Online Appendices

I. Overall summary statistics for the data used in the main analysis

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Table A.1: Summary Statistics per congressional district in 2013 and 2018 | | | | |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Variable | Mean | Std. Dev. | Min | Max |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Sugar Contributions\* | 7571 | 8815 | -900 | 52,900 |
| Ideological Ranking (ACU) | 46.9 | 35.3 | 0 | 100 |
| Tenure | 10.3 | 9 | 1 | 59 |
| Percent > 65 years old | 14.9 | 3.4 | 6.4 | 36.3 |
| Percent w/ bachelor's degree | 18.9 | 5.8 | 5.9 | 39.9 |
| Median earnings | 38092 | 8125.1 | 21748 | 80497 |
| Poverty Rate | 14.7 | 5.5 | 3.6 | 39.8 |
| Median income | 58533 | 16410 | 25801 | 134077 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| \*inflation-adjusted dollars given for the time period used in Table 1 in the main text. Statistics are for all congressional districts. | | | | |
|  |
|  |

II. Full regressions for Table 3 in main text

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Table A2. The Determinants of Voting in Favor of Sugar Reform | | | | | |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Window 1 | |  | Window 2 | |
| Variable | District F.E. | Incumbent F.E. |  | District F.E. | Incumbent F.E. |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Inflation-adjusted Sugar | -0.0006\*\*\* | -0.0006\*\*\* |  | -0.0006\*\*\* | -0.0003\*\*\* |
| Contributions | (0.001) | (0.001) |  | (0.001) | (0.003) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ACU | 0.16\*\*\* | -0.12\* |  | 0.17\*\*\* | 0.09 |
|  | (0.001) | (0.06) |  | (0.001) | (0.34) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Tenure | -0.14\*\*\* | -1.77\*\*\* |  | -.26\*\*\* | -1.37\*\*\* |
|  | (0.005) | (0.001) |  | (0.001) | (0.001) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Poverty Rate | 0.76\*\* | 2.97\*\* |  | 1.29\*\*\* | 2.15\*\*\* |
|  | (0.05) | (0.05) |  | (0.001) | (0.005) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| % w/ bachelor's degree | 0.64 | 0.58 |  | 1.03\* | 0.696 |
|  | (0.18) | (0.21) |  | (0.07) | (0.12) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Median income | -0.00001 | 0.001\* |  | -.0001 | 0.0006 |
|  | (0.97) | (0.09) |  | (0.73) | (0.18) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| % pop. > 65 years old | -1.97\*\*\* | -0.46 |  | -1.54\*\* | -.198 |
|  | (0.006) | (0.83) |  | (0.03) | (0.89) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Agriculture Committee | -35.9\*\*\* | -43.7\*\*\* |  | -34.2\*\*\* | -40.8\*\*\* |
|  | (0.001) | (0.001) |  | (0.001) | (0.001) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | 7.26 | -89.7\*\*\* |  | -3.36 | -65.4\*\* |
|  | (.57) | (0.001) |  | (0.81) | (0.02) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Pseudo R2 | 0.666 | 0.745 |  | 0.674 | 0.704 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 186 | 106 |  | 186 | 106 |
| Estimation method is Logit. The dependent variable equals 1 for “aye” votes on the reform (votes against sugar interests) and 0 otherwise. Window 1 is from 1/1/13 - 12/31/13 for the first vote and 1/1/18 - 12/31/18 for the second. Window 2 includes the twelve months before each vote, so 6/20/12 - 6/20/13 for the first and 5/17/17 - 5/17/18 for the second. P-values calculated using robust standard errors. \*\*\*, \*\*, and \* represent significance at the .01, .05, and .10 level, respectively. | | | | | |

III. Where We Started

Column 1 below contains the main results from our original submission using data directly from the CRP website, which is reported by election cycle (2011-12 and 2017-18). Column 2 reports our results when we aggregate the individual contributions data that we obtained from the CRP over the same time windows.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Table A.3: The Determinants of Voting in Favor of Sugar Reform | | | | | |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Using CERP’s Aggregated Data | |  | Using Author-Aggregated Data | |
| Variable | District F.E. | Incumbent F.E. |  | District F.E. | Incumbent F.E. |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Inflation-adjusted Sugar | -0.0004\*\*\* | -0.0012\*\*\* |  | -0.0006\*\*\* | -0.0006\*\*\* |
| Contributions | (0.001) | (0.001) |  | (0.001) | (0.004) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ACU | 0.14\*\*\* | -0.14 |  | 0.18\*\*\* | 0.14 |
|  | (0.001) | (0.12) |  | (0.001) | (0.29) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Tenure | -0.23\*\*\* | -1.96\*\*\* |  | -0.31\*\*\* | -.58 |
|  | (0.001) | (0.006) |  | (0.001) | (0.29) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Poverty Rate | 1.26\* | 5.6\*\*\* |  | 1.99\*\*\* | 4.2\*\*\* |
|  | (0.08) | (0.001) |  | (0.001) | (0.001) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| % w/ bachelor's degree | 0.967\*\* | 0.412 |  | 1.18\*\* | 1.35\*\*\* |
|  | (0.04) | (0.42) |  | (0.02) | (0.001) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Median income | -0.0001 | 0.002\*\*\* |  | 0.0001 | 0.0007\* |
|  | (0.32) | (0.001) |  | (0.84) | (0.08) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| % population > 65 years old | -1.05 | -4.13\*\*\* |  | -1.34\* | -2.87\*\*\* |
|  | (0.22) | (0.001) |  | (0.07) | (0.005) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Agriculture Committee | -31.9\*\*\* | -17.3\*\*\* |  | -32.0\*\*\* | -35.5\*\*\* |
|  | (0.001) | (0.001) |  | (0.001) | (0.001) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | -9.67 | -83.6\*\*\* |  | -22.4 | -75.1\*\* |
|  | (.48) | (0.001) |  | (.13) | (0.04) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Pseudo R2 | 0.676 | 0.849 |  | 0.727 | 0.736 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 186 | 106 |  | 186 | 106 |
| Estimation method is Logit. The dependent variable equals 1 for “aye” votes on the reform amendments (votes against sugar interests) and 0 otherwise. P-values are calculated using robust standard errors. \*\*\*, \*\*, and \* represent significance levels at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively. | | | | | |