

# Supporting Information for “Informing the Leader: Bureaucracies and International Crises”

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# 1 Opportunities to Use Force: Coding and Sources for Hawkishness Variable

<b>Chinese Offshore Islands</b> Year: 1953 Hawkish: Similar	<i>Impetus:</i> PRC captures lesser islands and threatens the Tachens <i>Sources:</i> Corpus*
<b>Korean War Armistice</b> Year: 1953 Hawkish: Similar	<i>Impetus:</i> PRC-North Korean attack during settlement deliberations <i>Sources:</i> Corpus, George and Smoke (1974); Dingman (1988); Crane (2000); Trachtenberg (1988); Ambrose (1984); Immerman (1998)
<b>Soviet Nuclear Program</b> Year: 1953 Hawkish: Defense	<i>Impetus:</i> US study of preventive attacks <i>Sources:</i> Corpus, Trachtenberg (1988); Brands (1989a)
<b>Dien Bien Phu</b> Year: 1954 Hawkish: Similar	<i>Impetus:</i> Vietminh offensive against French positions <i>Sources:</i> Corpus, Herring and Immerman (1984); Fair (1996); Ambrose (1984); Hoopes (1974)
<b>Guatemala</b> Year: 1954 Hawkish: State	<i>Impetus:</i> US sponsored and supported overthrow of Arbenz <i>Sources:</i> Moye (1998); Immerman (2010, 1980); Hove (2007); Immerman (1998)
<b>Taiwan Straits I</b> Year: 1954 Hawkish: State	<i>Impetus:</i> PRC bombards offshore islands <i>Sources:</i> Corpus, George and Smoke (1974); Chang (1988)
<b>Suez</b> Year: 1956 Hawkish: Defense	<i>Impetus:</i> Nationalization prompts attack, prompting Soviet threat <i>Sources:</i> Corpus, Warner (1991); Kingseed (1992)
<b>Jordan I</b> Year: 1957 Hawkish: Similar	<i>Impetus:</i> Pro-Egyptian/Syrian and leftist forces threaten Hussein <i>Sources:</i> Corpus, George and Smoke (1974); Little (1995); Immerman (1998)
<b>Syria</b> Year: 1957 Hawkish: Similar	<i>Impetus:</i> Syrian shift toward Soviet bloc <i>Sources:</i> Corpus, George and Smoke (1974); Blackwell (2000); Pearson (2007)
<b>Taiwan Straits Turmoil</b> Year: 1957 Hawkish: State	<i>Impetus:</i> Heavy PRC shelling of Quemoy island group <i>Sources:</i> Corpus
<b>Berlin Deadline</b> Year: 1958 Hawkish: Similar	<i>Impetus:</i> Soviet ultimatum on Berlin's status and control <i>Sources:</i> Corpus, George and Smoke (1974); Williamson (2010)
<b>Indonesia</b> Year: 1958 Hawkish: Defense	<i>Impetus:</i> Covert US efforts to change regime <i>Sources:</i> Corpus, Kahin and Audrey (N.d.); Brands (1989b); Scott (1985)
<b>Jordan II</b> Year: 1958 Hawkish: Defense	<i>Impetus:</i> Threats to Hussein's regime <i>Sources:</i> Corpus, Hahn (2006)
<b>Lebanon</b> Year: 1958 Hawkish: Similar	<i>Impetus:</i> Assassination of reformist editor and coup in Iraq <i>Sources:</i> Corpus, George and Smoke (1974); Little (1996); Hoopes (1974); Ambrose (1984)
<b>Taiwan Straits II</b> Year: 1958 Hawkish: Similar	<i>Impetus:</i> PRC attacks offshore islands <i>Sources:</i> Corpus, George and Smoke (1974); Gordon (1985)

<b>Cuba Expropriation</b>	<i>Impetus:</i> Soviet aid to Cuba and expropriations of US assets
<i>Year:</i> 1960	<i>Sources:</i> Corpus
<i>Hawkish:</i> Similar	
<b>Bay of Pigs</b>	<i>Impetus:</i> US sponsored landing/invasion of Cuba
<i>Year:</i> 1961	<i>Sources:</i> Corpus, Schlesinger (1965); Wyden (1979); Higgins (1987)
<i>Hawkish:</i> Defense	
<b>Berlin Wall</b>	<i>Impetus:</i> Challenge to freedom of movement in Berlin
<i>Year:</i> 1961	<i>Sources:</i> Corpus, George and Smoke (1974); Smyser (2009); Gearson and Schake (2002)
<i>Hawkish:</i> Similar	
<b>Kuwait</b>	<i>Impetus:</i> Iraqi threat to Kuwait's independence
<i>Year:</i> 1961	<i>Sources:</i> Corpus, Joyce (1995); Winger (2012)
<i>Hawkish:</i> Similar	
<b>Pathet Lao</b>	<i>Impetus:</i> Pathet Lao offensive
<i>Year:</i> 1961	<i>Sources:</i> Corpus, Mahajani (1971); Warner (1994); Kochavi (2002)
<i>Hawkish:</i> Defense	
<b>Phuoc Vinh</b>	<i>Impetus:</i> Vietcong attack on Phuoc Vinh
<i>Year:</i> 1961	<i>Sources:</i> Corpus, Pelz (1981); Warner (1994)
<i>Hawkish:</i> Defense	
<b>Trujillo</b>	<i>Impetus:</i> Assassination of Trujillo and domestic turmoil in DR
<i>Year:</i> 1961	<i>Sources:</i> Corpus, Rabe (1996); Dauer (2005)
<i>Hawkish:</i> Defense	
<b>China Arms Buildup</b>	<i>Impetus:</i> Large PRC military buildup in area of Taiwan
<i>Year:</i> 1962	<i>Sources:</i> Corpus, Hilsman (1967)
<i>Hawkish:</i> Similar	
<b>Cuban Missile Crisis</b>	<i>Impetus:</i> US response to Soviet missiles in Cuba
<i>Year:</i> 1962	<i>Sources:</i> Corpus, Allison and Zelikow (1999)
<i>Hawkish:</i> State	
<b>Nam Tha</b>	<i>Impetus:</i> Pathet Lao take region and threaten Thailand
<i>Year:</i> 1962	<i>Sources:</i> Corpus, Wehrle (1998); Kochavi (2002)
<i>Hawkish:</i> State	
<b>Taiwan Return</b>	<i>Impetus:</i> Taiwan considers assault on mainland
<i>Year:</i> 1962	<i>Sources:</i> Corpus, Kochavi (1996); Gordon (1985); Hilsman (1967)
<i>Hawkish:</i> Defense	
<b>Chinese Nuclear Program</b>	<i>Impetus:</i> US consideration of preventive strikes
<i>Year:</i> 1963	<i>Sources:</i> Burr and Richelson (2000)
<i>Hawkish:</i> Defense	
<b>Haiti</b>	<i>Impetus:</i> Duvalier instability and threat of communist influence
<i>Year:</i> 1963	<i>Sources:</i> Corpus, Arthus (2014)
<i>Hawkish:</i> Similar	
<b>Yemen</b>	<i>Impetus:</i> Civil war in Yemen with broad regional involvement
<i>Year:</i> 1963	<i>Sources:</i> Corpus, Bishku (1992); Little (1988); Smith (2000)
<i>Hawkish:</i> Similar	
<b>Congo</b>	<i>Impetus:</i> Revolution and hostage situation
<i>Year:</i> 1964	<i>Sources:</i> Corpus, Odom (1988)
<i>Hawkish:</i> Similar	
<b>Cyprus I</b>	<i>Impetus:</i> Outbreak of inter-communal violence
<i>Year:</i> 1964	<i>Sources:</i> Corpus, Wenzke and Lindley (2008); Brands Jr (1987); James (2002)
<i>Hawkish:</i> Similar	
<b>Laos I</b>	<i>Impetus:</i> Attempted coup and anti-aircraft firing on US planes
<i>Year:</i> 1964	<i>Sources:</i> Corpus, Benson (2014)
<i>Hawkish:</i> Similar	
<b>Panama Flag</b>	<i>Impetus:</i> Riots in the canal zones
<i>Year:</i> 1964	<i>Sources:</i> Corpus, Latham (2002); McPherson (2004)
<i>Hawkish:</i> Defense	

**Tonkin Gulf**  
Year: 1964  
Hawkish: Similar  
**Dominican Republic**  
Year: 1965  
Hawkish: State  
**Pleiku**  
Year: 1965  
Hawkish: Defense  
**Six Day War**  
Year: 1967  
Hawkish: State  
**Czechoslovakia**  
Year: 1968  
Hawkish: Similar  
**USS Pueblo**  
Year: 1968  
Hawkish: Similar  
**Tet Offensive**  
Year: 1968  
Hawkish: State  
**Cambodia Bombing**  
Year: 1969  
Hawkish: Defense  
**Korea EC-121**  
Year: 1969  
Hawkish: Similar  
**Black September**  
Year: 1970  
Hawkish: Similar  
**Cambodia Invasion**  
Year: 1970  
Hawkish: State  
**Cienfuegos**  
Year: 1970  
Hawkish: Defense  
**Cuban Shipping**  
Year: 1971  
Hawkish: Similar  
**Laos II**  
Year: 1971  
Hawkish: Defense  
**Christmas Bombing**  
Year: 1972  
Hawkish: State  
**Ports Mining**  
Year: 1972  
Hawkish: State  
**Arab Israeli War**  
Year: 1973  
Hawkish: State  
**Libya**  
Year: 1973  
Hawkish: Defense

*Impetus:* Reported attack on US ships  
*Sources:* Corpus, Ball (1991); Moise (1996)

*Impetus:* Government overthrown and civil conflict  
*Sources:* Corpus, McPherson (2003); Brands (1987); Draper (1971); Palmer Jr (2015)  
*Impetus:* Attack on Camp Holloway in Vietnam  
*Sources:* Corpus, Freedman (1996); Milne (2007); Greenstein and Burke (1989)  
*Impetus:* Preemptive Israeli strike and Soviet threat of intervention  
*Sources:* Corpus, Quandt (1992); Lazarowitz (2008)  
*Impetus:* Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia  
*Sources:* Corpus, Valenta (1979); Prozumenshchikov (2010)

*Impetus:* North Korea seizes US naval ship  
*Sources:* Corpus, Houghton (2015); Mobley (2001); Lerner (2001); Lamb (1984)  
*Impetus:* Offensive against US and allied forces in Vietnam War  
*Sources:* Corpus, Sigelman and McNeil (1980); Khong (1992)

*Impetus:* North Vietnam spring offensive and US response  
*Sources:* Corpus, McMahon (2010)

*Impetus:* North Korea shoots down US reconnaissance plane  
*Sources:* Corpus, Sarantakes (2017); Simmons (1978)

*Impetus:* Syria invades Jordan, threatening Hussein  
*Sources:* Corpus, Garfinkle (1985); Van Atta (2008); Kissinger (2011)  
*Impetus:* US expands ground operations into Cambodia  
*Sources:* Corpus, Drivas (2011)

*Impetus:* Soviet submarine base in Cuba  
*Sources:* Corpus, Crall and Martin (2013)

*Impetus:* Cuban seizure of commercial ships  
*Sources:* Corpus

*Impetus:* US expands bombing into Laos  
*Sources:* Corpus

*Impetus:* North Vietnam halts diplomatic efforts  
*Sources:* Corpus, Warner (2014)

*Impetus:* Easter Offensive and response in Vietnam War  
*Sources:* Corpus, Randolph (2009)

*Impetus:* Egypt attacks Israel, threat of Soviet intervention  
*Sources:* Corpus, Rabinovich (2007); Dinitz (1999); Sagan (1979)

*Impetus:* Libya attacks US reconnaissance flights  
*Sources:* Corpus

<b>Cyprus II</b>	<i>Impetus:</i> Turkey invades Cyprus
<i>Year:</i> 1974	<i>Sources:</i> Corpus, Wenzke and Lindley (2008); Constandinos (2009); Slengesol (2000)
<i>Hawkish:</i> Similar	
<b>Angola</b>	<i>Impetus:</i> Large Soviet-backed MPLA offensive
<i>Year:</i> 1975	<i>Sources:</i> Corpus, Noer (1993)
<i>Hawkish:</i> State	
<b>Mayaguez</b>	<i>Impetus:</i> Khmer Rouge seize US cargo ship
<i>Year:</i> 1975	<i>Sources:</i> Corpus, Lamb (1984); Snyder and Diesing (1977)
<i>Hawkish:</i> State	
<b>Saigon Fall</b>	<i>Impetus:</i> Fall of Saigon and evacuation of US personnel
<i>Year:</i> 1975	<i>Sources:</i> Corpus
<i>Hawkish:</i> State	
<b>Uganda</b>	<i>Impetus:</i> Amin holds all US citizens
<i>Year:</i> 1977	<i>Sources:</i> Corpus, Carter (2010)
<i>Hawkish:</i> Similar	
<b>Iran Revolution</b>	<i>Impetus:</i> Domestic challenges to US-supported Shah
<i>Year:</i> 1978	<i>Sources:</i> Corpus, Moens (1991)
<i>Hawkish:</i> Defense	
<b>Shaba II</b>	<i>Impetus:</i> Katangan rebels invade Zaire, threatening US citizens
<i>Year:</i> 1978	<i>Sources:</i> Corpus, Odom (1993)
<i>Hawkish:</i> Similar	
<b>Afghanistan</b>	<i>Impetus:</i> Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
<i>Year:</i> 1979	<i>Sources:</i> Corpus, Hartman (2002); Brzezinski (1983); Vance (1983)
<i>Hawkish:</i> Similar	
<b>Cuba Soviet Brigade</b>	<i>Impetus:</i> US intelligence identifies Soviet Brigade in Cuba
<i>Year:</i> 1979	<i>Sources:</i> Corpus, Brzezinski (1983)
<i>Hawkish:</i> Similar	
<b>Iran Hostage</b>	<i>Impetus:</i> Storming of US embassy and holding US citizens hostage
<i>Year:</i> 1979	<i>Sources:</i> Smith (1985); Glad (1989)
<i>Hawkish:</i> Defense	

\*Note: "Corpus" refers to texts included in the main corpus used for the analyses evaluating the two informational expectations. In some cases, it also refers to additional texts in the *Foreign Relations of the United States* series that did not qualify for corpus inclusion because they were from the sub-presidential level but were nonetheless helpful for coding the hawkishness variable.

## 1.1 Hawkishness Coding Rationale and Approach

The coding scheme for policy differences between civilian State and Defense officials (1) occurs at the crisis level and (2) involves a single coding decision comparing the hawkishness of policies endorsed by representatives of each bureaucracy. Both elements merit discussion. First, I code policy positions for the entire crisis rather than breaking down a crisis into smaller periods during which different decisions were made. This choice insures consistency with the other analyses in the study which occur at the full crisis level. It also minimizes the risk of ad hoc researcher decisions. Policy positions could be coded at less aggregated intervals within crises, but the process of crisis disaggregation would require many researcher decisions with few strict rules that could be specified ex ante to guide this process. The downside of the coding approach is that leaving crises aggregated to produce a single policy coding occasionally proves difficult because adviser policy prescriptions can evolve over the course of the crisis. In such cases I tried to weigh the totality of evidence, following the practice in Betts (1991). Though made on the basis of evidence from within the corpus and sometimes additional sources, other scholars could reasonably disagree with these coding decisions and perhaps improve upon them.

Second, the coding approach holds fixed all crisis-level attributes by coding the *relative* policy positions of State and Defense officials for a given crisis, which again follows the approach in Betts (1991). This process of comparing policy prescriptions within a single crisis minimizes the number of researcher decisions.

An alternative approach might involve coding the independent policy prescription for State and Defense for each crisis and then running a series of models with 122 observations (61 crises \* 2 bureaucracies) which could include covariates or fixed effects. While more flexible from a modeling standpoint, this alternative approach is more dubious from a coding standpoint. Rather than judging which bureaucracy adopted the more hawkish stance (a single judgment), it demands a unified ordinal coding scheme that can rank the relative hawkishness of a wide array of policy options from across crises which vary greatly in their intensity. Within a single crisis the coding task of comparing just two policy positions proved feasible, while coding becomes far more difficult when attempting to compare over 100 policy positions across the crises. For instance, a key decision during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war concerned the speed with which US supplies should be provided. State officials favored a more aggressive timetable than those from Defense who harbored greater concerns about escalatory responses from adversaries. Judging this case in isolation allows for a relatively straightforward judgment of which bureaucracy adopted the more aggressive policy stance. The nature of the policies under discussion obviously varied across cases. While the Arab-Israeli case involved arms provisions, the case surrounding the bombing of Cambodia in 1969 clearly involved a more direct application of violence. The salient difference in the latter concerned Defense Secretary Laird’s support for the bombing operation compared to State Secretary Roger’s opposition, albeit tepid, to it. Again, a single coding decision holding fixed the crisis simplifies the coding task and ideally increases its validity.

## 2 Corpus Characteristics

*Corpus Descriptives.* The full corpus consists of 5,404 speech acts across 382 documents with 176 unique speakers. Memos (versus meeting statements) constitute 3% of all speech acts, but tend to be longer and thus represent 27% of total words in the corpus. Meetings on average include 4.7 participants. Controlling for document type – meetings versus memos – does not affect the results as shown in §5.2 and 5.3. The average crisis has 3,442 words uttered by members of the five bureaucracies under analysis (State, CIA, NSC/WH, JCS, non-JCS Defense).

*Influential Speakers in Corpus.* Speakers with the highest volume of text by administration. Patterns accord with standard historical accounts about adviser influence with prominent officials—Dulles, Kissinger, Brzezinski—enjoying ample speaking time.

Table A2: Influential Speakers by Administration

Eisenhower	Kennedy	Johnson	Nixon	Ford	Carter
Dulles (John)	McNamara	Bundy	Kissinger	Kissinger	Brzezinski
Radford	Taylor	McNamara	Laird	Colby	Turner
Dulles (Allen)	Rusk	Ball	Rogers	Schlesinger	Vance
Cutler	Komer	Rostow	Moorer	Jones	Muskie
Smith (Walter)	Bundy	Rusk	Newsom	Wyand	Brown
Stassen	McCone	McCone	Helms	Rockefeller	Sullivan
Wilson	Schlesinger	Wheeler	Haig	Rumsfeld	Aaron

Notes: Speakers with the most text by administration.

*Assessing Corpus Comprehensiveness.* Does FRUS include a high percentage of the documents in which advisers provide input to presidents during international crises? This question is impossible to answer barring extensive trips to presidential libraries and additional archives, many of which closed for prolonged periods during the pandemic. To nonetheless gain some insight, this analysis leverages online finding aids from presidential libraries to identify materials with a high likelihood of being crisis-pertinent advice provided to presidents during six crises. The table below includes archival series when information about the scope of the collection is relatively complete, often thanks to digitization and online presentation of the materials. I include multiple series with potentially relevant documents while excluding those that typically have documents from below the presidential level or that contain extraneous material unrelated to advisory processes. In all cases, additional archival series are very likely to include relevant documents but whether

they do and how many they hold require archival visits. Thus, the series and sources in the table include only those with contents that could be assessed with a high degree of confidence from afar.

In the table, “Estimated Texts” only applies to those materials that reached the president and pertained to the crisis, as opposed to all materials in the series. “Likely Leader-Level and Crisis-Relevant” provides additional information when helpful on document inclusion/exclusion criteria, such as documents that record events occurring below the presidential level (e.g., meetings of the Kissinger-chaired Washington Special Actions Group). The amount of material varies across crises and administrations partly due to different advisory procedures across administrations and partly due to differences in the completeness of online finding aids and digitization across presidential libraries.

Again, the table below is far from complete. It reflects what can be assessed with reasonable confidence from online sources. *With those caveats in place for the six crises in Table A3, of the approximately 58 relevant leader-level texts solidly identified at the archives, 49 appear in FRUS.*

Table A3: Easier to Assess Archival Materials and FRUS Inclusion

Archival Series	Estimated Texts	Likely Leader-Level & Crisis-Relevant	FRUS Texts
<i>Fall of Saigon – Ford Library</i>			
NSC Meetings	4	Yes	4
Memoranda of Conversations	8	Yes (excluding those with foreign leaders)	6
<i>Mayaguez Seizure – Ford Library</i>			
NSC Meetings	5	Yes	5
Memoranda of Conversations	1	Yes	0
Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing (digitized)	4	Yes	2
<i>EC-121 Shootdown – Nixon Library</i>			
NSC Meetings	1	Yes	1
NSC Institutional Files	0	No (if not NSC meeting, then WSAG below Nixon)	0
<i>Gulf of Tonkin – Johnson Library</i>			
NSC Meetings	1	Yes (though an earlier meeting includes only one substantive comment on the crisis)	1
Memos to the President	0	No (background on talking points with U Thant)	0
<i>Phuoc Vinh – Kennedy Library</i>			
NSC Meetings	1	Yes	1
Memos to the President	3	Yes (Folder “November 1-20”)	3
Meetings with the President	0	Yes	0
<i>Suez – Eisenhower Library</i>			
NSC Meetings	5	Yes (9/6 meeting covered the 9/5 NIE)	5
Dulles Papers: WH Memoranda Meetings with the President	≈25	Yes	21

*Notes:* FRUS completeness among the *subset* of archival series for which presidential libraries provide sufficient information via online finding aids to discern their contents with confidence.

### 3 Adviser Content Measures

#### 3.1 Training: Texts and Inter-coder Reliability

##### Military Texts

Example 1: Ground Attacks on Base Camps in Cambodia: Attached at Tab A is a brief summary of the two options for ground attacks on enemy base camps in Cambodia submitted by General Abrams on March 30. In developing plans for potential operations against enemy base areas, General Abrams was asked to consider two possibilities: An attack against targets of high military priority which could involve the use of US forces if necessary. Any other operation which would reduce the necessity of the involvement of US forces. With respect to military priority, MACV considered an attack on Base Area 352/353 (COSVN Hq) to be the most lucrative. He made the following significant points about this base area.<sup>1</sup>

Example 2: The Chiefs believe that ground action against the North Vietnamese effort is adequate to reverse the situation. Air strikes on the three targets are not necessary from a military point of view. However, a South Vietnamese attack on their target is acceptable.<sup>2</sup>

##### Political Texts

Example 1: Iran. The two leading US academic experts on Iran, James Bill and Marvin Zonis, recently were debriefed in the Department following their separate visits to Iran at the end of November. In a wide range of Iranian contacts, both men found intense rage against the Shah personally. This is a marked change from the past when Iranians were content to blame their troubles on the Government and the Shah's advisers. Both professors see a slim chance that the Shah might retain a minimal role as constitutional monarch, but only if he moves quickly to negotiate a political compromise. They assess the opposition as very strong and extremely well-organized. Everywhere they found an eagerness for the US to play a decisive role in promoting a political solution to Iran's crisis.<sup>3</sup>

Example 2: In spite of economic difficulties there is no solid evidence that Trujillo's fall is imminent. Trujillo rules by force and will presumably remain in power as long as the armed forces continue to support him. While there is evidence of dissatisfaction on the part of a few officers there is as yet no cogent evidence of large-scale defection within the officer corps. The underground opposition to Trujillo composed of business, student and professional people is believed to be predominantly anti-Communist. They have substantially increased in numbers in recent years but have been unable to move effectively against Trujillo. In addition to opposition groups in the Dominican Republic, there are numerous exile groups located principally in Venezuela, Cuba, United States and Puerto Rico. In some cases these groups have been infiltrated by pro-Castro or pro-Communist elements.<sup>4</sup>

A research assistant produced identical codings for 82% of training set texts with Cohen's kappa= 0.65. Table A4 shows the full confusion matrix.

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<sup>1</sup>Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, April 27, 1970, *FRUS*, Volume VI, Vietnam, January 1969-July 1970, Document 264.

<sup>2</sup>Summary Notes of the 546th Meeting of the National Security Council, February 7, 1965, *FRUS*, Volume II, Vietnam, January-June 1965, Document 80.

<sup>3</sup>Memorandum from Warren Christopher to President Carter, December 1978, National Security Archive (NLC-00-158).

<sup>4</sup>Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy, February 15, 1961, *FRUS*, Volume XII, American Republics, Document 302.



		Coder 2	
		<i>political</i>	<i>military</i>
Coder 1	<i>political</i>	175	8
	<i>military</i>	76	216

### 3.2 Classifier, Validation, and Measurements

Naive Bayes with a multinomial distribution using the observed frequencies of words in classified texts and a Laplace smoother of 1, as implemented in `fastNaiveBayes` (Skogholt 2020), provided the best performance across several tested algorithms based on 10-fold cross-validation accuracy (88%). Random forest models and support vector machines each achieved 83% accuracy. The selected classifier performed similarly well on other metrics: precision (0.95), recall (0.85), and  $F$ -score (0.90). Additionally, the cross-validation exercise generates text scores for each document in the excluded set. Figure A1 plots each text’s score on the x-axis and its hand coded classification on the y-axis. Beyond high accuracy (solid points as a fraction of all points), the figure shows that inaccurate classifications were rarely far off the mark, instead clustering around the dashed vertical line at 0.




Figure A1: Cross-validation results. Dashed vertical line indicates  $Raw\ Model\ Score = 1$ .

To generate the binary *Political* and continuous *Political Content Score* measures for each bureaucracy-crisis observation I start with the “rawprob” output from the `fastNaiveBayes` predictions. The method estimates the probability that text  $T$  belongs to the military class  $M$ , given the words in  $T$ . By Bayes’ Rule, this desired quantity  $P(M | T)$  is equal to  $\frac{P(T|M)P(M)}{P(T)}$ . Let  $P(T | M)$  be the independent product over all  $P(w_i | M)$  where  $w_i$  represents each word in text  $T$ . The independence assumption is clearly wrong; words used in a text are highly correlated. Nonetheless, Naive Bayes provides accurate classifications despite the assumption violation. I use the observed word frequencies in the training set to estimate  $P(w_i | M)$ . Output “rawprob” in `fastNaiveBayes` estimates a text  $T$ ’s *military score* as  $\sum_i \log P(w_i | M)$  and *political score* analogously as  $\sum_i \log P(w_i | M')$ .

The binary *Political* measure equals one when *political score* > *military score*, and is otherwise zero. For the continuous *Political Content Score*, first calculate the *raw score* which is  $\frac{military\ score}{political\ score}$ , where values greater

than one indicate political content because the numerator and denominator are both negative. Figure A1 plots these scores on the x-axis. Finally, I standardize this score to span from 0 to 1 such that *Political Content*

$$Score_T = \frac{raw\ score_T - min(raw\ score)}{max(raw\ score) - min(raw\ score)}.$$

## 4 Adviser Uncertainty Measures

Below is a sample text with the uncertainty dictionary words italicized.

Ball and Thompson believe that the Chinese decision to intervene on the ground would, in the final analysis, *probably depend* largely on the extent to which Peiping felt assured of Soviet support. There is no way that we can safely predict *whether* or not such support would be forthcoming. They are convinced, *however*, that the *risks* of Chinese ground intervention would be great and the costs of such intervention tremendous—particularly since the very taking of this step by Peiping would presumably imply substantial Soviet involvement, *perhaps* even to the point of a large-scale Soviet-US confrontation.<sup>5</sup>

Dictionary methods are more difficult to validate than supervised learning approaches because there is no analogue to  $k$ -fold cross-validation (Grimmer and Stewart 2013). I adopt four approaches. The first hand codes a subset of all documents (roughly 5%) from the corpus into three levels of uncertainty. These human codings strongly correlate (0.53) with the dictionary method uncertainty scores.

The second approach leverages texts where there are clear expectations for the *relative* degree of uncertainty. For instance, during the EC-121 incident Defense Secretary Laird wrote to Nixon suggesting that the JCS was overly certain in its estimate of what outcome US forces could impose on North Korea. He wrote, “If U.S. losses occur in the strike (and I believe there is more chance they may than the JCS papers indicate)...”<sup>6</sup> Laird’s memo should, and does, register a higher uncertainty score than the JCS communications (6.2% vs. 2.6%). I repeat the exercise with two texts from during the Pleiku crisis in 1965. Thomas Hughes, Director of the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, was dismayed by an earlier memo from McGeorge Bundy. In Bundy’s memo concerning probable reactions to escalated US bombing in Vietnam, he understated the risk of bombing actions by ignoring probable Chinese reactions. Chinese intervention or support for the North Vietnamese would amount to greater enemy military capabilities and thus is an added source of uncertainty. Hughes writes:

Incomprehensibly to me, the White House memorandum discusses the risks of sustained US air strikes against North Vietnam without examining Chinese Communist responses. However, the two intelligence community products estimate Chinese Communist air intervention to be quite likely at some stage in this very process.<sup>7</sup>

Again, the measure appropriately identifies Hughes’ memo to be more uncertain than Bundy’s memo (uncertainty scores of 7.7% and 5.3% respectively).

A third validity check compares uncertainty scores of those with historically well-known assessments. For instance, George Ball is widely thought to have been uncertain about what outcomes the US could secure through force in Vietnam. Walt Rostow, in contrast, was an adamant believer that North Vietnamese resolve was limited and the continued application of force would prove effective. Consistent with expectations, the uncertainty score for Ball (5.4%) is higher than that for Rostow (4.6%).

The fourth validation approach uses an alternative dictionary to measure uncertainty. The Loughran and McDonald (2011) dictionary is less appropriate than the Lasswell one because the former was designed for financial contexts rather than political ones. Nonetheless, the generated measures are positively correlated (0.61) and, as shown in a robustness check below, all results hold with the alternative Loughran-McDonald scores.

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<sup>5</sup>Memorandum from Acting Secretary of State Ball to President Johnson, February 13, 1965, *FRUS*, Volume II, Vietnam, January-June 1965, Document 113.

<sup>6</sup>Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon, April 18, 1969, *FRUS*, Volume XIX, Part 1, Korea, 1969-1972, Document 17.

<sup>7</sup>Memorandum from the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Acting Secretary of State Ball, February 8, 1965, *FRUS*, Volume II, Vietnam, 1964-1968, Document 90. Note that this document is not addressed to the president and is therefore only used for validation purposes.

Finally, I conduct a placebo test using a dictionary measuring a concept that theoretically should have no relationship with bureaucratic position. Specifically, I apply the Lasswell “Religion” dictionary which includes words such as “shaker,” “gospel,” and “theological.” As shown in the robustness tests below, bureaucratic affiliation is unrelated to the use of religious terms.

## 5 Robustness Checks

### 5.1 Summary Statistics

Table A5: Summary Statistics

	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
<u>Outcome Variables</u>					
Political Content Score	168	0.55	0.19	0.03	1.00
Political	168	0.43	0.50	0	1
Uncertainty	168	5.21	1.64	1.32	9.73
<u>Explanatory Variables</u>					
State Department	168	0.29	0.45	0	1
<u>Control Variables</u>					
Total Words	168	1,216.43	1,215.07	179	9,529
Relative Capabilities	168	152.53	300.74	0.83	1,712.99
Regime Type	168	-5.77	3.54	-10	10
Distance (log)	168	9.06	0.67	7.50	9.70
Non-state Enemy	168	0.18	0.39	0	1
Republic Admin.	168	0.51	0.50	0	1

## 5.2 Bureaucracy Affects Adviser Content

*Descriptive plot with all five bureaucracies.* The manuscript pools over JCS/non-JCS Defense and CIA/NSC. Here they are broken apart.




Figure A2: Text content by bureaucracy. *Political Content Score* observations with diamond indicating bureaucracy mean.

*Binary outcome variable.* I present logit specifications for models using the dichotomous *Political* content variable as an outcome for models analogous to Models 5, 7, and 8 in Manuscript Table 1.

Table A6: Logistic regression (as opposed to OLS) for binary content measure

	<i>Political</i>		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
State Department	0.88** (0.35)	0.87 (0.55)	3.44*** (1.05)
Constant	-0.55*** (0.19)	1.25 (1.13)	0.06 (1.38)
Observations	168	168	105
Case Fixed Effects	N	Y	Y
Only 'Ideal' Types	N	N	Y

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Logistic regression with bureaucracy-crisis as unit of analysis. Fixed effects not shown for models that include them. Model 3 limits the sample to State, Defense, and JCS observations.

*Randomization inference.* To address sample size concerns, I use randomization inference which does not require appeals to large samples or parametric assumptions (Rosenbaum 2002). Using the comparisons from Manuscript Table 1 Model 3 as a baseline, I define a test statistic as the mean State Department *Political Content Score* minus the mean non-JCS Defense and JCS *Political Content Score*. In the observed data, the test statistic is 0.19. In each of 10,000 iterations, I randomly assign observations to be either *State Department* or not with assignment proportions that match the observed distribution. After randomly assigning bureaucratic affiliation, I calculate the test statistic given that randomization for each of the 10,000 iterations. *Across those 10,000, there are zero cases that produce a test statistic as large as the one observed in the real data.*

*Bayes factor.* Given critiques concerning the interpretation and appropriateness of hypothesis testing, I also report Bayes factors (bf) comparing specifications that include the *State Department* bureaucratic explanatory variable to those that do not. A first analysis compares models with all covariates either with or without the the *State Department* variable. The data is far more likely under my hypothesis which include the bureaucracy variable (bf=116). A second analysis repeats the exercise but while restricting the data set to “ideal” type bureaucracies which includes State and the various Defense organizations. The evidence is even stronger in support of a model including a bureaucracy variable (bf=2884). Analysis implemented with the BayesFactor package.

*Clustered standard errors.* Robustness checks cluster standard errors on the crisis for the two main specifications (Manuscript Table 1, Models 1 and 3). Both produce smaller standard errors and all results hold. For Model 3 which employs fixed effects, I follow Cameron and Miller (2015) and use the within estimator due to the small number of observations in each cluster.

*Control variables.* Reproduces Manuscript Table 1, Models 2 and 6. The use of crisis fixed effects in the main analysis precludes the use of crisis-level covariates. For robustness purposes, I show that results hold when using commonly employed control variables in a specification without fixed effects. *Relative Capabilities* measures US capabilities over opponent constitutes where capabilities reflect the standard CINC scores. *Regime Type* reflects the opponent’s polity score with higher values indicating more democratic regimes. *Distance (log)* measures the log distance between the US and the crisis location. *Non-state Enemy* is an indicator variable for whether the adversary is a non-state actor, such as a rebel group threatening a US-aligned regime. *Republican Administration* is an indicator variable for whether the crisis occurred during a Republic presidential administration.

Table A7: Crisis-level control variables (no fixed effects)

	<i>Political Content Score</i>	<i>Political</i>
	(1)	(2)
State Department	0.12*** (0.03)	0.19** (0.09)
Relative Capabilities	0.0000 (0.0001)	0.0002 (0.0002)
Regime Type	-0.001 (0.005)	-0.01 (0.01)
Distance (log)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.06)
Non-state Enemy	0.02 (0.05)	0.003 (0.13)
Republican Admin.	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.08)
Constant	0.77*** (0.20)	0.57 (0.53)
Observations	168	168
Case Fixed Effects	N	N

\* p < .1; \*\* p < .05; \*\*\* p < .01

Notes: OLS with bureaucracy-crisis as unit of analysis.

*Exclude potentially distinct observations.* Cases involving contemplated strikes against an adversary’s nascent nuclear program (PRC and USSR) may differ due to an arguably less compressed timeline compared to crises. Models 1 and 2 exclude these observations. Similarly, repeated cases from a given context may pose problems if they are not truly independent observations. Models 3 and 4 exclude observations related to the Vietnam War besides the first Vietnam-related case for both the Johnson and Nixon administrations.

Table A8: Subset of Observations

<i>Excludes ...</i>	<i>Proliferation Cases</i>		<i>Repeated Vietnam Cases</i>	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
State Department	0.13*** (0.03)	0.09*** (0.03)	0.12*** (0.03)	0.09*** (0.03)
Constant	0.51*** (0.02)	0.70*** (0.07)	0.52*** (0.02)	0.70*** (0.07)
N	164	164	150	150
Case Fixed Effects	N	Y	N	Y

\* $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

*Notes:* OLS with bureaucracy-crisis as unit of analysis. Fixed effects not shown for models that include them. Models 1 and 2 exclude “nuclear” observations; 3 and 4 exclude “repeat” Vietnam observations.

*Individual-level of analysis.* Because bureaucratic position is the main explanatory variable, I operationalize observations at the bureaucracy-crisis level for the main analysis. An alternative approach is to conduct analyses as the individual-level where each individual’s bureaucratic affiliation serves as the explanatory variable. The table below adopts this approach where each individual speaking event—whether a memo or all of an individual’s text from a meeting—is the unit of analysis. To insure sufficient text for generating valid measures in each observation, I limit the sample to instances with at least 30 words. All results hold using this alternative approach.

Table A9: Individual speaker level of analysis

	<i>Political Content Score</i>			<i>Political Class</i>		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
State Department	0.07*** (0.01)	0.06*** (0.01)	0.11*** (0.01)	0.21*** (0.04)	0.16*** (0.04)	0.31*** (0.05)
Constant	0.51***	0.61***	0.52***	0.42***	0.74***	0.39**
Observations	626	626	358	629	629	360
Case Fixed Effects	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Only ‘Ideal’ Types	N	N	Y	N	N	Y

\* $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

*Notes:* OLS with individual speaker observations as unit of analysis. Fixed effects not shown for models that include them. Models 3 and 6 limit the sample to State, Defense, and JCS observations.

*Individual-level of analysis excluding leader names from training data.* The table below recreates the prior one but now using content measures generated without including leader names in the training data. A potential concern is that mention of specific foreign leaders is not obviously associated with political, as opposed to military, content. As the manuscript reports, some leader names score quite highly as distinguishing terms. To address this issue, I regenerate all political content measures at the individual-level when dropping leader names from the training set. The dropped names are Nasser, Castro, Chiang, and Khrushchev. As shown below, all results hold using this alternative approach and the new measure has a 0.995 correlation with the main measure that includes leader names.

Table A10: Individual speaker level of analysis excluding leader names

	<i>Political Content Score</i>			<i>Political Class</i>		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
State Department	0.07*** (0.01)	0.06*** (0.01)	0.11*** (0.01)	0.23*** (0.04)	0.18*** (0.04)	0.33*** (0.05)
Constant	0.50*** (0.01)	0.61*** (0.03)	0.52*** (0.04)	0.41*** (0.02)	0.74*** (0.10)	0.38** (0.16)
Observations	626	626	358	629	629	360
Case Fixed Effects	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Only 'Ideal' Types	N	N	Y	N	N	Y

\* $p < 0.1$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$

*Notes:* OLS with individual speaker observations as unit of analysis. Content measures generated using a training set that drops all leader names. Fixed effects not shown for models that include them. Models 3 and 6 limit the sample to State, Defense, and JCS observations.

*Individual-level of analysis controlling for document type.* The table below accounts for whether the individual's input to the president occurred during a meeting or via a memorandum. It would be problematic if (a) advisers emphasize different content in written versus spoken communication with the president and (b) officials from the State Department were more likely to communicate via whichever means tends to privilege political content. The specifications below account for whether the text came from a memorandum. As shown, all results hold using when controlling for the means of communication.

Table A11: Individual speaker level of analysis controlling for document type

	<i>Political Content Score</i>			<i>Political Class</i>		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
State Department	0.07*** (0.01)	0.06*** (0.01)	0.11*** (0.01)	0.21*** (0.04)	0.16*** (0.04)	0.32*** (0.05)
Memorandum	0.03** (0.01)	0.004 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.04 (0.05)	-0.07 (0.05)	-0.07 (0.09)
Constant	0.50*** (0.01)	0.60*** (0.03)	0.53*** (0.05)	0.41*** (0.03)	0.79*** (0.11)	0.45*** (0.17)
Observations	626	626	358	629	629	360
Case Fixed Effects	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Only 'Ideal' Types	N	N	Y	N	N	Y

\* $p < 0.1$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$

*Notes:* OLS with individual speaker observations as unit of analysis. Controls for whether text came from a memo versus during a meeting. Fixed effects not shown for models that include them. Models 3 and 6 limit the sample to State, Defense, and JCS observations.



### 5.3 Bureaucracy Affects Adviser Uncertainty

*Descriptive plot with all five bureaucracies.* The manuscript pools over JCS/non-JCS Defense and CIA/NSC. Here they are broken apart.




Figure A3: Average uncertainty by bureaucracy. Color distinguishes between all observations, political content observations, and military content observations.

*Control variables.* Reproduces Manuscript Table 2, Model 2. The use of crisis fixed effects in the main analysis precludes the use of crisis-level covariates. For robustness purposes, I show that results hold when using commonly employed control variables in a specification without fixed effects. See Table A7 above for variable definitions and operationalizations.

Table A12: Crisis-level control variables (no fixed effects)

	<i>Uncertainty</i>
	(1)
State Department	0.60** (0.28)
Relative Capabilities	0.0002 (0.001)
Regime Type	-0.01 (0.04)
Distance (log)	-0.20 (0.19)
Non-state Enemy	-0.39 (0.43)
Republican Admin.	-0.37 (0.26)
Constant	7.04*** (1.75)
Observations	168
Case Fixed Effects	N

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

Notes: OLS with bureaucracy-crisis as unit of analysis.

*Randomization inference.* As described in the prior subsection, to address sample size concerns I use randomization inference which does not require appeals to large samples or parametric assumptions (Rosenbaum 2002). Using the comparisons from Manuscript Table 2 Model 3 as a baseline, I define a test statistic as the mean State Department *Uncertainty* score minus the mean Defense Department and JCS *Uncertainty* score. In the observed data, the test statistic is 0.72. In each of 10,000 iterations, I randomly assign observations to be either *State Department* or not with assignment proportions that match the observed distribution. After randomly assigning bureaucratic affiliation, I calculate the test statistic given that randomization for each of the 10,000 iterations. *Across those 10,000, only 3% of iterations produce a test statistic as large as the one observed in the real data.*

*Bayes factor.* Given critiques concerning the interpretation and appropriateness of hypothesis testing, I also report Bayes factors (bf) comparing specifications that include the *State Department* bureaucratic explanatory variable to those that do not. A first analysis compares models with all covariates either with or without the *State Department* variable. The data is weakly more likely under my hypothesis which include the bureaucracy variable (bf=2.6). A second analysis repeats the exercise but while restricting the data set to “ideal” type bureaucracies which includes State and the various Defense organizations. The evidence is somewhat stronger in support of a model including a bureaucracy variable (bf=2.9). Analysis implemented with the BayesFactor package.

*Clustered standard errors.* Robustness checks cluster standard errors on the crisis for the two main specifications (Manuscript Table 2, Models 1 and 3). Both produce comparable standard errors and all results hold. For Model 3 which employs fixed effects, I follow Cameron and Miller (2015) and use the within estimator due to the small number of observations in each cluster.

*Alternative uncertainty dictionary.* To assure that idiosyncrasies of the Lasswell “If” dictionary don’t drive the results, I also construct measures using the Loughran and McDonald (2011) uncertainty dictionary. All results hold with this alternative measurement strategy.

Table A13: Alternative uncertainty dictionary

	<i>Uncertainty</i>			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
State Department	0.43*	0.44*	0.96***	1.15**
	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.29)	(0.46)
Constant	2.84***	3.46***	2.11***	2.35**
	(0.12)	(0.55)	(0.72)	(0.87)
N	168	168	105	73
Case Fixed Effects	N	Y	Y	Y
Only ‘Ideal’ Types	N	N	Y	Y
Only ‘Expert’ Types	N	N	N	Y

\* $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

*Notes:* OLS with bureaucracy observations as unit of analysis. Fixed effects not shown for models that include them. Models 3 and 4 limit the sample to ‘ideal’ types—State, Defense, and JCS observations. Model 4 further restricts the sample to ‘expert’ observations where an ‘ideal’ type discusses its area of expertise.

*Placebo dictionary.* As a placebo test, I employ a dictionary designed to measure “Religious” tones in text. There is no theoretical reason for bureaucratic position to affect religious text during crisis advisory processes. Indeed, the table shows no such relationship.

Table A14: Placebo test with religion dictionary

	<i>Religion</i>			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
State Department	−0.08 (0.08)	−0.05 (0.09)	−0.003 (0.12)	0.03 (0.17)
Constant	0.50*** (0.04)	0.37* (0.22)	0.35 (0.29)	0.27 (0.33)
N	168	168	105	73
Case Fixed Effects	N	Y	Y	Y
Only ‘Ideal’ Types	N	N	Y	Y
Only ‘Expert’ Types	N	N	N	Y

\* $p < 0.1$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$

*Notes:* OLS with bureaucracy observations as unit of analysis. Fixed effects not shown for models that include them. Models 3 and 4 limit the sample to ‘ideal’ types—State, Defense, and JCS observations. Model 4 further restricts the sample to ‘expert’ observations where an ‘ideal’ type discusses its area of expertise.

*Exclude potentially distinct observations.* See the description for Table A8.

Table A15: Subset of Observations

<i>Excludes ...</i>	<i>Proliferation Cases</i>		<i>Repeated Vietnam Cases</i>	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
State Department	0.57** (0.28)	0.59** (0.29)	0.54* (0.29)	0.59* (0.30)
Constant	5.06*** (0.15)	6.24*** (0.66)	5.14*** (0.16)	6.24*** (0.67)
N	164	164	150	150
Case Fixed Effects	N	Y	N	Y

\* $p < 0.1$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$

*Notes:* OLS with bureaucracy observations as unit of analysis. Fixed effects not shown for models that include them. Models 1 and 2 exclude “nuclear” observations; 3 and 4 exclude “repeat” Vietnam observations.

*Individual-level of analysis.* See the description for Table A9.

Table A16: Individual speaker level of analysis

	<i>Uncertainty</i>			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
State Department	0.66** (0.27)	0.71** (0.28)	0.79** (0.36)	1.33*** (0.48)
Constant	5.11*** (0.14)	7.54*** (0.69)	6.54*** (1.17)	6.68*** (1.71)
N	629	629	360	250
Case Fixed Effects	N	Y	Y	Y
Only 'Ideal' Types	N	N	Y	Y
Only 'Expert' Types	N	N	N	Y

\* $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

*Notes:* OLS with individual speaker observations as unit of analysis. Fixed effects not shown for models that include them. Models 3 and 4 limit the sample to 'ideal' types—State, Defense, and JCS observations. Model 4 further restricts the sample to 'expert' observations where an 'ideal' type discusses its area of expertise.

*Individual-level of analysis controlling for document type.* The table accounts for whether the input to the president occurred during a meeting or via a memorandum. It would be problematic if (a) advisers provide different degrees of uncertainty in written versus spoken communication with the president and (b) officials from the State Department were more likely to communicate via whichever means tends to stress uncertainty. As shown, all results hold using when controlling for the means of communication.

Table A17: Individual speaker level of analysis controlling for document type

	<i>Uncertainty</i>			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
State Department	0.67** (0.27)	0.72** (0.28)	0.77** (0.36)	1.33*** (0.48)
Memorandum	0.31 (0.28)	0.21 (0.36)	0.34 (0.64)	0.13 (0.79)
Constant	5.04*** (0.15)	7.39*** (0.74)	6.26*** (1.29)	6.56*** (1.89)
N	629	629	360	250
Case Fixed Effects	N	Y	Y	Y
Only 'Ideal' Types	N	N	Y	Y
Only 'Expert' Types	N	N	N	Y

\* $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

*Notes:* OLS with individual speaker observations as unit of analysis. Controls for whether text came from a memo versus during a meeting. Fixed effects not shown for models that include them. Models 3 and 4 limit the sample to 'ideal' types—State, Defense, and JCS observations. Model 4 further restricts the sample to 'expert' observations where an 'ideal' type discusses its area of expertise.

Sources of uncertainty differences. The table presents full results including covariates for manuscript Table 3.

Table A18: Sources of Uncertainty Differences Across Bureaucracies

	<i>Uncertainty</i>		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Political Content Score	1.97*** (0.67)	1.31* (0.76)	1.59** (0.78)
State Department			0.05 (1.11)
Political Content*State Dept.			0.57 (1.77)
Relative Capabilities	0.0002 (0.001)	0.0001 (0.001)	0.0001 (0.001)
Regime Type	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.003 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)
Distance (log)	-0.16 (0.19)	-0.17 (0.19)	-0.16 (0.19)
Non-state Enemy	-0.41 (0.43)	-0.40 (0.43)	-0.43 (0.43)
Republican Admin.	-0.30 (0.26)	-0.27 (0.26)	-0.33 (0.26)
Constant	5.72*** (1.81)	5.73*** (1.80)	5.83*** (1.84)
Observations	168	168	168
Bureaucracy Fixed Effects	N	Y	N
Outcome Mean	5.21	5.21	5.21

\* $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Notes: OLS with bureaucracy-crisis observations as unit of analysis. Bureaucracy fixed effects not shown.

*Mechanisms driving uncertainty.* Manuscript Table 3, Model 3 (reproduced in full in Table A18) illuminates various mechanisms driving State's higher overall uncertainty. Though crude and to be taken with several grains of salt, I use the model results to apportion "credit" between the three mechanisms mentioned in the manuscript. Figure A4 graphically depicts the ideas described below. Using the model results, calculate the predicted *Uncertainty* for the State Department and non-State Department bureaucracies at their respective mean values on *Political Content Score*. Colored dashed vertical lines represent the mean values and the solid colored circles show the corresponding predicted *Uncertainty*. For visual simplicity, I plot an empty red circle at the predicted non-State *Uncertainty* level but vertically aligned with the predicted State *Uncertainty* score. The vertical gap here (empty red circle to solid blue circle) roughly represents the total effect of State Department on *Uncertainty*. It is roughly analogous to Manuscript Table 2, Model 3, with a total effect depicted of 0.62. The goal is to decompose that total effect between the three posited mechanisms. As described, roughly one-third of the total effect appears attributable to dispositional/cultural differences while two-thirds stems from informational mechanisms.

(1) *Informational content composition mechanism* (empty red circle to empty black triangle;  $\frac{0.20}{0.62}$ ). Part of the total effect is due to State discussing more political content on average (vertical blue line vs. vertical red line) and political content generally having higher uncertainty (positive slopes for predicted *Uncertainty* values). To gauge this mechanism, consider a counter-factual where non-State bureaucracies discuss as much political content as State and calculate the predicted *Uncertainty* score for these non-State organizations. The black triangle plots the predicted value. Thus, gap "1" between the empty red circle and empty black triangle shows how much of the total effect is attributable to differences in the composition of content discussed by various bureaucracies. This vertical gap is 0.20, or just under one-third of the total 0.62 effect.

(2) *Dispositional/cultural mechanism* (empty black diamond to solid blue circle;  $\frac{0.19}{0.62}$ ). Another potential mecha-




Figure A4: See discussion above and below.

nism is dispositional differences in the types of individuals who select into the State Department or cultural socialization that occurs within the State Department. As the predicted value lines (solid blue vs. solid red) show, State’s uncertainty is always above the predicted non-State uncertainty level. This is indicative of at least some dispositional gap. To attribute a portion of the total effect to this mechanism, I calculate the size of the gap at the minimum observed *Political Content Score* value for a State Department observation (the rug plot at the bottom of the figure shows all State Department scores). The minimum value is appropriate because it shows that even when further from its area of specialization, State Department officials are still predicted to express more uncertainty. The vertical dotted black line shows this minimum value and “2” demonstrates the predicted gap due to dispositional differences. For ease of interpretation, the diagonal black dotted line shows this gap through the full range of *Political Content Score* values. The “2” is again depicted, showing the distance from the empty black diamond to solid blue circle. This gap of 0.19 is under one-third of the total 0.62 effect.

(3) *Informational expertise mechanism* (empty black triangle to empty black diamond;  $\frac{0.23}{0.62}$ ). A third mechanism stems from State Department’s relative expertise in political matters which makes its officials particularly attuned to informational gaps on these political issues. Equipped to recognize this informational limits, they convey greater uncertainty. Indeed, the steeper slope of the predicted values for State attests to this point (solid blue line vs. solid red line). To put a size on this mechanism, I calculate the additional uncertainty stemming from State’s steeper slope, using the State’s minimum *Political Content Score* as an intercept point. The diagonal dotted line depicts this concept with the altered intercept. The “3”, showing the distance from the empty black triangle to empty black diamond, represents the portion of the State vs. non-State *Uncertainty* difference attributable to State’s added expertise in assessing political traits. This gap of 0.23 is just over one-third of the total 0.62 effect.

## 6 Transportability to *Internal* Bureaucratic Information Provision

The study addresses how bureaucratic position affects the input advisers provide to leaders during crises. The empirics do not reveal whether the differences in advisory content and uncertainty also pertain to information provision *within* bureaucracies – that is, for information not provided directly to the leader. There are theoretical reasons to expect that the relationship between bureaucratic position and advisory content persists regardless of whether the adviser is communicating to the leader. Comparative specializa-

tion across bureaucracies applies regardless of the leader's presence. Nonetheless, it is an open empirical matter whether the relationships documented at the leader level apply to internal bureaucratic information provision and processing.

A thorough analysis of this issue merits its own study. As a preliminary exercise, I evaluate field reports from State Department officials and Defense Department officials provided during the 1975 *Mayaguez* seizure. Data availability guides this case choice thanks to digitization of State cables from this era coupled with Defense cables hosted online by the Ford Presidential Library (NSC East Asia Series). I collected 27 State cables and 22 Defense cables from the time of the ship's seizure through the conclusion of the crisis on May 15. All cables originated overseas (or the US UN envoy). This excludes messages sent from Washington which typically entail implementation guidance as opposed to information provision.

While non-definitive given that the data comes from a single crisis, the results from the *Mayaguez* show similar patterns emerging further down within bureaucracies compared to those documented in the manuscript at the leader level. On the continuous *Political Content Score*, State and Defense respectively have average scores of 0.85 and 0.57, which indicates State discusses more political (vs. military) content. This distinction is even clearer on the binary *Political Class* measure where 74% of State cables and only 5% of those from Defense were categorized as political. For the *Uncertainty* score, we also observe patterns consistent with those in the manuscript. State provided more uncertainty in telegrams than found in Defense messages (3.7% v.s 2.6%). This difference on uncertainty scores is not significant ( $p = 0.12$  with  $n = 47$ ), though that is partly a function of having a single case with limited observations. The matter requires further inquiry, but the exercise here offers preliminary evidence that the empirical patterns found at the leader level may also hold lower down within the bureaucracy.



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