

# Corruption and Ideological Voting Online Appendix

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**Table 1: Summary Statistics - Macro indicators**

	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Coefficient	0.558	(0.192)	-0	1
Corruption	0.379	(0.256)	0	1
GDP per capita (1000\$)	2.800	(1.267)	1	7
Economic growth	2.569	(2.859)	-7	9
Democratic experience	54.165	(48.462)	0	203
Party Age	55.379	(36.144)	5	161
PR systems	0.887	(0.319)	0	1
Plurality systems	0.546	(0.500)	0	1
District magnitude	17.666	(29.044)	1	150
Effective number of parties	4.495	(1.534)	2	10
Incumbent majority	0.531	(0.107)	0	1
Federalism	0.887	(0.319)	0	1
East-Europe	0.175	(0.382)	0	1
Non-Europe	0.340	(0.476)	0	1
Presidentialism	0.784	(0.414)	0	1
Observations	97			

**Table 2: Summary Statistics - Micro indicators**

	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Ideological proximity	-0.041	(1.758)	-6	4
Perceptual accuracy	0.813	(0.125)	0	1
Political efficacy	0.727	(0.296)	0	1
Age	47.826	(16.492)	18	102
Male	0.509	(0.500)	0	1
Income	3.077	(1.373)	1	5
Low education	0.175	(0.380)	0	1
High education	0.197	(0.398)	0	1
Unemployed	0.043	(0.203)	0	1
Retired	0.206	(0.405)	0	1
Other	0.160	(0.367)	0	1
Incumbent partisan	0.255	(0.436)	0	1
Strength of partisanship	1.508	(1.067)	0	3
Observations	66987			

**Table 3: Second-stage estimates of ideological proximity on vote choice**

	Model 1 Full sample	Model 2 With partisanship	Model 3 Without outliers
Corruption	-0.223** (0.071)	-0.244*** (0.069)	-0.178* (0.082)
GDP/cap (10.000)	0.034* (0.013)	0.034* (0.013)	0.043* (0.017)
Economic growth	-0.003 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.005)
Democratic Experience	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.001)
Party Age	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)
PR Systems	0.023 (0.040)	0.065 (0.039)	0.006 (0.051)
Plurality	0.018 (0.033)	0.023 (0.036)	0.025 (0.036)
District Magnitude	0.001* (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Ef. number of parties	-0.014 (0.009)	-0.002 (0.009)	-0.017 (0.011)
Incumbent's majority	-0.209 (0.128)	-0.365** (0.133)	-0.214 (0.149)
Federalism	-0.026 (0.044)	-0.020 (0.043)	-0.002 (0.050)
Eastern Europe	0.067 (0.052)	0.112* (0.053)	0.063 (0.057)
Non-European	-0.130** (0.042)	-0.081 (0.045)	-0.121* (0.050)
Presidentialism	0.040 (0.041)	-0.003 (0.041)	0.059 (0.047)
Constant	0.678*** (0.109)	0.525*** (0.107)	0.657*** (0.133)
Observations	97	96	94
Log-Likelihood	88.965	89.111	69.335
R <sup>2</sup>	0.515	0.428	0.456

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

**Table 4: Robustness checks for second-stage estimates of ideological proximity on vote choice**

	Baseline	GDP+Democracy	Electoral Institutions	Government Structure	Without East
Corruption	-0.259*** (0.051)	-0.212*** (0.057)	-0.209** (0.065)	-0.144* (0.060)	-0.220** (0.087)
GDP per capita (1000\$)		0.049*** (0.011)	0.047*** (0.012)	0.039** (0.011)	0.030** (0.014)
Democratic experience		-0.001* (0.000)	-0.001 (0.000)	-0.001* (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Party Age			0.000 (0.000)		-0.000 (0.001)
PR systems			0.042 (0.043)		0.018 (0.040)
Plurality systems			-0.013 (0.029)		0.014 (0.040)
District magnitude			0.000 (0.001)		0.001* (0.001)
Effective number of parties			-0.007 (0.009)		-0.018 (0.011)
Incumbent majority				-0.030 (0.103)	-0.166 (0.134)
Federalism				0.015 (0.041)	-0.057 (0.052)
Presidentialism				0.118** (0.037)	0.078 (0.055)
East-Europe					
Non-Europe					-0.126** (0.045)
Economic growth					-0.002 (0.005)
Constant	0.628*** (0.021)	0.517*** (0.043)	0.512*** (0.075)	0.429*** (0.074)	0.672*** (0.118)
Observations	103	103	101	99	80
R <sup>2</sup>	0.203	0.337	0.346	0.405	0.572

**Table 5: Simultaneous equation models of vote choice, perceptual accuracy and political efficacy**

	Model 1	SEM 1		SEM 2	
	Vote	Vote	Perc Acc	Vote	Pol Effic
Corruption	-0.052 (0.339)	-0.102 (0.280)	-0.127*** (0.036)	-0.517** (0.198)	-0.197*** (0.046)
Corruption x Ideol prox	-0.124** (0.042)	-0.048 (0.041)		-0.054* (0.027)	
Ideological proximity	0.226*** (0.024)	-0.192*** (0.051)		0.075*** (0.013)	
Perceptual accuracy		-0.077 (0.399)			
Perc acc * Ideol prox		0.504*** (0.067)			
Political efficacy				-2.926*** (0.066)	
Pol Eff * Ideol prox				0.032** (0.010)	
Incumbent partisan	2.203*** (0.052)	2.176*** (0.048)		1.343*** (0.069)	
Economic growth	0.017 (0.014)	0.018 (0.015)		0.010 (0.008)	
Age	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.002* (0.001)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.001* (0.001)	-0.000* (0.000)
Male	-0.059*** (0.017)	-0.059** (0.019)	0.012*** (0.002)	-0.044*** (0.013)	-0.006 (0.003)
Income	0.000 (0.009)	0.001 (0.009)	0.008*** (0.001)	0.020*** (0.006)	0.006*** (0.001)
Low education	0.120** (0.038)	0.121** (0.039)	-0.014*** (0.004)	0.041 (0.028)	-0.004 (0.007)
High education	-0.051 (0.031)	-0.048 (0.030)	0.025*** (0.003)	0.032 (0.021)	0.018** (0.006)
Unemployed	0.024 (0.045)	0.024 (0.035)	-0.012* (0.006)	-0.026 (0.028)	-0.015* (0.007)
Retired	0.047 (0.030)	0.052* (0.025)	-0.001 (0.003)	0.079*** (0.022)	0.014** (0.005)
Other	-0.020 (0.029)	-0.022 (0.026)	0.000 (0.004)	0.022 (0.025)	0.007 (0.006)
Strength of partisanship			-0.002 (0.001)		0.058*** (0.003)


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	SEM 1			SEM 2	
	Vote	Vote	Perc Acc	Vote	Pol Effic
GDP per capita	0.059 (0.052)	0.058 (0.048)	-0.002 (0.006)	0.005 (0.030)	-0.008 (0.007)
Democratic experience	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.002 (0.001)	0.000 (0.000)
Party Age	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.000)
PR systems	0.079 (0.158)	0.074 (0.160)	-0.029 (0.020)	0.161* (0.081)	0.050* (0.022)
Plurality systems	0.168 (0.139)	0.169 (0.149)	-0.024 (0.019)	0.067 (0.102)	-0.003 (0.022)
District magnitude	0.002 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.005*** (0.001)	0.001*** (0.000)
Eff # of parties	-0.048 (0.043)	-0.049 (0.034)	-0.012** (0.005)	-0.064* (0.032)	-0.014* (0.007)
Incumbent majority	0.144 (0.407)	0.115 (0.437)	-0.132 (0.069)	0.341 (0.303)	0.020 (0.092)
Federalism	0.044 (0.162)	0.051 (0.163)	0.023 (0.017)	0.080 (0.129)	0.020 (0.020)
East-Europe	-0.080 (0.184)	-0.080 (0.180)	-0.004 (0.024)	0.212 (0.126)	0.082* (0.034)
Non-Europe	-0.105 (0.176)	-0.110 (0.172)	-0.046* (0.019)	-0.168 (0.101)	-0.042* (0.021)
Presidentialism	-0.137 (0.128)	-0.136 (0.137)	0.051* (0.020)	-0.299*** (0.087)	-0.078*** (0.022)
Constant	-1.188* (0.518)	-1.087 (0.595)	0.982*** (0.064)	1.578*** (0.277)	0.761*** (0.076)
Observations	66987	66987		66987	
Elections	88	88		88	
Log-Likelihood	-22990.124	29396.220		-32925.660	

Country-election bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses


\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Figure 1: Average marginal effect of ideological proximity across observed levels of corruption



Average marginal effect is calculated based on an observed-value approach following Hanmer and Kalkan's (2013) indications, based on 1000 simulations using the results in Model 1 in Table 5

**Figure 2: Average marginal effect of corruption across observed levels of ideological proximity to the incumbent**



Average marginal effect is calculated based on an observed-value approach following Hanmer and Kalkan's (2013) indications, based on 1000 simulations using the results in Model 1 in Table 5



Table 6: Robustness checks for vote choice models

	Program controls	Program inter	Instit inter	Without East	Without East+Inter	Fixed Effects
Corruption	0.160 (0.167)	-0.050 (0.327)	-0.067 (0.344)	0.251 (0.219)	0.169 (0.347)	-0.567*** (0.163)
Corruption x Ideol prox	-0.131** (0.047)	-0.151* (0.065)	-0.111* (0.056)	-0.191*** (0.055)	-0.183*** (0.052)	-0.108*** (0.018)
Ideological proximity	0.227*** (0.025)	0.247*** (0.074)	0.131* (0.057)	0.240*** (0.025)	0.239*** (0.023)	0.230*** (0.008)
Age	-0.002* (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.002*** (0.001)
Male	-0.058*** (0.018)	-0.058*** (0.016)	-0.057** (0.018)	-0.059** (0.020)	-0.060*** (0.016)	-0.050*** (0.014)
Income	0.001 (0.009)	0.001 (0.009)	0.001 (0.009)	0.005 (0.011)	0.007 (0.009)	-0.001 (0.005)
Low education	0.143** (0.045)	0.120*** (0.034)	0.120*** (0.034)	0.132** (0.043)	0.100** (0.037)	0.086*** (0.020)
High education	-0.061* (0.028)	-0.052* (0.025)	-0.053 (0.027)	-0.065* (0.032)	-0.067* (0.030)	-0.059** (0.018)
Unemployed	0.021 (0.044)	0.022 (0.044)	0.021 (0.042)	0.050 (0.040)	0.068 (0.037)	0.040 (0.034)
Retired	0.041 (0.029)	0.048 (0.028)	0.048 (0.027)	0.033 (0.034)	0.051 (0.032)	0.046* (0.023)
Other	-0.005 (0.029)	-0.021 (0.029)	-0.021 (0.029)	-0.009 (0.034)	-0.018 (0.027)	-0.020 (0.020)
Incumbent partisan	2.215*** (0.068)	2.199*** (0.055)	2.203*** (0.051)	2.179*** (0.053)	2.158*** (0.052)	2.212*** (0.016)
Economic growth	0.003 (0.012)	0.018 (0.013)	0.018 (0.014)	0.000 (0.014)	0.008 (0.017)	0.090*** (0.008)
GDP per capita (1000\$)	0.030 (0.040)	0.051 (0.048)	0.061 (0.046)	0.022 (0.044)	0.046 (0.047)	-0.211*** (0.050)
Democratic experience	0.002 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.002 (0.001)	0.000 (0.002)	0.007*** (0.001)

	Program controls	Programm inter	Instit inter	Without East	Without East+Inter	Fixed Effects
Party Age	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.007*** (0.001)
PR systems		0.087 (0.152)	0.061 (0.164)		-0.056 (0.137)	-0.043 (0.165)
Plurality systems		0.167 (0.137)	0.183 (0.169)		-0.086 (0.227)	0.131 (0.115)
District magnitude		0.002 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)		0.001 (0.002)	-0.004** (0.001)
Effective number of parties		-0.050 (0.040)	-0.056 (0.047)		-0.112* (0.047)	-0.033* (0.014)
Incumbent majority		0.131 (0.377)	0.124 (0.383)		0.029 (0.389)	0.045 (0.177)
Federalism		0.047 (0.145)	0.041 (0.187)		0.376 (0.220)	-0.265*** (0.074)
East-Europe		-0.084 (0.167)	-0.091 (0.192)			-0.800*** (0.159)
Non-Europe		-0.103 (0.155)	-0.107 (0.180)		0.033 (0.174)	-0.712*** (0.144)
Presidentialism		-0.130 (0.125)	-0.129 (0.156)		-0.008 (0.166)	-0.717*** (0.111)
Ideol proximity * GDP/cap		0.022 (0.017)				
Ideol proximity * Dem. Experience		-0.000 (0.000)				
Ideol proximity * Party Age		-0.001 (0.001)				
Ideol proximity * District magnitude			-0.000 (0.001)			
Ideol proximity * Ef. nr. parties			0.012 (0.011)			
Ideol proximity * PR			0.075* (0.035)			

	Program controls	Programm inter	Instit inter	Without East	Without East+Inter	Fixed Effects
Ideol proximity * PR			0.075*			
			(0.035)			
Ideol proximity * Plurality			-0.030			
			(0.034)			
Constant	-1.276***	-1.188*	-1.132*	-1.275***	-0.976*	0.299
	(0.153)	(0.465)	(0.544)	(0.205)	(0.433)	(0.317)
Country FE						YES
Year FE						YES
Observations	66987	66987	66987	58057	58057	66987
Log-Likelihood	-23094.654	-22953.989	-22940.586	-20436.598	-20277.409	-22253.416

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

## Heckman selection model with macro corruption and all four CSES waves

To test whether the effect of corruption on ideological voting is not an artifact of people participating less in elections in countries with corruption, because they feel less politically efficacious and do not see parties' positions on the ideological scale, I use a Heckman selection model (Heckman 1979) and estimate simultaneously the impact of corruption on turnout and vote for the incumbent. Self-reported turnout is coded 1 if respondents reported that they participated in elections and 0 otherwise.

The two equations used in the model are both set up as probit models of turnout ( $T_{1ik}$ ) and vote choice ( $V_{2ik}$ ), with latent dependent variables, linked through their correlated individual error terms ( $\epsilon_{1ik}$  and  $\epsilon_{2ik}$ ):

$$T_{1ik}^* = \alpha_{1t} + \omega_{1t}C_{ik} + \omega_{2t}Z_{ik} + \epsilon_{1ik} \quad (1)$$

and

$$V_{2ik}^* = \begin{cases} \alpha_1 + \beta_1 I_{ik} + \beta_2 C_k + \beta_3 C_k * I_{ik} + \gamma_1' X_{ik} + \epsilon_{2ik} & \text{if } T_{1ik} = 1 \\ & \text{if } T_{1ik} = 0 \end{cases} \quad (2)$$

Equation 2 of vote choice when turnout is 1 (for those who voted) is identical to the equation of vote for the incumbent in the paper. Both Equations 1 and 2 have a vector of covariates  $Z_{ik}$  or  $X_{ik}$ , for each individual  $i$  in country  $k$ , and covariates at aggregate level for each country  $k$ . The turnout model (1) includes the same predictors as the vote choice model, except for ideological proximity and the interaction between corruption and ideological proximity. For identification purposes, I add strength of partisanship as a control variable at the individual level and compulsory voting variable at the macro level.<sup>1</sup> Stronger partisans of any of the political parties are more likely to participate

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<sup>1</sup>Strength of partisanship coded 1 for those who do not feel close to any party, while for those who

than non-voters, but there are no theoretical reasons to expect them voting more for the incumbent. Compulsory voting increases turnout (Franklin 1999), but there are no clear empirical results indicating that compulsory voting brings an advantage (or not) to the incumbent. McAllister (1986), for example, finds that high turnout in Australia increases Labour’s support, but Citrin et al. (2003) show, based on simulations, that universal turnout in the United States would not benefit either the Democrats or the Republicans.

The two equations are estimated using conditional mixed-process models and maximum likelihood (Roodman et al. 2011). Similar to previous simultaneous equation models, I estimate standard errors using nonparametric bootstrapping, resampling elections and countries because of the hierarchical structure of the data.

Comparing the estimates from the Heckman vote choice model in Table 7 with those from the naïve vote for the incumbent model in Table 5, we see a drop in the magnitude of the interaction term between corruption and ideological proximity in the Heckman model. The coefficient is nevertheless still statistically significant and negative, meaning that corruption still has an eroding effect on ideological voting after accounting for its effect on turnout. That is partially due to the negative effect of corruption on turnout. People are less likely to vote in countries with high corruption than in countries with low corruption (the coefficient of corruption is negative and statistically significant). The probability of voting in countries with high levels of corruption is around 90% while in countries with low corruption is reduced to almost 80% (Figure 3). Over-reported turnout could explain the high estimated probabilities. Correcting for over-reporting is beside the scope of the article. There are no theoretical reasons to expect that people over-report voting in countries with high corruption than in countries with low corruption.


The correlation between the error terms is positive and statistically significant

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declared themselves as close to a party the variable is coded 2 = “not very close”, 3 = “somewhat close” and 4 = “very close”.

( $\text{atanhrho}=0.751$ ). Hence, the naïve vote choice model in Table 5 suffers of selection bias: unobserved factors that increase turnout are more likely to increase voters' probability of voting for the incumbent. The difference in coefficient between the naïve and Heckman models is nevertheless small, and as such I conclude that the selection bias in the naïve models of vote choice does not constitute a threat for the interpretation of the vote choice model with a sample of voters, at least when it comes to the main focus of the paper. After accounting for the effect of corruption on turnout, its impact on ideological voting is still strong and statistically significant.

**Figure 3: Average predicted probabilities of voting across observed levels of corruption**



Average probabilities are calculated based on an observed-value approach following Hanmer and Kalkan's (2013) indications, based on 1000 simulations using the results in Model 2 in Table 7

**Table 7: Heckman model of vote choice and turnout**

	Vote for incumbent	Turnout
Corruption x Ideol prox	-0.095* (0.043)	
Ideological proximity	0.206*** (0.020)	
Corruption	0.061 (0.264)	-0.545* (0.254)
Age	0.000 (0.001)	0.013*** (0.001)
Male	-0.065*** (0.015)	-0.033* (0.014)
Income	0.012 (0.008)	0.087*** (0.008)
Low education	0.087** (0.031)	-0.171*** (0.031)
High education	-0.031 (0.026)	0.203*** (0.027)
Unemployed	-0.022 (0.038)	-0.191*** (0.039)
Retired	0.023 (0.025)	-0.111*** (0.033)
Other	-0.027 (0.024)	-0.046* (0.019)
Incumbent partisan	2.116*** (0.053)	
Economic growth	0.021 (0.012)	
GDP per capita (1000\$)	0.074 (0.039)	0.038 (0.035)
Democratic experience	-0.000 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)
Party Age	-0.000 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)
PR systems	0.080 (0.133)	0.165 (0.141)
Plurality systems	0.160 (0.128)	-0.089 (0.095)
District magnitude	0.001 (0.001)	-0.003* (0.001)
Effective number of parties	-0.043 (0.035)	-0.043 (0.032)

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	Vote for incumbent	Turnout
Incumbent majority	0.209 (0.330)	-0.691 (0.462)
Federalism	-0.087 (0.197)	0.091 (0.143)
East-Europe	-0.042 (0.154)	-0.047 (0.137)
Non-Europe	-0.010 (0.134)	0.441*** (0.131)
Presidentialism	-0.012 (0.105)	0.421*** (0.110)
Strength of partisanship		0.322*** (0.023)
Compulsory voting		0.486*** (0.131)
Constant	-1.596*** (0.396)	0.160 (0.401)
/atanhrho		0.751*** 0.067
Observations	66 987	92511
Observations		88
Log-likelihood		-52168.157

Country-election bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$



**Models with perceptions of corruption instead of macro indicator of corruption**

**Table 8: Multilevel models of voting for the prime minister party**

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Perceived Corruption	-0.099*** (0.018)	-0.073*** (0.018)	0.039 (0.071)	-0.081*** (0.019)	-0.080*** (0.019)
Ideological proximity	0.190*** (0.007)	0.271*** (0.016)	0.272*** (0.017)	0.237*** (0.028)	0.379*** (0.080)
Perceived Corruption * Ideological proximity		-0.042*** (0.008)	-0.043*** (0.008)	-0.026** (0.009)	-0.027** (0.009)
PM party Partisan	2.404*** (0.067)	2.396*** (0.067)	2.593*** (0.132)	2.389*** (0.067)	2.389*** (0.067)
Coalition Partisan	-0.054 (0.067)	-0.051 (0.068)	0.203 (0.133)	-0.088 (0.068)	-0.088 (0.068)
Apartisan	0.840*** (0.067)	0.838*** (0.067)	0.889*** (0.135)	0.827*** (0.068)	0.827*** (0.068)
Age	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Male	-0.087*** (0.026)	-0.085** (0.026)	-0.085** (0.026)	-0.077** (0.026)	-0.077** (0.026)
Income	-0.015 (0.010)	-0.015 (0.010)	-0.015 (0.010)	-0.014 (0.010)	-0.014 (0.010)
Low Education	0.109** (0.040)	0.109** (0.040)	0.108** (0.040)	0.102* (0.041)	0.103* (0.041)
High Education	-0.037 (0.033)	-0.036 (0.033)	-0.035 (0.033)	-0.034 (0.034)	-0.035 (0.034)
Economic growth	0.059 (0.042)	0.057 (0.037)	0.060 (0.041)	0.064 (0.038)	0.061 (0.038)
Democracy	-0.005 (0.010)	-0.005 (0.010)	-0.005 (0.010)	0.002 (0.010)	0.001 (0.010)

Table continues on next page

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Economic development	0.009 (0.020)	0.009 (0.016)	0.007 (0.019) -0.132 (0.074)	-0.004 (0.018)	-0.001 (0.019)
PM party Partisan*Ideological Proximity					
Apartisan*Ideological Proximity					
Coalition Partisan*Ideological Proximity			-0.164* (0.075)		
Electoral disproportionality					0.011 (0.026)
Party age					-0.000 (0.004)
Democracy*Ideological proximity					-0.006** (0.002)
Ec development*Ideological proximity					0.005 (0.005)
Electoral disproportionality *Ideological proximity					-0.013* (0.007)
Party age * Ideological proximity					0.001 (0.001)
Constant	-1.455*** (0.310)	-1.492*** (0.283)	-1.646*** (0.323)	-1.475*** (0.288)	-1.541*** (0.353)
Country variation (SD)	0.407*** (0.058)	0.400*** (0.051)	0.400*** (0.057)	0.367*** (0.054)	0.366*** (0.052)
Variation of Ideological Proximity				0.101*** (0.016)	0.082*** (0.015)
Observations	19151	19151	19151	19151	19151
Country-years	26	26	26	26	26
AIC	11998.695	11970.028	11962.797	11784.605	11788.038
Log Likelihood	-5984.347	-5969.014	-5962.399	-5874.302	-5870.019

Standard errors in parentheses


\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

**Table 9: Average marginal effect of ideological proximity conditional on perceptions of corruption and their 95% confidence interval**

	Effect	95 % CI
Corruption is very widespread	0.024	0.021 , 0.028
Corruption hardly happens	0.048	0.042 , 0.054

Note: Average marginal effects calculated using the observed-value approach Hanmer and Kalkan (2013), based on 1000 simulations using the results in Model 2 in Table 8

**Figure 4: Average predicted probabilities of voting for the party of the prime minister as function of ideological proximity among those with low and high perceptions of corruption**



Average probabilities are calculated based on an observed-value approach following Hanmer and Kalkan's (2013) indications, based on 1000 simulations using the results in Model 2 in Table 8

**Table 10: Simultaneous Equations Models of voting for the Prime minister party with perceptual accuracy and political efficacy as mediators**

	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9
	<b>DV: Vote choice</b>			
Perceived Corruption	-0.055** (0.020)	-0.071*** (0.020)	-0.063** (0.020)	-0.064** (0.020)
Perceived Corruption * Ideol proximity	-0.043*** (0.008)	-0.030*** (0.008)	-0.041*** (0.008)	-0.040*** (0.008)
Ideological proximity	0.253*** (0.018)	-0.033 (0.044)	0.243*** (0.018)	0.179*** (0.033)
PM party Partisan	2.499*** (0.076)	2.473*** (0.076)	2.470*** (0.077)	2.469*** (0.077)
Coalition Partisan	-0.076 (0.077)	-0.059 (0.077)	-0.092 (0.079)	-0.089 (0.079)
Apartisan	0.849*** (0.075)	0.843*** (0.076)	0.830*** (0.077)	0.833*** (0.078)
Age	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)
Male	-0.080** (0.028)	-0.069* (0.029)	-0.081** (0.029)	-0.081** (0.029)
Income	-0.022 (0.011)	-0.017 (0.011)	-0.023* (0.012)	-0.022 (0.012)
Low Education	0.131** (0.043)	0.116** (0.044)	0.128** (0.044)	0.126** (0.044)
High Education	-0.024 (0.036)	-0.005 (0.037)	-0.033 (0.037)	-0.034 (0.037)
Economic growth	0.069 (0.038)	0.063 (0.039)	0.058 (0.039)	0.057 (0.039)
Democracy	-0.003 (0.009)	-0.004 (0.009)	-0.003 (0.009)	-0.003 (0.009)
Economic development	0.005 (0.018)	0.009 (0.018)	0.007 (0.018)	0.007 (0.018)
Perceptual Accuracy		-0.110*** (0.017)		
Political Efficacy				-0.004 (0.008)
Perceptual Accuracy*Ideol proximity		0.046*** (0.006)		
Political Efficacy*Ideol proximity				0.008* (0.003)
Constant	-1.552*** (0.291)	-0.900** (0.313)	-1.460*** (0.288)	-1.431*** (0.296)
Country Variance	0.138*** (0.040)	0.143*** (0.042)	0.134*** (0.040)	0.134*** (0.040)

Table continues on next page

	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9
	<b>DV: Perceptual Accuracy</b>		<b>DV: Political Efficacy</b>	
Perceived Corruption		-0.103*** (0.009)		-0.143*** (0.021)
PM party Partisan		-0.166*** (0.033)		0.079 (0.080)
Apartisan		-0.312*** (0.039)		0.322*** (0.096)
Coalition Partisan		-0.107*** (0.032)		0.060 (0.078)
Age		0.000 (0.000)		-0.002 (0.001)
Low Education		-0.133*** (0.020)		-0.205*** (0.047)
High Education		0.195*** (0.016)		0.197*** (0.039)
Male		0.107*** (0.013)		-0.049 (0.030)
Strength partisanship		-0.081*** (0.011)		0.487*** (0.025)
Income		0.050*** (0.005)		0.014 (0.012)
Electoral disproportionality		-0.059* (0.024)		-0.043 (0.032)
Democracy		-0.013 (0.009)		-0.011 (0.012)
Party age		0.007 (0.004)		-0.007 (0.005)
Economic development		0.009 (0.018)		0.005 (0.024)
Constant		6.781*** (0.299)		8.050*** (0.405)
Country Variance		0.120*** (0.034)		0.202*** (0.059)
Individual Variance		0.663*** (0.007)		3.488*** (0.040)
<i>N</i>	16508	16508	15566	15566
Country-year	26	26	25	25
Log Likelihood	-5.061.635	-25.111.289	-4.866.963	-36.718.370

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

**Table 11: Naïve and Heckman selection models of voting for the PM party as a function of perceived corruption**

	Model 10 Naïve Vote choice	Model 11 Vote choice	Turnout
Perceived Corruption	-0.074*** (0.020)	-0.072*** (0.020)	-0.052** (0.017)
Ideol proximity*P. Corruption	-0.039*** (0.008)	-0.039*** (0.008)	
Ideological proximity	0.262*** (0.017)	0.261*** (0.017)	
PM party Partisan	2.403*** (0.074)	2.401*** (0.074)	
Coalition Partisan	-0.071 (0.075)	-0.072 (0.075)	
Apartisan	0.855*** (0.075)	0.870*** (0.078)	
Age	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.015*** (0.001)
Male	-0.097*** (0.028)	-0.095*** (0.028)	-0.036 (0.025)
Income	-0.009 (0.011)	-0.012 (0.011)	0.095*** (0.010)
Low Education	0.091* (0.042)	0.096* (0.042)	-0.159*** (0.036)
High Education	-0.047 (0.035)	-0.051 (0.036)	0.151*** (0.037)
Strength partisanship			0.266*** (0.014)
Political Efficacy			0.083*** (0.006)
Political Involvement			0.318*** (0.029)
Economic growth	0.050 (0.045)	0.061** (0.021)	
Democracy	-0.005 (0.010)	-0.004 (0.010)	0.004 0.006
Economic Development	0.008 (0.020)	0.007 (0.013)	(0.012)
Electoral disproportionality			-0.023 (0.018)
Age of parties			0.001 (0.002)
Compulsory vote			0.467 (0.274)

Table continues on next page

	Model 10 Naïve Vote choice	Model 11 Vote choice	Turnout
Constant	-1.449*** (0.328)	-1.438*** (0.250)	0.100 (0.302)
Variance Constant	0.413*** (0.062)	0.431*** (0.178)	0.477*** (0.067)
Individuals	16713	36526	
Countries	24	24	
$\rho(\epsilon_{1ij}, \epsilon_{2ij})$		-0.134 (0.178)	
Log Likelihood	-11796.3385	-11796.338	

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$



**Table 12: Summary Statistics**

	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Vote for PM party	0.304	(0.460)	0	1
Perceived Corruption	1.692	(0.941)	0	3
Ideological proximity	-0.034	(2.387)	-8	5
Perceptual Accuracy	1.608	(0.920)	0	7
Political Efficacy	7.722	(1.999)	2	10
PM party Partisan	0.249	(0.432)	0	1
Coalition Partisan	0.493	(0.500)	0	1
Apartisan	0.201	(0.401)	0	1
Age	47.925	(16.074)	17	100
Male	0.519	(0.500)	0	1
Income	3.071	(1.351)	1	5
Low Education	0.153	(0.360)	0	1
High Education	0.224	(0.417)	0	1
Strength partisanship	1.502	(1.033)	0	3
Political involvement	0.417	(0.655)	0	2
Economic growth	2.622	(1.995)	0	8
Democracy	37.911	(14.890)	8	51
Economic development	23.933	(8.497)	5	36
Electoral disproportionality	5.304	(3.238)	1	17
Compulsory voting	0.071	(0.257)	0	1

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