**Supplementary Information Appendix**

“The Political Consequences of Gender in Social Networks.” Paul A. Djupe, Scott D. McClurg and Anand Edward Sokhey. Forthcoming at *The British Journal of Political Science.* (last update: December 2015)

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**Note 45 (p8) – An Extended Discussion of Supporting Literatures (on responses to networks)**

Some work indicates that patterns of interaction may be particularly important to the presence of sex differences (Maccoby 1990). Feminist theorists have long suggested that men are different from women. Carol Gilligan (1982) and followers (e.g., Belenky et al. 1986) indicated that women speak with a different, more caring and nurturing voice than men’s, perhaps rooted in differences in child development (but see Walker 1984). Whether or not these gender differences are generated by development is heavily debated, with a large body of research suggesting that behavioral sex differences emerge in social interaction (for a review, see Maccoby 1990). But there is agreement that there are real gender psychological and behavioral differences across societies (e.g., Wood and Eagly 2002). Reflecting these forces, public opinion research has identified a persistent gender gap in “protective” or “caring” issues (e.g., Conover 1988; Kaufman and Petrocik 1999; Page and Shapiro 1992; Pharr 1998).

Research consistent with this expectation also comes in findings that women are more conflict avoidant (Ulbig and Funk 1999) and tend to evince opinions at lower rates (Atkeson and Rapoport 2003; Djupe 2011; Rapoport 1982, 1985), which can be seen as another way of avoiding conflict. Relatedly, women have been shown to be more likely to “tend and befriend” – rather than engage in “fight or flight” – when subjected to stress (Taylor et al. 2000; see also Mather 2010; McClure 2000; see Taylor 2006 for a review). Mondak and Anderson (2004) attribute at least part of women’s lower rates of opinion expression to the way questions, especially political knowledge questions, are asked – the format of the items tends to promote guessing, which men are more willing to do. This critique also serves to confirm that men tend to be more willing to take social risks (Bromiley and Curley 1992).

Personality differences between men and women have also been found to affect such things as earnings, helping to explain wage gaps across decades (Mueller and Plug 2006). One of the mechanisms found to affect wages is the differential experience of men and women in negotiations that reinforces the finding of women’s higher conflict avoidance. This literature is also nuanced, but tends to agree that there are at least conditional gender effects. One meta-analysis found that women tend to reach less optimal outcomes in negotiations, and that features of the negotiation style and process were unable to erase or reverse that difference (Stuhlmacher and Walters 1999). Others, however, find situational- and gender-stereotype-triggers affect the results of negotiations, allowing much of the gap between men and women to be erased under the right conditions (e.g., Bowles, Babcock, and McGinn 2005; Kray, Thompson, and Galinsky, 2001).

**Note 50 (p11) – “Please see pages 3-4 of the Supporting Information Appendix for an additional test and discussion using the 1996 ISL data.”**

One feature that compounds the difficulty in making comparisons between men’s and women’s networks is that time and the network name generator are not constant. The 1992 CNES uses an “important matters” generator, while the 2008/09 ANES uses a political matters generator. The 1996 ISL study, however, randomly assigned either the important matters or a political name generator, thus enabling a test if the construction of the two types of networks are gendered at one time period. The results are presented in Table 1.A, which shows the difference between networks among men in the first two columns, then among women in the columns 4 and 5. The final columns provide *p* values for comparisons between men’s and women’s important matters and political matters networks, respectively.

The results suggest that men’s networks are equivalent regardless of the name generator used, though discussion is marginally higher in political matters networks. Women’s political networks are a bit smaller (.27 discussants; p=.03) than their important matters networks, but are otherwise equivalent; there is some evidence that their political matters contain more expertise. When we compare men’s and women’s important matters networks, there are no systematic differences. However, men’s political networks are significantly larger in these data (~.25 discussants; p=.07) and host more discussion (~.6; p=.02) than women’s political networks. Importantly, in these data women’s networks are just as disagreeable as men’s, and host an equivalent amount of political expertise.

The results certainly do not support the personality-driven expectation that women’s networks are smaller and more agreeable. Instead, the pattern of construction is suggestive of the presence of the gender system in which women have equally diverse interactions as men (Ridgeway and Smith-Lovin 1999), but men downplay the interactions they have with women (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; Mendez and Osborn 2009).

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| **Table 1.A** – Men’s and Women’s Political Networks Across Important Matters and Political Matters Network Generators in the 1996 ISL Data |
|  | *Men* | *Women* | *Important Matters men-women p-value* | *Political* *Matters men-women p-value* |
|  | Imp. Matters | Pol. Matters | *p* | Imp. Matters | Pol. Matters | *p* |
| Network size | 2.52 | 2.60 | .54 | 2.63 | 2.36 | .03 | .40 | .07 |
| Discussion | 4.63 | 5.12 | .10 | 4.35 | 4.47 | .64 | .30 | .02 |
| Agreement | .36 | .36 | .90 | .33 | .37 | .22 | .38 | .88 |
| Expertise | 1.20 | 1.22 | .47 | 1.18 | 1.23 | .11 | .68 | .71 |
| Sources: 1996 ISL. p-values are for t-tests. |

**Note 68 (p 17) – “We also provide further discussion of the function of network size in these models on pp. 5-7 of the Appendix.”**

One concern is about the role of network size in the production of both disagreement and political activity. As Huckfeldt, Johnson, and Sprague (2004) describe it, disagreement is more likely to appear in larger networks. Moreover, political activity is more common among those with larger networks, through which more political information is flowing (e.g., Leighley 1990). Thus, network size may have both direct and indirect effects on political participation and the observed differences in network effects may account for the gender differences observed. We argue that this is not the case.

We discuss network size as it pertains to the ISL model (Table 3). In one sense, it is covertly disguised as the “volume of political talk.” Following McClurg (2006), that variable adds the amount of political talk from each discussant and is therefore very highly correlated with network size (p. 17). We also included comparisons of network size by gender across the three datasets in a “construction” section (Table 1; discussion on pp. 11-12). The upshot is that we observe modest differences in network size by gender, but only in the 1992 dataset.

Third, we estimated versions of the models presented in Table 3 (ISL data) including an additional control for network size. The results remain essentially unchanged. These estimates appear in this SI Appendix and are footnoted in the manuscript (#68). Finally, we were interested to assess just how correlated network size and disagreement were in these three datasets. It turns out that the correlation is dictated by whether the “zeroes” are included. That is, network size runs from 0 to 3 (2008-09 ANES) or 0 to 5 (1992; 1996) in these different data sets, but the network measures were only asked of those who named discussion partners.

Of course, this is why models with social network measures typically have fewer cases than the total in the sample. We can explicitly code in the zeroes, though, so that those who faced no disagreement, for instance, are coded as 0. The 0 category would include those who faced only agreement as well as those who had no discussion partners. A great example of the effect of this coding difference is shown in the unweighted analyses using the 2008/09 ANES. If we include the zeroes, the correlation between network size and partisan disagreement is r=.37 (p<.01), and between network size and general disagreement is r=.74 (p<.01). When we take out the zeroes, the correlation drops to zero or reverses direction (r=-.08, p<.01 for partisan disagreement; r=.02, p=.41 for general disagreement).

There is no difference by gender in this relationship for “general disagreement.”[[1]](#footnote-1) There is a statistically marginal difference when we utilize “partisan disagreement.” Technically, there is no interaction between gender and network size predicting partisan disagreement when the “network-less” respondents (“the zeroes”) are included. When the zeroes are excluded (so just network size ranging from 1 to 3), there is a nearly significant interaction (*p*=.077), which is shown in Figure M.1 on the following page (this is in the presence of the same list of controls used in Table 4). The effect is almost distinguishable (at the 90% level) across smaller networks, with women more likely to have disagreeable discussants than men. However, the effect reverses in a “full” network: women almost have more (partisan) agreeable networks compared to men when they have 3 discussion partners (in the 2008/09 ANES).

**Figure M.1** – The Marginal Effect of “Female” Across the Range of Network Size on the Amount of Partisan Disagreement in the Network (unweighted estimates)



Source: 2008/09 ANES. 90% CIs

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| **Table A.1: Summary Statistics for Variables, 1992 CNES** |
| *Variable* | # of obs. | Mean | SD | Min | Max |
| Participatory Index | 1314 | 0.88 | 1.10 | 0 | 5 |
| Female | 1318 | 0.56 | 0.50 | 0 | 1 |
| Cross-Cutting Talk/Network Disagreement | 1318 | 0.86 | 0.81 | 0 | 2 |
| Avg. Freq. of Discussion | 1314 | 1.51 | 0.90 | 0 | 3 |
| Network Size | 1318 | 2.74 | 1.77 | 0 | 5 |
| Interest | 1315 | 1.47 | 0.66 | 0 | 2 |
| Education | 1316 | 2.98 | 1.20 | 1 | 5 |
| Str. of Rep. | 1318 | 1.46 | 1.64 | 0 | 4 |
| Str. of Dem. | 1318 | 1.53 | 1.63 | 0 | 4 |
| Age | 1313 | 45.24 | 17.29 | 18 | 92 |
| Income | 1228 | 2.35 | 1.60 | 0 | 5 |
| White | 1318 | 0.86 | 0.34 | 0 | 1 |
| Source: 1992 CNES  |

**Dependent Variable:** An additive index of 5 acts (working on a campaign, convincing people to vote for a candidate, attending meetings/rallies, putting up a yard sign/sticker, donating money to a candidate/party)

**Key Independent Variable – Cross-Cutting Exposure/Disagreement:** Network average of match between respondent candidate support and discussant candidate support (0=agreement; 1=mixed/part of dyad is independent or neutral; 2=disagreement/non-match).

All other measures follow (as closely as possible) the coding and construction in Mutz (2002) in her Appendix B (pp. 853-854).

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| **Table A.2: Summary Statistics for Variables, 1996 ISL**  |
|  | # Obs. | Mean | SD | Min | Max |
| Participation Index | 1562 | .45 | .87 | 0 | 4 |
| Education | 1558 | 2.24 | 1.22 | 0 | 4 |
| Income (household) | 1401 | 2.91 | 1.63 | 0 | 5 |
| Age | 1556 | 54.28 | 15.85 | 18 | 94 |
| Group Memberships | 1562 | 2.30 | 1.64 | 0 | 7 |
| Knowledge | 1562 | 1.87 | 1.07 | 0 | 3 |
| Interest | 1546 | 1.26 | .71 | 0 | 2 |
| Str. of PID | 1500 | 2.12 | .93 | 0 | 3 |
| Political Contacting | 1562 | 1.36 | .71 | 0 | 2 |
| Volume of Political Talk in Network | 1562 | 4.62 | 3.81 | 0 | 15 |
| % of Dyads in Network that Agree | 1259 | .35 | .41 | 0 | 1 |
| Avg. Knowledge in Network | 1259 | 1.21 | .42 | 0 | 2 |
| Network Size | 1562 | 2.52 | 1.82 | 0 | 5 |
| Female | 1562 | .55 | .50 | 0 | 1 |
| Source: 1996 Indianapolis-St. Louis Study  |

**Dependent Variable:** An additive index of 4 acts (working on a campaign, attending meetings or other events, putting up a yard sign, donating money to a candidate/campaign)

**Key Independent Variable – Avg. Knowledge in Network:** Network average of response to question: “Generally speaking, how much would you say [discussant] knows about politics? Would you say a great deal, an average amount, or not much at all?”

**Key Independent Variable – % Agreeing Discussants:** The proportion of dyads in a network that a respondent reports share her/his vote choice.

**Key Independent Variable – Volume of Political Talk:** Network sum of responses to question (0-3) asking about frequency of discussion.

All other measures follow the coding and construction detailed in his Appendix A (pp. 749-751) of McClurg (2006).

|  |
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| **Table A.3.: Summary Statistics for Variables, 2008-09 ANES**  |
| *Variable*  | # of Obs. | Mean | SD | Min | Max |
| Participatory Index | 2656 | 1.99 | 1.63 | 0 | 5 |
| Female | 4240 | .58 | .49 | 0 | 1 |
| Partisan Disagreement | 2388 | .98 | 1.26 | 0 | 6 |
| General Disagreement | 2633 | 1.79 | 1.15 | 0 | 5 |
| Network Education | 2584 | 8.61 | 4.58 | 0 | 14 |
| Network Size | 2656 | 2.28 | 1.21 | 0 | 3 |
| Education | 3222 | 3.36 | 1.09 | 1 | 5 |
| Income | 3187 | 12.23 | 4.13 | 1 | 19 |
| Str. of PID | 2733 | 1.95 | 1.04 | 0 | 3 |
| Age | 2611 | 50.81 | 15.45 | 17 | 90 |
| Interest | 2739 | 3.69 | .99 | 1 | 5 |
| Efficacy | 2737 | 2.44 | .92 | 1 | 5 |
| Nonwhite | 4239 | .18 | .38 | 0 | 1 |
| Source: 2008-09 ANES Panel Study  |

**Dependent Variable (November 2008 wave):** Additive index that sums respondents’ reports with respect to joining a protest/rally/demonstration, giving money to a political organization, attending a meeting, inviting/recruiting someone to a meeting, and distributing information or advertisements.

We follow Klofstad et al.’s (2013) construction of the two network disagreement measures (all network items appear in the September 2008 wave):

**Key Independent Variable – General Network Disagreement:** Network average of response to question: “In general, how different are [discussant’s name]’s opinions about government and elections from your own views: extremely different, very different, moderately different, slightly different, or not at all different?”

**Key Independent Variable – Partisan Disagreement:** The absolute value of the difference between a respondent’s partisanship (7 point scale), and the mean partisanship score of her network (discussant partisanship was asked on the same 7 point scale); we summed the scores for discussants, and divided by network size.

**Additional Key Independent Variable – Avg. Level of Formal Education in the Network:** Network average of respondent reports on level of formal education of named discussants (asked on a scale of 14 points, from 0=no schooling completed to 14=professional or doctorate degree)

Strength of partisanship, political interest, and external efficacy also come from wave 9 (September, 2008), and are coded low to high. Respondent formal education is the derived measure (“der05”), and runs from 1 (no high school diploma) to 5 (graduate degree).

**Table 2.A.1. Effect of Network Disagreement on Participation in Electoral Activities, Replication of Mutz (2002). Original and Split Models.**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Replication of 1992 CNES Analysis | For Men | For Women |
|  | β\* | s.e. |  | β\* | s.e. |  | β\* | s.e. |  |
| Network Variables |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cross-Cutting Talk | -.15 | .05 | \*\* | -.09 | .07 |  | -.19 | .07 | \*\* |
| Frequency of Discussion | .42 | .07 | \*\* | .36 | .09 | \*\* | .48 | .10 | \*\* |
| Network Size | .15 | .03 | \*\* | .20 | .04 | \*\* | .11 | .04 | \*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Control Variables |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Interest | .28 | .06 | \*\* | .30 | .09 | \*\* | .25 | .09 | \*\* |
| Education | .09 | .03 | \*\* | .09 | .04 | # | .08 | .04 | # |
| Republican | .08 | .04 | \* | -.02 | .05 |  | .18 | .06 | \*\* |
| Democrat | .14 | .04 | \*\* | .06 | .05 |  | .23 | .05 | \*\* |
| Age | -.00 | .00 | # | -.01 | .00 | \* | -.00 | .00 |  |
| Income | .00 | .02 |  | -.01 | .03 |  | .01 | .03 |  |
| White | -.01 | .04 |  | .04 | .15 |  | .14 | .14 |  |
| Female | -.17 | .07 | \*\* | — |  |  | — |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | -2.06 | .25 | \*\* | -1.78 | .34 | \*\* | -2.70 | .36 | \*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| NLikelihood Ratio χ2 | 995245.96^ |  |  | 439104.99^ |  |  | 559154.24^ |  |  |

Data: 1992 Cross-National Election Study

\* p<.05, \*\*p<.01, # p<.10, all two tailed tests

^ p<.01, one-tailed Chi-Square test

**Table 2.A.2. Effect of Network Disagreement Participation in Electoral Activities, Replication of Mutz (2002). Fully-Interactive Model.**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | β\* | s.e. |  |
| Cross-Cutting Talk | -.09 | .07 |  |
| Frequency of Discussion | .36 | .09 | \*\*\* |
| Network Size | .20 | .04 | \*\*\* |
| Interest | .30 | .09 | \*\*\* |
| Education | .09 | .04 | \* |
| Republican | -.02 | .05 |  |
| Democrat | .06 | .05 |  |
| Age | -.01 | .00 | \*\* |
| Income | -.01 | .03 |  |
| White | .04 | .15 |  |
| Female | -.91 | .50 | \* |
|  |  |  |  |
| Female \* Cross-Cutting Talk | -.10 | .09 |  |
| Female \* Frequency of Discussion | .13 | .13 |  |
| Female \* Network Size | -.09 | .05 | \* |
| Female \* Interest | -.05 | .13 |  |
| Female \* Education | -.00 | .06 |  |
| Female \* Republican | .20 | .08 | \*\*\* |
| Female \* Democrat | .17 | .08 | \*\* |
| Female \* Age | .01 | .00 |  |
| Female \* Income | .03 | .05 |  |
| Female \* White | .09 | .21 |  |
| Constant | -1.79 | .34 | \*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |
| NLikelihood Ratio χ2 | 998264.35^ |  |  |

\* p<.05, \*\*p<.01, # p<.10, all two tailed tests

^ p<.001, one-tailed Chi-Square test

Data: 1992 Cross-National Election Study

**Figure 2.A.1: Testing Gender Interactions for other Network Covariates**

**(Table 2 model in manuscript)**





**Figure 2.A.2: Predicted Counts, by Gender and Cross-Cutting Discussion (Table 2 model in manuscript)**



**Table 3.A.1. The Effect of Network Disagreement and Sophistication on Participation in Electoral Activities, Replication of McClurg (2006) – Original and Split Models.**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Replication of 1996 ISL Analysis | For Men | For Women |
|  | β\* | s.e. | β\* | s.e. | β\* | s.e. |
| Network Variables |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Volume of political talk | .05\*\* | (.02) | .03# | (.02) | .06\*\* | (.02) |
| Average political knowledge | .39\*\* | (.13) | .15 | (.18) | .65\*\* | (.20) |
| % Agreeing discussants | .25\* | (.12) | .22 | (.17) | .29 | (.18) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Control Variables |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Education | .02 | (.06) | .08 | (.08) | -.02 | (.08) |
| Household income | .07# | (.04) | .02 | (.06) | .10# | (.05) |
| Age | .01\* | .00  | .01# | (.01) | .01 | (.01) |
| Group memberships | .15\*\* | (.03) | .15\*\* | (.05) | .16\*\* | (.05) |
| Respondent knowledge | .05 | (.06) | -.02 | (.09) | .09 | (.08) |
| Interest | .49\*\* | (.09) | .48\*\* | (.12) | .46\*\* | (.13) |
| Strength of partisanship | .19\*\* | (.06) | .25\*\* | (.08) | .13 | (.09) |
| Political contact | .71\*\* | (.09) | .77\*\* | (.13) | .65\*\* | (.13) |
| Female | -.12 | (.10) | — |  | — |  |
| Constant | -5.05\*\* | (.37) | -4.73\*\* | (.50) | -5.44\*\* | (.53) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| NLikelihood Ratio χ2α\* | 1,122270.09.42^ |   | 531134.31.39^ |   | 591140.21.42^ |   |

Data: 1996 Indianapolis-St. Louis Study. Unweighted results.

\* p<.05, \*\*p<.01, # p<.10, all two tailed tests

^ p<.001, one-tailed Chi-Square test

**Table 3.A.2. The Effect of Network Disagreement and Sophistication on Participation in Electoral Activities, Replication of McClurg (2006) – Fully-Interactive Model**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | β\* | s.e. |  |
| Volume of political talk | .03 | .02 | \* |
| Average political knowledge | .15 | .18 |  |
| % Agreeing discussants | .22 | .17 |  |
| Education | .08 | .08 |  |
| Household income | .02 | .06 |  |
| Age | .01 | .01 | \* |
| Group memberships | .15 | .05 | \*\*\* |
| Respondent knowledge | -.02 | .09 |  |
| Interest | .48 | .12 | \*\*\* |
| Strength of Partisanship | .25 | .08 | \*\*\* |
| Political contact | .77 | .13 | \*\*\* |
| Female | -.71 | .73 |  |
|  |  |  |  |
| Interactions with Gender |  |  |  |
| Female \* political talk | .03 | .03 |  |
| Female \* political knowledge | .50 | .26 | \* |
| Female \* % agreeing discussants | .07 | .25 |  |
| Female \* education | -.10 | .11 |  |
| Female \* income | .09 | .08 |  |
| Female \* age | -.00 | .01 |  |
| Female \* group memberships | .01 | .07 |  |
| Female \* political knowledge | .10 | .12 |  |
| Female \* interest | -.02 | .18 |  |
| Female \* partisan strength | -.12 | .12 |  |
| Female \* political contact | -.12 | .18 |  |
|  |  |  |  |
| Constant | -4.73 | .50 | \*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |
| NLikelihood Ratio χ2α\* | 1,122279.47.41^ |  |  |

Data: 1996 Indianapolis-St. Louis Study

\* p<.05, \*\*p<.01, # p<.10, all two tailed tests

^ p<.001, one-tailed Chi-Square test

**Table 3.A.3. The Effect of Network Disagreement and Sophistication on Participation in Electoral Activities, Replication of McClurg (2006) – Including Network Size (Model Specification, Table 3, in Manuscript)**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Replication of 1996 ISL Analysis | Modeling Gender1996 ISL Analysis |
|  | β\* | s.e. |  | β\* | s.e. |  |
| Volume of political talk | .08 | .03 | \*\* | .07 | .04 |  |
| Female | -.11 | .10 |  | -.94 | .43 | \* |
| Female \* political talk |  |  |  | .02 | .06 |  |
| Average political knowledge | .34 | .13 | \* | .13 | .18 |  |
| Female \* Avg. political knowledge |  |  |  | .45 | .26 | # |
| % agreeing discussants | .24 | .12 | # | .20 | .17 |  |
| Female \* % agreeing discussants |  |  |  | .06 | .24 |  |
| Network size | -.10 | .07 |  | -.09 | .10 |  |
| Female \* network size |  |  |  | .01 | .14 |  |
| Education | .03 | .06 |  | .03 | .06 |  |
| Household income | .07 | .04 | # | .07 | .04 | # |
| Age | .01 | .00 | \* | .01 | .00 | \* |
| Group memberships | .15 | .03 | \*\* | .16 | .03 | \*\* |
| Respondent knowledge | .04 | .06 |  | .04 | .06 |  |
| Interest | .48 | .09 | \*\* | .47 | .09 | \*\* |
| Strength of partisanship | .19 | .06 | \*\* | .19 | .06 | \*\* |
| Political contact | .72 | .09 | \*\* | .71 | .09 | \*\* |
| Constant | -4.92 | .38 | \*\* | -4.52 | .42 | \*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| NLikelihood Ratio χ2α\* | 1,122272.10.42^ |  |  | 1,122277.26.41^ |  |  |

Data: 1996 Indianapolis-St. Louis Study

\* p<.05, \*\*p<.01, # p<.10, all two tailed tests

^ p<.001, one-tailed Chi-Square test

**Table 3.A.4. The Effect of Network Disagreement and Sophistication on Participation in Electoral Activities, Replication of McClurg (2006) – Original and Split Models, Including Network Size**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Replication of 1996 ISL Analysis | For Men | For Women |
|  | β\* | s.e. |  | β\* | s.e. |  | β\* | s.e. |  |
| Network Variables |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Volume of political talk | .08 | .03 | \*\*\* | .07 | .04 | # | .09 | .04 | \* |
| Average political knowledge | .34 | .13 | \*\* | .11 | .18 |  | .61 | .20 | \*\* |
| % Agreeing discussants | .24 | .12 | # | .20 | .17 |  | .28 | .18 |  |
| Network size | -.10 | .07 |  | -.11 | .10 |  | -.08 | .09 |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Control Variables |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Education | .03 | .06 |  | .09 | .08 |  | -.02 | .08 |  |
| Household income | .07 | .04 | # | .02 | .06 |  | .10 | .05 | # |
| Age | .01 | .00 | \* | .01 | .01 | # | .01 | .01 |  |
| Group memberships | .15 | .03 | \*\* | .15 | .05 | \*\* | .16 | .05 | \*\* |
| Respondent knowledge | .04 | .06 |  | -.02 | .09 |  | .08 | .08 |  |
| Interest | .48 | .09 | \*\* | .48 | .12 | \*\* | .45 | .13 | \*\* |
| Strength of Partisanship | .19 | .06 | \*\* | .25 | .08 | \*\* | .13 | .09 |  |
| Political contact | .72 | .09 | \*\* | .77 | .13 | \*\* | .65 | .13 | \*\* |
| Female | -.11 | .10 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | -4.92 | .38 | \*\* | -4.62 | .51 | \*\* | -5.32 | .55 | \*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| NLikelihood Ratio χ2α\* | 1,122272.10.42^ |  |  | 531135.41.39^ |  |  | 591140.91.42^ |  |  |

Data: 1996 Indianapolis-St. Louis Study

\* p<.05, \*\*p<.01, # p<.10, all two tailed tests

^ p<.001, one-tailed Chi-Square test

**Figure 3.A.1: Testing Gender Interactions for other Network Covariates**

**(Table 3 model in manuscript)**





**Figure 3.A.2: Predicted Counts, by Gender and Expertise (Table 3 model in manuscript)**



**Figure 4.A.1: Testing Gender Interactions for other Network Covariates**

**(Table 4 Specifications in manuscript – unweighted estimates)**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
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**Figure 4.A.2: Predicted Counts, by Gender and Disagreement, and Gender and Network Education (Table 4 Specifications in Manuscript – unweighted estimates)**

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| **Table 4.A.1: The Effect of Two Types of Network Disagreement & Network Sophistication on Political Participation – 2008-09 ANES** **(Respondents Reporting Zero Discussants Included)****(weighted estimates)**  |
|  | **General Disagreement Specification**  | **Partisan Disagreement** **Specification** |
|  | β\* | s.e. | β\* | s.e. |
| Network Variables |  |  |  |  |
| Discussant Disagreement | -.02 | .04 | -.05 | .03# |
| Average Education Level in Network | -.01 | .03 | .03 | .02 |
| Network Size | .17 | .09# | .06 | .07 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Control Variables |  |  |  |  |
| Education | .15 | .03\*\* | .12 | .03\*\* |
| Household Income | .01 | .01 | .01 | .00.1 |
| Strength of Partisanship  | -.02 | .03 | .00 | .02 |
| Age  | .01 | .00\*\* | .01 | .00\*\* |
| Interest  | .21 | .03\*\* | .19 | .03\*\* |
| Efficacy (external) | .04 | .02# | .05 | .02\* |
| Non-White | .04 | .08 | .06 | .08 |
| Female  | -.10 | .17 | -.05 | .17 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Interactions with Gender  |  |  |  |  |
|  Disc. Disagreement\*Female  | .03 | .06 | .04 | .04 |
| Network Education\*Female | .03 | .03 | .00 | .03 |
| Network Size\*Female  | -.08 | .11 | .02 | .10 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | -1.49 | .21\*\* | -1.42 | .21\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| N |  | 2271 |  | 2091 |
| Wald χ2 (sig) |  | 260.9 (.00) |  | 243.1 (.00) |
| Data: 2008-09 ANES Panel Study. # p<.10,\* p<.05, \*\*p<.01, all two tailed testsWeighted estimates (cumulative late panel), per ANES documentation. Note: Both negative binomial and poisson models were estimated; diagnostics indicate the poisson models to be more appropriate. |

**Table 4.A.2: The Effect of Network Disagreement & Network Sophistication on Participation – 2008-09 ANES –**

**(Split Models of Specification in Paper – “zeroes” excluded) (weighted estimates)**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Partisan Disagreement** | **General Disagreement** |
|  | Men | Women | Men | Women |
|  | β\* | s.e. | β\* | s.e. | β\* | s.e. | β\* | s.e. |
| Network Variables |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Discussant Disagreement | -.05 | .03# | -.01 | .02 | -.02 | .05 | .02 | .04 |
| Average Education Level in Network | .05 | .03# | .03 | .03 | -.01 | .04 | .04 | .02# |
| Network Size | .10 | .08 | .09 | .08 | .14 | .09# | .14 | .08# |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Control Variables |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Education | .09 | .04\* | .12 | .04\*\* | .13 | .04\*\* | .16 | .04\*\* |
| Household Income | .01 | .01 | .00 | .01 | .01 | .01 | .01 | .01 |
| Strength of Partisanship  | -.01 | .04 | -.02 | .03 | -.05 | .04 | -.01 | .03 |
| Age  | .01 | .00\*\* | .01 | .00\*\* | .00 | .00# | .01 | .00\*\* |
| Interest  | .24 | .05\*\* | .19 | .03\*\* | .28 | .05\*\* | .18 | .03\*\* |
| Efficacy (external) | .08 | .04\* | .06 | .03# | .08 | .04\* | .05 | .03 |
| Non-White | .06 | .13 | .05 | .10 | -.04 | .13 | .06 | .10 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | -2.05 | .39\*\* | -1.51 | .38\*\* | -1.56 | .44\*\* | -1.85 | .35\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| N |  | 715 |  | 940 |  | 788 |  | 1047 |
| Wald χ2(sig) |  | 107.2(.000) |  | 93.1(.000) |  | 120.8(.000) |  | 115.9(.000) |
| Data: 2008-09 ANES Panel Study.  |
| # p<.10, \* p<.05, \*\*p<.01, all two tailed testsNote: Respondents reporting zero discussants are excluded. Cumulative late panel weights applied, per ANES documentation. †Both negative binomial and poisson models were estimated; diagnostics indicate the poisson models to be more appropriate.  |

**Table 4.A.3: The Effect of Network Disagreement & Network Sophistication on Participation – 2008-09 ANES –**

**(Split Models, with Non-Network Related Discussion Control – “zeroes” excluded)**

**(weighted estimates)**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Partisan Disagreement** | **General Disagreement** |
|  | Men | Women | Men | Women |
|  | β\* | s.e. | β\* | s.e. | β\* | s.e. | β\* | s.e. |
| Network Variables |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Discussant Disagreement | -.03 | .03 | -.01 | .02 | -.01 | .05 | .02 | .04 |
| Average Education Level in Network | .05 | .03.1 | .04 | .02.1 | -.01 | .03 | .05 | .02\* |
| Network Size | .08 | .08 | .10 | .10 | .12 | .08 | .15 | .08# |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Control Variables |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  (overall) Political Discussion (Days per Week)  | .07 | .02\*\* | .06 | .02\*\* | .06 | .02\*\* | .07 | .02\*\* |
| Education | .09 | .04\* | .11 | .04\*\* | .12 | .04\*\* | .14 | .04\*\* |
| Household Income | .01 | .01 | .00 | .01 | .01 | .01 | -.01 | .01 |
| Strength of Partisanship  | -.02 | .04 | -.02 | .03 | -.05 | .04 | -.01 | .03 |
| Age  | .01 | .00\*\* | .01 | .00\* | .00 | .00 | .01 | .00\*\* |
| Interest  | .18 | .05\*\* | .13 | .04\*\* | .22 | .05\*\* | .10 | .04\*\* |
| Efficacy (external) | .08 | .04\* | .06 | .03# | .08 | .04# | .05 | .03 |
| Non-White | .11 | .13 | .05 | .10 | .00 | .13 | .05 | .09 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | -1.92 | .40\*\* | -1.48 | .38\*\* | -1.46 | .42\*\* | -1.77 | .35\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| N |  | 715 |  | 940 |  | 788 |  | 1047 |
| Wald χ2(sig) |  | 129.8 (.000) |  | 115.4(.000) |  | 140.6(.000) |  | 149.1(.000) |
| Data: 2008-09 ANES Panel Study.  |
| # p<.10, \* p<.05, \*\*p<.01, all two tailed testsNote: Respondents reporting zero discussants are excluded. Cumulative late panel weights applied, per ANES documentation. †Both negative binomial and poisson models were estimated; diagnostics indicate the poisson models to be more appropriate.  |

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| **Table 4.A.4: The Effect of Two Types of Network Disagreement & Network Sophistication on Political Participation – 2008-09 ANES** **(unweighted estimates)**  |
|  | **General Disagreement Specification**  | **Partisan Disagreement** **Specification** |
|  | β\* | s.e. | β\* | s.e. |
| Network Variables |  |  |  |  |
| Discussant Disagreement | -.01 | .03 | -.05 | .02\*\* |
| Average Education Level in Network | .01 | .02 | .03 | .02# |
| Network Size | .15 | .06\* | .12 | .06# |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Control Variables |  |  |  |  |
| Education | .13 | .02\*\* | .11 | .02\*\* |
| Household Income | .01 | .00\* | .01 | .00# |
| Strength of Partisanship  | .02 | .02 | .02 | .02 |
| Age  | .01 | .00\*\* | .01 | .00\*\* |
| Interest  | .18 | .02\*\* | .18 | .02\*\* |
| Efficacy (external) | .05 | .02\*\* | .05 | .02\*\* |
| Non-White | .01 | .05 | .02 | .05 |
| Female  | -.31 | .33 | -.07 | .35 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Interactions with Gender  |  |  |  |  |
|  Disc. Disagreement\*Female  | .02 | .04 | .03 | .03 |
| Network Education\*Female | .03 | .02 | .00 | .02 |
| Network Size\*Female  | .00 | .08 | .02 | .08 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | -1.52 | .26\*\* | -1.58 | .27\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| N |  | 1909 |  | 1726 |
| Likelihood Ratio χ2 |  | 405.16\*\* |  | 355.64\*\* |
| Data: 2008-09 ANES Panel Study. # p<.10,\* p<.05, \*\*p<.01, all two tailed testsNote: Respondents reporting no discussants (networks of size zero) are excluded. Both negative binomial and poisson models were estimated; diagnostics indicate the poisson models to be more appropriate. |

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| **Figure 3.A.3: Examining Gender\*Network Interactions, 2008-09 ANES, Estimates from Table 4 with 90% CIs** |
| Panels A-B. The marginal effect of network characteristics on participation, by gender; unweighted estimates |
| A.08-09 general B.emf | B.08-09 partisan B.emf |
| Panels C-D. The marginal effect of gender on participation, by network expertise and partisan disagreement, respectively |
| C. | D. |

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| **Table 4.A.5: The Effect of Two Types of Network Disagreement & Network Sophistication on Political Participation – 2008-09 ANES** **(Respondents Reporting Zero Discussants Included)****(unweighted estimates)**  |
|  | **General Disagreement Specification**  | **Partisan Disagreement** **Specification** |
|  | β\* | s.e. | β\* | s.e. |
| Network Variables |  |  |  |  |
| Discussant Disagreement | -.01 | .03 | -.05 | .02\*\* |
| Average Education Level in Network | .00 | .01 | .02 | .01 |
| Network Size | .14 | .05\*\* | .10 | .05\* |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Control Variables |  |  |  |  |
| Education | .14 | .02\*\* | .13 | .02\*\* |
| Household Income | .01 | .00\*\* | .01 | .00\*\* |
| Strength of Partisanship  | .02 | .02 | .03 | .02.11 |
| Age  | .01 | .00\*\* | .01 | .00\*\* |
| Interest  | .18 | .02\*\* | .18 | .02\*\* |
| Efficacy (external) | .04 | .02\* | .04 | .02\* |
| Non-White | .00 | .05 | .02 | .05 |
| Female  | -.08 | .09 | -.07 | .09 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Interactions with Gender  |  |  |  |  |
|  Disc. Disagreement\*Female  | .01 | .04 | .03 | .03 |
| Network Education\*Female | .02 | .02 | .00 | .02 |
| Network Size\*Female  | -.04 | .06 | .01 | .06 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | -1.51 | .12\*\* | -1.49 | .12\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| N |  | 2362 |  | 2179 |
| Likelihood Ratio χ2 |  | 743.48\*\* |  | 707.48\*\* |
| Data: 2008-09 ANES Panel Study. # p<.10,\* p<.05, \*\*p<.01, all two tailed testsNote: Both negative binomial and poisson models were estimated; diagnostics indicate the poisson models to be more appropriate. |

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| **Table 4.A.6: The Effect of Two Types of Network Disagreement & Network Sophistication on Political Participation – 2008-09 ANES** **(alternate specification – including non-network discussion control)****(unweighted estimates)**  |
|  | **General Disagreement Specification**  | **Partisan Disagreement** **Specification** |
|  | β\* | s.e. | β\* | s.e. |
| Network Variables |  |  |  |  |
| Discussant Disagreement | .01 | .03 | -.04 | .02\* |
| Average Education Level in Network | .01 | .02 | .03 | .02.14 |
| Network Size | .15 | .06\* | .12 | .06# |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Control Variables |  |  |  |  |
| Days per Week Discussion | .06 | .02\*\* | .05 | .13\*\* |
| Education | .13 | .02\*\* | .11 | .02\*\* |
| Household Income | .01 | .00 | .01 | .01 |
| Strength of Partisanship  | .01 | .02 | .01 | .02 |
| Age  | .01 | .00\*\* | .01 | .00\*\* |
| Interest  | .13 | .02\*\* | .13 | .02\*\* |
| Efficacy (external) | .05 | .02\*\* | .05 | .02\*\* |
| Non-White | .04 | .05 | .06 | .05 |
| Female  | -.29 | .33 | -.09 | .36 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Interactions with Gender  |  |  |  |  |
|  Disc. Disagreement\*Female  | .01 | .04 | .03 | .03 |
| Network Education\*Female | .03 | .02 | .00 | .02 |
| Network Size\*Female  | -.02 | .08 | .00 | .08 |
| Days per Week\*Female | .00 | .02 | .01 | .02 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | -1.45 | .26\*\* | -1.49 | .28\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| N |  | 1849 |  | 1668 |
| Likelihood Ratio χ2 |  | 447.15\*\* |  | 384.62\*\* |
| Data: 2008-09 ANES Panel Study. # p<.10,\* p<.05, \*\*p<.01, all two tailed testsNote: Respondents reporting no discussants (networks of size zero) are excluded. Both negative binomial and poisson models were estimated; diagnostics indicate the poisson models to be more appropriate. |

**Table 4.A.7: The Effect of Network Disagreement & Network Sophistication on Participation – 2008-09 ANES –**

**(Split Models of Previous Specification with non-network related discussion control) (unweighted estimates)**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Partisan Disagreement** | **General Disagreement** |
|  | Men | Women | Men | Women |
|  | β\* | s.e. | β\* | s.e. | β\* | s.e. | β\* | s.e. |
| Network Variables |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Discussant Disagreement | -.04 | .02\* | -.01 | .02 | .01 | .03 | .02 | .03 |
| Average Education Level in Network | .03 | .02 | .03 | .02\* | .01 | .02 | .04 | .02\* |
| Network Size | .12 | .06\* | .12 | .06\* | .14 | .06\* | .13 | .05\* |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Control Variables |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  (overall) Political Discussion (Days per Week)  | .04 | .01\*\* | .06 | .01\*\*\* | .05 | .01\*\*\* | .07 | .01\*\*\* |
| Education | .10 | .03\*\* | .13 | .02\*\*\* | .10 | .03\*\*\* | .15 | .02\*\*\* |
| Household Income | .01 | .01 | .00 | .01 | .01 | .007\* | .00 | .01 |
| Strength of Partisanship  | .02 | .03 | .01 | .02 | .00 | .02 | .02 | .02 |
| Age  | .01 | .00\*\*\* | .01 | .00\*\*\* | .01 | .00\*\* | .01 | .00\*\*\* |
| Interest  | .16 | .03\*\*\* | .12 | .03\*\*\* | .17 | .03\*\*\* | .10 | .03\*\*\* |
| Efficacy (external) | .06 | .03\* | .04 | .02\* | .06 | .03\* | .04 | .02\* |
| Non-White | .08 | .09 | .05 | .07 | .02 | .09 | .04 | .06 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | -1.61 | .30\*\*\* | -1.52 | .26\*\*\* | -1.54 | .28\*\*\* | -1.70 | .25\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| N |  | 722 |  | 946 |  | 796 |  | 1053 |
| Likelihood Ratio χ2 |  | 170.69\*\*\* |  | 216.04\*\*\* |  | 188.65\*\*\* |  | 263.83\*\*\* |
| Data: 2008-09 ANES Panel Study.  |
| \* p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001, # p<.10, all two tailed testsNote: Respondents reporting zero discussants are excluded. †Both negative binomial and poisson models were estimated; diagnostics indicate the poisson models to be more appropriate.  |

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| **Table 4.A.8:** **Disagreement, Sophistication & Participation , 2008-09 (Fully-Interactive Model Accompanying 4.A.6 –** **Partisan Disagreement; unweighted estimates)**  |
|  | β\* | s.e. |
| Network Variables |  |  |
| **Partisan Disagreement** | -.01 | .02 |
| Average Education Level in Network | .03 | .02\* |
| Network Size | .12 | .06\* |
|  |  |  |
| Control Variables |  |  |
| General Political Discussion (Days per Week)  | .06 | .01\*\*\* |
| Education | .13 | .02\*\*\* |
| Household Income | .00 | .01 |
| Strength of Partisanship  | .01 | .02 |
| Age  | .01 | .00\*\*\* |
| Interest  | .12 | .03\*\*\* |
| Efficacy (external) | .04 | .02 |
| Non-White | .05 | .07 |
| Male  | -.10 | .39 |
|  |  |  |
| Interactions with Gender (Male)  |  |  |
| Gen. Pol. Discussion | -.02 | .02 |
| Partisan Disagreement | -.03 | .03 |
| Network Education  | .00 | .03 |
| Network Size  | -.00 | .08 |
| Education  | -.04 | .04 |
| Income  | .01 | .01 |
| Strength of Partisanship | .01 | .03 |
| Age  | .00 | .00 |
| Interest | .04 | .05 |
| Efficacy | .02 | .04 |
| Non-White  | .03 | .11 |
|  |  |  |
| Constant | -1.52 | .26\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |
| N |  | 1668 |
| Likelihood Ratio χ2 |  | 387.38\*\*\* |
| Data: 2008-09 ANES Panel Study.\* p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001, # p<.10, all two tailed tests†Both negative binomial and poisson models were estimated; diagnostics indicate the poisson models to be more appropriate. Note: Excluding individuals reporting zero discussants. |

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| **Table 4.A.9: Disagreement, Sophistication & Participation, 2008-09 (Fully-Interactive Model Accompanying 4.A.6 –** **General Disagreement; unweighted estimates**)  |
|  | β\* | s.e. |
| Network Variables |  |  |
| **General Disagreement** | .02 | .03 |
| Average Education Level in Network | .04 | .02\* |
| Network Size | .13 | .05\* |
|  |  |  |
| Control Variables |  |  |
| General Political Discussion (Days per Week)  | .07 | .01\*\*\* |
| Education | .15 | .02\*\*\* |
| Household Income | .00 | .01 |
| Strength of Partisanship  | .02 | .02 |
| Age  | .01 | .00\*\*\* |
| Interest  | .10 | .03\*\*\* |
| Efficacy (external) | .04 | .02 |
| Non-White | .05 | .06 |
| Male  | .16 | .37 |
|  |  |  |
| Interactions with Gender (Male)  |  |  |
| Gen. Pol. Discussion | -.01 | .02 |
| General Disagreement | -.01 | .04 |
| Network Education  | -.03 | .02 |
| Network Size  | .01 | .08 |
| Education  | -.05 | .04 |
| Income  | .01 | .01 |
| Strength of Partisanship | -.01 | .03 |
| Age  | -.00 | .00 |
| Interest | .07 | .04 |
| Efficacy | .02 | .03 |
| Non-White  | -.02 | .11 |
|  |  |  |
| Constant | -1.70 | .25\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |
| N |  | 1849 |
| Likelihood Ratio χ2 |  | 453.31\*\*\* |
| Data: 2008-09 ANES Panel Study.\* p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001, # p<.10, all two tailed tests†Both negative binomial and poisson models were estimated; diagnostics indicate the poisson models to be more appropriate. Note: Excluding individuals reporting zero discussants.  |

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1. These results come from unweighted estimates. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)