

Dynamic Elite Partisanship:  
Party Loyalty and Agenda Setting in the US House  
Web Appendix

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## Data Sources

Variable	Source
Party Unity	Author coding using Voteview roll call data at <a href="http://voteview.com/">http://voteview.com/</a>
Party Votes	Author coding using Voteview roll call data at <a href="http://voteview.com/">http://voteview.com/</a>
Party Support	Author coding using Voteview roll call data at <a href="http://voteview.com/">http://voteview.com/</a>
Days to Election	Voteview roll call coordinates data at <a href="http://voteview.com/">http://voteview.com/</a> ; House Clerk website at <a href="http://clerk.house.gov">http://clerk.house.gov</a>
Retirement	Carson, Koger, Lebo and Young (2010)
Ideological Extremism	Carson, Koger, Lebo and Young (2010)
Seniority	Carson, Koger, Lebo and Young (2010)
Lagged Vote Share	Carson, Koger, Lebo and Young (2010)
Lagged Quality Challenger	Carson, Koger, Lebo and Young (2010)
Lagged Spending Gap	Carson, Koger, Lebo and Young (2010)
Lagged District Partisanship	Carson, Koger, Lebo and Young (2010)
In-party Midterm	Carson, Koger, Lebo and Young (2010)
Vote Types:	
a. Regular Passage Votes	Crespin, Rohde and Vander Wielen (2013)
b. Suspension Votes	Crespin, Rohde and Vander Wielen (2013)
c. Miscellaneous Passage Votes	Crespin, Rohde and Vander Wielen (2013)
d. Amendment Votes	Crespin, Rohde and Vander Wielen (2013)
e. Partisan Procedural Votes	Crespin, Rohde and Vander Wielen (2013)
Ultra-consensual Votes	Political Institutions and Public Choice (PIPC) House roll call data at <a href="http://sites.duke.edu/pipc/data/">http://sites.duke.edu/pipc/data/</a>
Disagreement Score	Author coding using Political Institutions and Public Choice (PIPC) House roll call data at <a href="http://sites.duke.edu/pipc/data/">http://sites.duke.edu/pipc/data/</a>
Polarization	Vander Wielen and Smith (2011)
Issue Types	Policy Agendas Project at <a href="http://www.policyagendas.org/">http://www.policyagendas.org/</a> ; Political Institutions and Public Choice (PIPC) House roll call data at <a href="http://sites.duke.edu/pipc/data/">http://sites.duke.edu/pipc/data/</a>
Preceding Election	Voteview roll call coordinates data at <a href="http://voteview.com/">http://voteview.com/</a> ; House Clerk website at <a href="http://clerk.house.gov">http://clerk.house.gov</a>
Lame Duck Session Votes	Voteview roll call coordinates data at <a href="http://voteview.com/">http://voteview.com/</a> ; House Clerk website at <a href="http://clerk.house.gov">http://clerk.house.gov</a>
Election Cycles	Voteview roll call coordinates data at <a href="http://voteview.com/">http://voteview.com/</a> ; House Clerk website at <a href="http://clerk.house.gov">http://clerk.house.gov</a>
Budget Votes	Political Institutions and Public Choice (PIPC) House roll call data at <a href="http://sites.duke.edu/pipc/data/">http://sites.duke.edu/pipc/data/</a>

## Omitting Random Slopes from Hierarchical Models

	Party Vote	Ultra-Consensual	Disagreement Score
Days to Election	−0.0004 (0.0003)	0.0006 (0.0004)	−0.0001* (4.09e-05)
Days to Election <sup>2</sup>	1.53e-06* (5.07e-07)	−1.57e-06* (5.54e-07)	3.23e-07* (6.11e-08)
Regular Passage Votes	−0.5298* (0.0590)	0.1387* (0.0612)	−0.0986* (0.0075)
Suspension Votes	−1.4935* (0.0791)	1.2585* (0.0712)	−0.2318* (0.0087)
Miscellaneous Passage Votes	−0.8206* (0.0787)	1.0583* (0.0769)	−0.1560* (0.0096)
Amendment Votes	0.8810* (0.0570)	−1.8702* (0.0705)	0.0702* (0.0073)
Partisan Procedural Votes	0.8536* (0.0602)	−0.9691* (0.0687)	0.1568* (0.0077)
Polarization	0.1096 (0.0638)	0.0503 (0.0553)	0.0482* (0.0105)
Constant	−1.6354 (1.4434)	1.4181 (1.4499)	0.1185 (0.1955)
Issue Type Fixed Effects	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>
SD Constant	0.3586	0.3044	0.0597

	Regular Passage	Suspensions	Amendments	Partisan Procedural
Days to Election	−0.0004* (0.0001)	−0.0039* (0.0005)	0.0019* (0.0004)	2.71e-05 (9.75e-05)
Days to Election <sup>2</sup>		4.88e-06* (7.41e-07)	−1.97e-06* (5.27e-07)	
Polarization	−0.4577* (0.0862)	0.2122* (0.0867)	0.3791* (0.1362)	0.0027 (0.0513)
Constant	0.7480* (0.3428)	−3.5055 (0.3732)	−3.1382* (0.5347)	−0.6418* (0.2126)
Issue Type Fixed Effects	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>
SD Constant	0.4902	0.4786	0.7803	0.2801

Table 1: *Agenda Setting Models Used in Prediction Figures Without Random Slopes Included.*  
Notes: See footnote 90. \* denotes  $p \leq 0.05$ .

## Non-Parametric Specification of Member-Level Model




Figure 1: *Member-Level Model Using Spline Specification.*

Notes: See in-text discussion.

## Robustness Checks

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Days to Election	3.94e-05 (5.81e-05)	8.72e-05 (8.04e-05)	0.0001 (0.0001)	7.51e-06 (0.0001)
Days to Election <sup>2</sup>	-7.52e-07* (1.96e-07)	-9.86e-07* (2.70e-07)	-5.69e-07* (2.76e-07)	-2.05e-07 (2.66e-07)
Days to Election <sup>3</sup>	1.02e-09* (1.96e-10)	1.21e-09* (2.66e-10)	5.65e-10* (2.68e-10)	2.12e-10 (2.59e-10)
Party Votes	-0.3800* (0.0224)	-0.3514* (0.0266)	-0.2788* (0.0277)	-0.2775* (0.0230)
Days to Election $\times$ Party Vote	0.0009* (9.29e-05)	0.0006* (0.0001)	0.0006* (0.0001)	0.0007* (0.0001)
Days to Election <sup>2</sup> $\times$ Party Vote	-2.98e-06* (3.12e-07)	-1.93e-06* (4.21e-07)	-1.69e-06* (4.29e-07)	-2.26e-06* (4.12e-07)
Days to Election <sup>3</sup> $\times$ Party Vote	3.36e-09* (3.09e-10)	2.39e-09* (4.15e-10)	2.04e-09* (4.21e-10)	2.62e-09* (4.05e-10)

Table 2: *Member-Level Models Excluding the Lagged Spending Gap Variable.*

Notes: See footnote 50. \* denotes  $p \leq 0.05$ .

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Days to Election	3.73e-05 (5.85e-05)	-0.0001 (0.0001)	0.0002 (0.0001)	5.04e-05 (0.0001)
Days to Election <sup>2</sup>	-5.79e-07* (1.99e-07)	-5.70e-07 (3.71e-07)	-9.44e-07* (3.76e-07)	-5.78e-07 (3.72e-07)
Days to Election <sup>3</sup>	8.27e-10* (2.00e-10)	9.78e-10* (3.70e-10)	1.07e-09* (3.70e-10)	7.02e-10 (3.67e-10)
Party Votes	-0.3789* (0.0224)	-0.2942* (0.0324)	-0.2275* (0.0342)	-0.2468* (0.0313)
Days to Election $\times$ Party Vote	0.0009* (9.34e-05)	0.0012* (0.0002)	0.0010* (0.0002)	0.0011* (0.0002)
Days to Election <sup>2</sup> $\times$ Party Vote	-2.94e-06* (3.15e-07)	-4.39e-06* (5.47e-07)	-3.20e-06* (5.68e-07)	-3.68e-06* (5.56e-07)
Days to Election <sup>3</sup> $\times$ Party Vote	3.31e-09* (3.12e-10)	4.90e-09* (5.40e-10)	3.54e-09* (5.57e-10)	4.02e-09* (5.45e-10)

Table 3: *Member-Level Models Using Fixed Effects for Election Cycles Rather than Congresses.*

Notes: See footnote 60. \* denotes  $p \leq 0.05$ .

	Party Vote	Ultra-Consensual	Disagreement Score
Days to Election	-0.0005 (0.0005)	0.0005 (0.0004)	-0.0001* (7.18e-05)
Days to Election <sup>2</sup>	1.54e-06* (7.39e-07)	-1.51e-06* (6.18e-07)	3.18e-07* (1.07e-07)

	Regular Passage	Suspensions	Amendments	Partisan Procedural
Days to Election	-0.0003* (0.0001)	-0.0038* (0.0005)	0.0023* (0.0004)	4.46e-05 (0.0001)
Days to Election <sup>2</sup>		4.39e-06* (8.81e-07)	-2.65e-06* (6.65e-07)	

Table 4: *Agenda Setting Models Using Random Effects for Election Cycles Rather than Congresses.*  
Notes: See footnote 69. \* denotes  $p \leq 0.05$ .

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Days to Election	6.44e-05 (0.0001)	-0.0001 (0.0002)	0.0003 (0.0002)	0.0001 (0.0002)
Days to Election <sup>2</sup>	-1.28e-06* (3.75e-07)	-1.41e-06* (7.18e-07)	-1.75e-06* (7.19e-07)	-1.28e-06 (7.14e-07)
Days to Election <sup>3</sup>	1.70e-09* (3.75e-10)	2.15e-09* (7.10e-10)	2.00e-09* (6.97e-10)	1.58e-09* (6.93e-10)
Party Votes	-0.7064* (0.0406)	-0.5872* (0.0618)	-0.4625* (0.0659)	-0.4545* (0.0588)
Days to Election $\times$ Party Vote	0.0016* (0.0002)	0.0021* (0.0003)	0.0017* (0.0003)	0.0020* (0.0003)
Days to Election <sup>2</sup> $\times$ Party Vote	-5.41e-06* (5.76e-07)	-7.48e-06* (1.03e-06)	-5.55e-06* (1.08e-06)	-6.75e-06* (1.06e-06)
Days to Election <sup>3</sup> $\times$ Party Vote	6.16e-09* (5.71e-10)	8.39e-09* (1.02e-09)	6.13e-09* (1.06e-09)	7.38e-09* (1.04e-09)

Table 5: *Member-Level Models Using Logit Rather than Probit Link.*  
Notes: See footnote 61. \* denotes  $p \leq 0.05$ .

	Party Vote	Ultra-Consensual
Days to Election	-0.0002 (0.0002)	0.0003 (0.0002)
Days to Election <sup>2</sup>	1.04e-06* (3.25e-07)	-1.05e-06* (3.71e-07)

	Regular Passage	Suspensions	Amendments	Partisan Procedural
Days to Election	-0.0002* (0.0001)	-0.0020* (0.0003)	0.0011* (0.0002)	1.91e-05 (0.0001)
Days to Election <sup>2</sup>		2.30e-06* (4.58e-07)	-8.95e-06 (7.77e-06)	

Table 6: *Agenda Setting Models Using Probit Rather than Logit Link.*  
Notes: Disagreement model is excluded because it is a linear model. See footnote 61. \* denotes  $p \leq 0.05$ .

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Days to Election	5.09e-05 (0.0002)	−0.0005 (0.0003)	−0.0002 (0.0003)	−0.0004 (0.0003)
Days to Election <sup>2</sup>	−1.29e-06* (6.04e-07)	1.03e-07 (1.07e-06)	2.12e-08 (1.09e-06)	4.67e-07 (1.10e-06)
Days to Election <sup>3</sup>	1.76e-09* (5.78e-10)	8.06e-10 (1.03e-09)	4.22e-10 (1.04e-09)	2.16e-11 (1.05e-09)
Party Votes	−0.7316* (0.0197)	−0.6215* (0.0335)	−0.5022* (0.0350)	−0.5054* (0.0355)
Days to Election × Party Vote	0.0017* (0.0002)	0.0026* (0.0004)	0.0023* (0.0004)	0.0027* (0.0005)
Days to Election <sup>2</sup> × Party Vote	−5.58e-06* (8.24e-07)	−9.49e-06* (1.43e-06)	−7.70e-06* (1.46e-06)	−9.22e-06* (1.49e-06)
Days to Election <sup>3</sup> × Party Vote	6.29e-09* (7.86e-10)	1.02e-08* (1.37e-09)	8.00e-09* (1.40e-09)	9.59e-09* (1.43e-09)
Retirement		0.1233 (0.1039)	0.1134 (0.1053)	
Ideological Extremism		1.9201* (0.0897)	1.9711* (0.0913)	
Seniority		−0.0025 (0.0031)	−0.0024 (0.0031)	
Lagged Vote Share		0.0041* (0.0005)	0.0041* (0.0005)	
Lagged Quality Challenger		0.0155 (0.0145)	0.0156 (0.0147)	
Lagged Spending Gap		0.0010 (0.0047)	0.0005 (0.0047)	
Lagged District Partisanship		−1.5189* (0.0848)	−1.5244* (0.0860)	
In-party Midterm Election		−0.0667* (0.0147)	−0.0711* (0.0148)	
Member-level Characteristics (Factor Score)				−0.4466* (0.0327)
Factor Score × Days to Election				0.0007 (0.0004)
Factor Score × Days to Election <sup>2</sup>				−2.56e-06 (1.33e-06)
Factor Score × Days to Election <sup>3</sup>				2.80e-09* (1.28e-09)
Factor Score × Party Votes				0.6825* (0.0436)
Factor Score × Days to Election × Party Votes				−0.0001 (0.0006)
Factor Score × Days to Election <sup>2</sup> × Party Votes				−5.88e-07 (1.83e-06)
Factor Score × Days to Election <sup>3</sup> × Party Votes				1.01e-09 (1.75e-09)
Constant	2.0352* (0.0341)	2.5827* (0.0772)	2.7866* (0.0817)	2.9709* (0.0442)
Vote Type Fixed Effects	No	No	Yes	Yes
Issue Type Fixed Effects	No	No	Yes	Yes
Congress Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
SD Constant	0.5354	0.4562	0.4661	0.5360
Log Likelihood	−624051.07	−209862.42	−204334.39	−202885.11
Pr > $\chi^2$	<0.0001	<0.0001	<0.0001	<0.0001
N	1,616,582	560,925	560,794	560,794
Groups	2,123	862	862	862

Table 7: *Hierarchical Member-Level Models For 20% Sample.*

Notes: See footnote 62. \* denotes  $p \leq 0.05$ .

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Days to Election	3.94e-05 (5.81e-05)	-5.80e-05 (0.0001)	0.0002 (0.0001)	0.0001 (0.0001)
Days to Election <sup>2</sup>	-7.52e-07* (1.96e-07)	-7.61e-07* (3.71e-07)	-1.04e-06* (3.74e-07)	-8.09e-07* (3.74e-07)
Days to Election <sup>3</sup>	1.02e-09* (1.96e-10)	1.20e-09* (3.65e-10)	1.18e-09* (3.63e-10)	9.78e-10* (3.65e-10)
Party Votes	-0.3800* (0.0224)	-0.2899* (0.0324)	-0.2234* (0.0342)	-0.2435* (0.0313)
Days to Election $\times$ Party Vote	0.0009* (9.29e-05)	0.0011* (0.0002)	0.0009* (0.0002)	0.0010* (0.0002)
Days to Election <sup>2</sup> $\times$ Party Vote	-2.98e-06* (3.12e-07)	-4.00e-06* (5.47e-07)	-2.84e-06* (5.68e-07)	-3.38e-06* (5.55e-07)
Days to Election <sup>3</sup> $\times$ Party Vote	3.36e-09* (3.09e-10)	4.46e-09* (5.41e-10)	3.13e-09* (5.57e-10)	3.67e-09* (5.43e-10)

Table 8: *Member-Level Models Excluding Lame Duck Session Votes.*

Notes: See footnote 75. \* denotes  $p \leq 0.05$ .

	Model 2	Model 3
Days to Election	5.80e-05 (7.31e-05)	0.0002* (7.51e-05)
Days to Election <sup>2</sup>	-7.61e-07* (2.44e-07)	-1.04e-06* (2.49e-07)
Days to Election <sup>3</sup>	1.20e-09* (2.35e-10)	1.18e-09* (2.39e-10)
Party Votes	-0.2899* (0.0079)	-0.2234* (0.0081)
Days to Election $\times$ Party Vote	0.0011* (0.0001)	0.0009* (0.0001)
Days to Election <sup>2</sup> $\times$ Party Vote	-4.00e-06* (3.35e-07)	-2.84e-06* (3.42e-07)
Days to Election <sup>3</sup> $\times$ Party Vote	4.46e-09* (3.21e-10)	3.13e-09* (3.27e-10)
Retirement	-0.1197* (0.0204)	-0.1294* (0.0206)
Ideological Extremism	1.0097* (0.0068)	1.0469* (0.0069)
Seniority	-0.0001 (0.0003)	-0.0002 (0.0003)
Lagged Vote Share	3.66e-05 (9.16e-05)	9.68e-05 (9.29e-05)
Lagged Quality Challenger	0.0149* (0.0028)	0.0142* (0.0028)
Lagged Spending Gap	-0.0088* (0.0008)	-0.0091* (0.0008)
Lagged District Partisanship	-0.2896* (0.0107)	-0.3221* (0.0108)
In-party Midterm Election	-0.1030* (0.0030)	-0.1094* (0.0030)

Table 9: *Member-Level Models Without Clustering on Individual Members.*

Notes: We present only the independent variables relevant to footnote 77. \* denotes  $p \leq 0.05$ .



	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Preceding Election	0.0798* (0.0096)	0.1039* (0.0187)	0.1017* (0.0189)	0.1234* (0.0190)
Party Votes	-0.1097* (0.0233)	0.0583 (0.0358)	0.0005 (0.0365)	0.0275 (0.0375)
Preceding Election $\times$ Party Votes	-0.2530* (0.0162)	-0.3236* (0.0301)	-0.2508* (0.0302)	-0.2844* (0.0301)

Table 10: *Member-Level Models For Votes occurring Immediately Before and After Elections.*

Notes: The variable *Preceding Election* is equal to one when the vote occurred in the two months immediately preceding an election, and is equal to zero for votes following election within the given Congress. We find that for non-party votes, there is a slightly higher probability of party support among individual members in the period preceding the election relative to the period immediately following election. However, for party votes, there is a markedly lower probability of party support in the period preceding election relative to the period following election. See in-text discussion. \* denotes  $p \leq 0.05$ .

	Party Vote			Ultra-Consensual			Disagreement Score		
Preceding Election	-0.6608* (0.1441)	-0.6523* (0.1431)	-0.6399* (0.1462)	0.9815* (0.1576)	0.9770* (0.1581)	0.9228* (0.1615)	-0.2208* (0.0335)	-0.1961* (0.0284)	-0.1606* (0.0238)
Polarization Variable	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>
Issue Type Fixed Effects	<i>No</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>

<i>Low Conflict Votes</i>						
	Regular Passage			Suspensions		
Preceding Election	0.3365* (0.1521)	0.3455* (0.1493)	0.3414* (0.1510)	0.3919* (0.1809)	0.3660* (0.1801)	0.0953 (0.1922)
Polarization Variable	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>
Issue Type Fixed Effects	<i>No</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>
<i>High Conflict Votes</i>						
	Amendments			Partisan Procedural		
Preceding Election	0.5867 (0.3230)	0.5644 (0.3410)	0.4277 (0.3416)	-0.4299* (0.1594)	-0.4291* (0.1588)	-0.3630* (0.1612)
Polarization Variable	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>
Issue Type Fixed Effects	<i>No</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>

Table 11: *Agenda Setting Models For Votes occurring Immediately Before and After Elections.*

Notes: The variable *Preceding Election* is equal to one when the vote occurred in the two months immediately preceding an election, and is equal to zero for votes following election within the given Congress. See footnote 94 for complete discussion. \* denotes  $p \leq 0.05$ .

	Model 2	Model 3
Days to Election	-7.32e-05 (0.0001)	0.0002 (0.001)
Days to Election <sup>2</sup>	-7.18e-07* (3.67e-07)	-9.90e-07* (3.69e-07)
Days to Election <sup>3</sup>	1.16e-09* (3.62e-10)	1.14e-09* (3.59e-10)
Party Votes	-0.3076* (0.0326)	-0.2429* (0.0343)
Days to Election $\times$ Party Vote	0.0011* (0.0002)	0.0009* (0.0002)
Days to Election <sup>2</sup> $\times$ Party Vote	-4.01e-06* (5.39e-07)	-2.87e-06* (5.58e-07)
Days to Election <sup>3</sup> $\times$ Party Vote	4.45e-09* (5.33e-10)	3.14e-09* (5.47e-10)
Retirement	-0.0663 (0.1348)	-0.0732 (0.1414)
Seniority	-0.0006 (0.0023)	-0.0007 (0.0024)
Lagged Vote Share	-0.0017 (0.0009)	-0.0017 (0.0010)
Lagged Quality Challenger	0.0078 (0.0187)	0.0070 (0.0192)
Lagged Spending Gap	-0.0149* (0.0072)	-0.0155* (0.0075)
Lagged District Partisanship	0.4420* (0.1324)	0.4365* (0.1365)
In-party Midterm Election	-0.1776* (0.0177)	-0.1870* (0.0183)

Table 12: *Member-Level Models Without Ideological Extremism Variable.*

Notes: The *Lagged District Partisanship* variable is positive and statistically significant after dropping the *Ideological Extremism* variable. See in-text discussion. \* denotes  $p \leq 0.05$ .

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Days to Election	2.83e-05 (5.84e-05)	-6.75e-05 (0.0001)	0.0002 (0.0001)	0.0001 (0.0001)
Days to Election <sup>2</sup>	-7.17e-07* (1.97e-07)	-7.31e-07* (3.71e-07)	-1.04e-06* (3.74e-07)	-8.08e-07* (3.74e-07)
Days to Election <sup>3</sup>	9.80e-10* (1.96e-10)	1.16e-09* (3.65e-10)	1.18e-09* (3.63e-10)	9.77e-10* (3.65e-10)
Party Votes	-0.3809* (0.0225)	-0.2910* (0.0325)	-0.2235* (0.0342)	-0.2437* (0.0313)
Days to Election $\times$ Party Vote	0.0009* (9.26e-05)	0.0011* (0.0002)	0.0009* (0.0002)	0.0010* (0.0002)
Days to Election <sup>2</sup> $\times$ Party Vote	-2.93e-06* (3.11e-07)	-3.97e-06* (5.46e-07)	-2.85e-06* (5.69e-07)	-3.39e-06* (5.56e-07)
Days to Election <sup>3</sup> $\times$ Party Vote	3.31e-09* (3.08e-10)	4.43e-09* (5.40e-10)	3.14e-09* (5.58e-10)	3.69e-09* (5.44e-10)

Table 13: *Member-Level Models Accounting for Budget Votes.*

Notes: See footnote 89. \* denotes  $p \leq 0.05$ .

	Party Vote	Ultra-Consensual	Disagreement Score
Days to Election	-0.0004 (0.0003)	0.0006 (0.0004)	-0.0001* (4.09e-05)
Days to Election <sup>2</sup>	1.52e-06* (5.07e-07)	-1.57e-06* (5.54e-07)	3.22e-07* (6.11e-08)

	Regular Passage	Suspensions	Amendments	Partisan Procedural
Days to Election	-0.0004* (0.0001)	-0.0039* (0.0005)	0.0019* (0.0004)	2.76e-05 (0.0001)
Days to Election <sup>2</sup>		4.85e-06* (7.40e-07)	-1.98e-06* (5.28e-07)	

Table 14: *Agenda Setting Models Accounting for Budget Votes.*

Notes: See footnote 89. \* denotes  $p \leq 0.05$ .

## Vote Type Categorization

Crespin, Rohde and Vander Wielen (n.d.) Vote Categorization Rubric	
Final Passage Votes	Non-Passage Votes
<u>Regular Passage</u> Passage of a Bill Final Passage of Conference Report Final Passage of Joint Resolution Passage over Presidential Veto	<u>Amendments</u> Straight Amendments (includes en bloc & amendments in the nature of a substitute) Amendments to Amendments Substitute (to an amendment) Motion to Table Amendment Amendment to Amendment to Substitute Perfecting Amendment Amendment to Substitute Perfecting Amendment to Substitute Suspension of Rules to Amend Bill Amendment to Special Rule
<u>Suspension</u> Suspension of Rules for a Bill Suspension of Rules for a Joint Resolution Suspension of Rules for Conference Report Motion to Suspend the Rules and Concur	<u>Procedural Partisan</u> Budget Waivers Motion to End Debate Motion to Rise from the Committee of the Whole Motion to Disagree Passage of Rules (Special Rule) Motion to Recede Motion to Order Previous Question Election of Speaker Motion to Recommit Motion to Instruct Conferees Motion to Recede and Concur Previous Question on Special Rules
<u>Miscellaneous Passage</u> Amendments to the Constitution Final Passage of Resolution Adoption of Concurrent Resolution Suspension of Rules for Concurrent Resolution Suspension of Rules for a Resolution Adoption of First Part of Resolution Adoption of Second Part of Resolution	<u>Miscellaneous Procedural</u> Motion to Discharge Motion to Go into Executive Committee Unanimous Consent Motion to Table Motion to Proceed Appeal of the Chair's Ruling Miscellaneous Motion to Agree Motion to Postpone Motion to Delete Motion to Commit Motion to Consider Motion to Permit to Read from Record Motion to Refer Motion to Strike Vote to Approve House Journal Motion to Adjourn Motion to Table Dispense with Further Proceedings with Quorum Call