

How do people evaluate foreign aid to “nasty” regimes?

Web Appendix

Tobias Heinrich*

Yoshiharu Kobayashi†

*Department of Political Science, University of South Carolina, heinric@mailbox.sc.edu.

†Department of Political Science and International Relations, Nazarbayev University, yoshiharu.kobayashi@nu.edu.kz.

A Coefficients

A.1 Coefficients for models with non-experimental variables




Figure A.1: Coefficients in Models with non-experimental Variables. To keep coefficients legible, we omit the intercept. Gray dots and lines are for the model under the basic specification for survey weights, black for the more complex. Point estimates are given by the dots, 95% confidence intervals through the horizontal lines. The omitted categories for the nominal variables are including sitting exactly at zero.

A.2 Coefficients for *addressing* models




Figure A.2: Coefficients in Models with experimental Variables. To keep coefficients legible, we omit the intercept. The figure is constructed analogously to Figure A.1.

A.3 Coefficients for basic models




Figure A.3: Coefficients in Models with experimental Variables. To keep coefficients legible, we omit the intercept. The figure is constructed analogously to Figure A.1.

A.4 Coefficients for *diverting* models




Figure A.4: Coefficients in Models with experimental Variables. To keep coefficients legible, we omit the intercept. The figure is constructed analogously to Figure A.1.

A.5 Coefficients for *distancing* models




Figure A.5: Coefficients in Models with experimental Variables. To keep coefficients legible, we omit the intercept. The figure is constructed analogously to Figure A.1.

B Conditional effects under alternative weighting schemes

B.1 Conditional effects for *distancing* and *diverting* under “basic” weighting scheme




Figure A.6: Effects of unpalatable policies conditional on *distancing* and *diverting* under “basic” weighting scheme. To keep coefficients legible, we omit the intercept. The figure is constructed analogously to Figure ??.

B.2 Conditional effects for *distancing* and *diverting* under “basic + demographics” weighting scheme




Figure A.7: Effects of unpalatable policies conditional on *distancing* and *diverting* under under “basic + demographics” weighting scheme. The figure is constructed analogously to Figure ??.

B.3 Conditional effects for *addressing* under alternative weighting scheme; *addressing* response




Figure A.8: Effects of unpalatable Policies conditional when the government optimally *addresses* under alternative weighting schemes. The figure is constructed analogously to Figure ??.

B.4 Difference between *addressing* and ignoring the issue for each channel




Figure A.9: Difference between *addressing* and ignoring the issue for each channel. The x-axis shows the difference between the effect of the issue when the optimal remedial aid amount is chosen and the effect when no additional aid is given for each channel on the y-axis and each issue. The horizontal lines and dots indicate the 95% confidence intervals and the point estimate.

C Survey balancing




Figure A.10: Survey balancing. Each panel's abscissa shows the standardized difference in means for the variables listed on the ordinate. Triangle indicate the raw differences between our own data and the CCES target; the dots show the differences after applying the weights from entropy balancing. The left hand panel shows the balancing when using the basic specification, the right hand side when relying on the more complex covariate set.