

TABLE A1
LIST OF STATES CODED AS EUROPEAN

Australia*
Austria*
Austria-Hungary
Baden
Bavaria
Belgium
Canada*
Denmark
France
Germany
Greece
Hanover**
Hesse Electoral
Hesse Grand Ducal
Italy
Luxembourg
Mecklenburg Schwerin
Modena**
Netherlands
New Zealand*
Norway
Papal States
Parma**
Portugal
Russia
Saxony
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Tuscany**
Two Sicilies**
United Kingdom
United States
Wurttemberg

All non-starred states were signatories to the 1864 Geneva Convention on the Treatment of the Wounded.

* Not a member of the international system at the time of the 1864 Convention either because they had not yet entered the international system.

** Hanover, Modena, Parma, Tuscany, and the Two Sicilies signed the 1856 Declaration of Paris, which preceded the 1864 Convention.

Table A2: Are Strategic and Identity Variables Correlated?

	Downes		Valentino et al.	
	Annexationist war aims	Insurgency/Attrition	Annexationist war aims	Insurgency/Attrition
European v. nonEuropean	0.045 (<i>p</i> =0.421)	-0.003 (<i>p</i> =0.960)	0.199 (<i>p</i> =0.015)	-0.058 (<i>p</i> =0.4864)

TABLE A3: DETERMINANTS OF CIVILIAN VICTIMIZATION BY PARTICIPANTS IN INTERSTATE WARS, 1816-2003 (LOGIT ESTIMATES)
REPLICATION AND REANALYSIS OF DOWNES (2008), WITH INTERACTION TERM

	<i>Model 1c</i>	<i>Model 2c</i>	<i>Model 3c</i>	<i>Model 4c</i>	<i>Model 5c</i>	<i>Model 6c</i>	<i>Model 7c</i>
Democracy (Polity dummy)	1.19 (0.70)		1.21* (0.68)		1.15* (0.65)	1.13* (0.63)	1.25* (0.75)
Democracy (Doyle dummy)		0.38 (0.66)		.25 (0.62)			
European v. non-European	1.62** (0.70)	1.92** (0.69)	1.49** (0.73)	1.83** (0.66)	2.09** (0.72)	1.30* (0.71)	1.81** (0.64)
War of attrition	2.88*** (0.62)	2.82*** (0.60)	2.88*** (0.67)	2.86*** (0.65)			2.84*** (0.60)
Log of Battle Deaths					0.71** (0.24)		
Log of War Duration						1.04** (0.36)	
Territorial annexation	4.33*** (0.83)	4.25*** (0.81)	3.73*** (0.85)	3.67*** (0.82)	3.75*** (0.74)	3.33*** (0.72)	4.47*** (0.78)
Relative capabilities	1.66** (0.84)	1.50* (0.83)	1.12 (1.09)	0.99 (1.04)	1.07 (0.80)	0.19 (0.84)	1.16 (0.83)
Deterrence	2.04*** (0.52)	2.31*** (0.57)	1.26** (0.63)	1.56** (0.69)	2.16*** (0.56)	1.21** (0.59)	1.55*** (0.47)
State is Target of CV	1.46** (0.58)	1.41** (0.55)	1.66** (0.63)	1.61** (0.61)	1.63** (0.63)	1.54** (0.70)	1.61** (0.56)
Post-1945	-0.81 (0.72)	-0.89 (0.75)	-0.67 (0.74)	-0.74 (0.78)	-0.32 (0.68)	-0.53 (0.63)	
Identity x Post45	-1.51 (1.07)	-1.16 (1.12)	-1.28 (1.07)	-0.97 (1.10)	-1.27 (1.02)	-0.93 (1.13)	
Post-1977							1.27 (0.97)
Identity x Post77							omitted¹
Constant	-5.97*** (0.95)	-5.87*** (0.94)	-4.95*** (1.08)	-4.91*** (1.08)	-7.51*** (1.38)	-5.54*** (1.17)	-6.05*** (0.83)
N	298	300	169	170	291	170	289
Log likelihood	-54.14	-55.66	-49.75	-51.18	-63.43	-59.68	-53.55
Wald Chi ²	66.45	80.01	55.99	62.32	61.33	42.72	66.08
Pseudo-R ²	0.61	0.60	0.53	0.52	0.53	0.43	0.61

¹ The interaction term perfectly predicted an absence of civilian targeting, and thus could not be included in the model. This result was consistent across all reanalyses of Downes' data that included this interaction term.

TABLE A4: REGRESSION MODELS OF CIVILIAN KILLING DURING INTERSTATE WARS (1900-2003)
REPLICATION AND REANALYSIS OF VALENTINO ET. AL (2006), WITH INTERACTION TERM
(N=148 FOR ALL MODELS)

	<i>Model</i> <i>1c</i>	<i>Model</i> <i>2c</i>	<i>Model</i> <i>3c</i>	<i>Model</i> <i>4c</i>	<i>Model</i> <i>6c²</i>	<i>Model</i> <i>7c</i>
<i>International Law</i>						
Treaty Status	-0.26 (0.82)		-0.23 (0.86)	-0.12 (0.79)	-0.17 (0.82)	-0.02 (0.79)
Mutual Treaty Ratification		0.09 (0.87)				
Treaty*Regime Type			-1.4 (1.89)			
<i>Alternative Hypotheses</i>						
Regime Type (binary)	0.03 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	.33 (1.66)	-0.81 (1.11)	0.63 (0.99)	
Regime Type (Polity)						0.05 (0.05)
Regime Type * Strategy				1.90 (1.47)		
Regime Type * War Aims					-1.61 (1.56)	
European v. Non-European	1.90** (0.78)	1.93** (0.78)	1.85** (0.79)	1.86** (0.77)	1.88** (0.78)	1.72** (0.70)
Post-1945	-0.13 (0.83)	-0.20 (0.81)	-0.17 (0.84)	-0.21 (0.82)	-0.26 (0.83)	
Identity * Post-1945	-3.17** (1.46)	-3.22** (0.03)	-2.91** (1.44)	-2.91** (1.36)	-2.48* (1.34)	
Post-1977						-1.13 (1.04)
Identity * Post-1977						-5.46** (1.70)
<i>Strategic Hypotheses</i>						
Attrition or Counterinsurgency Strategy	0.02** (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)	1.68** (0.75)	0.02** (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)
War Aims	3.22*** (0.87)	3.27*** (0.87)	3.16*** (0.86)	3.01*** (0.84)	3.52*** (0.97)	3.49*** (0.83)
War Duration	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)
<i>Controls</i>						
Relative Capabilities	2.50 (1.58)	2.44 (1.58)	2.57 (1.60)	2.79* (1.60)	2.44 (1.60)	2.99* (1.56)
Adversary Population Size	0.49** (0.22)	0.46** (0.22)	0.50** (0.22)	0.48** (0.22)	0.51** (0.22)	0.48** (0.21)
Constant	-8.12* (4.25)	-7.87** (4.18)	-8.43** (4.21)	-8.09* (4.21)	-8.78** (4.16)	-8.22** (4.03)
R ²	0.46	0.46	0.46	0.47	0.46	0.49

² The commands for the fifth model are not included in the replication file supplied to us by Valentino et al.

**TABLE A5: ORDERED PROBIT ANALYSIS OF NONCOMPLIANCE WITH THE LAWS OF WAR
REPLICATION AND RENALYSIS OF MORROW (2007), TABLE 1 WITH INTERACTION TERM**

	<i>Morrow</i> <i>1c</i>	<i>Morrow</i> <i>2c</i>	<i>Morrow</i> <i>3c</i>
<i>Reciprocal Variables</i>			
European v. non-European	0.222*	0.213*	0.188*
	(0.118)	(0.122)	(0.107)
Post-1945	0.037	0.040	
	(0.092)	(0.092)	
Identity x Post-1945	-0.159	-0.111	
	(0.222)	(0.218)	
Post-1977			0.139
			(0.149)
Identity x Post-1977			-0.039
			(0.399)
Victim's Noncompliance	-0.273	-0.502*	-0.281
	(0.289)	(0.282)	(0.289)
Clarity of Victim's Violations x Victim's Noncompliance	0.172***	0.180***	0.173***
	(0.051)	(0.049)	(0.051)
Joint Ratification x Victim's noncompliance	1.114**	1.379***	1.134***
	(0.354)	(0.345)	(0.354)
Clarity of Victim's Violations x Joint Ratification X Victim's Noncompliance	-0.222***	-0.272***	-0.227***
	(0.070)	(0.069)	(0.070)
Individual Violations X Victim's Noncompliance	0.157	0.310**	0.160
	(0.158)	(0.154)	(0.158)
State Violations X Victim's Noncompliance	0.077	0.260	0.075
	(0.168)	(0.164)	(0.168)
<i>Nonreciprocal Variables</i>			
Joint Ratification	-0.344	-0.682*	-0.358
	(0.374)	(0.375)	(0.374)
Violator Ratified	-0.026	-0.025	-0.034
	(0.168)	(0.176)	(0.168)
Violator Democracy	0.589***	0.652***	0.593***
	(0.142)	(0.137)	(0.141)
Violator Democracy X Joint Ratification	0.027	0.310	0.043
	(0.303)	(0.314)	(0.302)
Violator Democracy X Violator Ratified	-0.838**	-1.187***	-0.855**
	(0.309)	(0.321)	(0.306)
Power Ratio	0.544**	0.492**	0.528**
	(0.240)	(0.243)	(0.240)
Power Ratio X Joint Ratification	-0.700**	-0.523*	-0.698**
	(0.288)	(0.294)	(0.287)
Aerial	-0.196	-0.152	-0.196
	(0.194)	(0.199)	(0.194)
Armistice	-0.486**	-0.419**	-0.478**
	(0.186)	(0.190)	(0.186)
CBW	-1.138***	-1.019***	-1.133***
	(0.168)	(0.169)	(0.168)
High Seas	-0.335**	-0.201	-0.335**
	(0.165)	(0.169)	(0.164)
Civilians	0.438***	0.483***	0.443***
	(0.135)	(0.147)	(0.134)
Cultural	0.001	-0.002	0.001
	(0.185)	(0.207)	(0.185)
POWs	0.210	0.297**	0.214
	(0.135)	(0.147)	(0.135)
Violator Initiator	0.321***	0.373***	0.321***

	(0.079)	(0.078)	(0.079)
Violator Battle Deaths per 1,000 of Population	0.025***	0.025***	0.025***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Violator Lost	0.642***	0.575***	0.663***
	(0.160)	(0.161)	(0.161)
Violator Lost X Power Ratio	-0.818**	-0.699**	-0.850**
	(0.275)	(0.280)	(0.275)
1 st Cutpoint	0.83	0.73	0.82
2 nd Cutpoint	2.48	2.02	2.46
3 rd Cutpoint	3.68	3.47	3.67
N	1066	1066	1066
Log-Likelihood	-933.67	-953.76	-933.47
Significance Probability of Model	705 w/27	798 w/27	705 w/27
	df	df	df
Pseudo-R ²	0.274	0.30	0.27

**TABLE A6: REGRESSION MODELS OF CIVILIAN KILLING DURING INTERSTATE WARS (1900-2003)
REPLICATION AND REANALYSIS OF VALENTINO ET. AL (2006), WITH CONTIGUITY DUMMY
VARIABLE**

(N=148 FOR ALL MODELS)

	<i>Model 1d</i>	<i>Model 2d</i>	<i>Model 3d</i>	<i>Model 4d</i>	<i>Model 6d³</i>	<i>Model 7d</i>
<i>International Law</i>						
Treaty Status	-0.23 (0.82)		-0.09 (0.92)	0.05 (0.81)	-0.25 (0.82)	-0.21 (0.84)
Mutual Treaty Ratification		-0.39 (0.89)				
Treaty*Regime Type			0.87 (1.72)	-1.21 (1.31)	0.46 (1.01)	
<i>Alternative Hypotheses</i>						
Regime Type (binary)						
Regime Type (Polity)	0.03 (0.05)	0.03 (0.05)				0.02 (0.05)
Regime Type * Strategy				2.66 (1.66)		
Regime Type * War Aims					-1.18 (1.87)	
European v. Non-European	1.75* (0.97)	1.77* (0.97)	1.75* (0.97)	1.60* (0.97)	1.90* (0.97)	1.53 (1.01)
European v. European	0.28 (1.80)	0.31 (1.81)	0.32 (1.82)	0.54 (1.79)	0.35 (1.82)	0.42 (1.82)
Non-European v. European	0.77 (1.06)	0.78 (1.06)	0.75 (1.10)	0.72 (1.11)	0.77 (1.08)	0.78 (1.07)
Contiguity	1.20 (0.98)	1.20 (0.97)	1.14 (1.02)	0.80 (1.02)	1.11 (1.00)	1.21 (0.98)
<i>Strategic Hypotheses</i>						
Attrition or Counterinsurgency Strategy	0.02** (0.00)	0.02** (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)	1.73** (0.78)	0.02** (0.01)	
Attrition						0.02** (0.01)
Counterinsurgency						0.05** (0.02)
War Aims	3.05** (0.97)	3.02** (0.98)	3.01** (0.96)	2.68** (0.96)	3.31** (1.09)	3.04** (0.97)
War Duration	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)
<i>Controls</i>						
Relative Capabilities	2.70 (1.69)	2.70 (1.68)	2.76* (1.68)	3.17* (1.70)	2.64 (1.68)	2.74 (1.72)
Adversary Population Size	0.50** (0.24)	0.51** (0.24)	0.50** (0.24)	0.47* (0.24)	0.51** (0.24)	0.51** (0.24)
Constant	-9.87** (4.45)	-9.97** (4.47)	-10.12** (4.40)	-9.24** (4.38)	-10.18** (4.40)	-10.10** (4.49)
R ²	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.42	0.40	0.40

³ The commands for the fifth model are not included in the replication file supplied to us by Valentino et al.

**TABLE A7: ORDERED PROBIT ANALYSIS OF NONCOMPLIANCE WITH THE LAWS OF WAR REGARDING
TREATMENT OF CIVILIANS
REPLICATION AND RENALYSIS OF MORROW (2007), TABLE 1 WITH CONTIGUITY**

	<i>Morrow</i> <i>1d</i>	<i>Morrow</i> <i>2d⁴</i>
<i>Reciprocal Variables</i>		
European v. non-European	0.50* (0.28)	0.60** (0.28)
European v. European	-0.25 (0.29)	-0.08 (0.30)
Non-European v. European	-0.12 (0.27)	-0.01 (0.26)
Contiguity	0.27 (0.21)	0.22 (0.21)
Victim's Noncompliance	-3.24** (1.38)	-3.78** (1.51)
Clarity of Victim's Violations x Victim's Noncompliance	0.64** (0.33)	0.74** (0.35)
Joint Ratification x Victim's noncompliance	3.37** (1.47)	3.90** (1.60)
Clarity of Victim's Violations x Joint Ratification X Victim's Noncompliance	-0.77** (0.35)	-0.91** (0.38)
Individual Violations X Victim's Noncompliance	0.98 (0.64)	1.08 (0.69)
State Violations X Victim's Noncompliance	0.88 (0.64)	1.01 (0.70)
<i>Nonreciprocal Variables</i>		
Joint Ratification	-0.22 (0.94)	0.12 (1.02)
Violator Ratified	-0.53 (0.41)	-0.81* (0.43)
Violator Democracy	0.42 (0.44)	0.41 (0.41)
Violator Democracy X Joint Ratification	-1.01 (0.67)	-0.89 (0.70)
Violator Democracy X Violator Ratified	0.10 (0.73)	-0.06 (0.75)
Power Ratio	-0.25 (0.65)	0.08 (0.63)
Power Ratio X Joint Ratification	-0.52 (0.74)	-0.93 (0.74)
Violator Initiator	0.70*** (0.19)	0.71*** (0.19)
Violator Battle Deaths per 1,000 of Population	0.03*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)
Violator Lost	0.49 (0.40)	0.23 (0.40)
Violator Lost X Power Ratio	-0.43 (0.68)	-0.19 (0.68)
1 st Cutpoint	-0.84	-1.02
2 nd Cutpoint	1.04	0.67
3 rd Cutpoint	2.69	2.52
N	180	180

⁴ We could not replicate Morrow's third model when limiting the analysis to the treatment of civilians issue area because due to degrees of freedom and perfect predictability issues.

Log-Likelihood	-169.94	-165.62
Significance Probability of Model	74 w/21 df	80 w/21 df
Pseudo-R ²	0.18	0.20

**TABLE A8: ORDERED PROBIT ANALYSIS OF NONCOMPLIANCE WITH THE LAWS OF WAR BY ISSUE AREA
REPLICATION AND RENALYSIS OF MORROW (2007), TABLE 1**

	<i>CBW</i>	<i>Cultural</i>	<i>Prisoners of War</i> ⁵
<i>Reciprocal Variables</i>			
European v. non-European	0.95*	1.32*	0.56*
	(0.50)	(0.79)	(0.31)
European v. European	0.55	0.63	0.28
	(0.43)	(0.66)	(0.27)
Non-European v. European	-0.62	-0.62	-0.11
	(0.56)	(0.75)	(0.29)
Victim's Noncompliance	2.09	-11.95	-0.18
	(2.78)	(8.74)	(0.92)
Clarity of Victim's Violations x Victim's Noncompliance	-0.17	3.48	0.37
	(0.49)	(2.82)	(0.26)
Joint Ratification x Victim's noncompliance	-1.96	11.97	2.69**
	(2.80)	(8.71)	(1.19)
Clarity of Victim's Violations x Joint Ratification X Victim's Noncompliance	0.28	-3.72	-0.53**
	(0.54)	(2.85)	(0.24)
Individual Violations X Victim's Noncompliance	0.79	1.38	-0.31
	(0.64)	(1.16)	(0.73)
State Violations X Victim's Noncompliance	0.28	1.35	-0.63
	(0.81)	(1.35)	(0.74)
<i>Nonreciprocal Variables</i>			
Joint Ratification	5.06*	-0.03	-2.65**
	(2.72)	(4.51)	(1.11)
Violator Ratified	-1.64**	-1.56	0.24
	(0.82)	(3.18)	(0.39)
Violator Democracy	-1.02	0.78	-0.16
	(1.55)	(2.26)	(0.53)
Violator Democracy X Joint Ratification	2.70	-1.06	0.03
	(16.13)	(2.43)	(0.59)
Violator Democracy X Violator Ratified	-1.59	Omitted due to collinearity	-0.08
	(17.13)		(0.74)
Power Ratio	3.29*	-1.36	-0.82
	(1.77)	(4.85)	(0.66)
Power Ratio X Joint Ratification	-3.77**	-0.84	1.51*
	(1.90)	(4.91)	(0.81)
Violator Initiator	0.46	-0.14	0.18
	(0.32)	(0.49)	(0.20)
Violator Battle Deaths per 1,000 of Population	0.04**	0.06**	0.03***
	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.01)
Violator Lost	1.89**	1.63*	0.98**
	(0.60)	(0.91)	(0.42)
Violator Lost X Power Ratio	-1.53	-1.84	-0.95
	(1.11)	(1.63)	(0.73)
1 st Cutpoint	6.49	-2.51	0.61
2 nd Cutpoint	7.89	1.76	2.42
3 rd Cutpoint	8.10	3.41	3.93
N	204	66	170
Log-Likelihood	-63.08	-28.68	-151.98
Significance Probability of Model	100 w/20 df	38 w/20 df	121 w/20 df
Pseudo-R ²	0.44	0.40	0.29

⁵ Includes quality weights for data.

