

Supplementary Materials for “Failing the Test”

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A Preliminaries

A.1 Deviations from pre-analysis plan

Throughout this analysis, I deviate at five key junctures from the pre-registered analyses with respect to the econometric approach.

- First, I had pre-registered a bandwidth of 5pp around the threshold in the event of a response rate greater than 3%. In the end, I obtained a response rate of 5.2%—far greater than the typical response rates obtained through unsolicited one-off email surveys with no incentive. Given the significantly larger sample size, and out of concerns of bias-reduction, I have eschewed the pre-registered bandwidth in favor of a smaller bandwidth of 1pp. Owing to the tendency of smaller bandwidths to have estimates with wider confidence intervals, I believe this to be tolerable on the grounds that it is a null-biasing decision. Nonetheless, in the appendix I present the results of the main analyses according to the original, pre-registered 5pp bandwidth demonstrating their robustness.
- Second, I had pre-registered an alternative econometric approach: a local linear regression to recover the average treatment effect. In the time since registering my analysis plan, but prior to the implementation of the survey, I decided that, at least for the main analysis, bivariate regressions are more interpretable than a local linear regression. Nonetheless, in the appendix, I also present the additional results using the local linear specification, which are substantively unchanged (SA Section C.2.1).
- Third, I had pre-registered an intention to estimate the effect of failure on the individual survey items as the main outcomes. In the presentation of the results, I have instead opted to group the outcomes in “families” and construct indices, a decision motivated by feedback received from colleagues during workshops. In Figure 3, I have also presented the results from the benchmark analyses using the individual survey items as outcomes, showing the results to be robust.
- Fourth, I had intended to include three questions in the family of outcomes gauging “Javanese Preferentialism.” However, upon conclusion of the survey, I discovered an error in the translation of one of the measures. After the fact, I decided to remove this item from the construction of the index. The results are robust to its inclusion at any rate.
- Fifth, the initial theoretical interest of this project was in identifying the effect of failure on civil service examinations, which was the focus of the econometric approach described in the pre-analysis plan. With the support of reviewers and editors during the review process, the analysis has also come to present estimates of the effect of public service.

A.2 A discussion of research ethics

This section documents and discusses the steps that the researcher took to ensure that the research protocol adhered to ethical standards expected in social science research. Where relevant, this section mentions and discusses the specific principles mentioned in the Principles and Guidance for Human Subjects Research, as approved by the APSA council. This research was reviewed and approved by UC Berkeley IRB (protocol # 2020-02-12976). The research was also conducted in collaboration with the Indonesian civil service agency, which conducted its own internal review of the research and with whom the researcher worked to mitigate potential risks and discomforts to study participants.

The Indonesian civil service recently moved to a system of rigorous examinations in the selection of its civil servants. The goal of the research was to document both satisfaction and dissatisfaction with this new system, and how the experience of failing the test might be undermining support for the new institution itself. The research thus investigated an institution that was implemented independent of the research. Although participation in the research provided no immediate and direct benefits to participants, it is the view of the researcher that by taking part in such a study, participants were provided with an indirect benefit by being offered a venue to communicate their attitudes to the civil service agency. The main risk associated with the research is a data breach, which I discuss below.

The scale of the survey merits comment, particularly as it pertains to a broader ethical mandate to minimize harm. To the extent that research carries risks, it follows that researchers should in general limit the number of participants to the minimal viable number. In the case of the present research, the Indonesian civil service agency solicited participation from all 3,636,262 applicants. In the end, 204,989 applicants responded. The initial decision to solicit participation from all applicants was indeed out of concerns over statistical power: recall that the research design is chiefly interested in attitudes of individuals around a narrow cutpoint, which constitutes a more narrow subset of respondents. Previous studies where participation was solicited through a one-off email survey solicitation request obtained response rates in the range of 0.5% to 1%. Furthermore, the researcher believed that response rates would be lower in Indonesia, where internet access is more sparse than places reporting those response rate benchmarks. However, in the event, the survey obtained a response rate of 5.2%—vastly exceeding my expectations, but reflecting a desire to participate in the research, and probably owing to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic which has rapidly accelerated uptake of email and internet usage in Indonesia as individuals adapt to working from home.

As a fully observational study, the research involved no experimental manipulation (thus mostly sidestepping ethical concerns laid out in **Principle 6**). In July 2020, all individuals who had applied for the Indonesian civil service in 2018 were sent an email by the Indonesian civil service agency providing them with a unique link to a survey, and an invitation to participate in a survey regarding their views on the civil service recruitment process. Individuals were told in the solicitation email that participation was voluntary, that the research was being conducted in partnership with researchers at UC Berkeley, and that their individual responses would not be shared with the civil service agency.

The decision to send emails by the Indonesian civil service agency was motivated by two ethical considerations. First, after consultation with the civil service agency, it was agreed that survey solicitations from a foreign researcher could influence the process of obtaining informed consent—as described in **Principle 4** regarding the potential power imbalances between researcher and researched. Second, the method in which the Indonesian civil service agency sent the emails created a hard firewall between the survey data and the administrative data—thus improving the likelihood that the data would be kept confidential even in the event of a breach as described in **Principle 9**. In the worst case scenario, the Indonesian civil service agency could obtain applicants’ answers to sensitive questions and use them to revoke employment, or block future recruitment. However, under the method described, at no time did the researcher have access to respondents’ email addresses, and at no time has the civil service agency had access to the survey responses. The administrative data (test scores) and outcome data (survey measures) are linked with a unique randomly generated identifier—the key to which only the researcher has access. These steps were taken to mitigate possible harm to subjects.

Upon clicking the link to participate in the survey, respondents were directed to a landing page on Qualtrics. They were provided with further information about the study and its purpose

to evaluate applicant satisfaction and dissatisfaction with the civil service recruitment process. Describing the project in only general terms was done to maintain the integrity of the research and prevent undue influence of researcher demand effects. The landing page also provided information about the risks (possible data breach) and benefits (none) associated with it, and an exhortation that their participation was fully voluntary and that they could exit the platform at any time. At this point, respondents were prompted with a question soliciting their consent to participate—in a manner consistent with **Principle 5**. If they answered “no” the survey was immediately terminated. Throughout the survey, after each question battery, respondents were reminded that they could skip any questions they did not wish to answer—reminders that were designed to mitigate the possibility of any trauma stemming from answering uncomfortable questions, in line with **Principle 8**.

Finally, readers might be concerned about the research ethics of a large-scale data collection effort conducted in collaboration with a government entity, particularly as the attitudes in which this research is interested are sensitive. In addition to the data breach concerns discussed above, collaboration with government entities introduces concerns over the possibility of policy changes stemming from the findings and thus invokes **Principle 10** regarding broader social impacts. The project originated from a casual conversation between the researcher and the head of the human resources department at the Indonesian civil service agency regarding satisfaction and frustration with the new examination system. The researcher proposed a survey to obtain a better view of the margins upon which the civil service agency could improve its new system. From the outset, the research was thus intended to have social impacts on the implementation of a new policy. This intention was weighed in light of the importance of collecting and thus giving voice to applicants’ attitudes in the discussion about how to improve this policy—a benefit that I believe to outweigh any of the possible risks.

A.3 A note on data availability

The data used in this research derives from sensitive personnel records maintained by the Indonesian civil service agency. Most of the analyses presented in this article, however, are based on a small subset of observations: individuals who participated in the survey component and thus consented to share their responses for the purposes of scientific research. In keeping with APSR’s principles of data transparency, interested third parties may access the data based on these observations to replicate most of the figures and tables found in the paper.


Importantly, the main analyses in the paper do not make direct use of the underlying administrative data, but instead rely on variables that were generated based on the administrative data. For instance, the core explanatory variable is a forcing variable (i.e. the distance to a threshold) which, in the case of the SKD, is comprised of three composite scores (the three different components of the SKD) and is moreover a function of distance to the nationwide threshold. In the case of the SKB, meanwhile, this forcing variable is relative to the scores of other competitors for the specific job opening, the title of which replicators will not be able to observe.

Owing to the nature of my agreement with the Indonesian civil service agency, and due to the sensitivity of the individual-level personnel records, I am not permitted to release the full administrative data that is used in generating several of the tables and figures (Table A3, Figures A1 and A4). Interested replicators or third parties who wish to access the administrative data may nonetheless do so. Researchers should contact the IT Subdirector of the Indonesian civil service agency (BKN) in Jakarta with a formal written request to access the 2018-2019 applicant data. There is no requirement to access the data in any form of onsite lab and thus requests to access the data can therefore be conducted online. While I cannot release the data used, for the figures and tables that make use of the full administrative data, replicators can nonetheless access and review the code used to produce the analysis.

B Data and Identification

B.1 Independent Variable: Graphical Depiction

Figure A1—Graphical Depiction of Variation in Independent Variable



B.2 Dependent Variable: Outcome Questions

Javanese Preferentialism: We are now going to read some statements about relationships between Java and other islands. Please state whether you strongly disagree, somewhat disagree, somewhat agree, or strongly agree.

1. “Because a big portion of the Indonesian population lives on Java, the government should primarily focus its attention there.”

$$Y_i = \begin{cases} 4 & \text{if “Strongly agree”} \\ 3 & \text{if “Somewhat agree”} \\ 2 & \text{if “Somewhat disagree”} \\ 1 & \text{if “Strongly disagree”} \\ \text{NA} & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

2. “In recent years, the government of Indonesia has focused its attention on giving its resources

to Java.”

$$Y_i = \begin{cases} 4 & \text{if “Strongly agree”} \\ 3 & \text{if “Somewhat agree”} \\ 2 & \text{if “Somewhat disagree”} \\ 1 & \text{if “Strongly disagree”} \\ \text{NA} & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

Regional Preferentialism: We are now going to read some statements about relationships between regions in Indonesia. Please state whether you strongly disagree, somewhat disagree, somewhat agree, or strongly agree.

1. “The regional government should focus its attention on the interests of original residents, rather than on recent migrants.”

$$Y_i = \begin{cases} 4 & \text{if “Strongly agree”} \\ 3 & \text{if “Somewhat agree”} \\ 2 & \text{if “Somewhat disagree”} \\ 1 & \text{if “Strongly disagree”} \\ \text{NA} & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

2. “Too many people that originate from outside the region hold important positions within the regional government.”

$$Y_i = \begin{cases} 4 & \text{if “Strongly agree”} \\ 3 & \text{if “Somewhat agree”} \\ 2 & \text{if “Somewhat disagree”} \\ 1 & \text{if “Strongly disagree”} \\ \text{NA} & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

3. “The leaders of the regional government currently focus too much of their time on the interests of city-dwellers, to the detriment of rural folks.”

$$Y_i = \begin{cases} 4 & \text{if “Strongly agree”} \\ 3 & \text{if “Somewhat agree”} \\ 2 & \text{if “Somewhat disagree”} \\ 1 & \text{if “Strongly disagree”} \\ \text{NA} & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

Religious Intolerance: Please state whether you’d feel upset if...

1. “A member of a different religion built a place of worship in your village”

$$Y_i = \begin{cases} 4 & \text{if “Strongly upset”} \\ 3 & \text{if “Somewhat upset”} \\ 2 & \text{if “Somewhat not upset”} \\ 1 & \text{if “Not upset at all”} \\ \text{NA} & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

2. “A member of a different religion became a mayor in your district.”

$$Y_i = \begin{cases} 4 & \text{if “Strongly upset”} \\ 3 & \text{if “Somewhat upset”} \\ 2 & \text{if “Somewhat not upset”} \\ 1 & \text{if “Not upset at all”} \\ \text{NA} & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

3. “A member of a different religion became a senior official in the national government.”

$$Y_i = \begin{cases} 4 & \text{if “Strongly upset”} \\ 3 & \text{if “Somewhat upset”} \\ 2 & \text{if “Somewhat not upset”} \\ 1 & \text{if “Not upset at all”} \\ \text{NA} & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

National identification:

1. “In your opinion, in this modern era, is *Pancasila* still relevant to be used as a guiding ideology for the people of Indonesia?”

$$Y_i = \begin{cases} 4 & \text{if “Very relevant”} \\ 3 & \text{if “Somewhat relevant”} \\ 2 & \text{if “Somewhat irrelevant”} \\ 1 & \text{if “Very irrelevant”} \\ \text{NA} & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

2. “If you had to choose one, would you say that you identify more as an Indonesian, or as a member of a specific ethnic group (e.g., Javanese, Sundanese, Betawi, Batak, etc)?”

$$Y_i = \begin{cases} 3 & \text{if “Indonesian”} \\ 2 & \text{if “I identify with a little bit of both”} \\ 1 & \text{if “My ethnic group”} \\ \text{NA} & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

Perceptions of corruption: There are many factors that affect the likelihood of a candidate’s selection and preparedness. In your opinion, how important are the following factors in the selection process?

1. “Candidate merit”

$$Y_i = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if “Very important”} \\ 2 & \text{if “Somewhat important”} \\ 3 & \text{if “Somewhat unimportant”} \\ 4 & \text{if “Very unimportant”} \\ \text{NA} & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

2. “Connections with insiders”

$$Y_i = \begin{cases} 4 & \text{if “Very important”} \\ 3 & \text{if “Somewhat important”} \\ 2 & \text{if “Somewhat unimportant”} \\ 1 & \text{if “Very unimportant”} \\ \text{NA} & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

3. “Ethnicity, religion, and race”

$$Y_i = \begin{cases} 4 & \text{if “Very important”} \\ 3 & \text{if “Somewhat important”} \\ 2 & \text{if “Somewhat unimportant”} \\ 1 & \text{if “Very unimportant”} \\ \text{NA} & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

4. “Many people have the view that it is easier to get a civil service job with connections. Others think that the best way to become a civil servant is to study hard for the test. Which of these two routes is closer to your view?”

$$Y_i = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if “Connections”} \\ 0 & \text{if “Test”} \\ \text{NA} & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$


5. “In general, do you believe that the selections process for civil servants was done very transparently, somewhat transparently, not very transparently, or not at all transparently?”

$$Y_i = \begin{cases} 4 & \text{if “Very transparent”} \\ 3 & \text{if “Somewhat transparent”} \\ 2 & \text{if “Not very transparent”} \\ 1 & \text{if “Not at all transparent”} \\ \text{NA} & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

B.3 Threat 1: Nonrandom Assignment (Balance)

One observable implication of the as-if random assumption is that applicants ought to look statistically indistinguishable along a host of observable time-invariant characteristics on either side of the cutpoint. To evaluate this implication, I conduct a series of balance tests to examine whether the demographic characteristics of winners and losers look the same on either side of the threshold. The results of these tests are presented in Figure A2 and generally indicate that winners look statistically indistinguishable from losers on a range of observable characteristics, with the exception of age. On average, winners are older than losers, although by only six months—a substantively small imbalance likely attributable to the tendency of winning employment to nudge older applicants to regularly check their email when they might not have otherwise. To assuage concerns that the main findings are driven by this imbalance, in the appendix, I conduct the main analyses with age as a control variable, showing the results to be robust to its inclusion.


Figure A2—Balance Tests, Across Both Thresholds



B.4 Threat 2: Nonrandom Sorting

One concern is the design’s internal validity: i.e., whether the outcome of civil service exams is truly as good as random within a narrow bandwidth. To bolster this assumption I conduct two sets of tests. The first test attempts to detect evidence of “sorting” around the cutpoint—an especially valuable test given broader concerns about corruption in recruitment decisions. Drawing on the work of Cattaneo, Jansson and Ma (2018), I implement a test to detect evidence of manipulation around the threshold of the service effect; I observe no such signs of manipulation ($p = 0.19$). Owing to discrete nature of the forcing variable within the threshold of the basic competence examination scores, I conduct a visual inspection of the distribution below, which betrays no signs of “sorting.”


Figure A3—Sorting Tests—Distribution of Forcing Variables



B.5 Threat 3: Nonresponse Bias (and Attrition)

Another inferential concern is a form of attrition bias. In the full sample of respondents, compared to losers, winners were more than twice as likely to complete the survey (12.0% vs. 5.1%). This is understandable, since winners are more likely to be employed than losers and thus regularly checking email. But this tendency might introduce certain biases into the baseline estimates if, for instance, the attrited losers were individuals with systematically different attitudes than those who completed the survey. However, recall that the estimation sample is the subset of respondents who narrow passed or failed the civil service exam; within this sample of respondents, attrition bias is negligible (response rates: 11.3% v 10.5%). Nonetheless, I adopt two strategies to deal with attrition bias. First, I compare the demographic composition of the estimation sample to the universe of applicants in section B.5 in the appendix. Visually, the figure indicates that the sample composition is generally similar to the universe of applicants. Second, I implement a method proposed by Lee (2009) to construct worst-case estimates to bound the selection effect of attrition. These estimates are parametric, relying on an assumption of “monotonicity” in selection as affected by treatment assignment.¹

Figure A4—Composition of Sample of Respondents and Universe of Applicants



¹ Another method for bounding attrition bias, double sampling, proposed by Coppock et al. (2017), relies on less onerous assumptions and provides tighter bounds; however, this strategy was logistically infeasible due to implementation constraints imposed by the BKN.

C Additional analyses

C.1 Attrition/Selection Bias

C.1.1 Inverse Probability of Attrition (IPA) Weights

Table A1—The Effect of Basic Competence Examination (SKD) Failure, IPA Weights

	Java. Pref.		Reg. Pref.	Relg. Resent.	Corrup. Percep.	Natl. ID
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Failed SKD	0.128*** (0.041)	-0.008 (0.034)	0.0004 (0.027)	0.005 (0.028)	0.076*** (0.025)	-0.071** (0.028)
Constant	0.003 (0.026)	-0.001 (0.022)	-0.001 (0.018)	0.020 (0.017)	-0.009 (0.016)	0.003 (0.017)
Subset	Javan	non-Javan	—	—	—	—
Observations	2619	3683	6035	5910	7092	5873
Bandwidth	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Beta coefficients from weighted OLS regression. Standard errors were calculated using the Huber-White (HC0) correction. The outcomes measure are indexed values capturing (1) Javanese preferentialism among Javans and (2) among non-Javans, (3) regional preferentialism, (4) religious resentment, (5) perceptions of corruption, (6) national identification.

Table A2—The Effect of Passing Specialist Competence Examination (SKB), IPA Weights

	Java. Pref.		Reg. Pref.	Relg. Resent.	Corrup. Percep.	Natl. ID
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Passed SKB	-0.248*** (0.046)	-0.011 (0.047)	-0.262*** (0.034)	-0.036 (0.035)	-0.405*** (0.030)	0.125*** (0.034)
Constant	-0.008 (0.037)	-0.007 (0.038)	0.010 (0.028)	0.045 (0.029)	-0.015 (0.026)	-0.0004 (0.028)
Subset	Javan	non-Javan	—	—	—	—
Observations	2042	1890	3813	3728	4145	3716
Bandwidth	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Beta coefficients from weighted OLS regression. Standard errors were calculated using the Huber-White (HC0) correction. The outcomes measure are indexed values capturing (1) Javanese preferentialism among Javans and (2) among non-Javans, (3) regional preferentialism, (4) religious resentment, (5) perceptions of corruption, (6) national identification.

C.1.2 Worst Case Bounds

Table A3—Lee Bounds

	Effect of SKD Failure			Effect of Passing SKB		
	Lower	Upper	N	Lower	Upper	N
Java Pref. (Java)	-0.125	0.353	251079	-0.467	0.092	44073
Java Pref. (non-Java)	-0.008	0.173	251079	-0.272	-0.019	44073
Regional Pref.	-0.211	0.190	251079	-0.564	-0.073	44073
Religious Intolerance	-0.202	0.235	251079	-0.252	-0.023	44073
Nationalism	-0.274	-0.063	251079	0.139	0.431	44073
Corruption	0.076	0.301	251079	-0.952	-0.615	44073

C.1.3 Matriculant Analysis, Propensity Score Matching

Table A4—Matriculant Analysis, Propensity Score Matching

IV:	DV:	Estimate	SE	T-Stat	N
Matriculant	Javan Preferentialism (Javans)	-0.069	0.162	-0.427	1258
Matriculant	Javan Preferentialism (non-Javans)	0.084	0.180	0.464	1118
Matriculant	Regional Preferentialism	-0.096	0.111	-0.865	2308
Matriculant	Religious Resentment	-0.151	0.121	-1.242	2247
Matriculant	Corruption Perceptions	-0.361	0.098	-3.668	2493
Matriculant	National Identification	0.236	0.123	1.922	2236

C.2 Alternative Specifications

C.2.1 Pre-Registered Specifications

Table A5—The Effect of Basic Competence Examination (SKD) Failure, Local Linear

	Java. Pref.		Reg. Pref.	Relg. Resent.	Corrup. Percep.	Natl. ID
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Failed SKD	0.066*	−0.033	0.003	0.008	0.057***	−0.048**
	(0.036)	(0.030)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.024)
Forcing	−0.003**	−0.004***	−0.004***	−0.004***	−0.008***	0.002*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Failed SKD X Forcing	0.002	0.002	0.003*	−0.001	0.004**	−0.004**
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Constant	0.040*	0.052***	0.046***	0.058***	0.105***	−0.023
	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.015)
Subset	Javan	non-Javan	—	—	—	—
Observations	14293	19780	32778	32122	38177	31916
Bandwidth	5%	5%	5%	5%	5%	5%

Note: * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$. Beta coefficients from local linear regression. Standard errors were calculated using the Huber-White (HC0) correction. The outcomes measure are indexed values capturing (1) Javanese preferentialism among Javans and (2) among non-Javans, (3) regional preferentialism, (4) religious resentment, (5) perceptions of corruption, (6) national identification.


Table A6—The Effect of Passing Specialist Competence Examination (SKB), Local Linear

	Java. Pref.		Reg. Pref.	Relg. Resent.	Corrup. Percep.	Natl. ID
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Passed SKB	−0.212***	−0.017	−0.240***	0.020	−0.404***	0.139***
	(0.039)	(0.041)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.026)	(0.030)
Forcing	0.008	−0.001	−0.018**	−0.026***	−0.029***	−0.014
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.009)
Passed SKB X Forcing	−0.018	−0.008	0.010	0.026**	0.004	0.010
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.011)
Constant	0.020	0.0001	−0.043*	−0.060**	−0.062***	−0.036
	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.025)
Subset	Javan	non-Javan	—	—	—	—
Observations	8170	7246	14987	14624	16291	14581
Bandwidth	5%	5%	5%	5%	5%	5%

Note: * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$. Beta coefficients from local linear regression. Standard errors were calculated using the Huber-White (HC0) correction. The outcomes measure are indexed values capturing (1) Javanese preferentialism among Javans and (2) among non-Javans, (3) regional preferentialism, (4) religious resentment, (5) perceptions of corruption, (6) national identification.


C.2.2 Graphical Presentation of Results—Failing SKD

Figure A5—Effect of Failure on Basic Competence Examination (SKD)



C.2.3 Graphical Presentation of Results—The Effect of Passing SKB

Figure A6—Effect of Passing Specialist Competence Examination (SKB)



C.2.4 Main Specification, Age Controls

Table A7—The Effect of Basic Competence Examination (SKD) Failure, Age Control

	Java. Pref.		Reg. Pref.	Relg. Resent.	Corrup. Percep.	Natl. ID
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Failed Test	0.123*** (0.041)	-0.008 (0.034)	-0.002 (0.026)	0.008 (0.027)	0.081*** (0.024)	-0.068** (0.027)
Age	-0.017*** (0.006)	-0.015*** (0.005)	-0.024*** (0.004)	0.006 (0.004)	-0.008** (0.004)	0.028*** (0.004)
Constant	0.464*** (0.161)	0.403*** (0.136)	0.649*** (0.106)	-0.170 (0.109)	0.227** (0.099)	-0.755*** (0.107)
Subset	Javan	non-Javan	—	—	—	—
Observations	2619	3683	6050	5925	7110	5888
Bandwidth	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%

Note: * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$. Beta coefficients from OLS regression with age control. Standard errors were calculated using the Huber-White (HC0) correction. The outcomes measure are indexed values capturing (1) Javanese preferentialism among Javans and (2) among non-Javans, (3) regional preferentialism, (4) religious resentment, (5) perceptions of corruption, (6) national identification.

Table A8—The Effect of Passing Specialist Competence Examination (SKB), Age Control

	Java. Pref.		Reg. Pref.	Relg. Resent.	Corrup. Percep.	Natl. ID
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Passed SKB	-0.241*** (0.046)	-0.004 (0.047)	-0.268*** (0.032)	-0.035 (0.034)	-0.426*** (0.029)	0.127*** (0.033)
Age	-0.018*** (0.006)	-0.019*** (0.007)	-0.006 (0.005)	0.022*** (0.005)	0.004 (0.004)	0.011** (0.005)
Constant	0.468*** (0.171)	0.520*** (0.187)	0.161 (0.123)	-0.577*** (0.132)	-0.103 (0.109)	-0.304** (0.126)
Subset	Javan	non-Javan	—	—	—	—
Observations	2042	1890	3821	3736	4153	3724
Bandwidth	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%

Note: * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$. Beta coefficients from OLS regression with age control. Standard errors were calculated using the Huber-White (HC0) correction. The outcomes measure are indexed values capturing (1) Javanese preferentialism among Javans and (2) among non-Javans, (3) regional preferentialism, (4) religious resentment, (5) perceptions of corruption, (6) national identification.

C.2.5 Main Specification, Full Controls

Table A9—The Effect of Basic Competence Examination (SKD) Failure, Controls

	Java. Pref.		Reg. Pref.		Relg. Resent.		Corrup. Percep.		Natl. ID			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Failed SKD	0.125*** (0.041)	0.124*** (0.041)	-0.008 (0.034)	-0.006 (0.034)	-0.001 (0.026)	0.001 (0.026)	0.008 (0.027)	0.020 (0.026)	0.081*** (0.024)	0.084*** (0.024)	-0.069** (0.027)	-0.071*** (0.027)
Age		-0.015** (0.006)		-0.016*** (0.005)		-0.025*** (0.004)		0.006 (0.004)		-0.009** (0.004)		0.025*** (0.004)
Woman		0.098** (0.041)		-0.049 (0.034)		-0.014 (0.026)		-0.019 (0.026)		-0.105*** (0.024)		-0.127*** (0.027)
Urban		-0.050 (0.043)		0.014 (0.036)		-0.007 (0.028)		-0.105*** (0.027)		0.098*** (0.026)		-0.063** (0.028)
Muslim		0.015 (0.103)		0.075* (0.040)		0.076** (0.038)		0.803*** (0.031)		0.209*** (0.034)		-0.084** (0.037)
Constant	0.004 (0.025)	0.363* (0.199)	0.004 (0.022)	0.383*** (0.144)	0.0003 (0.017)	0.603*** (0.118)	0.003 (0.017)	-0.796*** (0.114)	0.007 (0.016)	0.108 (0.109)	0.001 (0.017)	-0.511*** (0.117)
Subset	Javan	Javan	non-Javan	non-Javan	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Observations	2619	2619	3683	3683	6050	6035	5925	5910	7110	7092	5888	5873
Bandwidth	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Beta coefficients from OLS regression with and without controls. Standard errors were calculated using the Huber-White (HC0) correction. The outcomes measure are indexed values capturing (1) Javanese preferentialism among Javans and (2) among non-Javans, (3) regional preferentialism, (4) religious resentment, (5) perceptions of corruption, (6) national identification.


Table A10—The Effect of Passing Specialist Competence Examination (SKB), Controls

	Java. Pref.		Reg. Pref.		Relg. Resent.		Corrup. Percep.		Natl. ID			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Passed SKB	-0.247*** (0.046)	-0.234*** (0.046)	-0.018 (0.047)	-0.001 (0.047)	-0.271*** (0.032)	-0.265*** (0.032)	-0.023 (0.034)	-0.033 (0.032)	-0.424*** (0.029)	-0.423*** (0.029)	0.133*** (0.033)	0.128*** (0.033)
Age		-0.018*** (0.006)		-0.022*** (0.007)		-0.008* (0.005)		0.022*** (0.005)		0.001 (0.004)		0.010** (0.005)
Woman		-0.030 (0.047)		-0.053 (0.047)		-0.082*** (0.032)		0.047 (0.033)		-0.126*** (0.028)		-0.079** (0.033)
Urban		0.107** (0.048)		0.075* (0.046)		0.001 (0.031)		-0.040 (0.032)		0.112*** (0.028)		-0.051 (0.033)
Muslim		0.220*** (0.080)		0.232*** (0.053)		0.052 (0.044)		0.781*** (0.041)		0.030 (0.038)		-0.008 (0.046)
Constant	-0.0001 (0.037)	0.265 (0.191)	0.005 (0.038)	0.402** (0.203)	0.002 (0.027)	0.216 (0.134)	0.003 (0.027)	-1.259*** (0.138)	0.006 (0.026)	-0.017 (0.117)	-0.006 (0.027)	-0.194 (0.140)
Subset	Javan	Javan	non-Javan	non-Javan	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Observations	2042	2042	1890	1890	3821	3813	3736	3728	4153	4145	3724	3716
Bandwidth	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Beta coefficients from OLS regression with and without controls. Standard errors were calculated using the Huber-White (HC0) correction. The outcomes measure are indexed values capturing (1) Javanese preferentialism among Javans and (2) among non-Javans, (3) regional preferentialism, (4) religious resentment, (5) perceptions of corruption, (6) national identification.

C.3 Trends in Communal Violence

Figure A7—Trends in Meritocracy and Communal Violence in Indonesia, 1998–2014



C.4 Sensitivity analysis

Figure A8—Effect of Failure on Basic Competence Examination (SKD), Sensitivity Analysis





Figure A9—The Effect of Passing Specialist Competence Examination (SKB), Sensitivity Analysis



C.5 Heterogenous Treatment Effects

Table A11—The Effect of Basic Competence Examination (SKD) Failure, By Perceptions of Javan Advantage

	Java. Pref.		Reg. Pref.	Relg. Resent.	Corrup. Percep.	Natl. ID
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Failed SKD	0.08*	−0.01	0.02	0.04	0.07**	−0.05
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Believe Javans Advantaged	0.64***	0.60***	0.51***	0.07*	0.33***	−0.11***
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Believe Javans Advantaged X Failed SKD	0.08	−0.001	−0.08	−0.09*	−0.01	−0.05
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Constant	−0.20***	−0.22***	−0.18***	−0.02	−0.11***	0.04*
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Subset	Javan	non-Javan	—	—	—	—
Observations	2607	3654	6005	5877	6689	5843
Bandwidth	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Beta coefficients from OLS regression with interaction terms. Standard errors were calculated using the Huber-White (HC0) correction. The outcomes measure are indexed values capturing (1) Javanese preferentialism among Javans and (2) among non-Javans, (3) regional preferentialism, (4) religious resentment, (5) perceptions of corruption, (6) national identification.

Table A12—The Effect of Basic Competence Examination (SKD) Failure, By Perceptions of Muslim Advantage

	Java. Pref.		Reg. Pref.	Relg. Resent.	Corrup. Percep.	Natl. ID
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Failed SKD	0.07	−0.05	−0.02	−0.0004	0.05**	−0.09***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Believe Muslims Advantaged	0.71***	0.40***	0.37***	0.29***	0.45***	−0.14***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Believe Muslims Advantaged X Failed SKD	0.17*	0.12	0.02	0.02	0.04	0.09
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Constant	−0.16***	−0.08***	−0.08***	−0.06***	−0.10***	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Subset	Javan	non-Javan	—	—	—	—
Observations	2566	3566	5885	5763	6543	5727
Bandwidth	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Beta coefficients from OLS regression with interaction terms. Standard errors were calculated using the Huber-White (HC0) correction. The outcomes measure are indexed values capturing (1) Javanese preferentialism among Javans and (2) among non-Javans, (3) regional preferentialism, (4) religious resentment, (5) perceptions of corruption, (6) national identification.

Table A13—The Effect of Basic Competence Examination (SKD) Failure, by Time Spent Studying

	Java. Pref.		Reg. Pref.	Relg. Resent.	Corrup. Percep.	Natl. ID
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Failed SKD	−0.102 (0.199)	−0.255 (0.198)	−0.067 (0.141)	0.066 (0.140)	−0.133 (0.137)	0.194 (0.151)
Time Spent Studying (1-5)	−0.046* (0.026)	−0.101*** (0.026)	−0.024 (0.019)	−0.021 (0.019)	−0.161*** (0.018)	0.080*** (0.019)
Failed SKD X Time Spent Studying	0.050 (0.043)	0.055 (0.042)	0.014 (0.030)	−0.013 (0.030)	0.047 (0.029)	−0.058* (0.032)
Constant	0.214* (0.121)	0.468*** (0.123)	0.109 (0.088)	0.100 (0.088)	0.742*** (0.084)	−0.365*** (0.091)
Subset	Javan	non-Javan	—	—	—	—
Observations	2617	3674	6039	5914	7095	5878
Bandwidth	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Beta coefficients from OLS regression. Standard errors were calculated using the Huber-White (HC0) correction. The outcomes measure are indexed values capturing (1) Javanese preferentialism among Javans and (2) among non-Javans, (3) regional preferentialism, (4) religious resentment, (5) perceptions of corruption, (6) national identification.

Table A14—The Effect of Basic Competence Examination (SKD) Failure, by Employment Status

	Java. Pref.		Reg. Pref.	Relg. Resent.	Corrup. Percep.	Natl. ID
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Failed SKD	−0.089 (0.096)	−0.040 (0.067)	−0.010 (0.055)	−0.007 (0.057)	0.014 (0.055)	−0.050 (0.058)
Employed	−0.036 (0.068)	−0.012 (0.052)	−0.027 (0.042)	−0.050 (0.042)	−0.069* (0.041)	0.141*** (0.042)
Failed SKD X Employed	0.251** (0.108)	0.040 (0.081)	−0.014 (0.064)	0.007 (0.066)	0.054 (0.064)	−0.005 (0.067)
Constant	0.032 (0.060)	0.016 (0.042)	0.043 (0.036)	0.043 (0.035)	0.076** (0.035)	−0.106*** (0.036)
Subset	Javan	non-Javan	—	—	—	—
Observations	2168	2944	5130	5133	5157	5150
Bandwidth	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Beta coefficients from OLS regression. Standard errors were calculated using the Huber-White (HC0) correction. The outcomes measure are indexed values capturing (1) Javanese preferentialism among Javans and (2) among non-Javans, (3) regional preferentialism, (4) religious resentment, (5) perceptions of corruption, (6) national identification.

C.6 Work and Employment Outcomes

Table A15—The Effect of Basic Competence Examination (SKD) Failure On Work Outcomes

	Income (m, IDR)		Employed		Job Satisfaction (1-4)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Failed Test	-0.09*	-0.08	0.01	0.01	-0.04	-0.003
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	1.82***	1.80***	0.71***	0.71***	2.77***	2.73***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Subset	—	Non-CS	—	Non-CS	—	Non-CS
Observations	4147	4000	5158	5153	4191	4038
Bandwidth	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Beta coefficients from OLS regression with interaction terms. Standard errors were calculated using the Huber-White (HC0) correction. The outcomes measure are indexed values capturing (1) Javanese preferentialism among Javans and (2) among non-Javans, (3) regional preferentialism, (4) religious resentment, (5) perceptions of corruption, (6) national identification.

Table A16—The Effect of Passing Specialist Competence Examination (SKB) On Work Outcomes

	Income (m, IDR)	Employed	Job Satisfaction (1-4)
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Passed Test	0.61***	0.04	0.42***
	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Constant	2.33***	0.79***	2.79***
	(0.05)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Observations	3213	1376	3317
Bandwidth	1%	1%	1%

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Beta coefficients from OLS regression. Standard errors were calculated using the Huber-White (HC0) correction. The outcomes measure are indexed values capturing (1) Javanese preferentialism among Javans and (2) among non-Javans, (3) regional preferentialism, (4) religious resentment, (5) perceptions of corruption, (6) national identification.

C.7 Tabular Presentation of Figures 3 and 4

Table A17—Tabular Presentation of Figure 3

Outcome	Effect of SKD Failure		Effect of Passing SKB	
	Estimate	SE	Estimate	SE
Govt should focus attention on Java (1-4)	0.106	0.038	-0.199	0.036
Govt has given most resources to Java (1-4)	0.084	0.032	-0.103	0.033
Govt should focus attention on Java (non, 1-4)	0.000	0.029	-0.010	0.036
Govt has given most resources to Java (non, 1-4)	-0.027	0.034	-0.017	0.045
Local govt should focus attention on locals over immigrants (1-4)	0.015	0.026	-0.276	0.032
Too many outsiders work in government (1-4)	0.003	0.025	-0.197	0.027
Local govt focuses too much on city-dwellers (1-4)	-0.014	0.025	-0.088	0.028
Upset if different religion built place of worship (1-4)	0.012	0.021	-0.003	0.023
Upset if different religion became mayor (1-4)	-0.002	0.023	-0.021	0.027
Upset if different religion became national minister (1-4)	0.008	0.022	-0.021	0.024
Is Pancasila still relevant? (1-4)	-0.054	0.018	0.048	0.018
Identify more as ethnic group (1) or Indonesian (3)	-0.005	0.014	0.051	0.016
How transparent is recruitment? (1-4, reversed)	0.035	0.021	-0.417	0.023
How important is merit (1-4, reversed)	0.026	0.019	-0.060	0.021
How important is ethnicity (1-4)	0.066	0.025	-0.136	0.024
How important are connections (1-4)	0.046	0.028	-0.261	0.029
Which more important? Test (0) or connections (1)	0.021	0.010	-0.085	0.009

Table A18—Tabular Presentation of Figure 4

Quintile	Difference by Place of Residence		Difference by Job Location	
	Estimate	SE	Estimate	SE
1	-0.139	0.063	-0.032	0.038
2	0.005	0.051	-0.157	0.070
3	0.099	0.059	0.055	0.077
4	0.026	0.060	0.098	0.070
5	0.053	0.068	0.203	0.084