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.042 |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (1.56) |  |  |
| Women pol. |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | -0.12 |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (-1.06) |  |
| Civil society |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | -0.60\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (-3.38) |
| Country FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 263 | 263 | 259 | 184 | 263 | 250 | 263 | 263 | 263 | 263 | 263 |

T-values (in parentheses) calculated with panel corrected standard errors. \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001

Table A26. Party institutionalization and coverage rates for sickness insurance (from SCIP) including one control at a time

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) |
| Party Instit. | 1.27\*\*\* | 1.07\*\*\* | 1.06\*\*\* | 3.64\*\*\* | 1.40\*\*\* | 1.25\*\*\* | 1.27\*\*\* | 1.26\*\*\* | 1.04\*\*\* | 1.28\*\*\* | 1.62\*\*\* |
|  | (5.40) | (4.53) | (4.21) | (4.77) | (5.82) | (5.56) | (5.42) | (4.90) | (4.88) | (5.43) | (5.70) |
| Polyarchy | -0.30\* | -0.13 | -0.12 | -0.35 | -0.43\*\* | -0.10 | -0.29\* | -0.31\* | -0.54\*\*\* | -0.25 | -0.19 |
|  | (-2.10) | (-0.87) | (-0.69) | (-1.94) | (-2.79) | (-0.81) | (-2.04) | (-2.03) | (-3.39) | (-1.73) | (-1.32) |
| Pop. | -0.041 | 0.077 | 0.0089 | 0.22 | 0.18 | 0.044 | -0.038 | -0.045 | -0.049 | -0.026 | -0.085 |
|  | (-0.38) | (0.65) | (0.08) | (1.72) | (1.63) | (0.40) | (-0.35) | (-0.39) | (-0.54) | (-0.24) | (-0.81) |
| GDP | 0.25\*\*\* | 0.28\*\*\* | 0.33\*\*\* | 0.16\* | 0.22\*\*\* | 0.24\*\*\* | 0.25\*\*\* | 0.25\*\*\* | 0.29\*\*\* | 0.23\*\*\* | 0.24\*\*\* |
|  | (4.94) | (5.79) | (4.94) | (2.34) | (4.30) | (5.09) | (4.85) | (4.86) | (5.64) | (4.22) | (4.93) |
| PR | -0.11\* | -0.13\*\* | -0.12\* | -0.059 | -0.085 | -0.14\* | -0.12\* | -0.11\* | 0.0069 | -0.087 | -0.11\* |
|  | (-2.32) | (-2.64) | (-2.53) | (-0.64) | (-1.77) | (-2.44) | (-2.51) | (-2.21) | (0.15) | (-1.64) | (-2.56) |
| Mixed | -0.025 | -0.049 | -0.034 | 0.012 | -0.011 | -0.047 | -0.026 | -0.022 | 0.035 | -0.0068 | -0.027 |
|  | (-0.42) | (-0.81) | (-0.57) | (0.15) | (-0.20) | (-0.70) | (-0.44) | (-0.38) | (0.66) | (-0.11) | (-0.50) |
| Urban |  | -2.9e-09\*\*\* |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | (-5.82) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Openness |  |  | -0.0039\*\* |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | (-2.90) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Inc. ineq. |  |  |  | -0.0030\* |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | (-2.13) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Fam. farms |  |  |  |  | 0.0057\*\*\* |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | (4.94) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Union den. |  |  |  |  |  | 0.0050\*\*\* |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | (4.58) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Left |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.038 |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (1.88) |  |  |  |  |
| Corruption |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | -0.062 |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (-0.18) |  |  |  |
| Imp. Admin. |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.13\*\*\* |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (4.13) |  |  |
| Women pol. |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | -0.13 |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (-1.20) |  |
| Civil society |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | -0.55\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (-2.95) |
| Country FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 267 | 267 | 263 | 188 | 267 | 254 | 267 | 267 | 267 | 267 | 267 |

T-values (in parentheses) calculated with panel corrected standard errors. \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001

Table A27. Party institutionalization and social expenditures as share of GDP (from CPDS) including one control at a time

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) |
| Party Instit. | 3.69 | 3.67 | 3.99 | 4.14 | 3.64 | -2.80 | 4.50\* | -4.26 | 5.84\*\* | 4.51\* | -0.27 |
|  | (1.79) | (1.78) | (1.95) | (1.74) | (1.77) | (-0.77) | (1.98) | (-1.70) | (2.74) | (2.26) | (-0.12) |
| Polyarchy | 1.61 | 1.62 | 1.54 | 0.96 | 1.76 | 4.68\*\* | 1.32 | 1.17 | 2.55\* | 3.80\*\* | -1.79 |
|  | (1.36) | (1.36) | (1.33) | (0.71) | (1.46) | (2.81) | (0.98) | (1.01) | (2.12) | (2.82) | (-1.26) |
| Pop. | -4.43\*\*\* | -4.41\*\*\* | -4.20\*\*\* | -4.36\*\*\* | -4.50\*\*\* | -4.11\*\*\* | -10.5\*\*\* | -5.29\*\*\* | -3.85\*\*\* | -3.46\*\*\* | -4.35\*\*\* |
|  | (-5.39) | (-5.24) | (-5.38) | (-5.13) | (-5.22) | (-4.61) | (-9.91) | (-6.18) | (-4.79) | (-4.68) | (-5.30) |
| GDP | 0.88 | 0.88 | 0.98 | -0.78 | 1.10 | 0.87 | -0.52 | 1.50 | 0.62 | 0.34 | -0.46 |
|  | (1.06) | (1.06) | (1.18) | (-0.77) | (1.26) | (1.04) | (-0.59) | (1.80) | (0.76) | (0.41) | (-0.52) |
| PR | -1.29\* | -1.29\* | -1.71\*\* | -2.79\*\*\* | -1.36\* | -0.045 | -0.66 | -2.25\*\*\* | -1.80\*\* | -1.24\* | -1.06 |
|  | (-2.17) | (-2.17) | (-2.80) | (-3.71) | (-2.31) | (-0.06) | (-1.15) | (-4.04) | (-2.88) | (-2.01) | (-1.84) |
| Mixed | -1.70\*\* | -1.70\*\* | -1.93\*\*\* | -2.78\*\*\* | -1.74\*\*\* | -0.82 | -1.35\*\* | -1.85\*\*\* | -1.82\*\*\* | -1.44\*\* | -2.20\*\*\* |
|  | (-3.26) | (-3.23) | (-3.55) | (-4.33) | (-3.38) | (-1.40) | (-2.73) | (-3.53) | (-3.36) | (-2.74) | (-4.11) |
| Urban |  | -1.1e-09 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | (-0.21) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Openness |  |  | -0.034\*\*\* |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | (-3.65) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Inc. ineq. |  |  |  | -0.030\* |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | (-2.41) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Fam. farms |  |  |  |  | -0.013 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | (-1.01) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Union den. |  |  |  |  |  | 0.044\*\*\* |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | (4.78) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Left |  |  |  |  |  |  | -0.38\* |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (-2.32) |  |  |  |  |
| Corruption |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | -19.4\*\*\* |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (-6.79) |  |  |  |
| Imp. Admin. |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | -0.91\*\*\* |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (-4.00) |  |  |
| Women pol. |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | -3.96\*\*\* |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (-4.37) |  |
| Civil society |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 7.28\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (4.02) |
| Country FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 781 | 781 | 781 | 741 | 781 | 737 | 739 | 781 | 781 | 775 | 781 |

T-values (in parentheses) calculated with panel corrected standard errors. \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001

Table A28. Party institutionalization and Public Goods (v2dlencmps from V-Dem) including one control at a time

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) | (13) |
| Party system | 1.26\*\*\* | 1.25\*\*\* | 1.27\*\*\* | 1.08\*\*\* | 1.24\*\*\* | 0.92\*\*\* | 1.29\*\*\* | 1.29\*\*\* | 1.26\*\*\* | 0.95\*\*\* | 1.20\*\*\* | 1.20\*\*\* | 1.27\*\*\* |
|  | (16.51) | (16.20) | (16.44) | (11.75) | (16.16) | (5.43) | (12.11) | (16.35) | (16.48) | (14.10) | (16.71) | (16.69) | (16.64) |
| Polyarchy | 0.57\*\*\* | 0.59\*\*\* | 0.58\*\*\* | 0.88\*\*\* | 0.67\*\*\* | 1.22\*\*\* | 0.76\*\*\* | 0.53\*\*\* | 0.55\*\*\* | 0.034 | -0.18\* | 0.31\*\*\* | 0.61\*\*\* |
|  | (8.96) | (9.24) | (9.01) | (12.76) | (10.78) | (10.14) | (9.46) | (8.20) | (8.65) | (0.55) | (-2.40) | (4.42) | (7.35) |
| Pop. | 0.16\*\*\* | 0.19\*\*\* | 0.19\*\*\* | 0.34\*\*\* | 0.13\*\* | -0.078 | -0.13\* | 0.20\*\*\* | 0.16\*\*\* | 0.18\*\*\* | 0.21\*\*\* | 0.31\*\*\* | 0.17\*\*\* |
|  | (4.05) | (4.61) | (4.54) | (5.50) | (3.28) | (-0.96) | (-2.26) | (4.73) | (4.02) | (4.69) | (5.07) | (8.04) | (4.09) |
| GDP | 0.081\*\* | 0.091\*\* | 0.10\*\* | 0.051 | 0.0088 | 0.016 | -0.047 | 0.097\*\* | 0.062\* | -0.015 | -0.0053 | 0.12\*\*\* | 0.080\* |
|  | (2.59) | (2.88) | (3.13) | (1.33) | (0.27) | (0.27) | (-0.84) | (2.95) | (1.96) | (-0.52) | (-0.18) | (3.92) | (2.55) |
| PR | -0.050 | -0.054 | -0.095\*\* | -0.021 | -0.071\* | 0.12\* | 0.26\*\*\* | -0.062 | -0.046 | -0.047 | -0.028 | -0.083\* | -0.046 |
|  | (-1.44) | (-1.56) | (-2.68) | (-0.45) | (-2.02) | (2.15) | (6.46) | (-1.78) | (-1.34) | (-1.58) | (-0.86) | (-2.48) | (-1.32) |
| Mixed | -0.27\*\*\* | -0.28\*\*\* | -0.30\*\*\* | -0.076 | -0.30\*\*\* | -0.26\*\*\* | -0.087 | -0.30\*\*\* | -0.27\*\*\* | -0.20\*\*\* | -0.26\*\*\* | -0.23\*\*\* | -0.27\*\*\* |
|  | (-6.93) | (-7.13) | (-7.65) | (-1.82) | (-7.69) | (-4.90) | (-1.91) | (-7.49) | (-6.87) | (-6.02) | (-6.72) | (-6.46) | (-6.87) |
| Urban |  | -1.3e-09\* |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | (-2.45) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Openness |  |  | -0.0022 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | (-1.49) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Inc, ineq. |  |  |  | -0.0051\*\*\* |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | (-3.83) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Fam. farms |  |  |  |  | -0.0031\*\*\* |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | (-3.68) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Union den. |  |  |  |  |  | 0.00065 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | (0.67) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Left |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.20\*\*\* |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (7.46) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Inter-state war. |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | -0.088\* |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (-2.56) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Civil war |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | -0.19\*\*\* |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (-5.12) |  |  |  |  |
| Corruption |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | -2.74\*\*\* |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (-29.45) |  |  |  |
| Imp. Admin. |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.28\*\*\* |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (19.09) |  |  |
| Women pol. |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1.81\*\*\* |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (25.12) |  |
| Civil society |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | -0.058 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (-0.68) |
| Country FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 7137 | 6986 | 6987 | 4447 | 6981 | 1994 | 2604 | 6779 | 7122 | 7137 | 7137 | 6435 | 7137 |

T-values (in parentheses) calculated with panel corrected standard errors. \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001

## Appendix A7: Replicating core heterogeneity tests (from Table 4 in paper) for alternative welfare measures

Table A29. Party institutionalization on coverage of major welfare risks (Encompassingness; SPAW)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Sample: | Autocratic | Democratic | Western countries | Non-western countries | Low rural inequality | High rural inequality |
| Party Institut. | 0.0088 | 1.40\*\*\* | 1.39\*\*\* | 0.28\*\*\* | 0.86\*\*\* | 0.052 |
|  | (0.10) | (7.65) | (6.81) | (3.69) | (7.87) | (0.51) |
| Population (ln) | 0.65\*\*\* | 1.19\*\*\* | 1.11\*\*\* | 0.61\*\*\* | 1.03\*\*\* | 0.57\*\*\* |
|  | (7.43) | (16.71) | (8.91) | (10.79) | (13.70) | (6.33) |
| GDP p.c. (ln) | -0.074 | -0.18\* | 0.16 | 0.20\*\*\* | 0.53\*\*\* | -0.24\*\* |
|  | (-1.80) | (-2.50) | (1.55) | (5.06) | (10.91) | (-3.18) |
| PR | 0.41\*\*\* | 0.87\*\*\* | 0.52\*\*\* | 0.51\*\*\* | 0.21\*\*\* | 0.73\*\*\* |
|  | (8.81) | (12.26) | (7.05) | (13.45) | (5.00) | (15.44) |
| Mixed | 0.54\*\*\* | 0.60\*\*\* | 0.63\*\*\* | 0.43\*\*\* | 0.11 | 0.62\*\*\* |
|  | (9.00) | (5.05) | (6.12) | (8.66) | (1.88) | (9.30) |
| Polyarchy |  |  | -1.26\*\*\* | -0.19\* | -0.42\*\*\* | -0.48\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (-7.91) | (-2.48) | (-4.86) | (-4.57) |
| Country Dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year Dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 3378 | 2767 | 1558 | 4596 | 3596 | 2474 |

T-values (in parentheses) calculated with panel corrected standard errors. \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001

Table A30. Testing for heterogeneity: Party institutionalization and SPAW Universalism Index

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Sample: | Autocratic | Democratic | Western countries | Non-western countries | Low rural inequality | High rural inequality |
| Party Institut. | 1.07\*\* | 1.28 | 6.97\*\*\* | 1.57\*\*\* | 2.29\*\*\* | 3.59\*\*\* |
|  | (2.66) | (0.85) | (3.66) | (3.78) | (4.19) | (5.91) |
| Population (ln) | 1.53\*\*\* | 3.19\*\*\* | 1.62 | 0.98\*\* | 0.90 | -2.50\*\*\* |
|  | (3.34) | (4.85) | (1.25) | (2.63) | (1.38) | (-4.35) |
| GDP p.c. (ln) | -0.0037 | 1.92\*\* | 4.84\*\*\* | 0.072 | 2.11\*\*\* | -2.65\*\*\* |
|  | (-0.02) | (2.71) | (4.51) | (0.31) | (8.00) | (-5.42) |
| PR | 0.40\* | -0.039 | -1.75\* | 0.69\*\*\* | 1.09\*\*\* | 0.44 |
|  | (1.96) | (-0.07) | (-2.30) | (3.33) | (3.56) | (1.52) |
| Mixed | 2.22\*\*\* | 1.14 | -1.76 | 2.59\*\*\* | 0.58 | 1.66\*\*\* |
|  | (6.47) | (1.26) | (-1.95) | (8.09) | (1.13) | (3.47) |
| Polyarchy |  |  | -6.88\*\*\* | 1.89\*\*\* | -0.85 | 0.084 |
|  |  |  | (-4.34) | (4.26) | (-1.43) | (0.13) |
| Country Dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year Dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 2524 | 1646 | 820 | 3352 | 2245 | 1855 |

T-values (in parentheses) calculated with panel corrected standard errors. \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001

Table A31. Testing for heterogeneity: Party institutionalization and Public Goods (v2dlencmps; V-Dem)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Sample: | Autocratic | Democratic | Western countries | Non-western countries | Low rural inequality | High rural inequality |
| Party Institut. | 1.12\*\*\* | 1.68\*\*\* | 1.19\*\*\* | 1.17\*\*\* | 1.53\*\*\* | 1.32\*\*\* |
|  | (11.19) | (12.88) | (7.98) | (13.94) | (15.35) | (11.33) |
| Population (ln) | -0.015 | -0.33\*\*\* | -0.44\*\*\* | 0.41\*\*\* | 0.012 | 0.12 |
|  | (-0.18) | (-6.21) | (-4.82) | (6.99) | (0.21) | (1.34) |
| GDP p.c. (ln) | -0.070 | 0.095\* | 0.36\*\*\* | 0.028 | 0.17\*\*\* | -0.0049 |
|  | (-1.68) | (2.06) | (4.33) | (0.83) | (4.41) | (-0.08) |
| PR | -0.059 | 0.068 | -0.073 | -0.13\*\* | -0.20\*\*\* | -0.045 |
|  | (-1.21) | (1.51) | (-1.46) | (-3.06) | (-4.31) | (-0.91) |
| Mixed | -0.15\*\* | -0.086 | -0.19\*\* | -0.25\*\*\* | -0.12\* | -0.54\*\*\* |
|  | (-2.70) | (-1.67) | (-3.06) | (-5.57) | (-2.18) | (-9.37) |
| Polyarchy |  |  | 1.24\*\*\* | 0.37\*\*\* | 0.76\*\*\* | 0.16 |
|  |  |  | (10.32) | (4.98) | (8.53) | (1.61) |
| Country Dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year Dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 3981 | 3137 | 1718 | 5419 | 4167 | 2885 |

T-values (in parentheses) calculated with panel corrected standard errors. \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001

## Appendix A8: Tests using alternative PI measure, omitting party linkages indicator

Table A32. Version of Party Institutionalization calculated without v2psprlnks regressed on various welfare measures

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | SPAW | | | V-Dem | | | SPAW | SCIP | | ILO |
|  | Encompassingness | | | Universalism | | | Universalism | RR | Coverage | Social Exp, |
| Level/Change | L | L | C | L | L | C | L | L | L | L |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) |
| PI reduced | 0.10\*\*\* | 0.090\*\*\* | 0.018\* | 0.24\*\*\* | 0.30\*\*\* | 0.043\*\*\* | 0.41\*\*\* | 0.30\*\*\* | 0.26\*\*\* | 0.29 |
| (- v2psprlnks) | (7.33) | (5.98) | (2.44) | (28.77) | (17.32) | (7.40) | (5.07) | (5.74) | (4.38) | (0.76) |
| PR |  | -0.43\*\*\* | -0.0066 |  | 0.36\*\*\* | 0.012 | 0.91\* | -0.40\*\* | -0.24 | 2.56\* |
|  |  | (-6.08) | (-0.21) |  | (5.39) | (0.50) | (2.28) | (-2.80) | (-1.59) | (2.23) |
| Mixed el. sys. |  | 1.19\*\*\* | 0.23\*\*\* |  | 0.15\*\*\* | -0.0058 | 0.86\*\* | -0.17\* | -0.032 | -4.37\*\*\* |
|  |  | (27.29) | (9.93) |  | (3.73) | (-0.43) | (2.70) | (-2.09) | (-0.29) | (-5.35) |
| Polyarchy |  | 0.17\*\*\* | 0.058\*\*\* |  | 0.24\*\*\* | 0.0012 | 0.40 | 0.0046 | 0.24\*\*\* | 1.12 |
|  |  | (4.72) | (3.46) |  | (8.31) | (0.12) | (1.77) | (0.09) | (4.36) | (1.35) |
| Pop. (ln) |  | 0.56\*\*\* | 0.071\*\*\* |  | 0.12\*\* | 0.044\*\*\* | 0.67\*\*\* | 0.18\*\* | -0.020 | -0.95 |
|  |  | (16.13) | (4.14) |  | (3.10) | (3.52) | (3.34) | (2.66) | (-0.43) | (-1.63) |
| GDP p.c. (ln) |  | 0.52\*\*\* | 0.040\* |  | -0.15\*\*\* | -0.0079 | 2.09\*\*\* | 0.15\* | 0.0083 | -1.53\*\* |
|  |  | (11.29) | (1.97) |  | (-4.00) | (-0.60) | (7.10) | (2.15) | (0.13) | (-2.89) |
| Dep. Var.t-1 |  |  | -0.17\*\*\* |  |  | -0.085\*\*\* |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | (-17.40) |  |  | (-14.18) |  |  |  |  |
| Country FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 9004 | 6110 | 6065 | 16218 | 7093 | 7080 | 4152 | 263 | 267 | 781 |

T-values (in parentheses) calculated with panel corrected standard errors. \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001

## Appendix A9: Placebo tests

Table A33. Placebo tests on v2dlunivl (from V-Dem)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Dep var. | Military Expenditure  (% of GDP) | | | Expenditures for Public Order (% of GDP) | | |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Party Institut. | -1.01\*\* | 0.16 | 0.13 | -0.0051\* | -0.0015 | 0.00034 |
|  | (-2.81) | (0.39) | (0.50) | (-2.38) | (-0.63) | (0.17) |
| Polyarchy |  | -1.62\*\*\* | -0.19 |  | -0.0023 | -0.0015 |
|  |  | (-5.80) | (-0.82) |  | (-0.94) | (-0.67) |
| Population |  | -0.013 | 0.11 |  | -0.0093\*\* | -0.00023 |
|  |  | (-0.04) | (0.43) |  | (-2.70) | (-0.08) |
| GDP |  | 0.25 | 0.42 |  | -0.0039\*\*\* | -0.00090 |
|  |  | (0.68) | (1.45) |  | (-4.35) | (-1.24) |
| PR |  | -0.089 | -0.34\* |  | 0.0026\*\* | 0.00039 |
|  |  | (-0.37) | (-2.25) |  | (2.74) | (0.46) |
| Mixed |  | 0.17 | -0.078 |  | 0.0023 | 0.00017 |
|  |  | (1.35) | (-0.81) |  | (1.55) | (0.16) |
| Lvd |  |  | -0.37\*\*\* |  |  | -0.37\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (-4.26) |  |  | (-8.23) |
| Country FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 3028 | 1919 | 1763 | 854 | 721 | 623 |

T-values (in parentheses) calculated with panel corrected standard errors. \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001

## Appendix A10: Additional tests for heterogeneity

Table A34. Party institutionalization and universalism (v2dlunivl from V-Dem), split sample according to income inequality Gini coefficients.

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) |
|  | High Inequality | Low  Inequality |
| Party institutionalization | 1.21\*\*\* | 1.99\*\*\* |
|  | (14.63) | (11.78) |
| Population | 0.37\*\*\* | 0.20\* |
|  | (4.85) | (2.19) |
| GDP | 0.13\* | 1.07\*\*\* |
|  | (2.06) | (13.88) |
| PR | 0.11\*\* | 0.68\*\*\* |
|  | (2.86) | (14.16) |
| Mixed | 0.070 | -0.30\*\*\* |
|  | (1.82) | (-4.69) |
| Country FE | Yes | Yes |
| Year FE | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 4893 | 2235 |

T-values (in parentheses) calculated with panel corrected standard errors. \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001

Table A35. Party institutionalization and universalism (v2dlunivl: V-Dem). Interaction specifications.

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) |
|  | Rural inequality | Income inequality | Western vs other countries |
| Party inst. | 1.97\*\*\* | 1.39\*\* | 0.89\*\*\* |
|  | (8.09) | (2.79) | (6.09) |
| Fam. Farms | 0.0042 |  |  |
|  | (1.41) |  |  |
| Party inst.\*Fam. farms | 0.0014 |  |  |
|  | (0.33) |  |  |
| Income ineq. |  | -0.034\*\* |  |
|  |  | (-2.70) |  |
| Party inst.\*Income ineq. |  | 0.018 |  |
|  |  | (1.18) |  |
| West |  |  | -6.97\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (-27.87) |
| Western dummy\*Party inst. |  |  | 4.39\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (20.91) |
| Country Dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year Dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 2199 | 2235 | 2235 |

T-values (in parentheses) calculated with panel corrected standard errors. Constant, year- and country-fixed effects, and controls (GDP [Log], population [Log], Polyarchy index, electoral system dummies) omitted from table. \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001

Table A36. Party institutionalization on universalism (v2dlunivl from V-Dem), omitting regions from sample

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) |
| Region excluded | All included | East. Europe | Lat. Amer. | MENA | Sub-Sa. Africa. | West | East. Asia | South-East  Asia | South  Asia | Pacific | Caribbean |
| Party instit. | 1.30\*\*\* | 0.96\*\*\* | 1.75\*\*\* | 1.38\*\*\* | 1.40\*\*\* | 0.98\*\*\* | 1.31\*\*\* | 1.22\*\*\* | 1.39\*\*\* | 1.30\*\*\* | 1.29\*\*\* |
|  | (16.23) | (12.30) | (19.50) | (16.08) | (14.21) | (11.94) | (16.22) | (14.98) | (17.01) | (16.23) | (16.10) |
| Country FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 7137 | 6394 | 5739 | 6497 | 5490 | 5419 | 6913 | 6766 | 6859 | 7137 | 7019 |


T-values calculated with panel corrected standard errors. Constant, fixed time, country effects and controls (GDP [Log], population [Log] electoral rules, and Polyarchy) excluded. \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001

Table A37. Party institutionalization on various welfare state measures, with sample restricted to Latin American countries

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | V-Dem universalism | | SPAW encompassingness | | SPAW universalism | |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Party instit. | 0.82\*\*\* | 0.21 | 0.20\* | 0.32\*\* | 1.29\*\* | 4.80\*\*\* |
|  | (7.71) | (1.43) | (2.01) | (2.61) | (2.64) | (5.82) |
| Polyarchy |  | 0.46\*\* |  | -0.30\*\* |  | -0.070 |
|  |  | (3.29) |  | (-2.58) |  | (-0.09) |
| Population |  | 0.80\*\*\* |  | -0.17 |  | -1.19 |
|  |  | (6.51) |  | (-1.45) |  | (-1.28) |
| GDP |  | -0.87\*\*\* |  | -0.46\*\*\* |  | -4.12\*\*\* |
|  |  | (-7.77) |  | (-5.48) |  | (-6.47) |
| PR |  | 0.49\*\*\* |  | 0.74\*\*\* |  | 0.0027 |
|  |  | (6.03) |  | (12.88) |  | (0.01) |
| Mixed |  | 0.37\*\*\* |  | 0.36\*\*\* |  | 2.66\*\*\* |
|  |  | (4.45) |  | (5.35) |  | (6.88) |
| Country Dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year Dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 2159 | 1398 | 1838 | 1257 | 1377 | 999 |

T-values calculated with panel corrected standard errors. \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001

## Appendix A11: General Sensitivity Analysis



## Appendix A12: Left Ideology and PI

**Table A38 The effect of party institutionalization conditioned by ideology and labor market organization on Universalism)**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| PI | 3.65\*\*\* | 1.38\*\*\* | 1.86\*\*\* |
|  | (5.72) | (11.28) | (8.21) |
| Left Cabinet | -0.011 |  |  |
|  | (-1.23) |  |  |
| PI\*Left Cabinet | 0.012 |  |  |
|  | (1.27) |  |  |
| Left Executive |  | 0.38\*\* |  |
|  |  | (3.02) |  |
| PI\*Left Executive |  | -0.30\* |  |
|  |  | (-2.04) |  |
| Union Density |  |  | 0.023\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (5.78) |
| Party System # Union Density |  |  | -0.019\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (-4.01) |
| Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Country Dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year Dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 792 | 2604 | 1994 |

t statistics in parentheses. T-values calculated with panel corrected standard errors. Constant, fixed time, country effects and controls (Polyarchy index, Electoral rules, GDP [Log] and population [Log]) excluded.\* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001

## Appendix A13: Polyarchy and Cummulative measurment

**Table A39 The effect of party institutionalization on welfare state Universalism**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) |
| Dep var. | levels | Change |
| PI | 1.37\*\*\* | 0.20\*\*\* |
|  | (17.36) | (7.76) |
| Polyarchy (cumulative) | -0.017\*\*\* | -0.0016\*\* |
|  | (-9.21) | (-2.73) |
| Controls | Yes | Yes |
| Country Dummies | Yes | Yes |
| Year Dummies | Yes | Yes |
| LDV | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 7174 | 7160 |

t statistics in parentheses. T-values calculated with panel corrected standard errors. Constant, fixed time, country effects and controls (Polyarchy index, Electoral rules, GDP [Log] and population [Log]) excluded.\* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001