

Social Norms after Conflict Exposure and Victimization by Violence:  
Experimental Evidence from Kosovo

Supplementary Material for an Online Appendix

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
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### **Brief Background on the Kosovo Conflict**

The population of Kosovo is approximately 1.8 million of which 88% are ethnic Albanians, 7% Serbs, with the remaining 5% being comprised by a range of other smaller ethnic communities (see map below). The red areas of North Kosovo (Leposavic, Zvecan, and Zubin Potok) and the Southern municipality of Strpce are the dominant Serbian enclaves in Kosovo, though Serb populations can be found elsewhere in large numbers in both urban and rural settings. Serb and Albanian populations are primarily distinguished by language and religion as well as to some degree by physicality. Albanians speak an Indo-European language which is unintelligible to Serbian Slavic speakers. Albanians are also primarily Sunni Muslims while Serbs are primarily Orthodox Christians, though there are sizable minority populations of Albanian Christians and Slavic Muslims in Kosovo. The Serb population continues to decline in Kosovo vis-à-vis Albanians.

**Figure 1. Serb population of Kosovo in 2011**



From 1945 until roughly 1990, Kosovo was a semi-autonomous province of the Republic of Serbia as part of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav period was marked by increasing ethnic tensions in Kosovo between ethnic Serbs and Albanians. Over the course of the Yugoslav period, ethnic Serbs migrated out of Kosovo while the remaining ethnic Albanian population grew rapidly. Kosovo was viewed by most Serbs as a sacred part of their historical territory and Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic exploited ethnic tensions Kosovo in the late 1980s to rally Serbian nationalists and consolidate his power in Serbia. As Yugoslavia rapidly


disintegrated, Milosevic used the opportunity to tighten Serbia's control over Kosovo. Ethnic Albanians resisted the Serbian crackdown with the ultimate goal of independence from Serbia. In 1996, Albanians formed a guerrilla resistance group called the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and tensions escalated. In 1998, Western intervention failed to bring a peaceful resolution to the disputed territory. In March 1999, NATO began an intensive bombing campaign of Serbia, which retaliated with an ethnic cleansing campaign of Kosovo in which over 800,000 ethnic Albanians fled to neighboring Macedonia. In June 1999 Serbia finally capitulated to NATO bombing and agreed to allow the United Nations to administer the Kosovo region until a more permanent arrangement could be agreed upon. Many ethnic Serbs then fled Kosovo with the retreating Serbian military and subsequent reprisal attacks by returning ethnic Albanian forces. Upon entering Kosovo, the United Nations found grim evidence of ethnic cleansing campaigns carried out by both Serbian and Albanian paramilitary groups in the wake of the chaos. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) continues to investigate and prosecute war crimes committed during the Kosovo War.

To end the Kosovo War, the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was given primary responsibility for governance headed by a Special Representative with sweeping powers. The UN authorized a new security framework called Kosovo Force (KFOR) which was operated primarily by NATO member states across different administrative sectors. At its height, KFOR consisted of over 50,000 military personnel, which has since been drawn down to about 14,000. Since 1999, UNMIK has worked toward the goal of greater self-government for Kosovo. On the national level, Kosovo has a parliamentary system with a unicameral legislature with executive power under a prime minister. Kosovo is further divided into thirty municipalities of varying ethnic composition. Since 1999, the UNMIK has steadily relaxed its administrative control over

Kosovo, and in 2008 transferred most remaining powers over to the European Union's Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX). The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has been supervising elections in Kosovo since 2001. In the 2007 parliamentary elections, the Albanian Democratic Party of Kosovo (DPK) won a plurality of the vote on a pledge for independence. The election was largely boycotted by ethnic Serbs. On February 17, 2008, the Assembly of Kosovo approved a declaration of Kosovo's independence, which was immediately recognized by the United States and most European NATO members, but condemned by Russia and especially Serbia. In 2008, ethnic Serbs municipalities created their own Community Assembly of Kosovo and Metohija rejecting independence. North Kosovo is under de facto control by local Serb populations and indirectly by the government of Serbia. The Serbian dinar is still the dominant currency of North Kosovo (the Euro is traded throughout the rest of the country). Serb leaders are increasingly calling for a partition of North Kosovo to be reunited with Serbia. The issue of Kosovo's independence remains a deep concern for many in Serbia as is the treatment of ethnic Serbs in Kosovo by Albanians.

**Figure 2. Kosovar Albanian Views of Kosovar Serbs (1996-2011)**


*Q: Please tell me whether you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable opinion of Serbs in Kosovo? (%)*



Source: Office of Opinion Research surveys, 1995-2011

**Figure 3. Kosovar Serb Views of Kosovar Albanians (1996-2011)**

*Q: Please tell me whether you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable opinion of Serbs in Kosovo? (%)*



Source: Office of Opinion Research surveys, 1996-2011

**Baselines of Ethnic Tolerance, Support for NATO, and Confidence in KFOR by Ethnicity**

**Table 1 Survey Baselines of Ethnic Tolerance, Support for NATO, and Confidence in KFOR by Ethnicity (1998-2000)**

Albanians	Views of Serbs						Views of NATO			Confidence in KFOR		
	Apr-98			Jan-99			Oct-00			Oct-00		
Future KFOR Sector	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N
British Sector (Prishtina)	3.28	1.293	160	3.84	0.398	195	1.26	0.62	359	2.18	1.04	337
French Sector (Mitrovica, Vushtrri)	3.69	0.775	100	3.80	0.401	140	1.21	0.46	180	1.44	0.63	179
German Sector (Prizren)	4.14	1.273	140	3.80	0.481	112	1.28	0.57	207	2.10	0.78	179
US sector (Gjilan, Urosevac)	3.60	0.653	120	3.90	0.33	236	1.10	0.38	174	2.12	0.77	127
Italian Sector (Peja, Gjakova)	3.63	1.316	180	--	--	--	1.35	0.67	142	2.05	0.95	132
Total	3.65	1.177	700	3.84	0.393	683			1062			954

Serbs	Views of Albanians						Views of NATO			Confidence in NATO		
	Apr-98			Jan-99			Oct-00			Oct-00		
Future KFOR Sector	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N
British Sector (Pristina, Kosovo Polje, Obilic)	3.77	0.53	159	3.75	0.541	136	3.98	0.15	180	3.79	0.46	179
French Sector (Mitrovica, Zvecan)	3.11	1.06	134	3.37	0.806	155	3.83	0.46	330	3.62	0.56	340
Total	3.47	0.878	293	3.55	0.719	291			510			519

Notes: The table groups responses by future KFOR sector. Municipalities such as Pristina are labeled as future “British sector” while Mitrovica, and Vushtrri (Uciturn) are designated as future “French sectors” and so on. The ethnic favorability question reads “Now I would like to ask your overall opinion of people from different nationalities. For each nationality please say whether you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable opinion of [Serbs living in Kosovo]” Respondents in the survey were asked to rate their opinion of Serbs and Albanians on a 1-4 scale where 1 indicates “favorable” and 4 indicates “unfavorable”. The first NATO question reads: “What is your opinion about the current role of NATO in Kosovo – very positive, somewhat positive, somewhat negative or very negative?” The second NATO question reads: “How much confidence do you have that KFOR is making conditions safe for Albanians/Serbs in Kosovo? Do you have a great deal of confidence, a fair amount, not very much or no confidence at all?” Responses are on a 1-4 scale where 1 indicates positive views/high confidence and 4 indicates negative views/no confidence.



Figure 4. State Department Estimates of Attacks on Settlements 1998-1999




Figure 5. State Department Estimates of Mass Graves and Killing Sites 1998-1999

# Mass Grave and Killing Sites in Kosovo

Incidents Reported as of  
Mid-November 1999





Figure 6. State Department Estimates of Property Destruction 1998-1999

# Kosovo: Damaged Buildings

(Percent of Total Number of Buildings  
in Each Town or Village)




**Figure 7. Map indicating damage assessments during the March 2004 riots against Serbs** (Source Austrian Military Assessment. Red dots indicate attacks by Albanians against Serbian person, property, and cultural heritage artifacts such as churches and monasteries.)




**Additional Figures, Maps, Robustness Checks**


**Figure 8. Map Indicating Exposure to Violence for Experimental Sample Using Ethnic Treatments**




**Figure 9. Map Indicating Property Damage for Experimental Sample Using Ethnic Treatments**



**Figure 10. Map Indicating Displacement by Violence for Experimental Sample Using Ethnic Treatments**



**Figure 11. Map Indicating Exposure to Violence for Experimental Sample Using Local/Not Local Treatments**





**Table 2. Exposure to Violence and Dictator Game Behavior and Expectations.**

Panel A	(1) Fairness	(2) Fairness	(3) Expect Fairness	(4) Expect Fairness	(5) Ingroup Bias	(6) Ingroup Bias	(7) Expect Bias	(8) Expect Bias
Experiment	Dictator	Dictator	Dictator	Dictator	Dictator	Dictator	Dictator	Dictator
violence	-0.861** (0.363)		-1.082*** (0.397)		0.587* (0.328)		0.732** (0.331)	
damage		-1.010*** (0.261)		-0.706** (0.276)		0.557** (0.231)		0.904*** (0.231)
Constant	-0.584*** (0.156)	-0.448*** (0.145)	-0.829*** (0.165)	-0.884*** (0.155)	0.0448 (0.148)	-0.00198 (0.139)	-0.198 (0.148)	-0.352** (0.140)
Observations	466	466	466	466	466	466	466	466
Adj R-squared	0.00992	0.0280	0.0147	0.0134	0.00496	0.00927	0.00774	0.0242
LL	-279.4	-274.3	-249.8	-250.1	-317.8	-316.4	-320.3	-315.0

Panel B	(1) Fairness	(2) Fairness	(3) Expect Fairness	(4) Expect Fairness	(5) Ingroup Bias	(6) Ingroup Bias	(7) Expect Bias	(8) Expect Bias
Experiment	Dictator	Dictator	Dictator	Dictator	Dictator	Dictator	Dictator	Dictator
violence	-1.004*** (0.384)		-1.224*** (0.427)		0.696** (0.337)		0.895** (0.348)	
damage		-1.067*** (0.276)		-0.608** (0.285)		0.653*** (0.244)		1.384*** (0.226)
albanian	-0.181 (0.218)	0.0404 (0.230)	-0.564** (0.231)	-0.443* (0.235)	-0.0120 (0.201)	-0.155 (0.210)	1.526*** (0.225)	0.0494 (0.204)
female	-0.0981 (0.216)	-0.0647 (0.217)	-0.106 (0.234)	-0.0639 (0.231)	0.175 (0.194)	0.155 (0.194)	0.0816 (0.204)	0.00320 (0.00939)
age	0.00778 (0.00885)	0.00803 (0.00883)	0.0120 (0.00959)	0.0127 (0.00963)	-0.00396 (0.00876)	-0.00392 (0.00884)	0.00291 (0.00938)	0.112** (0.0512)
education	-0.0238 (0.0541)	-0.0342 (0.0533)	-0.0376 (0.0561)	-0.0410 (0.0550)	0.0806* (0.0483)	0.0862* (0.0482)	0.108** (0.0509)	-0.0667 (0.231)
working	0.328 (0.224)	0.324 (0.226)	0.244 (0.261)	0.190 (0.259)	-0.199 (0.213)	-0.190 (0.214)	-0.0875 (0.231)	0.368* (0.217)
village	0.130 (0.230)	0.0918 (0.232)	0.0972 (0.238)	0.0856 (0.234)	0.0203 (0.206)	0.0404 (0.207)	0.353 (0.216)	-0.260 (0.207)
ordering	0.478** (0.223)	0.442** (0.223)	0.621*** (0.235)	0.586** (0.231)	-0.365* (0.199)	-0.341* (0.200)	-0.289 (0.207)	0.626** (0.249)
Constant	-0.894 (0.587)	-0.843 (0.574)	-0.975* (0.590)	-1.174** (0.563)	-0.229 (0.526)	-0.240 (0.519)	-2.100*** (0.576)	-2.028*** (0.576)
N	466	466	466	466	466	466	466	466
Adj R-squared	0.0303	0.0459	0.0506	0.0421	0.0205	0.0254	0.100	0.0999
LL	-273.7	-269.3	-240.7	-242.8	-312.8	-311.3	-290.5	-290.5

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table 3. Victimization by Violence and Public Good Game Behavior**

Panel A	(9) Fairness	(10) Fairness	(11) Ingroup Bias	(12) Ingroup Bias
Experiment	Public Goods	Public Goods	Public Goods	Public Goods
violence	-0.968*** (0.354)		1.013*** (0.334)	
damage		-0.323 (0.238)		0.362 (0.227)
Constant	-0.299** (0.152)	-0.484*** (0.144)	-0.410*** (0.150)	-0.218 (0.140)
Observations	466	466	466	466
Adj R-squared	0.0128	0.00307	0.0147	0.00397
LL	-297.2	-300.1	-318.1	-321.6
Panel B	(9) Fairness	(10) Fairness	(11) Ingroup Bias	(12) Ingroup Bias
Experiment	Public Goods	Public Goods	Public Goods	Public Goods
violence	-1.013*** (0.370)		1.022*** (0.344)	
damage		-0.177 (0.252)		0.348 (0.237)
albanian	-0.580*** (0.210)	-0.539** (0.215)	0.139 (0.200)	0.0567 (0.205)
female	-0.0911 (0.205)	-0.0497 (0.202)	0.200 (0.193)	0.160 (0.191)
age	0.0318*** (0.00940)	0.0317*** (0.00933)	-0.0141 (0.00930)	-0.0139 (0.00928)
education	0.00795 (0.0526)	0.00929 (0.0520)	0.0419 (0.0493)	0.0413 (0.0489)
working	-0.223 (0.230)	-0.280 (0.230)	0.277 (0.217)	0.321 (0.216)
village	0.00285 (0.221)	0.0148 (0.218)	-0.312 (0.206)	-0.309 (0.204)
ordering	0.122 (0.213)	0.112 (0.210)	0.0365 (0.199)	0.0520 (0.197)
Constant	-0.873 (0.574)	-1.175** (0.565)	-0.433 (0.545)	-0.184 (0.529)
N	466	466	466	466
Adj R-squared	0.0442	0.0318	0.0288	0.0177
LL	-287.7	-291.4	-313.5	-317.1

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table 4. Victimization by Violence using In-group/Out-group Treatments (logit regression with standard errors clustered by location)**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Dependent Variable	Fairness	Expect Fairness	Fairness	Ingroup Bias	Expect Bias	Ingroup Bias
Experiment	Dictator	Reverse Dictator	Public Goods	Dictator	Reverse Dictator	Public Goods
violence	-1.004** (0.431)	-1.224*** (0.428)	-1.013** (0.460)	0.696** (0.302)	1.022*** (0.312)	-1.004** (0.431)
	-0.181 (0.344)	-0.564 (0.375)	-0.580** (0.293)	-0.0120 (0.254)	0.139 (0.322)	-0.181 (0.344)
female	-0.0981 (0.188)	-0.106 (0.242)	-0.0911 (0.196)	0.175 (0.244)	0.200 (0.203)	-0.0981 (0.188)
age	0.00778 (0.00953)	0.0120 (0.0112)	0.0318*** (0.00957)	-0.00396 (0.00878)	-0.0141 (0.00972)	0.00778 (0.00953)
education	-0.0238 (0.0496)	-0.0376 (0.0730)	0.00795 (0.0489)	0.0806* (0.0438)	0.0419 (0.0554)	-0.0238 (0.0496)
working	0.328 (0.264)	0.244 (0.261)	-0.223 (0.242)	-0.199 (0.241)	0.277 (0.203)	0.328 (0.264)
village	0.130 (0.344)	0.0972 (0.335)	0.00285 (0.262)	0.0203 (0.250)	-0.312 (0.260)	0.130 (0.344)
ordering	0.478 (0.342)	0.621* (0.318)	0.122 (0.262)	-0.365 (0.234)	0.0365 (0.257)	0.478 (0.342)
	-0.894 (0.726)	-0.975 (0.868)	-0.873 (0.656)	-0.229 (0.585)	-0.433 (0.706)	-0.894 (0.726)
N	466	466	466	466	466	466
Adj. r2	0.0303	0.0506	0.0442	0.0205	0.0288	0.0303

clustered standard errors by location in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table 5. Victimization by Violence using In-group/Out-group Treatments (logit regression with time/locational fixed effects)**

Dependent Variable	(1) Fairness	(2) Expect Fairness	(3) Fairness	(4) Ingroup Bias	(5) Expect Bias	(6) Ingroup Bias
Experiment	Dictator	Reverse Dictator	Public Goods	Dictator	Reverse Dictator	Public Goods
violence	-0.685* (0.406)	-0.977** (0.447)	-1.055*** (0.392)	0.490 (0.357)	0.856** (0.377)	0.954*** (0.364)
female	-0.119 (0.219)	-0.117 (0.234)	-0.145 (0.210)	0.179 (0.195)	0.0622 (0.204)	0.255 (0.199)
age	0.00401 (0.0108)	0.00430 (0.0115)	0.0218** (0.0102)	-0.00418 (0.00967)	0.00796 (0.0103)	-0.00710 (0.00985)
education	-0.0421 (0.0598)	-0.0167 (0.0637)	0.0335 (0.0573)	0.0581 (0.0529)	0.0822 (0.0558)	0.0262 (0.0539)
working	0.206 (0.249)	0.103 (0.262)	-0.318 (0.242)	-0.131 (0.221)	-0.0826 (0.231)	0.378* (0.227)
village	0.143 (0.247)	0.349 (0.290)	-0.00858 (0.229)	0.0282 (0.216)	0.235 (0.230)	-0.277 (0.216)
ordering	0.684*** (0.241)	0.823*** (0.285)	0.259 (0.224)	-0.445** (0.210)	-0.312 (0.224)	0.0484 (0.210)
N	466	466	466	466	466	466
dates/locations	13	13	13	13	13	13
Adj. r2	0.0303	0.0371	0.0300	0.0180	0.0222	0.0263

standard errors in parentheses  
 \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table 6. Victimization by Violence using Alternate Local/Not Local Treatments**

Dependent Variable	(1) Amount offered	(2) Amount offered	(3) Amount offered	(4) Amount offered	(5) Amount offered	(6) Amount offered
Experiment Treatment	Dictator Local	Dictator Not Local	Dictator Not Local	Trust Local	Trust Not Local	Trust Not Local
violence	0.693 (1.949)	-2.532** (1.147)	-3.181*** (1.193)	1.569 (0.999)	-2.016** (0.814)	-1.823** (0.847)
albanian			-1.283 (0.870)			-0.230 (0.418)
female			-0.445 (0.542)			0.400 (0.319)
age			0.0532* (0.0311)			-0.0109 (0.0116)
education			0.307 (0.272)			0.0616 (0.157)
working			-0.317 (0.619)			0.636** (0.308)
Constant	4.107*** (0.376)	4.974*** (0.316)	3.594** (1.502)	2.764*** (0.193)	2.900*** (0.170)	2.785*** (0.658)
sigma	3.341*** (0.371)	2.937*** (0.321)	2.855*** (0.302)	1.653*** (0.190)	1.467*** (0.152)	1.427*** (0.148)
Observations	106	107	106	106	107	106
Adj. R-squared	0.000286	0.00534	0.0206	0.00740	0.0181	0.0357

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \* p&lt;0.1

Table 6 cont. Victimization by Violence using Local/Not Local Treatments

Dependent Variable	(1) Amount offered	(2) Amount offered	(3) Amount offered	(4) Amount offered
Experiment Treatment	Ultimatum Local	Ultimatum Local	Ultimatum Not Local	Ultimatum Not Local
violence	-2.981* (1.578)	-1.793 (1.425)	-2.523* (1.289)	-2.337* (1.295)
albanian		-1.629** (0.636)		0.677 (0.620)
female		1.049* (0.582)		-0.667 (0.481)
age		-0.0491* (0.0262)		0.00248 (0.0269)
education		0.0686 (0.260)		0.176 (0.234)
working		0.487 (0.664)		-0.961* (0.509)
Constant	5.084*** (0.276)	6.899*** (1.253)	5.084*** (0.276)	4.398*** (1.243)
Observations	107	105	107	106
Adj. R-squared	0.00750	0.0368	0.00750	0.0199

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table 7. Victimization by Violence using Local/Not Local Treatments (tobit regression, standard errors clustered by location)**

	(1)	(3)	(1)	(3)	(4)	(6)
Dependent Variable	Amount offered	Amount offered	Amount offered	Amount offered	Amount offered	Amount offered
Experiment Treatment	Dictator Local	Dictator Not Local	Ultimatum Local	Ultimatum Not Local	Trust Local	Trust Not Local
violence	0.800 (1.723)	-3.181** (1.250)	-1.793 (1.595)	-2.337 (1.915)	1.736 (1.694)	-1.823* (1.049)
albanian	-0.880 (0.612)	-1.283 (0.945)	-1.629*** (0.505)	0.677 (0.681)	0.785* (0.435)	-0.230 (0.316)
female	1.472 (1.000)	-0.445 (0.589)	1.049 (0.780)	-0.667* (0.358)	0.544 (0.544)	0.400** (0.163)
age	0.0128 (0.0224)	0.0532** (0.0225)	-0.0491** (0.0207)	0.00248 (0.0237)	-0.0191 (0.0178)	-0.0109 (0.00976)
education	-0.433** (0.175)	0.307 (0.384)	0.0686 (0.328)	0.176 (0.268)	-0.323 (0.259)	0.0616 (0.167)
working	-0.776 (0.564)	-0.317 (0.569)	0.487 (0.691)	-0.961*** (0.356)	0.965** (0.378)	0.636* (0.337)
Constant	5.718*** (0.815)	3.594*** (1.102)	6.899*** (1.549)	4.398*** (0.810)	3.406*** (0.625)	2.785*** (0.576)
Observations	105	106	105	106	105	106
Adj. R-squared	0.0197	0.0209	0.0368	0.0199	0.0459	0.0357

Robust standard errors clustered by location in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table 8. Victimization by Violence using Local/Not Local Treatments (OLS regression, locational fixed effects)**

Dependent Variable	(1) Amount offered	(3) Amount offered	(1) Amount offered	(3) Amount offered	(4) Amount offered	(6) Amount offered
Experiment Treatment	Dictator Local	Dictator Not Local	Ultimatum Local	Ultimatum Not Local	Trust Local	Trust Not Local
violence	0.588 (1.493)	-2.731** (1.259)	0.506 (1.276)	-1.761 (1.160)	1.167* (0.680)	-1.447** (0.590)
albanian	-0.245 (1.317)	-2.550* (1.428)	-0.522 (1.126)	-1.176 (1.316)	1.518** (0.600)	-0.335 (0.669)
female	0.909* (0.542)	-0.711 (0.487)	0.00672 (0.464)	-0.820* (0.449)	0.233 (0.247)	0.211 (0.228)
age	-0.00344 (0.0213)	0.0486** (0.0214)	-0.0378** (0.0182)	0.0144 (0.0197)	-0.0106 (0.00968)	-0.00703 (0.0100)
education	-0.301 (0.238)	0.114 (0.252)	0.0575 (0.203)	0.125 (0.232)	-0.208* (0.108)	0.0373 (0.118)
working	-0.640 (0.592)	-0.464 (0.511)	0.0809 (0.506)	-0.819* (0.471)	0.559** (0.269)	0.433* (0.239)
Constant	5.537*** (1.544)	5.534*** (1.521)	6.022*** (1.320)	5.634*** (1.401)	2.159*** (0.703)	2.779*** (0.712)
Observations	105	106	105	106	105	106
R2	0.076	0.125	0.049	0.082	0.158	0.113
locations	6	6	6	6	6	6

standard errors in parentheses  
 \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1



**Table 9. Determinants of Victimization by Violence**

Kolmogorov Smirnov Balance Tables (K-S balance statistics – full sample)

	Victim of violence	Destruction of property
Female	0.15***	0.03
Age	0.05	0.07
Education	0.04	0.07
Village	0.03	0.09

OLS Regression on Covariates of Victimization

VARIABLES	(1) violence	(2) damaged
female	-0.0491* (0.0265)	-0.0274 (0.0383)
age	0.000901 (0.00117)	0.00107 (0.00168)
education	-0.00122 (0.00663)	-0.0114 (0.00956)
village	-0.0108 (0.0271)	-0.0474 (0.0391)
Constant	0.363*** (0.0662)	0.538*** (0.0954)
Observations	466	466
R-squared	0.009	0.007

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table 10. Violence and Matching on Covariates**

Coarsened exact matching on gender, age, education, and urban/rural environment

VARIABLES	(1) Fairness	(2) Expect Fairness	(3) In-group Bias	(4) Expect Bias	(5) Fairness	(6) In-group Bias
Experiment	Dictator	Dictator	Dictator	Dictator	Public Goods	Public Goods
violence	-1.358*** (0.506)	-1.439*** (0.470)	1.043** (0.413)	0.840** (0.416)	-0.956** (0.444)	1.201*** (0.410)
Constant	-0.487** (0.220)	-0.753*** (0.211)	-0.148 (0.195)	-0.330 (0.202)	-0.274 (0.207)	-0.512*** (0.194)
Observations	352	352	352	352	352	352

Propensity score kernel matching on gender, age, education, urban/rural environment

VARIABLES	(1) Fairness	(2) Expect Fairness	(3) In-group Bias	(4) Expect Bias	(5) Fairness	(6) In-group Bias
Experiment	Dictator	Dictator	Dictator	Dictator	Public Goods	Public Goods
violence	-0.948** (0.369)	-1.149*** (0.401)	0.664** (0.333)	0.773** (0.335)	-0.947*** (0.355)	1.079*** (0.338)
Constant	-0.524*** (0.160)	-0.792*** (0.169)	0.0110 (0.151)	-0.244 (0.151)	-0.284* (0.155)	-0.464*** (0.153)
Observations	466	466	466	466	466	466

Robust standard errors in parentheses  
 \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table 11. Property Damage and Matching on Covariates**

Coarsened Exact Matching on Gender, Age, Education, Urban/Rural environment						
VARIABLES	(1) Fairness	(2) Expect Fairness	(3) In-group Bias	(4) Expect Bias	(5) Fairness	(6) In-group Bias
Experiment	Dictator	Dictator	Dictator	Dictator	Public Goods	Public Goods
damage	-1.342*** (0.336)	-0.849** (0.345)	0.834*** (0.299)	0.916*** (0.304)	-0.526* (0.311)	0.486 (0.296)
Constant	-0.207 (0.204)	-0.802*** (0.211)	-0.216 (0.198)	-0.384* (0.205)	-0.421** (0.203)	-0.202 (0.201)
Observations	357	357	357	357	357	357

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table 12. Determinants of Displacement for Serb Subjects (Logit regression)**

VARIABLES	(1) moved	(2) moved	(3) moved	(4) moved	(5) moved	(7) moved
Ethnic ties	-0.132 (0.201)					
Ingroup close		-0.0239 (0.266)				
Outgroup close			0.0170 (0.207)			
Ingroup trust				-0.117 (0.279)		
Outgroup trust					0.188 (0.226)	
female						-0.639* (0.357)
age						0.00127 (0.0182)
education						0.132 (0.101)
village						0.00596 (0.366)
Constant	-0.656* (0.392)	-0.783 (0.501)	-0.903 (0.702)	-0.500 (0.860)	-1.160*** (0.423)	-1.516 (0.967)
Observations	158	151	150	154	153	158
Adj. R-squared	0.00233	4.34e-05	3.71e-05	0.000929	0.00367	0.0265
LL	-95.08	-92.82	-91.63	-93.82	-93.20	-92.77

standard errors in parentheses  
 \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table 13. Determinants of Displacement for Albanian Subjects (Logit regression)**

VARIABLES	(1) moved	(2) moved	(3) moved	(4) moved	(5) moved	(10) moved
Ethnic ties	-0.132 (0.204)					
Ingroup close		0.00537 (0.149)				
Outgroup close			-0.0970 (0.135)			
Ingroup trust				-0.196 (0.180)		
Outgroup trust					-0.286* (0.166)	
female						-0.148 (0.235)
age						0.00385 (0.00973)
education						0.0693 (0.0548)
village						0.390 (0.240)
Constant	-0.656* (0.397)	-0.368 (0.279)	-0.0544 (0.441)	0.209 (0.533)	0.113 (0.288)	-1.030* (0.562)
Observations	158	304	302	306	306	308
Adj. R-squared	0.00233	3.13e-06	0.00127	0.00294	0.00723	0.00946
LL	-95.08	-205.9	-204.2	-206.7	-206.2	-206.8

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \* p&lt;0.1


**Table 14. Summary Statistics of Variables for Sample with Ethnic Treatments**

Variable	Description	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Dictator Ingroup bias	1 = amount sent to ingroup > amount sent to outgroup, 0 = amount sent to ingroup <= amount to outgroup in Dictator Game	466	0.562	0.497	0	1
Dictator Fairness	1 = amount sent to ingroup = amount to outgroup, 0 = amount sent unequal	466	0.294	0.456	0	1
Dictator Expectations Ingroup Bias	1 = amount expected from ingroup > amount expected from outgroup, 0 = amount expected from ingroup <= amount from outgroup	466	0.515	0.500	0	1
Dictator Expectations of Fairness	1 = amount expected from ingroup = amount expected from outgroup, 0 = amount expected unequal	466	0.234	0.424	0	1
Public Good Ingroup Bias	1 = amount sent to ingroup > amount sent to outgroup, 0 = amount sent to ingroup <= amount to outgroup in Dictator Game	466	0.487	0.500	0	1
Public Good Fairness	1 = amount sent to ingroup = amount to outgroup, 0 = amount sent unequal	466	0.348	0.477	0	1
Saw violence injured	1 = witnessed violence against others in conflict 1 = personally injured in conflict	466	0.528	0.500	0	1
Family injured	1 = family member injured in conflict	466	0.240	0.428	0	1
Family killed	1 = family member killed in conflict	466	0.191	0.394	0	1
Friends injured	1 = friends injured in conflict	466	0.547	0.498	0	1
Friends killed	1 = friends killed in conflict	466	0.464	0.499	0	1
Violence (index)	Alpha score Index of victimization by violence	466	0.353	0.285	0	1
Home damaged	1 = home damaged by conflict	466	0.536	0.499	0	1
Home destroyed	1 = home destroyed by conflict	466	0.433	0.496	0	1
Business damaged	1 = business damaged by conflict	466	0.408	0.492	0	1
Damaged (index)	Alpha score index of home and business damage	466	0.459	0.411	0	1
Albanian	1 = Albanian subject, 0 = Serb subject	466	0.661	0.471	0	1
female	1 = female subject, 0 = male subject	466	0.496	0.501	0	1
age	age in years	466	30.380	11.540	18	66
education	1 = no formal education to 10 = advanced graduate education	466	6.600	2.060	1	10
village	1 = village experimental location	466	0.459	0.499	0	1
working	1 = full-time, part-time, or self-employed, 0 = unemployed, student, housewife, pensioner	466	0.376	0.485	0	1
moved	1 = displaced by wartime violence, 0 = not displaced	466	0.371	0.484	0	1


**Table 15. Summary Statistics of Variables for Sample with Local/Not-Local Treatments**

Variable	Description	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Dictator giving	Amount sent in the dictator game 0-10	218	4.46	2.60	0	10
Trust offers	Amount offered in the trust game 0-4	218	2.58	1.12	0	4
Ultimatum offers	Amount offered in the ultimatum game 0-10	218	4.78	2.32	0	10
Treatment	0 = local treatment, 1 = not-local treatment	220	0.50	0.50	0	1
Injured during war	1 = personally injured during 1998-1999 war	212	0.11	0.31	0	1
Injured after war	1 = personally injured after 1998-1999 war	212	0.02	0.15	0	1
Family mem. injured during war	1 = family member injured during 1998-1999 war	212	0.15	0.36	0	1
Family mem. injured after war	1 = family member injured after 1998-1999 war	212	0.06	0.23	0	1
Family mem. killed during war	1 = family member killed during 1998-1999 war	210	0.18	0.39	0	1
Family mem. killed after war	1 = family member killed after 1998-1999 war	211	0.03	0.18	0	1
Violence (index)	Alpha score Index of victimization by violence	213	0.09	0.18	0	1
Albanian	1 = Albanian subject, 0 = Serb subject	220	0.79	0.41	0	1
female	1 = female subject, 0 = male subject	220	0.38	0.49	0	1
age	age in years	217	30.1	12.0	16	69
education	1 = no formal education to 10 = advanced graduate education	217	3.75	0.99	2	6
working	1 = full-time, part-time, or self-employed, 0 = unemployed, student, housewife, pensioner	220	0.33	0.47	0	1

**Figure 12. Dictator Game Decision-Making by Ethnicity**




**Figure 13. Dictator Game Expectations from Others by Ethnicity**







**Figure 14. Public Goods Game Decision-Making by Ethnicity**




**Figure 15. Within-Subject Dictator Game**



**Figure 16. Within Subject Dictator Game Expectations**



**Figure 17. Public Goods Decision Making**



## **Instructions for Dictator and Public Goods Games with Ethnic Treatments**

### **BEFORE THE SESSION**

1. *Local Administrator and Assistant rehearse the script, and prepare the session room. There must be sufficient space to accommodate participants and to assure that each participant has enough space to work in comfort and relative privacy. One person per table or desk. Do not crowd subjects!*
2. *The Administrator prepares the forms.*

### **CHECK-IN**

1. *As participants arrive, they are greeted at the entrance to the session room. They are asked to show their letter of invitation [FORM "LETTER OF INVITATION"] to participate in the session. Because this letter will have been hand delivered by either the administrator him/herself or one of the other local interviewers, someone will be able to guarantee that the person with the letter is, in fact, the person who received the letter.*
2. *The administrator will then give each respondent a consent form to read. [FORM "LETTER OF CONSENT"] The respondent may then choose to leave, indicating lack of consent. Respondents who stay have consented to participate by agreeing to stay.*
3. *The administrator assigns each respondent who has agreed to stay a unique ID number printed on an index card, and assigns them to a seat. Each person should have their own separate table to work.*

### **INTRODUCTION**

Welcome. Thank you for coming today. My name is \*\*\*. Thank you for agreeing to participate in this study. Your participation in this study is voluntary. As you know you will receive a payment of 10 euros today for your participation. You also have the opportunity to receive up to 10 additional euros based on the tasks involved in today's activity. Please understand that we will be providing all money and at no time will we ask you for money so do not worry.

Now, let me tell you a little about this research project. This is an international research project, and the questions that you will answer and the tasks you will perform have been asked of people all over the world. The purpose of the project is to understand how people of different ethnicity, cultures, and backgrounds make decisions, interact with other people, and how their decisions are affected by the conditions where they live. We are going to ask you to make decisions about money. These decisions will involve not only you but also other people in Kosovo.

In this project, I will serve not only as the administrator of this session, but also as your local contact, in case you ever have questions about the progress of the study or your involvement. Standing over there is my assistant. He/she will pass out the forms and materials that you will use.

You will participate in two main types of tasks today. You will receive different forms for each task. In one task, you will be asked to make several decisions about how to allocate

money. In each of these tasks, you will have to decide how to allocate a sum of money between yourself and someone else or a group of people. These other people will not be in this room, but they will be future participants in this study, and they will all be from Kosovo.

The other task will be to complete a survey, which asks questions from general international social surveys on public opinion, attitudes, and basic social data. Rest assured that we will not ask you to provide any information that could be used to identify you as a participant in this study.

Before we begin there are several rules we would like you to keep in mind:

1. First, you should not talk with one another or look at anyone else's work.
2. Second, please listen to all instructions that I give you. This is very important. If you follow the instructions carefully you might make a considerable sum of money.
3. Third, we will be handing out many different forms to you. Please do not begin filling out or looking at those forms until I ask you to do so.
4. Finally, you just received a card with an ID number on it. Please turn it upside down. Do not show that number to anyone else except myself or one of my assistants.

Do you have any questions? If not, let's begin!

### ***Decision-Making Tasks***

First, we will do a series of decision-making tasks. Please pay attention because you can earn money if you listen closely and follow instructions. The assistant will come around to each of you and hand you a survey booklet and a pen. The first thing you will need to do is to copy the ID number on the card you were given on the front of the survey booklet. Do not open the booklet until I instruct you to do so. We will go through each question together as a group. I will read each question aloud and you will circle the appropriate answer.

In the following tasks you will be asked to make decisions involving money. In a typical task, you will have a specific amount of money and then you must decide how much to keep for yourself and how much to give to another person or group of people. These people are not physically present in this room today, but they will be participating in a future session somewhere in Kosovo. Like you, they will be randomly selected to participate in the study. For every decision you make today, the other person or persons will either be [Albanians or Serbs from Kosovo].

For each task you will make a series of decisions. Then at the end, we will role a dice to see for which task you will be paid. Because you do not know which task is the one for which you are paid, it is extremely important to pay attention to the instructions for every decision.

#### [Dictator Game Tasks]

In this task, you again have to decide how much money to keep and how much to give to another person. Please look at the information to see whether the other person is [Albanian or Serb from Kosovo]. This person is not physically present in this room today, but they will be

participating in a future session. Like you, this person will be randomly selected to participate in the study.

In this task, you and the other person each start with 5 euros. In this task, you can send any amount from 0 to 5 euros to the other person. Or instead of sending money, you can choose to TAKE any amount from 0 to 5 euros from the other person for yourself. Do you understand? Whatever you send to or take from another person, we will pay them at a future session if their task is selected. If this task is selected for payment, you will receive 5 euros minus whatever you decided to send to the other person or plus whatever you decided to take from the other person. Remember, you can do whatever you wish.

Option1: You could SEND money to the other person.

For example:

1. You could keep [4,50 euros and give 0,50 to the other person, then you would have 4,50 euros and the other person would have  $5+0,50 = 5,50$  euros].
2. You could keep [2,50 euros and give 2,50 euros to the other person, then you would have 2,50 euros and the other person would have  $5+2,50 = 7,50$  euros] or
3. You could keep [all 5 euros and give 0 euros to the other person, then you would have 5 euros and the other person would have  $5+0= 5$  euros].  
[repeat using other examples]

Option 2: You could also keep all 5 euros and TAKE an additional 0,50 to 5,00 euros from the other person.

For example:

4. You could keep [all 5 euros and take 0,50 from the other person, then you would have  $5+0,50 = 5,50$  euros and the other person would have  $5-0,50 = 4,50$  euros].
5. You could keep [all 5 euros and take 1 euro from the other person, then you would have  $5+1 = 6$  euros and the other person would have  $5-1 = 4$  euros] or
6. You could keep [all 5 euros and take 5 euros to the other person, then you would have  $5+5 = 10$  euros and the other person would have  $5-5= 0$  euros].  
[repeat using other examples]

Option 3: You may also decide NEITHER to send or take any money away from the other person. In this case, you will have 5 euros and the other person will have 5 euros.

You can do anything you wish. Do you understand? Just remember to pay attention to whom you are sending money or taking money from. It is either an [Albanian or Serb from Kosovo].

First you must decide whether to send money, take money, or do neither. Please make your decision by circling the option “Send ” “Take” or “Neither” on your form. If you want to send money, circle the amount you want to send in the column below. If you want to take money, circle the amount you want to take in the column below. If you do not want to send or take money, then circle 0 at the top of the column. Do you understand? Please make your decision now.

Now, you are going to receive an envelope from someone who has performed the same task that you. This person is not physically present in this room today, but took part in this study at a previous time somewhere in Kosovo. Like you, they had to decide how much money to keep and how much money to send or take from another person. They knew the other person will be either an [Albanian or Serb from Kosovo].

As before you have 5 euros to start. In this task, your assignment is to predict whether you think the other person sent money to you or took money from you, and how much. If this task is selected for payment, you will receive 5 euros plus or minus whatever amount is written in the envelope. Also, if you predict correctly what they did, you will receive an additional 0,50 euro. Do you understand?

First, I would like you to read the information about the other person who has sent you the envelope. It is either an [Albanian or Serb from Kosovo]. This person is not present in the room today but has already completed this task at an earlier session somewhere in Kosovo.

Then, I would like you to predict whether the other person will send money, take money, or do neither. Please make your decision by circling the option “Send” “Take” or “Neither” on your form. Then you must decide how much money you think the other person sent you or took from you. If you think they will send money, circle the amount you think they will to send in the column below. If you think they will take money, circle the amount you think they will take in the column below. (Give examples using other options). If you think they will not want to send or take money, then circle 0 at the top of the column. Do you understand? Please make your decision now.

*Repeat Instructions for Either SAME ETHNICITY or OTHER ETHNICITY*

*[Public Goods Game Instructions]*

The next task is different from the previous tasks so please pay close attention. In this task you are given 2,50 euros and you must decide how much to keep and how much to contribute to a GROUP ACCOUNT. In your group there are 10 people in total where a majority (7 out of 10) are either [Albanians or Serbs from Kosovo]. You and every other person in the group must decide how much to keep and how much to put into the group account. Whatever you and the other members of the group put into the group account is doubled and divided evenly among all of you. Each of you already has 5 additional euro already in the group account. Rather than putting money into the account, you may also decide to take money out of the group account to keep for yourself. Whatever you take out of the account is divided in half but the remainder is yours to keep. In the end, you and everyone else in your group will receive an equal share of the money in the group account. The amount you receive will depend on how much you and others put in or take from the group account. Do you understand?

First, I would like you to read the information about whether your group is majority [Albanians or Serbs from Kosovo]. The people in your group are not present in the room today but have already completed this task at an earlier session somewhere in Kosovo. Like you, these people were randomly selected to participate in the study. Each person has already decided how much to keep and how much put in or take out of the Group Account. They also knew whether the majority of the people in the group are [Albanian or Serb from Kosovo].

Now, you must decide whether to send money, take money, or do neither. Please make your decision by circling the option “Put In” “Take Out” or “Neither” on your form. If you want

to put money in the account, circle the amount you want to put in the column below. Remember that whatever you put in is doubled and divided equally among everyone in the group. If you want to take money out, circle the amount you want to take out in the column below. Remember that whatever you take out is divided in half. If you do not want to put money in or take money out, then circle 0 at the top of the column.

If this task is selected for payment, we will match your decision with 9 other people who have already completed this task. You will earn whatever you keep for yourself plus an equal portion of whatever is in the group account. Please make your decision now.

### **Selection Tasks for Payment**

We will now select one of the tasks for payment by rolling a six-sided dice. Once the task is selected, we will come around and collect your booklets and calculate your payments. While we are calculating your payment, you will complete a survey. We will call you one at a time to receive your payment once the survey is completed.

### ***Survey Task***

Now we would like you to answer a few questions about your background and opinions on a wide range of issues. The assistant will come around to each of you and hand you a survey booklet. The first thing you will need to do is to copy the ID number on the card you were given on the front of the survey booklet. Do not open the booklet until I instruct you to do so. We will go through each question together as a group. I will read each question aloud and you will circle the appropriate answer. Please do not read ahead. Answer only the question that I am reading to you, and be patient if others take more time. If you have questions, please raise your hand, and I will come to you. Please do not say your answers to questions aloud, because it will influence what others think. And you may all disagree about the answers to some of the questions. When everyone is finished, the assistant will collect the survey booklets and we will call you one at a time to receive your payment for participating in this project.

### **CONCLUSION**

This concludes our study. I want to thank everyone for your participation. The tasks that you engaged in here are valuable for our research. You are now free to leave. Please leave all materials here including all pens and paper. We thank you for participating in our study, and please feel free to contact us in the future if you have any questions. Our contact information is provided on your invitation letter and consent form. However, please feel free to stay if you have any further questions. Thank you again and have a good day.

## Administrator's Script

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### BEFORE THE SESSION

1. *Local Administrator and Assistant rehearse the script, and prepare the session room. There must be sufficient space to accommodate participants and to assure that each participant has enough space to work in comfort and relative privacy. One person per table or desk. Do not crowd subjects!*
2. *The Administrator prepares the forms.*

### CHECK-IN

1. *As participants arrive, they are greeted at the entrance to the session room. They are asked to show their letter of invitation [FORM "LETTER OF INVITATION"] to participate in the session. Because this letter will have been hand delivered by either the administrator him/herself or one of the other local interviewers, someone will be able to guarantee that the person with the letter is, in fact, the person who received the letter.*
2. *The administrator will then give each respondent a consent form to read. [FORM "LETTER OF CONSENT"] The respondent may then choose to leave, indicating lack of consent. Respondents who stay have consented to participate by agreeing to stay.*
3. *The administrator assigns each respondent who has agreed to stay a unique ID number printed on an index card, and assigns them to a seat. Each person should have their own separate table to work.*

### INTRODUCTION

Welcome. Thank you for coming today. My name is \*\*\*. Thank you for agreeing to participate in this study. Your participation in this study is voluntary. As you know you will receive a payment of 5 euros today for your participation. You also have the opportunity to receive up to 12 additional euros based on the tasks involved in today's activity. Please understand that we will be providing all money and at no time will we ask you for money so do not worry.

Now, let me tell you a little about this research project. This is an international research project, and the questions that you will answer and the tasks you will perform have been asked of people all over the world. The purpose of the project is to understand how people of different ethnicity, cultures, and backgrounds make decisions, interact with other people, and how their decisions are affected by the conditions where they live. We are going to ask you to make decisions about money. These decisions will involve not only you but also other people in Kosovo.

In this project, I will serve not only as the administrator of this session, but also as your local contact, in case you ever have questions about the progress of the study or your



involvement. Standing over there is my assistant. He/she will pass out the forms and materials that you will use.

You will participate in two main types of tasks today. You will receive different forms for each task. In one task, you will be asked to make several decisions about how to allocate money. In each of these tasks, you will have to decide how to allocate a sum of money between yourself and someone else or a group of people. These other people will not be in this room, but they will be future participants in this study, and they will all be from Kosovo.

The other task will be to complete a survey, which asks questions from general international social surveys on public opinion, attitudes, and basic social data. Rest assured that we will not ask you to provide any information that could be used to identify you as a participant in this study.

Before we begin there are several rules we would like you to keep in mind:

1. First, you should not talk with one another or look at anyone else's work.
2. Second, please listen to all instructions that I give you. This is very important. If you follow the instructions carefully you might make a considerable sum of money.
3. Third, we will be handing out many different forms to you. Please do not begin filling out or looking at those forms until I ask you to do so.
4. Finally, you just received a card with an ID number on it. Please turn it upside down. Do not show that number to anyone else except myself or one of my assistants.

Do you have any questions? If not, let's begin!

### ***Decision-Making Tasks***

First, we will do a series of decision-making tasks. Please pay attention because you can earn money if you listen closely and follow instructions. The assistant will come around to each of you and hand you a survey booklet and a pen. The first thing you will need to do is to copy the ID number on the card you were given on the front of the survey booklet. Do not open the booklet until I instruct you to do so. We will go through each question together as a group. I will read each question aloud and you will circle the appropriate answer.

In the following tasks you will be asked to make decisions involving money. In a typical task, you will have a specific amount of money and then you must decide how much to keep for yourself and how much to give to another person or group of people. These people are not physically present in this room today, but they will be participating in a future session somewhere in Kosovo. Like you, they will be randomly selected to participate in the study. For every decision you make today, the other person or persons will either be [from your town/village in Kosovo or from another town/village in Kosovo].

For each task you will make a series of decisions. Then at the end, we will roll a dice to see for which task you will be paid. Because you do not know which task is the one for which you are paid, it is extremely important to pay attention to the instructions for every decision.

#### **Task 1**

Your first task is to decide how to allocate 10 euros between yourself and someone else. You have to decide how much to keep for yourself and how much to send to another person.

First, look at the information below to see whether the other person is [from your town/village in Kosovo or from another town/village in Kosovo]. This person is not physically present in this room today, but they will be participating in a future session somewhere in Kosovo.

Then look at the column below to decide how much to send. You can send any amount from 0 to up to 10 euros. Whatever you decide to keep for yourself we will pay you if this is the task that is selected for payment. Whatever you send to another person, we will give them at a future session. Remember, you can do whatever you wish.

For example:

1. You could keep [7,50 euros and give 1,50 to the other person].
2. You could keep [5 euro and give 5 euro to the other person] or you could keep [all 10 euros and give 0 euros to the other person].
3. You can do anything you wish. (Repeat using other examples).

Do you understand? Just remember to pay attention to whom you are sending money. Please make your decision by circling the amount of money you want to send. Please make your decision now.

### **Task 2A, 2B**

We are now ready to begin a second task. This new task is conducted by pairs of individuals. Each pair is made up of a Proposer and a Receiver. Each of you will partake in this task with someone (*not*) from this town/village. None of you will know exactly with whom you are matched.

In first task, you are the Proposer. You must decide how to allocate 10 euros between yourself and a Receiver. You have to decide how much to keep for yourself and how much to offer to the Receiver. If the Receiver accepts your offer, then you get the money you set aside for yourself and the Receiver gets the money you offered to them. If, however, the Receiver rejects the offer, then neither you nor the Receiver get any money. Is this clear?

First, look at the information below to see whether the Receiver is [from your town/village in Kosovo or from another town/village in Kosovo].

Then look at the column below to decide how much to offer. You can offer any amount from 0 to up to 10 euros. Whatever you decide to keep for yourself we will pay you if this is the task that is selected for payment, but only if the Receiver agrees to your offer. Remember, you can do whatever you wish.

For example:

1. You could keep [7,50 euros and offer 1,50 to the Receiver]. If the Receiver agrees, then you get 7,50 euro and the receiver gets 1,50 euro. If the Receiver says no to this offer, then you both get 0 euro.

2. You could keep [5 euro and offer 5 euro to the Receiver]. If the Receiver agrees, then you get 5 euro and the Receiver gets 5 euro. If the Receiver says no to this offer, then you get 0 euro.
3. You could keep [all 10 euros and give 0 euros to Receiver]. If the Receiver agrees, then you get 10 euro and the Receiver gets 0 euro. If the Receiver says no to this offer, then you both get 0 euro.
4. You can do anything you wish. (Repeat using other examples).

Do you understand? Just remember to pay attention to whom you are offering money. Please make your decision by circling the amount of money you want to offer. Please make your decision now.

In the next task, you are now the Receiver. You must decide what offers (0-10 euro) you will accept from a Proposer. If you accept the Proposer's offer, then the Proposer gets the money they kept for themselves and you get the money they offered to you. If, however, you reject the offer, then neither you nor the Proposer get any money. Is this clear?

First, look at the information below to see whether the Proposer is [from your town/village in Kosovo or from another town/village in Kosovo].

Then look at the columns below to decide whether to accept or reject each offer. If you wish to accept an offer, circle "Yes". If you wish to reject an offer, circle "No". We will then match your choices with the Proposer's offer. If you say "Yes" to the offer, then you and the Proposer get the money. If you say "no" to the offer, then neither you nor the Receiver get any money. Remember, you can do whatever you wish.

For example:

1. Suppose the Proposer offers you [7,50 euros and keeps 1,50 euro]. If you say yes to this offer, then you get 7,50 euro and the Proposer gets 1,50 euro. If you say no to this offer, then you both get 0 euro.
2. Suppose the Proposer offers you [5 euros and keeps 5 euro]. If you say yes to this offer, then you get 5 euro and the Proposer gets 5 euro. If you say no to this offer, then you both get 0 euro.
3. Suppose the Proposer offers you [0 euros and keeps 10 euro]. If you say yes to this offer, then you get 0 euro and the Proposer gets 10 euro. If you say no to this offer, then you both get 0 euro.
4. You can do anything you wish. (Repeat using other examples).

Do you understand? Just remember to pay attention who is offering you money. Please make your decision by circling yes or no to each possible offer. Please make your decision now.

### **Task 3A, 3B**

We are now ready to begin the last task. This new task is also conducted by pairs of individuals. Each pair is made up of a 1<sup>st</sup> Mover and a 2<sup>nd</sup> Mover. Each of you will partake in this task with someone (*not*) from this town/village. None of you will know exactly with whom you are matched.

In first task, you are the 1<sup>st</sup> Mover. You must decide how to allocate 4 euros between yourself and the 2<sup>nd</sup> Mover. You have to decide how much to keep for yourself and how much to send to the 2<sup>nd</sup> Mover. Whatever you keep for yourself is yours. Whatever you send to the 2<sup>nd</sup> Mover, we will multiply by 3. The 2<sup>nd</sup> Mover must decide how to allocate the tripled amount between him/herself and you. Is this clear?

First, look at the information below to see whether the 2<sup>nd</sup> Mover is [from you town/village in Kosovo or from another town/village in Kosovo].

Then look at the column below to decide how much to send. You can send any amount from 0 to up to 4 euros. Whatever you decide to keep for yourself we will pay you if this task is selected for payment. Whatever you send to the 2<sup>nd</sup> Mover, we will multiply by 3 and match with a 2<sup>nd</sup> Mover. If this task is selected for payment you will receive the money the 2<sup>nd</sup> Mover decides to send back to you. Remember, you can do whatever you wish.

For example:

1. You could keep [3 euros and send 1 euro to the 2<sup>nd</sup> Mover]. In this case, we will multiply [1 euro  $\times 3 = 3$  euro]. The 2<sup>nd</sup> Mover will then decide how much of [3 euro] to keep and how much to send back to you.
2. You could keep [2,50 euros and send 2,50 euro to the 2<sup>nd</sup> Mover]. In this case, we will multiply [2,50 euro  $\times 3 = 7,50$  euro]. The 2<sup>nd</sup> Mover will then decide how much of [7,5 euro] to keep and how much to send back to you.
3. You could keep [4 euros and send 0 euro to the 2<sup>nd</sup> Mover]. In this case, there will be nothing to send to the 2<sup>nd</sup> Mover.
4. You could keep [0 euros and send 4 euro to the 2<sup>nd</sup> Mover]. In this case, we will multiply [4 euro  $\times 3 = 12$  euro]. The 2<sup>nd</sup> Mover will then decide how much of [12 euro] to keep and how much to send back to you.
5. You can do anything you wish. (Repeat using other examples).

Do you understand? Just remember to pay attention to whom you are sending money. Please make your decision by circling the amount of money you want to send. Please make your decision now.

In the next task, you are now the 2<sup>nd</sup> Mover. You must decide how much money (0-4 euro) to keep for yourself and how much to send back to a 1<sup>st</sup> Mover. We will match your decision to a 1<sup>st</sup> Mover's decision. Whatever you keep for yourself is yours. Whatever you send back will go to the 1<sup>st</sup> Mover. Is this clear?

First, look at the information below to see whether the 1<sup>st</sup> Mover is [from you town/village in Kosovo or from another town/village in Kosovo].

Then look at the column below to decide how much to send back for each possible offer from the 1<sup>st</sup> Mover. Whatever you decide to keep for yourself, we will pay you if this task is selected for payment. Whatever you send back will go to the 1<sup>st</sup> Mover. Remember, you can do whatever you wish.

For example:

1. Suppose the 1<sup>st</sup> Mover keeps [3 euros and sends you 1 euro]. In this case, we will multiply [1 euro  $\times 3 = 3$  euro]. You will then decide how much of [3 euro] to keep and how much to send back to the 1<sup>st</sup> Mover.

2. Suppose the 1<sup>st</sup> Mover keeps [2,50 euros and sends you 2,50 euro]. In this case, we will multiply [2,50 euro x3 = 7,50 euro]. You will then decide how much of [7,50 euro] to keep and how much to send back to the 1<sup>st</sup> Mover.
3. Suppose the 1<sup>st</sup> Mover keeps [4 euros and sends you 0 euro]. In this case, there will be nothing to send back to the 1<sup>st</sup> Mover and nothing for you to keep.
4. Suppose the 1<sup>st</sup> Mover keeps [0 euros and sends you 4 euro]. In this case, we will multiply [4 euro x3 = 12 euro]. You will then decide how much of [12 euro] to keep and how much to send back to the 1<sup>st</sup> Mover.
5. You can do anything you wish. (Repeat using other examples).

Do you understand? Just remember to pay attention from whom you are receiving money. Please make your decision by circling the amount of money you want to keep for yourself and send back for each possible option. Please make your decision now.

### **Selection Tasks for Payment**

We will now select one of the tasks for payment by rolling a dice. Once the task is selected, we will come around and collect your booklets and calculate your payments. While we are calculating your payment, you will complete a survey. We will call you one at a time to receive your payment once the survey is completed.

### ***Survey Task***

Now we would like you to answer a few questions about your background and opinions on a wide range of issues. The assistant will come around to each of you and hand you a survey booklet. The first thing you will need to do is to copy the ID number on the card you were given on the front of the survey booklet. Do not open the booklet until I instruct you to do so. We will go through each question together as a group. I will read each question aloud and you will circle the appropriate answer. Please do not read ahead. Answer only the question that I am reading to you, and be patient if others take more time. If you have questions, please raise your hand, and I will come to you. Please do not say your answers to questions aloud, because it will influence what others think. And you may all disagree about the answers to some of the questions. When everyone is finished, the assistant will collect the survey booklets and we will call you one at a time to receive your payment for participating in this project.

### **CONCLUSION**

This concludes our study. I want to thank everyone for your participation. The tasks that you engaged in here are valuable for our research. You are now free to leave. Please leave all materials here including all pens and paper. We thank you for participating in our study, and please feel free to contact us in the future if you have any questions. Our contact information is provided on your invitation letter and consent form. However, please feel free to stay if you have any further questions. Thank you again and have a good day.

## Calculating Experimental Pay-Outs

Our experimental design was complicated by several things. First, the security environment was not such that we could have Serbs and Albanians together in the same room. They do not reside in the same communities and it would not be safe or practical to try to transport either group to a common location. Albanians wouldn't feel safe in a Serb community or vice versa. There is also the problem that Serbs and Albanians do not speak one another's language (only older Albanians know Serbian from the Yugoslav period, but most of the population is young - the median age is 27). Finally, it was impractical to have two experiments running simultaneously at different locations. We lacked the resources to have two field research teams running at once. We also did not have the facilities to run two simultaneous computer lab experiments with Serbs in one location and Albanians in another. Hence, for lack of a neutral common language, security concerns and practicality, we had to devise a way to construct payoffs for interactive games that did not create deception.

We told everyone that their decisions would be randomly matched with others who completed the study in the past and would also affect the pay-outs of those who participate in future sessions. So, for the dictator experiment, subjects decide how much to keep and send. Whatever they send, we give to someone at a subsequent session using sealed envelopes. The envelopes contain a piece of paper indicating the amount of money the subject sent. We could not use real money in this experiment due to lack small paper denominations for the Euro. Subjects only were allowed to open an envelope if that task was select for payment and only after they had completed all experimental and survey tasks. Envelopes which were not selected for payment were collected at the end of the session and subjects were not allowed to open them. In each experiment, the subject was matched to an appropriate recipient (or vice versa) for the given treatment. For the first group of subjects, we matched them to a pilot group. For the last group of subjects, we matched them to students in a class at the University of Pristina. Hence, every pay-out was determined by a real decision either by the subject (in terms of how much to keep in an experiment) and a real recipient. We use the strategy method for the ultimatum and trust games since we cannot have the subjects and recipients play simultaneously. We hope this clarifies the pay-out process. Experiments were randomly selected for payment by rolling a six-sided die.