


Online Appendices for Does Political Oversight of the Bureaucracy Increase Accountability?

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A Descriptives

A.1 Map of Sample

Figure A1: Map of Uganda Showing the 28 Districts in the Sample



A.2 Perception of the Intervention

Below are descriptions of the intervention provided by councilors during qualitative interviews:

“The only [financial] documents we get are from Kampala, from the Budget Information.¹ We show these documents to the chief to try and pressure to get better information from him.”²

“The program gives us information which we otherwise could not get. [...] It is an eye opener: It has introduced checks and balances, eliminating ghost projects, and projects from other subcounties wrongly listed here.”³

“We use that information for monitoring. When we reach [at a school] we ask how much money they got. If it does not match with our own number we get concerned and ask: How come this information is not matching?! [...] That way the headmaster knows we are informed and monitoring closely.”⁴

¹The intervention is locally known as Budget Transparency Initiative, or BTI.

²Qualitative interview with LC3 chairperson, ruling party, AII2.

³Qualitative interview with opposition council members, DII1.

⁴Qualitative interview with opposition councilors, BII.

Table A1: What was the most important thing you learned from those workshops?

Open-ended response	Frequency	Percent	Domain
Roles of councilors	285	25%	Rights & responsibilities
Councilors responsible for overseeing service delivery	193	17%	Rights & responsibilities
How to monitor effectively	122	11%	Capacity
Budget formulation	106	9%	Capacity
Importance of monitoring	90	8%	Rights & responsibilities
Right to access financial documents	83	7%	Rights & responsibilities
Budget allocations to subcounty projects	55	5%	Budget information
Financial reporting systems	51	4%	Capacity
How to use the Budget Hotline	39	3%	Budget information
Other	64	6%	
How to interpret budgets	37	3%	Capacity
Actual transfers to subcounty	14	1%	Budget information
Expenditures on subcounty projects	13	1%	Budget information
Not ok to deviate from budget	8	1%	Capacity
Total	1,160	100	
Rights & responsibilities	651	59%	
Capacity	324	30%	
Budget information	121	11%	

Notes: Councilors were asked about their perception of the workshop during the first follow-up survey by enumerators not associated with the intervention. The question was open-ended.

Table A2: What have you used the material for?

Open-ended response	Frequency	Percent
For monitoring	741	75%
To demand accountability from SC chief	129	13%
Other	51	5%
To obtain other financial documents	24	2%
To demand accountability from district	18	2%
To start investigations	14	1%
To obtain technical specifications of project inputs	9	1%
To demand accountability from contractor	5	1%
Total	991	100%

Notes: Councilors were asked about their perception of the workshop during the first follow-up survey by enumerators not associated with the intervention. The question was open-ended.

A.3 Deviations from the Preanalysis Plan

Operationalization of dependent variables

I had prespecified using the difference between the baseline and follow-up survey as dependent variable. The main tables instead report results from the more standard approach of controlling for baseline values. Results are robust to using the prespecified specification (see SI in the APSR Dataverse).

Heterogeneous treatment effects

While testing the conditioning effects of political competition on local politicians' incentives to engage in oversight has always been a main objective of this project, the initial preanalysis plan focused on heterogeneous treatment effects by perceived party competition (the crosscutting design described in Section D.2). Qualitative interviews and the 8-month follow-up survey made it clear that the crosscutting intervention was perceived as toothless. Instead, it became evident that party dominance was such a strong determinant of politician incentives that it was drowning out any marginal changes in perceived electoral competition. An updated preanalysis plan, registered prior to analysis of the two 22-month follow-up surveys, thus specified the subgroup analysis by alignment.

A.4 Ethical Considerations

IRB approvals for this study were secured at IPA (Protocol ID: 1063), Yale University (Protocol ID: 1404013737), and at the Ugandan National Council for Science and Technology (UNCST) (Protocol ID: ARC153). More general approval for the project was also received from UNCST itself (Protocol ID: SS3489) and from the Office of the President, Uganda.

I took several steps to address the major ethical challenges associated with this research, which I view to be: a) that providing information about funds received by local governments and how bureaucrats had reportedly spent them might generate conflict between bureaucrats and politicians, b) that interviewing local government officials may take time away from their duties, and c) that participants might feel pressured to participate in the study and/or that their anonymity might be compromised by the data storage protocols.

With respect to the first concern, it was important that the Ministry of Finance was involved in and signed off on every project design decision and that the information shared was the official data provided by the Government of Uganda. A Steering Committee, consisting of representatives from the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, the Ministry of Local Government, the Office of the Prime Minister, the Overseas Development Institute, Innovations for Poverty Action and two Ugandan civil society organizations guided the intervention and study. The Ministry of Finance has the mandate to share financial information and local government officials have the right and indeed a duty to access it in order to fulfill their mandate of monitoring service delivery. Furthermore, implementation teams were already experienced in training local government officials and received a week-long training of trainers regarding how to present the information and conduct the workshops, which included modules on constructive and peaceful reconciliation of conflict. One may also be concerned that the control group did not receive the training and the information. We provided as many local government officials with the intervention as was feasible given budget constraints. The study period was viewed as a pilot by the Ministry of Finance, which it was going to use to decide how many resources to allocate to a scale-up in the future. At the end of the study period, all equipment and know-how was transferred to the Ministry of Finance. The budget website, which was forming the backbone of the intervention, was live at the time this article was written, providing regularly updated public information on all available local government budgets and expenditures.

With respect to the concern that the survey may have distracted local government officials from performing their duties, mobilization teams contacted all participants several days in advance to schedule appointments which worked with their schedule.

With respect to concerns about survey respondents' informed consent and privacy, participation in the study was voluntary and all respondents need to have given their informed consent in order to participate. Respondents received a small compensation for their transport to the subcounty headquarters where interviews were conducted in the form of 10,000 shs. (about USD 3), which was deemed the appropriate amount by local research and government partners. All data was collected electronically on password protected PDAs, using SurveyCTO, an ODK based platform. Data was uploaded to an encrypted server on a daily basis, networks permitting, and then stored on password protected computers using encryption and removing all personally identifying information from the datasets.

B Dependent Variables

Table B1: Index Composition

Index	Index components	BL
<i>Short-term outcomes</i>	<i>Expected to change at first follow-up survey</i>	
Knowledge	# of correct steps in budget formulation listed	✓
	# of correct procurement steps listed	✓
	Know that chief can take action if project implementation is substandard	
	Know that chief can withhold payment if project implementation is substandard	✓
	# of correct monitoring steps listed (construction projects)	✓
	# of correct monitoring steps listed (schools)	✓
	# of grant types of subcounty listed	✓
	Know that no law preventing councilors from accessing financial info of subcounty exists	
Political oversight	# of financial documents requested (<i>monitoring</i>)	
	# of types of financial documents requested (<i>monitoring</i>)	
	# of third-party observed monitoring visits ^A (<i>monitoring</i>)	
	# of financial documents given access to (<i>access</i>)	
	# of repercussions taken against contractors (<i>repercussions</i>)	
	# of projects with tensions with contractors (<i>repercussions</i>)	
<i>Longer term outcomes</i>	<i>Expected to change at second follow-up survey</i>	
Allocations	Allowances paid to councilors for attending council meetings in past 12 months	✓
	Total monthly amount councilors receive from their council work	✓
Personal wealth	Consumption index (meat, drinks, airtime, clothing, funeral and wedding contributions)	✓
	Support of relatives (school fees, other monetary support)	✓
	Assets	✓
Satisfaction with projects	User satisfaction with overall project quality ^A	
	User satisfaction with information received about project ^A	
	User satisfaction with processes of project implementation ^A	
	Users indicate that project meets needs of community ^A	
	End user satisfaction ^A	
Project quality	Physical assessment of project quality ^A	
	Project exhibits any problems ^A	

Notes: All variables are measured in the survey, unless noted otherwise. Variables indicated with ^A are collected during the project audit. “Users” refers to elected village chairpersons and, for projects implemented in schools or health centers, the facility head and regular facility staff. “End users” refers to citizens and, for projects implemented in schools or health centers, facility staff. A ✓ in the column “BL” indicates that the variable was also collected at baseline.

C Descriptive Statistics

C.1 Relationship between Bureaucrats and Politicians

Table C1: If there are any disagreements between the technocrats and the councilors, what could they be about? (open-ended)

Theme	Response	Politician sample		Bureaucrat sample	
Bureaucrats' performance	Lacking transparency of finances	34%	72%	23%	52%
	Suspect technocrats to misuse funds	14%		11%	
	Absenteeism of technocrats	12%		8%	
	Quality of project implementation	11%		10%	
Politicians' performance	Councilors demanding allowances/meetings	9%	11%	22%	30%
	Councilors make illegal financial requests	2%		8%	
Other	Allocation of projects / funds to locations	12%	18%	13%	18%
	No disagreements	6%		5%	

Notes: The question was asked to 461 subcounty bureaucrats and 2,358 subcounty politicians during the baseline survey. The average number of reasons given per respondent was 1.6.

Table C2: Descriptive Statistics by Type of Official

Variable	Subcounty politicians		Subcounty bureaucrats		p-value
	n	mean	n	mean	
Education (years)	2,365	10.37	461	17.11	0.000
Female	2,365	0.37	461	0.21	0.000
Wealth index	2,359	(0.24)	413	1.24	0.000
HH income (in 1,000 UGX)	2,365	586	461	1,490	0.000
Promotions based on hard work	2,365	2.48	461	2.83	0.000
Rating of relationship between bur. & pol.	2,365	3.15	461	3.64	0.000
Behavioral measures					
Number recall	2,365	4.40	461	5.35	0.000
Dice points reportedly rolled	2,365	164.15	461	161.47	0.011
Allocation to public	2,365	4.32	461	5.07	0.000

Notes: Survey responses and behavioral measures were collected at baseline.

Figure C1: Differences in Education Levels Between Bureaucrats and Politicians




Table C3: Party Affiliations of Local Chairpersons

Sample:

		District Chairperson			Total
		NRM	Opposition	Independent	
Subcounty Chairperson	NRM	178 68.5%	12 4.6%	5 1.9%	195 75.0%
	Opposition	23 8.9%	8 3.1%	0 0.0%	31 11.9%
	Independent	21 8.1%	3 1.2%	10 3.8%	34 13.1%
Total		222 85.4%	23 8.9%	15 5.8%	260 100%

Uganda:

		District Chairperson			Total
		NRM	Independent	Opposition	
Subcounty Chairperson	NRM	742 57.7%	114 8.9%	55 4.3%	911 70.8%
	Independent	159 12.4%	36 2.80%	19 1.5%	214 16.6%
	Opposition	96 7.5%	12 0.93%	53 4.1%	161 12.5%
Total		997 77.5%	162 12.6%	127 9.9%	1,286 100

Notes: The unit of observation is the subcounty. Source: National Electoral Commission 2011.

C.2 Covariate Balance

Table C4: Covariate Balance – Subcounty and Councilor Characteristics

Covariates (subcounty level)	Treatment		Control		p-value
	n	mean	n	mean	
Share opposition in council	150	0.11	110	0.09	0.263
LC3 aligned with central government	149	0.83	109	0.89	0.150
Councilor quality above median	150	0.47	110	0.54	0.317
Technocrat quality above median	150	0.48	110	0.53	0.453
Census data					
Literacy share	150	0.67	110	0.67	0.593
Primary completion rate	150	0.28	110	0.28	0.613
Some secondary	150	0.15	110	0.14	0.541
Ethnic fractionalization*	150	0.26	110	0.29	0.489
Agriculture share	150	0.27	110	0.27	0.934
Age	150	20.45	110	20.31	0.352
Unemployment share	150	0.01	110	0.01	0.741
Covariates (councilors)	n	mean	n	mean	p-value
Education (years)	1,374	10.38	991	10.35	0.766
Wealth index	1,374	0.01	991	-0.01	0.596
Number recall (beh.)	1,374	4.39	991	4.42	0.437
Female	1,374	0.38	991	0.36	0.505
NRM member	1,370	0.84	988	0.86	0.137
Sum of dice points (beh.)	1,374	165	991	163	0.107
Allocation to public (beh.)	1,374	4.26	991	4.39	0.317
Baseline levels of DVs (councilors)	n	mean	n	mean	p-value
Correct steps: monitoring construction	1,374	2.28	991	2.33	0.275
Correct steps: monitoring school	1,374	3.83	991	3.97	0.050
Know: Chief issues pmt of contractor	1,374	0.74	991	0.74	0.749
Know: Chief can withhold pmt	1,374	0.41	991	0.41	0.885
Project substandard: Anything chief can do?	1,374	0.89	991	0.89	0.955
Correct steps: Procurement	1,374	1.87	991	1.92	0.552
Number of SC grants correctly named	1,374	3.45	991	3.42	0.708
Correct steps: Budget formulation	1,374	3.80	991	3.76	0.612
Chief: "Seeing financial info illegal"	1,374	0.12	991	0.11	0.450
Able to give (any) budget figure	1,374	0.39	991	0.38	0.539
Self-reported monitoring visits	1,374	2.98	991	2.99	0.909
Transfer incidences of technocrats◇	1,374	0.74	991	0.80	0.090
Further variables (councilors)	n	mean	n	mean	p-value
Mistake: Prob. voters find out (1-6)	1,374	4.26	991	4.23	0.640
Voters monitoring politicians (1-6)	1,374	4.81	991	4.97	0.002
Money lost: Prob. voters find out (1-6)	1,374	4.80	991	4.79	0.809
Money lost: Prob. pressed to correct (1-6)	1,374	4.60	991	4.56	0.566
Intend to run in 2016	1,374	0.79	991	0.80	0.326
Position intending to run for	1,374	0.78	991	0.81	0.955
Promotions based on performance (1-4)	1,374	2.49	991	2.47	0.652
Relationship with technocrats (1-4)	1,374	3.14	991	3.17	0.276

Notes: Difference in means between pooled treatment and control. All reported p-values are from two-sided t-tests. * Ethnic fractionalization is measured as Herfindahl index: $ELF = 1 - \sum_{i=1}^n s_i^2$ where s_i is the share of group i ($i = 1, \dots, n$). ◇ Number of planned, threatened, or council-initiated transfers in past 12 months.

C.3 Descriptive Statistics and Covariate Balance by Alignment

Table C5: Covariates by Alignment – Subcounty and Councilor Characteristics

Covariates at subcounty level	Not aligned		Aligned		p-value
	n	mean	n	mean	
Share opposition in council	82	0.23	178	0.05	0.000
Avg. dice roll sum (councilors)	81	163.31	177	164.34	0.429
Avg. number recall (councilors)	82	4.36	178	4.42	0.171
Avg. years of education (councilors)	82	10.25	178	10.43	0.163
Avg. public mindedness (councilors)	82	4.47	176	4.20	0.068
Councilor quality above median	82	0.54	178	0.49	0.476
Technocrat quality above median	82	0.49	178	0.50	0.856
Census data					
Literacy share	82	0.68	178	0.67	0.381
Primary completion rate	82	0.32	178	0.26	0.000
Some secondary	82	0.16	178	0.13	0.000
Ethnic fractionalization*	82	0.18	178	0.32	0.000
Agriculture share	82	0.28	178	0.27	0.418
Age	82	21.03	178	20.09	0.000
Unemployment share	82	0.01	178	0.02	0.069
Covariates (councilors)					
Education (years)	749	10.24	1,616	10.43	0.091
Wealth index	749	-0.13	1,616	0.06	0.000
Number recall (beh.)	749	4.36	1,616	4.42	0.114
Female	749	0.33	1,616	0.39	0.001
NRM member	747	0.69	1,611	0.92	0.000
Sum of dice points (beh.)	749	163.70	1,616	164.36	0.483
Allocation to public (beh.)	749	4.46	1,616	4.25	0.114
Baseline levels of DVs (councilors)					
Correct steps: monitoring construction	749	2.29	1,616	2.31	0.721
Correct steps: monitoring school	749	3.91	1,616	3.88	0.653
Know: Chief issues pmt of contractor	749	0.75	1,616	0.73	0.479
Know: Chief can withhold pmt	749	0.37	1,616	0.43	0.009
Project substandard: Anything chief can do?	749	0.88	1,616	0.90	0.129
Correct steps: Procurement	749	1.70	1,616	1.98	0.002
Number of SC grants correctly named	749	3.52	1,616	3.40	0.092
Correct steps: Budget formulation	749	3.94	1,616	3.71	0.010
Chief: "Seeing financial info illegal"	749	0.13	1,616	0.10	0.122
Able to give (any) budget figure	749	0.38	1,616	0.39	0.517
Other variables (councilors)					
Self-reported monitoring visits	749	3.10	1,616	2.93	0.163
Transfer incidences of technocrats◊	749	0.89	1,616	0.71	0.000
Voters monitoring politicians (1-6)	749	4.32	1,616	4.22	0.175
Late: Prob. voters find out (1-6)	749	4.87	1,616	4.88	0.834
Money lost: Prob. voters find out (1-6)	749	4.88	1,616	4.76	0.064
Money lost: Prob. pressed to correct (1-6)	749	4.67	1,616	4.54	0.034
Intend to run in 2016	749	0.79	1,616	0.79	0.982
Position intending to run for	749	0.46	1,616	0.95	0.491
Promotions based on performance (1-4)	749	2.51	1,616	2.47	0.483
Relationship with technocrats (1-4)	749	3.11	1,616	3.17	0.047

Notes: Difference in means between aligned and non-aligned subcounties. All reported p-values are from two-sided t-tests. * Ethnic fractionalization is measured as Herfindahl index: $ELF = 1 - \sum_{i=1}^n s_i^2$ where s_i is the share of group i ($i = 1, \dots, n$). ◊ Number of planned, threatened, or council-initiated transfers in past 12 months.

Table C6: Descriptive Statistics by Alignment

	Mean: Aligned	Mean Not aligned	n	p-value
Subcounty councilors (unit of observation: parish)				
Vote margin	59%	43%	6,956	0.000
Share unopposed	44%	28%	6,973	0.000
Candidates per seat	1.75	2.09	6,973	0.000
LC3 chairperson (unit of observation: subcounty)				
Vote margin	42%	21%	1,284	0.000
Share unopposed	18%	4%	1,286	0.000
Candidates per seat	2.56	3.33	1,285	0.000
Subcounty averages				
Share of council from opposition party	7%	25%	1,285	0.000
Share of MPs NRM	79%	62%	1,262	0.000
Presidential vote share	75%	65%	1,286	0.000

Notes: Data from the National Electoral Commission, 2011.

D Additional Results

Table D1: Survey with District Bureaucrats

Variable	Treatment		Control		p-value t-test
	n	mean	n	mean	
“BTI active in subcounty”	271	0.708	196	0.658	0.248
Time spent on subcounty	362	3.260	269	3.227	0.607

Notes: The unit of observation is the official-subcounty dyad. Data from interviews with 75 district officials.

Table D2: Expected Consequences of Speaking Up (Figure 3)

	(1)	(2)	3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Aligned	0.181* (0.070)	0.187** (0.067)	0.132* (0.066)	0.055 (0.062)	-0.013 (0.058)	0.005 (0.090)	0.091+ (0.054)
Constant	1.982*** (0.073)	1.870*** (0.067)	1.940*** (0.067)	1.818*** (0.064)	1.555*** (0.059)	1.877*** (0.089)	1.777*** (0.054)
Observations	2367	2382	2383	2384	2371	2372	2387
R^2	0.007	0.012	0.009	0.003	0.002	0.009	0.008

Notes: The dependent variable is the perceived probability that, as a result of speaking up about misallocated funds, a hypothetical councilor will: face additional obstacles in the next campaign (column 1), lose out on parish programs (2), not be informed of government programs (3), receive less in allowances (4), become unpopular in the council (5), or be expelled from her party (6). Average anticipated repercussions are shown in column 7.

Table D3: Treatment Effects on Components of the Knowledge Index

	(1) Knowledge index	(2) Monitoring latrine	(3) Monitoring school	(4) Chief can withhold	(5) Chief can act	(6) Procurement steps	(7) Subcounty grants	(8) Budget process	(9) No law
Treatment	0.065** (0.025)	0.064 (0.046)	0.003 (0.052)	0.077+ (0.043)	0.063 (0.043)	0.112* (0.051)	0.059 (0.044)	0.137** (0.050)	0.005 (0.032)
Constant	0.012 (0.030)	0.015 (0.053)	0.041 (0.060)	0.079+ (0.048)	-0.090 (0.065)	0.063 (0.068)	0.009 (0.060)	0.036 (0.055)	-0.049 (0.053)
Observations	2,365	2,365	2,365	2,365	2,335	2,365	2,365	2,365	2,303
R^2	0.167	0.131	0.078	0.075	0.067	0.184	0.175	0.120	0.422

Notes: The dependent variables are: column (1) knowledge index, (2) number of steps correctly listed for monitoring latrine construction, (3) number of steps correctly listed for monitoring a school, (4) knows that chief can withhold payment in case of substandard work, (5) knows that subcounty chief can take action in case of substandard work, (6) procurement steps correctly listed, (7) number of subcounty grant types correctly listed, (8) steps in budget formulation process correctly listed, (9) knows no law exists which prevents councilors from accessing subcounty financial information. All models include a control for the baseline value if available, a vector of demeaned covariates as well their interactions with the treatment indicator, district fixed effects, and indicators for stratification blocks. Robust standard errors clustered at the subcounty level are shown in parentheses. *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, + $p < 0.1$

Table D4: Treatment Effects on Components of the Political Oversight Index

	(1) Behavior index	(2) Documents requested	(3) Doc. types requested	(4) Documents accessed	(5) Monitoring visits	(6) Projects with tensions	(7) Projects with repercussions
Treatment	0.103** (0.031)	0.173*** (0.046)	0.197*** (0.043)	0.086* (0.041)	0.015 (0.062)	0.039 (0.058)	0.047 (0.057)
Constant	-0.016 (0.036)	0.000 (0.049)	0.022 (0.046)	-0.027 (0.049)	0.012 (0.059)	-0.025 (0.068)	-0.059 (0.071)
Observations	2,365	2,361	2,361	2,359	1,594	2,357	2,315
R^2	0.227	0.158	0.200	0.167	0.131	0.099	0.111

Notes: The dependent variables are: column (1) averaged z-score index of the index components in columns (2-7), (2) # of financial documents requested by councilors (3) # of types of financial documents requested by councilors, (4) # of financial documents given access to, (5) # of third-party observed monitoring visits by councilors to schools and health centers in past 12 months, (6) # of projects with tensions with contractors, and (7) # of repercussions taken by councilors against contractors (redo, no retention payment, formal investigation etc.). All models include a vector of demeaned covariates as well their interactions with the treatment indicator, district fixed effects, and indicators for stratification blocks. Robust standard errors clustered at the subcounty level are shown in parentheses. *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, + $p < 0.1$


D.1 Treatment Effects on Political Oversight by Partisanship and Alignment

Table D5: Treatment Effects on Political Oversight by Partisanship and Alignment

DV: Indices	(1) Oversight	(2) Monitoring	(3) Access	(4) Repercussions
Treatment	0.014 (0.039)	0.074 (0.047)	0.054 (0.058)	-0.083 (0.065)
Treat * Not aligned * Opposition/Independent	0.147 (0.094)	0.278* (0.136)	0.326* (0.141)	-0.132 (0.147)
Treat * Not aligned	0.200* (0.082)	0.183+ (0.093)	0.078 (0.139)	0.287* (0.141)
Treat * Opposition/Independent	-0.019 (0.091)	-0.190 (0.129)	-0.071 (0.141)	0.239+ (0.128)
Not aligned	-0.065 (0.089)	-0.093 (0.103)	-0.108 (0.172)	-0.005 (0.177)
Opposition/Independent	-0.072 (0.062)	-0.003 (0.079)	-0.137 (0.111)	-0.113 (0.075)
Constant	0.007 (0.040)	0.039 (0.045)	0.005 (0.068)	-0.032 (0.075)
Observations	2346	2345	2340	2344
R^2	0.262	0.238	0.194	0.163
ATE (Aligned, Opposition/Independent)	-0.005	-0.116	-0.017	0.156
p-value (Aligned, Opposition/Independent)	0.952	0.317	0.903	0.228
ATE (Not aligned, NRM)	0.214	0.258	0.132	0.205
p-value (Not aligned, NRM)	0.002	0.001	0.247	0.081
ATE (Not aligned, Opposition/Independent)	0.342	0.346	0.387	0.311
p-value (Not aligned, Opposition/Independent)	0.000	0.002	0.022	0.045
Difference in ATEs (Aligned: NRM vs. Opposition/Independent)	-0.019	-0.190	-0.071	0.239
p-value (Aligned: NRM vs. Opposition/Independent)	0.833	0.142	0.614	0.064
Difference in ATEs (Not aligned: NRM vs. Opposition/Independent)	0.127	0.088	0.255	0.106
p-value (Not aligned: NRM vs. Opposition/Independent)	0.160	0.467	0.102	0.400
Difference in ATEs (NRM: Aligned vs. Not aligned)	0.200	0.183	0.078	0.287
p-value (NRM: Aligned vs. Not aligned)	0.015	0.050	0.577	0.042
Difference in ATEs (Opposition/Independent: Aligned vs. Not aligned)	0.347	0.462	0.404	0.155
p-value (Opposition/Independent: Aligned vs. Not aligned)	0.002	0.001	0.030	0.407

Notes: Displaying average treatment effects on four behavior indices among elected politicians: Monitoring effort, access to financial documents, repercussions initiated against contractors, and an aggregate index. Robust standard errors clustered at the subcounty level in parentheses. Specification includes controls and fixed effects for the relative quality group (stratification variable) and district fixed effects. *Not aligned* is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the local political leadership is not aligned with the presidency. The middle panel shows predicted treatment effects for each subgroup and the corresponding p-values. The bottom panel shows differences in treatment effects between different subgroups and the corresponding p-values. *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, + $p < 0.1$.

Figure D1: Treatment Effects on Political Oversight by Partisanship and Alignment



Displaying average treatment effects on four behavior indices among elected politicians: Monitoring effort (*Monitor*), access to financial documents (*Access*), and steps taken to improve service delivery, in particular initiating repercussions against contractors and bureaucrats (*Rep.*), and an aggregate index (*Index*). Predicted values are conditional on whether a respondent is a member of the ruling party (NRM) and whether the subcounty is aligned. The graph includes 90% (thick) and 95% (thin) confidence intervals.

D.2 Crosscutting Design: Targeting Political Challengers

A variation of the intervention in a random subset of treatment subcounties sought to directly manipulate councilors’ *incentives* to use the offered tools, by also involving their political challengers and local opinion leaders in the training workshops and subsequent information dissemination. The idea was to introduce second-order monitoring of politicians by engaged citizens and political opponents, and to stimulate perceived political competition.

Local opinion leaders are defined as engaged citizens who have a reputation for speaking up on behalf of the community, but do not hold any government position. Political challengers are defined as people who either ran against councilors in the last election in 2011 or were expected by councilors to run against them in the upcoming elections in 2016 at the time of the baseline survey. I identified individuals in both groups during the baseline survey and, in the case of political challengers, also through 2011 election data. I held training workshops for councilors and opinion leaders and political challengers jointly to ensure that councilors were aware of the training of the other groups.⁵

To identify political components, councilors were asked at baseline who their most serious challengers had been in the last election in 2011, and whom they expected to be their main challengers in 2016, if intending to run. In addition, I took the names of the runner-ups from the official election results from 2011. In subcounties assigned to the councilors plus opponents treatment (*Treat * Challengers*), mobilizers did their best to locate these individuals and to personally invite them to the training workshop. Local opinion leaders were also invited to the workshop. These were identified through the baseline survey, when respondents were asked to give us the names of people known to be “movers and shakers” in the community who tend to speak up on behalf of the community, but do not hold any formal position in government. An average of 7.3 opinion leaders and political challengers per assigned subcounty attended the training.

⁵Subcounties from the different treatment arms—*councilors only* versus *councilors plus*—were never combined in one workshop.

To test whether the crosscutting design had a differential treatment effect, I estimate the model:

$$Ys_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Treat_i + \beta_2 Treat * Challengers_i + \sum_{j=1}^{J-1} \gamma_j X_{ji} + \sum_{j=1}^{J-1} \delta_j S_{ji} + \tau P_i + \sum_{j=1}^{J-1} \epsilon_j D_{ij} + u_i$$

where all terms are the same as before, and *Treat * Challengers* indicates whether a subcounty was assigned to receive the treatment for both the councilors and the opinion leaders and political challengers. As before, *Treat* takes value 1 for all subcounties designed to receive any treatment. We can therefore interpret the coefficient on *Treat * Challengers* as the marginal effect of also treating opinion leaders and political challengers.

Table D6 presents the results. The coefficient on *Treat * Challengers* is not significant for any of the outcome indices, indicating that the crosscutting treatment did not have any differential effect on the accountability-seeking behavior of councilors.

One interpretation is that in a setting with as low levels of electoral competition as local governments in Uganda—with an average vote margin of 54% and 38% of councilors running unopposed—the crosscutting intervention was too subtle. If politicians feel secure in their seat, or if reelection is driven by non-programmatic factors, providing their political opponents with financial information and training is unlikely to alter politicians’ behavior. Indeed, qualitative interviews suggest that many of the political challengers and opinion leaders who attended were perceived as “toothless” by council members and did not follow-up on the financial information. Instead, structural factors—the presence of local political leaders who are not affiliated with the ruling party—moderated the incentives of councilors to engage in oversight.

Table D6: Treatment Effect on the Oversight Index and Subindices by Treatment Arm

	Oversight index (1)	Monitoring (2)	Access (3)	Repercussions (4)
Treatment	0.109** (0.038)	0.171*** (0.043)	0.075+ (0.043)	0.050 (0.070)
Treatment*Challengers	-0.012 (0.042)	-0.035 (0.045)	0.022 (0.052)	-0.003 (0.076)
Constant	-0.016 (0.036)	0.008 (0.038)	-0.027 (0.049)	-0.035 (0.066)
Observations	2,365	2,,364	2359	2,361
R ²	0.227	0.208	0.167	0.122
F (Treat + Treat*Challengers = 0)	7.069	12.788	3.438	0.606
p-value (Treat + Treat*Challengers = 0)	0.008	0.000	0.065	0.437

Notes: The aggregate index of political oversight (oversight index) and its subindices, monitoring, access to financial documents, and initiated repercussions, are averaged z-score indices. Robust standard errors clustered at the subcounty level in parentheses. Specification includes controls and district fixed effects. *Treat * Challengers* indicates whether a subcounty was assigned to receive the intervention for both councilors and their political challengers and opinion leaders. The F-test evaluates the null hypothesis that the coefficient on *Treat* plus the coefficient on *Treat * Challengers* is zero. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1.

D.3 Treatment Effects on Personal Rents and Service Delivery

Table D7: Treatment Effects on Personal Rents of Councilors

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	After 22 months				After 8 months			
	Allocation index	Consumption index	Support to relatives index	Assets index	Allocation index	Consumption index	Support to relatives index	Assets index
Treatment	-0.006 (0.039)	-0.010 (0.017)	0.021 (0.025)	-0.020 (0.030)	-0.020 (0.041)	-0.000 (0.021)	-0.046 (0.028)	-0.011 (0.047)
Constant	0.020 (0.054)	0.023 (0.020)	-0.017 (0.030)	-0.007 (0.036)	0.027 (0.046)	0.002 (0.027)	0.008 (0.029)	-0.078 (0.088)
Observations	2,390	2,438	2,438	2,396	2,359	2,365	2,365	2,365
R ²	0.359	0.348	0.224	0.626	0.421	0.356	0.238	0.025

Notes: *Allocation index* consists of the total amount councilors report receiving from their council work per month, as well as an estimate of the amount received for council meetings (reported council meetings per year times reported sitting fee, median responses per subcounty). *Consumption index* consists of a battery of variables on meat, fish, and beverage consumption, expenditure on airtime, clothing, and social events, and the number of times household members went to bed hungry in the past month (entering negatively). *Support to relatives index* consists of variables on school fees paid for extended relatives, as well as other support offered to extended relatives. All three indices are averaged z-score indices. *Asset index* is calculated using principal component analysis on a battery of variables on asset ownership. All models include a vector of demeaned covariates as well as their interaction with the treatment indicator, indicators for stratification blocks, and district fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the subcounty level are shown in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1.

Table D8: Treatment Effects on Personal Rents of Councilors by Alignment

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	After 22 months				After 8 months			
	Allocation index	Consumption index	Support to relatives index	Assets index	Allocation index	Consumption index	Support to relatives index	Assets index
Treatment	0.011 (0.049)	-0.019 (0.022)	0.024 (0.032)	-0.030 (0.037)	-0.064 (0.048)	-0.012 (0.023)	-0.052 (0.034)	0.116 (0.121)
Treatment * Not aligned	-0.132 (0.109)	-0.018 (0.048)	-0.028 (0.063)	0.002 (0.082)	0.060 (0.098)	-0.030 (0.052)	0.019 (0.064)	-0.308 (0.288)
Not aligned	0.292* (0.137)	-0.002 (0.059)	-0.030 (0.083)	0.062 (0.088)	0.078 (0.139)	0.003 (0.061)	-0.030 (0.069)	-0.378 (0.453)
Constant	-0.052 (0.062)	0.035 (0.024)	-0.031 (0.036)	-0.003 (0.040)	-0.004 (0.059)	0.012 (0.029)	0.005 (0.034)	0.027 (0.107)
N	2,220	2,258	2,258	2,220	2,192	2,192	2,192	2,192
R ²	0.415	0.367	0.242	0.642	0.460	0.377	0.254	0.040
Estimate (Treat + Treat * Not aligned)	-0.121	-0.038	-0.004	-0.029	-0.004	-0.042	-0.033	-0.192
P-value (Treat + Treat * Not aligned)	0.155	0.353	0.944	0.662	0.960	0.372	0.498	0.330

Notes: Allocation index consists of the total amount councilors report receiving from their council work per month, as well as an estimate of the amount received for council meetings (reported council meetings per year times reported sitting fee, median responses per subcounty). Consumption index consists of a battery of variables on meat, fish, and beverage consumption, expenditure on airtime, clothing, and social events, and the number of times household members went to bed hungry in the past month (entering negatively). Support to relatives index consists of variables on school fees paid for extended relatives, as well as other support offered to extended relatives. All three indices are averaged z-score indices. Asset index is calculated using principal component analysis on a battery of variables on asset ownership. All models include a vector of demeaned covariates as well as their interaction with the treatment indicator, indicators for stratification blocks, and district fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the subcounty level are shown in parentheses. The bottom panel shows predicted treatment effects for councilors in non-aligned areas and the corresponding p-value. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1.

Table D9: Treatment Effects on Satisfaction Indices and Components

Sample: Controls:	In health centers and schools				All projects			
	Standard (1)	Adjusted (2)	None (3)	n	Standard (4)	Adjusted (5)	None (6)	n
Respondents: All combined								
Satisfaction index (z-score)	0.071 (0.068)	0.030 (0.074)	0.061 (0.064)	424	0.044 (0.062)	0.000 (0.065)	0.021 (0.060)	657
Satisfaction index (PCA)	0.165 (0.145)	0.133 (0.164)	0.134 (0.133)	424	0.228 (0.139)	0.201 (0.150)	0.134 (0.133)	424
Respondents: Senior facility staff								
Satisfaction index, staff (z-score)	0.046 (0.088)	0.002 (0.101)	0.058 (0.078)	424	0.070 (0.085)	0.044 (0.094)	0.058 (0.078)	424
Components:								
Overall satisfaction	-0.059 (0.147)	-0.078 (0.174)	-0.002 (0.132)	424	-0.036 (0.146)	-0.048 (0.163)	-0.002 (0.132)	424
Satisfied with information	0.174 (0.125)	0.101 (0.138)	0.198+ (0.113)	424	0.216+ (0.125)	0.171 (0.131)	0.198+ (0.113)	424
Satisfied with processes	0.148 (0.165)	0.133 (0.185)	0.189 (0.128)	424	0.185 (0.158)	0.187 (0.172)	0.189 (0.128)	424
Project responds to need	-0.080 (0.154)	-0.194 (0.150)	-0.048 (0.125)	424	-0.107 (0.156)	-0.171 (0.152)	-0.048 (0.125)	424
Staff satisfaction	0.049 (0.110)	0.047 (0.132)	-0.045 (0.111)	424	0.093 (0.110)	0.078 (0.127)	-0.045 (0.111)	424
Respondents: Village leaders								
Satisfaction index, village head (z-score)	0.095 (0.076)	0.059 (0.082)	0.063 (0.079)	424	0.058 (0.072)	0.021 (0.071)	0.022 (0.070)	657
Components:								
Overall satisfaction	0.225+ (0.121)	0.263* (0.108)	0.213 (0.134)	424	0.115 (0.118)	0.103 (0.105)	0.120 (0.121)	657
Satisfied with information	0.252 (0.158)	0.145 (0.154)	0.154 (0.160)	424	0.119 (0.136)	0.093 (0.135)	0.050 (0.125)	657
Satisfied with processes	0.015 (0.125)	0.001 (0.132)	0.011 (0.132)	424	-0.046 (0.110)	-0.080 (0.110)	-0.065 (0.116)	657
Project responds to need	0.021 (0.123)	-0.099 (0.122)	0.038 (0.122)	424	0.086 (0.099)	0.003 (0.099)	0.075 (0.113)	657
User satisfaction	-0.039 (0.104)	-0.015 (0.117)	-0.100 (0.102)	424	0.016 (0.097)	-0.014 (0.100)	-0.069 (0.090)	657

Notes: The dependent variables, from top to bottom are: (a) z-score and (b) principal component indices, respectively, consisting of the following components: the extent to which the most senior health workers or teachers found at the health center or school, respectively, are satisfied with (d) the overall quality of the work, (e) the information they received over the course of project implementation, and (f) processes of project implementation, (g) whether the project type corresponds to community needs, and (h) the overall satisfaction level of other staff on the premises; all on a 1-4 scale. Rows (j)-(n) show the same variables, but elicited from elected village leaders, or their most senior available representative. Rows (c) and (i) show z-score subindices for senior facility staff and elected village leaders, respectively. Columns (1) and (4) show results with the vector of standardized controls used in the remainder of the article; columns (2) and (5) show results with an adjusted vector of standardized controls which includes the set of prespecified variables and all variables for which two-sided t-tests with the project data yield p-values below or equal to 0.2, as well as their interaction with the treatment indicator. All covariates are averaged at the subcounty level. Columns (3) and (6) show results without covariate adjustment. The sample is restricted to projects which were implemented in schools or health centers. All models include an indicator for sector, indicators for stratification blocks, and district fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the subcounty level are shown in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1.

Table D10: Treatment Effects on Satisfaction Indices and Components by Alignment (Health and Education)

Subgroups: Controls:	Aligned			Not aligned			n
	Standard (1)	Adjusted (2)	None (3)	Standard (4)	Adjusted (5)	None (6)	
Respondents: All combined							
(a) Satisfaction index (z-score)	-0.173 (0.108)	-0.113 (0.098)	-0.015 (0.072)	0.401+ (0.401)	0.442** (0.126)	0.204 (0.126)	424
(b) Satisfaction index (PCA)	-0.467+ (0.248)	-0.286 (0.224)	-0.033 (0.146)	1.143* (0.335)	0.961** (0.287)	0.444 (0.276)	424
Respondents: Senior facility staff							
(c) Satisfaction index, staff (z-score)	-0.264+ (0.147)	-0.204 (0.133)	-0.005 (0.098)	0.367+ (0.187)	0.415** (0.146)	0.140 (0.131)	424
Components:							
(d) Overall satisfaction	-0.524* (0.235)	-0.397+ (0.208)	-0.032 (0.170)	0.484+ (0.288)	0.375+ (0.222)	-0.102 (0.207)	424
(e) Satisfied with information	-0.147 (0.216)	-0.118 (0.204)	0.087 (0.135)	0.620* (0.299)	0.580* (0.238)	0.370+ (0.194)	424
(f) Satisfied with processes	-0.574* (0.256)	-0.428+ (0.234)	0.059 (0.166)	0.787* (0.311)	0.670* (0.262)	0.390* (0.196)	424
(g) Project responds to need	0.142 (0.213)	0.088 (0.185)	-0.013 (0.179)	-0.745** (0.249)	-0.075 (0.206)	-0.132 (0.106)	424
(h) Staff satisfaction	-0.215 (0.204)	-0.163 (0.186)	-0.127 (0.143)	0.687* (0.267)	0.524* (0.227)	0.173 (0.188)	424
Respondents: Village leaders							
(i) Satisfaction index, village leader (z-score)	-0.082 (0.117)	-0.022 (0.096)	-0.025 (0.090)	0.436** (0.165)	0.469** (0.149)	0.267+ (0.155)	424
Components:							
(j) Overall satisfaction	0.114 (0.196)	0.119 (0.179)	0.090 (0.148)	0.579+ (0.322)	0.647+ (0.356)	0.490+ (0.292)	424
(k) Satisfied with information	-0.109 (0.233)	0.047 (0.194)	-0.113 (0.172)	0.890** (0.292)	0.755* (0.294)	0.636* (0.308)	424
(l) Satisfied with processes	-0.423+ (0.220)	-0.142 (0.169)	0.020 (0.145)	0.482+ (0.285)	0.448* (0.225)	-0.025 (0.281)	424
(m) Project responds to need	0.075 (0.113)	0.114 (0.112)	0.033 (0.147)	-0.556* (0.244)	-0.022 (0.213)	0.103 (0.212)	424
(n) User satisfaction	-0.069 (0.090)	-0.251 (0.162)	-0.155 (0.118)	0.782** (0.248)	0.517* (0.226)	0.134 (0.197)	424

Notes: Columns (1)-(3) show average treatment effects for aligned subcounties, columns (4)-(6) show predicted treatment effects for non-aligned subcounties (derived from the linear combination of the coefficient on Treatment and Treatment * Not aligned). The dependent variables, from top to bottom are: (a) z-score and (b) principal component indices, respectively, consisting of the following components: the extent to which the most senior health workers or teachers found at the health center or school, respectively, are satisfied with (d) the overall quality of the work, (e) the information they received over the course of project implementation, and (f) processes of project implementation, (g) whether the project type corresponds to community needs, and (h) the overall satisfaction level of other staff on the premises; all on a 1-4 scale. Rows (j)-(n) show the same variables, but elicited from elected village leaders, or their most senior available representative. Rows (c) and (i) show z-score subindices for senior facility staff and elected village leaders, respectively. Columns (1) and (4) show results with the vector of standardized controls used in the remainder of the article; columns (2) and (5) show results with an adjusted vector of standardized controls which includes the set of prespecified variables and all variables for which two-sided t-tests with the project data yield p-values below or equal to 0.2, as well as their interaction with the treatment indicator. All covariates are averaged at the subcounty level. Columns (3) and (6) show results without covariate adjustment. The sample is restricted to projects which were implemented in schools or health centers. All models include an indicator for sector, indicators for stratification blocks, and district fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the subcounty level are shown in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1.

Table D11: Treatment Effects on Satisfaction Indices and Components by Alignment (All Projects)

Subgroups: Controls:	Aligned			Not aligned			n
	Standard (1)	Adjusted (2)	None (3)	Standard (4)	Adjusted (5)	None (6)	
Respondents: All combined							
(a) Satisfaction index (z-score)	-0.078 (0.092)	-0.074 (0.086)	-0.000 (0.069)	0.285+ (0.147)	0.304* (0.126)	0.037 (0.119)	657
(b) Satisfaction index (PCA)	-0.411+ (0.235)	-0.271 (0.211)	-0.033 (0.146)	1.199** (0.326)	0.976** (0.280)	0.444 (0.276)	424
Respondents: Senior facility staff							
(c) Satisfaction index, staff (z-score)	-0.223 (0.142)	-0.181 (0.122)	-0.005 (0.098)	0.407* (0.183)	0.438** (0.142)	0.140 (0.131)	424
Components:							
(d) Overall satisfaction	-0.466* (0.227)	-0.330+ (0.190)	-0.032 (0.170)	0.541+ (0.282)	0.442* (0.220)	-0.102 (0.207)	424
(e) Satisfied with information	-0.101 (0.210)	-0.069 (0.189)	0.087 (0.135)	0.666* (0.291)	0.629** (0.236)	0.370+ (0.194)	424
(f) Satisfied with processes	-0.530* (0.246)	-0.388+ (0.216)	0.059 (0.166)	0.831** (0.304)	0.710** (0.259)	0.390* (0.196)	424
(g) Project responds to need	0.152 (0.212)	0.058 (0.182)	-0.013 (0.179)	-0.735** (0.251)	-0.105 (0.206)	-0.132 (0.106)	424
(h) Staff satisfaction	-0.172 (0.203)	-0.174 (0.187)	-0.127 (0.143)	0.731** (0.265)	0.512* (0.220)	0.173 (0.188)	424
Respondents: Village leaders							
(i) Satisfaction index, village leader (z-score)	-0.051 (0.103)	-0.030 (0.089)	0.000 (0.078)	0.317+ (0.161)	0.312* (0.142)	0.069 (0.142)	657
Components:							
(j) Overall satisfaction	-0.067 (0.165)	-0.053 (0.160)	0.044 (0.135)	0.606+ (0.316)	0.613+ (0.324)	0.290 (0.255)	657
(k) Satisfied with information	-0.144 (0.180)	-0.032 (0.157)	-0.08 (0.137)	0.563* (0.273)	0.467+ (0.239)	0.266 (0.260)	657
(l) Satisfied with processes	-0.240 (0.162)	-0.063 (0.127)	-0.012 (0.126)	0.317 (0.240)	0.155 (0.197)	-0.247 (0.250)	657
(m) Project responds to need	0.075 (0.113)	0.044 (0.106)	0.077 (0.114)	-0.227 (0.225)	0.124 (0.220)	0.126 (0.248)	657
(n) User satisfaction	-0.069 (0.090)	-0.046 (0.126)	-0.031 (0.105)	0.324 (0.239)	0.202 (0.210)	-0.088 (0.172)	657

Notes: Columns (1)-(3) show average treatment effects for aligned subcounties, columns (4)-(6) show predicted treatment effects for non-aligned subcounties (derived from the linear combination of the coefficient on Treatment and Treatment * Not aligned). The dependent variables, from top to bottom are: (a) z-score and (b) principal component indices, respectively, consisting of the following components: the extent to which the most senior health workers or teachers found at the health center or school, respectively, are satisfied with (d) the overall quality of the work, (e) the information they received over the course of project implementation, and (f) processes of project implementation, (g) whether the project type corresponds to community needs, and (h) the overall satisfaction level of other staff on the premises; all on a 1-4 scale. Rows (j)-(n) show the same variables, but elicited from elected village leaders, or their most senior available representative. Rows (c) and (i) show z-score subindices for senior facility staff and elected village leaders, respectively. Columns (1) and (4) show results with the vector of standardized controls used in the remainder of the article; columns (2) and (5) show results with an adjusted vector of standardized controls which includes the set of prespecified variables and all variables for which two-sided t-tests with the project data yield p-values below or equal to 0.2, as well as their interaction with the treatment indicator. All covariates are averaged at the subcounty level. Columns (3) and (6) show results without covariate adjustment. The sample in rows (b) to (h) is restricted to projects which were implemented in schools or health centers, the remainder includes all sampled projects. All models include an indicator for sector, indicators for stratification blocks, and district fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the subcounty level are shown in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1.

Table D12: Treatment Effects on Observed Project Quality

Sample: Covariates:	In health centers and schools			All projects		
	Standard (1)	Adjusted (2)	None (3)	Standard (4)	Adjusted (5)	None (6)
Treatment	-0.161 (0.112)	-0.077 (0.125)	-0.099 (0.105)	0.021 (0.102)	0.001 (0.099)	-0.001 (0.091)
Constant	-0.066 (0.148)	-0.007 (0.189)	-0.051 (0.150)	-0.040 (0.126)	-0.007 (0.157)	-0.053 (0.136)
Observations	424	424	424	657	657	657
R ²	0.249	0.244	0.171	0.191	0.190	0.141

Notes:

Table D13: Treatment Effects on Observed Project Quality by Alignment

Sample: Covariates:	In health centers and schools			All projects		
	Standard (1)	Adjusted (2)	None (3)	Standard (4)	Adjusted (5)	None (6)
Treatment	-0.696** (0.228)	-0.397* (0.185)	-0.141 (0.113)	-0.144 (0.156)	-0.016 (0.133)	0.070 (0.101)
Treat * Not Aligned	1.466** (0.380)	0.840* (0.326)	0.101 (0.256)	0.587* (0.289)	0.229 (0.285)	-0.246 (0.215)
Not aligned	-1.408** (0.449)	-1.022* (0.394)	0.034 (0.355)	-0.394 (0.332)	-0.069 (0.311)	0.286 (0.278)
Constant	0.484* (0.206)	0.237 (0.170)	-0.071 (0.186)	0.114 (0.169)	-0.066 (0.151)	-0.133 (0.158)
N	424	424	424	657	657	657
R ²	0.331	0.278	0.172	0.241	0.211	0.144
Estimate (Treat + Treat * Not aligned)	0.770**	0.443*	-0.040	0.443**	0.213	-0.175
SE (Treat + Treat * Not aligned)	(0.250)	(0.218)	(0.227)	(0.221)	(0.212)	(0.191)
p-value (Treat + Treat * Not aligned)	0.002	0.044	0.861	0.046	0.317	0.359

Notes: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1.

E Robustness Checks

Table E1: Robustness Checks – Political Oversight Index and Subindices

	Oversight index				Monitoring subindex			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Treatment	0.105*** (0.030)	0.087*** (0.032)	0.065 (0.041)	0.106*** (0.034)	0.156*** (0.034)	0.130*** (0.034)	0.114*** (0.043)	0.157*** (0.035)
Constant	-0.014 (0.036)	-0.007 (0.036)	-0.006 (0.027)	0.344 (0.612)	0.004 (0.038)	0.018 (0.038)	-0.014 (0.030)	0.599 (0.622)
Observations	2,365	2,365	2,365	260	2,364	2,364	2364	260
R^2	0.239	0.114	0.002	0.497	0.218	0.069	0.004	0.470
Covariates	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
District FE	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes

	Access subindex				Repercussions subindex			
	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
Treatment	0.087** (0.040)	0.069* (0.041)	0.049 (0.055)	0.061 (0.046)	0.051 (0.053)	0.042 (0.054)	0.014 (0.064)	0.061 (0.059)
Constant	-0.009 (0.048)	-0.021 (0.049)	-0.000 (0.040)	0.441 (0.825)	-0.033 (0.064)	-0.026 (0.064)	-0.001 (0.045)	-0.186 (1.132)
Observations	2,359	2,359	2,359	260	2,361	2,361	2,361	260
R^2	0.178	0.082	0.001	0.488	0.131	0.110	0.000	0.366
Covariates	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
District FE	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes

Notes: The aggregate index of political oversight (oversight index) and its subindices, monitoring effort, access to financial documents, and initiated repercussions, are averaged z-score indices. The first column in each panel (1, 5, 9, and 13) shows results for the main specification with covariates and district fixed effects. The second column shows the main specification without covariates, the third without covariates and without constituency fixed effects, and the fourth column in each panel shows results for the main specification, but with all variables aggregated at the unit of randomization, the subcounty. Robust standard errors clustered at the subcounty level are shown in parentheses. *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, + $p < 0.1$.

Table E2: Robustness Checks – Political Oversight Index and Subindices by Alignment

	Oversight index				Monitoring subindex			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Treatment	0.015 (0.037)	0.032 (0.034)	-0.017 (0.045)	0.051 (0.039)	0.060 (0.043)	0.069+ (0.040)	0.018 (0.050)	0.095* (0.043)
Treat * Not aligned	0.237** (0.081)	0.176* (0.077)	0.202* (0.084)	0.192* (0.078)	0.229** (0.087)	0.172* (0.082)	0.221** (0.085)	0.190* (0.080)
Not aligned	-0.066 (0.088)	-0.065 (0.094)	0.072 (0.058)	-0.068 (0.093)	-0.079 (0.100)	-0.034 (0.095)	0.040 (0.061)	-0.047 (0.105)
Constant	-0.000 (0.039)	0.002 (0.040)	0.010 (0.046)	0.289 (0.660)	0.034 (0.043)	0.020 (0.044)	0.033 (0.051)	0.373 (0.660)
Observations	2,346	2,346	2,346	258	2,345	2,345	2,345	258
R^2	0.261	0.118	0.034	0.512	0.237	0.071	0.025	0.481
Estimate (Treat+Treat*Not aligned)	0.252	0.208	0.185	0.243	0.289	0.241	0.239	0.286
p-value (Treat+Treat*Not aligned)	0.000	0.042	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Covariates	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
District FE	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes

	Access subindex				Repercussions subindex			
	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
Treatment	0.054 (0.055)	0.086+ (0.048)	0.040 (0.064)	0.065 (0.055)	-0.061 (0.063)	-0.044 (0.057)	-0.090 (0.069)	-0.016 (0.064)
Treat * Not aligned	0.154 (0.138)	-0.020 (0.098)	-0.001 (0.115)	0.009 (0.110)	0.289* (0.140)	0.290* (0.134)	0.288* (0.145)	0.294* (0.138)
Not aligned	-0.107 (0.170)	-0.025 (0.163)	0.201* (0.087)	-0.029 (0.154)	-0.026 (0.176)	-0.129 (0.178)	0.038 (0.101)	-0.118 (0.175)
Constant	-0.009 (0.065)	-0.025 (0.067)	-0.019 (0.065)	0.529 (0.912)	-0.036 (0.075)	-0.001 (0.071)	-0.003 (0.077)	0.000 (1.154)
Observations	2,340	2,340	2,340	258	2,344	2,344	2,344	258
R^2	0.192	0.087	0.014	0.494	0.162	0.115	0.021	0.384
Estimate (Treat+Treat*Not aligned)	0.208	0.066	0.040	0.074	0.229	0.246	0.198	0.279
p-value (Treat+Treat*Not aligned)	0.000	0.328	0.003	0.014	0.000	0.635	0.072	0.253
Covariates	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
District FE	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes

Notes: The aggregate index of political oversight (oversight index) and its subindices, monitoring effort, access to financial documents, and initiated repercussions, are averaged z-score indices. The first column in each panel (1, 5, 9, and 13) shows results for the main specification with covariates and district fixed effects. The second column shows the main specification without covariates, the third without covariates and without district fixed effects, and the fourth column in each panel shows results for the main specification, but with all variables aggregated at the unit of randomization, the subcounty. Robust standard errors clustered at the subcounty level are shown in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1.

Table E3: Robustness Checks – Oversight Index and Subindices by Different Definitions of Alignment

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	Oversight index			Monitoring subindex			Access subindex			Repercussions subindex		
Treat	0.015 (0.037)	0.065* (0.033)	0.046 (0.035)	0.060 (0.043)	0.113** (0.039)	0.087* (0.039)	0.054 (0.055)	0.086+ (0.045)	0.069 (0.051)	-0.061 (0.063)	-0.006 (0.054)	-0.019 (0.063)
Treat * Not aligned	0.237** (0.081)	0.199* (0.098)	0.176* (0.086)	0.229** (0.087)	0.146 (0.098)	0.190* (0.090)	0.154 (0.138)	0.100 (0.157)	0.097 (0.138)	0.289* (0.140)	0.310+ (0.187)	0.210 (0.145)
Not aligned	-0.066 (0.088)	-0.174* (0.073)		-0.079 (0.100)	-0.137+ (0.081)		-0.107 (0.170)	-0.088 (0.136)		-0.026 (0.176)	-0.247+ (0.132)	
Constant	-0.000 (0.039)	0.000 (0.035)	-0.017 (0.035)	0.034 (0.043)	0.027 (0.037)	0.013 (0.037)	-0.009 (0.065)	-0.027 (0.051)	-0.033 (0.051)	-0.036 (0.075)	-0.018 (0.065)	-0.043 (0.064)
Observations	2,346	2,346	2,358	2,345	2,345	2,357	2,340	2,340	2,352	2,344	2,344	2,354
R ²	0.261	0.258	0.259	0.237	0.235	0.237	0.192	0.192	0.191	0.162	0.159	0.158
Estimate (Treat*Not aligned)	0.252	0.264	0.222	0.289	0.260	0.277	0.208	0.186	0.166	0.229	0.305	0.191
p-value (Treat*Not aligned)	0.000	0.003	0.002	0.000	0.002	0.000	0.060	0.204	0.152	0.048	0.086	0.116
Not aligned is defined as:												
LC3 & LC5 chairperson not NRM	X			X			X			X		
LC3 chairperson not NRM		X			X			X			X	
LC5 chairperson not NRM			X			X			X			X

Notes: The aggregate index of political oversight (oversight index) and its subindices, monitoring, access to financial documents, and initiated repercussions, are averaged z-score indices. Robust standard errors are clustered at the subcounty level in parentheses. All specifications include standardized controls as well as their interaction with the treatment indicator and district fixed effects. *Not aligned* is a binary indicator for the political leadership in a subcounty *not* entirely belonging to the national ruling party. In columns (1), (4), (7), and (10), this is defined as both the LC3 and the LC5 chairperson not being NRM members. In columns (2), (5), (8), and (11), this is defined as the LC3 chairperson not being an NRM member. In columns (3), (6), (9), and (12), this is defined as the LC5 chairperson not being an NRM member. Predicted treatment effect and corresponding p-value for councilors in non-aligned subcounties are included in the penultimate panel. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1.

Table E4: Benjamini-Hochberg Corrections by Family of Outcomes

Subindices of the political oversight index in the pooled sample (Table 2)			
	Monitoring	Access	Repercussions
Uncorrected p-value	0.000	0.029	0.342
Critical BH value ($\alpha = 0.05$)	0.017	0.033	0.050
Critical BH value ($\alpha = 0.10$)	0.033	0.067	0.100
Passes BHP ($\alpha = 0.05$)	yes	yes	no
Passes BHP ($\alpha = 0.10$)	yes	yes	no
Subindices of the political oversight index in non-aligned subcounties (Table 3)			
	Monitoring	Access	Repercussions
Uncorrected p-value	0.000	0.060	0.048
Critical BH value ($\alpha = 0.05$)	0.017	0.050	0.033
Critical BH value ($\alpha = 0.10$)	0.033	0.100	0.067
Passes BHP ($\alpha = 0.05$)	yes	no	no
Passes BHP ($\alpha = 0.10$)	yes	yes	yes
Satisfaction subindices in non-aligned subcounties (Table 4)			
	LC1s	Staff	
Uncorrected p-value	0.051	0.027	
Critical BH value ($\alpha = 0.05$)	0.050	0.025	
Critical BH value ($\alpha = 0.10$)	0.100	0.050	
Passes BHP ($\alpha = 0.05$)	no	no	
Passes BHP ($\alpha = 0.10$)	yes	yes	
All main outcomes in non-aligned subcounties (Tables 3 & 4)			
	Political oversight	Satisfaction	Observed quality
Uncorrected p-value	0.000	0.054	0.046
Critical BH value ($\alpha = 0.05$)	0.017	0.050	0.033
Critical BH value ($\alpha = 0.10$)	0.033	0.100	0.067
Passes BHP ($\alpha = 0.05$)	yes	no	no
Passes BHP ($\alpha = 0.10$)	yes	yes	yes

Notes: Uncorrected p-values are derived from the estimation underlying the respective original tables. BHP stands for Benjamini-Hochberg procedure, which was implemented for a significance level of $\alpha = 0.05$ and $\alpha = 0.10$, respectively. A result is considered as passing BHP if the uncorrected p-value is below the Benjamini-Hochberg (BH) critical value of $\frac{i}{m} * \alpha$, where i is the rank of a p-value in the family (from smallest to largest) and m is the number of tests in the family.

F Example Budget Data

Budget and Expenditures for Lukhonia Subcountry, Mbale District, FY 2012/13. Source: Ministry of Finance (MoFPED), www.budget.go.ug As reported by the District to MoFPED										
Responsible Institution	Parish/Subcountry	Location / Facility	Sector	Reporting Period FY 12/13	Plan	Status	Budget (million)	Total Expenditure (million)	% Budget Spent	Source of Funding
Mbale District	Nabwerre-Lukhonia	Lukhonia	Accountability	July to June	Sis 0.4 million was allocated to Lukhonia for Financial Management and Accountability between July 2012 and June 2013	Sis 3.9 million were transferred to Lukhonia between July 2012 and June 2013 for Financial Management and Accountability	0.4	3.9	958.40%	District Unconditional Grant - Non Wage
Mbale District	Nabwerre-Lukhonia	Lukhonia	Agriculture	July to June	Sis 5.2 million was allocated to Lukhonia to fund costs of Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS) between July 2012 and June 2013	Sis 0.0 million were transferred to Lukhonia between July 2012 and June 2013 to fund costs of Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS)	5.2	0	0%	Conditional Grant for NAADS
Mbale District	Nabwerre-Lukhonia	NABWEYE P/S	Education	July to September	Sis 3.7 million was allocated to NABWEYE P/S to fund costs of running the Primary School between July 2012 and June 2013	Sis 1.2 million were transferred to NABWEYE P/S between July 2012 and September 2012 to fund costs of running the Primary School	3.7	1.3	33.50%	Conditional Grant to Primary Education
Mbale District	Nabwerre-Lukhonia	Lukhonia	Health	July to June	Sis 0.3 million was allocated to Lukhonia for Primary Healthcare between July 2012 and June 2013	Sis 0.3 million were transferred to Lukhonia between July 2012 and June 2013 for Primary Healthcare	0.3	0.3	129.60%	District Unconditional Grant - Non Wage
Mbale District	Nabwerre-Lukhonia	Lukhonia	Public Sector Management	July to June	Sis 3.2 million was allocated to Lukhonia for Local Statutory Bodies between July 2012 and June 2013	Sis 2.0 million were transferred to Lukhonia between July 2012 and June 2013 for Local Statutory Bodies	3.2	2	61.80%	District Unconditional Grant - Non Wage
Mbale District	Nabwerre-Lukhonia	Lukhonia	Social Development	July to June	Sis 3.5 million was allocated to Lukhonia for Community Mobilisation and Empowerment between July 2012 and June 2013	Sis 3.9 million were transferred to Lukhonia between July 2012 and June 2013 for Community Mobilisation and Empowerment	3.5	3.9	111.20%	LGAUSD (Former LGDF)
Mbale District	Nabwerre-Lukhonia	Namwemba - Nabwerre Road	Works and Transport	July to March	Sis 3.8 million was allocated to Namwemba - Nabwerre Road for District, Urban and Community Access Road Maintenance between July 2012 and June 2013	Sis 1.8 million were transferred to Namwemba - Nabwerre Road between July 2012 and March 2013 for District, Urban and Community Access Road Maintenance	3.8	1.8	46.50%	Other Transfers from Central Government
Mbale District	Nabwerre-Lukhonia	Namwemba - Nabwerre (part)	Works and Transport	July to June	Sis 24.6 million was allocated to Namwemba - Nabwerre (part) for District, Urban and Community Access Road Maintenance between July 2012 and June 2013	Sis 0.0 million were transferred to Namwemba - Nabwerre (part) between July 2012 and June 2013 for District, Urban and Community Access Road Maintenance	24.6	0	0%	Other Transfers from Central Government
Mbale District	Namwemba-Lukhonia	Lukhonia	Agriculture	July to June	Sis 5.2 million was allocated to Lukhonia to fund costs of Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS) between July 2012 and June 2013	Sis 0.0 million were transferred to Lukhonia between July 2012 and June 2013 to fund costs of Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS)	5.2	0	0%	Conditional Grant for NAADS

G Behavioral Measures

Randomization was stratified by ‘quality groups’, as measured by the three behavioral measures described below.

Honesty. To measure honesty, I use a method developed by Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) and adapted by Hanna and Wang (2017).⁶ The idea is to give respondents both an opportunity and an incentive to cheat, while being able to observe whether they take advantage of it. To this end, at the end of the survey, respondents were asked to privately roll a six-sided die 42 times and to report the total number of scores they obtained on a sheet. The exercise was introduced as a fun activity with a chance of winning money to thank them for their time. Respondents received 33 Ugandan Shillings for every point they reported, for a maximum of 8,300 Ugandan Shillings (about USD 3.30, the equivalent of a nice meal in a local restaurant) in addition to their transport refund. Results and scripts are included in the secondary SI. Higher total scores are a proxy measure for a higher propensity to cheat.⁷ I found this measure to correlate with actual corrupt behavior among Indian civil servants.

Public-mindedness. To measure the extent to which officials value public versus private benefits, I designed a variation of a public goods game which was administered at the end of the survey. To thank respondents for their time, they were each given ten tokens. Each token represented a chance to win 50,000 Ugandan shilling or about USD 20. To make this salient, tokens were small laminated 50,000 Shilling bills. Respondents were asked to allocate their ten tokens across six different purposes. Should one of their tokens win, the money would go towards the pre-specified purpose. Three of the purposes benefited the entire community (contribution to the local school, contribution to the local health center, contribution to repair a broken water source in the community), while the other three benefited the individual’s family (contribution to own children’s school fees, contribution to upkeep of parents / other relatives, contribution for home improvement). Enumerators were trained to present the six purposes in an alternating order in a neutral tone, clearly stating that there was no ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ allocation and that their choice would be confidential. They also informed respondents that one winning token per district would be drawn, and that they would be informed should one of theirs be the lucky draw. Should a token allocated to school fees, home improvement or relatives win, then they would receive the money directly via mobile money on their cell phone. Should a token allocated towards a local school, health center or water source win, then the research team would pay the money to the project as an anonymous donation and present the respondent with a receipt as proof that the money had been allocated as intended. Respondents were asked to allocate their ten tokens on a board indicating the six purposes. Enumerators were instructed to leave them alone while allocating their tokens. Respondents could allocate them however they liked, with all ten tokens on one purpose or a distribution across purposes. Enumerators then recorded the allocation and asked respondents for the reasons for which they had chosen this allocation. Results and scripts are included in the secondary SI. The resulting measure is the number of tokens allocated to community projects, ranging from zero to ten.

Monitoring effort. Research teams visited one local government project per parish, such as primary schools, health centers, newly constructed boreholes or feeder roads. Projects were selected from the universe of all projects funded by local government in the Financial Year 2013/14, i.e. the fiscal cycle in which the baseline survey took place. Monitoring these projects through visits is part of the mandate of subcounty and district councilors and bureaucrats. Besides a number of questions about project implementation and perceived quality, village chairpersons – and in the case of primary schools and health centers also the respective in-charges – were asked when specific district and subcounty officials had last visited the project for monitoring purposes, if ever.

These measures were averaged by bureaucrats and politicians at the subcounty level, standardized and aggregated to an additive quality index. On this basis, I divided subcounties into four ‘quality groups’ for stratification (low-low, low-high, high-low, and high-high), where ‘low quality politicians’ indicates that the average quality measure of politicians in a given subcounty is below the median average quality of politicians in the entire sample, and so forth.

⁶Fischbacher, Urs and Franziska Föllmi-Heusi. 2013. “Lies in Disguise: An Experimental Study on Cheating.” *Journal of the European Economic Association* 11(3):525–547. Hanna, Rema and Shing-Yi Wang. 2017. “Dishonesty and Selection into Public Service: Evidence from India.” *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy* 9(3):262–90.

⁷This is, of course, a noisy measure since it combines propensity to cheat with random error. Respondents roll the dice 42 times to reduce the random error.