

Regime Support and Gender Quotas in Autocracies

Appendix

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A Arab Barometer Results


Table A.1 shows the quotas in place in each country at the time of the Arab Barometer surveys (2018-2019). Egypt adopted a quota in 2020 reserving 25% of seats for women.

Table A.1: Quotas in place before Arab Barometer surveys

Country	Quota Exist in...	Quota Type	Last Version Adopted
Algeria	Single/Lower House Sub-national Level	Quotas in candidate lists between 20%-50% depending on district size	2012
Egypt		No Quotas	
Iraq	Single/Lower House Sub-national Level	25% of the seats reserved for women	2009
Jordan	Single/Lower House Sub-national Level	15 seats reserved for women	2012
Kuwait		No Quotas	
Lebanon		No Quotas	
Libya	Single/Lower House Sub-national Level	Male and female candidates alternate in candidate lists	2012
Morocco	Single/Lower House Sub-national Level	60 seats reserved for women	2011
Palestine	Single/Lower House Sub-national Level	Quota in candidate lists for 20% women	2005
Sudan	Single/Lower House	25% of the seats reserved for women	2008
Tunisia	Single/Lower House Sub-national Level	Parity between men and women in candidate lists	2014
Yemen		No Quotas	

Figure A.1 summarizes the distribution of our dependent variable by country. The question asked, “Some people think in order to achieve fairer representation a certain percentage of elected positions should be set aside for women. To what extent do you agree with this statement?” Responses ranged from strongly agree to strongly disagree.

Figure A.1: Support for Quotas by Country (Arab Barometer)



A.1 Robustness Checks

Figure A.2 show that results are no different among countries with or without quotas in place at the time of the survey. Figure A.3 show that results are stronger among the autocracies than democracies. Models 4 and 5 in Table A.3 show each result.

Figure A.2: Predicted Probabilities for Support for Quota (by Quota Exists, IV: Government Index)





Figure A.3: Predicted Probabilities for Support for Quota (by Regime Type, IV: Government Index)



A.2 Alternative Independent Variables

The figures and tables below show that results are robust to using the two alternative independent variables. Models 6 and 7 in Table A.3 show the pooled results.

Figure A.4: Predicted Probabilities for Support for Quota (IV: Government Satisfaction)





Figure A.5: Predicted Probabilities for Support for Quota (IV: Must Support Government)



A.3 Regression Tables

Table A.2 shows main results regionwide and in individual countries (Fig 1). Table A.3 shows results for secondary hypotheses (Fig 2) and Appendix Figs A.2, A.3, A.4, and A.5 .

Table A.2: Government Performance on Support for Gender Quotas (Figure 1)

		Dependent Variable:												
		Support for Quota												
		All	Algeria	Egypt	Iraq	Jordan	Kuwait	Lebanon	Libya	Morocco	Palestine	Sudan	Tunisia	Yemen
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)
C1	Government Performance	0.12*** (0.01)	0.32*** (0.04)	0.15*** (0.03)	0.06 (0.04)	0.10** (0.04)	0.25*** (0.04)	0.10*** (0.03)	0.08** (0.04)	0.19*** (0.04)	0.02 (0.03)	0.09*** (0.03)	0.10*** (0.03)	0.09*** (0.02)
	Gender Egalitarianism	0.53*** (0.01)	0.37*** (0.05)	0.44*** (0.03)	0.41*** (0.04)	0.58*** (0.04)	0.61*** (0.06)	0.62*** (0.03)	0.68*** (0.05)	0.69*** (0.04)	0.50*** (0.03)	0.24*** (0.04)	0.53*** (0.04)	0.67*** (0.03)
	Female	0.14*** (0.01)	0.29*** (0.04)	0.17*** (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)	0.19*** (0.05)	0.07 (0.06)	0.11*** (0.03)	0.03 (0.05)	0.07 (0.06)	0.14*** (0.03)	0.12*** (0.04)	0.20*** (0.04)	0.10** (0.04)
	Islamist	-0.05*** (0.01)	0.03 (0.04)	-0.07* (0.03)	0.09** (0.04)	-0.0002 (0.05)		-0.06* (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)	0.10* (0.05)	-0.16*** (0.03)	-0.09** (0.05)	0.002 (0.04)	-0.18*** (0.04)
	Trustworthy	-0.02 (0.02)	0.03 (0.07)	-0.08** (0.03)	-0.14* (0.07)	0.09 (0.07)	0.10 (0.07)	0.05 (0.09)	0.12 (0.09)	-0.12* (0.06)	-0.06 (0.05)	0.01 (0.05)	-0.11 (0.07)	0.01 (0.04)
	Age	0.0000** (0.0000)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.0004 (0.002)	-0.0000 (0.0000)	0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.005** (0.002)	-0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0005 (0.001)	0.0000 (0.0000)	0.0000* (0.0000)	0.003* (0.002)
	Education	0.01*** (0.004)	0.03** (0.01)	0.001 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)	0.04*** (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)
	Unemployed	-0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.06)	0.02 (0.07)	-0.16** (0.07)	0.07 (0.07)	-0.12 (0.13)	-0.003 (0.06)	0.09 (0.07)	0.01 (0.07)	0.03 (0.05)	0.07 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.05)
	Single	0.02 (0.02)	0.06 (0.07)	0.02 (0.06)	-0.05 (0.08)	-0.0000 (0.07)	0.07 (0.08)	0.01 (0.05)	0.08 (0.07)	0.12* (0.07)	-0.06 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.05 (0.07)	0.04 (0.06)
	Children	0.03** (0.01)	-0.03 (0.05)	0.07* (0.04)	0.08 (0.06)	-0.07 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.07)	0.003 (0.04)	0.02 (0.07)	0.27*** (0.06)	-0.09** (0.04)	0.05 (0.05)	0.002 (0.06)	0.05 (0.04)
	Pol. Interest	0.03*** (0.01)	0.04* (0.02)	0.07*** (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.05*** (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)	-0.07** (0.03)	0.02 (0.02)	0.08*** (0.02)	0.06*** (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
	Monarchy	0.60*** (0.05)												
	Quota Exist	-0.48*** (0.03)												
	Polity	0.04*** (0.01)												
	Country FE	Included	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Observations	17,357	1,520	1,497	1,903	1,345	908	1,903	1,427	892	1,828	1,447	1,645	1,950	
R ²	0.20	0.14	0.25	0.09	0.16	0.23	0.24	0.15	0.35	0.17	0.09	0.17	0.31	
Adjusted R ²	0.20	0.14	0.25	0.08	0.15	0.22	0.23	0.14	0.34	0.16	0.09	0.16	0.30	

Note:

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

Table A.3: Government Performance on Support for Gender Quotas
(Figures 2, A2, A3, A4, and A5)

	Dependent Variable:						
	Support for Quota						
	All (1)	All (2)	All (3)	All (4)	All (5)	All (6)	All (7)
Government Performance	0.135*** (0.013)	0.284*** (0.039)	0.127*** (0.014)	0.131*** (0.015)	0.136*** (0.019)		
Government Satisfaction						0.026*** (0.002)	
Must Support Government							0.064*** (0.006)
Female	0.204*** (0.038)	0.143*** (0.012)	0.143*** (0.012)	0.144*** (0.013)	0.169*** (0.015)	0.128*** (0.013)	0.152*** (0.012)
Gender Egalitarianism	0.533*** (0.011)	0.658*** (0.031)	0.533*** (0.011)	0.528*** (0.011)	0.466*** (0.013)	0.548*** (0.011)	0.532*** (0.011)
Islamist	-0.050*** (0.012)	-0.050*** (0.012)	-0.026 (0.038)	-0.051*** (0.012)	0.002 (0.015)	-0.053*** (0.012)	-0.054*** (0.012)
Quota Exist	-0.477*** (0.034)	-0.478*** (0.034)	-0.478*** (0.034)	-0.020 (0.039)	0.030* (0.017)	-0.183*** (0.059)	-0.456*** (0.033)
Authoritarian					-0.240*** (0.050)		
Gov. Perform * Female	-0.031* (0.018)						
Gov. Perform * Egalitarianism		-0.063*** (0.014)					
Gov. Perform * Islamist			-0.012 (0.018)				
Gov. Perform * Quota Exist				0.008 (0.019)			
Gov. Perform * Authoritarian					0.092*** (0.025)		
Trustworthy	-0.019 (0.017)	-0.020 (0.017)	-0.019 (0.017)	-0.011 (0.017)	-0.014 (0.022)	-0.034** (0.017)	-0.009 (0.016)
Age	0.00000** (0.00000)	0.00000** (0.00000)	0.00000** (0.00000)	0.00000* (0.00000)	0.00000* (0.00000)	0.00000** (0.00000)	0.00000** (0.00000)
Education	0.012*** (0.004)	0.012*** (0.004)	0.012*** (0.004)	0.010*** (0.004)	0.027*** (0.005)	0.012*** (0.004)	0.014*** (0.004)
Unemployed	-0.006 (0.018)	-0.006 (0.018)	-0.006 (0.018)	-0.023 (0.018)	-0.028 (0.022)	-0.004 (0.019)	-0.004 (0.018)
Single	0.016 (0.017)	0.017 (0.017)	0.015 (0.017)	0.024 (0.017)	0.021 (0.021)	0.017 (0.017)	0.019 (0.017)
Children	0.031** (0.015)	0.032** (0.015)	0.031** (0.015)	0.046*** (0.015)	0.047** (0.018)	0.030** (0.015)	0.028* (0.015)
Political Interest	0.026*** (0.006)	0.027*** (0.006)	0.027*** (0.006)	0.029*** (0.006)	0.040*** (0.008)	0.024*** (0.006)	0.032*** (0.006)
Polity	0.041*** (0.005)	0.041*** (0.005)	0.041*** (0.005)	-0.010*** (0.002)		-0.004 (0.006)	0.037*** (0.005)
Monarchy	0.596*** (0.055)	0.596*** (0.055)	0.597*** (0.055)			0.131* (0.074)	0.582*** (0.053)
Country FE	Included	Included	Included	Included	Included	Included	Included
Observations	17,357	17,357	17,357	17,357	12,152	16,918	18,446
R ²	0.199	0.200	0.199	0.170	0.161	0.188	0.200
Adjusted R ²	0.198	0.199	0.198	0.170	0.160	0.187	0.199

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.4: Government Performance on Support for Gender Quotas (Minimal Controls)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Support for Quota			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Government Performance	0.119*** (0.009)	0.136*** (0.013)	0.279*** (0.039)	0.125*** (0.014)
Gender Egalitarianism	0.536*** (0.011)	0.536*** (0.011)	0.658*** (0.031)	0.536*** (0.011)
Female	0.130*** (0.012)	0.200*** (0.037)	0.129*** (0.012)	0.130*** (0.012)
Islamist	-0.051*** (0.012)	-0.052*** (0.012)	-0.051*** (0.012)	-0.029 (0.038)
Gov. Perform * Female		-0.035** (0.018)		
Gov. Perform * Egalitarianism			-0.061*** (0.014)	
Gov. Perform * Islamist				-0.011 (0.018)
Constant	0.888*** (0.038)	0.855*** (0.042)	0.567*** (0.084)	0.875*** (0.043)
Country FE	Included	Included	Included	Included
Observations	17,637	17,637	17,637	17,637
R ²	0.195	0.195	0.196	0.195
Adjusted R ²	0.194	0.194	0.195	0.194

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.5: Government Performance on Support for Gender Quotas (By Islamism)

	Dependent Variable:											
	All (1)	Algeria (2)	Egypt (3)	Iraq (4)	Jordan (5)	Support for Quota Lebanon (6)	Libya (7)	Morocco (8)	Palestine (9)	Sudan (10)	Tunisia (11)	Yemen (12)
Government Performance	0.127*** (0.014)	0.488*** (0.066)	0.149*** (0.036)	0.028 (0.061)	0.021 (0.088)	0.126*** (0.039)	0.101* (0.058)	0.198*** (0.060)	0.010 (0.044)	0.026 (0.072)	0.102** (0.052)	0.072** (0.032)
Islamist	-0.026 (0.038)	0.425*** (0.141)	-0.094 (0.134)	-0.019 (0.154)	-0.193 (0.205)	0.036 (0.108)	0.090 (0.153)	0.129 (0.176)	-0.186* (0.112)	-0.246 (0.154)	-0.002 (0.131)	-0.266** (0.105)
Gov. Perform * Islamist	-0.012 (0.018)	-0.220*** (0.075)	0.012 (0.058)	0.057 (0.078)	0.097 (0.099)	-0.064 (0.065)	-0.037 (0.074)	-0.014 (0.079)	0.015 (0.055)	0.083 (0.079)	0.002 (0.069)	0.037 (0.044)
Gender Egalitarianism	0.533*** (0.011)	0.369*** (0.045)	0.439*** (0.031)	0.413*** (0.037)	0.576*** (0.043)	0.617*** (0.032)	0.681*** (0.050)	0.686*** (0.045)	0.499*** (0.033)	0.241*** (0.038)	0.527*** (0.038)	0.669*** (0.029)
Female	0.143*** (0.012)	0.289*** (0.042)	0.172*** (0.039)	0.063 (0.045)	0.194*** (0.048)	0.106*** (0.032)	0.034 (0.048)	0.074 (0.060)	0.141*** (0.033)	0.117*** (0.039)	0.205*** (0.044)	0.097** (0.039)
Trustworthy	-0.019 (0.017)	0.004 (0.069)	-0.077** (0.035)	-0.135* (0.074)	0.087 (0.073)	0.067 (0.089)	0.122 (0.087)	-0.119* (0.062)	-0.057 (0.046)	0.013 (0.053)	-0.111 (0.072)	0.010 (0.036)
Age	0.00000* (0.00000)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.0004 (0.002)	-0.00000 (0.00001)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.005** (0.002)	-0.00000 (0.00000)	-0.0005 (0.001)	0.00000 (0.00000)	0.00000* (0.00000)	0.003* (0.002)
Education	0.012*** (0.004)	0.025** (0.012)	0.001 (0.011)	0.016 (0.014)	-0.018 (0.017)	0.051*** (0.012)	0.012 (0.017)	0.044*** (0.016)	-0.012 (0.012)	0.049*** (0.012)	-0.018 (0.014)	0.015 (0.011)
Unemployed	-0.006 (0.018)	0.023 (0.055)	0.023 (0.065)	-0.161** (0.066)	0.074 (0.071)	0.0004 (0.062)	0.090 (0.067)	0.006 (0.070)	0.032 (0.053)	0.065 (0.052)	-0.021 (0.063)	-0.011 (0.051)
Single	0.015 (0.017)	0.063 (0.067)	0.021 (0.062)	-0.047 (0.076)	-0.002 (0.067)	0.009 (0.048)	0.081 (0.073)	0.119* (0.070)	-0.057 (0.057)	-0.032 (0.049)	-0.054 (0.069)	0.043 (0.056)
Children	0.031** (0.015)	-0.029 (0.053)	0.069* (0.040)	0.076 (0.064)	-0.073 (0.052)	0.001 (0.040)	0.022 (0.073)	0.266*** (0.062)	-0.094** (0.042)	0.047 (0.047)	0.002 (0.059)	0.049 (0.043)
Pol. Interest	0.027*** (0.006)	0.043* (0.025)	0.072*** (0.021)	0.021 (0.020)	0.007 (0.023)	0.053*** (0.018)	0.051** (0.023)	-0.069** (0.030)	0.023 (0.016)	0.080*** (0.019)	0.057*** (0.020)	-0.015 (0.019)
Monarchy	0.597*** (0.055)											
Quota Exist	-0.478*** (0.034)											
Polity	0.041*** (0.005)											
Country FE	Included	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Observations	17,357	1,520	1,497	1,903	1,345	1,903	1,427	892	1,828	1,447	1,645	1,950
R ²	0.199	0.150	0.251	0.088	0.160	0.239	0.147	0.351	0.165	0.093	0.165	0.308
Adjusted R ²	0.198	0.143	0.245	0.082	0.152	0.234	0.140	0.342	0.160	0.085	0.159	0.304

Note:

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

A.4 Arab Barometer Questionnaire

We use the following questions in this paper (variable names in bold):

1. [**Support Quota**] Some people think in order to achieve fairer representation a certain percentage of elected positions should be set aside for women. To what extent do you agree with this statement? (strongly agree to strongly disagree)
2. [**Government Performance Index**] How would you evaluate the current government's performance on [INSERT ITEM]? (very good to very bad)
 - Creating employment opportunities
 - Narrowing the gap between rich and poor
 - Providing security and order
 - Keeping prices down
3. [**Gender Egalitarianism Index**] The following questions are your personal opinions about the principles that should determine the behavior and situation of women in our society. For each of the statements listed below, please indicate whether you agree strongly, agree, disagree, or disagree strongly with it? (strongly agree to strongly disagree)
 - A woman can become President or Prime Minister of a Muslim country.
 - In general, men are better at political leadership than women.
 - University education for males is more important than university education for females.
 - Women and men should have equal rights in making the decision to divorce.
 - Husbands should have final say in all decisions concerning the family.
4. [**Islamist Ideology**] Which of the following two statements is the closest to your point of view? Choose statement 1 or statement 2?

- I prefer a religious political party over a non-religious political party.
- I prefer a non-religious political party over a religious political party.

5. [**Female**] Gender [Interviewer: Do not ask, Record]?
6. [**Trustworthy**] Generally speaking, would you say that “Most people can be trusted” or “that you must be very careful in dealing with people”?
7. [**Age**] In what year were you born?
8. [**Education**] What is your highest level of education? (No Formal Education / Elementary / Preparatory / Secondary / Mid-Level Diploma / BA / MA and Above)
9. [**Unemployed**] Are you. . . (Employed / Self-Employed / Retired / A Housewife / A Student / Unemployed or looking for work / Other)?
10. [**Single**] What is your current social status? (Single or Bachelor / Living with a partner / Engaged / Married / Divorced / Separated / Widowed)
11. [**Children**] Do you have children? (Yes / No)
12. [**Political Interest**] In general, to what extent are you interested in politics? (very interested to very uninterested)
13. [**Government Satisfaction**] On a scale from 0-10 measuring the extent of your satisfaction with the current government’s performance, in which 0 means that you are completely dissatisfied with its performance and 10 means you are completely satisfied. To what extent are you satisfied with the current government’s performance? (completely unsatisfied to completely satisfied)
14. [**Must Support Government**] Do you agree or disagree with the following statements? [Citizens must support the government’s decisions, even if they disagree with them] (strongly agree to strongly disagree)

B Algeria Survey

The survey experiment in Algeria was fielded between February 5-21, 2020. Respondents were recruited into the survey through advertisements on Facebook that were shown to all 19 million adult Algerian Facebook users. The Facebook advertisement (Figure B.1) featured a picture of the Algerian flag with the title “Algeria Politics Survey.” The text says: “Take this academic survey from Princeton University about Algerian politics.”

Figure B.1: Facebook Advertisement



Clicking on the advertisement took users out of Facebook and into Qualtrics, a survey platform. Since the survey was conducted on Qualtrics, not Facebook, Facebook did not learn users’ answers to the survey or even if they took the survey at all.

Once in Qualtrics, users could choose to take the survey in Arabic, French, or English. Over 93% chose to take the survey in Arabic, with the remainder in French. On the first page, respondents answered three eligibility questions: age (must be over 18), nationality (must be Algerian), and current location (must be currently in Algeria). We later verified that they were living in Algeria using the geolocation of IP addresses; we exclude any survey completed outside of Algeria.

After answering the eligibility questions, eligible users then proceeded to the consent form, which described all risks and benefits to the user. If they clicked agree, they could

proceed to the survey itself, knowing they could terminate the survey at any time. The survey itself featured nearly 100 questions, including demographics, attitudes toward the protests, attitudes toward political developments since Bouteflika’s ouster, and attitudes toward the military and toward democracy. The questionnaire featured randomization in question order as well as answer order.

To incentivize Algerians to complete the entire survey, we offered cell phone credit as a reward for completion. In the consent form, respondents were informed that if they completed the survey, they would receive 100DZD (<\$1) of mobile phone credit. At the end of the survey, respondents who wished to claim their reward were taken to a separate platform, a Google form, where they could enter their mobile phone number separate from their survey answers. We subsequently sent phone credit remotely using the Swiss company CY.SEND, which partners with the three largest mobile phone companies in Algeria: Mobilis, Djezzy, and Ooredoo. In total, only one-third of survey takers chose to enter their phone numbers and receive credit.

B.1 Representativeness

Cognizant of the biases in the Facebook population, we followed Zhang et al. (2018) in setting age and gender quotas to attempt to generate a more representative sample. We created multiple ads (each with the same picture) and targeted each to a specific age-gender group: Algerian women aged 35-44, for instance. We then altered how much we would spend on each ad each day (the “quota”): we set the minimum, \$1/day, for groups over-represented on Facebook, such as men aged 18-24 and 25-34. We spent progressively larger amounts on under-represented groups, up to \$10/day on Algerian women over 65 years old. The amount spent affects how long each day the ad would be shown to the targeted demographic.

These quotas succeeded in creating a more balanced sample. Table B.1 presents the age and gender demographics for the overall Algerian population (from the 2015 census), for the total Algerian Facebook population (from April 2019), and for our survey sample (February


2020). The table suggests that although Algerians on Facebook tend to skew younger and more male, our quotas succeeded in countering these biases. About 50% of our survey sample was female, compared to only 36% of the overall Algerian Facebook population. About 69% of our sample was under age 35, compared to 76% of the Facebook population (and 64% of the actual population).

Table B.1: Representativeness of Algeria Survey Sample

	Census 2015		Facebook Population		Survey Sample	
Age	<i>Men</i>	<i>Women</i>	<i>Men</i>	<i>Women</i>	<i>Men</i>	<i>Women</i>
0-17	14.8	14.0	3.8	3.7	0	0
18-24	8.5	8.2	18.0	13.2	12.2	18.6
25-34	9.4	9.2	24.9	12.7	18.6	19.9
35-44	6.9	6.9	10.6	3.9	12.8	8.3
45-54	4.9	4.9	4.1	1.5	4.0	2.6
55-64	3.3	3.2	1.5	0.5	1.8	0.8
65+	2.9	3.0	1.1	0.5	0.5	0.0
Total	50.6	49.4	64	36	49.8	50.2

Figure B.2 shows the approximate location of survey respondents, demonstrating that they are also geographically diverse. Like the actual Algerian population, the vast majority lived in cities along the coast.

Figure B.2: Map of Survey Respondents



While the survey sample is therefore relatively representative in terms of age, gender, and location, it is likely that it is imbalanced on other demographics. As an online survey,

our sample likely skews wealthier and better educated – i.e., those who have access to the internet. While we do not have corresponding population data to compare to, Table B.2 presents descriptive statistics for each of the major variables used in our survey.

Table B.2: Descriptive Statistics, Algeria Survey

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Pctl(25)	Pctl(75)	Max
Female	911	0.502	0.500	0	0	1	1
Age	911	4.526	1.555	2	3	6	9
Education	911	4.772	0.939	1	4	5	7
Income	911	3.609	2.270	1	2	5	10
Married	911	0.404	0.491	0	0	1	1
Unemployed	911	0.239	0.427	0	0	0	1
Student	911	0.288	0.453	0	0	1	1
Urban	911	2.486	0.727	1	2	3	3
Amazigh	911	0.142	0.349	0	0	0	1
Heard of Quota	911	0.417	0.493	0	0	1	1
Knew When	911	0.135	0.342	0	0	0	1
Economy	899	1.533	0.909	1	1	2	5
Supp Democracy	911	3.617	1.079	1	3	4	5
Supp Protests	911	0.550	0.498	0	0	1	1
Islamist	911	0.201	0.401	0	0	0	1
Women Improve Politics	878	3.478	1.675	1	2	4	7
Support for Quotas	911	2.840	1.158	1	2	4	5

B.2 Verification Checks

While people joined Facebook originally to keep in touch with their friends and acquaintances and maintain their social networks, recent years have seen growing concerns that regimes and conspiracy theorists might also use the network to spread propaganda and sway public opinion. In Algeria, for instance, protesters in the *Hirak* became increasingly concerned about what they called “electronic flies” – pro-regime ‘bots’ or ‘trolls’ regularly posting on Facebook or Twitter for Algerians to stop protesting and instead participate in the regime’s roadmap of presidential elections in December 2019 (Bouattia, 2019).

Globally, the behavior of such bots and trolls thus far has been public posts and com-

ments. There has been no evidence that they have taken academic surveys advertised on Facebook, and we find it unlikely they would spend time and resources on something that is not public and does not provide immediate outcomes. Substantively, the majority of respondents in our survey said they support the *Hirak* protesters, suggesting that *had* pro-regime accounts attempted to infiltrate our survey they did not succeed. Qualtrics, after all, has mechanisms in place to prevent ‘ballot-box stuffing,’ for instance by preventing the same URL from taking the survey more than once.

Still, we perform two additional checks to verify that respondents were real people taking the survey seriously. First, we examine how long it took respondents to complete the survey. While bots programmed to take the survey would finish rapidly, our median time to completion was 27 minutes (see figure B.3, left), with less than 1% completing the survey in under 10 minutes. This suggests that respondents were real people genuinely reading and thinking about each question.




Figure B.3: Verification Checks: (a) Time to Completion and (b) Duplicates

Second, following Kuriakose and Robbins (2016), we test for duplicate and near-duplicate surveys, which might indicate an organized attempt to flood the survey with a particular narrative. On the contrary, our survey had no perfect duplicates, and only 5% were even 85% the same (figure B.3, right),¹ the threshold Kuriakose and Robbins (2016) consider potentially problematic. These tests help increase our confidence that the data are genuine.

¹R code to detect duplicates obtained from https://github.com/andrewflowers/survey-fraud/blob/master/r_scripts/percentmatch.R.

B.3 Ethics of Priming Experiment

The entire survey, including the priming experiment, was approved through the IRBs at both W&M (PHSC-2019-03-11-13532) and Princeton (IRB #11581). Each of the experimental primes were factual and already covered in Algerian media, and thus did not involve any deception. Moreover, existing research suggests that priming effects, particularly short paragraphs, are momentary, not durable, dissipating within days, if not hours (Gaines, Kuklinski and Quirk, 2007, pp. 5-6).

B.4 Covariate Balance


Despite any overall sample biases, our intent in this paper is not to infer a population statistic, i.e., that X% of Algerians support gender quotas. Instead, it is to experimentally examine, within the sample, how different primes shape levels of support for quotas. Accordingly, for our purposes, what is most important is that covariates are balanced across treatment groups. Figure B.4 shows that they are, comparing each prime to the control.

Randomization was conducted among the full sample, and not stratified by any particular sub-group. Yet, Table B.3 shows that within each subset, the number of respondents in the control and each treatment group is still roughly equal.

Table B.3: Number of respondents in each treatment group

	Overall	Regime		Gender		Egalitarian		Islamist	
		Oppose	Support	Men	Women	No	Yes	No	Yes
Control	236	126	110	128	108	175	54	181	55
Women	212	116	96	100	112	160	45	173	39
Regime	224	128	96	111	113	164	50	181	43
Trade-off	239	131	108	115	124	188	42	193	46
Total	911	501	410	454	457	687	191	728	183


Figure B.4: Covariate Balance across Treatment Groups



B.5 Mediation Analysis

Figure B.5 shows that the women treatment increased agreement with the statement: “gender quotas advance women’s rights.” Table B.4 presents a Baron and Kenny (1986) style mediation, showing that the effect of the women treatment on support for quotas vanishes when controlling for this mechanism, suggesting its effect is occurring through it.

Figure B.5: Mechanism



Note: Figure created from Table B.4, model 1.

Table B.4: Baron & Kenny (1986) Mediation Analysis

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Mechanism	Support for Quotas	
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Women Prime	0.44*** (0.16)	0.26*** (0.10)	0.14 (0.09)
Regime Prime	0.11 (0.16)	0.07 (0.09)	0.04 (0.09)
Trade-Off Prime	0.21 (0.16)	0.13 (0.09)	0.06 (0.09)
Mechanism			0.25*** (0.02)
<i>Covariates</i>			
Female	0.49*** (0.13)	0.45*** (0.08)	0.33*** (0.07)
Age	-0.13** (0.06)	-0.08** (0.03)	-0.05 (0.03)
Education	0.01 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)
Income	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)
Married	-0.25* (0.15)	-0.12 (0.09)	-0.06 (0.08)
Unemployed	0.11 (0.16)	0.08 (0.09)	0.05 (0.09)
Student	0.32* (0.20)	0.08 (0.12)	0.003 (0.11)
Urban	0.01 (0.08)	0.06 (0.05)	0.06 (0.04)
Amazigh	-0.21 (0.17)	-0.08 (0.10)	-0.04 (0.09)
Heard of Quota	-0.37*** (0.14)	-0.19** (0.08)	-0.10 (0.08)
Knew When	0.29 (0.19)	-0.09 (0.11)	-0.16 (0.10)
Economy	0.04 (0.06)	0.01 (0.04)	-0.001 (0.04)
Supp Democracy	0.06 (0.05)	0.07** (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)
Supp Protests	-0.21* (0.12)	-0.06 (0.07)	-0.003 (0.07)
Women Improve Politics	0.40*** (0.04)	0.23*** (0.02)	0.13*** (0.02)
Islamist	-0.50*** (0.15)	-0.37*** (0.09)	-0.25*** (0.08)
Constant	2.76*** (0.55)	1.99*** (0.33)	1.32*** (0.31)
Observations	855	867	855
R ²	0.28	0.30	0.42
Adjusted R ²	0.26	0.28	0.40

Note: * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Table B.5 presents a more formal causal mediation analysis (Imai, Keele and Tingley, 2010), showing that the women treatment increased support for gender quotas precisely because it increased agreement with this statement. This mechanism mediated about 43% of the total effect of the women treatment on support for gender quotas. Moreover, the direct effect was not significant, suggesting there is no other reason why the women treatment increased support for quotas.

Table B.5: Imai et al. (2010) Causal Mediation Analysis


	Estimate	95% CI Lower	95% CI Upper	p-value
Mediated Effect	0.1094	0.0377	0.19	<2e-16***
Direct Effect	0.1428	-0.0295	0.30	0.14
Total Effect	0.2522	0.0696	0.44	<2e-16***
Proportion Mediated	0.4337	0.1527	1.43	<2e-16***

B.6 Attention Check

About 18.5% of the original sample failed the attention check, which asked what percent of parliamentary lists are reserved for women. The answer had been provided in all treatment groups, including the control. That suggests that those 18.5% did not carefully read, or at least could not recall, the text of the experiment. As a result, they are unlikely to be affected by the experiment, and we thus exclude them from the main results.

Removing them does not appear to create differential attrition bias. Figure B.6 shows that all treatment groups were equally likely to pass the attention check. About 81% in each prime passed, none significantly different from the control ($p=0.8$ for each).

Figure B.6: No Differential Attrition by Treatment Group



As expected, results are weaker when including those who failed the attention check, as they are not affected by the primes. Yet, Table B.6 shows that each of the core findings hold even with their inclusion. Model 1 presents the overall results, showing that the women prime significantly increased support for quotas, but the trade-off did not. Model 2 presents the interaction by regime support/opposition, showing that the regime gains prime indeed has a significantly different effect among those who support and oppose the regime. Finally, model 3 subsets to the regime prime, showing that when cognizant of regime gains, regime opponents are less supportive of quotas than supporters.

Table B.7 then shows that each of the secondary hypotheses also hold when including those who failed the attention check.

Table B.6: Main results are robust to including those who failed attention check

	<i>Dependent variable: Support for Quotas (1-5)</i>		
	Overall (1)	Interaction (2)	Regime Prime (3)
Women Prime	0.20** (0.09)	0.14 (0.12)	
Regime Prime	-0.02 (0.09)	0.15 (0.13)	
Trade-Off Prime	0.09 (0.08)	0.01 (0.12)	
Women Prime * Supp Protests		0.12 (0.17)	
Regime Prime * Supp Protests		-0.30* (0.17)	
Trade-Off Prime * Supp Protests		0.15 (0.17)	
Supp Protests	-0.04 (0.07)	-0.04 (0.12)	-0.35** (0.14)
<u>Covariates</u>			
Female	0.46*** (0.07)	0.45*** (0.07)	0.27* (0.15)
Age	-0.06* (0.03)	-0.06** (0.03)	-0.09 (0.06)
Education	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	0.04 (0.07)
Income	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	0.01 (0.03)
Married	-0.18** (0.08)	-0.18** (0.08)	-0.15 (0.16)
Unemployed	0.04 (0.09)	0.03 (0.09)	0.11 (0.18)
Student	0.10 (0.10)	0.10 (0.10)	0.06 (0.22)
Urban	0.07 (0.04)	0.07* (0.04)	0.01 (0.09)
Amazigh	-0.05 (0.09)	-0.05 (0.09)	-0.24 (0.19)
Heard of Quota	-0.19** (0.08)	-0.20** (0.08)	-0.23 (0.16)
Knew When	0.02 (0.11)	0.03 (0.11)	-0.03 (0.23)
Economy	-0.001 (0.03)	-0.0002 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.07)
Supp Democracy	0.05* (0.03)	0.05* (0.03)	0.10 (0.06)
Islamist	-0.32*** (0.08)	-0.34*** (0.08)	-0.32* (0.17)
Women Improve Politics	0.23*** (0.02)	0.24*** (0.02)	0.24*** (0.04)
Attention Check	0.16** (0.08)	0.15* (0.08)	0.37** (0.17)
Constant	1.87*** (0.29)	1.87*** (0.30)	1.69*** (0.57)
Observations	1,059	1,059	259
R ²	0.30	0.30	0.32
Adjusted R ²	0.28	0.29	0.27

Note: * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Table B.7: Secondary results hold when including those who failed attention check

	<i>Dependent variable: Support for Quotas (1-5)</i>					
	Men (1)	Women (2)	Inegalitarian (3)	Egalitarian (4)	Non-Islamist (5)	Islamist (6)
Women Prime	0.27** (0.13)	0.11 (0.12)	0.26*** (0.10)	-0.20 (0.23)	0.22** (0.10)	0.10 (0.19)
Regime Prime	0.06 (0.12)	-0.12 (0.12)	-0.04 (0.09)	0.04 (0.23)	-0.03 (0.10)	0.04 (0.19)
Trade-Off Prime	0.13 (0.12)	0.02 (0.12)	0.11 (0.09)	0.11 (0.24)	0.07 (0.10)	0.09 (0.19)
Female			0.49*** (0.08)	0.77*** (0.20)	0.52*** (0.08)	0.17 (0.17)
Women Improve Politics	0.21*** (0.03)	0.27*** (0.03)			0.22*** (0.02)	0.32*** (0.04)
Islamist	-0.27** (0.11)	-0.41*** (0.11)	-0.46*** (0.08)	-0.02 (0.25)		
Age	-0.08* (0.04)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.13 (0.08)	-0.08** (0.03)	-0.01 (0.07)
Education	-0.08* (0.05)	0.05 (0.05)	-0.07* (0.04)	0.06 (0.10)	-0.04 (0.04)	0.04 (0.08)
Income	-0.04* (0.02)	0.004 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.03)
Married	-0.10 (0.12)	-0.21* (0.11)	-0.25*** (0.09)	-0.06 (0.22)	-0.18** (0.09)	-0.27 (0.19)
Unemployed	0.12 (0.12)	-0.08 (0.13)	0.04 (0.09)	-0.10 (0.26)	0.03 (0.10)	0.06 (0.20)
Student	0.22 (0.16)	0.03 (0.14)	0.18 (0.11)	-0.08 (0.30)	0.12 (0.12)	-0.09 (0.23)
Urban	0.05 (0.06)	0.09 (0.06)	0.08* (0.05)	-0.04 (0.12)	0.05 (0.05)	0.13 (0.09)
Amazigh	0.05 (0.12)	-0.18 (0.14)	-0.01 (0.10)	-0.07 (0.25)	-0.10 (0.10)	0.27 (0.25)
Heard of Quota	-0.27** (0.11)	-0.10 (0.12)	-0.28*** (0.09)	0.02 (0.22)	-0.18** (0.09)	-0.30* (0.18)
Knew When	0.01 (0.13)	0.15 (0.20)	-0.06 (0.12)	0.44 (0.28)	0.06 (0.12)	-0.07 (0.30)
Economy	0.02 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.05)	0.01 (0.04)	-0.09 (0.11)	0.01 (0.04)	-0.07 (0.08)
Supp Democracy	0.03 (0.04)	0.07* (0.04)	0.07** (0.03)	0.05 (0.07)	0.06* (0.03)	0.003 (0.06)
Supp Protests	-0.09 (0.10)	0.03 (0.09)	-0.01 (0.07)	-0.20 (0.19)	-0.09 (0.07)	0.13 (0.15)
Attention Check	0.18 (0.12)	0.14 (0.11)	0.25*** (0.09)	-0.05 (0.25)	0.20** (0.09)	-0.06 (0.17)
Constant	2.31*** (0.41)	1.70*** (0.43)	2.52*** (0.31)	3.38*** (0.85)	2.03*** (0.33)	1.12* (0.64)
Observations	533	526	21 841	218	836	223
R ²	0.22	0.25	0.22	0.16	0.28	0.34
Adjusted R ²	0.19	0.22	0.21	0.08	0.26	0.27

Note: * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

B.7 Questionnaire

We use the following questions in this paper (variable names in bold):

1. [**Female**] What is your gender?
2. [**Age**] What is your age?
3. [**Urban**] How would you describe the city or village you live in? (Urban, Suburban, Rural)
4. [**Unemployed, Student**] What is your current occupational status? (Employed, Unemployed, Student, Housewife, Retired)
5. [**Education**] What is your level of education? (Less than HS, HS, BA, MA, PhD)
6. [**Income**] What is the total monthly income for all members of your household?
7. [**Amazigh**] Which language is your mother tongue? (Arabic, Tamazight, French, Other)
8. [**Economy**] How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the economic situation in the country? (very dissatisfied to satisfied)
9. [**Supp Protests**] Do you support or oppose the current wave of protests in Algeria (the Hirak)? (strongly support to strongly oppose)
10. [**Supp Democracy**] Do you agree with the following statement? A democratic system may have its flaws, but it is better than other political systems (strongly agree to strongly disagree)
11. [**Islamist**] Which of the following labels comes closest to describing your political views? (Islamist, Salafi, Secularist, Liberal, Leftist/Socialist, Nationalist)

12. [**Gender Egalitarianism**] In general, social and economic problems would improve if there were more women in politics.
13. [**Heard of Quota**] Have you heard of the electoral gender quota laws for parliament?
14. [**Knew When**] Do you know when the gender quota law was implemented? (Before 2013, 2013-2017, After 2017)
15. [**Survey Experiment**] See paper, Table 1.
16. [**Support Quota**] Some people think in order to achieve fairer representation a certain percentage of elected positions should be set aside for women. To what extent do you agree with this statement?
17. [**Attention Check**] Approximately what percent of party lists are currently reserved for women? (0, 30, 50%)
18. [**Mechanism**] To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement? Gender quotas advance women's rights. (strongly disagree to strongly agree).

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