

Maximizing the reliability of cross-national measures of presidential power

Online Materials File

The studies included in the paper

1.) We identified the following 49 studies that operationalized a presidential power variable: Ishiyama 1995; Hellman 1996; Frye 1997; Ishiyama and Velten 1998; Escobar-Lemmon 2001; Frye 2002; Payne 2002; Roper 2002; Herron and Randazzo 2003; Nielson 2003; Pennings 2003; Biglaiser and DeRouen 2004; Horowitz 2004; UNDP 2004; Clark and Wittrock 2005; UNDP 2005; Beliaev 2006; Bodenstein and Schneider 2006; Cheibub 2006; Stein et al 2006; Whitefield 2006; Pop-Eleches 2007; Tavits 2007a; Tavits 2007b; Armingeon and Careja 2008; Campos and Giovannoni 2008; Cheibub and Chernykh 2008; Hicken and Stoll 2008; Horowitz and Browne 2008; Kim and Bahry 2008; Negretto 2008; Tavits 2008b; Thyne and Moreno 2008; Vowles 2008; Cheibub and Chernykh 2009; Dettrey and Schwindt-Bayer 2009; Schleiter and Morgan-Jones 2009a; Schleiter and Morgan-Jones 2009b; Tavits 2009; Alee and Peinhardt 2010; Bunce and Wolchik 2010; Doyle 2010; Kitschelt et al 2010; Scartascini et al 2010; Schleiter and Morgan-Jones 2010; Wibbels and Roberts 2010; Crisp et al 2011; Doyle 2011; and Pereira et al 2011. Other studies included a discussion of presidential power, but failed to estimate its effect. See, for example, Protsyk 2005.

2.) We identified the following 19 studies that constructed a separate and original measure of presidential power: Clark and Wittrock 2005, 182; Doyle 2010, 318-319; Frye 2002, 90; Hellman 1996, 53; Hellman and Tucker 1995; Hicken and Stoll 2008, 1113; Johannsen 2002; McGregor 1994; Metcalf 2000, 669-670; Nijzink et al 2006, 322; Payne 2002, 197-198; Roper 2002, 257-258; Shugart 1996, 7; Shugart and Carey 1992, 155; Siaroff 2003; Spörer 2004, 164-165; Taghiyev 2006; and UNDP 2004, 92; UNDP 2005, Anexo, 76. Some of these measures are variations on an existing measure.

3.) We identified the following 16 studies that used one of the above measures, but that both/either reported scores for a different set of countries and/or

gave countries different scores from the original study: Cranenburgh 2008, 959; Cranenburgh 2009, 53; Elgie 2009, 253-254; Elgie 2011, 18-19; Elgie and Moestrup 2008, 252-253; Frye 1997, 547-548; Metcalf 2000, 674; Moestrup 2011a, 151-152; Moestrup 2011b, 253; Costa Lobo and Amorim Neto 2009, 264-267; Özsoy 2009, 96-98; Özsoy 2010, 146-147; Tavits 2009, 53; and Wu and Tsai 2011, 185. Costa Lobo and Amorim Neto 2009 and Tavits 2009 each provide two separate measures. When estimating the effect of presidential power, some writers failed to provide any information about how they constructed their measure of presidential power and failed to record the scores for individual countries. Other writers provided information about how they constructed their measure of presidential power, but failed to record the scores for individual countries either in the article or in replication material on their website. For some of these studies, it may be possible to try to reconstruct the scores for particular countries, but it would not possible to know whether the reconstructed scores matched those of the original author. Therefore, these studies are not included. In addition, this figure does not include studies where the scores of a separate study are merely duplicated and where, therefore, there are no original scores.

- 4.) We identified the following 5 measures of presidential power that provided scores for the behavioral power of presidents: Cranenburgh 2008; Costa Lobo and Amorim Neto 2009; Elgie 2011b; Siaroff 2003; Tavits 2008a.

Principal component analysis

Table 1 presents the results of the principal component analysis retaining the first component after PCA. They show that some measures of power, notably Moestrup and Costa Lobo and Amorim Neto's application of Metcalf's scores, have little in common with the rest of the data. These two measures explain practically none of the variance in the underlying dimension of presidential power. By contrast, other measures, such as Spörer, Elgie and Moestrup, Frye, and Taghiyev, account for large proportions of the underlying variance.

Table 1: Principal Component Analysis

Principal Components Results	Component 1	SE	[95 % CIs]	Unexplained
Eigenvalue	15.452			
Difference	10.4203			
Proportion	0.5519			
Principal Components (Eigenvectors)				
Shugart and Cary (1992)	0.0911	0.16868	-0.23948	0.42174
Metcalf (2000)	0.1631	0.11255	-0.05747	0.38372
Elgie and Moestrup (2008)	0.2464	0.03368	0.18033	0.31238
Moestrup (2011a)	-0.0121	0.17228	-0.34978	0.32556
Elgie (2011a)	0.1983	0.09925	0.00376	0.39282
Hellman and Tucker (1995)	0.2313	0.06373	0.10634	0.35619
Frye (2002)	0.2299	0.06210	0.10820	0.35166
Hicken and Stoll (2008)	0.1231	0.15926	-0.18905	0.43523
Metcalf (2000)	0.1904	0.10768	-0.02070	0.40142
Tavits (2007a)	0.2001	0.09519	0.01351	0.38665
Costa Lobo and Amorim Neto (2009)	0.0267	0.17065	-0.30777	0.36117
Özsoy (2009)	0.2046	0.08432	0.03935	0.36991
Özsoy (2010)	0.1625	0.11377	-0.06046	0.38552
Nijzink <i>et al.</i> (2006)	0.1157	0.15264	-0.01834	0.41490
Roper (2002)	0.2169	0.06987	0.07998	0.35388
Payne (2002)	0.2091	0.07724	0.05766	0.36048
UNDP (2005)	0.1870	0.10786	-0.02443	0.39839
Armingeon and Careja (2008)	0.2172	0.08276	0.05501	0.37945
Shugart (1996)	0.1692	0.11027	-0.04690	0.38537
Cranenburgh (2009)	0.1816	0.09300	-0.00070	0.36385
Clark and Wittrock (2005)	0.2140	0.07289	0.07117	0.35690
Hellman (1996)	0.2239	0.07062	0.08549	0.36233
Frye (1997)	0.2197	0.08686	0.04940	0.38990
Johannsen (2003)	0.1789	0.12531	-0.06676	0.42447
McGregor (1994)	0.1600	0.12671	-0.08831	0.40840
Spörer (2004)	0.2429	0.04051	0.16347	0.32229
Taghiyev (2006)	0.2326	0.05695	0.12091	0.12091
Doyle (2010)	0.1880	0.09401	0.00372	0.37224
<i>Rho</i> = 0.5519				0.4539

Table 2: prespow1 Scores

Country Year	Raw score	Standard errors	95% Confidence Intervals for raw scores	Normalized score
Albania 1991-1998	0.214	0.037	0.127	0.301
Albania 1998 -	0.175	0.027	0.055	0.295
Algeria 1997-2008	0.504			0.483
Angola 1993-2009	0.431			0.408
Argentina 1984-1994	0.317	0.032	-0.098	0.732
Argentina 1994 -	0.430	0.049	0.294	0.567
Armenia 1991-1994	0.436	0.043	0.301	0.571
Armenia 1995-2005	0.427	0.060	0.271	0.582
Armenia 2006 -	0.664			0.650
Austria 1945 -	0.128	0.012	0.100	0.156
Azerbaijan 1996-2002	0.711	0.070	0.488	0.933
Bangladesh 1986 -	0.143			0.107
Belarus 1994-1996	0.564	0.067	0.399	0.728
Belarus 1997 -	0.631	0.094	0.369	0.893
Benin 1991 -	0.647	0.179	-0.125	1.419
Bolivia 1967-1994	0.317	0.033	-0.098	0.733
Bolivia 1995-2008	0.347	0.053	0.179	0.514
Bosnia and H 1996 -	0.313	0.188	-2.070	2.695
Botswana 1967 -	0.750			0.740
Brazil 1946-1953	0.475			0.453
Brazil 1954 - 1960	0.407	0.068	-0.461	1.274
Brazil 1988 -	0.507	0.044	0.394	0.619
Bulgaria 1990-1991	0.058	0.033	-0.361	0.477
Bulgaria 1992 -	0.216	0.044	0.122	0.310
Burkina Faso 1978-1980	0.200			0.166
Burkina Faso 1991-2011	0.375			0.349
Burundi 1992 - 1996	0.575			0.557
CAR 1992-1993	0.300			0.271
CAR 1995-2002	0.413	0.113	-1.017	1.842
CAR 2005 -	0.481	0.044	-0.075	1.037
Cameroon 1996 -	0.375			0.349
Cape Verde 1991-1992	0.225			0.193
Cape Verde 1993 -	0.310	0.066	0.100	0.520
Chile 1891-1925	0.400			0.375
Chile 1925-1969	0.500			0.479
Chile 1969-1973	0.542	0.058	-0.191	1.275
Chile 1989 -	0.587	0.058	0.427	0.747
China 1983-2004	0.040			0
Colombia 1960 - 1990	0.440	0.060	-0.326	1.205
Colombia 1991 -	0.406	0.062	0.233	0.578
Comoros 1997-1998	0.350			0.323
Comoros 2002 -	1.000			1.000
Congo Brazzaville 1961-1963	0.200			0.166
Congo Brazzaville 1992-1997	0.242	0.068	-0.052	0.535
Congo Brazzaville 2002 -	1.000			1.000
Costa Rica 1949 -	0.312	0.032	0.223	0.402
Cote d'Ivoire 1961-1999	0.380			0.354
Croatia 1991-2000	0.362	0.050	0.250	0.473
Croatia 2001 -	0.319	0.074	0.001	0.637
Cuba 1941-1958	0.325			0.297
Cyprus 1960 -	0.663	0.338	-3.626	4.951
Czech Rep 1993-2000	0.177	0.036	0.088	0.266
Czech Rep 2001-2011	0.287	0.103	-0.042	0.615
Djibouti 1993-2009	1.000			1.000

Dominican Republic 1967-1994	0.350				0.323
Dominican Republic 1995-2002	0.424	0.072	0.113	0.735	0.400
Ecuador 1984-1998	0.388	0.058	0.138	0.638	0.363
Ecuador 1999-2008	0.578	0.050	0.417	0.738	0.560
Egypt 1980-2000	0.528				0.509
El Salvador 1984-2000	0.340	0.063	0.140	0.541	0.313
El Salvador 2001 -	0.398	0.022	0.125	0.672	0.373
Estonia 1992 -	0.217	0.032	0.145	0.289	0.184
Finland 1957 - 1994	0.191	0.009	0.075	0.306	0.157
Finland 1995-1999	0.196	0.027	0.121	0.271	0.162
Finland 2000-2011	0.088	0.035	-0.023	0.200	0.050
France 1963-2008	0.166	0.020	0.117	0.214	0.131
Gabon 1997-2010	0.434	0.004	0.387	0.481	0.410
Gambia 1997 -	0.625				0.609
Georgia 1990-1995	0.200		0.200	0.200	0.166
Georgia 1996-2003	0.604	0.071	0.430	0.779	0.588
Georgia 2004 -	0.575				0.557
Germany 1920-1932	0.400				0.375
Germany 1946 -	0.068				0.029
Ghana 1980-1991	0.450				0.427
Ghana 1992 -	0.458	0.091	0.068	0.849	0.436
Greece 1986 -	0.068				0.029
Guatemala 1985 -	0.312	0.061	0.144	0.480	0.283
Guinea 1992-2009	0.600	0.212	-2.094	3.295	0.584
Guinea-Bissau 1980 -	0.310	0.015	0.123	0.498	0.281
Haiti 1987 -	0.104	0.070	-0.196	0.404	0.066
Honduras 1982 -	0.369	0.010	0.337	0.401	0.343
Hungary 1991-2011	0.305	0.045	0.200	0.409	0.275
Iceland 1944 -	0.352	0.079	0.133	0.571	0.325
India 1950 -	0.098				0.060
Indonesia 1960-2002	0.069				0.030
Iran 1990 -	0.158				0.123
Ireland 1938 -	0.100	0.048	-0.033	0.233	0.062
Israel 1964 -	0.045				0.005
Italy 1948 -	0.136				0.100
Kazakhstan 1990-1992	0.520	0.220	-2.275	3.315	0.500
Kazakhstan 1993-1995	0.450				0.427
Kazakhstan 1996 -	0.674	0.080	0.419	0.930	0.661
Kenya 1998-2007	0.631	0.119	0.119	1.143	0.616
Kyrgyzstan 1990-1992	0.275		0.275	0.275	0.245
Kyrgyzstan 1993-1995	0.480	0.089	0.196	0.765	0.459
Kyrgyzstan 1996-2002	0.505	0.055	0.363	0.647	0.484
Kyrgyzstan 2003-2007	0.671	0.019	0.430	0.911	0.657
Latvia 1992-1997	0.168	0.025	0.111	0.225	0.133
Latvia 1998 -	0.050				0.010
Lithuania 1993 -	0.311	0.044	0.217	0.405	0.282
Macedonia 1992 -	0.151	0.031	0.084	0.219	0.116
Madagascar 1993-1997	0.138	0.088	-0.974	1.249	0.101
Madagascar 1998-2008	0.431	0.006	0.352	0.511	0.407
Malawi 1994 -	0.607	0.165	0.082	1.132	0.590
Mali 1992-2012	0.365	0.094	0.104	0.626	0.339
Malta 1965 -	0.182				0.148
Mauritania 2006-2008	0.469	0.031	0.072	0.866	0.446
Mauritius 1992 -	0.210	0.103	-1.095	1.515	0.177
Mexico 1929 -	0.370	0.028	0.280	0.460	0.343
Moldova 1990	0.260	0.110	-1.140	1.660	0.229
Moldova 1991-1994	0.316	0.091	-0.843	1.475	0.288
Moldova 1995-2000	0.270	0.059	0.130	0.410	0.240
Moldova 2001 -	0.301	0.069	0.004	0.598	0.272
Mongolia 1992 -	0.322	0.092	-0.075	0.718	0.293
Mozambique 1987 - 1990	0.318				0.290

Mozambique 1991-2004	0.381	0.006	0.308	0.453	0.355
Mozambique 2005 -	0.491	0.099	0.065	0.916	0.469
Namibia 1990 -	0.410	0.060	0.256	0.563	0.385
Nicaragua 1987 -	0.427	0.039	0.303	0.550	0.403
Niger 1993-1995	0.475	0.025	0.157	0.793	0.453
Niger 2000-2009	0.369	0.069	-0.505	1.242	0.342
Nigeria 1989-1993	0.313	0.013	0.154	0.471	0.284
Nigeria 1999 -	0.658	0.170	-0.074	1.391	0.644
Pakistan 1998-1999	0.344				0.316
Panama 1972 -	0.474	0.046	0.326	0.621	0.452
Paraguay 1968-1991	0.550				0.531
Paraguay 1992 -	0.301	0.045	0.156	0.446	0.272
Peru 1980-1992	0.236	0.011	0.101	0.370	0.204
Peru 1994 -	0.443	0.056	0.263	0.623	0.420
Philippines 1987 -	0.305	0.095	-0.906	1.515	0.276
Poland 1990-1992	0.175				0.140
Poland 1993-1996	0.323	0.051	0.205	0.441	0.295
Poland 1997 -	0.271	0.044	0.175	0.368	0.241
Portugal 1976 - 1982	0.294	0.031	-0.103	0.691	0.264
Portugal 1983 -	0.229	0.016	0.190	0.268	0.197
Romania 1992 -	0.280	0.033	0.211	0.349	0.250
Russia 1990-1991	0.150				0.114
Russia 1992-1993	0.298	0.073	-0.017	0.613	0.269
Russia 1994 -	0.579	0.056	0.454	0.704	0.561
STP 1991-2002	0.310	0.015	0.123	0.498	0.281
STP 2003 -	0.239	0.011	0.094	0.383	0.207
Senegal 1992-2000	0.413	0.013	0.254	0.571	0.388
Senegal 2001 -	0.583	0.116	0.084	1.082	0.566
Seychelles 1993 -	0.625				0.609
Sierra Leone 1992 -	0.565	0.217	-0.369	1.500	0.547
Singapore 1995 -	0.210				0.176
Slovakia 1993-1998	0.207	0.033	0.129	0.284	0.173
Slovakia 1999-2001	0.082	0.032	-0.322	0.486	0.043
Slovakia 2002 -	0.222	0.139	-0.376	0.820	0.189
Slovenia 1992 -	0.153	0.019	0.114	0.193	0.118
South Africa 1996 -	0.407	0.218	-2.358	3.173	0.383
South Korea 1949-1959	0.250				0.219
South Korea 1962-1972	0.450				0.427
South Korea 1988 -	0.375				0.349
Sri Lanka 1979 -	0.314	0.086	-0.054	0.683	0.286
Syria 1973-2011	0.602				0.585
Taiwan 1995 -	0.300	0.025	-0.018	0.618	0.271
Tajikistan 1995 -	0.518	0.051	0.387	0.649	0.498
Tanzania 1995 -	0.469	0.094	-0.722	1.660	0.446
Timor Leste 2002 -	0.193				0.159
Togo 2003 -	0.438				0.414
Trinidad & Tobago 1976 -	0.100				0.063
Tunisia 1998 - 2010	0.380				0.354
Turkey 1983-2007	0.297	0.127	-1.314	1.909	0.268
Turkey 2008 -	0.182		0.182	0.182	0.148
Turkmenistan 1992 - 2008	0.675	0.078	0.476	0.875	0.662
US 1788 -	0.318	0.008	0.222	0.413	0.289
Uganda 1996 -	0.531	0.126	-0.012	1.075	0.512
Ukraine 1992-1995	0.420	0.106	0.125	0.715	0.395
Ukraine 1996-2004	0.463	0.061	0.319	0.606	0.440
Ukraine 2005-2010	0.356	0.206	-2.264	2.977	0.329
Ukraine 2011 -	0.486	0.065	0.328	0.644	0.464
Uruguay 1985 -	0.402	0.020	0.338	0.467	0.377
Uzbekistan 1993 -	0.659	0.056	0.516	0.802	0.645
Venezuela 1961 - 1999	0.287	0.039	0.179	0.395	0.257
Venezuela 2001 -	0.415				0.391

Yugoslavia 1992-2000	0.235	0.025	-0.083	0.553	0.203
Zaire 1997-2002	0.304				0.275
Zambia 1992-1995	0.350				0.323
Zambia 1996 -	0.625	0.130	0.213	1.038	0.610
<u>Zimbabwe 1991-2008</u>	<u>0.752</u>	<u>0.189</u>	<u>-0.061</u>	<u>1.565</u>	<u>0.742</u>

Table 3: prespow2 Scores

Country Year	Raw score	Standard errors	95% Confidence Intervals for raw scores	Normalized score
Albania 1991-1998	-0.181	0.038	-0.270	-0.091 0.215
Albania 1998 -	-0.203	0.116	-0.704	0.298 0.185
Algeria 1997-2008	0.271			0.813
Angola 1993-2009	0.041			0.509
Argentina 1984-1994	-0.069	0.078	-1.059	0.921 0.363
Argentina 1994 -	0.052	0.047	-0.078	0.182 0.523
Armenia 1991-1994	0.161	0.021	0.094	0.228 0.668
Armenia 1995-2005	0.087	0.046	-0.030	0.204 0.570
Armenia 2006 -	0.020			0.480
Austria 1945 -	-0.082	0.021	-0.131	-0.033 0.346
Azerbaijan 1996-2002	0.323	0.056	0.144	0.502 0.882
Bangladesh 1986 -	-0.207			0.180
Belarus 1994-1996	0.220	0.055	0.086	0.354 0.745
Belarus 1997 -	0.412	0.059	0.249	0.575 1.000
Benin 1991 -	0.205	0.030	0.076	0.334 0.725
Bolivia 1967-1994	-0.069	0.078	-1.059	0.921 0.363
Bolivia 1995-2008	-0.082	0.019	-0.143	-0.021 0.346
Bosnia and H 1996 -	-0.060	0.087	-1.166	1.047 0.375
Botswana 1967 -	0.067			0.543
Brazil 1946-1953	0.089			0.572
Brazil 1954 - 1960	0.007	0.082	-1.034	1.047 0.463
Brazil 1988 -	0.181	0.045	0.066	0.295 0.693
Bulgaria 1990-1991	-0.253	0.078	-1.246	0.740 0.119
Bulgaria 1992 -	-0.122	0.036	-0.199	-0.046 0.293
Burkina Faso 1978-1980	0.013			0.472
Burkina Faso 1991-2011	-0.219			0.165
Burundi 1992 - 1996	-0.020			0.429
CAR 1992-1993	-0.027			0.419
CAR 1995-2002	-0.021	0.006	-0.093	0.051 0.427
CAR 2005 -	-0.093	0.078	-1.084	0.897 0.331
Cameroon 1996 -	-0.219			0.165
Cape Verde 1991-1992	-0.103			0.317
Cape Verde 1993 -	-0.064	0.031	-0.163	0.035 0.370
Chile 1891-1925	0.041			0.509
Chile 1925-1969	0.105			0.593
Chile 1969-1973	0.143	0.025	-0.169	0.456 0.644
Chile 1989 -	0.293	0.069	0.102	0.485 0.843
China 1983-2004	-0.343			0
Colombia 1960 - 1990	0.042	0.063	-0.754	0.837 0.510
Colombia 1991 -	0.016	0.074	-0.190	0.221 0.475
Comoros 1997-1998	0			0.454
Comoros 2002 -	0.257			0.794
Congo Brazzaville 1961-1963	-0.129			0.283
Congo Brazzaville 1992-1997	-0.004	0.067	-0.292	0.284 0.449
Congo Brazzaville 2002 -	0.257			0.794
Costa Rica 1949 -	-0.119	0.041	-0.234	-0.004 0.297
Cote d'Ivoire 1961-1999	0.106			0.594
Croatia 1991-2000	0.082	0.025	0.026	0.138 0.563
Croatia 2001 -	-0.062	0.018	-0.139	0.014 0.372
Cuba 1941-1958	-0.007			0.446
Cyprus 1960 -	0.183	0.184	-2.154	2.520 0.697
Czech Rep 1993-2000	-0.207	0.039	-0.303	-0.112 0.180
Czech Rep 2001-2011	-0.139	0.087	-0.418	0.139 0.270
Djibouti 1993-2009	0.257			0.794
Dominican Republic 1967-	0.009			0.467

Dominican Republic 1995-	0.053	0.033	-0.087	0.193	0.525
Ecuador 1984-1998	0.056	0.043	-0.130	0.242	0.529
Ecuador 1999-2008	0.288	0.064	0.084	0.493	0.836
Egypt 1980-2000	0.303				0.855
El Salvador 1984-2000	-0.066	0.043	-0.203	0.070	0.367
El Salvador 2001 -	0.017	0.041	-0.501	0.534	0.476
Estonia 1992 -	-0.212	0.040	-0.303	-0.121	0.174
Finland 1957 - 1994	0.006	0.092	-1.162	1.174	0.462
Finland 1995-1999	0.074	0.070	-0.120	0.268	0.553
Finland 2000-2011	-0.140	0.079	-0.393	0.113	0.269
France 1963-2008	0.008	0.051	-0.117	0.133	0.465
Gabon 1997-2010	0.001	0.172	-2.183	2.185	0.455
Gambia 1997 -	-0.029				0.417
Georgia 1990-1995	-0.104	0.045	-0.672	0.465	0.317
Georgia 1996-2003	0.251	0.042	0.149	0.354	0.787
Georgia 2004 -	-0.067				0.366
Germany 1920-1932	0.041				0.509
Germany 1946 -	-0.243				0.133
Ghana 1980-1991	0.127				0.623
Ghana 1992 -	-0.062	0.058	-0.312	0.187	0.372
Greece 1986 -	-0.243				0.133
Guatemala 1985 -	-0.133	0.056	-0.288	0.023	0.279
Guinea 1992-2009	0.116	0.002	0.094	0.137	0.608
Guinea-Bissau 1980 -	0	0.002	-0.030	0.030	0.454
Haiti 1987 -	-0.148	0.065	-0.973	0.676	0.258
Honduras 1982 -	-0.047	0.070	-0.270	0.175	0.392
Hungary 1991-2011	-0.056	0.058	-0.190	0.077	0.380
Iceland 1944 -	0.296	0.096	0.030	0.561	0.846
India 1950 -	-0.267				0.102
Indonesia 1960-2002	-0.305				0.051
Iran 1990 -	-0.187				0.207
Ireland 1938 -	-0.122	0.051	-0.264	0.019	0.293
Israel 1964 -	-0.337				0.008
Italy 1948 -	-0.039				0.403
Kazakhstan 1990-1992	0.214	0.117	-1.278	1.706	0.738
Kazakhstan 1993-1995	0.330				0.892
Kazakhstan 1996 -	0.226	0.015	0.180	0.272	0.754
Kenya 1998-2007	0.082	0.021	-0.007	0.171	0.564
Kyrgyzstan 1990-1992	0.031	0.027	-0.316	0.377	0.495
Kyrgyzstan 1993-1995	0.163	0.043	0.026	0.300	0.670
Kyrgyzstan 1996-2002	0.213	0.034	0.125	0.300	0.736
Kyrgyzstan 2003-2007	0.136	0.128	-1.495	1.767	0.634
Latvia 1992-1997	-0.282	0.021	-0.331	-0.233	0.081
Latvia 1998 -	-0.292				0.067
Lithuania 1993 -	-0.056	0.039	-0.140	0.028	0.380
Macedonia 1992 -	-0.226	0.023	-0.276	-0.175	0.156
Madagascar 1993-1997	-0.039	0.065	-0.862	0.784	0.403
Madagascar 1998-2008	-0.089	0.082	-1.135	0.957	0.337
Malawi 1994 -	0.090	0.060	-0.102	0.282	0.574
Mali 1992-2012	-0.042	0.040	-0.155	0.070	0.398
Malta 1965 -	0.098				0.584
Mauritania 2006-2008	-0.092	0.079	-1.097	0.912	0.333
Mauritius 1992 -	-0.260	0.006	-0.333	-0.188	0.110
Mexico 1929 -	-0.092	0.065	-0.300	0.115	0.332
Moldova 1990	-0.159	0.091	-1.311	0.994	0.244
Moldova 1991-1994	-0.059	0.039	-0.552	0.434	0.376
Moldova 1995-2000	-0.086	0.052	-0.209	0.037	0.341
Moldova 2001 -	-0.227	0.013	-0.283	-0.170	0.154
Mongolia 1992 -	-0.106	0.066	-0.389	0.177	0.314
Mozambique 1987 - 1990	0.005				0.461
Mozambique 1991-2004	0.012	0.014	-0.171	0.195	0.471

Mozambique 2005 -	0.014	0.011	-0.031	0.060	0.473
Namibia 1990 -	-0.010	0.023	-0.071	0.050	0.441
Nicaragua 1987 -	0.056	0.036	-0.059	0.171	0.528
Niger 1993-1995	0.085	0.094	-1.105	1.275	0.567
Niger 2000-2009	-0.083	0.088	-1.198	1.031	0.344
Nigeria 1989-1993	-0.003	0.004	-0.049	0.043	0.450
Nigeria 1999 -	0.082	0.064	-0.194	0.357	0.562
Pakistan 1998-1999	0.058				0.532
Panama 1972 -	0.137	0.033	0.031	0.243	0.636
Paraguay 1968-1991	0.136				0.635
Paraguay 1992 -	-0.158	0.050	-0.318	0.002	0.245
Peru 1980-1992	-0.134	0.064	-0.944	0.676	0.277
Peru 1994 -	0.059	0.073	-0.174	0.292	0.533
Philippines 1987 -	-0.039	0.080	-1.057	0.979	0.403
Poland 1990-1992	-0.098				0.325
Poland 1993-1996	0.040	0.064	-0.108	0.188	0.507
Poland 1997 -	-0.008	0.044	-0.105	0.089	0.443
Portugal 1976 - 1982	0.110	0.116	-1.369	1.588	0.600
Portugal 1983 -	0.067	0.063	-0.088	0.222	0.543
Romania 1992 -	0.006	0.034	-0.067	0.079	0.463
Russia 1990-1991	-0.249				0.124
Russia 1992-1993	-0.030	0.037	-0.187	0.127	0.415
Russia 1994 -	0.249	0.037	0.167	0.330	0.784
STP 1991-2002	0	0.002	-0.030	0.030	0.454
STP 2003 -	-0.008	0.017	-0.218	0.203	0.444
Senegal 1992-2000	0.081	0.085	-1.001	1.162	0.561
Senegal 2001 -	-0.027	0.080	-0.369	0.316	0.419
Seychelles 1993 -	-0.029				0.417
Sierra Leone 1992 -	0.114	0.072	-0.195	0.424	0.606
Singapore 1995 -	-0.119				0.297
Slovakia 1993-1998	-0.190	0.035	-0.273	-0.106	0.203
Slovakia 1999-2001	-0.195	0.089	-1.321	0.930	0.196
Slovakia 2002 -	-0.106	0.071	-0.411	0.198	0.314
Slovenia 1992 -	-0.215	0.017	-0.252	-0.178	0.169
South Africa 1996 -	-0.087	0.058	-0.830	0.656	0.339
South Korea 1949-1959	-0.054				0.383
South Korea 1962-1972	0.073				0.551
South Korea 1988 -	0.025				0.488
Sri Lanka 1979 -	-0.030	0.089	-0.414	0.354	0.415
Syria 1973-2011	0.400				0.984
Taiwan 1995 -	-0.052				0.385
Tajikistan 1995 -	0.106	0.028	0.033	0.178	0.594
Tanzania 1995 -	-0.149	0.073	-1.074	0.777	0.257
Timor Leste 2002 -	-0.035				0.408
Togo 2003 -	-0.171				0.228
Trinidad & Tobago 1976 -	-0.264				0.105
Tunisia 1998 - 2010	0.106				0.594
Turkey 1983-2007	0.114	0.051	-0.528	0.756	0.606
Turkey 2008 -	0.124	0.014	-0.050	0.298	0.619
Turkmenistan 1992 - 2008	0.297	0.048	0.175	0.420	0.848
US 1788 -	-0.084	0.077	-1.061	0.893	0.344
Uganda 1996 -	-0.014	0.012	-0.068	0.039	0.436
Ukraine 1992-1995	0.052	0.089	-0.197	0.300	0.523
Ukraine 1996-2004	0.165	0.036	0.081	0.249	0.673
Ukraine 2005-2010	-0.079	0	-0.083	-0.075	0.350
Ukraine 2011 -	0.192	0.026	0.128	0.256	0.709
Uruguay 1985 -	-0.037	0.039	-0.160	0.087	0.406
Uzbekistan 1993 -	0.278	0.025	0.215	0.341	0.823
Venezuela 1961 - 1999	-0.157	0.047	-0.289	-0.025	0.247
Venezuela 2001 -	0.027				0.490
Yugoslavia 1992-2000	-0.278	0.001	-0.286	-0.269	0.087

Zaire 1997-2002	0.006				0.462
Zambia 1992-1995	0.025				0.487
Zambia 1996 -	0.117	0.023	0.043	0.192	0.610
Zimbabwe 1991-2008	0.172	0.044	-0.019	0.362	0.682

Comparing the standard errors across regions

Figures 1 and 2 below present the raw normalized scores for Prespow1 and Prespow2 respectively as well as their 95 per cent confidence intervals by region for all country years. For example, Figure 1 shows that most of the countries in the Americas have very small confidence intervals, indicating a high level of concordance among the original scores for most of the countries in this region. By contrast, the confidence intervals for countries in Africa are generally much larger, reflecting disagreements among scholars about presidential power scores in this region. Figure 3 presents the distribution of each our measures.

Constructing the Confidence Intervals

As stated in Footnote 28, we calculate the confidence intervals on the basis of the original prespow 1 and 2 scores that generate our raw scores and not the final normalized 0-1 prespow 1 and 2 scores. This has the effect that the confidence intervals we report for a given country do not necessarily provide a measure of confidence relative to the prespow scores for any other country. Rather, they provide a measure of confidence in the level of concordance among the original set of scores for that country.

Formally: the standard error of the mean, s_{μ} is defined as $\sqrt{s^2/n}$, where n is the number of observations, \bar{x} is the mean and s , the variance. Let α be $1 - l/100$, where l is the significance level and t_{α} is the two-sided t statistic corresponding to a significance level of α with $n - 1$ degrees of freedom. We obtain t_{α} in Stata as `invttail(n-1,0.5*\alpha)`. Therefore, the lower and upper confidence bounds are, respectively, $\bar{x} - s_{\mu}t_{\alpha}$ and $\bar{x} + s_{\mu}t_{\alpha}$.

For example, let us take the prespow1 measure for Cyprus (1960-). This is the measure with the largest confidence intervals for any country and so represents the most extreme case. This measure is comprised of two original scores, one from Hicken and Stoll (13/40 normalized as 0.325) and one from Shugart (16/16, normalized as 1).¹ In this example, $n = 2$, $s^2 = 0.22781$; $\bar{x} =$


¹ Hicken and Stoll 2008; Shugart 1996.

0.6625. Therefore, $s_{\mu} = 0.3375$ (that is, $\sqrt{0.2278/2}$). We obtain 95 per cent confidence intervals, so therefore, $\alpha = 1-0.95$, $\alpha = 0.05$. We can then obtain $\text{invttail}(n-1, 0.5*\alpha)$, which is, $\text{invttail}(1, 0.025) = 12.706$.² Finally, the lower and upper bounds can be derived: $0.6625 - (0.3375)(12.706)$ and $0.6625 + (0.3375)(12.706)$. That is, -3.625775 and +4.950775.


Therefore, these confidence intervals are a reflection of the degree of concordance among the original presidential power scores that constitute our raw score. Their purpose is primarily to provide scholars with an easy way of gauging the degree to which there is agreement on the presidential power score for a particular country.

² This returns the inverse reverse cumulative (upper tail or survivor) student's t distribution, which can be calculated in Stata with the command `display invttail`.

Figure 1: Raw Prespow1 Scores and Confidence Intervals by Region



Africa - Raw Prespow1 Scores



Asia - Raw Prespow1 Scores






Figure 2: Raw Prespow2 Scores and Confidence Intervals by Region



Africa - Raw Prespow2 Scores



Asia - Raw Prespow2 Scores





Figure 3: Kernel Density Plot of Prespow1 and Prespow2



Note: Vertical lines represent the mean of each measure

Robustness – Dynamic PCA Specification

If data within a panel is interdependent, that is, the data exhibits cross-sectional dependence or serial dependence, then this will undermine the assumptions needed to perform PCA or factor analysis on longitudinal data.³ This may be a problem if we have a long time series of presidential power, as annual measures of power will exhibit this type of auto-correlation.

However, our data is in country time period format (e.g. there is one line for Argentina 1984-94 inclusive) and, as such, this means that we do not perform PCA with a long time series, which is where we are most likely to find this type of serial dependence. In fact, as we report in fn 38, the results of a Wooldridge test for serial correlation indicates that this is not an issue for our data.⁴ Likewise, tests also indicate our panel does not appear to suffer from cross-sectional dependence.⁵

Nonetheless, as a further robustness test, we also performed a dynamic PCA with panel data according to the procedure suggested by Federici and Mazzitelli.⁶ This method allows for cross-sectional analysis of PCA, and accounts for the time series dimension with linear regression. It allows the resulting analysis to take into account both time and the panel structure. That is:

$$X(I, J, T) = \{x_{ijt}\}, i = 1 \dots I, j = 1 \dots J, t = 1, T,$$

where i is the unit, j the variable and t , the time. It decomposes the variance and covariance matrix into: a matrix of the structure of the units; a matrix of the average dynamics of the system; and finally a matrix of the differential dynamic of the single units.⁷

Given the difficulty of implementing this type of dynamic PCA with our expectation maximization algorithm approach,⁸ we employ standard imputation, using the Amelia II package developed by Honaker et al. and also

³ See Sarafidis and Wansbeek 2010; Wansbeek and Meijer 2000.

⁴ Drukker 2003.

⁵ De Hoyos and Sarafidis 2006.

⁶ Federici and Mazzitelli 2005.

⁷ Federici and Mazzitelli 2005, 2.

⁸ Particularly as we use the command PCAMAT in Stata 13 to perform our analysis.

Honaker and King to solve the problem of missing data.⁹ We then performed the dynamic PCA analysis on ten multiply imputed datasets.¹⁰ The first component produces an eigenvalue of 21.659, which captures over 77 per cent of the underlying variance. The eigenvectors for the first principal component are very similar to the eigenvectors returned with the EM approach. In fact, the resulting measure of presidential power modeled in this manner correlates very highly, over .93, with our cross-sectional EM approach that produces prespow2. This measure can be found on our website (www.presidential-power.com).

⁹ Honaker et al. 2007; Honaker and King 2010.

¹⁰ We included all 28 measures of presidential power in the analysis, and set priors for imputation at the suggested threshold of 5 per cent of the number of observations. See Honaker and King 2010.

Changing Power – A Brief Qualitative Study of Argentina

In both our measures of presidential power, Argentina experienced an increase in the presidential power score after 1994 (prespow1 moves from 0.288 to 0.407 and prespow2 moves from 0.363 to 0.523). We record a country time period score only if one of our 28 measures of presidential power records a score for a given time period. So, in this case, we have original scores for Argentina both for the 1989-1994 period *and* the post-1994 period.

If we examine the events of 1994 in Argentina, we can see that they corroborate the increase in our measure of presidential power. During Carlos Menem's first term in government in Argentina, he began to push for a reform of the constitution that would allow him to run for re-election (prior to 1994, this was prohibited). Raúl Alfonsín, the leader of the major Argentine opposition party, *Unión Cívica Radical* (UCR), given his party's poor performance in the 1993 legislative election, decided to negotiate with Menem in order to benefit from what he perceived to Menem's inevitable victory.¹¹ The resulting negotiations between Menen and Alfonsín produced the Pact of Olivos, an agreement on constitutional reform, which granted Menem re-election in return for a number of initiatives that Alfonsín believed would limit the power of the president.¹² These included the creation of the new post, Cabinet Chief (*jefe de gabinete*), appointed by the president, and subject to the confidence of an absolute majority (in both houses). It also limited the ability of Congress to delegate power to the president, except during emergencies and for fixed time periods only.¹³

However, the reform significantly increased the *legislative* powers of the president by incorporating "...three instruments until then excluded from the formal constitution: legislative delegation, emergency decrees, and line-item vetoes."¹⁴ Although the reform attempted to curb *de facto* executive prerogatives, in reality, "...a strict reading of the constitution indicates that

¹¹ Jones 1997, 291; Negretto 1998.

¹² Jones 1997, 291.

¹³ Negretto 1998, 23-24; Jones 1997, 293.

¹⁴ Negretto 1998, 24.

the Argentine president's legislative powers have increased.”¹⁵ This is directly in line with the change in institutional power we observe in our data.

¹⁵ Jones 1997, 293.

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