

Online Appendix of “Deliberation and Ethical Voting Behavior: Evidence from a Campaign Experiment in Benin.” (Not Intended for Publication)

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1 Experimental Principles

The experiment took place with the full agreement of the three main contenders of the 2011 Beninese Presidential election: incumbent’s President Yayi Boni party FCBE (Force Cowrie for Emerging Benin); main opposition’s candidate (Adrien Houngbedji) Party for Democratic Renewal (PRD); and candidate Abdoulaye Bio Tchane (ABT). At no point was such collaboration imposed on these politicians or their parties and throughout the experiment members of IREEP (*Institut de Recherche Empirique en Economie Politique* based in Benin) and of the relevant political party worked fully together in the implementation of the town-hall meetings. In addition to consent, the experimental design followed all permitting and local regulations as of 2011. In addition, participation in all surveys and town-hall meetings was voluntary and with the full consent of respondents. Replication files available in the APSR Dataverse at <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/PRYYZ5>.

The experiment was made possible due to the longstanding academic collaboration between IREEP and its founding director and principal investigator of this study (Leonard Wantchekon, a Beninese citizen) with different political actors in Benin. The collaboration dates from 2001 and continues until today. This type of partnership between researchers and political parties for academic purposes has become increasingly common in other settings across Sub-Saharan Africa (for a recent example, see Casey, Kamara and Meriggi (2021)) but also among established democracies. For example, researchers have partnered with political parties to examine the effect of distributing certain type of information in Canada (Loewen and Rubenson (2008)), Italy (Kendall, Nannicini, and Trebbi (2015)), and France (Pons (2018)), to mention a few. Other interventions, such as get-out-the-vote campaigns the US (Nickerson, Friedrichs and King 2006) have also partnered with established political parties, as opposed to running them in a non-partisan way. In this type of experiments with political elites, parties’ incentive to participate is usually to become better informed about how the political world they inhabit functions and (or) whether certain policies work (Loewen, Rubenson and Wantchekon 2010). In our case, political parties learned about the impact of town-hall meetings on citizens’ knowledge of candidates’ platforms and subsequent turnout and vote-shares.

Finally, it should be noted that the nature of the intervention (town-halls) was in no case foreign to Beninese culture or political experiences. In fact, Benin has a strong tradition of conflict resolution via dialogue known as *l’arbre a palabre* (palaver tree) (see Zato Koto Yerima, 2014) which is also common in other African cases (Wiredu 1995). In other words, town-hall meetings are not a extraneous imposition or practice and actually have many practical advantages for candidates, particularly those with a low budget as rallies tend to be very expensive. Instead, the intervention could be seen as a way to make political campaigning more efficient – if the aim is to mobilize voters and disseminate information about the candidates’ platform.

2 Tables and Figures

Table A.1: List of Selected Communes and Assigned Candidate

	(1)	(2)
Province	Commune	Assigned Candidate
Alibori	Banikoara	YAYI
Alibori	Karimama	YAYI
Akatora	Kouande	YAYI
Akatora	Natittingou	ABT
Atlantique	Abomey-Calavi	UN
Atlantique	Kpomasse	UN
Atlantique	Tofto	UN
Borgou	Kalale	YAYI
Borgou	Perere	YAYI
Borgou	Tchaourou	YAYI
Collines	Dassa-Zoume	ABT
Collines	Ouessa	YAYI
Collines	Save	YAYI
Donga	Djougou Rural	ABT
Donga	Ouake	ABT
Kouffo	Djakotomey	UN
Kouffo	Toviklin	UN
Kouffo	Dogbo-Tota	UN
Mono	Athieme	UN
Mono	Bopa	UN
Mono	Lokossa	UN
Oueme	Adjohoun	UN
Oueme	Avrankou	UN
Oueme	Porto Novo	UN
Plateau	Ifangni	UN
Plateau	Ketou	UN
Zou	Agbangnizoun	UN
Zou	Bohicon	UN
Zou	Zangnando	UN
Zou	Zogbodomey	UN

In every commune 5 villages were randomly assigned to treatment (2) and control (3). Total villages 150 (5 from each of the 30 communes); Treated villages 60 (2 from each of the 30 communes); Control villages 90 (3 from each of the 30 communes).

Figure A.1: Selected Communes in Study




Figure A.2: Communes Assignment to Each Candidate




Table A.2: Differences in Official and Self-Reported Voting Behavior

	Overall	Opposition	Yayi
DV: Official Turnout - Self Reported Turnout (village %)			
Treatment	2.452 (1.794)	1.565 (1.796)	4.893 (4.598)
Observations	150	110	40
Panel B: Official Vote Outcomes - Self-Reported Vote (village %)			
Treatment	-6.252*** (2.085)	-8.895*** (2.573)	1.016 (2.962)
Observations	150	110	40

ITT Estimates. Clustered standard errors at the village level in parentheses. Commune fixed effects included. DV in Panel A, linear difference in official turnout and village average self reported turnout (survey). DV in Panel B, linear difference in official vote share for treated candidates and the self reported vote-share (from survey). All variables take values 0-100. In the case of survey data these are the village percentage % of respondents who self-report voting in the election and whether they preferred the treated candidate. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.3: Covariate Balance Among Respondents in Treatment and Control Villages: Opposition Districts

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Variable	Treat Mean	Control Mean	N	Treat Effect	p-value
Male	0.585	0.580	3,329	0.006	0.676
Age	36.28	36.38	3,207	-0.107	0.870
Fon Ethnicity?	0.494	0.482	3,329	0.016	0.667
Num. Languages	1.989	1.963	3,328	0.025	0.572
Any Education	0.508	0.501	3,320	0.009	0.731
Marital Status 1=monogomous, 0 = else	0.423	0.413	3,328	0.010	0.611
Political Information: Know Mayor	0.695	0.661	3,318	0.036	0.118
Political Information: Know President (Yayi)	0.952	0.958	3,308	-0.006	0.485
Will Vote Upcoming Elections?	0.977	0.969	3,288	0.008	0.207
Prefer Treated Candidate?	0.616	0.566	2,954	0.051	0.079
Currently Employed?	0.580	0.549	3,282	0.033	0.160
Do you enjoy a regular income?	0.198	0.220	3,176	-0.024	0.170
Are you a farmer?	0.463	0.447	3,278	0.018	0.501

Specifications include commune (block) fixed effects and are estimated using OLS. P-values clustered at the village level are reported in column 5.

Table A.4: Covariate Balance Among Respondents in Treatment and Control Villages: Incumbent Districts

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Variable	Treat Mean	Control Mean	N	Treat Effect	p-value
Male	0.658	0.603	1,243	0.053	0.083
Age	38.73	39.02	1,202	-0.395	0.746
Fon Ethnicity?	0.0943	0.111	1,243	-0.047	0.469
Num. Languages	2.008	1.888	1,243	0.124	0.130
Any Education	0.436	0.350	1,241	0.078	0.056
Marital Status 1=monogomous, 0 = else	0.455	0.418	1,243	0.034	0.319
Political Information: Know Mayor	0.751	0.782	1,241	-0.040	0.418
Political Information: Know President (Yayi)	0.977	0.980	1,238	-0.001	0.900
Will Vote Upcoming Elections?	0.945	0.990	1,238	-0.047	0.089
Prefer Treated Candidate?	0.948	0.964	1,230	-0.01	0.470
Currently Employed?	0.510	0.457	1,229	0.052	0.123
Do you enjoy a regular income?	0.280	0.243	1,195	0.037	0.270
Are you a farmer?	0.683	0.690	1,232	-0.013	0.691

Specifications include commune (block) fixed effects and are estimated using OLS. P-values clustered at the village level are reported in column 5.

Table A.5: Treatment effect on Town-Hall Attendance (Manipulation Check)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Overall	Opposition	Incumbent
	DV: Attended meetings enabled by candidate?		
Treatment	0.484*** (0.008)	0.475*** (0.010)	0.508*** (0.012)
Observations	5,078	3,724	1,354

ITT Estimates. Robust standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. All specifications include a commune fixed effect. *Attend* takes values 0-1. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.6: Treatment Effect on Turnout: Robustness Checks

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Sample...	Overall	Opposition	Incumbent
Panel A			
DV: Turnout Rate (Official)			
Weighting by Share of Attendees			
Treatment	4.235** (1.928)	4.438** (2.022)	2.847 (6.074)
Observations	139	106	33
Panel B			
Excluding Low Turnout < 20%			
Treatment	2.623* (1.492)	2.653* (1.572)	2.539 (3.634)
Observations	149	110	39
Panel C			
Excluding Turnout = 100%			
Treatment	3.245* (1.638)	1.527 (1.507)	7.661* (4.328)
Observations	138	101	37
Panel D			
Including Pretreatment Covariates			
Treatment	3.681** (1.694)	3.330* (1.783)	4.456 (5.529)
Observations	150	110	40
Panel E			
Adjusted For Tally Discrepancies			
Treatment	3.249** (1.571)	2.572* (1.478)	5.111 (4.301)
Observations	150	110	40
Panel F			
IV Estimates			
$\widehat{Treatment}$	4.052** (1.789)	2.919* (1.536)	9.087 (7.119)
Observations	150	110	40

ITT Estimates. Robust standard errors in parentheses. In Panel D, the village-level averages included are a) the pre-electoral intention to turn out to vote; b) the preexisting knowledge of the President; and c) the preexisting knowledge of Mayor's name. In Panel F we instrument the villages for which we have complete attendance data with the randomized assignment to estimate CACE, the complier average causal effect. All specifications include a commune fixed effect. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.7: Treatment Effect on Voting Behavior: Heterogeneous Effects by Pretreatment Covariates

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Overall	Opposition	Incumbent	Overall	Opposition	Incumbent
	DV: Official Turnout			DV: Official Vote Share Treated		
Panel A: By Gender						
Treatment	9.568 (8.143)	-0.855 (7.607)	31.254 (25.116)	9.789 (10.590)	13.532 (10.091)	0.706 (26.918)
Female X Treatment	-0.141 (0.178)	0.080 (0.173)	-0.606 (0.550)	-0.221 (0.238)	-0.304 (0.238)	-0.016 (0.573)
Female	0.154 (0.136)	0.058 (0.108)	0.550 (0.557)	0.322* (0.166)	0.366** (0.169)	0.139 (0.499)
Observations	150	110	40	150	110	40
Panel B: By Poverty						
Treatment	10.680* (5.801)	7.515 (5.100)	26.015 (18.285)	-7.857 (8.175)	-12.769 (9.992)	9.787 (16.000)
Poverty X Treatment	-1.925 (1.577)	-1.308 (1.335)	-5.103 (4.666)	2.084 (2.242)	3.471 (2.881)	-2.582 (3.778)
Poverty	1.202 (1.125)	1.179 (1.215)	2.064 (2.592)	1.504 (1.603)	2.193 (2.359)	0.498 (1.874)
Observations	150	110	40	150	110	40
Panel C: Including Education						
Treatment	5.504 (4.608)	3.608 (4.633)	8.908 (9.650)	-4.818 (5.408)	3.730 (7.051)	-22.743*** (5.702)
Education X Treatment	-0.046 (0.087)	-0.009 (0.091)	-0.114 (0.203)	0.104 (0.111)	-0.082 (0.132)	0.550*** (0.165)
Education	0.172** (0.073)	0.174** (0.080)	0.151 (0.205)	0.018 (0.097)	-0.014 (0.129)	0.088 (0.133)
Observations	150	110	40	150	110	40

ITT Estimates. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All specifications include a commune fixed effect. Female and Education take values 0-100 (percentage % in village). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.8: Treatment Effect on Turnout and Vote-Choices: Including Pretreatment Co-variates

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Overall	Opposition	Incumbent	Overall	Opposition	Incumbent
	DV: Village Turnout			DV: Village Vote Share for Treated Cand.		
Treatment	3.609** (1.674)	3.247** (1.609)	4.770 (5.388)	0.574 (2.094)	0.107 (2.528)	-2.944 (4.441)
Poverty Index	0.032 (1.038)	-0.597 (1.261)	0.967 (2.505)	2.321 (1.455)	4.699* (2.406)	1.297 (1.252)
Female?	0.090 (0.101)	0.115 (0.109)	0.047 (0.226)	0.242** (0.121)	0.298** (0.145)	-0.008 (0.165)
Any Education?	0.157** (0.068)	0.196*** (0.073)	0.058 (0.198)	-0.002 (0.107)	-0.158 (0.151)	0.284 (0.182)
Fon ethnicity	-0.006 (0.042)	0.005 (0.047)	-0.098 (0.081)	-0.127* (0.073)	-0.103 (0.083)	-0.215 (0.137)
Observations	150	110	40	150	110	40

ITT Estimates. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All specifications include a commune fixed effect. Female, Fon, and Education have values 0-100 (percentage % in village). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.9: Treatment Effect on Information: Heterogeneous Effects by Pretreatment Covariates

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Overall	Opposition	Incumbent
DV: Know Platform			
Panel A: Heterogeneity by Gender			
Treatment	0.129*** (0.025)	0.114*** (0.027)	0.197*** (0.060)
Treatment X Female	0.020 (0.036)	0.021 (0.041)	0.011 (0.076)
Female	-0.171*** (0.021)	-0.161*** (0.026)	-0.198*** (0.035)
Observations	4,383	3,328	1,055
Panel B: Heterogeneity by Poverty			
Treatment	0.132*** (0.040)	0.125*** (0.045)	0.197* (0.105)
Treatment X Poverty Index	0.002 (0.008)	-0.001 (0.009)	0.005 (0.018)
Poverty Index	0.016*** (0.005)	0.016** (0.007)	0.017** (0.006)
Observations	4,070	3,090	980
Panel C: Heterogeneity by Education			
Treatment	0.171*** (0.027)	0.162*** (0.029)	0.231*** (0.063)
Treatment X Education	-0.063* (0.034)	-0.067* (0.037)	-0.070 (0.080)
Education	0.217*** (0.023)	0.234*** (0.025)	0.165*** (0.050)
Observations	4,383	3,328	1,055

ITT Estimates. Robust standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. All specifications include a commune fixed effect. All data used is individual level data, therefore, all estimates are weighted by the self reported over actual attendance to town-hall meetings. “Female”, “Education”, and “Know Platform” take values 0-1. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.10: Treatment Effect on Information: Including Pretreatment Political Knowledge

Treated...	DV: Know Platform		DV: Preference & Specific Knowledge						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	All	Opp.	Inc	Opp. UN traits	Opp. UN issues	Opp. ABT traits	Opp. ABT issues	Incumbent traits	Incumbent issues
Treatment	0.137*** (0.023)	0.114*** (0.024)	0.212*** (0.062)	0.065** (0.028)	0.034* (0.018)	0.043 (0.042)	0.060*** (0.015)	0.041 (0.050)	-0.072 (0.048)
Know Mayor?	0.141 (0.111)	0.283** (0.122)	-0.127 (0.197)	-0.130 (0.135)	0.073 (0.094)	0.346 (0.286)	0.115*** (0.030)	0.348** (0.140)	-0.209 (0.156)
Know Yayi?	0.009 (0.220)	-0.206 (0.169)	0.684 (0.746)	-0.161 (0.276)	0.067 (0.163)	-0.619 (0.528)	0.317*** (0.107)	0.716 (0.536)	0.085 (0.601)
Observations	4,383	3,328	1,055	2,760	2,760	600	600	1,060	1,060

ITT Estimates. Robust standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. All specifications include a commune fixed effect and averaged of self-reported knowledge of the name of the local mayor and the name of the President (Yayi Boni). The two main dependent variables take the value of 1 if the respondents knows the platform of the treated candidate and the self-reported reason for why s/he prefers this candidate are his personal traits (columns 4,6,8) or his campaign issues (columns 5,7,9), 0 if there is no specific information reported or this is not his preferred candidate. All specifications are weighted by the self reported over actual attendance to town-hall meetings in that village. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.11: Voting Behavior and Treatment Assignment: Information & Coordination

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Overall	Opposition	Incumbent	Overall	Opposition	Incumbent
	DV: Turnout			DV: Official Vote Share		
Panel A: Heterogeneity by Village Discussion						
Treatment	2.689 (6.224)	4.927 (6.233)	-9.159 (18.694)	-7.890 (8.984)	-5.091 (10.444)	-22.073 (17.253)
Treatment X Village Discussion	0.009 (0.095)	-0.033 (0.095)	0.177 (0.260)	0.112 (0.125)	0.075 (0.148)	0.288 (0.233)
Village Discussion	-0.005 (0.087)	-0.072 (0.094)	0.242 (0.202)	-0.025 (0.106)	-0.008 (0.124)	-0.077 (0.205)
Observations	150	110	40	150	110	40
Panel B: Heterogeneity by Household Discussion						
Treatment	7.789 (7.500)	13.821* (7.977)	-3.518 (16.162)	-9.023 (6.435)	-11.669 (7.386)	-4.764 (16.579)
Treatment X Household Discussion	-0.067 (0.114)	-0.176 (0.117)	0.132 (0.233)	0.133 (0.094)	0.182 (0.116)	0.052 (0.205)
Household Discussion	0.072 (0.077)	0.037 (0.083)	0.201 (0.167)	-0.012 (0.090)	0.004 (0.112)	-0.075 (0.194)
Observations	150	110	40	150	110	40
Panel C: Heterogeneity by Information and Discussion						
Treatment	-5.552 (8.350)	-6.397 (7.718)	-3.283 (24.926)	-11.330 (11.207)	-11.033 (13.968)	-31.106 (21.790)
Treatment X Platform Knowledge	0.247** (0.105)	0.376*** (0.110)	0.064 (0.224)	0.045 (0.131)	-0.007 (0.179)	0.101 (0.177)
Treatment X Household Discussion	-0.255 (0.182)	-0.402** (0.176)	0.164 (0.526)	0.126 (0.200)	0.349 (0.235)	-0.631 (0.495)
Treatment X Village Discussion	0.148 (0.172)	0.195 (0.168)	-0.146 (0.632)	-0.027 (0.217)	-0.202 (0.242)	0.939 (0.629)
Platform Knowledge	0.076 (0.096)	0.000 (0.095)	0.216 (0.280)	0.149* (0.079)	0.196* (0.099)	-0.057 (0.150)
Household Discussion	0.138 (0.130)	0.100 (0.151)	0.148 (0.277)	0.033 (0.110)	0.065 (0.139)	-0.027 (0.231)
Village Discussion	-0.087 (0.141)	-0.096 (0.155)	0.127 (0.321)	-0.077 (0.129)	-0.119 (0.157)	-0.045 (0.249)
Observations	150	110	40	150	110	40

ITT Estimates. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All specifications include a commune fixed effect. Platform Knowledge, Household Discussion, and Village Discussion have values 0-100 (percentage % in village) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.12: Voting Behavior, Deliberation and Vote-Buying Attempts: Controlling for Propaganda

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Overall	Opposition	Incumbent	Overall	Opposition	Incumbent
	DV: Turnout			DV: Vote Share		
Treatment	2.112 (3.132)	1.144 (3.025)	1.832 (7.819)	5.944 (3.723)	3.564 (4.658)	12.800* (6.397)
Treatment X Cash Handout	0.037 (0.076)	0.040 (0.076)	0.136 (0.220)	-0.211** (0.088)	-0.131 (0.103)	-0.555** (0.201)
Cash Handout	0.068 (0.074)	0.078 (0.079)	-0.093 (0.244)	-0.143 (0.103)	-0.181 (0.120)	0.059 (0.237)
Propaganda	-0.036 (0.077)	-0.072 (0.089)	0.106 (0.206)	-0.067 (0.080)	-0.118 (0.089)	-0.022 (0.187)
Observations	150	110	40	150	110	40

ITT Estimates. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All specifications include a commune fixed effect and use official turnout and vote share data as well as village level aggregates from the post-electoral survey. "Cash Handout" takes the value 0-100 (% of offers per village).*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.13: Voting Behavior, Deliberation and Vote-Buying Attempts: Campaign Assessments

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Overall	Opposition	Incumbent
	DV: Useful / Instructive Campaign		
Treatment	5.807** (2.462)	6.937** (2.873)	1.103 (4.013)
Treatment X Cash Handout	-0.069* (0.037)	-0.079* (0.042)	-0.030 (0.055)
Cash Handout	0.076*** (0.018)	0.076*** (0.022)	0.078*** (0.026)
Observations	4,543	3,512	1,031

ITT Estimates. Robust standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. All specifications include a commune fixed effect. Individual level responses: “cash handout” takes values 0-1, “useful / instructive campaign” takes values 0-1. All estimates weighted by the self reported over actual attendance to town-hall meetings. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

3 List of Variables

1. Village-Level Outcomes

- Official Turnout: election day voters over registered ones. Values: 0-100.
- Official Vote-Share: candidates' votes over total votes. Values: 0-100.
- Registered Voters: total number of registered voters prior to the election. Values: 0-N.
- Share of Town-Hall Attendees: total number of recorded attendees (across all town-hall meetings) over registered voters. Values: 0-1
- Survey weight: total self-reported attendees per village over total actual (recorded) attendees at the town-hall meeting.

2. Pre-Electoral Individual-Level Survey

(a) Electoral Behavior

- Turnout: Will you vote [in the upcoming election]?. Values: 1 (yes), 0 (no).
- Preferred Treated Candidate? Values: 1 (yes) if expressed preference for the treated candidate, 0 otherwise. Based on the question 'who is your preferred candidate?' Yayi Boni (Incumbent), Andrien Houngbedji (UN) or Abdoulaye Bio-Tchane (ABT); do not know (.)

(b) Political Information

- Candidate Knowledge: do you know candidate Yayi Boni (incumbent)? Values: 1 (yes), 0 (no)
- Political Knowledge: do you know the name of the mayor of your town? Values: 1 (yes), 0 (no)

(c) Sociodemographics

- Sex: sex of respondent. Values: 1 (Male), 0 (Female).
- Age: age of respondent. Values : 18 to 95.
- Ethnic: ethnic group of respondent? Values: 1 (Fon), 0 (others).
- Language: number of languages spoken. Values: 1-3
- Education: any type of formal education. Values: 1 (yes), 0 (no)
- Marital status: Values 1 (monogamous relationship), 0 (single, polygamous, divorced, widowed).
- Employed?: Values 1 (yes), 0 (no)
- Regular income?: Values 1 (yes), 0 (no)
- Farmer?: Values 1 (yes), 0 (no)

3. Post-Electoral Individual-Level Survey

(a) Electoral Preferences

- Survey Turnout: Did you vote [in the last election]?. Values: 1 (yes), 0 (no).

- Survey Vote. Values: 1 (if for the treated candidate), 0 otherwise. Comes from: Did you vote for....? Yayi Boni, Andrien Houngbedji, Abdoulaye Bio-Tchane, or other candidates, do not know (.).

(b) Information & Coordination

- Platform Knowledge: do you know the platform of your preferred candidate? Values: 1 (yes), 0 (no)
- Specific Knowledge: what is the reason for which he is the best candidate...? (Open ended)
 - Issues of ...: Values: 1 if the supporter gives an “issue” as the reason for support. 0 otherwise.
 - Traits of: Values: 1 if the supporter gives “candidate traits” as the reason for support. 0 otherwise.
- Discuss Politics (household): Do you discuss politics with people in your household? Values: 1 (yes), 0 (no)
- Discuss Politics (town): Do you discuss politics with people in your town? Values: 1 (yes), 0 (no).
- Useful Campaign: The last presidential campaign in your village was useful / instructive? Values: 1 (yes), 0 (no).

(c) Town-Hall Attendance

- Attend: During the campaign, did you attend meetings organized by political activists in your village? Values: 1 (yes), 0 (no).
 - Meeting influence (conditional on attendance): Do you think that attending the meetings has influenced your vote? Values: 1 (yes), 0 (no)
 - Knowing other villagers (conditional on attendance & influence): at the meeting, is it possible to better know what other villagers think? Values: 1 (yes), 0 (no)
 - Knowing candidate (conditional on attendance & influence): at the meeting, is it possible to know precisely what the candidate will do? Values: 1 (yes), 0 (no)
 - Listen Candidate (conditional on attendance & influence): the meeting has given you the chance to listen to your candidate? Values: 1 (yes), 0 (no).
 - Share Information (conditional on attendance & influence): have you shared the information received from the meetings with the villages? Values: 1 (yes), 0 (no).

(d) Cash Handouts

- Money: did you receive money from the candidates (during the campaign)? Values: 1 (yes), 0 (no).
- Propaganda: did you receive a t-shirt, calendar or other items during the campaign? Values: 1 (yes), 0 (no)

(e) Sociodemographics

- Female: sex of respondent. Values: 1 (Female), 0 (Male).

- Poverty: poverty index based on number of rooms in house, tenure of the household, roof material, source of water, and source of light in household. Values : .2 (richest) - (25) poorest.
- Education: did you attend (formal schooling)? Values: 1 (yes), 0 (no).
- Fon: What is your ethnicity? Values: 1 (Fon), 0 (other).

(f) Miscellaneous

- Ethnic Voting: "Personally, would you feel embarrassed to vote for someone from another ethnic group?" Yes (1) No (0).
- Regionalism: "Do you think a politician should serve the interests of all regions or only the ones from which he is from?" All - yes (1) Not All - no (2).

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