Appendix

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| ***Table A1:*** *The Effect of Prior Attitudes on Correct Interpretations (Logistic Regression Analysis)*  *Panel A: Politician sample*   |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | |  | **Model 1** | **Model 2** | **Model 3** | **Model 4** | **Model 5** | **Model 6** | **Model 7** | **Model 8** | | Pro public sector | -3.47\*\*\*  (0.99) | 2.77\*\*\*  (0.68) | -0.84  (0.69) | 0.76  (0.74) | -2.61\*\*\*  (0.71) | 1.25  (0.73) | -0.17  (0.61) | -0.27  (0.64) | | Intercept | 3.72\*\*\*  (0.86) | -0.33  (0.45) | 1.75\*\*  (0.51) | 0.79  (0.50) | 2.13\*\*\*  (0.51) | 0.44  (0.47) | 1.09\*  (0.47) | 1.39\*\*  (0.45) | | Wald Chi2 | 12.19\*\*\* | 16.43\*\*\* | 1.47 | 1.03 | 13.72\*\*\* | 2.91 | 0.08 | 0.18 | | n | 127 | 124 | 118 | 118 | 106 | 107 | 120 | 123 | | Data | Schools;  T1 | Schools;  T2 | Schools;  P1 | Schools;  P2 | Roads;  T1 | Roads;  T2 | Roads;  P1 | Roads;  P2 |   *Panel B: Citizen sample*   |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | |  | **Model 1** | **Model 2** | **Model 3** | **Model 4** | **Model 5** | **Model 6** | **Model 7** | **Model 8** | | Pro public sector | -2.28\*\*  (0.77) | 3.31\*\*\*  (0.79) | 0.14  (0.65) | -0.74  (0.72) | -1.27  (0.68) | 0.67  (0.78) | -0.55  (0.69) | 0.27  (0.70) | | Intercept | 1.87\*\*\*  (0.48) | -1.09\*  (0.47) | 0.63  (0.43) | 1.05\*  (0.44) | 0.96\*  (0.44) | 0.52  (0.49) | 0.74  (0.42) | 0.54  (0.42) | | Wald Chi2 | 8.80\*\* | 17.48\*\*\* | 0.05 | 1.08 | 3.50 | 0.74 | 0.64 | 0.15 | | n | 121 | 126 | 128 | 125 | 128 | 126 | 123 | 129 | | Data | Schools;  T1 | Schools;  T2 | Schools;  P1 | Schools;  P2 | Roads;  T1 | Roads;  T2 | Roads;  P1 | Roads;  P2 |   *Note:* The dependent variable measures whether respondents identify the supplier with the highest rate of satisfaction as being the one that performs best. \*\*\*;\*\*;\*: P<0.001; 0.01; 0.05; two-sided significance tests. Entries are logistic regression coefficients. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  ***Table A2:*** *Differences between politician and citizen responses to experiment 1 and 2*   |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | |  | **Model 1** | **Model 2** | **Model 3** | **Model 4** | **Model 5** | **Model 6** | **Model 7** | **Model 8** | | Prior attitudes (pro public sector) | 0.14  (0.65) | -0.74  (0.71) | -0.55  (0.69) | 0.27  (0.70) | -2.28\*\*  (0.77) | 3.31\*\*\*  (0.79) | -1.27  (0.68) | 0.67  (0.78) | | Politician dummy | 1.12  (0.66) | -0.26  (0.66) | 0.34  (0.62) | 0.84  (0.61) | 1.85  (0.98) | 0.76  (0.65) | 1.17  (0.67) | -0.08  (0.68) | |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | | Treatment dummy | 1.24  (0.64) | -2.14\*\*  (0.64) | 0.21  (0.60) | -0.02  (0.65) | -- | -- | -- | -- | |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | | Prior attitudes x politician  Prior attitudes x treatment  Politician x treatment  Prior attitudes x politician x treatment | -0.98  (0.94)  -2.42\*  (1.00)  0.73  (1.18)  -0.21  (1.57) | 1.50  (1.03)  4.05\*\*\*  (1.06)  1.02  (0.93)  -2.03  (1.47) | 0.38  (0.92)  -0.72  (0.97)  0.83  (0.91)  -1.72  (1.34) | -0.55  (0.95)  0.40  (1.05)  -0.92  (0.91)  1.12  (1.43) | -1.19  (1.25)  --  --  -- | -0.53  (1.04)  --  --  -- | -1.34  (0.98)  --  --  -- | 0.57  (1.07)  --  --  -- | |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | | Intercept | 0.63  (0.43) | 1.05\*  (0.44) | 0.74  (0.41) | 0.54  (0.42) | 1.87\*\*\*  (0.48) | -1.09\*  (0.47) | 0.96\*  (0.44) | 0.52  (0.49) | | Wald Chi2 | 27.31\*\*\* | 43.43\*\*\* | 26.00\*\*\* | 8.15 | 21.80\*\*\* | 36.99\*\*\* | 17.91\*\*\* | 4.22 | | N | 494 | 493 | 477 | 485 | 248 | 250 | 234 | 233 | | Data | Schools;  T1, P1 | Schools;  T2, P2 | Roads;  T1, P1 | Roads;  T2, P2 | Schools;  T1 | Schools;  T2 | Roads;  T1 | Roads;  T2 |   *Note:* The dependent variable measures whether politicians identify the supplier with the highest rate of satisfaction as being the one that performs best. \*\*\*;\*\*;\*: P<0.001; 0.01; 0.05; two-sided significance tests. Entries are logistic regression coefficients. Robust standard errors in parentheses. | | | | | |
| ***Table A3:*** *Differences between politician and citizen responses in experiment 3* | | | | |
|  | Model 1 Private provider performs best | Model 2 Private provider performs best | Model 3 Public provider performs best | Model 4 Public provider performs best |
| Prior attitudes (pro public) | -2.076\*\*\* (0.360) | -1.854\*\* (0.590) | 2.805\*\*\* (0.385) | 3.358\*\*\*  (0.669) |
| Politician | 0.53 (0.328) | -0.107  (0.512) | 0.719\*  (0.314) | 1.241\*  (0.552) |
| One piece of information | Ref. | Ref. | Ref. | Ref. |
| Three pieces of information | 0.018 (0.165) | 0.687  (0.568) | -0.052 (0.171) | 0.699  (0.579) |
| Five pieces of information | 0.030 (0.167) | -0.376  (0.522) | 0.224 (0.179) | 0.432  (0.583) |
| Prior attitudes x Politician | -0.068  (0.476) | 0.604  (0.763) | -0.503  (0.515) | -1.460  (0.876) |
| Three pieces x Prior attitudes |  | -1.330  (0.919) |  | -1.171  (0.932) |
| Five pieces x Prior attitudes |  | 0.470  (0.836) |  | -0.421  (0.948) |
| Three pieces x Politician |  | 0.416  (0.816) |  | -0.773  (0.766) |
| Five pieces x Politician |  | 1.649\*  (0.784) |  | -0.821  (0.779) |
| Prior attitudes x Three pieces x Politician |  | -0.089  (1.202) |  | 1.328 (1.222) |
| Prior attitudes x Five pieces x Politician |  | -2.028  (1.124) |  | 1.740  (1.315) |
| Constant | 1.381\*\*\*  (0.241) | 1.335\*\*\*  (0.366) | -1.120\*\*\* (0.260) | -1.419\*\* (0.425) |
| Wald chi2 | 83.40 | 88.04 | 104.77 | 105.79 |
| n | 993 | 993 | 967 | 967 |
| *Note:* The dependent variable measures whether respondents identify the provider with the highest rehabilitation success rate as being the one that performs best. \*\*\*;\*\*;\*: P<0.001; 0.01; 0.05; two sided significance tests. Entries are logistic regression coefficients. Robust standard errors in parentheses. | | | | |