State Strategies in Multi-Ethnic Territories:

Explaining Variation in the Former Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc

Robustness Checks

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| **Table 4.**  **Logit Analyses of State Strategies, 1992**  **Robustness Checks** | | | | | |
| Explanatory Variables | (I)  Repression Model with Roma & Russian Dummies | (II)  Exclusion Model with Roma & Russian Dummies | (III)  Assimilation Model with Roma & Russian Dummies | (IV)  Accommodation  Model with Roma & Russian Dummies | (V)  Assimilation  Model with Resources |
| *Coercive Capacity* | -0.461\*\*\* | 0.005 | -0.890 | 0.082 | -0.099 |
|  | (0.160) | (0.006) | (0.566) | (0.054) | (0.183) |
| *Group Prop. of Population* | -5.207 | -1.692 | 7.937\*\* | -10.37\*\*\* | 8.985\* |
|  | (7.862) | (3.058) | (3.627) | (3.695) | (5.309) |
| *Birth Rate* | -1.065\* | 0.359 | 0.368 | -0.462 | 0.140 |
|  | (0.633) | (0.310) | (0.261) | (0.289) | (0.368) |
| *Lobby State* | -1.660\*\* | 1.059 | 0.135 | -0.490 | -0.602 |
|  | (0.789) | (0.648) | (0.660) | (0.609) | (1.357) |
| *Distance from Europe* | -0.680 | -0.239 | 1.922\*\* | -0.255 | 1.891\* |
|  | (0.671) | (0.673) | (0.775) | (0.598) | (1.044) |
| *Democracy* | -0.150\*\*\* | -0.108 | 0.122 | 0.140\*\*\* | 0.084 |
|  | (0.054) | (0.068) | (0.081) | (0.05) | (0.098) |
| *Per Capita Income* | 0.038 | -0.055 | 0.283 | -0.02 | -0.685\* |
|  | (0.191) | (0.167) | (0.237) | (0.247) | (0.407) |
| *Roma* | 5.186\*\*\* | 0.434 | 0 | -2.082 |  |
|  | (1.930) | (0.980) | (0) | (2.098) |  |
| *Russian* | 0 | 0.368 | -0.936 | 1.179 |  |
|  | (0) | (0.443) | (1.015) | (0.920) |  |
| *Resources in Base* |  |  |  |  | 1.220\* |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.748) |
| Constant | 5.128 | 0.173 | -17.66\*\*\* | 2.036 | -14.87\* |
|  | (5.330) | (5.993) | (6.826) | (4.584) | (8.719) |
| Observations | 118 | 131 | 121 | 131 | 58 |

*Notes*: The dependent variable is coded “1” for cases which pursued the given strategy and “0” for all others. Huber robust standard errors are in parentheses. Regression disturbance terms are clustered at the country level.

\* Significantly different from zero at 90 per cent confidence.

\*\* Significantly different from zero at 95 per cent confidence.

\*\*\* Significantly different from zero at 99 per cent confidence.

Adding *Resources in Base* only impacts the *Assimilation* equation so I only show these results here.

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| **Table 5.**  **Multinomial Probit and Ordinal Logit Analyses of State Strategies, 1992** | | | | |
| Explanatory Variables |  | Multinomial Probit Regressions |  | Ordinal Logistic Regression |
|  | (I)  Exclusion | (II)  Assimilation | (III)  Accommodation | (IV)  State Strategy  Scale |
| *Coercive Capacity* | 0.375\*\*\* | -0.210 | 0.377\*\*\* | 0.071\* |
|  | (0.144) | (0.257) | (0.144) | (0.04) |
| *Group Prop. of Population* | 4.806 | 7.630\*\* | 0.906 | -1.632 |
|  | (4.060) | (3.750) | (3.899) | (1.473) |
| *Birth Rate* | 0.154 | 0.030 | -0.413\* | -0.512\* |
|  | (0.218) | (0.267) | (0.250) | (0.294) |
| *Lobby State* | 1.737\*\*\* | 1.069 | 0.997\* | 0.054 |
|  | (0.594) | (0.697) | (0.564) | (0.599) |
| *Distance from Europe* | 0.665 | 1.987\*\*\* | 0.836 | 1.003\*\* |
|  | (0.543) | (0.646) | (0.577) | (0.407) |
| *Democracy* | 0.019 | 0.141\*\*\* | 0.155\*\*\* | 0.146\*\*\* |
|  | (0.048) | (0.049) | (0.049) | (0.041) |
| *Per Capita Income* | -0.066 | 0.231 | 0.026 | 0.115 |
|  | (0.152) | (0.155) | (0.131) | (0.141) |
| Constant1 | -6.151 | -17.15\*\*\* | -6.859 | 6.132\*\* |
|  | (4.522) | (5.477) | (4.775) | (3.019) |
| Constant2 |  |  |  | 7.704\*\* |
|  |  |  |  | (3.267) |
| Constant3 |  |  |  | 8.755\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  | (3.222) |
| Observations | 131 | 131 | 131 | 131 |
|  |  |  |  |  |

*Note*: In Models I-III, the baseline category is Repression. Huber robust standard errors are in parentheses.

\* Significantly different from zero at 90 per cent confidence.

\*\* Significantly different from zero at 95 per cent confidence.

\*\*\* Significantly different from zero at 99 per cent confidence.

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| **Table 6.**  **Instrumental Variable Estimation**  **Separatism and Autonomy, Transfer, Border, 1992 (First-Stage)** |

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| --- | --- |
| Explanatory Variables | (I)  Separatism Model |
| *Autonomy* | 0.236 |
|  | (0.143) |
| *Transfer* | 0.394\*\*\* |
|  | (0.083) |
| *Border* | 0.377\*\* |
|  | (0.181) |
| *Coercive Capacity* | -0.010 |
|  | (0.011) |
| *Group Prop. of Population* | -0.088 |
|  | (1.135) |
| *Birth Rate* | -0.048 |
|  | (0.07) |
| *Lobby State* | -0.369 |
|  | (0.216) |
| *Distance from Europe* | -0.035 |
|  | (0.145) |
| *Democracy* | -0.012 |
|  | (0.013) |
| *Per Capita Income* | 0.032 |
|  | (0.039) |
| Constant | 0.357 |
|  | (1.176) |
| Observations | 58 |