Appendix

S7. Figures

Figure S7: Print screen from closed-list without candidate information treatment

Parties will be awarded seats on the basis of how many votes they receive. If a party is awarded one seat, the first candidate listed for that party will win a seat; if the party is awarded two seats, the first two candidates listed will win seats, etc.

Election for the European Parliament

			Vote Choice
	Conservative Party	1. Evelyn Preston	
1	All .	2. Dom Courtney	0
	and the second sec	3. Ken Chase	
	The Green Party	1. Kimberley Franks	
2		2. Andy Kingsley	0
	Green Party	3. Andrew Linden	
	The Labour Party	1. Jessica Hunter	
3	(LE)	2. Kenny Greene	0
		3. Richard Grey	
	Liberal Democrats	1. Nigel Wyatt	
4		2. Christine Kendall	Θ
		3. Harry Stern	
	United Kingdom Independence Party	1. Rosie Travers	
5	UKIP	2. Rowan Jarod	Θ
	æ	3. Conor O'Brien	

Vote for one of the parties below.

Figure S8: Print screen from closed-list with candidate information treatment

Parties will be awarded seats on the basis of how many votes they receive. If a party is awarded one seat, the first candidate listed for that party will win a seat; if the party is awarded two seats, the first two candidates listed will win seats, etc.

Election for the European Parliament

				Endorsements			
			Vote Choice	Britain in Europe	Britain Out of Europe		
	Conservative Party	1. Evelyn Preston		*			
1	All .	2. Ken Chase	Θ				
	appel 1	3. Richard Grey			*		
	The Green Party	1. Conor O'Brien			*		
2	Green Party	2. Rosie Travers	Θ				
		3. Nigel Wyatt		*			
3	The Labour Party	1. Dom Courtney	Θ	*			
		2. Rowan Jarod			*		
		3. Kimberley Franks					
Lib	Liberal Democrats	1. Andy Kingsley	0		*		
4	LIBERAL DEMOCRATS	2. Christine Kendall					
		3. Andrew Linden		*			
	United Kingdom Independence Party	1. Kenny Greene			*		
5	UKIP	2. Jessica Hunter	Θ		*		
		3. Harry Stern			*		

Vote for one of the parties below.

Figure S9: Print screen from open-list without candidate information treatment

Parties will be awarded seats on the basis of how many votes their candidates collectively receive. If a party is awarded one seat, the candidate from that party who receives the most votes will win a seat; if the party is awarded two seats, the two candidates from that party who receive the most votes will win seats, etc.

Election for the European Parliament

			Vote Choice
	Conservative Party	1. Richard Grey	Θ
1	le con	2. Conor O'Brien	Θ
	The second s	3. Jessica Hunter	Θ
	The Green Party	1. Dom Courtney	Θ
2		2. Andy Kingsley	Θ
	Green Party	3. Kimberley Franks	Θ
	The Labour Party	1. Christine Kendall	Θ
з		2. Rowan Jarod	Θ
		3. Andrew Linden	Θ
4	Liberal Democrats	1. Kenny Greene	Θ
	LIBERAL DEMOCRATS	2. Nigel Wyatt	Θ
		3. Rosie Travers	Θ
	United Kingdom Independence Party	1. Ken Chase	Θ
5	UKIP	2. Harry Stern	Θ
	J	3. Evelyn Preston	Θ

Vote for one of the candidates below.

Figure S10: Print screen from open-list with candidate information treatment

Parties will be awarded seats on the basis of how many votes their candidates collectively receive. If a party is awarded one seat, the candidate from that party who receives the most votes will win a seat; if the party is awarded two seats, the two candidates from that party who receive the most votes will win seats, etc.

Election for the European Parliament

				Endo	orsements
			Vote Choice	Britain in Europe	Britain Out of Europe
Conservative Party		1. Conor O'Brien	Θ		*
1	All .	2. Christine Kendall	Θ		
	appel 1	3. Harry Stern	Θ	*	
	The Green Party	1. Jessica Hunter	Θ	*	
2 Green Party		2. Richard Grey	0		
	Green Party	3. Dom Courtney	0		*
3 The Labour Part	The Labour Party	1. Kimberley Franks	Θ		
		2. Nigel Wyatt	Θ	*	
		3. Kenny Greene	0		*
4 Liberal Democrat	Liberal Democrats	1. Ken Chase	Θ		*
	LIBERAL DEMOCRATS	2. Evelyn Preston	0		
		3. Andy Kingsley	Θ	*	
	United Kingdom Independence Party	1. Rosie Travers	Θ		*
5		2. Andrew Linden	Θ		*
		3. Rowan Jarod	Θ		*

Vote for one of the candidates below.

S8. TABLES



Figure S11: Quantile-quantile plot of empirical distribution of *p*-values against uniform

NOTE: The quantile-quantile plot shows the empirical distribution of the p-values calculated from a joint F-test of no differences between the 22 covariate means against the theoretically expected uniform distribution. All p-values are above the 45 degree line indicating that randomization was successfully implemented. All estimates are weighted using YouGov's survey weights.



Figure S12: Party vote shares in each of the four treatment conditions

NOTE: The only significant differences in party vote share across treatment conditions are for the Conservatives and UKIP between the open-list with information condition, and the other conditions. This indicates that neither the provision of information nor open lists on their own affect party vote choice.

	(1) EU Dissent
High-Salience	-0.62 (-2.62)
Constant	2.89 (27.45)
Observations	200

Table S3: Internal party EU dissent/conflict

Note: Regression coefficients shown with corresponding t-statistic in parentheses.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	
	Vote s	hares o	f candi	idates b	y party	
Party	GRN	LAB	LD	CON	UKIP	
Pro EU	0.48	0.48	0.55	0.26	0	
Neutral	0.21	0.18	0.21	0.22	0	
Anti EU	0.31	0.34	0.24	0.52	1	
Observations	219	686	263	634	427	
	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	
	Respondents' self-placement by par					
	- • • • P • •	nacinos	sen-pi	acemen	t by party	
Party	GRN	LAB	LD	CON	UKIP	
Party Pro EU	GRN 0.40	LAB 0.37	LD 0.45	CON 0.14	UKIP 0.04	
Party Pro EU Neutral	GRN 0.40 0.39	LAB 0.37 0.39	LD 0.45 0.40	CON 0.14 0.41	UKIP 0.04 0.20	
Party Pro EU Neutral Anti EU	GRN 0.40 0.39 0.21	LAB 0.37 0.39 0.25	LD 0.45 0.40 0.15	CON 0.14 0.41 0.45	UKIP 0.04 0.20 0.77	

Table S4: Vote shares of candidates and respondents' stance on European integration

Note: Models 1–5 present the votes shares of pro-European, neutral and Eurosceptic candidates by party under open-list with information. Models 6–10 present the shares of survey respondents that are pro-European, neutral and Eurosceptic that identify with a particular party. All estimates are weighted using YouGov's survey weights.

Covariates	Closed / No	Closed / With	Open / No	Open / with	<i>p</i> -value
EU membership	4.36	4.48	4.44	4.38	0.68
Female	0.49	0.51	0.52	0.53	0.10
Age	46.49	46.45	47.25	46.77	0.57
Lab Party ID 2010	0.33	0.32	0.32	0.33	0.83
Con Party ID 2010	0.28	0.28	0.29	0.29	0.97
Lib Party ID 2010	0.11	0.13	0.12	0.12	0.46
Green Party ID 2010	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.41
UKIP Party ID 2010	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.62
No Party ID 2010	0.21	0.20	0.20	0.19	0.75
Lab Vote 2010	0.26	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.93
Con Vote 2010	0.29	0.30	0.30	0.29	0.99
Lib Vote 2010	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.22	0.99
Green Vote 2010	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.31
UKIP Vote 2010	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.32
No Vote 2010	0.16	0.17	0.16	0.15	0.61
Region: North	0.24	0.24	0.28	0.23	0.03
Region: Midlands	0.17	0.17	0.16	0.15	0.55
Region: East	0.10	0.10	0.09	0.10	0.66
Region: London	0.13	0.14	0.11	0.13	0.25
Region: South	0.23	0.22	0.23	0.24	0.57
Region: Wales	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.58
Region: Scotland	0.09	0.08	0.08	0.09	0.89
Sample Size	2251.25	2259.53	2346.71	2230.01	

Table S5: Balance tests over covariate means

Note: Table reports means values in the four experimental treatments ("Closed / No" denotes closed list and no information provided on candidates' positions on Europe; "Open / with" denotes open-list and information provided on candidates' positions on Europe) along with p-values corresponding to the test of the null hypothesis that the four means are the same. All estimates, including the effective sample size, are weighted using YouGov's survey weights.

	Table So	6: Party	vote sh	ares by t	reatmer	it, subsei	t by vot	ers' part	y identif	ication			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(9)	(2)	(8)	(6)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)
Voters' party ID	CON	CON	CON	CON	CON	GRN	GRN	GRN	GRN	GRN	LAB	LAB	LAB
Party vote share	CON	GRN	LAB	ΓD	UKIP	CON	GRN	LAB	ΓD	UKIP	CON	GRN	LAB
Open-list	-0.01	-0.00	0.00	-0.02	0.03	-0.02	0.10	-0.02	-0.07	0.01	0.00	-0.02	-0.00
	(-0.29)	(-0.22)	(1.70)	(-2.07)	(1.00)	(-0.45)	(1.58)	(-1.40)	(-1.62)	(0.48)	(0.70)	(-1.13)	(-0.04)
With information	-0.06	0.01	0.00	-0.01	0.06	-0.03	-0.01	0.10	-0.08	0.03	0.02	0.00	-0.04
	(-1.72)	(0.93)	(1.33)	(-1.23)	(1.82)	(-1.02)	(-0.14)	(1.58)	(-1.99)	(0.96)	(2.03)	(0.03)	(-1.31)
$Open \times information$	0.14	-0.00	0.00	0.04	-0.18	0.07	-0.06	-0.06	0.07	-0.02	0.00	0.01	0.04
	(3.00)	(-0.11)	(0.32)	(2.78)	(-4.30)	(1.48)	(-0.58)	(-0.89)	(1.63)	(-0.32)	(0.09)	(0.41)	(1.17)
Constant	0.75	0.02	0.00	0.03	0.20	0.03	0.85	0.02	0.09	0.01	0.01	0.08	0.80
	(31.10)	(3.35)	(0.00)	(2.80)	(9.14)	(1.02)	(15.68)	(1.40)	(2.06)	(1.15)	(2.09)	(7.10)	(43.82)
Observations	2251	2251	2251	2251	2251	170	170	170	170	170	2751	2751	2751
	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)	(25)	
Voters' party ID	LAB	LAB	LD	LD	LD	LD	LD	UKIP	UKIP	UKIP	UKIP	UKIP	
Party vote share	ΓD	UKIP	CON	GRN	LAB	ΓD	UKIP	CON	GRN	LAB	ΓD	UKIP	
Open-list	-0.00	0.01	0.03	-0.03	0.02	-0.04	0.01	0.00	0.00	-0.02	0.00	0.01	
	(-0.06)	(0.74)	(1.16)	(-0.58)	(0.77)	(-0.66)	(0.39)	(0.26)	(0.84)	(-1.29)	(0.16)	(0.32)	
With information	0.00	0.01	0.05	-0.03	-0.02	-0.03	0.03	-0.00	0.01	-0.00	0.01	-0.01	
	(0.30)	(0.50)	(1.33)	(-0.83)	(-1.00)	(-0.56)	(0.90)	(-0.70)	(1.65)	(-0.26)	(0.55)	(-0.54)	
$Open \times information$	-0.00	-0.05	-0.04	-0.02	0.01	0.05	-0.00	0.11	-0.01	0.01	-0.02	-0.08	
	(-0.30)	(-1.92)	(-0.72)	(-0.26)	(0.13)	(0.56)	(-0.01)	(3.94)	(-1.49)	(0.41)	(-0.67)	(-2.10)	
Constant	0.02	0.08	0.03	0.13	0.03	0.76	0.04	0.01	0.00	0.02	0.01	0.96	
	(3.00)	(6.21)	(1.88)	(4.64)	(2.10)	(20.13)	(2.30)	(1.41)	(1.00)	(1.65)	(1.01)	(53.29)	
Observations	2751	2751	717	717	717	717	717	833	833	833	833	833	
<i>Note:</i> Separate OLS regrusurvey weights.	essions for n	nodels 1–25.	. Regression	ı coefficient:	s shown wit	th correspon	iding <i>t</i> -stat	istic in pare.	ntheses. AI	l regression.	s are weigh	ted using Y ₆	uGov's

S9. Assessing strategic voting in the experiment

Our analysis considered the effect of ballot type under the assumption that voters are either expressive or strategic. To the extent that our survey respondents acted like strategic voters, we might expect to see an effect of ballot order in the closed list component of our experiment. In particular, under closed lists we might expect Eurosceptic voters to be more likely to vote Conservative when a Eurosceptic candidate is nearer to the top of the Conservative party list. That is, a right-leaning Eurosceptic voter might focus on two pivotal events: the one in which she casts the decisive vote between a UKIP candidate and a non-Eurosceptic candidate from another party, and the one in which she casts the decisive vote between a Eurosceptic Conservative candidate and a non-Eurosceptic candidate from another major party. Note that the probability of the second pivotal event depends crucially on the order in which the Conservative candidates are listed. A sophisticated voter would recognize that the Conservatives are likely to win either 0 or 1 seat in this (hypothetical) election, very unlikely to win 2 seats, and extremely unlikely to win all 3 seats. Thus the pivotal event of electing a Eurosceptic Conservative is most likely when the Eurosceptic Conservative candidate is at the top of the party list, less likely when that candidate is in the middle of the list, and vanishingly unlikely if the candidate is at the bottom of the list. It follows that such a voter would be more likely to vote Conservative under closed lists when the Eurosceptic Conservative is higher on the party list.

Table S7 indicates that we do not see this pattern in the aggregate: support for the Conservatives and UKIP among Eurosceptic voters under closed lists does not depend significantly on whether the Eurosceptic Conservative is near the top of the party list. We find similar null effects for all other parties.

		rosceptin	canala			5 1150
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Party	CON	CON	CON	UKIP	UKIP	UKIP
Outcome			Vo	te Shares	3	
Eurosceptic 1st	0.01			-0.01		
	(0.29)			(-0.15)		
Eurosceptic 2nd		0.04			0.06	
		(1.02)			(1.27)	
Eurosceptic 1st or 2nd			0.05			0.05
			(1.41)			(1.13)
Constant	0.20	0.19	0.17	0.55	0.53	0.52
	(9.94)	(9.62)	(6.46)	(21.50)	(21.52)	(14.80)
Observations	906	906	906	906	906	906

Table S7: Position of Eurosceptic candidate on Conservative list

Note: Separate OLS regressions for models (1)-(6). Regression coefficients shown with corresponding *t*-statistic in parentheses. All regressions are weighted using YouGov's survey weights. The subsample used for this analysis focuses on Eurosceptic voters under the closed-list with information treatment condition. EUROSCEPTIC 1ST = 1 indicates that the first candidate on the Conservative party list is endorsed by "Britain Out of Europe", EUROSCEPTIC 2ND = 1 that the second candidate on the party list is a Eurosceptic, and EUROSCEPTIC 1ST OR 2ND = 1 that either of the first two candidates is Eurosceptic.

The simplest explanation for this non-finding is that voters in our experiment tended to act in an expressive way rather than carefully considering likely election outcomes. It is also possible that they do consider election outcomes but their expectations about the likely outcomes are so diffuse that we fail to see effects in the aggregate, whether because they tend not to agree about likely voting outcomes or they do not understand how voting outcomes maps to electoral outcomes. Perhaps there would be more strategic behavior in a real election in which voters are exposed to messages by strategic activists and campaign officials.