

Online supporting material to the article
“Historical Polarization and Representation in South American
Party Systems, 1900-1990”

British Journal of Political Science

Simon Bornschier

June 2016

Appendix A

Critical antecedent and critical juncture in Table 1

This Appendix provides additional explanations regarding some of the information presented in Table 1 in the main text. It presents evidence for the classification of the strength of the right and the duration of polarization in those countries not included in the more detailed comparative historical analysis. Furthermore, for all countries, I provide further justification for the exact timing of the relevant phase for the measurement of the antecedent condition, the critical juncture itself, and the duration of polarization that follows the critical juncture. The discussion complements that provided in the main text, and thus varies in length depending on the treatment there and the degree to which the identification of the critical moments may prove controversial. The countries are listed in alphabetical order.

Argentina

Antecedent condition: The Conservatives were always regionally divided in Argentina, as shown by Gibson (1996: chap. 2) in great detail. Between 1880 and 1916, the Partido Autonomista Nacional (PAN) dominated politics, but this was not in the context of a competitive party system. Politics was not

based on a “national network of competing parties, but a national single-party system that served as an umbrella for disparate provincial interests” (Gibson 1996: 47). The relevant period for measuring the strength of conservative parties is thus from 1912 (after the Sáenz Peña electoral law granted universal suffrage) until the end of the competitive regime in 1930. Jones, Lauga, and León-Roesch (2005, in Nohlen) provide data from 1916 onwards. The period between 1930 and 1943 is disregarded, because no competitive regime was in place before the military coup of 1943. The Conservatives did unite under the Partido Demócrata Nacional (PND) and governed as part of the Concordancia coalition in this period, but its rule was based on electoral fraud (Gibson 1996: 59). In 1931, the Yrigoyenist wing of the Unión Cívica Radical (UCR) was barred from participating (McGuire 1995: 208).

Critical juncture and polarization phase: As mentioned in the main text, my analysis of the Argentine case focuses on the Peronist phase, rather than on the conflict between the middle-class dominated UCR (the Radicals) and the traditional political and landowning elite. While the Radicals and the Conservatives did hold contrasting ideological views (see Alonso 2000, Remmer 1984: 87-103, Collier and Collier 2002: 134), the resulting antagonism is more properly described as a regime divide than an economic cleavage (Rueschemeyer, Huber Stephens, and Stephens 1992: 179). This is reflected in the prevailing view that downplays the ideological differences between these two camps and instead describes this as an antagonism between “ins” and “outs” (e.g., Gibson 1996: chap. 2; Madsen and Snow 1991: 40). The fact that the Radicals had achieved their goals with the introduction of universal suffrage in 1912 and quickly became dominant after 1916 (which is reflected in the low vote scores for conservative parties reported in Table 1), further contributed to the limited degree of ideological polarization reflected by the pre-Peronist party system. Finally, the success of the Peronists themselves shows that the state interventionist terrain was not occupied prior to their rise. But even if we were to consider Argentina polarized prior to the rise of Perón, situating the critical juncture at that point (1946) does not bias the analysis. For reasons of space, I therefore leave out an extended discussion the antagonisms characteristic of the Argentine party system prior to Perón’s takeover.

The Peronist-anti-Peronism cleavage formed between 1943 and 1946. In 1946, Juan Domingo Perón was elected president and governed until 1955. This period produced intense polarization along the protectionism vs. free-markets divide, as discussed in the text. In 1955, Perón was toppled by a military coup. Upon the return to an electoral regime in 1958 and until 1966, Peronism was banned. Although competition was thus restricted, polarization along the Peronism-anti-Peronist divide persisted during this period (see O'Donnell 1979 [1973]: Chap. 4). Collier and Collier (2002: 494) highlight that, contrary to most other cases in which labor parties were faced with strong conservative reactions following the incorporation of labor into politics, Perón did not exclude leftist currents from his movement, and thus did not moderate in ideological terms. As mentioned in a footnote in the main text, Perón was re-elected president during the short-lived democratic regime in place between 1973 and 1976, but this experience is unlikely to have reinforced partisan identities, as Perón sought compromise with the right, and as strong centrifugal tendencies tore the Peronist movement apart (see Bermeo 2003: chap. 6).

Bolivia

Antecedent condition, critical juncture, and polarization phase: In late 19th century Bolivia, a party system existed that seemed progressively capable of channeling the conflicts of the day, but it was based on a very restricted suffrage (Gamarra and Malloy 1995: 400, Klein 1969: 25, Rueschemeyer et al. 1992: 160-1). After the Chaco War, a liberal political regime with universal suffrage for literate male citizens re-emerged in 1938 (Whitehead 2001: 25). It is from this point onwards until 1952 that the party system can be considered polarized along the economic dimension. Consequently, the strength of the right is measured before 1938. Although the parties of the right proved creative in forming anti-leftist alliances, their inferiority with respect to the growing Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (Nationalist Revolutionary Movement, MNR), the Partido de la Izquierda Revolucionaria (PIR, the internationalist left), as well as several other leftist parties, was annihilating (Klein 1969: chap 11). In the 1942 elections, characterized by Klein (1969: 354) as “uniquely free” in Bolivian history, the oligarchy lost the chamber of

deputies to the left. The very weakness of the right made polarization short-lived: The instability of subsequent left-wing and right-wing governments amidst violently repressed worker protest paved the way for military intervention in politics and, ultimately, for the revolution of 1952 (as documented extensively in Klein 1969). After 1952, the MNR became hegemonic: In the four elections that took place between 1956 and 1962, the party reached an average vote share of 85.7% (Lazarte R. 2005: 141-142). The parties of the right that existed before 1952 are too numerous and their alliances too complex to be dealt with here. Whitehead (2001: 25) notes that the military was a major power contender in the post-1938 period and that the traditional elite and its parties and interest associations were “disarticulated” by the 1952 revolution. Although the post-1938 period was marked by regime instability, it did entail competition between leftist and rightist parties, and may thus be characterized as a period of polarization. The 1952 revolution, on the other hand, while inaugurating Bolivia’s first fully democratic regime (Rueschemeyer et al. 1992: 160-1) and a period of far-reaching reforms, ended polarization due to the MNR achieving near-hegemonic status.

Brazil

Antecedent condition: The “Old Republic” (1889-1930) did not see the formation of a national party system, as politics remained extremely decentralized in what is frequently described as the “Politics of Governors” of the federal states (Lamounier 1990: 97). As a result, Brazil is an even more extreme case of disunity among conservative forces than Argentina (both cases are discussed by Gibson 1996, chap. 2). Conflict resolution was characterized by gentlemen’s agreements, rather than conflicts being processed in a nationalized elite party system. Subsequently, in Vargas’ “Estado Novo”, inspired by European Fascism, parties were abolished altogether between 1937 and 1945 (Skidmore 1967: 12-41, Lamounier 1990).

As no nationalized party system had existed since 1889, all parties in the post-1945 regime were created from scratch. The Communist Party, the only surviving party from the years prior to Vargas’ dictatorship, was banned in 1947 (see Collier and Collier 2002: 370, who state that the Brazilian Communist Party was the strongest in Latin America in 1945). Given that

polarization only occurred in the early 1960s, it might be argued that the period between 1945 and 1962 is relevant for determining the strength of conservative parties. Indeed, the Social Democratic Party (PSD) had been formed by Vargas upon stepping down in 1945 as the party of the regional elites, and was to mobilize votes using the country's traditional clientelistic networks (Chalmers 1972). Likewise, the third major party in the post-1945 regime, the National Democratic Union (UDN), represented the opponents of the Vargas dictatorship. In the countryside, the UDN and the PSD represented dissenting factions of the landed elites, which achieved a dominant role in both parties in the new democratic regime. Although no differing ideologies of these parties were discernible at the local level, the antagonism between proponents and opponents of the Vargas regime was the main political line of conflict in the post-1945 regime (Hagopian 1996: 61-72). Thus, the division of the political oligarchy (which was closely allied with landowners) weakened the protection of elite interests at the critical juncture. The fact that the two parties joined forces with the military to orchestrate the 1964 coup (Hagopian 1996, Stepan 1978) underlines the fragility of elite interest protection in the parliamentary arena. Mainwaring (1999: 72) shows that the party system became increasingly fractionalized between 1945 and 1962.

Polarization at the critical juncture was triggered by the third major party of the 1945-1964 semi-democratic regime, the Brazilian Labor Party (PTB). This party was created by Vargas' allies in the labor movement and conceived as a mass party to bring out the vote of the urban working class, aided by state-sponsored unions that distributed benefits based on particularistic criteria (Skidmore 1967: 54-62, Schmitter 1971, Hagopian 1996: 61-2, Weyland 1996). In ideological terms, the PTB and PSD differed little until the 1960s, and often formed alliances in elections. For this reason, it is difficult to establish the vote share of the PSD, and I thus refrain from calculating the joint strength of the PSD and the UDN for the period between 1945 and 1962. It must be stressed, however, that President João Goulart, who moved the PTB to the left during his term in office (1961-1964) did not enjoy a parliamentary majority, underlining that conservative forces might have been able to protect their interests in the parliamentary arena. Goulart promised to extend the franchise, to legalize the Communist Party, and to pursue agrarian reform.

When he tried to circumvent parliament to achieve these goals, the military staged the 1964 coup together with the traditional political elite (Stepan 1978, von Mettenheim 1995: 90-91, Hagopian 1996).

Even if we were to classify the conservative right as strong, the Brazilian case still fits my argument, as the 1964 coup aborted a short-lived process of polarization. This alternative classification would imply that the Brazil followed Route 2 (together with Colombia and Venezuela), rather than Route 4 in Figure 1. In any event, Brazil's experience of ideological polarization prior to the 1980s was extremely limited.

Chile

Timing of critical juncture reflects first polarization of the party system. The Socialists (which became the Partido Comunista de Chile, PCCh in 1920) had been founded in 1912, but their vote share remained very small before the 1930s (in 1921, they reached 1.4%); Socialists and Communists jointly reach 6.7% of the vote in 1932 and 15.4% in 1937 (all figures based on Nohlen 2005b). The Chilean case is covered in detail in the main text.

Colombia

Antecedent condition: Institutionalized elite contestation begins with the ending of the War of a Thousand Days in 1902. The case of Colombia is discussed in detail in the main text.

Ecuador

Antecedent condition: There seems to be a scholarly consensus that no nationalized, competitive party system was in place prior to the 1930s (I am reluctant to refer to the ensuing period as the advent of mass politics, when registered voters only comprised 7.7% of the population in 1931, according to McDonald and Ruhl 1989). According to Rueschemeyer et al. (1992: 174), "(...) tensions between the coastal agro-exporters and the highland oligarchy remained strong [after 1875] and obstructed the institutionalization of contestation. (...) [A] period of constitutional oligarchic rule [occurred] from

1916 to 1925, during which, however, there was little attempt to extend centralized state control over the highlands, where the landowners were left in control". In other words, the party system lost its capacity to represent important interests long before any significant extensions of the franchise occurred (and the two traditional parties were challenged by new political actors). The first figures available from Nohlen and Pachano (2005) on the strength of conservative parties are those for the period between 1946 and 1954. In the four legislative elections that took place in this period, the Partido Conservador Ecuatoriano scored 26.9% on average. If we consider the Liberals as defenders of conservative elite interests as well (because they defended the interests of the coastal economic elite, as mentioned above), then that share rises to 44%. However, the strength of these parties in parliament is misleading because the main challenger to the established parties simply did not invest in party building (and of course because the Conservatives and the Liberals were not united). Consequently, the ability of José María Velasco Ibarra to win presidential races five times (see below), underscores the limited degree to which conservative political forces were able to establish strong bonds with their supporters, as do the frequent military interventions (see McDonald and Ruhl 1989: 305). For this reason, I classify the conservative parties as weak to intermediate in strength.

Absence of a critical juncture: The weakness of mass party building on the part of the elites was attenuated by the fact that their position was not challenged by progressive movements or parties with coherent left-wing ideologies (Rueschemeyer et al. 1992: 171). In the 1930s, José María Velasco Ibarra established "Velascismo" as a lasting political tendency in the country, but his movement was largely devoid of ideology, as observers agree (e.g., Conaghan 1995: 446, McDonald and Ruhl 1989: 310). Velasco owed his early successes to his close ties to the traditional elites, and although he resembled Argentina's Perón in rhetoric, he "...never produced real material and political advances for lower-class supporters" (Conaghan 1995: 446). Although creating various parties, his movement was "quintessentially antiparty" (McDonald and Ruhl 1989: 310). Velasco became president five times (four times by election, once by insurrection), and was deposed four times by military coup (ibid.). From the 1940s on, a plethora of parties developed. Apart from the numerous, but weak parties of the left, they resulted from splits from the traditional Liberal

and Conservative parties. As a result, the party system became increasingly fragmented, with around 80 parties competing for voters in the mid-1960s (McDonald and Ruhl 1989: 308-314). Consequently, the elite party system de-institutionalized, and only in 1970 did Izquierda Democrática appear as Ecuador's first ideologically united mass party (ibid.). However, its support has been volatile, and although it won the presidency in 1988, its rise does not seem to have resulted to a polarization of political space along ideological lines. Consequently, political change came from without the party system: Neither the indigenous uprising of 1990, nor Rafael Correa's ascendancy to the presidency and his promise of a "Socialism for the 21st Century" in 2007 were backed by political parties (Conaghan 2008).

Mexico

Antecedent condition: Elite competition was not institutionalized due to the Liberals' victory in the civil wars that followed independence and the hegemonic regime they subsequent put in place; consequently, the antagonism between Liberals and Conservatives vanished, and the religious cleavage was more or less resolved (Coppedge 1998: 190-191, Middlebrook 2000: 15-17). A single leader, Díaz, governed from 1876 to 1911, inaugurating a tradition of intolerance for the opposition. According to Rueschemeyer et al. (1992: 200-4), the failure to consolidate state power and elite heterogeneity prevented the emergence of a constitutional oligarchic regime. As a result, no mass political parties formed prior to the revolution (Collier and Collier 2002: 113-115).

Critical juncture and polarization phase: Significant polarization occurred after the Mexican revolution and the new constitution of 1917 (Collier and Collier 2002: 202-250). The Partido de la Revolución Mexicana (Party of the Mexican Revolution, PRM) then moves to the right after 1938 under Cárdenas's successor Camacho. The new electoral law of 1946 marginalizes most opposition parties and establishes a dominant party system. The Mexican Communist Party was outlawed in 1949 (Collier and Collier 2002: 407-420). The Partido Revolucionario Institucional (Party of the Institutionalized Revolution, PRI, as the PRM was re-baptized in 1946) maintained a dominant position for decades thanks to patronage and political favors, despite some

degree of open contestation. In 1939, the catholic and anti-socialist National Action Party (PAN) was formed to oppose the PRI, but lacking the resources to challenge its rival, it would take several decades for the party to become a serious contender and thereby to polarize political space (Magaloni 2006, Greene 2007, Levitsky and Way 2010: 149-161). Due to its entrenchment in clientelistic networks, the PRI even retains a strong position within the increasingly pluralist pattern of party competition emerging since the 2000.

Paraguay

Antecedent condition: The Paraguayan parties resemble those in Uruguay and Colombia in having built multi-class alliances based on strong party loyalties and clientelistic networks (Abente 1995, McDonald and Ruhl 1989: 65-68). These similarities with the Uruguayan and Colombian cases – which are also highlighted by Dix (1989: 30) – in the antecedent period leads me to classify Paraguay into the group of countries displaying favorable conditions for the protection of elite interests by national political parties. Data on electoral returns is available from Nohlen (2005a) only for the period in which the Stroessner dictatorship was already in place (and under which party competition formally continued), and is thus of limited value.

Absence of polarization: The only real challenge to the Colorado/Republican and Liberal parties before the 2000s came from the “Febrerista movement” in the 1930s, a progressive liberal splinter movement calling for land reform and far-reaching social reforms (McDonald and Ruhl 1989: 67). The movement took power in 1936, but it did not polarize the party system because it severely restricted party activity until its overthrow by the military a year later (Nickson 2015: 226). A phase of instability and military dictatorships followed, at the end of which General Stroessner established a de-facto one-party dominant system. Opposition was tolerated to a certain degree in order to give the regime a democratic façade, although the Communists remained outlawed. The Febrerista Party continued to operate from exile, but it lacked ideological clarity (Ameringer 1992: 493). Meanwhile, the electoral rules guaranteed the strongest party two-thirds of the seats in parliament, and the Colorados, which supported Stroessner, always won the elections (McDonald and Ruhl 1989: 68-9, Di Tella 2004).

Peru

Antecedent condition: The Civilista Party, a conservative party that had succeeded in uniting parts of the upper classes, had become the most influential political group from 1872 onwards (McDonald and Ruhl 1989: 210, Di Tella 2004: 8). The embryonic party system that existed under a tightly restricted electorate was destroyed by the 1919-1930 dictatorship, and no conservative party survived into the post-1930 electoral regime (Gibson 1996: 35-36).

Critical juncture and polarization phase: APRA was only legalized in 1945, but I date back polarization to 1931, the first elections after the founding of APRA, which ushered violent conflict because APRA candidate Haya de la Torre did not accept the election result. In 1956, APRA entered the first of a series of alliances and coalitions with the political right, resulting in the loss of its distinctive ideological profile (see the detailed analysis in Collier and Collier 2002: 477-483). Consequently, 1956 marks the end of ideological polarization. Although APRA was repressed between 1931 (immediately after its first participation in elections) and 1945, we may consider political space as polarized throughout this period because the labor movement and the Confederación de Trabajadores del Peru (CTP) that were allied with the party continued to mobilize along the state-market cleavage (similarly to what was the case with the Peronists in Argentina, where polarization was kept alive during proscriptions of the Peronist party due to the movement's dominance in the labor movement, as discussed in the main text). Between 1945 and 1948, APRA governed in alliance with the Communists under Bustamante's presidency. During the period between 1948 and 1955, APRA and the CTP were repressed. After APRA's move to the center in 1956, renewed polarization in the party system occurred only in the 1980s with the forging of the Izquierda Unida coalition, but this period of polarization again proved short-lived (Roberts 1998: chap. 7-8).

Uruguay

Antecedent condition: As stated in the analysis of the Uruguayan case, currents in both traditional parties defended conservative interests. Rather than dissecting the conservative and progressive currents within the Colorado and

Blanco parties, Table 1 assesses the strength of Conservative forces by means of the Blancos' vote share. Although the Colorado party also featured sub-lemas defending the interests of elites, there is ample agreement – as noted in the main text – that the Blancos were more conservative and closer to the interests of rural landowners.

Critical juncture and polarization phase: José Batlle y Ordóñez came to power in 1903, and it is a matter of debate whether polarization dates back to that year or the year after. According to Collier and Collier (2002: 127, 273), the Colorados moved to the left in 1904, but Batlle's reformist program was well known and stirred controversy even before its implementation. In fact, Batlle's election in 1903 prompted a one-year military revolt by the Blancos that ushered in a civil war from which the Colorados emerged victorious. I date the beginning of the polarization phase to the first steps in implementing Batlle's reformist program, which was vigorously opposed by the Blancos, especially during the initial period of reform (1904-1920), as well as during the "neo-Battlista" period between 1942 and 1958 (Luna 2006: 134, 146; Collier and Collier 2002: 444). An authoritarian backlash occurred between 1933 and 1942, but arguably, polarization persisted during this period: The backlash resulted from the declining protection of elite agricultural interests (Rueschemeyer et al. 1992: 209-210), and thus resulted from and reinforced the divide between the two main parties. As explained in the main text, polarization persisted and then heightened in the 1960s: While the Colorados moved to the center in 1966, the political space they had traditionally occupied was immediately taken over by the left that was to become the Frente Amplio coalition.

Venezuela

In the Venezuelan case, Table 1 presents the configuration of factors for two instances of democratization: The 1945-1948 democratic regime, which engendered substantial polarization and resulted in a military coup by conservative sectors of society and the military, and the post-1958 pacted democracy that aborted polarization. The stability of the party system in the latter regime owes a lot to the party identities forged in the 1940s, but as I argue in the text, these distinctive ideological identities were no longer

reinforced by political conflict in the post-1958 regime, and thus gradually waned.

(1) "Trienio", 1945-1948

Antecedent condition: No pluralistic order had existed prior to the extension of the franchise, and no mass political parties formed before to the revolution of 1945 (Coppedge 1998: 190-1, Middlebrook 2000: 15-7).

Critical juncture and polarization phase: Acción Democrática (AD), which had united the opposition against the military dictatorships that had governed the country, came close to achieving hegemony between 1945 and 1948 (the so-called "trienio"). This period saw the growth of a conservative party: The Comité Político Electoral Independiente (COPEI), founded in 1946, centrally opposed AD's attempt to establish state control over education. Because AD achieved a near-hegemonic status during the Trienio, the intense polarization its rule engendered resulted in a military coup (Collier and Collier 2002: 263, 27-70, Coppedge 1998: 192-3, Karl 1986).

(2) Post-1958 pacted democracy

Antecedent condition: No competitive elections were held between 1947 and 1958, therefore it is difficult to establish the strength of the right. Looking at the last competitive elections in the Trienio and the 1958 elections, which were again competitive, we can observe that AD's vote share declined from 70.8% in the Chamber of Deputies in 1947 to 49.5% in 1958. Concomitantly, the combined vote share of COPEI and Unión Republicana Democrática (URD) rose from 21.3 to 42% (Molina and Thibaut 2005: 569). Thus, elite parties were strong at the outset of the post-1958 pacted democracy and remained so. In fact, the two main right-wing parties were indispensable allies for AD in the push for re-democratization.

Critical juncture and ending of polarization in the post-1958 regime: See extensive discussion in main text.

References

- Abente, Diego. 1995. "A Party System in Transition: The Case of Paraguay." In *Building Democratic Institutions. Party Systems in Latin America*, edited by Scott Mainwaring and Timothy R. Scully, 298–320. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Alonso, Paula. 2000. *Between Revolution and the Ballot Box. The Origins of the Argentine Radical Party in the 1890s*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ameringer, Charles D. 1992. *Political Parties of the Americas, 1980s to 1990s: Canada, Latin America, and the West Indies*. New Westport, Conn: Greenwood.
- Bermeo, Nancy. 2003. *Ordinary People in Extraordinary Times. The Citizenry and the Breakdown of Democracy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Chalmers, Douglas A. 1972. "Parties and Society in Latin America." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 7 (2): 102–28.
- Collier, Ruth Berins, and David Collier. 2002. *Shaping the Political Arena. Critical Junctures, the Labor Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America*. Notre Dame, IND: University of Notre Dame Press, Second Edition.
- Conaghan, Catherine M. 1995. "Politicians Against Parties: Discord and Disconnection in Ecuador's Party System." In *Building Democratic Institutions. Party Systems in Latin America*, edited by Scott Mainwaring and Timothy R. Scully, 434–58. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- . 2008. "Ecuador: Correa's Plebiscitary Presidency." *Journal of Democracy* 19 (2): 46–60.
- Coppedge, Michael. 1998. "The Evolution of Latin American Party Systems." In *Politics, Society, and Democracy: Latin America*, edited by Scott Mainwaring and Arturo Valenzuela, 171–206. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Di Tella, Torcuato S. 2004. *History of Political Parties in Twentieth-Century Latin America*. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.
- Dix, Robert H. 1989. "Cleavage Structures and Party Systems in Latin America." *Comparative Politics* 22 (1): 23–37.
- Gamarra, Eduardo A., and James M. Malloy. 1995. "The Patrimonial Dynamics of Party Politics in Bolivia." In *Building Democratic Institutions. Party Systems in Latin America*, edited by Scott Mainwaring and Timothy R. Scully, 399–433. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Gibson, Edward L. 1996. *Class and Conservative Parties. Argentina in Comparative Perspective*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Greene, Kenneth F. 2007. *Why Dominant Parties Lose. Mexico's Democratization in Comparative Perspective*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hagopian, Frances. 1996. *Traditional Politics and Regime Change in Brazil*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Jones, Mark P., Lauga, Martín, and León-Roesch, Marta. 2005. "Argentina." In *Elections in the Americas. A Data Handbook. Volume II: South America*, edited by Nohlen, Dieter, 59–122. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Karl, Terry Lynn. 1986. "Petroleum and Political Pacts: The Transition to Democracy in Venezuela." In *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Latin America*, edited by Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, 196–219. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Klein, Herbert S. 1969. *Parties and Political Change in Bolivia, 1880-1952*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Lamounier, Bolívar. 1990. "Brazil: Inequality Against Democracy." In *Politics in Developing Countries. Comparing Experiences with Democracy*, edited by Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, 87–134. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Lazarte R., Jorge. 2005. "Bolivia." In *Elections in the Americas. A Data Handbook. Volume II: South America*, edited by Nohlen, Dieter, 123–61. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Levitsky, Steven, and Lucan A. Way. 2010. *Competitive Authoritarianism. Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Luna, Juan Pablo. 2006. "Programmatic and Non-Programmatic Party-Voter Linkages in Two Institutionalized Party Systems: Chile and Uruguay in Comparative Perspective." Manuscript, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
- Madsen, Douglas, and Peter G. Snow. 1991. *The Charismatic Bond. Political Behaviour in Time of Crisis*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Magaloni, Beatriz. 2006. *Voting for Autocracy. Hegemonic Party Survival and Its Demise in Mexico*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Mainwaring, Scott. 1999. *Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of Democratization: The Case of Brazil*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- McDonald, Ronald H., and J. Mark Ruhl. 1989. *Party Politics and Elections in Latin America*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- McGuire, James. 1995. "Political Parties and Democracy in Argentina." In *Building Democratic Institutions. Party Systems in Latin America*, edited by Scott Mainwaring and Timothy R. Scully, 200–246. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Middlebrook, Kevin J. 2000. "Conservative Parties, Elite Representation, and Democracy in Latin America." In *Conservative Parties, the Right, and Democracy in Latin America*, edited by Kevin J. Middlebrook, 1–50. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Molina, José, and Thibaut, Bernard. 2005. "Venezuela." In *Elections in the Americas. A Data Handbook. Volume II: South America*, edited by Nohlen, Dieter, 535–92. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Nickson, R. Andrew. 2015. *Historical Dictionary of Paraguay*. Rowman & Littlefield.
- Nohlen, Dieter, ed. 2005a. *Elections in the Americas. A Data Handbook. Volume II: South America*. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.
- . 2005b. "Chile." In *Elections in the Americas. A Data Handbook. Volume II: South America*, edited by Nohlen, Dieter, 253–93. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Nohlen, Dieter, and Pachano, Simon. 2005. "Ecuador." In *Elections in the Americas. A Data Handbook. Volume II: South America*, edited by Nohlen, Dieter, 365–410. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- O'Donnell, Guillermo. 1979. *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism. Studies in South American Politics*. 2nd ed. Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California.
- Remmer, Karen L. 1984. *Party Competition in Argentina and Chile. Political Recruitment and Public Policy, 1890-1930*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
- Roberts, Kenneth M. 1998. *Deepening Democracy? The Modern Left and Social Movements in Chile and Peru*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Rueschemeyer, Dietrich, Evelyne Huber Stephens, and John D. Stephens. 1992. *Capitalist Development and Democracy*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

- Schmitter, Philippe C. 1971. *Interest Conflict and Political Change in Brazil*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Skidmore, Thomas E. 1967. *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964. An Experiment in Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Stepan, Alfred. 1978. "Political Leadership and Regime Breakdown: Brazil." In *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes*, edited by Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, 110–37. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- von Mettenheim, Kurt. 1995. *The Brazilian Voter. Mass Politics in Democratic Transition, 1974-1986*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Whitehead, Laurence. 2001. "The Emergence of Democracy in Bolivia." In *Towards Democratic Viability: The Bolivian Experience*, edited by John Crabtree and Laurence Whitehead, 21–40. Basingstoke: Palgrave.

Online-Appendix B

Construction of the Index for Party-Voter Congruence

The index used to measure the congruence between voter preferences and party positions is primarily based on Luna and Zechmeister's (2005, 2010) innovative attempt to measure the quality of representation in eleven Latin American countries. From a conceptual point of view, this index corresponds closely to my dependent variable, as it measures how strongly partisan alignments are shaped by programmatic party-voter linkages. Luna and Zechmeister (2005, 2010) combine data from political elites and mass surveys to measure the correlation between the position of parties and that of their electorates across a number of issue bundles including economic and religious issues, preferences for a democratic regime, law and order, and good governance. The authors rely on Latinobarómetro mass surveys to measure voter preferences and the PELA elite surveys of elected party representatives to measure the mean issue positions of parties' legislative delegations. The Latin America Parliamentary Elites Surveys (PELA) were conducted by the University of Salamanca (see Alcántara 2008).

For each issue bundle, several specific survey items are used that are included both in the elite and the mass-level survey data. The authors devise two indices. The more demanding of the two takes into account all the issues of an issue bundle ("Conservative Score"). I use this index because it also forms part of Kitschelt, Hawkins, Luna, Rosas, and Zechmeister's (2010) overall measure of "programmatic partisan structuration", which can be used

to derive values for Peru and Venezuela, which are not covered in Luna and Zechmeister's analysis. Most components of the indices devised by Kitschelt et al. (2010: 171) measure the clarity of policy alternatives offered by political parties along the economic dimension in each country. The index is again based on the PELA surveys. While Kitschelt et al. devise a number of measures, I rely on their PPS-2 index, because this is the measure they use most frequently in their book, and because it is very highly correlated with Luna and Zechmeister's index (see below). The first component of the PPS-2 index is the strength of this economic dimension in structuring parliamentarians' economic issue preferences (throughout Latin America, the first dimension that shows up in a discriminant analysis of parliamentarian' issue preferences is economic in nature). The second component is the association between this dimension and parliamentarians' left-right self-placements. The third component is Luna and Zechmeister's (2010) assessment of the degree to which party positions reflect voter preferences. It is identical to the index developed by these two authors in their earlier article (Luna and Zechmeister 2005).

In comparing their measure with the other components of the Kitschelt et al. (2010) PPS-2 index, Luna and Zechmeister (2010) find a correlation of .96 when Costa Rica and Mexico are excluded from the sample. While Costa Rica is not included in my analysis, the difference in the case of Mexico derives from the fact that Mexican parties offer rather clear-cut and contrasting policy options (captured by Kitschelt et al.'s index), which do not, however, mirror corresponding differences in voter preferences (Luna and Zechmeister's focus). For the Mexican case, Luna and Zechmeister's congruence measure is thus clearly preferable. For all the other cases, the two indices yield very

similar relative locations, as Figure B1 shows. It is thus unproblematic to use Kitschelt et al.'s PPS-2 index to impute missing values for Peru and Venezuela. Figure B1 shows how these values are derived using linear imputation. As mentioned in the main text, both indices are further validated by the results of an analysis of the individual-level attitudes underlying left/right self-placement in electorates (Harbers et al. 2013), and they also correspond closely to my own assessment of party-voter congruence in seven countries in the late 1990s (Bornschieer 2013).




Figure B1: Imputing missing values in Luna and Zechmeister's (2005, 2010) index of party-voter congruence

References

- Alcántara Sáez, Manuel, ed. 2008. *Politicians and Politics in Latin America*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Bornschiefer, Simon. 2013. "Trayectorias históricas y responsiveness del sistema de partidos en siete países de América Latina." *América Latina Hoy* 65(diciembre), 45-77.
- Harbers, Imke, de Vries, Catherine E., and Steenbergen, Marco. R. 2013. "Attitude Variability Among Latin American Publics: How Party System Structuration Affects Left/Right Ideology." *Comparative Political Studies* 46(8), 947-967.
- Kitschelt, Herbert, Hawkins, Kirk A., Luna, Juan Pablo, Rosas, Guillermo, and Zechmeister, Elisabeth. J. 2010. *Latin American Party Systems*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Luna, Juan Pablo, and Zechmeister, Elisabeth J. 2005. "Political Representation in Latin America. A Study of Elite-Mass Congruence in Nine Countries." *Comparative Political Studies* 38(4), 388-416.
- Luna, Juan Pablo, and Zechmeister, Elisabeth J. 2010. "Political Representation in Latin America." In Kitschelt, Herbert, Hawkins, Kirk A., Luna, Juan Pablo, Rosas, Guillermo, and Zechmeister, Elisabeth. J., *Latin American Party Systems*, 119-144. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mainwaring, Scott, and Timothy R. Scully. 1995. "Introduction: Party Systems in Latin America." In *Building Democratic Institutions. Party Systems in Latin America*, edited by Scott Mainwaring and Timothy R. Scully, 1-34. Stanford: Stanford University Press.