The Political Legacy of Violence during China's Cultural Revolution Online Appendix

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Section I The China Survey

The China Survey is a project carried out by the College of Liberal Arts at Texas A&M University in collaboration with the Research Center for Contemporary China at Peking University in 2008. It is based on a stratified multi-stage probability sample of all Chinese adults, which was drawn using GPS/GIS Assistant Area Sampling (see Landry and Shen 2005). A total of 5,525 target respondents were selected from 59 prefectures. The end result was a national probability sample of 3,989 individuals aged 18 or over, drawn from 59 prefectural-level administrative regions, representing a response rate of 72.2%. To adjust for survey design effects, each primary sampling unit is treated as a cluster. Data are weighted in terms of strata, age and gender, based on the 2000 Census data.

Table 1.1: Distribution of the Outcome Variables

Trust in Central Leaders	Frequency	Percent
1. Do Not Trust at All	68	3.53
2. Do Not Trust Very Much	171	8.89
3. Trust Somewhat	738	38.36
4. Trust Very Much	947	49.22
Total	1,924	100

Democracy	Frequency	Percent
0	199	11.3
1	165	9.37
2	207	11.75
3	174	9.88
4	152	8.63
5	380	21.58
6	147	8.35
7	116	6.59
8	108	6.13
9	43	2.44
10	70	3.98
Total	1,761	100

Freedom of Expression	pression Frequency		
0	425	22.08	
1	245	12.73	
2	276	14.34	
3	172	8.94	
4	129	6.7	
5	311	16.16	
6	104	5.4	
7	86	4.47	
8	79	4.1	
9	43	2.23	
10	55	2.86	
Total	1,925	100	

Protest (Original Ordinary Coding)	Frequency	Percent
1. Never did and never will	1,819	86.05
2. Never did but probably will	245	11.59
3. Did earlier but will never do	22	1.04
4. Did earlier	21	0.99
5. Did last year	7	0.33
Total	2,114	100

Section II Variable Construction

Table 2.1: Sources and Summary Statistics of All Variables (Sample=Local Residents)

Variable	Source	Ν	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Generalized Trust	The China Survey 2008	2375	0.549	0.498	0	1
Trust in Family Members	The China Survey 2008	2437	3.875	0.359	1	4
Trust in Relatives	The China Survey 2008	2420	3.531	0.572	1	4
Trust in Central Leaders	The China Survey 2008	1924	3.333	0.782	1	4
Democracy	The China Survey 2008	1761	4.119	2.716	0	10
Freedom of Expression	The China Survey 2008	1925	3.210	2.783	0	10
Protest	The China Survey 2008	2114	0.013	0.114	0	1
Male	The China Survey 2008	2459	0.566	0.496	0	1
Year of Birth	The China Survey 2008	2459	1961.698	15.956	1916	1990
Age	The China Survey 2008	2459	46.302	15.956	18	92
Age Squared	The China Survey 2008	2459	2398.348	1563.433	324	8464
Ethnic Han	The China Survey 2008	2459	0.833	0.373	0	1
Good Class	The China Survey 2008	2186	0.794	0.404	0	1
Middle Class	The China Survey 2008	2186	0.166	0.372	0	1
Discussing Politics with Family	The China Survey 2008	1278	2.284	0.920	1	4
Sent-Down Generation	The China Survey 2008	2459	0.115	0.319	0	1
Number of Deaths/1,000	Walder 2014	2418	0.507	0.896	0	5.025
Number of Deaths_County/1,000	Walder 2014	2459	0.723	2.820	0	22.569
Number of Deaths/1,000 (log)	Walder 2014	2418	0.315	0.383	0	1.796
Number of Deaths/1,000 (Spatial Lag)	Walder 2014	2182	0.481	0.242	0.271	1.484
Account Length (log)	Walder 2014	2450	8.342	0.438	7.425	9.587
Male to Female Ratio	1964 Census	2418	1.056	0.065	0.860	1.328

Urban Population Percentage	1964 Census	2409	9.860	5.191	2.578	25.020
Frequency of Mass Rebellions	Dincecco and Wang 2018	2223	1.008	1.750	0	10
Population Density	1964 Census	2214	195.730	145.350	0	697.690
Per Capita GDP (log)	Kung and Chen 2011	2179	5.583	0.397	4.579	6.599
Natural Disasters	Kung and Chen 2011	2179	13.749	5.207	6.056	23.625
Excess Procurement Ratio	Kung and Chen 2011	2179	1.689	2.346	-2.104	5.993
Party Member Density	Kung and Chen 2011	1933	64.324	15.384	37.571	94.400
Longitude	China Historical GIS	2223	113.560	7.405	87.612	126.643
Latitude	China Historical GIS	2223	32.799	6.879	21.277	47.360
Natural Resource	Karlsen et al. 2001	2223	0.678	0.467	0	1
Colony	Fairbank and Twitchett 1980	2223	0.073	0.260	0	1
Suitability for Wetland Rice	Global Agro-Ecological Zones	2223	1.733	0.575	0.969	3.275
Distance to Beijing	China Historical GIS	2223	1137.916	640.878	140.118	2416.937
Length of Rivers	China Historical GIS	2223	88.845	55.951	8.238	285.542

	Generali	zed Trust	Trust in Fan	Trust in Family Members		Relatives
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Variable	Coefficient	Coefficient	Coefficient	Coefficient	Coefficient	Coefficient
	(Clustered S.E.)	(Clustered S.E.)	(Clustered S.E.)	(Clustered S.E.)	(Clustered S.E.)	(Clustered S.E.)
Number of Deaths/1,000	0.028	0.048*	0.044	0.063***	0.045*	0.078**
	(0.017)	(0.025)	(0.033)	(0.010)	(0.026)	(0.033)
Male		-0.019		0.008		-0.031
		(0.025)		(0.015)		(0.033)
Age		0.007		0.002		0.005
		(0.006)		(0.003)		(0.006)
Age Squared		-0.000		-0.000		-0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)
Ethnic Han		0.034		-0.016		-0.002
		(0.057)		(0.027)		(0.068)
Good Class		-0.018		0.077*		0.066
		(0.066)		(0.044)		(0.082)
Middle Class		-0.022		0.046		0.060
		(0.070)		(0.051)		(0.098)
Male to Female Ratio		0.864**		-0.261*		0.494
		(0.387)		(0.150)		(0.548)
Urban Population Percentage		0.012**		0.008**		0.020**
		(0.006)		(0.003)		(0.010)
Frequency of Mass Rebellions		0.004		0.014***		0.006
		(0.007)		(0.003)		(0.011)
Population Density		-0.000		-0.000		0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)

Table 2.2: OLS Estimates of the Effects of Cultural Revolution Violence on Interpersonal Trust

Per Capita GDP (log)		0.483**		-0.644***		-1.007***
		(0.198)		(0.117)		(0.347)
Natural Disasters		0.070**		0.035**		0.018
		(0.031)		(0.013)		(0.041)
Excess Procurement Ratio		-0.018		-0.045***		-0.090***
		(0.014)		(0.007)		(0.017)
Party Member Density		-0.001		-0.000		-0.005
		(0.002)		(0.001)		(0.003)
Longitude		0.011		0.003		0.007
		(0.013)		(0.007)		(0.026)
Latitude		-0.001		0.096***		0.082**
		(0.023)		(0.010)		(0.038)
Natural Resource		-0.192***		-0.060***		-0.147***
		(0.050)		(0.022)		(0.054)
Colony		0.091		-0.157**		-0.155
		(0.064)		(0.062)		(0.192)
Suitability for Wetland Rice		0.135***		0.201***		0.278**
		(0.048)		(0.035)		(0.106)
Distance to Beijing		0.000		0.000***		-0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)
Length of Rivers		0.000		-0.000		0.001**
		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.001)
Account Length (log)	0.052	-0.028	-0.055	0.031	-0.027	0.107
	(0.053)	(0.044)	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.068)	(0.113)
Provincial F.E.	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Intercept	0.133	-5.679**	4.310***	2.348*	3.810***	3.063
	(0.459)	(2.780)	(0.335)	(1.287)	(0.585)	(4.644)

Ν	2337	1623	2396	1656	2379	1645
<u>R²</u>	0.057	0.055	0.045	0.082	0.033	0.064

P values are based on two-tailed tests. p<0.1, p<0.05, p<0.01.

	Number of Deaths/1,000
	(1)
Variable	Standardized Coefficient
	(Clustered S.E.)
Male to Female Ratio	0.159
	(0.131)
Urban Population Percentage	-0.128
	(0.088)
Frequency of Mass Rebellions	-0.051
	(0.044)
Population Density	-0.062
	(0.053)
Per Capita GDP (log)	0.302
	(0.228)
Natural Disasters	0.339
	(0.286)
Excess Procurement Ratio	0.126
	(0.121)
Party Member Density	-0.015
	(0.067)
Longitude	-0.001
	(0.157)
Latitude	-0.151
	(0.242)
Natural Resource	-0.081
	(0.094)
Colony	0.011
	(0.027)
Suitability for Wetland Rice	-0.031
	(0.074)
Distance to Beijing	0.369
	(0.334)

Table 2.3: Determinants of Cultural Revolution Violence Across Chinese Prefectures (1966–71) Number of Deaths/1.000

Length of Rivers	-0.008
	(0.052)
Account Length (log)	0.132
	(0.086)
Provincial F.E.	YES
Intercept	-0.091
	(0.182)
Ν	224
R ²	0.454

 $\overline{P \text{ values are based on two-tailed tests. }*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.}$

Section III Full Results

	Trust in Ce	ntral Leaders	Democracy Freedo		Freedom of	f Expression	Protest	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Coefficient	Coefficient	Coefficient	Coefficient	Coefficient	Coefficient	Coefficient	Coefficient
	(C.S.E)	(C.S.E)	(C.S.E)	(C.S.E)	(C.S.E)	(C.S.E)	(C.S.E)	(C.S.E)
Number of Deaths/1,000	-0.093***	-0.259***	0.271*	1.131***	0.068	1.047***	-0.003	-0.013***
	(0.033)	(0.037)	(0.138)	(0.148)	(0.193)	(0.171)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Male		-0.039		0.117		-0.057		0.013***
		(0.046)		(0.182)		(0.162)		(0.004)
Age		0.003		-0.052*		-0.023		-0.001
		(0.008)		(0.026)		(0.030)		(0.001)
Age Squared		0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)
Ethnic Han		0.000		-0.175		-0.436		0.009*
		(0.081)		(0.329)		(0.353)		(0.005)
Good Class		0.037		-0.118		-0.167		-0.006
		(0.084)		(0.454)		(0.394)		(0.020)
Middle Class		0.062		-0.245		-0.044		-0.006
		(0.095)		(0.467)		(0.395)		(0.020)
Male to Female Ratio		-2.751***		13.883***		21.149***		-0.111***
		(0.610)		(3.202)		(2.804)		(0.032)
Urban Population Percentage		0.060***		-0.199***		-0.135***		0.002***
-		(0.010)		(0.041)		(0.032)		(0.001)
Frequency of Mass Rebellions		0.038***		-0.015		-0.127***		-0.001

		(0.012)		(0.059)		(0.033)		(0.001)
Population Density		0.001***		-0.003*		-0.003***		-0.000
		(0.000)		(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.000)
Per Capita GDP (log)		-1.193***		6.709***		6.927***		-0.077***
		(0.386)		(1.646)		(1.272)		(0.018)
Natural Disasters		-0.130***		0.460***		0.747***		-0.002
		(0.040)		(0.169)		(0.208)		(0.003)
Excess Procurement Ratio		0.312***		-1.509***		-2.042***		-0.002*
		(0.074)		(0.322)		(0.375)		(0.001)
Party Member Density		0.042***		-0.160***		-0.224***		-0.001***
		(0.009)		(0.040)		(0.045)		(0.000)
Longitude		-0.101***		0.511***		0.484***		-0.007***
		(0.022)		(0.109)		(0.093)		(0.002)
Latitude		0.004		-0.112		-0.148		0.012***
		(0.036)		(0.168)		(0.129)		(0.002)
Natural Resource		0.123*		-0.867***		-1.292***		0.006*
		(0.071)		(0.230)		(0.291)		(0.003)
Colony		-0.503***		0.776		2.326***		-0.001
		(0.128)		(0.479)		(0.332)		(0.005)
Suitability for Wetland Rice		0.220**		-1.352***		-0.853**		0.003
		(0.087)		(0.360)		(0.351)		(0.005)
Distance to Beijing		-0.001**		0.004**		0.004**		0.000**
		(0.000)		(0.002)		(0.002)		(0.000)
Length of Rivers		0.003***		-0.012***		-0.000		-0.000**
		(0.001)		(0.003)		(0.002)		(0.000)
Account Length (log)	-0.078	0.087	0.417	0.256	0.174	-0.314	-0.002	-0.012***
	(0.093)	(0.055)	(0.460)	(0.455)	(0.375)	(0.221)	(0.010)	(0.004)

Provincial F.E.	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Intercept	4.072***	21.200***	-0.375	-92.360***	0.892	-95.362***	0.032	1.128***
	(0.793)	(4.608)	(3.979)	(20.964)	(3.246)	(19.303)	(0.087)	(0.264)
Ν	1895	1296	1724	1201	1887	1319	2081	1461
R ²	0.088	0.121	0.063	0.119	0.083	0.129	0.021	0.022

P values are based on two-tailed tests. p<0.1, p<0.05, p<0.01.

Section IV Robustness Checks

First, there were a large number of urban youths who were sent down to the countryside as part of the program "Up to the Mountains and Down to the Villages," which was practiced initially on a limited scale before the Great Leap Forward (1958-1961) and accelerated sharply in 1968. According to aggregate statistics released by the Chinese government, 12 million urban youths were sent to the countryside between 1968-1975 (Bernstein 1977). These "sent-down youths" spent most of their time in the Chinese countryside until 1976 and were exposed to violence primarily in the villages to which they were sent. However, the China Survey did not ask about respondents' sent-down experience and where they were sent down to. Based on the fact that the "sent-down youths" primarily consisted of people who were 15-20 years old in 1968, I designate respondents who were born between 1948 and 1953 as the "sent-down generation." I expect that the violence in sent-down youths' hometowns should have a weak or null effect on their political trust, because they experienced the Cultural Revolution somewhere else. I hence estimate Equation (1) separately with a sample of "sent-down generation" and a sample of "non-sent-down generation" (people who were born before 1976 but were not in the "sent-down generation"), as Table 4.1 shows, the violence in people's hometowns during the Cultural Revolution only has a significantly negative effect on political attitudes and behavior in the "non-sent-down" sample but not in the "sent-down" sample. However, the null effect in the "sent-down" sample might also be due to the sample's small N. Because the China Survey does not include any information on respondents' sent-down experience, this article is not able to provide a fine-grained analysis for the "sent-down youths," so I leave the question for future research.

	Trust in Cen	tral Leaders	Demo	ocracy	Freedom of	Expression	Pro	test
	Non-Sent- Down	Sent- Down	Non-Sent- Down	Sent- Down	Non-Sent- Down	Sent- Down	Non-Sent- Down	Sent- Down
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Variable	Coefficient	Coefficient	Coefficient	Coefficient	Coefficient	Coefficient	Coefficient	Coefficient
	(C.S.E)	(C.S.E)	(C.S.E)	(C.S.E)	(C.S.E)	(C.S.E)	(C.S.E)	(C.S.E)
Number of Deaths/1,000	-0.388***	0.005	1.525***	0.145	1.474***	1.016*	-0.013***	-0.003
	(0.038)	(0.112)	(0.117)	(0.566)	(0.121)	(0.572)	(0.002)	(0.012)
Male	-0.009	-0.129	0.127	0.811	0.009	-0.439	0.007*	0.031*
	(0.055)	(0.121)	(0.199)	(0.724)	(0.146)	(0.761)	(0.004)	(0.018)

Table 4.1 OLS Estimates of the Effects of Cultural Revolution Violence by Sent-Down Experience

Age	0.024	-1.783	-0.042	-6.437	-0.034	-22.602**	-0.001	-0.430
	(0.017)	(2.457)	(0.053)	(13.444)	(0.057)	(9.816)	(0.001)	(0.826)
Age Squared	-0.000	0.015	0.000	0.056	0.000	0.197**	0.000	0.004
	(0.000)	(0.021)	(0.000)	(0.117)	(0.000)	(0.086)	(0.000)	(0.007)
Ethnic Han	-0.040	0.172	-0.475	-0.207	-0.511	0.599	0.004	0.010
	(0.094)	(0.145)	(0.364)	(1.406)	(0.357)	(1.051)	(0.004)	(0.010)
Good Class	0.117	-0.169	-0.153	1.200	-0.392	0.585	-0.020	0.046*
	(0.125)	(0.287)	(0.532)	(0.734)	(0.544)	(1.106)	(0.029)	(0.025)
Middle Class	0.121	-0.119	-0.184	0.457	-0.345	1.023	-0.014	0.022
	(0.129)	(0.333)	(0.489)	(0.800)	(0.477)	(1.318)	(0.031)	(0.021)
Male to Female Ratio	-4.761***	-0.489	19.526***	5.261	29.265***	28.509***	-0.111***	-0.061
	(0.571)	(1.385)	(2.715)	(6.865)	(1.764)	(9.876)	(0.037)	(0.165)
Urban Population Percentage	0.072***	0.100***	-0.241***	-0.131	-0.211***	-0.163*	0.000	0.007***
	(0.010)	(0.016)	(0.037)	(0.087)	(0.030)	(0.093)	(0.000)	(0.002)
Frequency of Mass Rebellions	0.066***	0.024	-0.060	0.172	-0.163***	-0.309***	-0.003***	0.008***
	(0.014)	(0.028)	(0.051)	(0.109)	(0.040)	(0.098)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Population Density	0.001**	0.001	-0.002	-0.008	-0.004***	0.001	-0.000**	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.006)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Per Capita GDP (log)	-1.192***	-0.051	5.483***	0.000	5.781***	4.221	-0.060**	-0.194**
	(0.359)	(0.997)	(1.220)	(.)	(0.740)	(4.901)	(0.025)	(0.087)
Natural Disasters	-0.348***	0.032	0.932***	0.282	1.529***	0.680	0.001	-0.006
	(0.052)	(0.119)	(0.190)	(0.447)	(0.147)	(0.589)	(0.003)	(0.010)
Excess Procurement Ratio	0.066***	-0.101**	-0.146***	-0.016	-0.361***	-2.083	0.003**	0.007
	(0.022)	(0.044)	(0.053)	(0.370)	(0.060)	(1.261)	(0.001)	(0.028)
Party Member Density	0.028***	0.000	-0.045***	-0.013	-0.095***	-0.191	-0.001**	0.001
	(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.013)	(0.048)	(0.010)	(0.143)	(0.000)	(0.003)
Longitude	-0.136***	-0.031	0.672***	0.448	0.780***	0.338	-0.008***	-0.008

	(0.022)	(0.060)	(0.090)	(0.300)	(0.069)	(0.285)	(0.002)	(0.008)
Latitude	-0.052	-0.001	-0.137	-0.117	-0.212*	0.058	0.014***	0.013
	(0.042)	(0.090)	(0.157)	(0.691)	(0.109)	(0.514)	(0.004)	(0.008)
Natural Resource	0.194**	0.080	-1.240***	0.971	-1.751***	-1.096	0.008*	0.008
	(0.080)	(0.252)	(0.222)	(0.725)	(0.229)	(0.896)	(0.004)	(0.016)
Colony	-0.840***	0.288	0.645	1.586	2.681***	1.814	0.013*	-0.096***
	(0.136)	(0.260)	(0.458)	(1.711)	(0.294)	(1.394)	(0.007)	(0.028)
Suitability for Wetland Rice	0.228**	-0.431**	-1.435***	-3.046*	-1.271***	-0.813	-0.005	0.052**
	(0.100)	(0.175)	(0.336)	(1.738)	(0.228)	(1.365)	(0.006)	(0.025)
Distance to Beijing	-0.002***	0.000	0.005***	-0.000	0.007***	0.004	0.000**	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.006)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Length of Rivers	0.003***	0.005***	-0.012***	-0.029**	-0.003*	0.004	-0.000***	0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.011)	(0.001)	(0.008)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Account Length (log)	0.061	0.626***	0.763*	1.991***	-0.033	-0.635	-0.012***	-0.023
	(0.056)	(0.123)	(0.409)	(0.655)	(0.174)	(0.986)	(0.004)	(0.023)
Provincial F.E.	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Intercept	35.551***	52.604	-135.375***	122.872	-160.343***	566.162**	1.031***	14.075
	(4.682)	(67.547)	(18.984)	(372.663)	(13.201)	(263.734)	(0.298)	(22.635)
					· · ·			
Ν	950	156	867	122	941	147	1061	173
R ²	0.135	0.412	0.142	0.285	0.136	0.263	0.029	0.091

 $\overline{P \text{ values are based on two-tailed tests. *}p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.}$

Second, Walder's original (2014) dataset was measured at the county level. Because I need to match it with other prefectural-level covariates, which are more available than county-level data, I aggregate the violence data to the prefectural level in the main analysis. Table 4.2 shows that when I use the county-level Number of Deaths/1,000 as the independent variable with standard errors clustered at the county level, the results are not changed.

	Trust in Central		Freedom of	
	Leaders	Democracy	Expression	Protest
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Coefficient	Coefficient	Coefficient	Coefficient
	(C.S.E)	(C.S.E)	(C.S.E)	(C.S.E)
Number of Deaths_County/1,000	-0.158***	0.778***	0.413***	-0.005***
	(0.029)	(0.141)	(0.137)	(0.002)
Male	-0.042	0.123	-0.060	0.013***
	(0.049)	(0.165)	(0.157)	(0.004)
Age	0.004	-0.055**	-0.027	-0.001
	(0.008)	(0.027)	(0.029)	(0.001)
Age Squared	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Ethnic Han	0.018	-0.250	-0.413	0.010**
	(0.085)	(0.339)	(0.359)	(0.004)
Good Class	0.036	-0.128	-0.165	-0.006
	(0.085)	(0.445)	(0.402)	(0.019)
Aiddle Class	0.054	-0.207	-0.005	-0.007
	(0.100)	(0.438)	(0.415)	(0.020)
Male to Female Ratio	-3.969***	20.964***	21.164***	-0.114**
	(0.899)	(3.932)	(4.872)	(0.055)
Jrban Population Percentage	0.051***	-0.175***	-0.085**	0.001

Table 4.2 OLS Estimates of the Effects of Cultural Revolution Violence Using County-Level Data

	(0.012)	(0.042)	(0.037)	(0.001)
Frequency of Mass Rebellions	0.023*	0.034	-0.064*	-0.001*
	(0.013)	(0.052)	(0.032)	(0.001)
Population Density	0.001*	-0.001	-0.002**	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)
Per Capita GDP (log)	-0.684	4.683**	2.007	-0.058**
	(0.417)	(1.791)	(1.269)	(0.025)
Natural Disasters	-0.229***	1.066***	0.911**	-0.001
	(0.059)	(0.288)	(0.359)	(0.004)
Excess Procurement Ratio	0.075**	-0.276***	-0.274***	-0.002
	(0.033)	(0.100)	(0.100)	(0.003)
Party Member Density	0.026***	-0.079***	-0.068**	-0.000
	(0.005)	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.000)
Longitude	-0.124***	0.681***	0.395***	-0.006***
	(0.031)	(0.167)	(0.144)	(0.002)
Latitude	-0.006	-0.089	-0.049	0.011***
	(0.048)	(0.183)	(0.188)	(0.003)
Natural Resource	0.102	-0.826***	-0.989***	0.002
	(0.085)	(0.253)	(0.335)	(0.004)
Colony	-0.451***	0.693	1.901***	0.004
	(0.137)	(0.647)	(0.454)	(0.007)
Suitability for Wetland Rice	0.192**	-1.410***	-0.528	-0.001
	(0.086)	(0.475)	(0.442)	(0.006)
Distance to Beijing	-0.001***	0.006***	0.004	0.000*
	(0.000)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.000)
Length of Rivers	0.003***	-0.012***	0.000	-0.000
	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.000)

Account Length (log)	-0.068	1.000*	0.030	-0.017**
	(0.082)	(0.535)	(0.337)	(0.006)
Provincial F.E.	YES	YES	YES	YES
Intercept	28.122***	-138.522***	-85.225***	0.975**
	(6.268)	(32.577)	(31.463)	(0.391)
Ν	1296	1201	1319	1461
R ²	0.120	0.122	0.122	0.021

P values are based on two-tailed tests. p < 0.1, p < 0.05, p < 0.01.

Third, because my dataset combines prefectural-level and individual-level variables, a popular econometric solution is to cluster the standard errors so that individuals within the prefectures are in fact more similar to one another than individuals from another prefecture (Moulton 1990). However, when the number of clusters (prefectures) is small, multilevel models outperform clustering in estimating the effect of aggregate-level variables (Cheah 2009). The number of clusters (51) in my analysis is not necessarily small, so I choose to use clustering in the main analysis, but I also want to see whether HLM produces the same results. Table 4.3 presents estimates produced by HLM, which fits Equation (1) via maximum likelihood, and the results are similar to the OLS estimates with clustering, except that the estimate with Protest is just shy of statistical significance (p=0.138).

	Trust in Central	D	Freedom of	D ()
	Leaders	Democracy	Expression	Protest
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Coefficient	Coefficient	Coefficient	Coefficient
	(S.E)	(S.E)	(S.E)	(S.E)
Number of Deaths/1,000	-0.259***	1.131***	1.047***	-0.013
	(0.072)	(0.266)	(0.254)	(0.009)
Male	-0.039	0.117	-0.057	0.013**
	(0.043)	(0.159)	(0.149)	(0.005)
Age	0.003	-0.052*	-0.023	-0.001
	(0.008)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.001)
Age Squared	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Ethnic Han	0.000	-0.175	-0.436	0.009
	(0.089)	(0.316)	(0.304)	(0.011)
Good Class	0.037	-0.118	-0.167	-0.006
	(0.106)	(0.398)	(0.379)	(0.013)
fiddle Class	0.062	-0.245	-0.044	-0.006
	(0.117)	(0.433)	(0.415)	(0.015)

Table 4.3 Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Effects of Cultural Revolution Vio	olence using Multilevel Modeling

Male to Female Ratio	-2.751***	13.883***	21.149***	-0.111
	(0.993)	(3.547)	(3.389)	(0.117)
Urban Population Percentage	0.060***	-0.199***	-0.135***	0.002
	(0.014)	(0.052)	(0.050)	(0.002)
Frequency of Mass Rebellions	0.038*	-0.015	-0.127*	-0.001
	(0.020)	(0.073)	(0.071)	(0.002)
Population Density	0.001	-0.003	-0.003	-0.000
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.000)
Per Capita GDP (log)	-6.716	21.793	15.857	-0.465
	(4.695)	(16.973)	(16.406)	(0.569)
Natural Disasters	0.136	-0.860*	-0.582	0.018
	(0.130)	(0.469)	(0.452)	(0.016)
Excess Procurement Ratio	0.184**	-0.680**	-0.502	0.005
	(0.094)	(0.341)	(0.326)	(0.011)
Party Member Density	0.085	-0.387*	-0.298	0.004
	(0.056)	(0.203)	(0.196)	(0.007)
Longitude	-0.101***	0.511***	0.484***	-0.007
	(0.039)	(0.147)	(0.139)	(0.005)
Latitude	0.004	-0.112	-0.148	0.012
	(0.062)	(0.227)	(0.215)	(0.007)
Natural Resource	0.123	-0.867**	-1.292***	0.006
	(0.099)	(0.359)	(0.343)	(0.012)
Colony	-0.503***	0.776	2.326***	-0.001
	(0.195)	(0.674)	(0.654)	(0.023)
Suitability for Wetland Rice	0.220	-1.352***	-0.853*	0.003
	(0.143)	(0.499)	(0.481)	(0.017)
Distance to Beijing	-0.001*	0.004*	0.004**	0.000

	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.000)
Length of Rivers	0.003***	-0.012***	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.000)
Account Length (log)	0.087	0.256	-0.314	-0.012
	(0.116)	(0.408)	(0.390)	(0.014)
Provincial F.E.	YES	YES	YES	YES
Intercept	45.617*	-145.911*	-124.701	2.649
	(23.603)	(85.254)	(82.381)	(2.854)
N	1296	1201	1319	1461

 $\frac{1296}{P \text{ values are based on two-tailed tests. }*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.}$

Fourth, I use listwise deletion in the main analysis to deal with missing data. However, as King et al. (2001, 51) argue, if the missing process is nonignorable, that is, if the probability that a cell is missing depends on the unobserved value of the missing response, listwise deletion can bias conclusions. As an alternative solution to missing data, I employ multiple imputation technique to impute 60 multiple matrices with complete data on the dependent variables. Table 4.4 shows the results with the imputed data sets, and the results are the same.

	Trust in Central	Domooroov	Freedom of	Duotost
	Leaders	Democracy	Expression	Protest
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Coefficient	Coefficient	Coefficient	Coefficient
	(C.S.E)	(C.S.E)	(C.S.E)	(C.S.E)
Number of Deaths/1,000	-0.292***	1.284***	1.658***	-0.034***
	(0.055)	(0.169)	(0.297)	(0.005)
Male	-0.080	0.049	-0.165	0.014*
	(0.065)	(0.274)	(0.184)	(0.007)
Age	-0.000	-0.045	-0.031	-0.002
	(0.010)	(0.033)	(0.041)	(0.002)
Age Squared	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Ethnic Han	0.015	-0.006	-0.630	0.016
	(0.131)	(0.426)	(0.382)	(0.010)
Good Class	0.058	0.337	0.115	-0.013
	(0.112)	(0.502)	(0.410)	(0.026)
Middle Class	0.146	0.122	0.088	-0.013
	(0.124)	(0.525)	(0.408)	(0.028)
Male to Female Ratio	-3.203***	11.127***	23.416***	-0.300***
	(0.993)	(3.696)	(4.376)	(0.062)

Table 4.4 OLS Estimates of the Effects of Cultural Revolution Violence Using Imputed Data

Urban Population Percentage	0.067***	-0.155***	-0.118**	0.001*
	(0.011)	(0.041)	(0.045)	(0.001)
Frequency of Mass Rebellions	0.032**	-0.037	-0.163***	-0.001
	(0.014)	(0.057)	(0.050)	(0.001)
Population Density	0.001**	-0.004*	-0.003	-0.000**
	(0.000)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.000)
Per Capita GDP (log)	-1.345***	6.045***	9.381***	-0.217***
	(0.453)	(1.746)	(2.087)	(0.049)
Natural Disasters	-0.127*	0.328*	1.149***	-0.007
	(0.067)	(0.182)	(0.316)	(0.005)
Excess Procurement Ratio	0.324***	-1.376***	-2.759***	0.035***
	(0.110)	(0.351)	(0.611)	(0.007)
Party Member Density	0.041***	-0.128***	-0.298***	0.003***
	(0.014)	(0.044)	(0.070)	(0.001)
Longitude	-0.097***	0.581***	0.545***	-0.017***
	(0.027)	(0.113)	(0.136)	(0.003)
Latitude	-0.000	-0.323*	-0.027	0.021***
	(0.045)	(0.184)	(0.174)	(0.007)
Natural Resource	0.177*	-1.008***	-1.716***	0.021***
	(0.096)	(0.259)	(0.477)	(0.006)
Colony	-0.409**	1.417*	2.942***	-0.006
	(0.176)	(0.724)	(0.574)	(0.010)
Suitability for Wetland Rice	0.092	-1.786***	-1.138*	0.009
	(0.132)	(0.606)	(0.625)	(0.012)
Distance to Beijing	-0.001	0.001	0.007**	0.000
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.000)
Length of Rivers	0.003***	-0.007**	0.007**	-0.000***

	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.000)
Account Length (log)	0.186**	0.599	-0.286	-0.016***
	(0.082)	(0.514)	(0.358)	(0.006)
Provincial F.E.	YES	YES	YES	YES
Intercept	21.441***	-88.418***	-125.775***	2.666***
	(6.508)	(21.119)	(30.056)	(0.448)
N	854	854	854	854

Notes: Only the missing values in the dependent variables are imputed. The covariates in the imputation model include Male, Age, Age Squared, Ethnic Han, Good Class, and Middle Class. 60 imputed datasets are produced and estimated by Stata's *mi* package. *P values are based on two-tailed tests.* *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.

Fifth, the main independent variable *Number of Deaths/1000* is highly right skewed because there are many zeros. In the following analysis, I transform the independent variable into a natural log transformed measure (log((Number of Deaths/1000)+1))) and use it as the independent variable. The results are similar.

$\begin{array}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$		Trust in Central Leaders	Democracy	Freedom of Expression	Protest
(C.S.E) (C.S.E) (C.S.E) (C.S.E) nmber of Deaths/1,000 (log) -0.618*** 2.639*** 2.816*** -0.033*** (0.115) (0.437) (0.517) (0.006) ale -0.040 0.118 -0.049 0.013*** (0.046) (0.182) (0.162) (0.004) ge 0.004 -0.051* -0.020 -0.001 ge 0.004 -0.051* -0.020 -0.001 ge 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 ge 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 ge 0.0007 0.0327		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
nmber of Deaths/1,000 (log) -0.618*** 2.639*** 2.816*** -0.033*** (0.115) (0.437) (0.517) (0.006) ale -0.040 0.118 -0.049 0.013*** (0.046) (0.182) (0.162) (0.004) ge 0.004 -0.051* -0.020 -0.001 (0.008) (0.027) (0.030) (0.001) ge Squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 nhic Han -0.032 -0.129 -0.416 0.009* 0.042 0.0327 (0.348) (0.005) ood Class 0.032 -0.105 -0.156 -0.006 (0.085) (0.456) (0.396) (0.020) (0.020) iddle Class 0.063 -0.249 -0.056 -0.006 (0.096) (0.467) (0.396) (0.020) ale to Female Ratio -1.885*** 9.881*** 18.171*** -0.079** (0.550) (3.357) (2.370) (0.030)		Coefficient	Coefficient	Coefficient	Coefficient
$ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$		(C.S.E)	(C.S.E)	(C.S.E)	(C.S.E)
ale -0.040 0.118 -0.049 0.013^{***} (0.046)(0.182)(0.162)(0.004)ge 0.004 -0.051^* -0.020 -0.001 (0.008)(0.027)(0.030)(0.001)ge Squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 (0.000)(0.000)(0.000)(0.000)(0.000)hnic Han -0.007 -0.129 -0.416 0.009^* $0.082)$ (0.327)(0.348)(0.005)bod Class 0.032 -0.105 -0.156 -0.006 (0.085) (0.456)(0.396)(0.020)iddle Class 0.063 -0.249 -0.056 -0.006 0.096 (0.467) (0.396)(0.020)ale to Female Ratio -1.885^{***} 9.881^{***} 18.171^{***} -0.079^{**} (0.550) (3.357) (2.370) (0.030) ban Population Percentage 0.057^{***} -0.180^{***} -0.127^{**} 0.001^{***}	umber of Deaths/1,000 (log)	-0.618***	2.639***	2.816***	-0.033***
(0.046) (0.182) (0.162) (0.004) (0.004) -0.051* -0.020 -0.001 (0.008) (0.027) (0.030) (0.001) (0.000) 0.000 0.000 0.000 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.012) (0.027) (0.348) (0.005) (0.012) (0.015) (0.156) (0.020) (0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.020) (0.022) (0.035) (0.456) (0.396) (0.020) (0.024) (0.0467) (0.396) (0.020) (0.024) (0.025) (3.357) (2.370) (0.030) (ban Population Percentage (0.057*** (0.180*** (0.127*** (0.01***		(0.115)	(0.437)	(0.517)	(0.006)
ge 0.004 -0.051^* -0.020 -0.001 (0.008) (0.027) (0.030) (0.001) ge Squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) hnic Han -0.007 -0.129 -0.416 0.009^* (0.082) (0.327) (0.348) (0.005) bod Class 0.032 -0.105 -0.156 -0.006 (0.085) (0.456) (0.396) (0.20) iddle Class 0.063 -0.249 -0.056 -0.006 (0.096) (0.467) (0.396) (0.20) ale to Female Ratio -1.885^{***} 9.881^{***} 18.171^{***} -0.079^{**} (0.550) (3.357) (2.370) (0.030) ban Population Percentage 0.057^{***} -0.180^{***} -0.127^{***} 0.001^{***}	fale	-0.040	0.118	-0.049	0.013***
$ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$		(0.046)	(0.182)	(0.162)	(0.004)
ge Squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) hnic Han -0.007 -0.129 -0.416 0.009^* (0.082) (0.327) (0.348) (0.005) bod Class 0.032 -0.105 -0.156 -0.006 (0.085) (0.456) (0.396) (0.020) iddle Class 0.063 -0.249 -0.056 -0.006 (0.096) (0.467) (0.396) (0.020) ale to Female Ratio -1.885^{***} 9.881^{***} 18.171^{***} -0.079^{**} (0.550) (3.357) (2.370) (0.030) what Population Percentage 0.057^{***} -0.180^{***} -0.127^{***} 0.001^{***}	ge	0.004	-0.051*	-0.020	-0.001
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$		(0.008)	(0.027)	(0.030)	(0.001)
hnic Han -0.007 -0.129 -0.416 0.009^* (0.082) (0.327) (0.348) (0.005) ood Class 0.032 -0.105 -0.156 -0.006 (0.085) (0.456) (0.396) (0.020) $iddle$ Class 0.063 -0.249 -0.056 -0.006 (0.096) (0.467) (0.396) (0.020) ale to Female Ratio -1.885^{***} 9.881^{***} 18.171^{***} -0.079^{**} (0.550) (3.357) (2.370) (0.030) ban Population Percentage 0.057^{***} -0.180^{***} -0.127^{***} 0.001^{***}	ge Squared	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
(0.082)(0.327)(0.348)(0.005)ood Class0.032-0.105-0.156-0.006(0.085)(0.456)(0.396)(0.020)iddle Class0.063-0.249-0.056-0.006(0.096)(0.467)(0.396)(0.020)ale to Female Ratio-1.885***9.881***18.171***-0.079**(0.550)(3.357)(2.370)(0.030)ban Population Percentage0.057***-0.180***-0.127***0.001***		(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
bod Class 0.032 -0.105 -0.156 -0.006 (0.085) (0.456) (0.396) (0.020) iddle Class 0.063 -0.249 -0.056 -0.006 (0.096) (0.467) (0.396) (0.020) ale to Female Ratio -1.885^{***} 9.881^{***} 18.171^{***} -0.079^{**} (0.550) (3.357) (2.370) (0.030) ban Population Percentage 0.057^{***} -0.180^{***} -0.127^{***} 0.001^{***}	thnic Han	-0.007	-0.129	-0.416	0.009*
(0.085)(0.456)(0.396)(0.020)iddle Class0.063-0.249-0.056-0.006(0.096)(0.467)(0.396)(0.020)ale to Female Ratio-1.885***9.881***18.171***-0.079**(0.550)(3.357)(2.370)(0.030)ban Population Percentage0.057***-0.180***-0.127***0.001***		(0.082)	(0.327)	(0.348)	(0.005)
iddle Class 0.063 -0.249 -0.056 -0.006 (0.096) (0.467) (0.396) (0.020) ale to Female Ratio $-1.885***$ $9.881***$ $18.171***$ $-0.079**$ (0.550) (3.357) (2.370) (0.030) ban Population Percentage $0.057***$ $-0.180***$ $-0.127***$	ood Class	0.032	-0.105	-0.156	-0.006
(0.096) (0.467) (0.396) (0.020) ale to Female Ratio -1.885*** 9.881*** 18.171*** -0.079** (0.550) (3.357) (2.370) (0.030) ban Population Percentage 0.057*** -0.180*** -0.127*** 0.001***		(0.085)	(0.456)	(0.396)	(0.020)
ale to Female Ratio-1.885***9.881***18.171***-0.079**(0.550)(3.357)(2.370)(0.030)ban Population Percentage0.057***-0.180***-0.127***	fiddle Class	0.063	-0.249	-0.056	-0.006
(0.550)(3.357)(2.370)(0.030)ban Population Percentage0.057***-0.180***-0.127***0.001***		(0.096)	(0.467)	(0.396)	(0.020)
ban Population Percentage 0.057*** -0.180*** -0.127*** 0.001***	Iale to Female Ratio	-1.885***	9.881***	18.171***	-0.079**
		(0.550)	(3.357)	(2.370)	(0.030)
(0.010) (0.042) (0.034) (0.001)	rban Population Percentage	0.057***	-0.180***	-0.127***	0.001***
	-	(0.010)	(0.042)	(0.034)	(0.001)

Table 4.5 Using Log Transformed Independent Variable

Frequency of Mass Rebellions	0.039***	-0.018	-0.140***	-0.000
	(0.011)	(0.060)	(0.037)	(0.001)
Population Density	0.001**	-0.003*	-0.004***	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.000)
Per Capita GDP (log)	-0.978**	5.658***	6.828***	-0.096***
	(0.457)	(1.600)	(1.234)	(0.023)
Natural Disasters	-0.066*	0.174	0.518***	0.002
	(0.038)	(0.156)	(0.171)	(0.002)
Excess Procurement Ratio	0.178***	-0.909***	-1.620***	0.005
	(0.059)	(0.268)	(0.321)	(0.004)
Party Member Density	0.022***	-0.069**	-0.151***	-0.000
	(0.007)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.000)
Longitude	-0.065***	0.340***	0.363***	-0.006***
	(0.021)	(0.104)	(0.078)	(0.001)
Latitude	0.026	-0.192	-0.267*	0.013***
	(0.042)	(0.207)	(0.137)	(0.003)
Natural Resource	0.122*	-0.856***	-1.388***	0.007*
	(0.067)	(0.245)	(0.321)	(0.004)
Colony	-0.455***	0.535	2.195***	0.000
	(0.148)	(0.455)	(0.302)	(0.005)
Suitability for Wetland Rice	0.146	-0.973**	-0.588*	0.000
	(0.103)	(0.370)	(0.310)	(0.005)
Distance to Beijing	-0.000	0.001	0.002	0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.000)
Length of Rivers	0.003***	-0.012***	0.001	-0.000**
	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.000)
Account Length (log)	0.158**	-0.042	-0.633**	-0.009*

	(0.068)	(0.473)	(0.240)	(0.005)
Provincial F.E.	YES	YES	YES	YES
Intercept	13.808***	-58.731***	-71.489***	0.815***
	(4.115)	(17.460)	(15.370)	(0.223)
Ν	1296	1201	1319	1461
<u>R²</u>	0.120	0.115	0.129	0.022

P values are based on two-tailed tests. p<0.1, p<0.05, p<0.01.

Sixth, because the China Survey employs a complex survey sampling design, following Landry and Shen's (2005) suggestions, I rerun the analyses considering the survey design effects by using sampling weights. Table 4.6 shows similar results.

	Trust in Central		Freedom of	
	Leaders	Democracy	Expression	Protest
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Coefficient	Coefficient	Coefficient	Coefficient
	(C.S.E)	(C.S.E)	(C.S.E)	(C.S.E)
Number of Deaths/1,000	-0.223***	1.219***	1.031***	-0.007**
	(0.060)	(0.212)	(0.190)	(0.003)
Male	-0.105*	0.021	-0.145	0.010***
	(0.061)	(0.197)	(0.213)	(0.004)
Age	0.007	-0.056**	-0.042	-0.001
	(0.010)	(0.028)	(0.033)	(0.001)
Age Squared	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Ethnic Han	0.116	-0.183	-0.565	0.011**
	(0.126)	(0.361)	(0.391)	(0.005)
Good Class	0.105	-0.314	-0.338	-0.000
	(0.106)	(0.441)	(0.460)	(0.012)
Aiddle Class	0.113	-0.352	0.002	-0.001
	(0.127)	(0.461)	(0.524)	(0.013)
Male to Female Ratio	-2.524***	12.364***	18.865***	-0.065*
	(0.778)	(3.297)	(2.937)	(0.034)
Jrban Population Percentage	0.053***	-0.190***	-0.114***	0.001***
	(0.013)	(0.040)	(0.036)	(0.000)
Frequency of Mass Rebellions	0.030*	0.016	-0.154***	-0.000

Table 4.6 Considering Survey Design Effects (OLS Estimates)

	(0.015)	(0.046)	(0.040)	(0.001)
Population Density	0.001	-0.003**	-0.004**	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.000)
Per Capita GDP (log)	-0.844	5.028***	2.929**	-0.062***
	(0.541)	(1.850)	(1.270)	(0.023)
Natural Disasters	-0.093*	0.656***	0.918***	0.001
	(0.049)	(0.210)	(0.260)	(0.003)
Excess Procurement Ratio	0.237**	-0.106	-0.281***	-0.004
	(0.110)	(0.081)	(0.083)	(0.003)
Party Member Density	0.033**	-0.017	-0.052***	-0.001**
	(0.013)	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.000)
Longitude	-0.078**	0.504***	0.381***	-0.004***
	(0.033)	(0.126)	(0.105)	(0.002)
Latitude	-0.009	-0.150	-0.041	0.010***
	(0.052)	(0.228)	(0.170)	(0.003)
Natural Resource	0.054	-0.740***	-1.367***	0.000
	(0.105)	(0.244)	(0.307)	(0.004)
Colony	-0.336	0.840	2.359***	-0.000
	(0.204)	(0.570)	(0.493)	(0.005)
Suitability for Wetland Rice	0.171	-1.351***	-0.672*	0.004
	(0.130)	(0.339)	(0.401)	(0.005)
Distance to Beijing	-0.001	0.003*	0.004*	0.000**
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.000)
Length of Rivers	0.003***	-0.014***	0.001	-0.000
	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.000)
Account Length (log)	0.069	0.185	-0.411	-0.008*
	(0.108)	(0.486)	(0.324)	(0.005)

Provincial F.E.	YES	YES	YES	YES
Intercept	16.914***	-95.931***	-82.313***	0.624**
	(6.234)	(22.237)	(21.531)	(0.267)
Ν	1296	1201	1319	1461
Population Size	222,907,863	210,381,046	227,627,930	253,143,050
<u>R</u> ²	0.146	0.122	0.133	0.021

P values are based on two-tailed tests. p<0.1, p<0.05, p<0.01.

Seventh, one might argue that there is spatial spillover of the violence. For example, the violence in city B might affect people's political trust in its neighboring city A. To consider this spatial spillover, I specify a spatial model in which a spatial lag is included. The computation of spatially lagged variables requires a spatial weight matrix, which mathematically describes the spatially dependent structures in the matrix. I use spgen in Stata, which computes spatially lagged variables using the geographical information of latitude and longitude. The key feature of the spgen command is that the spatial weight matrix is endogenously constructed in a sequence of the program code and not exogenously included into Stata as a matrix type. Specifically, my spatial weight matrix is constructed using the market potential model proposed by Harris (1954), which is a popular model in the economic geography literature. Table 4.7 presents the OLS estimates with a spatial lag. Including the spatial lag does not change my original results.

	Trust in Central Leaders	Democracy	Freedom of Expression	Protest
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Coefficient	Coefficient	Coefficient	Coefficient
	(C.S.E)	(C.S.E)	(C.S.E)	(C.S.E)
Sumber of Deaths/1,000	-0.278***	0.928***	1.130***	-0.014***
	(0.038)	(0.142)	(0.179)	(0.002)
patial Lag	0.532	5.277**	-2.182	0.017
	(0.583)	(2.336)	(1.495)	(0.024)
Iale	-0.040	0.116	-0.052	0.013***
	(0.047)	(0.180)	(0.162)	(0.004)
age	0.003	-0.056**	-0.021	-0.001
	(0.008)	(0.027)	(0.030)	(0.001)
ge Squared	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
thnic Han	-0.006	-0.205	-0.422	0.009*
	(0.082)	(0.328)	(0.352)	(0.005)
ood Class	0.035	-0.134	-0.159	-0.006

Table 4.7: OLS Estimates of the Effects of Cultural Revolution Violence with a Spatial Lag

	(0.085)	(0.453)	(0.395)	(0.020)
Middle Class	0.065	-0.212	-0.061	-0.006
	(0.095)	(0.468)	(0.396)	(0.020)
Male to Female Ratio	-2.803***	12.715***	21.551***	-0.115***
	(0.588)	(2.691)	(2.736)	(0.034)
Urban Population Percentage	0.060***	-0.206***	-0.132***	0.002***
	(0.009)	(0.037)	(0.035)	(0.001)
Frequency of Mass Rebellions	0.030**	-0.102	-0.092*	-0.001
	(0.014)	(0.079)	(0.050)	(0.001)
Population Density	0.001***	-0.003**	-0.003***	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)
Per Capita GDP (log)	-0.850	9.944***	5.587***	-0.068***
	(0.591)	(2.453)	(1.780)	(0.025)
Natural Disasters	-0.117**	0.562***	0.704***	-0.002
	(0.049)	(0.176)	(0.200)	(0.003)
Excess Procurement Ratio	0.257**	-2.004***	-1.832***	-0.002
	(0.110)	(0.441)	(0.411)	(0.001)
Party Member Density	0.039***	-0.186***	-0.212***	-0.001***
	(0.011)	(0.043)	(0.046)	(0.000)
Longitude	-0.093***	0.599***	0.446***	-0.007***
	(0.024)	(0.126)	(0.104)	(0.002)
Latitude	-0.003	-0.193	-0.114	0.011***
	(0.034)	(0.176)	(0.128)	(0.003)
Natural Resource	0.133**	-0.717***	-1.351***	0.006*
	(0.065)	(0.235)	(0.307)	(0.004)
Colony	-0.417**	1.720**	1.939***	0.002
	(0.182)	(0.714)	(0.468)	(0.007)

Suitability for Wetland Rice	0.184*	-1.807***	-0.662	0.002
	(0.096)	(0.403)	(0.414)	(0.006)
Distance to Beijing	-0.001***	0.002	0.005**	0.000**
	(0.000)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.000)
Length of Rivers	0.003***	-0.015***	0.001	-0.000**
	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.000)
Account Length (log)	0.140*	0.853	-0.552*	-0.010
	(0.082)	(0.533)	(0.324)	(0.006)
Provincial F.E.	YES	YES	YES	YES
Intercept	18.289***	-119.576***	-83.993***	1.043***
	(6.409)	(26.582)	(21.979)	(0.319)
N	1296	1201	1319	1461
R ²	0.122	0.123	0.129	0.022

P values are based on two-tailed tests. p < 0.1, p < 0.05, p < 0.01.

Eighth, I drop one prefecture at a time to examine whether the results are sensitive to any prefectures. Figures 4.1-4.4 present the OLS estimates with their 95% confidence intervals.




Figure 4.1: OLS Estimates of the Effects of Cultural Revolution Violence on Trust in Central Leaders




Figure 4.2: OLS Estimates of the Effects of Cultural Revolution Violence on Democracy




Figure 4.3: OLS Estimates of the Effects of Cultural Revolution Violence on Freedom of Expression




Figure 4.4: OLS Estimates of the Effects of Cultural Revolution Violence on Protest

Section V Instrumental Variable Estimates




Figure 5.1 Geographic Locations of Sulfur Mines




Figure 5.2: Scatter Plot of Number of Deaths/1,000 and Average Distance to Sulfur Mines (log)

One possible violation of the exclusion restriction is that the localities that are near the plants are subject to more contemporary repression given their proximity to weapons. This is unlikely, given the development of modern transportation that distributes access to weapons. To test this assumption, I collect data on the number of public security organizations from Baidu's points of interest database to proxy for government repressiveness and test whether the prefectures that are closer to sulfur mines have more public security organizations per capita or per square kilometer. As Table 5.1 shows, the effect of *Average Distance to Sulfur Mines (log)* on the density of public security is indistinguishable from zero.

	Per Capita Public Security Organizations	Public Security Organization/km2
	Coefficient	Coefficient
	(Clustered S.E.)	(Clustered S.E.)
Average Distance to Sulfur Mines (log)	8.490	-0.001
	(7.855)	(0.004)
Provincial F.E.	YES	YES
N	277	277
R ²	0.361	0.358

Table 5.1 OLS Estimates of the Effects of Average Distance to Sulfur Mines on Contemporary Repression

Notes: These regressions include all Chinese prefectures.

Another potential violation of the exclusion restriction is that the localities that are close to the plants have experienced a different development path focusing on certain industries, and therefore may have a lower or higher quality of government. To test this possibility, I collect data on a range of variables that measure the quality of government across prefectures, including per capita GDP, perceived corruption, experienced corruption, bureaucratic efficiency, prevalence of bribery, quality of legal institutions, size of government, and average schooling, from a variety of data sources, such as the China Survey, the World Bank's World Business Environment Survey, and government statistics. Table 5.2 (Notes) provides details about these measures and the estimates. As shown, prefectures that are closer to sulfur mines do not differ from other prefectures on any of these quality-of-government measures.

	Per Capita GDP	Perceived Corruption	Experienced Corruption	Days Interacting with Bureaucracy	Bribery	Confidence in Local Courts	Size of Government	Average Schooling
	Coefficient (Clustered S.E.)	Coefficient (Clustered S.E.)	Coefficient (Clustered S.E.)	Coefficient (Clustered S.E.)	Coefficient (Clustered S.E.)	Coefficient (Clustered S.E.)	Coefficient (Clustered S.E.)	Coefficient (Clustered S.E.)
Average Distance to Sulfur Mines (log)	3229.800 (5868.417)	-0.084 (0.293)	-0.079 (0.082)	-14.387 (9.379)	-2.531 (2.030)	7.918 (12.701)	-0.573 (4.970)	-0.215 (0.262)
Provincial F.E.	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
N	284	54	54	117	117	117	284	258
<u>R²</u>	0.355	0.419	0.572	0.469	0.504	0.426	0.693	0.460

Table 5.2 OLS Estimates of the Effects of Average Distance to Sulfur Mines on Contemporary Quality of Government

Notes: This table presents the OLS estimates of the effects of *Average Distance to Sulfur Mines (log)* on some contemporary quality-of-government measures. *Per Capita GDP* is the 2001-2010 average per capita GDP at the prefectural level. *Perceived Corruption* is the aggregate level of perceived corruption, *Experienced Corruption* is the aggregate level of experienced corruption, both from the China Survey. *Days Interacting with Bureaucracy* is constructed by aggregating firms' reported number of days interacting with the government from the World Bank's World Business Environment Survey (2005). *Bribery* is constructed by aggregating firms' answers to the question "Is there a need for informal payment to staff from the financial institutions?" from the World Bank's World Business Environment Survey (2005). *Confidence in Local Courts* is constructed by aggregating firms' answers to the question "Is there a need for informal payment to staff from the financial institutions?" from the World Bank's World Business Environment Survey (2005). *Confidence in Local Courts* is constructed by aggregating firms' answers to the question "In the case of commercial disputes with the suppliers, clients or subsidiaries in your locality, how much confidence do you have that the disputes will be settled with justice by the local legal system?" from the World Bank's World Business Environment Survey was conducted jointly by the World Bank and the Enterprise Survey Organization of the National Bureau of Statistics of China. The survey was implemented in 2005 and interviewed 12,400 firms located in 120 cities across all Chinese provinces except Tibet. In each province, the provincial capital was automatically surveyed, and

additional cities were selected based on the economic size of a province. 100 firms were sampled in each city, except for the four provincial-level cities (Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and Chongqing), where 200 firms were surveyed. *Size of Government* is the 2001-2010 average share of government expenditure in total GDP at the prefectural level. *Average Schooling* is the average year of schooling in every prefecture from the 2000 Census.

	Trust in Central Leaders	Democracy	Freedom of Expression	Protest
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Coefficient	Coefficient	Coefficient	Coefficient
	(C.S.E)	(C.S.E)	(C.S.E)	(C.S.E)
Number of Deaths/1,000 (instrumented)	-0.344***	1.261***	1.204***	-0.011***
	(0.050)	(0.233)	(0.248)	(0.002)
Male	-0.037	0.118	-0.057	0.013***
	(0.045)	(0.177)	(0.158)	(0.004)
Age	0.003	-0.052**	-0.023	-0.001
	(0.008)	(0.026)	(0.029)	(0.001)
Age Squared	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Ethnic Han	0.005	-0.188	-0.454	0.009**
	(0.078)	(0.315)	(0.340)	(0.005)
Good Class	0.041	-0.124	-0.172	-0.006
	(0.082)	(0.443)	(0.384)	(0.019)
Middle Class	0.065	-0.251	-0.048	-0.006
	(0.093)	(0.455)	(0.385)	(0.020)
Male to Female Ratio	-3.445***	14.993***	22.495***	-0.097***
	(0.506)	(3.741)	(2.680)	(0.033)
Urban Population Percentage	0.067***	-0.208***	-0.148***	0.001***
	(0.009)	(0.036)	(0.032)	(0.001)
Frequency of Mass Rebellions	0.044***	-0.022	-0.138***	-0.001
	(0.011)	(0.054)	(0.032)	(0.001)
Population Density	0.001***	-0.003**	-0.003***	-0.000

Table 5.3 IV Estimates of the Effects of Cultural Revolution Violence: Second Stage Results

	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)
Per Capita GDP (log)	-9.698***	26.153**	21.358**	-0.405***
	(2.726)	(10.815)	(9.888)	(0.138)
Natural Disasters	0.229***	-1.003***	-0.759***	0.016***
	(0.074)	(0.331)	(0.268)	(0.005)
Excess Procurement Ratio	0.247***	-0.771***	-0.615***	0.004
	(0.051)	(0.199)	(0.206)	(0.003)
Party Member Density	0.123***	-0.444***	-0.369***	0.004**
	(0.032)	(0.134)	(0.123)	(0.002)
Longitude	-0.135***	0.566***	0.548***	-0.007***
	(0.024)	(0.115)	(0.110)	(0.001)
Latitude	0.019	-0.138	-0.179	0.011***
	(0.036)	(0.157)	(0.125)	(0.002)
Natural Resource	0.175**	-0.953***	-1.391***	0.005
	(0.075)	(0.282)	(0.326)	(0.003)
Colony	-0.565***	0.861*	2.445***	0.000
	(0.116)	(0.452)	(0.312)	(0.005)
Suitability for Wetland Rice	0.280***	-1.439***	-0.967***	0.002
	(0.091)	(0.334)	(0.309)	(0.005)
Distance to Beijing	-0.001***	0.004**	0.005**	0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.000)
Length of Rivers	0.003***	-0.012***	-0.000	-0.000**
	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.000)
Account Length (log)	0.083	0.271	-0.295	-0.012***
	(0.055)	(0.434)	(0.216)	(0.004)
Provincial F.E.	YES	YES	YES	YES
Intercept	62.477***	-171.005***	-155.929***	2.312***

	(14.119)	(58.885)	(54.540)	(0.712)
Ν	1,296	1,201	1,319	1,461
R ²	0.121	0.119	0.129	0.022
Durbin-Wu-Hausman Test (p value)	0.248	0.652	0.558	0.848

	Number of Deaths/1,000				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	
	Coefficient	Coefficient	Coefficient	Coefficient	
	(C.S.E)	(C.S.E)	(C.S.E)	(C.S.E)	
Average Distance to Sulfur Mines (log)	3.084***	3.023***	3.046***	2.971***	
	(0.419)	(0.466)	(0.432)	(0.468)	
Male	0.016*	-0.006	-0.002	0.010	
	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.010)	
Age	-0.002*	0.001	0.000	0.001	
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	
Age Squared	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	
Ethnic Han	0.129**	0.164***	0.168***	0.143**	
	(0.060)	(0.057)	(0.058)	(0.060)	
Good Class	0.053**	0.048**	0.043**	0.038**	
	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.018)	
Middle Class	0.023	0.036**	0.033	0.024	
	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.021)	
Male to Female Ratio	-8.462***	-8.550***	-8.639***	-7.530***	
	(1.649)	(1.505)	(1.489)	(1.750)	
Urban Population Percentage	0.053***	0.052***	0.057***	0.048***	
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.018)	
Frequency of Mass Rebellions	0.168***	0.155***	0.169***	0.152***	
	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.034)	(0.037)	
Population Density	0.002***	0.002***	0.002***	0.002***	
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	
Per Capita GDP (log)	-31.960***	-31.703***	-31.753***	-28.926***	

Table 5.4 IV Estimates of the Effects of Cultural Revolution Violence: First Stage Results

	(6.196)	(6.067)	(5.913)	(6.441)
Natural Disasters	0.885***	0.900***	0.907***	0.830***
	(0.155)	(0.143)	(0.142)	(0.166)
Excess Procurement Ratio	0.557***	0.548***	0.541***	0.505***
	(0.118)	(0.118)	(0.116)	(0.119)
Party Member Density	0.416***	0.413***	0.415***	0.377***
	(0.077)	(0.075)	(0.073)	(0.080)
Longitude	-0.300***	-0.314***	-0.312***	-0.287***
	(0.045)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.051)
Latitude	-0.271***	-0.235***	-0.243***	-0.243***
	(0.075)	(0.082)	(0.080)	(0.085)
Natural Resource	0.923***	0.921***	0.909***	0.864***
	(0.176)	(0.163)	(0.167)	(0.166)
Colony	-0.758***	-0.720***	-0.777***	-0.628***
	(0.210)	(0.212)	(0.200)	(0.222)
Suitability for Wetland Rice	-0.077	-0.025	-0.018	-0.129
	(0.193)	(0.190)	(0.183)	(0.198)
Distance to Beijing	-0.007***	-0.006***	-0.006***	-0.006***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Length of Rivers	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Account Length (log)	-0.422**	-0.450***	-0.468***	-0.411**
	(0.164)	(0.152)	(0.156)	(0.174)
Provincial F.E.	YES	YES	YES	
Intercept	179.793***	178.964***	179.217***	162.856***
	(31.660)	(30.548)	(29.911)	(33.084)
Ν	1,296	1,201	1,319	1,461

<i>F</i> -Stat 54.08 42.13 49.79 40.29	R ²	0.963	0.957	0.961	0.951
	<i>F</i> -Stat	54.08	42.13	49.79	40.29

	Trust in Central Leaders	Democracy	Freedom of Expression	Protest
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Coefficient	Coefficient	Coefficient	Coefficient
	(C.S.E)	(C.S.E)	(C.S.E)	(C.S.E)
Number of Deaths/1,000 (instrumented)	-0.395***	3.552*	1.767**	-0.024**
	(0.112)	(2.085)	(0.826)	(0.010)
Male	-0.036	0.140	-0.058	0.013***
	(0.045)	(0.175)	(0.158)	(0.004)
Age	0.002	-0.048*	-0.021	-0.001
	(0.008)	(0.025)	(0.029)	(0.001)
Age Squared	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Ethnic Han	0.007	-0.416	-0.518	0.010**
	(0.078)	(0.396)	(0.346)	(0.004)
Good Class	0.044	-0.238	-0.188	-0.005
	(0.084)	(0.454)	(0.384)	(0.019)
Middle Class	0.067	-0.347	-0.066	-0.006
	(0.093)	(0.469)	(0.385)	(0.020)
Male to Female Ratio	-3.870***	34.448*	27.326***	-0.187***
	(0.985)	(17.929)	(6.927)	(0.072)
Urban Population Percentage	0.071***	-0.379***	-0.194***	0.002***
	(0.010)	(0.142)	(0.059)	(0.001)
Frequency of Mass Rebellions	0.048***	-0.153	-0.179***	0.000
	(0.011)	(0.114)	(0.051)	(0.001)
Population Density	0.001**	-0.005	-0.004***	0.000

Table 5.5: IV Estimates of the Effects of Cultural Revolution Violence: Second Stage Results using Presence of Sulfur Mine

	(0.000)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.000)
Per Capita GDP (log)	-11.522***	102.601*	41.106*	-0.812**
	(4.362)	(60.026)	(23.110)	(0.345)
Natural Disasters	0.286**	-3.498*	-1.393*	0.029**
	(0.131)	(2.089)	(0.804)	(0.011)
Excess Procurement Ratio	0.285***	-2.365*	-1.017**	0.012*
	(0.089)	(1.252)	(0.483)	(0.007)
Party Member Density	0.147***	-1.434*	-0.624**	0.009**
	(0.055)	(0.782)	(0.301)	(0.004)
Longitude	-0.156***	1.524*	0.780**	-0.011***
	(0.047)	(0.891)	(0.340)	(0.004)
Latitude	0.028	-0.588	-0.291	0.014***
	(0.043)	(0.459)	(0.181)	(0.003)
Natural Resource	0.207*	-2.466	-1.747***	0.012*
	(0.114)	(1.639)	(0.667)	(0.007)
Colony	-0.603***	2.356	2.870***	-0.008
	(0.127)	(1.441)	(0.579)	(0.009)
Suitability for Wetland Rice	0.316***	-2.974**	-1.376***	0.010
	(0.108)	(1.256)	(0.478)	(0.008)
Distance to Beijing	-0.001***	0.010*	0.006**	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.000)
Length of Rivers	0.003***	-0.012**	-0.000	-0.000*
	(0.001)	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.000)
Account Length (log)	0.081	0.533	-0.225	-0.012***
	(0.060)	(0.804)	(0.312)	(0.005)
Provincial F.E.	YES	YES	YES	YES
Intercept	72.793***	-610.997*	-268.027*	4.603**

	(23.724)	(359.278)	(138.434)	(1.935)
Ν	1296	1201	1319	1461
\mathbb{R}^2	0.119	0.058	0.124	0.021
Durbin-Wu-Hausman Test (p value)	0.509	0.011	0.362	0.691

		Number of Deaths/1,000				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)		
	Coefficient	Coefficient	Coefficient	Coefficient		
	(C.S.E)	(C.S.E)	(C.S.E)	(C.S.E)		
Presence of Sulfur Mine	-0.502**	-0.415	-0.461*	-0.469*		
	(0.246)	(0.251)	(0.237)	(0.237)		
Male	0.028***	-0.004	0.004	0.013		
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.009)		
Age	-0.007***	-0.001	-0.003*	-0.001		
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)		
Age Squared	0.000***	-0.000	0.000	0.000		
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)		
Ethnic Han	0.118**	0.156***	0.171***	0.131**		
	(0.058)	(0.053)	(0.057)	(0.058)		
Good Class	0.043*	0.046**	0.028	0.022		
	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.018)		
Middle Class	0.025	0.048**	0.037	0.033		
	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.025)	(0.025)		
Male to Female Ratio	-8.460***	-8.785***	-8.923***	-7.529***		
	(2.259)	(2.092)	(2.058)	(2.267)		
Urban Population Percentage	0.055*	0.055*	0.060**	0.050*		
	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)		
Frequency of Mass Rebellions	0.099**	0.077*	0.096**	0.083*		
	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.042)	(0.043)		
Population Density	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001		
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)		

Table 5.6: IV Estimates of th	e Effects of Cultural Revolution	Violence: First Stage	Results using	Presence of Sulfur Mine
	C Elicets of Cultural fite, oracion	i loieneet i mse seage	LECOMICS MOINE	I I Cochee of Sulful Millie

Per Capita GDP (log)	-3.729***	-3.616***	-3.741***	-3.508***
	(1.081)	(1.130)	(1.104)	(1.098)
Natural Disasters	-0.802***	-0.769***	-0.780***	-0.730***
	(0.151)	(0.158)	(0.152)	(0.148)
Excess Procurement Ratio	0.299***	0.300***	0.297***	0.285***
	(0.082)	(0.078)	(0.079)	(0.081)
Party Member Density	0.052***	0.048***	0.050***	0.045***
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Longitude	-0.406***	-0.418***	-0.413***	-0.382***
	(0.073)	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.078)
Latitude	0.103	0.135	0.130	0.110
	(0.116)	(0.120)	(0.121)	(0.119)
Natural Resource	0.914***	0.897***	0.897***	0.846***
	(0.235)	(0.214)	(0.221)	(0.213)
Colony	-0.946**	-0.808**	-0.928**	-0.808**
	(0.402)	(0.385)	(0.378)	(0.376)
Suitability for Wetland Rice	0.496*	0.501*	0.533**	0.409
	(0.266)	(0.264)	(0.257)	(0.267)
Distance to Beijing	-0.004***	-0.003**	-0.004**	-0.003**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Length of Rivers	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Account Length (log)	-0.268	-0.261	-0.295	-0.227
	(0.233)	(0.223)	(0.228)	(0.234)
Provincial F.E.	YES	YES	YES	
Intercept	86.547***	85.610***	86.629***	79.796***
	(13.970)	(13.668)	(13.124)	(14.313)

Ν	1296	1201	1319	1461
R ²	0.936	0.926	0.932	0.919
<i>F</i> -Stat	4.19	2.73	3.79	3.92

Section VI: Mechanisms

Outcome	Trust in Central Leaders							
Bin	Year of Birth (X0)	Marginal Effect	C.S.E	Lower 95% CI	Upper 95% Cl			
1	1946	-0.109	0.019	-0.146	-0.071			
2	1963	-0.039	0.012	-0.063	-0.014			
3	1978	-0.033	0.013	-0.059	-0.007			
Outcome			Democracy					
Bin	Year of Birth (X0)	Marginal Effect	C.S.E	Lower 95% CI	Upper 95% CI			
1	1947	0.519	0.136	0.252	0.785			
2	1965	0.467	0.156	0.162	0.772			
3	1979	0.301	0.106	0.093	0.510			
Outcome		Freed	om of Expressi	D n				
Bin	Year of Birth (X0)	Marginal Effect	C.S.E	Lower 95% CI	Upper 95% CI			
1	1948	0.423	0.185	0.060	0.786			
2	1965	0.478	0.194	0.097	0.859			
3	1979	0.352	0.129	0.100	0.605			
Outcome			Protest					
Bin	Year of Birth (X0)	Marginal Effect	C.S.E	Lower 95% CI	Upper 95% CI			
1	1946	-0.001	0.003	-0.006	0.004			
2	1964	-0.001	0.002	-0.005	0.002			

Table 6.1: Interflex Estimates of the Effects of Cultural Revolution Violence Across Three Generations

3	1978	-0.002	0.001	-0.005	0.000

Table 6.2: Interflex Estimates of the Effects of Cultural Revolution Violence at Different Levels of Discussing Politics with	1
Family	

Outcome	Trust in Central Leaders				
Bin	Discussing Politics with Family (X0)	Marginal Effect	C.S.E	Lower 95% CI	Upper 95% CI
1	1	0.519	0.294	-0.057	1.095
2	2	-0.016	0.032	-0.079	0.047
3	3	-0.087	0.035	-0.156	-0.019

Outcome		Democracy			
Bin	Discussing Politics with Family (X0)	Marginal Effect	C.S.E	Lower 95% CI	Upper 95% CI
1	1	-0.243	0.915	-2.036	1.551
2	2	0.227	0.156	-0.078	0.533
3	3	0.605	0.183	0.245	0.964

Outcome	Freedom of Expression					
Bin	Discussing Politics with Family (X0)	Marginal Effect	C.S.E	Lower 95% CI	Upper 95% CI	
1	1	-0.899	1.054	-2.965	1.166	
2	2	0.207	0.129	-0.046	0.459	
3	3	0.308	0.413	-0.500	1.117	

Outcome		Protest			
Bin	Discussing Politics with Family (X0)	Marginal Effect	C.S.E	Lower 95% CI	Upper 95% CI
1	1	-0.042	0.052	-0.143	0.059
2	2	0.008	0.006	-0.003	0.019
3	3	-0.008	0.010	-0.028	0.011




Figure 6.1: Interflex Estimates of the Marginal Effects of Cultural Revolution Violence on Democracy Across Different Generations




Figure 6.2: Interflex Estimates of the Marginal Effects of Cultural Revolution Violence on Freedom of Expression Across Different Generations




Figure 6.3: Interflex Estimates of the Marginal Effects of Cultural Revolution Violence on Protest Across Different Generations




Figure 6.4: Interflex Estimates of the Marginal Effects of Cultural Revolution Violence on Democracy at Different Levels of Discussing Politics with Family




Figure 6.5: Interflex Estimates of the Marginal Effects of Cultural Revolution Violence on Freedom of Expression at Different Levels of Discussing Politics with Family




Figure 6.6: Interflex Estimates of the Marginal Effects of Cultural Revolution Violence on Protest at Different Levels of Discussing Politics with Family

	Discussing Politics with Family
	(1)
	Coefficient
	(C.S.E)
Sumber of Deaths/1,000	-0.007
	(0.191)
Iale	-0.096
	(0.158)
Age	0.244
	(0.319)
age Squared	-0.005
	(0.007)
thnic Han	0.520***
	(0.150)
Good Class	-0.759*
	(0.398)
Aiddle Class	-0.808*
	(0.446)
Iale to Female Ratio	-1.671
	(2.007)
Irban Population Percentage	0.102***
	(0.030)
requency of Mass Rebellions	-0.007
	(0.032)
opulation Density	0.002**
	(0.001)

Table 6.3: OLS Estimates of the Determinants of Discussing Politics with Family

Per Capita GDP (log)	-2.318
	(1.664)
Natural Disasters	-0.038
	(0.129)
Excess Procurement Ratio	0.035
	(0.227)
Party Member Density	0.010
	(0.027)
Longitude	-0.164
	(0.106)
Latitude	0.284
	(0.192)
Natural Resource	-0.501***
	(0.151)
Colony	-0.243
	(0.290)
Suitability for Wetland Rice	0.066
	(0.332)
Distance to Beijing	0.001
	(0.002)
Length of Rivers	0.004
	(0.003)
Account Length (log)	-0.123
	(0.210)
Provincial F.E.	YES
Intercept	22.149
	(16.213)

Ν	166
R ²	0.342

	Trust in Central Leaders		Democracy		Freedom of	Expression	Protest	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Coefficient	Coefficient	Coefficient	Coefficient	Coefficient	Coefficient	Coefficient	Coefficient
	(C.S.E)	(C.S.E)	(C.S.E)	(C.S.E)	(C.S.E)	(C.S.E)	(C.S.E)	(C.S.E)
Number of Deaths/1,000	0.011	-0.104**	0.123	0.150	-0.233*	-0.003	-0.001	0.005
	(0.030)	(0.047)	(0.223)	(0.417)	(0.136)	(0.442)	(0.003)	(0.010)
Male		-0.007		0.173		0.232		0.014
		(0.061)		(0.243)		(0.225)		(0.009)
Age		0.026**		0.053		-0.076		0.001
		(0.011)		(0.047)		(0.048)		(0.002)
Age Squared		-0.000*		-0.001		0.000		-0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)
Ethnic Han		-0.066		0.137		-0.036		0.013**
		(0.118)		(0.310)		(0.368)		(0.006)
Good Class		-0.203		0.215		0.444		-0.011
		(0.148)		(0.627)		(0.488)		(0.034)
Middle Class		0.008		0.073		0.461		-0.007
		(0.145)		(0.607)		(0.559)		(0.037)
Male to Female Ratio		-1.726***		-2.426		5.747		-0.209
		(0.442)		(3.496)		(4.747)		(0.152)
Urban Population Percentage		-0.016**		-0.054		0.092		-0.007**
		(0.008)		(0.063)		(0.108)		(0.003)
Frequency of Mass Rebellions		-0.038***		0.094		-0.033		-0.012***
		(0.007)		(0.069)		(0.083)		(0.004)
Population Density		0.000		0.001		0.004*		-0.000*
		(0.000)		(0.002)		(0.002)		(0.000)

Table 6.4: OLS Estimates of the Effects of Cultural Revolution Violence on New Residents

Per Capita GDP (log)		0.755**		2.558		0.355		0.122
		(0.333)		(2.753)		(5.069)		(0.147)
Natural Disasters		-0.119***		-0.350		0.452		-0.008
		(0.029)		(0.257)		(0.377)		(0.012)
Excess Procurement Ratio		0.215***		0.508		-0.515		-0.000
		(0.069)		(0.655)		(0.792)		(0.020)
Party Member Density		0.026***		0.074		-0.075		-0.000
		(0.008)		(0.061)		(0.101)		(0.003)
Longitude		-0.017		0.085		0.016		0.011
		(0.022)		(0.217)		(0.287)		(0.008)
Latitude		-0.179***		-0.743**		0.163		-0.022*
		(0.028)		(0.288)		(0.296)		(0.011)
Natural Resource		0.172***		-1.370***		-1.243**		0.035*
		(0.055)		(0.380)		(0.511)		(0.018)
Colony		-0.412***		1.558**		2.041***		0.030*
		(0.055)		(0.644)		(0.750)		(0.017)
Suitability for Wetland Rice		-0.188**		-0.781		-0.383		-0.043
		(0.082)		(0.647)		(0.925)		(0.029)
Distance to Beijing		-0.002***		-0.005**		0.005		-0.000
		(0.000)		(0.003)		(0.003)		(0.000)
Length of Rivers		0.001		0.001		0.004		-0.000
		(0.000)		(0.004)		(0.006)		(0.000)
Account Length (log)	-0.325***	-0.304***	0.204	-0.483	0.180	0.067	-0.002	0.026
	(0.112)	(0.050)	(0.481)	(0.541)	(0.363)	(0.618)	(0.010)	(0.022)
Provincial F.E.	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Intercept	6.112***	12.917***	2.009	19.017	1.523	-17.180	0.015	-0.724
	(0.941)	(3.722)	(3.860)	(34.958)	(3.065)	(52.508)	(0.089)	(1.516)

Ν	1127	705	996	617	1134	703	1275	804
R ²	0.062	0.172	0.069	0.143	0.117	0.180	0.039	0.051