# SUPPORTING INFORMATION FOR "ISSUE PRIMING REVISITED: SUSCEPTIBLE VOTERS AND DETECTABLE EFFECTS"

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#### ANALYSIS OF THE VOTING MODEL WITH A "NEGATIVE" PRIMING EFFECT

The paper's discussion of the voting model (in the "Detectability of priming effects" section of the paper) focuses on the implications for observed vote intention, y, of a *positive* priming effect,  $\theta$ , given that type-B respondents are a.) observed or b.) not observed. Here, we describe the parallel consequences of a *negative* priming effect, i.e.,  $\theta < 0$ . All terms are as defined in the paper, including references to areas I, II and III of Figure 1.

Consider, first, the case where type-B respondents are observed. If a priming event produces an equivalent negative (leftward) shift in  $y^*$  for all voters, then, whatever the magnitude of  $\theta$ , no change will be observed for those in area I. For those in area II, change in  $y_i$  will be observed if  $\theta \leq y_i^* - \lambda$ . For those in area II, change is observed if  $\theta \leq y_i^* - \kappa$ .

Now, consider the situation when type-B respondents are not observed. For those in area I, again, no change in  $y_i$  is observed. For those in area III, change is observed only if  $\theta \leq y_i^* - \kappa$ . By definition,  $y_i^* - \kappa > y_i^* - \lambda$  (where the expression to the right of the inequality is the condition for observing change in area III when type-B respondents are observed). Thus, when only type-A respondents are observed, it takes a larger negative priming effect to generate a detectable change in voting behaviour among those in area III. Finally, given that the behaviour of those in area II is not observed, change in  $y_i$  is observed only if  $\theta \leq \lambda - \kappa$ . This implies that it takes a larger priming effect to generate detectable change in voting behaviour when only type-A respondents are observed.

#### CASE DETAILS

#### United States, 1976

In the midst of high unemployment in the fall of 1976, the first televised presidential debate in a generation attracted a massive audience and focused, in part, on the question of government's role in job creation (Lenz, 2012, p. 64). The Republican incumbent, President Gerald Ford, favored an approach focused on private sector efforts, whereas the Democratic challenger, Jimmy Carter, proposed a program of public-works projects to stimulate employment. To investigate whether the debate primed the issue of public works, Lenz leverages the Presidential Campaign Impact on Voters Study, which completed interviews in California and Pennsylvania over the course of 1976. The data allow a three-wave test of priming: interviews completed in June and August constitute the two pre-priming-event waves; interviews completed in October, following the debate, constitute the post-priming-event wave.

**Measurement.** Views on the public-works issue are captured using a measure that queries whether government should "directly provide jobs to those out of work".<sup>1</sup> The measure of party-position knowledge combines items from a battery of questions on the public-works issue (including the item from which the issue attitude measure for each respondent derives). All respondents who, on a previous item, indicated they

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Throughout this section, text enclosed in quotations derives from the wording of the survey items, as recorded in the questionnaire or codebook for the study in question.

"[knew] something about" Carter and Ford were asked to place the candidates on a continuum of policy positions ranging from "government should directly provide jobs" to "government should not directly provide jobs". In the analysis, party-position knowledge is defined as placing Carter strictly on the pro-government-job-creation side of Ford, both before and after the priming event. Party identification in the first and second waves of the survey is measured using the first component of the standard twopart indicator: "Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?" In the analysis, I distinguish Democrats (coded 1) and Republicans (coded 0) from Independents (coded .5). The continuous dependent for this election captures favorability towards Carter, utilizing part of a battery designed to provide "an indication of [respondents'] feelings toward the candidates". Respondents who indicated, in a previous item, that they "[knew] something about" Carter were asked to place him on a 7-level scale running from "extremely favorable" to "extremely unfavorable". In the analysis, those who did not indicate that they "[knew] something about" Carter – and so were not given the opportunity to place him on the measure – are assigned to the midpoint of the scale. The scale itself is coded to the [0,1] interval.

#### Netherlands, 1986

One of the more remarkable null results in Lenz's (2012) study of priming effects involves the 1986 Dutch parliamentary elections, which coincided with the nuclear meltdown at Chernobyl in present-day Ukraine. The disaster occurred just weeks before Election Day and quickly focused attention on the question of nuclearplant construction in the Netherlands. Early in the campaign, the ruling coalition of Christian Democrats and Liberals were identified with the pro-nuclear-plant position, while the major opposition parties took an opposing view. Although Lenz's analysis of the case reveals that perceptions of the incumbent coalition's position changed significantly over the campaign – as the coalition, naturally, sought to align itself with the public's surging anxieties about nuclear power (see, especially, Lenz, 2012, p. 145) – some citizens may, nonetheless, have continued to place the Christian Democrats and Liberals nearer the pro-nuclear pole on the question. To test the hypothesis that the Chernobyl disaster primed attitudes on nuclear-plant construction, we build a twowave panel using the Dutch Parliamentary Election Study, which completed most of its first-wave interviews prior to the accident.

Measurement. The issue attitude in the case is measured with an item asking respondents to place themselves on a continuum running from "no nuclear plants" to "more nuclear plants". The party-position knowledge measure captures respondents' placements of the major parties on the issue of constructing new nuclear power plants in the country. The variable tracks placements of the two parties in the governing coalition, the Christian Democrats and Liberals, in relation to the two main opposition parties, Labour and the Social Liberals. For each of these parties, the survey asks respondents to place the parties on a continuum running from "no nuclear plants" to "more nuclear plants". Correct placement in this context means placing the government parties strictly on the more-plants side of the major opposition parties. Party identification is captured with a measure that combines those who "think of themselves" as an "adherent of one of the political parties" with those who indicate that they are "more attracted to" one of the parties. In the analysis, I distinguish those identifying with the governing Christian Democrats and Liberals (coded 1) from all others (coded 0).

#### <u>Canada, 1988</u>

One of the best-known examples of issue priming involved controversy over the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA) during the 1988 Canadian general election (Johnston, et al., 1992). While the issue was salient even before the election, Johnston and colleagues (1992) argue that campaign messaging played a pivotal role in priming attitudes on the question as voters decided between the incumbent Progressive Conservatives (PCs), who supported the agreement, and the other major parties, the Liberals and New Democrats (NDP), who opposed it. In Lenz's (2012) analysis of issue priming in this election, the priming event was the leaders' debate of October 25<sup>th</sup>. To test the hypothesis that opinion on the FTA was primed by the debate, following Lenz, this paper uses data from the 1988 Canadian Election Study (CES) to create a two-wave panel.

**Measurement.** The issue attitude is measured with a straightforward question that asks whether respondents support or oppose the "Free Trade Agreement with the United States". Party identification is captured using a Canadian adaptation of the standard ANES measures. The relevant items asks, "Thinking of federal politics, do you usually think of yourself as a Liberal, Conservative, NDP or none of these?" In the analysis, Conservative partisans (coded 1) are distinguished from all others (coded 0).

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The continuous dependent in analysis of this election is a thermometer rating of the incumbent Progressive Conservative party. The item queries "feelings" about the "Conservative party", where "[r]atings between 50 and 100 degrees mean that [the respondent feels] favourable toward" the party and "[r]atings between 0 and 50 degrees mean that [the respondent feels] unfavourable toward" the party. This scale is compressed to the [0,1] interval in the analysis. The measure of national economic perception – used in the additional regression analysis reported in Table A2 of this document – relies on the standard retrospective question. The question queries evaluations of the economy in the "country as a whole… over the past year", asking if conditions have "gotten better, stayed about the same or gotten worse?" Responses are scaled to the [0,1] interval.

The survey data for this election do not supply a direct measure of knowledge of the parties' positions on the Free Trade Agreement (FTA). In its place, I rely on a measure, from the first wave of the study, which requires respondents to place the parties on the closely related question of how "close" or "distant" Canada's "ties" with the U.S. should be. In the analysis, those with party-position knowledge are defined as those who place the PCs strictly on the pro-close-relations side of the Liberals. Although Lenz (2012) does not employ this measure in his analyses, there is reason to assume it is a good surrogate for a question specifically concerning the parties' views on the FTA. First, the FTA was very salient to Canadians even before the campaign (Johnston et al., 1992); thus, it is likely that, during the course of the 1988 campaign, a question regarding the "closeness" of "ties" to the U.S. would be interpreted largely in reference to the parties' positions on the agreement. Second, respondents' selfplacements on the closeness measure are highly correlated with their views on the FTA (r = 0.53).

It bears some discussion that, as noted in the paper, the indicator of partyposition knowledge for Canada 1988 derives solely from the first, pre-priming-event wave of the study. While it would be preferable to construct a measure that also captured post-priming-event knowledge, it is likely that reliance on the first-wave indicator is a conservative choice analytically. First, it is unlikely that many respondents possessing knowledge of parties' positions prior to a priming event lose this knowledge after that event. In Lenz's research, for instance, on average just 1 in 10 respondents with party-position knowledge prior to a priming event lose that knowledge after the priming event (2012, p. 118, Table 5.1). This finding comports with the conceptualization of priming events in the current paper (p. 5), which emphasizes precisely these events' capacity to make available to voters information about policy controversies. Second, among those who do "forget" party-position knowledge following a priming event, it is highly plausible that the impact on vote choice of the relevant issue attitude weakens: having become ignorant of where the parties stand on a given issue, it is increasingly likely that such a respondent would fail to connect her own attitude to the vote in a manner that is consistent with other voters.<sup>2</sup> If this

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Similarly, Lenz argues that "[n]o matter how salient the issue, a person cannot intentionally shift her vote to the party that shares her position unless she has some idea what that party's position is" (2012, pp. 77, 79).

reasoning is correct, then including a small minority of "forgetters" along with a much larger group of "knowers" (to adopt Lenz's [2012] terminology) can only weaken evidence of issue priming.

#### <u>Canada, 1993</u>

Jenkins (2002) argues that, during the final two weeks of the 1993 Canadian election campaign, media coverage of a minor party, the Reform Party, primed the issue of "cultural accommodation" (p. 383). Canadians placed Reform at the lessaccommodating pole of this dimension, a position of "antipathy toward minorities and an unwillingness to accommodate Québec's distinctiveness" (Jenkins, 2002, p. 383). Jenkins (2002) identifies October 11<sup>th</sup> as the turning point in media coverage, when coverage of the party's position on cultural accommodation began to surge in volume. Following Jenkins (2002), the present analysis is based on data from the 1993 Canadian Election Study, which permits construction of a two-wave panel.

Measurement. Views on cultural accommodation derive from a 5-item index, including attitudes concerning immigrants, French Canada, racial minorities and Aboriginal people. (The analysis is restricted to non-Québec residents, as Reform did not run candidates in that province in 1993.) The measure of party-position knowledge relies on a question that asks "how much" the Reform Party wants "to do for racial minorities". Party-position knowledge is defined as responding that the party wished to do "somewhat less" or "much less" than now. As for Canada 1988, the measure in the Canada 1993 case derives solely from the first wave of the survey. Thus, the analytical implications of relying on first-wave measures, noted above, apply to this case, *mutatis*  *mutandis*. The continuous dependent in this election is a measure of favorability towards the Reform Party. Respondents were asked to place the party "on a scale that runs from 0 to 100", where 0 corresponds to "very unfavourable" and 100 corresponds to "very favourable". This measure is compressed to the [0,1] interval in the analysis. The indicator for Western Canadian respondents, which enters as a control in the additional regression analysis in Table A2, below, separates those residing in British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba (coded 1) from all others (coded 0).

For all elections other than Canada 1993, the long-term political predisposition that is controlled in the analysis is based on a measure of party identification. For two reasons, however, we cannot utilize such an indicator in analyzing this case. First, in the 1993 Canadian election, identification with the Reform Party (voting for which is the dependent variable in the analysis of the case) was highly volatile, a reflection of the party's novelty and the broader fluctuations in the party system that year (Nevitte, et al., 1995). This makes the variable an unsuitable control. Second, Jenkins (2002) argues that the impact of attitudes toward the role of government increased across the election campaign (although the pattern reflects, on his analysis, learning rather than priming). As a result, there is a strong *prima facie* reason to suspect that a model excluding this measure would suffer from omitted variable bias. As noted in Table 1, thus, in place of a control for party identification I rely in this analysis on an index of attitudes toward the role of government. The index is comprised of eight items capturing views regarding a range of policy issues, including cutting the deficit, controlling inflation, and social spending. Complete details of the variable's

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construction are in Jenkins (2002, p. 406). In the analysis, the index is scaled to the [0,1] interval.

#### United Kingdom, 1997

The 1997 British general election featured the rise to prominence of the issue of European integration, a topic that was "ignored" in the preceding election in 1992 (Lenz, 2012, p. 63). Voters placed Labour and the Conservatives on opposite sides in the debate, with Labour as the pro-integration party. In Lenz's (2012) analysis, while no particular day is identified as the key moment, the priming event is understood to have occurred in the year prior to the 1997 election. To test the hypothesis that heightened attention to the European-integration question increased voters' weighting of the issue, Lenz relies – as does the current paper – on the 1992-1997 British Election Panel Study, specifically, interviews completed with panellists in 1995, in 1996 and following the election in 1997.

**Measurement.** Views on integration are measured by a scale, where one pole corresponds to the view that Britain should "do all it can to unite fully with the European Union" and the other pole corresponds to a belief the country should "do all it can to protect its independence" from the E.U. Party-position knowledge is derived from measures that ask respondents to place the Tories and Labour on the same scale. Party-position knowledge is defined as placing Labour strictly on the pro-integration side of the Conservatives in both 1996 and 1997. Party identification is measured using wording adapted from the standard ANES measure. The item asks, "Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as Conservative, Labour, Liberal Democrat, or what?"

Respondents in Scotland and Wales could also choose "Nationalist" or "Plaid Cymru", respectively. The measure was included in a split-sample question-order experiment in both 1995 and 1996, with random halves assigned to either an early- or late-placement condition. In the analysis, Labour partisans (coded 1) are distinguished from all others (coded 0). The continuous dependent in this study is a measure of favorability toward the Labour Party. Respondents were asked to indicate their feelings toward the party by placing it on a five-level scale running from "strongly in favour" to "strongly against". This measure is compressed to the [0,1] interval in the analysis. The measure of national economic perceptions, which enters as a control in Table A2, below, relies on a question that asks, "Looking back over the last year or so, would you say that Britain's economy has got stronger, got weaker or has stayed about the same?" Those indicated conditions had got "stronger" or "weaker" were further asked, "By a lot or a little?" The resulting five-level measure is coded to the [0,1] interval in the analysis.

#### United States, 2000

The hotly contested 2000 U.S. presidential election is also claimed to have featured an episode of issue priming (Johnston, Hagen and Jamieson, 2004). In Johnston and colleagues' account, the priming of an issue – Bush's proposal, which Gore opposed, to allow Americans to invest a portion of their Social Security contributions in the stock market – was crucial to Gore's (ultimately abortive) recovery at the end of the campaign (Johnston, Hagen and Jamieson, 2004, pp. 144-173). The priming event, on Lenz's reading, began with the first debate, on October 3<sup>rd</sup>. After this point, the issue ought to carry greater weight in voters' judgments. Analysis of the case in Lenz (2012), and in this paper, uses three waves of a panel collected as part of the 2000 National Annenberg Election Study (NAES).

**Measurement.** Attitudes toward the Social Security issue are tapped with a question that asks, "Do you personally favor or oppose allowing workers to invest some of their Social Security contributions in the stock market?" The measure of partyposition knowledge relies on questions that ask respondents to place Bush and Gore on the issue of investing Social Security funds. In this case, knowledgeable respondents are those identifying Bush as the pro-investing-Social-Security candidate both before and after the priming event. Party identification is measured using a slightly modified version of the first question in the standard ANES battery, as follows: "Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an independent or something else?" In the analysis, I distinguish Republicans and Democrats from Independents and others (who comprise the reference category). The continuous measure for this election queries favorability toward "George W. Bush". Respondents are invited to place themselves on a scale running from zero ("very unfavorable") to one hundred ("very favorable"). In the analysis, those declining to rate Bush are placed at the midpoint and the variable itself is compressed to the [0,1] interval.

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### ADDITIONAL TABLES AND STATISTICAL RESULTS

Table A1. Minor Parties Supported in the Estimation Samples

Neth., 1986	Cda., 1988	Cda., 1993	U.S., 1976	U.K., 1997	U.S., 2000
Communist	Reform Party,	(other)	Eugene	Liberal Domocrat	Ralph Nader,
Party of	(other)		wiccartity	Scottish	(other)
Radicals.				Nationalist	
Pacifist				Party, Plaid	
Socialist Party,				Cymru, Green	
Reformed				Party,	
Political Party,				Referendum	
Reformed				Party, (other)	
Political					
League,					
Reformatory					
Political					
Federation,					
Centre Party,					
Evangelical					
People's Party,					
(other)					

Note: (other) refers to the "other" category recorded in the survey question.

#### Issue Priming Tests with Additional Controls

**Canada, 1988.** Previous analysis of this election suggests that the impact of national economic perceptions on vote choice grew over time during the campaign (DELETED; cf., Gelman and King, 1993). Given the economic content of the FTA issue, an additional model including a measure of national economic perception and its interaction with the interview-wave indicator was examined. The priming effect is robust to this alternative specification (see Table A2).

**Canada, 1993.** In this election, the Reform Party is generally understood to have benefited from its image as a party of Western Canada (Nevitte et al., 1995). Given the correlation between region and elements of the cultural accommodation index, particularly the national question, an additional model including an indicator for Western respondents and its interaction with the interview-wave indicator was estimated. The priming effect is robust to this alternative specification (see Table A2).

**United Kingdom, 1997.** Given the economic content of the debate on European integration, combined with the expectation that election campaigns prime economic considerations (Gelman and King, 1993), a model including a lagged measure of national economic perception and its interaction with the interview-wave indicator was examined (see Table A2). While the magnitude of the priming effect estimate is very similar, in this model the interaction just edges out of statistical significance (*p*=0.143). Notably, however, the interaction between economic perceptions and the interview wave, which is significant, is *negatively* signed. The difference between the two

specifications, thus, likely reflects multicollinearity among the several overlapping interaction terms. Note, also, that in a model with a continuous dependent the priming effect is robust to the control for national economic perception and its interaction (*p*=0.077). Previous research has also suggested that favourable perceptions of Labour Party leader Tony Blair were pivotal in the election result and may have been activated by the campaign (Webb, Poguntke, and Kolodny, 2012, pp. 85-86).<sup>3</sup> Accordingly, two additional models including measures<sup>4</sup> of evaluations of Tony Blair and their interaction with the interview wave were estimated. The priming effect is robust to both specifications (see Table A2).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> I thank one of the anonymous reviewers of this manuscript for drawing my attention to this possible confounding effect.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> One measure taps perceptions of whether Blair is "capable of being a strong leader", while the other asks "how good a job" Blair would do as Prime Minister. These are the only two measures of Blair's perceived leadership traits present in both of the required waves (i.e., 1995 and 1996) of the British Panel Election Study.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Cda. 1988	Cda. 1993	U.K. 1997	U.K. 1997	U.K. 1997
Issue	0.3269*** (0.0366)	0.4493*** (0.0855)	0.0686*	0.0629* (0.0370)	0.0606
Post	0.0444	-0.0872* (0.0494)	0.0811	-0.0467* (0.0279)	-0.0959* (0.0497)
Issue * Post	0.0957++	0.1566++	$(0.0657^{a})$	0.0859†	0.0775†
PID	(0.0434) 0.4447*** (0.0392)	(0.0840) 0.2288*** (0.0818)	0.3205***	(0.0003) 0.3188*** (0.0594)	(0.0391) 0.3091*** (0.0595)
PID * Post	-0.1398*** (0.0452)	(0.1962** (0.0777)	-0.0919 (0.0901)	-0.0708 (0.0887)	-0.0698 (0.0873)
Natl. Econ. Perc.	0.1585** (0.0717)	<u>, 1</u>	-0.0336 (0.0477)	()	()
Natl. Econ. Perc. * Post	-0.0098 (0.0863)		-0.1931** (0.0800)		
West	. ,	0.0212 (0.0325)	. ,		
West * Post		0.0138 (0.0361)			
Lagged Vote		, , ,	0.5290*** (0.0598)	0.5232*** (0.0599)	0.5165*** (0.0603)
Lagged Vote * Post			-0.0624 (0.0842)	-0.0460 (0.0841)	-0.0664 (0.0847)
Blair Strong Leader				0.0438*	
Blair Strg. Ldr. * Post				-0.0051 (0.0369)	
Blair PM				. ,	0.1282** (0.0651)
Blair PM * Post					0.0920 (0.0861)
Constant	-0.0707* (0.0385)	-0.2408*** (0.0464)	0.0508 (0.0376)	0.0072 (0.0198)	-0.0392 (0.0358)
Observations R-squared	1,478 0.4005	750 0.1772	1,216 0.6400	1,216 0.6365	1,216 0.6403

Table A2. Issue Priming Tests with Additional Controls

Note: OLS regression estimates and standard errors corrected for clustering within individuals. Restricted to those with knowledge of party positions on primed issues. In Model 2, PID is an index of attitudes regarding the role of government, as described in the paper. In Models 1 and 2, Issue, National Economic Perceptions and PID are measured in the first wave of the study; in Models 3, 4, and 5, Issue, National Economic Perceptions, PID, Blair Strong Leader and Blair PM are lagged by one wave. For one-tailed tests:  $^{+++}$  p<0.01,  $^{++}$  p<0.05,  $^{+}$  p<0.10,  $^{a}$  p<0.15. For two-tailed tests:  $^{***}$  p<0.01,  $^{**}$  p<0.05,  $^{*}$  p<0.1.

#### Learning Effects

Lenz (2012, Ch. 5) examines whether acquiring knowledge of a party's (or candidate's) position on a policy increases the influence on vote choice of attitudes toward that policy. This possibility, of course, is central to his critique of the conventional test of priming (see "Alternative Test of Issue Priming" in the paper). Lenz's modelling strategy for investigating such "learning effects" closely parallels his approach to priming effects: he relies on the two- and three-wave tests of priming, except that, to capture the influence of learning, Lenz restricts the analysis to those who acquire knowledge of the party's (or candidate's) policy commitments by the final wave of the panel. In an analysis of six elections and one experiment, Lenz concludes that "citizens who learned the positions of the parties or candidates failed to bring their votes in line with their own policy attitudes" (p. 120).

This analysis, however, partially excludes type-B respondents – that is, four of the seven tests are restricted to those declaring for a major party in each wave of the panels. Accordingly, Table A3 reports, for the affected cases, estimates of learning effects that include type-B respondents. We observe positive and statistically significant increases in the impact of policy attitudes in two elections (Netherlands 1986 and U.S. 1976). However, in only one of these two cases are the results consistent with the view that citizens have learned, in a meaningful sense, "to bring their votes in line" with their issue attitudes. In Netherlands 1986, the impact of the issue attitude among "learners" grows from nullity to a sizable effect; among learners in U.S. 1976, however, a large and perversely negative effect shrinks to nullity. While it is reasonable

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to infer, thus, that (some) voters may have learned to correctly apply their issue attitudes to the vote in the former case,<sup>5</sup> the same cannot be said for voters in the latter case. At best, this latter group of voters have simply learned not to misapply their issue attitudes to the vote.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> We cannot be certain, of course, that the change in the attitude's impact reflects a learning process, as

it could equally reflect priming (see "Alternative Tests of Issue Priming" in the paper).

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Neth. 1986	U.S. 1976	U.K. 1997	U.S. 2000
Issue	-0.0109	-0.2991***	0.1426**	0.0730
	(0.0518)	(0.1005)	(0.0595)	(0.0587)
Issue * Post	0.1646+++	0.2899++	-0.0626	-0.1317
	(0.0618)	(0.1511)	(0.0919)	(0.1096)
Post	0.0051	-0.1370	0.0187	0.0177
	(0.0287)	(0.1415)	(0.0436)	(0.0786)
PID	0.8335***		0.2555**	
	(0.0452)		(0.1150)	
PID * Post	-0.0775		0.2244	
	(0.0557)		(0.1461)	
Lagged Vote		0.4846***	0.5315***	0.7322***
		(0.0893)	(0.1111)	(0.1176)
Lagged Vote * Post		0.1238	-0.2618*	-0.2459
		(0.1071)	(0.1347)	(0.1551)
Democratic PID		0.2530**		-0.1569*
		(0.1137)		(0.0795)
Republican PID		-0.0270		0.0656
		(0.1253)		(0.1051)
Democratic PID * Post		-0.1246		0.0409
		(0.1475)		(0.1023)
Republican PID * Post		0.0139		0.1810
		(0.1648)		(0.2142)
Constant	0.0531**	0.2778**	0.0260	0.1091*
	(0.0268)	(0.1100)	(0.0270)	(0.0578)
Observations	352	248	618	144
R-squared	0.6710	0.4183	0.5650	0.6546

Table A3. Learning Effects in Four Elections

Note: OLS regression estimates and standard errors corrected for clustering within individuals. Restricted to those who acquired knowledge of party positions on primed issues in the final survey wave. In Model 1, Issue and PID are measured in the first wave of the study; in Models 2, 3, and 4, Issue and PID are lagged by one wave. For one-tailed tests:  $^{+++}$  p<0.01,  $^{++}$  p<0.05,  $^{+}$  p<0.10. For two-tailed tests:  $^{***}$  p<0.01,  $^{**}$  p<0.05,  $^{*}$  p<0.1.

# **Other Statistical Results**

# Table A4. Seemingly Unrelated Estimation Results

	H: Issue*Post <sub>A</sub> = Issue*Post <sub>A+B</sub>	H: Issue*Post <sub>A</sub> /Issue <sub>A</sub> = Issue*Post <sub>A+B</sub> /Issue <sub>A+B</sub>
Neth. 1986	0.164	0.183
Cda. 1988	0.068	0.034
Cda. 1993	0.528	0.305
U.S. 1976	0.157	0.169
U.K. 1997	0.056	0.118
U.S. 2000	0.309	0.493
Fisher's Combined Test	0.037	0.040

Note: Main cell entries are one-sided *p*-values. In the column titles, the terms in the inequalities refer to coefficient estimates in Tables 2 and 3.

	(1.)	(2.)	(3.)	(4.)
	Pr(Vote=1	Pr(Vote=1		
	Unprimed)	Primed)	Difference	S.E.
Neth. 1986	0.301	0.341	0.041	0.022
Cda. 1988	0.322	0.369	0.048	0.021
Cda. 1993	0.129	0.219	0.090	0.048
U.S. 1976	0.531	0.524	-0.008	0.067
U.K. 1997	0.317	0.360	0.043	0.030
U.S. 2000	0.472	0.558	0.086	0.068

Table A5. Estimated Vote Shares and Priming Effects

Note: Column (1) is the predicted value of *y*, given the election's model estimates in Table 2 or 3, assuming mean values of all predictors and setting the coefficient on the attitude-wave interaction to zero. Column (2) replicates column (1), except that the attitude-wave coefficient is set to its estimated value.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Neth. 1986	Cda. 1988	Cda. 1993	U.S. 1976	U.K. 1997	U.S. 2000
lanua	0 4000***	0 4004***	0 (122***	0.2405*	0.0402	0.0074
Issue	0.1806***	0.4861***	0.6133***	0.2195*	0.0402	-0.0071
Dt	(0.0541)	(0.0501)	(0.1177)	(0.1143)	(0.0300)	(0.0484)
POST	0.0316	0.0144	-0.1281***	-0.0737	0.0043	-0.2325*
	(0.0277)	(0.0212)	(0.0417)	(0.0958)	(0.0110)	(0.1289)
Type-B Respondent	0.0056	-0.0769***	0.1959***	0.1533	0.0791**	0.0691
	(0.0435)	(0.0227)	(0.0713)	(0.1601)	(0.0330)	(0.1671)
Issue * Post	0.0583	0.0342	0.1616**	-0.1532	-0.0184	0.0789
	(0.0765)	(0.0487)	(0.0762)	(0.1474)	(0.0361)	(0.1008)
Issue * Post * Type-B	0.1004	0.1290†	0.0275	0.1854	0.0881	0.0292
	(0.1321)	(0.0881)	(0.2068)	(0.2536)	(0.0858)	(0.2272)
Issue * Type-B	-0.1481	-0.3859***	-0.5049***	-0.1561	-0.0124	-0.0586
	(0.0934)	(0.0609)	(0.1394)	(0.1926)	(0.0637)	(0.1674)
Type-B * Post	0.0493	0.0472	0.1030	0.1339	-0.0520	0.1390
	(0.0615)	(0.0352)	(0.1165)	(0.1820)	(0.0387)	(0.1912)
PID	0.8214***	0.4576***	0.2376**		0.0975	
	(0.0410)	(0.0484)	(0.1031)		(0.0665)	
PID * Post	-0.0710	-0.0686	0.2136***		-0.1103*	
	(0.0579)	(0.0486)	(0.0654)		(0.0665)	
PID * Post * Type-B	0.6277***	-0.1312	-0.0351		-0.0135	
//	(0.1411)	(0.1060)	(0.2358)		(0.1438)	
PID * Type-B	-0.7253***	-0.2309***	-0.1065		0.1801*	
	(0.0998)	(0.0725)	(0.1523)		(0.1049)	
Lagged Vote	· · · ·	· · · ·	· · · ·	0.6999***	0.8764***	0.7937***
				(0.1224)	(0.0730)	(0.1145)
Lag. Vote * Post				0.1988	0.1063	0.1383
				(0.1458)	(0.0700)	(0.1136)
Lag Vote * Post * Type-B				0 3397	-0 4062***	-1 0135***
				(0.2486)	(0.1360)	(0 2323)
Lagged Vote * Type-B				-0.8921***	-0 5770***	-0.0608
				(0.1861)	(0 1044)	(0.1687)
Democratic PID				0.1301)	(0.1044)	-0 2172*
				(0.0697)		-0.2170
Republican PID				(0.0097)		-0 0071
				-0.0134 (0.0046)		-0.0071
				(0.0946)		(0.0330)

Table A6. Issue Priming Effects by Respondent Type

Table A6. (continued)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Neth. 1986	Cda. 1988	Cda. 1993	U.S. 1976	U.K. 1997	U.S. 2000
Dem. PID * Post				-0.0373		0.2364*
				(0.0906)		(0.1223)
Rep. PID * Post				0.0638		0.0431
				(0.1000)		(0.0555)
Dem. PID * Type-B				0.1571		0.1828
				(0.1541)		(0.2019)
Rep. PID * Type-B				-0.0708		-0.0386
				(0.1614)		(0.2227)
Dem. PID * Post * Type-B				-0.2920		-0.2102
				(0.2115)		(0.2540)
Rep. PID * Post * Type-B				-0.2277		0.1796
				(0.1733)		(0.3722)
Constant	0.0004	0.0699***	2802***	0.0556	-0.0017	0.1985*
	(0.0196)	(0.0189)	(0.0540)	(0.0969)	(0.0051)	(0.1053)
Observations	656	1,478	750	424	1,216	312
R-squared	0.7583	0.5452	0.2118	0.6263	0.7539	0.8166

Note: OLS regression estimates and standard errors corrected for clustering within individuals. Restricted to those with knowledge of party positions on primed issues. In Model 3, PID is an index of attitudes regarding the role of government, as described in the paper. In Models 1, 2 and 3, Issue and PID are measured in the first wave of the study; in Models 4, 5, and 6, Issue and PID are lagged by one wave. For one-tailed tests:  $^{+++}$  p<0.01,  $^{++}$  p<0.05,  $^{+}$  p<0.10. For two-tailed tests:  $^{***}$  p<0.01,  $^{**}$  p<0.05,  $^{*}$  p<0.1.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Respondent Type:	A	Non-resp.	Abstain	Minor
lssue	0.1806	0.1322	0.1573	0.1550
	(0.0775)	(0.0677)	(0.0723)	(0.0642)
Post	0.0316	0.0471	0.0302	0.0269
	(0.0130)	(0.0175)	(0.0125)	(0.0118)
Issue * Post	0.0583	0.1237	0.0514	0.0702
	(0.0468)	(0.0715)	(0.0441)	(0.0503)
PID	0.8214	0.7949	0.8257	0.8371
	(0.0591)	(0.0543)	(0.0561)	(0.0513)
PID * Post	-0.0710	-0.0675	-0.0651	-0.0744
	(0.0368)	(0.0539)	(0.0356)	(0.0393)
Constant	0.0004	-0.0000	0.0016	0.0019
	(0.0112)	(0.0119)	(0.0107)	(0.0101)
Observations	520	586	544	584
R-squared	0.8000	0.7365	0.7886	0.7912
_ <i>p</i> <sup>a</sup>	n/a	0.153	0.704	0.370

Table A7. Issue Priming Effects: Comparing Type-A with Type-B Subtypes: Netherlands 1986

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Issue and PID are measured in the first wave of the study. <sup>a</sup> One-sided p-value (H: Issue\*Post<sub>A</sub> = Issue\*Post<sub>Named Type-B Subtype</sub>).

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)		
Respondent Type:	А	Non-resp.	Abstain	Minor		
Issue	0.4861	0.3726	0.4209	0.4536		
	(0.0501)	(0.0390)	(0.0459)	(0.0486)		
Post	0.0144	0.0435	0.0083	0.0151		
	(0.0212)	(0.0173)	(0.0193)	(0.0209)		
Issue * Post	0.0342	0.1188	0.0111	0.0436		
	(0.0487)	(0.0447)	(0.0444)	(0.0461)		
PID	0.4576	0.4608	0.4981	0.4304		
	(0.0484)	(0.0418)	(0.0451)	(0.0485)		
PID * Post	-0.0686	-0.1023	-0.0914	-0.0964		
	(0.0486)	(0.0466)	(0.0465)	(0.0462)		
Constant	0.0699	0.0131	0.0514	0.0586		
	(0.0189)	(0.0129)	(0.0172)	(0.0184)		
Observations	840	1,296	992	932		
R-squared	0.5839	0.4653	0.5110	0.4919		
p <sup>a</sup>	n/a	0.015	0.881	0.280		
Note: Debugt standard errors in parentheses, locus and DID are measured in the first						

Table A8. Issue Priming Effects: Comparing Type-A with Type-B Subtypes: Canada 1988

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Issue and PID are measured in the first wave of the study. <sup>a</sup> One-sided *p*-value (H: Issue\*Post<sub>A</sub> = Issue\*Post<sub>Named Type-B Subtype</sub>).

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	
Respondent Type:	А	Non-resp.	Abstain	Minor	
Issue	0.6156	0.4518	0.6158	0.5699	
	(0.1175)	(0.0925)	(0.1111)	(0.1071)	
Post	-0.1283	-0.1312	-0.0909	-0.0880	
	(0.0417)	(0.0448)	(0.0444)	(0.0414)	
Issue * Post	0.1628	0.2214	0.1001	0.1320	
	(0.0762)	(0.0838)	(0.0795)	(0.0772)	
PID	0.2339	0.2123	0.2800	0.2064	
	(0.1024)	(0.0850)	(0.1003)	(0.0946)	
PID * Post	0.2118	0.2461	0.1655	0.1912	
	(0.0649)	(0.0703)	(0.0771)	(0.0653)	
Constant	-0.2807	-0.2235	-0.2976	-0.2566	
	(0.0539)	(0.0446)	(0.0520)	(0.0471)	
Observations	476	662	516	552	
R-squared	0.2223	0.1931	0.2147	0.2026	
pa	n/a	0.184	0.944	0.796	
Nata, Dabyet standard sware in generations, Jacks and DID are generated in the first					

Table A9. Issue Priming Effects: Comparing Type-A with Type-B Subtypes: Canada 1993

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Issue and PID are measured in the first wave of the study. <sup>a</sup> One-sided *p*-value (H: Issue\*Post<sub>A</sub> = Issue\*Post<sub>Named Type-B Subtype</sub>).

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Respondent Type:	A	Non-resp.	Abstain	Minor
lssue	0.2195	0.1615	0.1971	0.1844
	(0.1139)	(0.0992)	(0.1138)	(0.1073)
Issue * Post	-0.1532	-0.0041	-0.0904	-0.1489
	(0.1469)	(0.1263)	(0.1361)	(0.1334)
Lagged Vote	0.6999	0.4668	0.7188	0.7683
	(0.1220)	(0.0823)	(0.1186)	(0.1005)
Lagged Vote * Post	0.1988	0.1848	0.1216	0.1207
	(0.1453)	(0.0962)	(0.1477)	(0.1156)
Democratic PID	0.0753	0.1126	0.0580	0.0528
	(0.0694)	(0.0793)	(0.0729)	(0.0679)
Republican PID	-0.0154	-0.1192	-0.0013	0.0231
	(0.0943)	(0.0832)	(0.0870)	(0.0891)
Democratic PID * Post	-0.0373	-0.0698	-0.0442	0.0065
	(0.0903)	(0.1058)	(0.0915)	(0.0988)
Republican PID * Post	0.0638	0.0041	0.0119	0.0483
	(0.0997)	(0.0929)	(0.0988)	(0.0987)
Post	-0.0737	-0.0708	-0.0253	-0.0533
	(0.0955)	(0.0921)	(0.0921)	(0.0918)
Constant	0.0556	0.1926	0.0434	0.0185
	(0.0966)	(0.0825)	(0.0884)	(0.0921)
Observations	252	408	264	268
R-squared	0.8411	0.5597	0.7898	0.7943
pa	n/a	0.139	0.121	0.459

Table A10. Issue Priming Effects: Comparing Type-A with Type-B Subtypes: U.S. 1976

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Issue and PID are lagged by one wave.

<sup>a</sup> One-sided *p*-value (H: Issue\*Post<sub>A</sub> = Issue\*Post<sub>Named Type-B Subtype</sub>).

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Respondent Type:	A	Non-resp.	Abstain	Minor
Issue	0.0402	0.0743	0.0869	0.0615
	(0.0300)	(0.0371)	(0.0419)	(0.0355)
Issue * Post	-0.0184	0.0313	-0.0736	0.1075
	(0.0361)	(0.0573)	(0.0604)	(0.0597)
Lagged Vote	0.8764	0.6701	0.7449	0.6192
	(0.0730)	(0.0935)	(0.0827)	(0.0614)
Lagged Vote * Post	0.1063	0.0803	0.1156	-0.0751
	(0.0700)	(0.1141)	(0.0985)	(0.0889)
PID	0.0975	0.2618	0.1646	0.2731
	(0.0665)	(0.0880)	(0.0763)	(0.0604)
PID * Post	-0.1103	-0.0826	-0.1131	-0.0502
	(0.0665)	(0.1085)	(0.1005)	(0.0922)
Post	0.0043	-0.0141	0.0001	-0.0448
	(0.0110)	(0.0238)	(0.0197)	(0.0264)
Constant	-0.0017	0.0090	0.0107	0.0204
	(0.0051)	(0.0160)	(0.0137)	(0.0169)
Observations	616	704	786	1,054
R-squared	0.9612	0.8951	0.8459	0.6933
ρ <sup>a</sup>	n/a	0.169	0.833	0.025

Table A11. Issue Priming Effects: Comparing Type-A with Type-B Subtypes: U.K. 1997

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Issue and PID are lagged by one wave.

<sup>a</sup> One-sided *p*-value (H: Issue\*Post<sub>A</sub> = Issue\*Post<sub>Named Type-B Subtype</sub>).

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Respondent Type:	А	Non-resp.	Abstain	Minor
lssue	-0.0071	0.0063	0.0216	-0.0445
	(0.0479)	(0.0512)	(0.0506)	(0.0517)
Issue * Post	0.0789	0.1835	0.0376	0.0877
	(0.0997)	(0.1098)	(0.0993)	(0.0908)
Lagged Vote	0.7937	0.7720	0.7195	0.8144
	(0.1132)	(0.0939)	(0.1110)	(0.0923)
Lagged Vote * Post	0.1383	-0.0614	0.0466	0.0782
	(0.1124)	(0.1322)	(0.1349)	(0.1006)
Democratic PID	-0.2178	-0.1657	-0.2494	-0.2253
	(0.1120)	(0.0873)	(0.0992)	(0.1002)
Republican PID	-0.0071	0.0173	0.0180	-0.0157
	(0.0333)	(0.0493)	(0.0397)	(0.0326)
Democratic PID * Post	0.2364	0.0881	0.2794	0.2877
	(0.1209)	(0.1185)	(0.1293)	(0.1119)
Republican PID * Post	0.0431	0.0126	0.1497	0.1414
	(0.0549)	(0.0811)	(0.0906)	(0.0708)
Post	-0.2325	-0.1207	-0.2820	-0.2802
	(0.1274)	(0.1025)	(0.1203)	(0.1193)
Constant	0.1985	0.1784	0.2356	0.2177
	(0.1041)	(0.0739)	(0.0949)	(0.0977)
Observations	240	274	270	256
R-squared	0.9187	0.7866	0.7796	0.8688
p <sup>a</sup>	n/a	0.111	0.725	0.389

Table A12. Issue Priming Effects: Comparing Type-A with Type-B Subtypes: U.S. 2000

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Issue and PID are lagged by one wave.

<sup>a</sup> One-sided *p*-value (H: Issue\*Post<sub>A</sub> = Issue\*Post<sub>Named Type-B Subtype</sub>).

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Neth. 1986	Cda. 1988	Cda. 1993	U.S. 1976	U.K. 1997	U.S. 2000
Issue	1.9054**	2.4400***	5.7789***	1.0323*	0.8851**	0.0047
	(0.7691)	(0.2512)	(1.1002)	(0.5904)	(0.4385)	(0.7499)
Post	1.1566**	0.5828**	1.0456	-0.5330	-0.6028	-1.8994**
	(0.4514)	(0.2263)	(0.9138)	(0.6080)	(0.4346)	(0.9295)
Issue * Post	0.5300	0.0436	-0.7584	0.1669	0.8243†	1.1383‡
	(0.7454)	(0.2816)	(1.0592)	(0.8379)	(0.6480)	(0.9998)
PID	4.9808***	2.3259***	2.8002***		2.1471***	
	(0.5469)	(0.2194)	(0.8395)		(0.3148)	
PID * Post	-0.6268	-0.7724***	0.6302		-0.7270	
	(0.5742)	(0.2410)	(0.7718)		(0.4875)	
Lagged Vote				2.2117***	3.0842***	5.0285***
				(0.4099)	(0.3047)	(0.8759)
Lagged Vote *				1 0018*	-0 2/15	-1 8696*
Post				1.0010	-0.2415	-1.0050
				(0.5241)	(0.4255)	(1.0505)
Dem. PID				0.5650		-2.4890**
				(0.4284)		(1.1724)
Rep. PID				-0.7638		-0.0975
				(0.5450)		(1.0311)
Dem. PID * Post				-0.2960		2.1266
				(0.7186)		(1.4980)
Rep. PID * Post				-0.3478		1.7237
				(0.6798)		(1.3098)
Constant	-4.1932***	-3.1191***	-7.1312***	-1.5739***	-3.1475***	-1.3132**
	(0.4471)	(0.2075)	(0.8357)	(0.4947)	(0.3138)	(0.5396)
Observations	656	1 478	750	474	1 216	312

Table A13. Issue Priming Tests, Logit Specifications

Note: Logit regression estimates and standard errors corrected for clustering within individuals. Restricted to those with knowledge of party positions on primed issues. In Model 3, PID is an index of attitudes regarding the role of government, as described in the paper. In Models 1, 2 and 3, Issue and PID are measured in the first wave of the study; in Models 4, 5 and 6, Issue and PID are lagged by one wave. For one-tailed tests:  $^{+++}$  p<0.01,  $^{++}$  p<0.05,  $^{+}$  p<0.10,  $^{+}$  p=0.127. For two-tailed tests:  $^{***}$  p<0.01,  $^{**}$  p<0.05,  $^{*}$  p<0.1.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Neth. 1986	Neth. 1986	Cda. 1988	Cda. 1988	Cda. 1993	Cda. 1993
Outcome:	1	2	1	2	1	2
Issue	1.7090***	2.0956***	0.9182***	2.3845***	0.3378	4.1367***
	(0.3996)	(0.5170)	(0.1831)	(0.2174)	(0.4718)	(0.7629)
Post	-0.0473	0.7927***	-0.7018***	0.1859	-0.8470**	0.4025
	(0.1320)	(0.2717)	(0.1343)	(0.1725)	(0.4095)	(0.6235)
Issue * Post	-0.4283	-0.0549	0.2040	0.0040	-0.0206	-0.4621
	(0.3856)	(0.4447)	(0.2136)	(0.2357)	(0.6355)	(0.7303)
PID	0.6601	3.9117***	0.9293***	2.4499***	0.0133	2.1457***
	(0.4198)	(0.4073)	(0.2399)	(0.2455)	(0.4539)	(0.6425)
PID * Post	-0.7614	-0.6713**	-0.0321	-0.7415***	0.3220	0.6053
	(0.5928)	(0.3165)	(0.2848)	(0.2820)	(0.5759)	(0.5633)
Constant	-1.4190***	-2.9569***	-0.4006***	-2.0297***	-0.6814**	-4.8618***
	(0.1679)	(0.2892)	(0.1028)	(0.1565)	(0.3034)	(0.5651)
Observations	656	656	1,478	1,478	750	750

Table A14. Issue Priming Tests, Multinomial Probit Specifications, Two-wave Tests

Note: Multinomial probit regression estimates and standard errors corrected for clustering within individuals. Restricted to those with knowledge of party positions on primed issues. Issue and PID are measured in the first wave of the study. In Models 5 and 6, PID is an index of attitudes regarding the role of government, as described in the paper. For one-tailed tests: +++ p<0.01, ++ p<0.05, + p<0.10. For two-tailed tests: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

		1-1	1-1		<i>(</i> _)	( - )
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	U.S. 1976	U.S. 1976	U.K. 1997	U.K. 1997	U.S. 2000	U.S. 2000
Outcome:	1	2	1	2	1	2
Issue	0.9553	1.3657**	1.1494***	1.3338***	-0.1483	0.2001
	(0.6235)	(0.6317)	(0.3395)	(0.4041)	(0.6660)	(0.6201)
Post	0.0493	-0.8404	0.0572	-0.3265	-0.4668	-1.8535**
	(0.6761)	(0.6648)	(0.3425)	(0.7309)	(0.6738)	(0.9040)
Issue * Post	1.2209†	0.3553	0.1779	0.8166†	1.4736++	1.2454†
	(0.9025)	(0.9187)	(0.4870)	(0.5959)	(0.7548)	(0.8898)
PID			0.5287*	1.7710***		
			(0.3076)	(0.3095)		
Democratic PID	0.5232	0.6934			-1.4565**	-1.8300**
	(0.5175)	(0.5186)			(0.7272)	(0.8036)
Republican PID	-0.5594	-0.6190			-0.2482	-0.0000
	(0.4890)	(0.4954)			(0.7493)	(0.6479)
Dem. PID * Post	-0.4439	-0.4922			1.4305*	1.8264
	(0.7326)	(0.7254)			(0.8504)	(1.2250)
Rep. PID * Post	-0.2984	-0.1640			0.5821	1.4470**
	(0.6644)	(0.6597)			(0.7874)	(0.7150)
Lagged Vote (=1)	1.7045***	1.4050***	2.9117***	2.8286***	2.0608***	2.3976***
	(0.4727)	(0.4798)	(0.2592)	(0.5107)	(0.5505)	(0.6090)
Lagged Vote (=2)	2.0289***	3.2959***	2.5879***	4.8215***	2.2102***	4.6509***
	(0.6522)	(0.6283)	(0.4075)	(0.5803)	(0.4578)	(0.5322)
Lag. Vote (=1) * Post	-0.0786	0.9464	-0.3642	-0.5518		
	(0.7235)	(0.7979)	(0.3073)	(0.7436)		
Lag. Vote (=2) * Post	-1.7149*	0.3906	0.0362	-0.6132		
	(0.9549)	(0.8878)	(0.4718)	(0.7056)		
Constant	-1.7426***	-1.8687***	-2.1065***	-3.6811***	-1.6185**	-1.7519***
	(0.5396)	(0.5397)	(0.2518)	(0.4565)	(0.6360)	(0.5987)
Observations	424	424	1,216	1,216	312	312

Table A15. Issue Priming Tests, Multinomial Probit Specifications, Three-wave Tests

Note: Multinomial probit regression estimates and standard errors corrected for clustering within individuals. Restricted to those with knowledge of party positions on primed issues. Issue and PID are lagged by one wave. For one-tailed tests:  $^{+++}$  p<0.01,  $^{++}$  p<0.05,  $^{+}$  p<0.10. For two-tailed tests:  $^{***}$  p<0.01,  $^{**}$  p<0.05,  $^{*}$  p<0.1.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Neth. 1986	Cda. 1988	Cda. 1993	U.S. 1976	U.K. 1997	U.S. 2000
Issue	1.9025***	1.7978***	1.8540***	0.9080	1.0095***	0.1119
	(0.3846)	(0.1701)	(0.5049)	(0.5764)	(0.3439)	(0.7683)
Post	0.1076	-0.5125***	-1.7586***	-0.3442	-0.0441	-2.0809**
	(0.1528)	(0.1395)	(0.4911)	(0.6659)	(0.4308)	(0.9909)
Issue * Post	0.3070	0.8385+++	1.5222+++	0.4717	0.6137‡	0.8313
	(0.3673)	(0.2209)	(0.6151)	(0.8032)	(0.5002)	(1.0216)
PID	3.9868***	2.0493***	0.8617*	,	2.0061***	· · ·
	(0.4171)	(0.1785)	(0.4833)		(0.2981)	
PID * Post	0.5074	-0.3320	1.6214***		-0.7899*	
	(0.4224)	(0.2266)	(0.5266)		(0.4651)	
Lagged Vote (=1)	, ,	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	2.0003***	3.4766***	1.8113*
				(0.5397)	(0.3378)	(0.9382)
Lagged Vote (=2)				3.9715***	6.0536***	6.0770***
				(0.6628)	(0.4620)	(1.0750)
Lagged Vote (=1) * Post				0.1680	-0.4195	1.9800
				(0.6970)	(0.3876)	(1.3067)
Lagged Vote (=2) * Post				0.4938	-0.5881	-1.2681
				(0.8174)	(0.5169)	(1.3286)
Democratic PID				0.3943		-2.2742**
				(0.4246)		(1.0653)
Republican PID				-0.8299		0.0523
				(0.5116)		(0.8307)
Democratic PID * Post				-0.2868		2.9006*
				(0.6105)		(1.5192)
Republican PID * Post				-0.1795		1.4221
				(0.6519)		(1.0434)
Constant cut1	1.6199***	0.5406***	1.7585***	1.2890**	2.4176***	0.9306
	(0.1943)	(0.1013)	(0.3244)	(0.5620)	(0.3128)	(0.6862)
Constant cut2	3.2434***	2.3597***	3.0381***	3.1135***	6.1661***	2.6451***
	(0.2264)	(0.1188)	(0.3192)	(0.6057)	(0.3972)	(0.7993)
Observations	656	1,478	750	424	1,216	312

Table A16. Issue Priming Tests, Ordered Logit Specifications, Version 1 (Minor-party Supporters=2)

Note: Ordered logit regression estimates and standard errors corrected for clustering within individuals. Restricted to those with knowledge of party positions on primed issues. In Model 3, PID is an index of attitudes regarding the role of government, as described in the paper. In Models 1, 2 and 3, Issue and PID are measured in the first wave of the study; in Models 4, 5 and 6, Issue and PID (including Democratic & Republican PID) are lagged by one wave. For one-tailed tests:  $^{++}$  p<0.01,  $^{++}$  p<0.05,  $^{+}$  p<0.10,  $^{\pm}$  p=0.110. For two-tailed tests:  $^{***}$  p<0.01,  $^{**}$  p<0.05,  $^{*}$  p<0.1.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Neth. 1986	Cda. 1988	Cda. 1993	U.S. 1976	U.K. 1997	U.S. 2000
Issue	1.9641***	1.6703***	2.3138***	0.7842	0.7432**	0.0054
	(0.4327)	(0.1644)	(0.5465)	(0.5648)	(0.3495)	(0.7185)
Post	-0.1941	-0.5253***	-2.6531***	-0.5537	-0.0132	-2.9357***
	(0.2600)	(0.1435)	(0.6461)	(0.6677)	(0.3617)	(1.0590)
Issue * Post	0.4632	0.8126+++	2.4480+++	0.4427	0.3889	0.6693
	(0.4889)	(0.2173)	(0.7638)	(0.7521)	(0.5274)	(0.9864)
PID	3.9831***	1.9086***	0.8841*		1.9705***	
	(0.3907)	(0.1828)	(0.4881)		(0.3362)	
PID * Post	0.7219	-0.3385	2.0184***		-0.6107	
	(0.4457)	(0.2239)	(0.5877)		(0.4847)	
Lagged Vote (=1)				1.8469***	1.9611***	1.3393
				(0.5185)	(0.2781)	(0.8832)
Lagged Vote (=2)				3.8042***	3.3159***	5.5462***
				(0.6343)	(0.3314)	(0.9032)
Lagged Vote (=1) * Post				0.3510	-0.9756**	2.6741*
				(0.6884)	(0.3827)	(1.3695)
Lagged Vote (=2) * Post				0.5479	-0.6640	-0.4943
				(0.7974)	(0.4288)	(1.2907)
Democratic PID				0.3726		-2.2718**
				(0.4183)		(1.0194)
Republican PID				-0.7397		0.0206
				(0.4883)		(0.7809)
Democratic PID * Post				-0.0997		3.5855**
				(0.6142)		(1.6571)
Republican PID * Post				-0.0470		1.8034*
				(0.6299)		(1.0099)
Constant cut1	2.2096***	0.7004***	2.3221***	1.3283**	2.4584***	0.8229
	(0.2287)	(0.1012)	(0.3632)	(0.5465)	(0.2553)	(0.6573)
Constant cut2	3.2425***	2.1647***	3.3285***	2.8396***	3.2633***	1.9867***
	(0.2399)	(0.1125)	(0.3562)	(0.5732)	(0.2722)	(0.7147)
Observations	656	1,478	750	424	1,216	312

Table A17. Issue Priming Tests, Ordered Logit Specifications, Version 2 (Minor-party Supporters=1)

Note: Ordered logit regression estimates and standard errors corrected for clustering within individuals. Restricted to those with knowledge of party positions on primed issues. In Model 3, PID is an index of attitudes regarding the role of government, as described in the paper. In Models 1, 2 and 3, Issue and PID are measured in the first wave of the study; in Models 4, 5 and 6, Issue and PID (including Democratic & Republican PID) are lagged by one wave. For one-tailed tests:  $^{++}$  p<0.01,  $^{++}$  p<0.05,  $^{+}$  p<0.10. For two-tailed tests:  $^{***}$  p<0.01,  $^{**}$  p<0.05,  $^{*}$  p<0.1.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Cda. 1988	Cda. 1993	U.S. 1976	U.K. 1997	U.S. 2000
Issue	0.1433***	0.3298***	0.1679***	0.0646***	0.0450
	(0.0172)	(0.0560)	(0.0555)	(0.0225)	(0.0387)
Post	0.0562***	0.0079	-0.1152	0.0636***	-0.0182
	(0.0106)	(0.0292)	(0.0733)	(0.0240)	(0.0818)
Issue * Post	-0.0204	0.0717†	0.0825‡	0.0441+	0.1025+
	(0.0174)	(0.0454)	(0.0673)	(0.0318)	(0.0702)
PID	0.1542***	0.3286***		0.0842***	
	(0.0153)	(0.0580)		(0.0180)	
PID * Post	-0.0263*	0.0311		0.0017	
	(0.0157)	(0.0537)		(0.0248)	
Lagged Therm.			0.4026***	0.6522***	0.6383***
			(0.0660)	(0.0371)	(0.0873)
Lagged Therm. * Post			0.2074**	-0.0554	-0.0748
			(0.0922)	(0.0464)	(0.1035)
Democratic PID			0.1564***		-0.0420
			(0.0439)		(0.0458)
Republican PID			-0.0978*		0.0525
			(0.0518)		(0.0335)
Democratic PID * Post			-0.1517***		0.0271
			(0.0522)		(0.0733)
Republican PID * Post			0.0216		0.0133
			(0.0647)		(0.0530)
Constant	0.4090***	0.0548*	0.2152***	0.1342***	0.2007***
	(0.0109)	(0.0319)	(0.0597)	(0.0148)	(0.0580)
Observations	1,476	750	432	1,216	312
R-squared	0.2592	0.2390	0.5899	0.7068	0.6314

Table A18. Issue Priming Tests with Continuous Dependents

Note: OLS regression estimates and standard errors corrected for clustering within individuals. Restricted to those with knowledge of party positions on primed issues. In Model 2, PID is an index of attitudes regarding the role of government, as described in the paper. In Models 1 and 2, Issue and PID are measured in the first wave of the study; in Models 3, 4 and 5, Issue and PID are lagged by one wave. For one-tailed tests:  $^{+++}$  p<0.01,  $^{++}$  p<0.05,  $^{+}$  p<0.10,  $^{+}$  p=0.111. For two-tailed tests:  $^{***}$  p<0.01,  $^{**}$  p<0.05,  $^{*}$  p<0.1.

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