A Online Appendix

Online Appendix

The Violence of Law-and-order Politics: The case of law enforcement candidates in Brazil

There are two Appendices. This online appendix (Appendix A) is available on the APSR website, and all text references that include "A" are in this appendix. Appendix B is available at the Dataverse (Novaes, 2023). References to tables and figures that include "B" are there.

A.1 Descriptive statistics

Table A.1: Comparing municipalities that had and did not have a law-and-order candidate, 2012

Variable	All	Law-and-order	L&O, close margin	No Law-and-order
Non-white population	0.52	0.55	0.54	0.51
Population (average)	33628.94	81967.31	147047.08	14533.64
Population (median)	11116.50	24821.00	51970.00	8558.00
Inequality (Gini)	0.50	0.51	0.52	0.50
Security council	0.08	0.13	0.19	0.06
GDP per capita	19878.89	24285.92	27346.06	18137.97
Homicide rate	14.54	20.60	24.43	12.15
Non-white men homicide rate	8.42	12.86	15.48	6.67
Security spending pc	3.64	6.31	8.51	2.59
Car robberies pc	22.44	35.63	47.90	16.77
N. of councilor lists	4.43	6.19	7.60	3.73
Law-and-order cand.	0.28	1.00	1.00	-
N. of Law-and-order	0.52	1.83	2.76	-
N. of lists w. law-and-order	0.45	1.58	2.20	-
% of left-wing law-and-order	0.26	0.26	0.24	-
Law-and-order elected	0.05	0.19	0.33	-
N. law-and-order elected	0.06	0.21	0.37	-
Law enforcement or military occ.	0.39	0.81	0.89	0.23
N. Law enforc. or military occ.	0.97	2.55	4.06	0.34
N. council candidates	75.52	127.25	185.36	55.09
Total municipalities	5568	1576	516	3992

Note: Close margin refers to group of an absolute margin inferior to 0.1%.

Table A.2: Count of words related to public security in campaign platform

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Ballot name	0.89^{***}	0.85^{***}	0.81^{***}	0.62^{**}	0.54^{*}	0.52^{*}
	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.26)	(0.30)	(0.29)	(0.28)
No ballot name	0.26^{**}	0.26^{**}	0.25^{*}			
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)			
Intercept	0.69^{***}	0.56^{***}	0.69^{***}	0.95^{***}	0.61^{***}	-1.14^{***}
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.17)	(0.13)	(0.16)	(0.36)
State FE	-	-	Yes	-	-	Yes
Year FE	-	Yes	Yes	-	Yes	Yes
Num. obs.	30691	30691	30691	352	352	352

Note: Robust SEs in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$



(a) Total number of local security committees

(b) Total number of local security committees

Figure A.1: Total number of local security committees and map of existing committees in 2012

A.2 Local Security Committees

Table A.3: Comparing municipalities that had a security committee with those that did not, 2012

variable	With Committee	Without Committee	p-value
Non-White Population	0.48	0.56	0.00
Population (in thousands)	121.45	80.54	0.03
Inequality (Gini)	0.51	0.52	0.17
GDP per capita, in reais	28786.47	23439.79	0.00
Variation in homicides	1.32	3.10	0.18
Variation in homicides of non-white men	1.96	3.82	0.04
Variation in security spending, in reais pc	14.32	12.53	0.63



Figure A.2: Presence of local public security institutions in places with a security committee and a law-and-order candidate, 2012. *Bars are 95% C.I.s.*

Table A.4: Relationship between establishing local security committees and other local measures in public security.

	Dedicated budget	Multi-year	Community council	Sum
(Intercept)	0.026	0.029	0.063	0.118
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.006)
Security Committee	0.154	0.100	0.108	0.362
	(0.026)	(0.023)	(0.026)	(0.046)
Num.Obs.	4909	4909	4909	4909
Std.Errors	HC2	HC2	HC2	HC2

A.3 Robustness of the RD design



Figure A.3: Balance tests

Graphical representation in Dataverse Appendix.

A.3.1 Density test

The density test of the running variable is important to the regression discontinuity design because it informs us if there has been any potential manipulation around the cutoff. If there has, the potential outcomes framework would break apart, as treatment assignment would be compromised by unknown factors that could be associated with the selection of treatment and control. In our case, the running variable for the regression discontinuity design is the distance between the candidate and the last winner of the candidate's list, if that candidate lost the election, or the distance to the first loser of the list when the candidate won the election. Manipulation would happen if close winning or close losing candidates would in fact cluster on one side or the other for some reason. As the test below shows, however, there is no indication of sorting



Figure A.4: Density test. *Nonparametric density test around the RDD cutoff*

around the zero margin threshold (0 at the x-axis).[42]

[42]Test performed using the software described in Cattaneo, Matias D., Michael Jansson, and Xinwei Ma. "Local regression distribution estimators." Journal of Econometrics (2021).



(a) Homicides



(b) Local randomization



(c) Discontinuity

Figure A.5: The Effect of Electing a Law Enforcement Candidate on **Past** Homicide Rates. *Both plots estimate local linear models. Bars in (a) represent 95% robust C.I.s. Non-parametric bandwidth selection is in red. Table B.7 In Appendix B presents estimates. In (b), point estimates are differences of means. Bars are 95% C.I.s. (c) illustrates the discontinuity with binned averages and local linear regression lines.*



Figure A.6: Difference in municipal spending, education and sanitation. *Nonparametric RDDs. Bars represent 95% robust C.I.s. Table B.8 In Appendix B presents estimates.*

A.3.2 Placebo test for public security spending

The idea behind the tests in Figure A.6 is to check whether the election of a law enforcement candidate alters spending in areas outside the expertise of these candidates. Although the tests in the main text show that the election of law enforcement candidates generates more spending on public security and given that policymakers work under a constrained budget, it is unlikely that the increase in public security spending would result in noticeably less spending in specific areas. That is, since there are many areas in the municipal budget, it is also improbable that the increase in public security would generate a significant crowd-out in any health or education expenditure alone. Tests confirm that the election of law-and-order candidates does not show any noticeable effect on spending in these areas.

A.4 Alternate specifications and other results

Figure A.7 presents the results for differences in homicides for different groups of municipalities. Effects are larger in more unequal municipalities (higher and lower inequality are defined according to the Municipal Gini coefficient. Those above the median are high-inequality municipalities, and vice-versa). Moreover, effects are larger in municipalities with a population greater than 50,000.



Figure A.7: The Effect of Electing a Law Enforcement Candidate. *Local linear models. Bars represent 95% robust C.I.s. Table B.9 presents estimates.*



Figure A.8: Election of law-and-order candidates and homicides among women. *Nonparametric RDDs. Bars represent 95% robust C.I.s. Table B.10 in Appendix B reports estimates*

A.4.1 Estimations using raw vote margins



Figure A.9: Difference in homicide due to firearms or other means. *Nonparametric RDDs. Bars represent 95% robust C.I.s. Table B.11 in Appendix B reports estimates.*

Table A.5: Homicides (raw vote margin)

	Benchmark	MSE-optimal	2nd Polynomial	No previous L&O
Robust Coef.	12.933	5.863	7.376	7.154
	[4.395]	[2.790]	[3.372]	[2.955]
	(0.003)	(0.036)	(0.029)	(0.015)
Bandwidth	0	118	194.5	124.4
N.obs	231	503	622	380

Note:
Nonparametric estimations (MSE-two selection, unless noted) with year fixed effects, robust standard errors in brackets, p-values in parentheses. Includes municipalities whose raw vote margin is smaller than the median of municipalities within 0.01 percent margin (or smaller than 110 votes)

Table A.6: Effect of electing a police law-and-order candidate on homicides in municipalities with a security committee

	All municipalities	MSE-optimal	2nd Polynomial	No Previous L&O
Robust Coef.	−22.661	−19.733	−20.524	−35.636
	[13.645]	[14.099]	[16.957]	[16.792]
	(0.097)	(0.162)	(0.226)	(0.034)
Bandwidth	0.39 %	0.37 %	0.45 %	0.48 %
N.obs	16	17	24	10

Note:
Nonparametric estimations (MSE-two selection, unless noted) with year fixed effects, robust standard errors in brackets, p-values in parentheses.

A.4.2 Police law-and-order candidates in municipalities with security committees

Note that, after selecting municipalities with a police law-and-order candidate only and in municipalities with a preexisting security committee, these tests become low-powered.

A.4.3 Undetermined cases of violent death and reporting of police killings

It is possible that law enforcement incumbents influence the how authorities report homicides. First, it is possible that law enforcement incumbents affect how coroners rule on police killings, or "*autos de resistência*." In Figure A.10, I test and rule out that hypothesis using a binary outcome that indicates whether the municipality reported any homicide by the police after the election. Second, it is possible that politicians manipulate local statistics to deflate cases of homicides. Cerqueira (2012) finds suggestive evidence of this happening in the state of Rio de Janeiro. However, that has not been the case for law enforcement incumbents. The estimate at the bottom shows that there is no detectable increase or decrease in the number of undetermined homicides.



Figure A.10: Election of law-and-order candidates and potential data tampering. *Nonparametric RDDs. Bars represent 95% robust C.I.s.*. Table B.12 reports estimates.

A.5 Geography of police activity and homicides, municipalities with or without security committees

It is possible that, while improving the distribution of public security resources, committees break the pattern in which law-and-order support is unevenly distributed in the municipality. To test this hypothesis, I estimate the Herfindal-Hirschmann index of vote concentration in municipalities' polling stations. If the hypothesis is true, we should expect a reduction in concentration or a smaller HHI index. However, as Table A.7 reports, that is not the case. In linear models with controls and robust standard errors, the presence of local security committees is not statistically significantly related to the concentration of votes across polling stations. The unit of analysis is

Table A.7: Vote concentration (HHI) across polling stations and the presence of local security committee

	All	Elected Law-and-order
(Intercept)	1.007	2.069
	(0.201)	(0.541)
Local security committee	−0.026	0.032
	(0.076)	(0.106)
Population	0.000	−0.001
	(0.000)	(0.001)
Inequality (gini)	−1.578	−3.454
	(0.410)	(1.097)
Non-white pop.	0.342	−0.434
	(0.206)	(0.664)
Num.Obs.	196	34

municipalities, and the first column report results for all São Paulo municipalities in 2012, and the second column reports only where law and order candidates won.

A.5.1 Polling stations and their neighborhoods

The spatial analysis is predicated on the assumption that the support law-and-order candidates receive at the polling station reflects the support of the neighborhood in which the polling station is inserted. Resolution n. 20.132/98 and subsequent legislation established that voters must choose a *seção eleitoral* in a polling station within an electoral zone (*zona eleitoral)*. An electoral zone can be a municipality or an area of a municipality, and voters may, in principle, choose voting locations that are not close to their homes. It is unlikely that voters will choose to vote close to their work for convenience since all elections in Brazil take place on Sundays. Forging address documents to move zones is considered fraud.[43]

However, as noted in the text, voters may move to a different neighborhood or city, and fail to update their address, or if the closest polling station already has a large number of voters registered, the electoral authority may designate a polling station farther from a voter's home address. If these factors occur systematically, the correspondence between polling station support and neighborhood support may be imprecise. Worse, if these factors vary according to the support of law-and-order candidates, the estimates in the main text may be biased.

To check if polling stations' demographics are representative of their neighborhoods, I compare 2010 census data with data from the registry of voters in 2012. The census is a complete and detailed account of the area in which the polling stations is located. The registry provides some data on registered voters, including information about the educational level of voters at the time of registry. I do the comparison by calculating the correlation between schooling information from the registry of voters

[43]See Hidalgo, F Daniel and Simeon Nichter. 2016. "Voter buying: Shaping the electorate through clientelism." American Journal of Political Science 60(2):436–455.

Table A.8: Relationship between **College education** (electoral data) and income data (census)

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]
Rich neighborhood	0.323^{***}	0.319^{***}		
	(0.010)	(0.010)		
Poor neighborhood			-0.312^{***}	-0.315^{***}
			(0.012)	(0.012)
Intercept	0.038^{***}		0.073^{***}	
	(0.007)		(0.009)	
Municipal FE	-	Yes	-	Yes
Num. obs.	2602	2602	2602	2602

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

and literacy in the census (measured as the proportion of households whose heads are literate), and also using income from the census. Schooling is strongly correlated with income in Brazil,[44] making it a proxy for income. We should expect that if the registry of voters is representative of the area's population, income from the census and education from the registry will be highly correlated, especially using fixed-effects models that estimate correlations within a municipality.

Results strongly suggest that support for law and order at a polling station is equivalent to neighborhood support. Tables A.8 and A.9 estimate these correlations. The two dependent variables in these models are opposites (but not complements) of each other: the rate of college-educated voters and the rate of illiteracy or low educational level. Estimations reveal a very strong association for all variables and models. As expected, poorer neighborhoods – neighborhoods with a high proportion of poor households – also exhibit voters with lower education and fewer college degrees. The opposite applies to richer neighborhoods. Literacy is strongly, and negatively associated to illiteracy. More importantly, the estimates are extremely precise, corroborating the assumption made in the main text that voters represent individuals in a neighborhood who are very similar.

A.5.2 Other results

I separate municipalities according to the presence of local security committees. My hypothesis is that where committees are in place, there will be less evidence of favoritism. Specifically, communities that did not support winning law-and-order candidates will not experience less police activity relative to crime activity, or an increase in homicide. Please note that the amount of polling stations in areas with a committee is small.

[44] Binelli, Chiara and Naercio Menezes-Filho. 2019. "Why Brazil fell behind in college education?" Economics of Education Review 72:80–106.

Table A.9: Relationship between **Low educational attainment** (electoral data), income and educational data (census)

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Rich neighborhood	-0.347^{***}	-0.358^{***}				
	(0.012)	(0.012)				
Poor neighborhood			0.410^{***}	0.434^{***}		
			(0.020)	(0.020)		
Literacy					-0.332^{***}	-0.332^{***}
					(0.022)	(0.022)
Intercept	0.080^{***}		0.052^{***}		-0.001	
	(0.018)		(0.018)		(0.018)	
Municipal FE	-	Yes	-	Yes	-	Yes
Num. obs.	2598	2598	2598	2598	2594	2594

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table A.10: Support for Law Enforcement Candidates (LEC) and Police Activity

	Variation, 2012-2016					
	No Security Committee			Security Committee		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Low support	-0.4^{***}	-0.4^{***}	-0.3^{**}	-1.3	-2.2	-0.1
	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(4.4)	(3.2)	(0.2)
poor	7.0^{***}	5.7^{***}	1.3^{**}	55.2	-6.1	-1.2
	(2.0)	(1.3)	(0.6)	(70.8)	(10.8)	(1.9)
rich	-1.0^{***}	-1.3^{***}	-1.6^{***}	-94.5	-31.1	-3.9
	(0.2)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(121.3)	(43.1)	(4.8)
prop_nonwhite	6.3^{***}	5.1^{***}	3.9^{***}	-102.4	-19.7	0.2
	(1.1)	(0.4)	(0.4)	(129.9)	(28.5)	(0.8)
prop_local_total_young_men	0.7	1.0^{**}	0.5^{***}	-126.8	-24.5	-1.6
	(1.1)	(0.4)	(0.1)	(156.5)	(32.5)	(2.7)
total_votes_local	0.000^{***}	0.000^{***}	0.000^{***}	-0.01	-0.002	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.01)	(0.002)	(0.000)
Constant	-1.6^{***}	-2.6^{***}	-1.2^{***}	72.8	16.4	0.3
	(0.02)	(0.2)	(0.05)	(91.6)	(22.3)	(0.7)
Radius	0.25 km	0.5 km	1 km	0.25 km	0.5 km	1 km
P.St. controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Munic. FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
N. obs	2001	2075	2001	26	62	100

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.11: Support for Law Enforcement Candidates (LEC) and Homicides

	Variation, 2012-2016					
	No Security Committee			Security Committee		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Low support	0.19***	0.48***	4.13***	0.20***	0.02	0.76
	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.57)	(0.06)	(0.33)	(0.74)
poor	−0.70***	−2.17***	−21.12***	−0.98***	−5.89	−0.56
	(0.13)	(0.37)	(1.74)	(0.22)	(4.00)	(4.49)
rich	0.22***	0.53***	−1.39*	0.23	−0.77	−6.49***
	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.81)	(0.45)	(0.94)	(1.35)
prop_nonwhite	1.23***	4.19***	43.52***	−1.40***	−1.66**	−22.45**
	(0.05)	(0.11)	(1.84)	(0.46)	(0.78)	(9.02)
total_votes_local	0.0000***	0.0000***	0.0001***	0.0000	−0.0001	0.001
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0002)	(0.001)
prop_local_total_young_men	−0.53***	−1.79***	−8.52***	0.39	−2.14***	2.82
	(0.06)	(0.16)	(0.78)	(0.40)	(0.81)	(4.10)
Constant	−0.20***	−0.63***	−8.59***	0.41***	3.00***	14.27***
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.69)	(0.05)	(0.82)	(1.11)
Radius	0.25 km	0.5 km	1 km	0.25 km	0.5 km	1 km
P.St. controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Munic. FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
N. obs	2169	2169	2169	106	106	106

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.12: Credit claiming, connection with the police, and police chiefs in social media, **police candidates only** (Jan/21-Feb/22)

	Credit claim	Post with police	Post with police chief
Law-and-order police	0.224	0.293	0.207
	[0.090]	[0.089]	[0.091]
	(0.014)	(0.001)	(0.025)
Baseline	0.466	0.397	0.345
	[0.066]	[0.065]	[0.063]
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Num.Obs.	116	116	116

Note:
Robust standard errors in brackets, p-values in parentheses.

A.6 Social media

I describe how I coded social media variables in the Datverse appendix.

Table A.13: Effect of the election of law-and-order candidates on Homicides

	Benchmark	MSE-optimal	2nd Polynomial	No previous L&O	Levels with lag	Age as control
Robust Coef.	13.674	18.323	19.977	9.247	9.640	14.108
	[4.358]	[4.656]	[5.158]	[4.717]	[4.105]	[4.357]
	(0.002)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.050)	(0.019)	(0.001)
Bandwidth	0.27 %	0.29 %	0.4 %	0.33 %	0.27 %	0.27 %
N.obs	227	174	315	209	308	229

Note:
Nonparametric estimations (MSE-two selection, unless noted) with year fixed effects, robust stand
brackets, p-values in parentheses.

Table A.14: Effect of the election of not-police law-and-order candidates on Homicides

	Benchmark	MSE-optimal	2nd Polynomial	No previous L&O
Robust Coef.	4.382	4.390	7.952	5.342
	[4.640]	[4.512]	[5.515]	[4.220]
	(0.345)	(0.331)	(0.149)	(0.206)
Bandwidth	0.36 %	0.42 %	0.49 %	0.58 %
N.obs	183	176	215	136

Note:
Nonparametric estimations (MSE-two selection, unless noted) with year fixed effects, robust standard errors in brackets, p-values in parentheses.

A.7 Tables and robustness checks for Figures in the main text

Columns are:

- **Benchmark**: Estimations shown in main text: Mean Square Error bandwidth selection, one for each side of the cutoff, local linear models using a triangular kernel.
- **MSE-optimal**: Estimations using single optimal bandwidth for both sides of the cutoff.
- **2nd Polynomial**: Estimations using a 2nd-polynomial model.
- **No previous L&O**: Municipalities with an incumbent law-and-order candidate before treatment assignment excluded.

Column **Levels with lag** estimate the benchmark model using levels of homicides per 100,000 population/year as the dependent variable. Column **Age as control** includes the age of the law-and-order candidate as a control.

Table A.15: Effect of the election of an investigative police officer law-and-order candidate on Homicides

	Benchmark	MSE-optimal	2nd Polynomial	No previous L&O
Robust Coef.	15.379	14.528	16.865	−0.087
	[9.063]	[8.799]	[10.330]	[6.903]
	(0.090)	(0.099)	(0.103)	(0.990)
Bandwidth	0.38 %	0.43 %	0.46 %	0.53 %
N.obs	41	42	89	30

Note:
Nonparametric estimations (MSE-two selection, unless noted) with year fixed effects, robust standard errors in brackets, p-values in parentheses.

Table A.16: Effect of the election of a police officer law-and-order candidate on Homicides

	Benchmark	MSE-optimal	2nd Polynomial	No previous L&O
Robust Coef.	25.048	27.770	33.272	18.844
	[6.968]	[7.273]	[8.269]	[7.530]
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.012)
Bandwidth	0.3 %	0.31 %	0.43 %	0.33 %
N.obs	93	83	156	101

Note:
Nonparametric estimations (MSE-two selection, unless noted) with year fixed effects, robust standard errors in brackets, p-values in parentheses.

Table A.17: Effect of the election of law enforcement, but NOT law-and-order candidates on Homicides

	Benchmark	MSE-optimal	2nd Polynomial	No previous L&O
Robust Coef.	0.309	−0.346	1.041	0.662
	[3.122]	[2.924]	[4.284]	[3.310]
	(0.921)	(0.906)	(0.808)	(0.841)
Bandwidth	0.49 %	0.58 %	0.61 %	0.46 %
N.obs	497	584	591	447

Note:
Nonparametric estimations (MSE-two selection, unless noted) with year fixed effects, robust standard errors in brackets, p-values in parentheses.

Table A.18: Effect of the election of law-and-order candidates on Spending

	Benchmark	MSE-optimal	2nd Polynomial	No previous L&O
Robust Coef.	21.478	19.866	24.576	26.187
	[8.398]	[8.464]	[9.704]	[10.603]
	(0.011)	(0.019)	(0.011)	(0.014)
Bandwidth	0.29 %	0.4 %	0.37 %	0.27 %
N.obs	236	232	413	195

Note:
Nonparametric estimations (MSE-two selection, unless noted) with year fixed effects, robust standard errors in brackets, p-values in parentheses.

Table A.19: Effect of the election of not-police law-and-order candidates on Spending

	Benchmark	MSE-optimal	2nd Polynomial	No previous L&O
Robust Coef.	24.007	22.911	29.803	35.468
	[10.337]	[9.334]	[13.124]	[14.565]
	(0.020)	(0.014)	(0.023)	(0.015)
Bandwidth	0.47 %	0.53 %	0.52 %	0.44 %
N.obs	173	195	289	124

Note:
Nonparametric estimations (MSE-two selection, unless noted) with year fixed effects, robust standard errors in brackets, p-values in parentheses.

Table A.20: Effect of the election of investigative police law-and-order candidates on Spending

	Benchmark	MSE-optimal	2nd Polynomial	No previous L&O
Robust Coef.	41.822	26.128	50.000	41.966
	[26.679]	[21.194]	[33.100]	[32.551]
	(0.117)	(0.218)	(0.131)	(0.197)
Bandwidth	0.39 %	0.61 %	0.57 %	0.35 %
N.obs	44	66	70	26

Note:
Nonparametric estimations (MSE-two selection, unless noted) with year fixed effects, robust standard errors in brackets, p-values in parentheses.

Table A.21: Effect of the election of police law-and-order candidates on Spending

	Benchmark	MSE-optimal	2nd Polynomial	No previous L&O
Robust Coef.	19.278	13.015	14.528	22.052
	[9.986]	[8.990]	[10.371]	[12.281]
	(0.054)	(0.148)	(0.161)	(0.073)
Bandwidth	0.27 %	0.29 %	0.36 %	0.27 %
N.obs	118	117	166	96

Note:
Nonparametric estimations (MSE-two selection, unless noted) with year fixed effects, robust standard errors in brackets, p-values in parentheses.

Table A.22: Effect of the election of not law-and-order candidates (but law enforcement) on Spending

	Benchmark	MSE-optimal	2nd Polynomial	No previous L&O
Robust Coef.	−4.733	−2.046	−2.791	−5.364
	[7.583]	[6.746]	[9.337]	[7.871]
	(0.533)	(0.762)	(0.765)	(0.496)
Bandwidth	0.54 %	0.48 %	0.54 %	0.49 %
N.obs	386	385	547	341

Note:
Nonparametric estimations (MSE-two selection, unless noted) with year fixed effects, robust standard errors in brackets, p-values in parentheses.

Table A.23: Effect of the election of law-and-order candidates on Homicides, Municipalities with Security Committee

	Benchmark	MSE-optimal	2nd Polynomial	No previous L&O
Robust Coef.	−0.433	0.352	2.328	−13.154
	[8.915]	[9.019]	[10.501]	[7.134]
	(0.961)	(0.969)	(0.825)	(0.065)
Bandwidth	0.48 %	0.49 %	0.56 %	0.39 %
N.obs	64	62	75	33

Note:
Nonparametric estimations (MSE-two selection, unless noted) with year fixed effects, robust standard errors in brackets, p-values in parentheses.

Table A.24: Effect of the election of law-and-order candidates on Homicides, Municipalities without Security Committee

	Benchmark	MSE-optimal	2nd Polynomial	No previous L&O
Robust Coef.	14.791	19.783	21.245	15.759
	[4.741]	[5.012]	[5.681]	[5.624]
	(0.002)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.005)
Bandwidth	0.27 %	0.3 %	0.39 %	0.32 %
N.obs	193	151	272	166

Note:
Nonparametric estimations (MSE-two selection, unless noted) with year fixed effects, robust standard errors in brackets, p-values in parentheses.

Table A.25: Effect of the election of POLICE law-and-order candidates on Homicides, Municipalities without Security Committee

	Benchmark	MSE-optimal	2nd Polynomial	No previous L&O
Robust Coef.	28.644	30.269	35.035	27.390
	[8.193]	[8.384]	[9.947]	[8.289]
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)
Bandwidth	0.3 %	0.31 %	0.42 %	0.32 %
N.obs	77	74	138	75

Note:
Nonparametric estimations (MSE-two selection, unless noted) with year fixed effects, robust standard errors in brackets, p-values in parentheses.

Table A.26: Effect of the election of law-and-order candidates on Homicides, Large municipalities (smaller than 50,000 pop.) without Security Committee

	Benchmark	MSE-optimal	2nd Polynomial	No previous L&O
Robust Coef.	15.253	20.845	23.493	13.577
	[7.361]	[7.700]	[8.493]	[9.046]
	(0.038)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.133)
Bandwidth	0.28 %	0.3 %	0.38 %	0.29 %
N.obs	109	71	124	111

Note:
Nonparametric estimations (MSE-two selection, unless noted) with year fixed effects, robust standard errors in brackets, p-values in parentheses.

Table A.27: Effect of the election of law-and-order candidates on Homicides, small municipalities (smaller than 50,000 pop.) without Security Committee

	Benchmark	MSE-optimal	2nd Polynomial	No previous L&O
Robust Coef.	9.665	10.767	13.442	14.791
	[6.536]	[6.865]	[8.423]	[8.216]
	(0.139)	(0.117)	(0.111)	(0.072)
Bandwidth	0.36 %	0.39 %	0.47 %	0.4 %
N.obs	138	130	187	99

Note:
Nonparametric estimations (MSE-two selection, unless noted) with year fixed effects, robust standard errors in brackets, p-values in parentheses.

Table A.28: Effect of the election of law-and-order candidates on Homicides, without Security Committee, using controls

	Benchmark	MSE-optimal	2nd Polynomial	No previous L&O
Robust Coef.	14.791	19.783	21.245	15.759
	[4.741]	[5.012]	[5.681]	[5.624]
	(0.002)	(<0.001)	(<0.001)	(0.005)
Bandwidth	0.27 %	0.3 %	0.39 %	0.32 %
N.obs	193	151	272	166

Note:
Nonparametric estimations (MSE-two selection, unless noted) with year fixed effects, robust standard errors in brackets, p-values in parentheses.

Table A.29: Effect of the election of law-and-order candidates on Appointments of past police employees

	Benchmark	MSE-optimal	2nd Polynomial	No previous L&O
Robust Coef.	6.355	4.507	4.804	9.343
	[6.224]	[6.204]	[6.722]	[8.064]
	(0.307)	(0.468)	(0.475)	(0.247)
Bandwidth	0.41 %	0.41 %	0.57 %	0.41 %
N.obs	413	376	560	303

Note: Nonparametric estimations (MSE-two selection, unless noted) with year fixed effects, robust standard errors in brackets, p-values in parentheses.

Table A.30: Effect of the election of not-police law-and-order candidates on appointments of past police employees

	Benchmark	MSE-optimal	2nd Polynomial	No previous L&O
Robust Coef.	9.280	6.464	7.868	15.993
	[9.446]	[9.344]	[12.054]	[15.517]
	(0.326)	(0.489)	(0.514)	(0.303)
Bandwidth	0.44 %	0.49 %	0.41 %	0.42 %
N.obs	292	235	243	229

Note:
Nonparametric estimations (MSE-two selection, unless noted) with year fixed effects, robust standard errors in brackets, p-values in parentheses.

Table A.31: Effect of the election of investigative police law-and-order candidates on appointments of past police employees

	Benchmark	MSE-optimal	2nd Polynomial	No previous L&O
Robust Coef.	−5.905	−2.581	−8.270	−4.910
	[3.516]	[3.608]	[4.888]	[8.371]
	(0.093)	(0.474)	(0.091)	(0.557)
Bandwidth	0.32 %	0.43 %	0.36 %	0.36 %
N.obs	29	42	45	21

Note:
Nonparametric estimations (MSE-two selection, unless noted) with year fixed effects, robust standard errors in brackets, p-values in parentheses.

Table A.32: Effect of the election of police law-and-order candidates on appointments of past police employees

	Benchmark	MSE-optimal	2nd Polynomial	No previous L&O
Robust Coef.	9.206	3.102	−0.138	11.758
	[4.743]	[3.774]	[5.611]	[5.871]
	(0.052)	(0.411)	(0.980)	(0.045)
Bandwidth	0.43 %	0.29 %	0.37 %	0.41 %
N.obs	162	120	136	125

Note:
Nonparametric estimations (MSE-two selection, unless noted) with year fixed effects, robust standard errors in brackets, p-values in parentheses.

Table A.33: Effect of the election of not law-and-order (but law enforcement) candidates on appointments of past police employees

	Benchmark	MSE-optimal	2nd Polynomial	No previous L&O
Robust Coef.	−2.189	−4.420	0.353	−0.388
	[16.742]	[17.203]	[16.985]	[16.721]
	(0.896)	(0.797)	(0.983)	(0.981)
Bandwidth	0.24 %	0.33 %	0.36 %	0.23 %
N.obs	197	205	295	176

Note:
Nonparametric estimations (MSE-two selection, unless noted) with year fixed effects, robust standard errors in brackets, p-values in parentheses.

Table A.34: Effect of the election of law-and-order candidates on Killings of or by law enforcement agents

	Killings by law enforcement agents	Killings of law enforcement agents
Robust Coef.	0.258	−0.052
	[0.208]	[0.099]
	(0.215)	(0.600)
Bandwidth	0.39 %	0.55 %
N.obs	271	401

Note:
Nonparametric estimations (MSE-two selection) with year fixed effects, robust standard errors in brackets, p-values in parentheses.