Supplementary Material: Civilian Protest in Civil War: Insights from Côte d'Ivoire

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A1   Introduction

This appendix complements the article "Civilian Protest in Civil War: Insights from Côte d'Ivoire" and presents descriptive statistics, reports robustness tests for *H1* and *H2*, discusses alternative explanations for *H3*, and lists all non-public sources cited in the main analysis (archival sources and news sources identified through Factiva). The code book and all replication files are available at https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/MPTSQR.

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A2 Descriptive Statistics

Table A1: Descriptive statistics (conflict week)

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Median	Max
One-sided violence	450	0.13	0.33	0	0	1
One-sided violence$_{t-1}$	450	0.12	0.33	0	0	1
One-sided violence$_{t-2}$	450	0.12	0.33	0	0	1
One-sided violence fatalities	450	3.38	20.85	0	0	314
One-sided violence fatalities$_{t-1}$	450	3.34	20.84	0	0	314
One-sided violence fatalities$_{t-2}$	450	3.34	20.84	0	0	314
Peacekeeper violence	381	0.05	0.22	0	0	1
Peacekeeper violence$_{t-1}$	381	0.05	0.22	0	0	1
Peacekeeper violence$_{t-2}$	381	0.05	0.22	0	0	1
Alignment protest$_{t-1}$	449	0.12	0.32	0	0	1
Alignment protest frequency$_{t-1}$	449	0.30	1.40	0	0	20
Pro-government protest$_{t-1}$	449	0.06	0.23	0	0	1
Anti-government protest$_{t-1}$	449	0.09	0.29	0	0	1
Anti-intervention protest$_{t-1}$	449	0.10	0.30	0	0	1
Negotiations	450	0.25	0.43	0	0	1
Battles	450	0.06	0.23	0	0	1
Number of peacekeepers	450	7.04	3.60	0.00	8.35	11.23
Anti-peace protest$_{t-1}$	449	0.04	0.20	0	0	1
Reform protest$_{t-1}$	449	0.18	0.39	0	0	1
'No war, no peace' period	450	0.75	0.43	0	1	1
Violent protest$_{t-1}$	449	0.12	0.32	0	0	1
Large protest$_{t-1}$	449	0.12	0.33	0	0	1

Table A2: Descriptive statistics (district-week)

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Median	Max
One-sided violence	6,300	0.01	0.11	0	0	1
One-sided violence$_{t-1}$	6,300	0.01	0.11	0	0	1
One-sided violence$_{t-2}$	6,300	0.01	0.11	0	0	1
One-sided violence fatalities	6,300	0.24	5.19	0	0	273
One-sided violence fatalities$_{t-1}$	6,300	0.24	5.19	0	0	273
One-sided violence fatalities$_{t-2}$	6,300	0.24	5.19	0	0	273
Peacekeeper violence	5,334	0.01	0.07	0	0	1
Peacekeeper violence$_{t-1}$	5,334	0.01	0.07	0	0	1
Peacekeeper violence$_{t-2}$	5,334	0.01	0.07	0	0	1
Alignment protest$_{t-1}$	6,286	0.02	0.12	0	0	1
Alignment protest frequency$_{t-1}$	6,286	0.02	0.20	0	0	6
Pro-government protest$_{t-1}$	6,286	0.004	0.07	0	0	1
Anti-government protest$_{t-1}$	6,286	0.01	0.11	0	0	1
Anti-intervention protest$_{t-1}$	6,286	0.01	0.11	0	0	1
Negotiations	6,300	0.25	0.43	0	0	1
Battles	6,300	0.01	0.08	0	0	1
Number of peacekeepers	6,300	0.29	0.43	0.00	0.15	2.75
Anti-peace protest$_{t-1}$	6,286	0.003	0.06	0	0	1
Reform protest$_{t-1}$	6,286	0.02	0.13	0	0	1
'No war, no peace' period	6,300	0.75	0.43	0	1	1
Violent protest$_{t-1}$	6,286	0.01	0.11	0	0	1
Large protest$_{t-1}$	6,286	0.01	0.12	0	0	1
Political polarization (2001)	6,300	0.80	0.06	0.69	0.80	0.90
Political polarization (2010)	6,300	0.73	0.31	0.08	0.89	1.00
Ethnic polarization (2008)	6,300	0.68	0.13	0.26	0.72	0.81

A3 Robustness Tests for H1

Controlling for Other Protest Types

One issue with the analysis could be that concurrent protests of another type account for the findings regarding *H1.* Since single protest events sometimes include multiple claims (as long as they focused on different targets), it is possible that the results are driven by another protest type that often coincided with alignment protests. To account for this possibility, I replicate the main model in Table 3 (Model 2) controlling for a one-week temporal lag of the occurrence of other protest types. This procedure is limited to anti-intervention protests, anti-peace protests, and reform protests, as pro-intervention and pro-peace protests are too rare and generate perfect predictions. Table A3 presents the results. The results remain robust, meaning that the coefficient of alignment protests remains positive and statistically significant. An additional finding is that anti-peace protests also have a positive and statistically significant effect on one-sided violence against civilians across conflict-weeks and district-weeks (Model 12 and Model 15 in Table A3). This finding is consistent with insights from the qualitative analysis of anti-peace protests, which suggests that such protests often heightened tensions in Côte d'Ivoire. Moreover, it is consistent with an inverse logic of the finding that pro-peace protests can deescalate tensions and promote peace (see e.g. Abbs 2021; Dudouet 2021; Nilsson et al. 2020).

Table A3: Controlling for other protest types

| | Occurrence of one-sided violence against civilians | | | | | |
	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
Alignment protest$_{t-1}$	1.03**	0.82*	0.87**	1.67***	1.49***	1.61***
	(0.42)	(0.44)	(0.44)	(0.49)	(0.50)	(0.47)
Anti-intervention protest$_{t-1}$	−0.56			−0.50		
	(0.48)			(0.66)		
Anti-peace protest$_{t-1}$		0.92*			1.75***	
		(0.53)			(0.61)	
Reform protest$_{t-1}$			0.29			0.80*
			(0.39)			(0.44)
One-sided violence$_{t-1}$	0.73*	0.78*	0.73*	1.71***	1.64***	1.68***
	(0.41)	(0.41)	(0.41)	(0.41)	(0.41)	(0.41)
One-sided violence$_{t-2}$	1.64***	1.49***	1.54***	2.04***	2.06***	1.98***
	(0.37)	(0.36)	(0.36)	(0.38)	(0.37)	(0.37)
Negotiations	0.36	0.32	0.35	0.24	0.25	0.23
	(0.36)	(0.35)	(0.35)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.29)
Battles	1.68***	1.59***	1.61***	3.56***	3.58***	3.57***
	(0.55)	(0.54)	(0.56)	(0.54)	(0.55)	(0.55)
Number of peacekeepers	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01	0.06	0.18	0.10
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.22)
Unit of analysis	Week	Week	Week	District-week	District-week	District-week
District fixed effects	-	-	-	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	449	449	449	6,286	6,286	6,286
Log Likelihood	−135.00	−134.62	−135.50	−225.62	−223.32	−225.06
Akaike Inf. Crit.	286.01	285.25	287.00	493.24	488.63	492.11

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.
All models correct for rare events bias using mean bias-reducing adjusted scores.

Using Count Models

As a second robustness test, I replicate the main models but use count variables for both the dependent and independent variable instead, thus estimating the effect of the number of alignment protest events on the number of one-sided violence fatalities. Since the dependent variable is a count with many zero values, all models use negative binomial regression. The results are presented in Table A4 and remain robust, meaning that the coefficient of alignment protest frequency is positive and statistically significant.

Table A4: One-sided Violence Fatalities and Alignment Protest Frequency

			Count of one-sided violence fatalities			
	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)
Alignment protest freq.$_{t-1}$	0.66***	0.24*		2.37***	2.74***	
	(0.20)	(0.13)		(0.79)	(0.49)	
Pro-government protest freq.$_{t-1}$			1.57***			3.55***
			(0.37)			(1.01)
Anti-government protest freq.$_{t-1}$			0.09			2.11***
			(0.15)			(0.60)
One-sided violence fatalities$_{t-1}$		0.05***	0.05***		0.16***	0.16***
		(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.02)	(0.02)
One-sided violence fatalities$_{t-2}$		0.01	0.01		0.04***	0.04***
		(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.02)	(0.02)
Negotiations		0.87*	1.05**		2.10***	2.11***
		(0.45)	(0.44)		(0.40)	(0.39)
Battles		2.82***	3.16***		6.93***	6.58***
		(0.85)	(0.84)		(1.19)	(1.17)
Number of peacekeepers		−0.21***	−0.15***		−0.003	0.12
		(0.06)	(0.05)		(0.37)	(0.37)
Unit of analysis	Week	Week	Week	District-week	District-week	District-week
District fixed effects	-	-	-	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	449	449	449	6,286	6,286	6,286
Log Likelihood	−370.47	−334.53	−331.81	−553.41	−497.04	−496.46
Akaike Inf. Crit.	744.94	683.06	679.62	1,136.83	1,034.08	1,034.93

Note: Standard errors in parentheses: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Including Additional Control Variables

A third concern is that the main models suffer from omitted variable bias. As a robustness test, I therefore replicate the main model (Model 2 in Table 3) when including additional control variables. Model 23 and 26 control for whether the week fell during the two periods of active armed conflict (19 September 2002–9 November 2004 and 25 February 2011–27 April 2011) or the period of "no war, no peace" (10 November 2004–24 February 2011), using the active conflict period as the reference category. The inclusion of this variable helps account for alignment protests being more common in weeks with active conflict, which may also be more likely to see one-sided violence against civilians. Model 24 and 27 control for whether any protests that resulted in violence occurred in the week prior. This variable seeks to alleviate the possibility that alignment protests coincided with violent protests that triggered violent backlashes against civilians in the week after. Finally, Model 25 and 28 control for whether any large protest (more than 1,000 participants) occurred in the week prior. This control variable helps ascertain that the results are not driven by the size rather than the demands of alignment protests. The results are reported in Table A5 and remain robust, meaning that the coefficient of alignment protest remains positive and statistically significant.

Table A5: Adding additional control variables

| | Occurrence of one-sided violence against civilians | | | | | |
	(23)	(24)	(25)	(26)	(27)	(28)
Alignment protest$_{t-1}$	0.87**	0.76*	1.10**	1.52***	1.48***	1.81**
	(0.43)	(0.44)	(0.46)	(0.50)	(0.51)	(0.73)
One-sided violence$_{t-1}$	0.73*	0.67	0.71*	1.65***	1.64***	2.28***
	(0.40)	(0.41)	(0.41)	(0.42)	(0.43)	(0.53)
One-sided violence$_{t-2}$	1.56***	1.52***	1.58***	1.99***	2.00***	2.72***
	(0.35)	(0.36)	(0.36)	(0.37)	(0.37)	(0.50)
Negotiations	0.31	0.38	0.34	0.22	0.26	0.41
	(0.36)	(0.36)	(0.36)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.32)
Battles	1.55***	1.39**	1.59***	3.38***	3.57***	3.63***
	(0.56)	(0.58)	(0.55)	(0.58)	(0.54)	(0.61)
Number of peacekeepers	0.04	−0.02	−0.02	0.23	0.09	0.88***
	(0.08)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.27)	(0.23)	(0.21)
'No war, no peace' period	−0.52			−0.32		
	(0.71)			(0.35)		
Violent protest$_{t-1}$		0.62			0.48	
		(0.41)			(0.51)	
Large protest$_{t-1}$			−0.43			0.22
			(0.51)			(0.81)
Unit of analysis	Week	Week	Week	District-week	District-week	District-week
District fixed effects	-	-	-	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	449	449	449	6,286	6,286	6,286
Log Likelihood	−135.54	−134.80	−135.31	−225.86	−225.77	−259.60
Akaike Inf. Crit.	287.09	285.59	286.61	493.71	493.54	535.21

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
All models correct for rare events bias using mean bias-reducing adjusted scores.

Including Additional District-level Control Variables

A final concern is that omitted variables in the district-week analysis confound the relationship between alignment protests and one-sided violence against civilians. In particular, Balcells (2017) argues and demonstrates for the Ivorian 2010–2011 post-election crisis that pre-war political and ethnic polarisation was associated with violence against civilians, a variable that may also be related to the occurrence of wartime civilian protest. Hence, as a robustness test, I replicate the main district-week analysis (Model 5 in Table 3) when including additional district-level control variables. Model 29 controls for the mean political polarisation score across municipalities in the district in the 2001 municipal elections, using data from Van Baalen (2020). The political polarisation score is measured using the discrete polarisation measure developed by Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2002) and can be interpreted as the extent to which the district had a bipolar distribution, that is, a 50%-50% parity between two opposing political parties. The variable ranges from zero to one, where higher values indicate a higher degree of political polarisation. Model 30 controls for political polarisation between Laurent Gbagbo-supporters and Alassane Ouattara-supporters in the second round of the 2010 presidential election, using data from the Ivorian Electoral Commission.[1] While this variable is measured towards the end of the civil war, and could hence be the result of protest events or violence against civilians, the focus on the presidential election also makes it a better measure of political polarisation around the civil war's main political cleavage. Model 31 controls for ethnic polarisation measured as the degree of polarisation between seven ethnolinguistic groups (Northern Mandé, Southern Mandé, Krou, Voltaïque, Akan, immigrants, and others) using data from the 2008 Household Living Standards Survey conducted by the Ivorian National Institute of Statistics (INS 2008). The results are reported in Table A6 and remain robust, meaning that the coefficient of alignment protest remains positive and statistically significant. To avoid multicollinearity, none of the models include district fixed effects.

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[1]The election results are available at https://www.cei.ci/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/R%C3%A9sultats-du-second-tour.pdf.

Table A6: Adding additional district-level control variables

	Occurrence of one-sided violence against civilians		
	(29)	(30)	(31)
Alignment protest$_{t-1}$	1.90***	2.20***	1.90***
	(0.57)	(0.54)	(0.58)
One-sided violence$_{t-1}$	2.28***	2.10***	2.28***
	(0.53)	(0.50)	(0.53)
One-sided violence$_{t-2}$	2.70***	2.47***	2.72***
	(0.50)	(0.49)	(0.50)
Negotiations	0.42	0.41	0.42
	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.31)
Battles	3.63***	3.58***	3.64***
	(0.59)	(0.56)	(0.60)
Number of peacekeepers	0.87***	0.67***	0.87***
	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.21)
Political polarization (2001)	−2.97		
	(1.97)		
Political polarization (2010)		3.34***	
		(1.02)	
Ethnic polarization (2008)			−0.18
			(0.62)
Unit of analysis	District-week	District-week	District-week
District fixed effects	No	No	No
Observations	6,286	6,286	6,286
Log Likelihood	−259.22	−249.70	−259.65
Akaike Inf. Crit.	534.43	515.40	535.30

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. All models correct for rare events bias using mean bias-reducing adjusted scores.

A4 Robustness Tests for H2

Controlling for Other Protest Types

Just as with the effect of alignment protest on one-sided violence against civilians, one possibility is that other concurrent protests account for the findings regarding *H2*. I thus account for this possibility by replicating the main model in Table 4 (Model 2) controlling for a one-week temporal lag of the occurrence of other protest types. This procedure is limited to anti-government protests, pro-government protests, anti-peace protests, and reform protests, as pro-intervention and pro-peace protests are too rare and generate perfect predictions. Table A7 presents the results. The results remain robust, meaning that the coefficient of anti-intervention protests remains positive and statistically significant. No other protest type has a consistent effect on the likelihood of violence involving peacekeepers across both the conflict week and district-week, although it should be noted that pro-government protests, anti-peace protests, and reform protests all have a statistically significant effect on the likelihood of peacekeeper violence in the district-week analysis (Models 37–39).

Table A7: Controlling for other protest types

	Occurrence of violence involving peacekeepers							
	(32)	(33)	(34)	(35)	(36)	(37)	(38)	(39)
Anti-intervention protest$_{t-1}$	1.18**	1.06**	1.00*	1.08**	1.07**	0.71**	0.76*	1.02**
	(0.54)	(0.48)	(0.52)	(0.51)	(0.44)	(0.36)	(0.45)	(0.44)
Anti-government protest$_{t-1}$	−0.46				−0.12			
	(0.69)				(0.36)			
Pro-government protest$_{t-1}$		0.002				1.87***		
		(0.84)				(0.70)		
Anti-peace protest$_{t-1}$			0.55				2.21***	
			(0.76)				(0.73)	
Reform protest$_{t-1}$				−0.15				−0.67**
				(0.54)				(0.27)
Peacekeeper violence$_{t-1}$	−0.29	−0.28	−0.29	−0.32	0.91	1.00*	0.78	0.90
	(0.71)	(0.77)	(0.73)	(0.73)	(0.64)	(0.52)	(0.78)	(0.64)
Peacekeeper violence$_{t-2}$	0.64	0.63	0.54	0.58	−0.19	0.03	−0.46	−0.09
	(0.68)	(0.70)	(0.74)	(0.69)	(0.35)	(0.31)	(0.48)	(0.34)
Negotiations	0.87**	0.85**	0.85**	0.83*	0.25	0.19	0.27	0.23
	(0.42)	(0.42)	(0.42)	(0.43)	(0.28)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.29)
Number of peacekeepers	−0.09*	−0.08	−0.08	−0.08	−0.76**	−0.55	−0.59	−0.77**
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.33)	(0.36)	(0.36)	(0.33)
Unit of analysis	Week	Week	Week	Week	District-week	District-week	District-week	District-week
District fixed effects	-	-	-	-	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	380	380	380	380	5,320	5,320	5,320	5,320
Log Likelihood	−69.94	−70.22	−70.11	−70.15	−171.24	−169.74	−169.08	−170.87
Akaike Inf. Crit.	153.89	154.43	154.21	154.29	382.48	379.49	378.15	381.74

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
All models correct for rare events bias using mean bias-reducing adjusted scores.

Including Additional Control Variables

Second, and again mirroring the analysis for *H1*, I examine whether the models suffer from omitted variable bias. Model 40 and 43 control for whether the week fell during the period of active armed conflict (19 September 2002–9 November 2004) or the period of "no war, no peace" (10 November 2004–24 February 2011), using the active conflict period as the reference category. Model 41 and 44 control for whether any protests that resulted in violence occurred in the week prior. Model 42 and 45 control for whether any large protest (more than 1,000 participants) occurred in the week prior. The results are reported in Table A8. The results in the conflict week analysis (Models 40–42) remain robust to the inclusion of these additional control variables, meaning that the coefficient of anti-intervention protest remains positive and statistically significant. This is not the case in the district-week analysis when controlling for the period of "no war, no peace" (Model 43) and violent protest (Model 44): although the coefficient of anti-intervention protest remains positive, it is not statistically significant at conventional levels ($p \approx 0.16$ in Model 43 and $p \approx 0.50$ in Model 44). This finding is not surprising given that both anti-intervention protests and violence involving peacekeepers was more common in the active conflict period, and given that a large share of the anti-intervention protests resulted in violence (sometimes involving peacekeepers). Hence, although the results in Model 43 and 44 do not necessarily invalidate the main findings, it should be noted the effect of anti-intervention protest on the likelihood of peacekeeper violence is less robust at the district-week level.

Table A8: Adding additional control variables

| | Occurrence of violence involving peacekeepers | | | | | |
	(40)	(41)	(42)	(43)	(44)	(45)
Anti-intervention protest$_{t-1}$	0.92*	1.00*	1.63***	0.69	0.51	0.74**
	(0.54)	(0.54)	(0.56)	(0.49)	(0.75)	(0.30)
Peacekeeper violence$_{t-1}$	−0.94	−0.33	−0.19	0.57	0.67	0.97
	(0.64)	(0.68)	(0.76)	(0.58)	(0.63)	(0.61)
Peacekeeper violence$_{t-2}$	0.32	0.60	0.68	−0.32	−0.29	−0.18
	(0.76)	(0.70)	(0.67)	(0.37)	(0.39)	(0.37)
Negotiations	1.00**	0.86**	0.83*	0.05	0.26	0.25
	(0.46)	(0.42)	(0.43)	(0.30)	(0.28)	(0.28)
Number of peacekeepers	0.18**	−0.08	−0.10*	0.73**	−0.75**	−0.73**
	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.34)	(0.34)	(0.34)
'No war, no peace' period	−2.74***			−2.33***		
	(0.69)			(0.45)		
Violent protest$_{t-1}$		0.24			1.14	
		(0.63)			(0.82)	
Large protest$_{t-1}$			−1.04*			0.51
			(0.63)			(0.39)
Unit of analysis	Week	Week	Week	Week	District-week	District-week
District fixed effects	-	-	-	-	Yes	Yes
Observations	380	380	380	5,320	5,320	5,320
Log Likelihood	−64.63	−70.20	−69.17	−158.23	−170.78	−171.22
Akaike Inf. Crit.	143.26	154.40	152.35	356.47	381.55	382.44

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
All models correct for rare events bias using mean bias-reducing adjusted scores.

Including Additional District-level Control Variables

Finally, also mirroring the analysis for *H2*, I re-examine the district-week analysis when including several district-level polarisation control variables (Model 10 in Table 4). Model 46 controls for the mean political polarisation score across municipalities in the district in the 2001 municipal elections. Model 47 controls for political polarisation between Laurent Gbagbo-supporters and Alassane Ouattara-supporters in the second round of the 2010 presidential election. Model 48 controls for ethnic polarisation measured as the degree of polarisation between seven ethnolinguistic groups. To avoid multicollinearity, none of the models include district fixed effects. Moreover, all models exclude the two-week temporal lag of peacekeeper violence, as this variable generates perfect predictions. The results are reported in Table A9 and remain robust, meaning that the coefficient of alignment protest remains positive and statistically significant.

Table A9: Adding district-level control variables

	Occurrence of violence involving peacekeepers		
	(46)	(47)	(48)
Anti-intervention protest$_{t-1}$	1.63***	1.59***	1.62***
	(0.52)	(0.51)	(0.52)
Peacekeeper violence$_{t-1}$	1.52**	1.46**	1.53**
	(0.62)	(0.62)	(0.62)
Negotiations	0.28	0.27	0.28
	(0.34)	(0.34)	(0.34)
Number of peacekeepers	0.06	−0.03	0.08
	(0.34)	(0.32)	(0.34)
Political polarization (2001)	−2.68		
	(2.25)		
Political polarization (2010)		1.10	
		(0.67)	
Ethnic polarization (2008)			0.53
			(1.14)
Unit of analysis	District-week	District-week	District-week
District fixed effects	No	No	No
Observations	5,320	5,320	5,320
Log Likelihood	−182.72	−181.52	−182.90
Akaike Inf. Crit.	377.45	375.03	377.81

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.
All models correct for rare events bias using mean bias-reducing adjusted scores.

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A6   Alternative Explanations for H3

Below, I elaborate on alternative explanations pertaining to the role of anti-peace protests in undermining the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement. Below, I assess five alternative explanations (and how they relate to anti-peace protests): a failure to address underlying issues, the lack of third-party security guarantees, the lack of power-sharing, role of elite manipulation, and French use of coercive mediation.

A Failure to Address Underlying Issues

A first plausible alternative explanation is that a failure to address the civil war's underlying issues provoked the agreement's downfall (cf. Wallensteen 2015). There is, however, little evidence to suggest that the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement did not address key underlying issues. To the contrary, scholars have noted that the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement contained all key ingredients. According to Mehler (2009, 466), the agreement addressed "most of the salient political problems of the country," whereas Mitchell (2012, 178) notes that the settlement "addressed both political and military dimensions of the conflict." The agreement contained multiple provisions that sought to address the immediate issue of Northern political exclusion, as well as several issues widely understood as the civil war's underlying issues (for an overview, see Akindès 2004). Annex I of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement set forth a set of

reforms to resolve critical issues pertaining to citizenship and the status of foreign nationals.[2] Annex II further suggested electoral reforms to expand suffrage, while Annex III ensured that opposition leader Alassane Ouattara would be able to compete in the upcoming elections, another of the rebels' demands. Finally, Annex IV dealt with the issue of land ownership, one of the foremost structural causes of the civil war (Mitchell 2014). Thus, in so far as peace agreements go, the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement was exemplary in addressing both the structural and immediate causes of the civil war.

The Lack of Third-party Security Guarantees

A second plausible alternative explanation is that a lack of third-party security guarantees undermined the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement. Walter (2002) argues that a critical barrier to civil war settlement is that the parties cannot credibly commit to implement a settlement for fear of being cheated by the other signatory. This fear is particularly damaging to the disarmament and demobilization process, as doing so makes the parties vulnerable to surprise attacks. The foremost solution to such credible commitment problems, according to Walter (2002, 26–27), is third-party security guarantees that entail outside actors both verifying and enforcing the settlement terms.

Issues pertaining to disarmament and demobilization, especially in regard to sequencing, were indeed a key impediment to implementing the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement. Nevertheless, this alternative explanation cannot account for the outcome, as the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement clearly included third-party security guarantees. The Linas-Marcoussis Agreement stipulated the creation of a committee consisting of, among others, representatives of the EU, AU, ECOWAS, UN, and France to "monitor implementation" of the agreement (§4) and guarantee the "regrouping and subsequent disarming of all forces" (§1g and §1h). Moreover, the agreement further stipulated that regrouping, disarmament, and demobilization of all forces should be undertaken "under the supervision of ECOWAS and French forces" (Annex VII §1 and §2). These forces were not mere chimeras, but already deployed in Côte d'Ivoire in numbers approaching several thousand troops (Martin, Piccolino, and Speight 2022, 1450). In fact, French forces intervened as early as September 2002, and had by the time of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement's signing already established a buffer zone across the country that kept the warring parties separated and limited the risk of surprise attacks during the proposed disarmament and demobilization phase (Martin, Piccolino, and Speight

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[2]The Linas-Marcoussis Agreement is available in full at: https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/CI_030123_LinasMarcousisAgreement.pdf

2022, 1448–1450). Thus, a lack of third-party security guarantees cannot explain the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement's failure.

The Lack of Power-sharing

A third plausible alternative explanation is that a lack of a concrete power-sharing agreement undermined the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement. Walter (2002) argues that third-party security guarantees only constitute a first step towards overcoming credible commitment problems, as "[s]olving the short-term problem of demobilization [...] does not solve the long-term problem of political participation" (Walter 2002, 27). She further argues that the belligerents will only remain committed to a negotiated settlement as far as the agreement ensures that they will be able to maintain some degree of executive power in the future. Thus, peace agreements should hold only when they involve power-sharing arrangements that "prevent the full concentration of political, military, and territorial power into the hands of a single administration" (Walter 2002, 31).

The Linas-Marcoussis Agreement included several provisions that sought to ensure all parties a share of power in the post-agreement phase, albeit not permanently. The agreement called for the creation of a Government of National Reconciliation to "be set up immediately after the conclusion of the Paris conference" (§3a) that should be led by a consensus Prime Minister (§3c) and "made up of representatives appointed by each of the Ivorian delegations taking part in the Round Table" (§3d). Moreover, the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement stipulated a range of electoral reforms aimed to ensure free and fair elections (Annex II). Hence, a lack of power-sharing provisions cannot explain why the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement failed to end the civil war. To the contrary. While analysts have described the power-sharing formula as "appropriate," "ambitious," and "comprehensive" (Mitchell 2012, 178–180), they note that the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement failed primarily *because* the power-sharing provisions were too far-reaching, perceived as unacceptable to government hardliners, and never implemented (Mehler 2009, 466). As discussed in the main article, anti-peace protests played a key role in signalling that the power-sharing deal was perceived as unfair by government hardliners, and preventing the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement's implementation.

Elite Manipulation

A fourth plausible alternative explanation is that anti-peace protests against the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement were part of a concerted effort by President Gbagbo to covertly neutralize international influence, buy time, and remain in power (see e.g. Piccolino 2011, 14). This alternative explanation holds that President Gbagbo mobilized anti-peace protests to provide a smokescreen for reneging on an agreement he viewed as unfavourable. As noted

by ICG (2003, 31), "Gbagbo agreed [to the deal], clearly realising that he could activate the 'young patriots' and present their anger as the 'people's' refusal of French pressure." This alternative explanation certainly holds some promise: President Gbagbo did have close ties with the individuals and groups involved in organizing anti-peace protests, and such protests did indeed help provide a smokescreen for reneging on the agreement.

Yet, there are a number of limitations with this explanation. First, it overlooks that mass-protest is hard to manufacture absent real grievances and powerful protest brokers (see e.g. Lockwood 2022). Thus, it seems unlikely that the President could have mobilized 100,000s of people had the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement been openly embraced by hardliners in the government camp. Second, this explanation cannot explain why President Gbagbo often—and at significant cost to his reputation—actively sought to quell protests against the settlement. After signing the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement, the President instructed his Defense Minister to ensure that protests did not "get out of hand" (Reuters 2003a). Both President Gbagbo and Prime Minister N'Guessan met with Jeunes Patriotes leaders in late January to explain the agreement and convince them to call off the protests (AFP 2003b; Reuters 2003a). President Gbagbo also went on state television to assuage the protesters to go home (AFP 2003a). Third, even though President Gbagbo tried to prevent anti-peace protests, he was often unsuccessful, indicating that he did not have as much control over protest brokers and participants as the elite manipulation thesis would suggest. On 10 February, for example, President Gbagbo tried to persuade Jeunes Patriotes leader Goudé to postpone a scheduled sit-in outside a French military base (Reuters 2003b). Nevertheless, the sit-in went ahead as planned. "We're not obliged to listen to the government," Goudé announced at the 1,000-man strong sit-in (AP 2003). These efforts go to show that President Gbagbo was not fully in control of the protest movement, nor did he necessarily welcome opposition to the agreement he just signed. Finally, while I cannot fully refute the possibility that anti-peace protests constituted a cynical plot orchestrated by President Gbagbo for walking away from the agreement, such a strategy still rested on actual anti-peace protests. Thus, this alternative explanation still indicates that civilian protest played a key role in obstructing conflict resolution.

French Coercive Mediation

A fifth plausible alternative explanation is that France's involvement as a mediatior and its use of coercive and manipulative mediation strategies constituted a key reason for the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement's ultimate failure to end the civil war. Although there is no scholarly consensus on whether coercive mediation enables or hampers conflict resolution (for an overview, see Wallensteen and Svensson 2014), critics of coercive mediation argue that

efforts to pressure or threaten the warring parties into signing an agreement decrease trust in the mediator and are therefore bound to fail (Laurie 1999). Related to the Ivorian civil war, several authors suggest that the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement agreement failed to end the civil war because French coercive mediation "presented a major obstacle for negotiating a durable and mutually acceptable power-sharing arrangement [especially ...] given the long-standing and increasingly heightened anti-French sentiments within the Gbagbo camp" (Mitchell 2012, 179).

The role of French coercive mediation provides the most plausible alternative explanation for the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement's failure, as it helps explain both why the government signed the agreement (because they were pressured to) and why they failed to implement it (because they had no interest in implementing what they had been forced to concede). Yet, this explanation should be seen as complementary, rather than a full alternative, to the proposition that anti-peace protests undermined the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement. Although the record clearly shows that French pressure and involvement in negotiating the deal delegitimized the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement (see e.g. Charbonneau 2012; Mehler 2009; Mitchell 2012; Piccolino 2011), the main expression of this discontent was the organization of anti-peace and anti-intervention protests by hardliners in the government camp. Thus, just like the elite manipulation thesis, this alternative explanation actually presumes that civilian protests played a role in undermining the settlement.

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