Web Appendix

Table 1   Manipulations, Sample Size, Mean Age, Gender Balance, Education and Income Level

|	Scenario 1 (counter-piracy)				Scenario 2 (regime-change)			
Manipulations	#1	#2	#3	#4	#1	#2	#3	#4
Sample Size	274	293	297	291	271	261	283	302
Mean Age	46.4	47.7	47.2	47.6	46.0	46.1	49.9	48.2
Gender Balance (% of male)	56.6	56.5	54.5	59.4	58.3	52.3	64.8	60.6
University Education (Yes = 1)	.52	.53	.55	.54	.54	.52	.54	.51
Income Level (5 scales)	3.36	3.38	3.41	3.41	3.39	3.43	3.38	3.42

Source: Authors

Table 2   Descriptive Statistics (order of appearance in the article)

| Variables	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
#1 Unanimous UNSC approval	2272	0.24	0.43	0	1
#2 UNSC approval with 4 negative votes and 2 abstaintions	2272	0.24	0.43	0	1
#3 No UNSC approval due to veto by Russia and China	2272	0.26	0.44	0	1
#4 No approval due to self-withdrawal	2272	0.26	0.44	0	1
Supports for US Use of Force	1978	2.43	0.90	1	4
Supports for Sending SDF to ME	2033	2.25	0.98	1	4
Generates a desirable outcome for int'l society	1924	2.25	0.95	1	4
Generates a desirable outcome for Japan	1869	2.05	0.97	1	4
Use of force is for the "right purpose"	1857	2.19	0.94	1	4
Use of force is in line with the "right procedure"	1883	2.07	0.93	1	4
Use of force comes after exhausting diplomatic solution	1969	2.49	0.99	1	4
Use of force is "legally legitimate"	1836	2.21	0.97	1	4
Counter Piracy Military Action	2272	0.51	0.50	0	1
Male (male=1)	2272	0.51	0.50	0	1
Age	2272	47.12	13.97	20	69
Income Level (five scale from rich=5 to poor=1)	2143	2.60	1.03	1	5
College Education (college educated=1)	2248	0.54	0.50	0	1
Trusting US government	2170	2.09	0.88	1	4
Holding a favorable feeling to the USA	2083	2.62	0.74	1	4
Use of force is acceptable as a solution of int'l issues	2100	2.07	0.93	1	4

Source: Authors

Figure 1: Level of Support for US Use of Force under Different Stimuli of UNSC Approval Success and Failure: Scenario 1 (counter-piracy)

2.67	2.57	2.59
Mean support for US use of force when **UNSC resolution adopted unanimously**	Mean support for US use of force when **UNSC resolution narrowly adopted**	Mean support for US use of force when **the UNSC resolution failed by Russian/Chinese veto**

dif: .40 *******   dif: .31 *******   dif: .33 *******

2.25
Mean support for US use of force when **the UNSC resolution failed by the US's self-withdrawal**

Note: "dif." shows differences between the arrow and stars indicate significance by 1% (***), 5% (**) or 10% (*). If no arrow is drawn, the difference between stimuli is not significantly different.
Source: Authors

Figure 2: Level of Support for US Use of Force under Different Stimuli of UNSC Approval Success and Failure: Scenario 2 (regime-change)

2.39	2.41	2.39
Mean support for US use of force when **UNSC resolution adopted unanimously**	Mean support for US use of force when **UNSC resolution narrowly adopted**	Mean support for US use of force when **the UNSC resolution failed by Russian/Chinese veto**

dif: .26 ******   dif: .28 *******   dif: .26 ******

2.13
Mean support for US use of force when **the UNSC resolution failed by the US's self-withdrawal**

Note: "dif." shows differences between the arrow and stars indicate significance by 1% (***), 5% (**) or 10% (*). If no arrow is drawn, the difference between stimuli is not significantly different.
Source: Authors

Figure 3: Level of Support for Sending Japanese Troops under Different Stimuli of UNSC Approval Success and Failure: Scenario 1 (counter-piracy)

2.38	**2.39**	**2.30**
Mean support for Japanese troop dispatch when **UNSC resolution adopted unanimously**	Mean support for Japanese troop dispatch when **UNSC resolution narrowly adopted**	Mean support for Japanese troop dispatch when **the UNSC resolution failed by Russian/Chinese veto**

dif: .31 *******

dif: .32 *******

dif: .29 ******

2.07

Mean support for Japanese troop dispatch when **the UNSC resolution failed by the US's self-withdrawal**

Note: "dif." shows differences between the arrow and stars indicate significance by 1% (***), 5% (**) or 10% (*). If no arrow is drawn, the difference between stimuli is not significantly different. Source: Authors

Figure 4: Level of Support for Sending Japanese Troops under Different Stimuli of UNSC Approval Success and Failure: Scenario 2 (regime-change)

2.18	**2.32**	**2.23**
Mean support for Japanese troop dispatch when **UNSC resolution adopted unanimously**	Mean support for Japanese troop dispatch when **UNSC resolution narrowly adopted**	Mean support for Japanese troop dispatch when **the UNSC resolution failed by Russian/Chinese veto**

dif: .26 ******

2.07

Mean support for Japanese troop dispatch when **the UNSC resolution failed by the US's self-withdrawal**

Note: "dif." shows differences between the arrow and stars indicate significance by 1% (***), 5% (**) or 10% (*). If no arrow is drawn, the difference between stimuli is not significantly different. Source: Authors

Figure 5: Mean Score concurring that the use of force is "desirable for international peace" under Different Stimuli of UNSC Approval Success and Failure: Scenario 1 (counter-piracy)

2.50 Mean score concurring that the use of force is desirable for international peace when **UNSC resolution adopted unanimously**	2.44 Mean score concurring that the use of force is desirable for international peace when **UNSC resolution narrowly adopted**	2.42 Mean score concurring that the use of force is desirable for international peace when **the UNSC resolution failed by Russian/Chinese veto**

dif: .31 ***   dif: .26 **   dif: .24 *

2.19
Mean score concurring that the use of force is desirable for international peace when **the UNSC resolution failed by the US's self-withdrawal**

Note: "dif." shows differences between the arrow and stars indicate significance by 1% (***), 5% (**) or 10% (*). If no arrow is drawn, the difference between stimuli is not significantly different.
Source: Authors

Figure 6: Mean Score concurring that the use of force is "desirable for international peace" under Different Stimuli of UNSC Approval Success and Failure: Scenario 2 (regime-change)

2.20 Mean score concurring that the use of force is desirable for international peace when **UNSC resolution adopted unanimously**	2.14 Mean score concurring that the use of force is desirable for international peace when **UNSC resolution narrowly adopted**	2.14 Mean score concurring that the use of force is desirable for international peace when **the UNSC resolution failed by Russian/Chinese veto**

dif: .26 **

1.94
Mean score concurring that the use of force is desirable for international peace when **the UNSC resolution failed by the US's self-withdrawal**

Note: "dif." shows differences between the arrow and stars indicate significance by 1% (***), 5% (**) or 10% (*). If no arrow is drawn, the difference between stimuli is not significantly different.
Source: Authors

Figure 7: Mean Score concurring that the use of force is done "with good intention" under Different Stimuli of UNSC Approval Success and Failure: Scenario 1 (counter-piracy)

2.47	2.43	2.25
Mean score concurring that the use of force is with good intention when **UNSC resolution adopted unanimously**	Mean score concurring that the use of force is with good intention when **UNSC resolution narrowly adopted**	Mean score concurring that the use of force is with good intention when **the UNSC resolution failed by Russian/Chinese veto**

dif: .36 ***

dif: .33 **

2.10
Mean score concurring that the use of force is with good intention when **the UNSC resolution failed by the US's self-withdrawal**

Note: "dif." shows differences between the arrow and stars indicate significance by 1% (***), 5% (**) or 10% (*). If no arrow is drawn, the difference between stimuli is not significantly different.
Source: Authors

Figure 8: Mean Score concurring that the use of force is done "with good intention" under Different Stimuli of UNSC Approval Success and Failure: Scenario 2 (regime-change)

2.08	2.18	2.13
Mean score concurring that the use of force is with good intention when **UNSC resolution adopted unanimously**	Mean score concurring that the use of force is with good intention when **UNSC resolution narrowly adopted**	Mean score concurring that the use of force is with good intention when **the UNSC resolution failed by Russian/Chinese veto**

dif: .29 ***

dif: .24 **

1.89
Mean score concurring that the use of force is with good intention when **the UNSC resolution failed by the US's self-withdrawal**

Note: "dif." shows differences between the arrow and stars indicate significance by 1% (***), 5% (**) or 10% (*). If no arrow is drawn, the difference between stimuli is not significantly different.
Source: Authors

Figure 9: Mean Score concurring that the use of force is in line with the "right procedure" under Different Stimuli of UNSC Approval Success and Failure: Scenario 1 (counter-piracy)

2.52	2.51
Mean score concurring that the use of force is done in line with right procedure when **UNSC resolution adopted unanimously**	Mean score concurring that the use of force is done in line with right procedure when **UNSC resolution narrowly adopted**

dif: .65 ***   dif: .76 ***

dif: .64 ***   dif: .77 ***

1.87	1.75
Mean score concurring that the use of force is done in line with right procedure when **the UNSC resolution failed by Russian/Chinese veto**	Mean score concurring that the use of force is done in line with right procedure when **the UNSC resolution failed by the US's self-withdrawal**

Note: "dif." shows differences between the arrow and stars indicate significance by 1% (***), 5% (**) or 10% (*). If no arrow is drawn, the difference between stimuli is not significantly different. Source: Authors

Figure 10: Mean Score concurring that the use of force is in line with the "right procedure" under Different Stimuli of UNSC Approval Success and Failure: Scenario 2 (regime-change)

2.27	2.30
Mean score concurring that the use of force is done in line with right procedure when **UNSC resolution adopted unanimously**	Mean score concurring that the use of force is done in line with right procedure when **UNSC resolution narrowly adopted**

dif: .48 ***   dif: .67 ***

dif: .51 ***   dif: .64 ***

| 1.79	1.62
Mean score concurring that the use of force is done in line with right procedure when **the UNSC resolution failed by Russian/Chinese veto**	Mean score concurring that the use of force is done in line with right procedure when **the UNSC resolution failed by the US's self-withdrawal**

Note: "dif." shows differences between the arrow and stars indicate significance by 1% (***), 5% (**) or 10% (*). If no arrow is drawn, the difference between stimuli is not significantly different. Source: Author

Figure 11: Mean Score concurring that the use of force is "legally legitimate" under Different Stimuli of UNSC Approval Success and Failure: Scenario 1 (counter-piracy)

2.63	2.68
Mean score concurring that the use of force is legally legitimate when **UNSC resolution adopted unanimously**	Mean score concurring that the use of force is legally legitimate when **UNSC resolution narrowly adopted**

dif: .60 *** ⇕   dif: .80 ***

dif: .75 ***   dif: .65 ***

2.03	1.88
Mean score concurring that the use of force is legally legitimate when **the UNSC resolution failed by Russian/Chinese veto**	Mean score concurring that the use of force is legally legitimate when **the UNSC resolution failed by the US's self-withdrawal**

Note: "dif." shows differences between the arrow and stars indicate significance by 1% (***), 5% (**) or 10% (*). If no arrow is drawn, the difference between stimuli is not significantly different. Source: Authors

Figure 12: Mean Score concurring that the use of force is "legally legitimate" under Different Stimuli of UNSC Approval Success and Failure: Scenario 2 (regime-change)

2.44	2.42
Mean score concurring that the use of force is legally legitimate when **UNSC resolution adopted unanimously**	Mean score concurring that the use of force is legally legitimate when **UNSC resolution narrowly adopted**

dif: .51 *** ⇕   dif: .67 ***

dif: .69 ***   dif: .49 ***

1.93	1.75
Mean score concurring that the use of force is legally legitimate when **the UNSC resolution failed by Russian/Chinese veto**	Mean score concurring that the use of force is legally legitimate when **the UNSC resolution failed by the US's self-withdrawal**

Note: "dif." shows differences between the arrow and stars indicate significance by 1% (***), 5% (**) or 10% (*). If no arrow is drawn, the difference between stimuli is not significantly different. Source: Authors