

APPENDIX FOR:
**COMMITTEE CHAIRS AND LEGISLATIVE REVIEW
 IN PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACIES**

PRIMARY FINDINGS

Below, the full model estimates from which the effects in Table 1 and Figures 1 and 2 in main text are calculated.

TABLE 1. Effects of Coalition Partner and Opposition Party Committee Chairs on the Extent of Changes to Government Bills

Variables	Estimates
Coalition Partner Committee Chair	0.010 (0.150)
Distance between the Minister and Coalition Partner Committee Chair	0.023 (0.081)
Opposition Party Committee Chair	0.190 (0.141)
Distance between the Minister and Opposition Party Committee Chair	0.024 (0.053)
Distance between the Minister and the Coalition Compromise	0.093*** (0.035)
Distance between the Minister and Opposition Parties	-0.033* (0.019)
Minority Government	-0.195 (0.171)
Number of Committee Referrals	0.036 (0.027)
Number of Subarticles in Draft Bill (Logged)	0.972*** (0.034)
Expiration of Bill before Plenary Vote	-1.225*** (0.175)
Length of Legislative Review	0.002*** (0.000)
Germany	0.676*** (0.221)
Netherlands	0.092 (0.206)
Industrial Policy	-0.413*** (0.117)
Social Policy	-0.324 (0.234)
Regional Policy	-0.195 (0.212)
Environmental Policy	-0.138 (0.134)
Intercept	-1.564*** (0.239)
Overdispersion Parameter	-0.243*** (0.073)

Note: Coefficient estimates (and standard errors) from random-intercepts negative binomial model (grouped on legislative committee). N: 1,100. Number of committees across countries: 55. Likelihood-ratio test of random-intercepts negative binomial model versus negative binomial model without random intercepts shows a significant improvement in fit ($p < 0.05$). Significance levels : * : 10% ** : 5% *** : 1%.

ROBUSTNESS CHECKS

At the request of the reviewers and editorial team, we have examined the robustness of our substantive conclusions to potential measurement error in our estimates of party preferences derived from expert surveys. Though, as the tables below show, the substance of our results does not change when modeling the error according the prescriptions of Lindstädt, Proksch and Slapin (2016), we choose not to present these results in the main text for two reasons. First, we prefer our results to be comparable to previous works using the same data. Second, and substantially more important, we could not locate the individual-level Laver and Hunt (1992) data and were therefore forced to utilize the Benoit and Laver (2006) data for all observations — a concession that we believe biases our results toward the null.

The results in the table below are from a series of 1,000 models. At each iteration, new ideological divisions are calculated by sampling with replacement from the individual expert placements and recording the modal placement. These modal placements are then used to derive the ideological distance measures as discussed in the main text and the models are estimated. We then take 100 samples from the model posterior and record them. Below, we describe the distributions of parameter draws by their mean, standard deviation, and our certainty that the parameter is different from 0. We do not include the random effects estimates in these tables, but these models are derived from the same hierarchical negative binomial modes described in the main text.

TABLE 2. Results from modal expert placement bootstrapping exercise

Variable	Mean	SD	<i>p</i>
Coalition Partner Committee Chair	-0.006	0.149	0.484
Distance between the Minister and Coalition Partner Committee Chair	0.114	0.081	0.080
Opposition Party Committee Chair	0.303	0.144	0.017
Distance between the Minister and Opposition Party Committee Chair	-0.024	0.056	0.338
Distance between the Minister and the Coalition Compromise	0.123	0.100	0.101
Distance between the Minister and Opposition Parties	-0.026	0.066	0.342
Minority Government	-0.181	0.174	0.148
Number of Committee Referrals	0.037	0.027	0.088
Number of Subarticles in Draft Bill (Logged)	0.981	0.035	0.000
Expiration of Bill before Plenary Vote	-1.197	0.175	0.000
Length of Legislative Review	0.002	0.000	0.000
Germany	0.634	0.234	0.004
Netherlands	0.215	0.205	0.148
Industrial Policy	-0.469	0.132	0.000
Social Policy	-0.381	0.241	0.058
Regional Policy	-0.225	0.221	0.153
Environmental Policy	-0.072	0.143	0.304
Intercept	-1.735	0.229	0.000
Overdispersion Parameter	-0.241	0.074	0.001

REFERENCES

- Benoit, Kenneth and Michael Laver. 2006. *Party Policy in Modern Democracies*. London: Routledge.
- Laver, Michael and W. Ben Hunt. 1992. *Policy and Party Competition*. New York: Routledge.
- Lindstädt, René, Sven-Oliver Proksch and Jonathan B. Slapin. 2016. “When Experts Disagree: Response Aggregation and Its Consequences in Expert Surveys.” *Manuscript: University of Essex*.