

**Disappointed Expectations:  
Downward Mobility and Electoral Change**

**SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL**

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# Supplementary Material

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# A1 Model Selection and Optimization

## A1.1 Mother’s Occupational Characteristics

Although contemporary research in social mobility should take much more seriously the past and future role of mothers (Beller 2009), we follow the majority of existing work and use only fathers’ occupation. The main reason is data availability: missing values on occupation are much more prevalent among mothers than fathers, most likely a result of higher shares of atypical employment or unpaid work, which are only inadequately captured by standard occupational classifications.

Figure A1 demonstrates the very strong correlation between a status discordance measure constructed from father’s *and* mother’s occupational background as compared to the measure used in the main analysis, which is based only on father’s characteristics. We are able to reproduce all our key results within the reduced sample of respondents for whom we have information on mothers’ occupational status.

Still, we are convinced that the gender-specific patterns of role models in the parental home deserve more attention and hope that our analysis serves as a starting point for future analyses, including a consideration of how the effects of status discordance differ in homes where the mother is the primary breadwinner or in single-mother homes.




Figure A1: Predictions based on both parents’ vs. fathers’ information

### A1.2 Variance Importance

Figures A2 and A3 show variance importance plots of the two random forest models used to create the key explanatory variable in the main analysis in the main body of the text and the auxiliary analysis based on a reduced set of predictors presented in Section A6.2.




Figure A2: Random Forest Variable Importance, Extended Full Model

### Random forest variable importance plot




Figure A3: Random Forest Variable Importance, Reduced Model

### A1.3 Comparing Different Algorithms

Table A1 shows mean squared errors for different specifications of the random forest, varying number of trees (ntree) and number of variables randomly sampled as candidates at each split (varbysplit) for both the full extended model and the reduced model. The different random forest specifications have comparable mean squared errors as a considerably more complicated ensemble approach, which only marginally improves performance (see also Figure A4 below). Furthermore, Table A13 demonstrates that our results do not hinge on specific choices related to parameters and model optimization.

	model	npredictors	ntree	varbysplit	mse
1	Ensemble	extended			217.52
2	RandomForest	extended	500.00	5.00	218.37
3	RandomForest	extended	500.00	4.00	218.43
4	RandomForest	extended	1000.00	4.00	218.47
5	RandomForest	extended	1000.00	5.00	219.19
6	RandomForest	extended	1000.00	3.00	219.59
7	RandomForest	extended	500.00	3.00	219.71
8	RandomForest	extended	500.00	10.00	222.21
9	RandomForest	extended	1000.00	10.00	223.18
10	Ensemble	reduced			226.70
11	RandomForest	extended	1000.00	2.00	226.74
12	RandomForest	extended	500.00	2.00	226.74
13	RandomForest	reduced	1000.00	3.00	228.56
14	RandomForest	reduced	500.00	3.00	228.58
15	RandomForest	reduced	1000.00	4.00	229.68
16	RandomForest	reduced	500.00	4.00	229.69
17	RandomForest	reduced	500.00	2.00	230.96
18	RandomForest	reduced	1000.00	2.00	231.20
19	RandomForest	reduced	500.00	5.00	232.11
20	RandomForest	reduced	1000.00	5.00	232.16

**Table A1:** MSE Comparison

In addition to various versions of the random forest algorithm, we also demonstrate to what extent a machine learning approach that combines (“ensembles”) different methods and weights them according to their predictive performance, improves the accuracy of the prediction model. The ensemble approach confirms that random forests appear as the most powerful algorithms for our purpose (compared to Lasso Regression, Bagging, Neural Nets and Support Vector Machines) and hence applies a large internal weight to the random forest (63%), resulting in only weak improvements in predictive performance. Figure A4 shows results from an external cross-validation. While we get a clear improvement over a naive guess based on only the mean, the ensemble (“Super Learner”) is just tying with the best discrete algorithm.





Figure A4: Super Learner (ensemble) vs. individual algorithms

## A2 Status Discordance: Empirical Distribution

The left panel in Figure A5 shows a heatmap of the empirical distribution of intergenerational reference points (prediction) vs. realized status for SOEP respondents in 2018. Raw status discordance values have been transformed into decile ranks to improve readability. While reference point and realized status correlate as expected, indicated by the darker shaded cells along the diagonal, there is a considerable amount of upward and downward mobility indicated by non-empty off-diagonal cells.

The right panel in Figure A5 shows the full empirical distribution in the form of a scatterplot. The illustration is a typical rank-rank (percentile) correlation as often used in mobility studies. The resulting parameters can be interpreted as levels of absolute mobility (intercept  $\alpha = 36.6$ ) and relative mobility (slope  $\beta = 0.368$ ), subject to the fact that our x-axis, in contrast to classic mobility research, is not actual father status but predicted child status based on parental background.



**Figure A5:** Empirical Distribution of Status Discordance in Germany



## A3 Validation

### A3.1 Status Discordance and Life Satisfaction

Table A2 shows standardized coefficients of an OLS model regressing three different items capturing life satisfaction on status discordance and the full set of covariates as in the main models. The first three rows show standardized coefficients of other continuous, and hence comparable, variables.

**Table A2:** Validation against Life Satisfaction

	Satisf. now	Satisf. in 1 Year	Satisf. in 5 Years
Status Discordance (standardized)	−0.099*** (0.022)	−0.071*** (0.020)	−0.073*** (0.022)
Age (standardized)	0.028 (0.036)	−0.172*** (0.033)	−0.408*** (0.036)
Income (log, standardized)	0.064** (0.024)	0.074*** (0.022)	0.082*** (0.024)
Female (1=yes)	0.023 (0.040)	0.072* (0.037)	0.076 (0.040)
Migration Background (1=yes)	−0.007 (0.068)	0.114 (0.063)	0.115 (0.068)
Educ: Elementary	0.553* (0.272)	0.210 (0.251)	0.285 (0.275)
Educ: Lower Second.	0.730** (0.271)	0.384 (0.249)	0.547* (0.274)
Educ: Secondary	0.811** (0.278)	0.392 (0.257)	0.584* (0.281)
Educ: University Prep.	0.773** (0.274)	0.417 (0.253)	0.680* (0.277)
Educ: Tertiary I	0.800** (0.275)	0.471 (0.254)	0.637* (0.278)
Educ: Tertiary II	0.791** (0.274)	0.473 (0.252)	0.656* (0.277)
Emp. Status: not in labor force	0.056 (0.085)	−0.022 (0.079)	0.009 (0.085)
Emp. Status: other	−0.088 (0.130)	−0.148 (0.120)	−0.076 (0.130)
Location: Returned	0.063 (0.096)	0.033 (0.089)	0.077 (0.097)
Location: Moved Away	0.036 (0.039)	0.066 (0.036)	0.136*** (0.039)
In 1989: West	0.112 (0.070)	0.083 (0.065)	0.050 (0.070)
In 1989: Abroad	0.319* (0.159)	0.226 (0.146)	0.111 (0.159)
In 1989: Born later	0.211* (0.091)	0.155 (0.084)	0.130 (0.091)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.024	0.036	0.074
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.019	0.031	0.070
Num. obs.	6572	6546	6417

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ . All models include regional (Bundesland) fixed effects.

### A3.2 Status Discordance and Verbalized Expectations

Figure A6 shows the simple bivariate scatterplot comparing calculated values of our main explanatory variable, status discordance, against an alternative measure based on verbalized status expectations at the age of 17 for the small subset of respondents for which the latter variable is available. For a relatively large share of respondents, the difference between aspired and realized occupation is zero. Of course, this could be a result of realistic expectations. More likely, however, is that a zero difference indicates that respondents already knew their occupational destiny at the age of 17, which is especially likely for people in vocational training. The Figure hence includes a regression line for the full sample (grey) and a regression line (black) for the sample excluding zero-difference observations marked in grey.




Figure A6: Validation against verbalized expectations (bivariate)

Table A3 shows the same correlation in a multivariate setting, including the full set of covariates used in the main analysis.

**Table A3:** Validation against verbalized expectations (multivariate)

	Full Model	Dropping Zero Diff
Status Discordance	0.622*** (0.054)	0.845*** (0.075)
Female (1=yes)	2.283 (1.247)	2.784 (1.757)
Age	-0.287 (0.272)	-0.522 (0.385)
Migration Background (1=yes)	3.918 (2.008)	1.780 (2.768)
Educ: Lower Second.	5.091** (1.876)	8.166** (2.878)
Educ: Secondary	11.709*** (2.690)	14.437*** (3.821)
Educ: University Prep.	20.529*** (2.265)	24.197*** (3.114)
Educ: Tertiary I	13.078*** (3.476)	14.950** (4.902)
Educ: Tertiary II	19.257*** (2.814)	25.104*** (3.833)
Emp. Status: not in labor force	-3.049 (2.571)	-1.805 (3.298)
Emp. Status: other	-4.204 (2.876)	-2.412 (3.781)
Income (log)	-1.665 (1.117)	-0.936 (1.466)
Location: Returned	6.591 (5.460)	11.168 (8.073)
Location: Moved Away	1.065 (2.485)	3.141 (4.185)
In 1989: West	-2.183 (2.736)	-2.398 (3.821)
In 1989: Born later	-0.791 (3.148)	-0.604 (4.321)
Intercept	20.979 (10.912)	17.828 (15.011)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.414	0.510
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.365	0.447
Num. obs.	409	271

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ . Both models include regional (Bundesland) fixed effects.

## A4 Additional Descriptives

### A4.1 Networks

The two additional distributions in Figure A7 provide more evidence on the multiple sources of status discordance in the spirit of Figure 2 in the main body of the text. Here, we attempt to capture the influence of social networks and collective organization on occupational mobility by looking at union membership and church attendance. The illustration provides some tentative evidence for the presence of such network effects in that individuals active in either organization are characterized, on average, by slightly more positive mobility trajectories. Note that both variables, union membership and church attendance, are not available in the 2018 SOEP wave used for the main analysis but had to be merged from the 2015 and 2016 wave, respectively. The evidence thus hinges on the assumptions that membership in such organizations is relatively stable over time.




Figure A7: Network effects

## A4.2 Variation by Gender over Time

Figure A8 shows mean predicted occupational status for male and female respondents over time, using our reduced model specification described in Section A6.2. In the longitudinal procedure, each respondent contributes one randomly sampled observation between the age of 45 and 55. The summary of the variance importance of the respective random forest model is detailed in Table A4 below. As expected, women have lower occupational status on average but they rapidly catch up, indicated by the narrowing gap over time. Note, however, that this auxiliary longitudinal perspective is complicated by (a) slightly changing composition of the panel survey over time and (b) the bounded nature of the occupational status measure, which ranges from around 20 to 90. More generally, the sample size of the SOEP may not allow for a detailed documentation of disaggregated time trends with a sufficient degree of statistical confidence (Dodin et al. 2021).




Figure A8: Predicted Occupational Status over Time, by Gender

	IncNodePurity
ybirth	78204.26
female	17230.14
german	5741.60
mback	11885.46
east1989	9819.62
west1989	16678.40
bornafter1989	0.00
loc_largecity	13300.73
loc_medcity	10111.64
loc_smallcity	10609.84
sameloc_still	15288.13
sameloc_no	10098.98
fisei88_full	125506.74
fedu	65431.28

Table A4: Variance Importance Random Forest Longitudinal

# A5 Full Regression Tables (Main Models)

**Table A5:** Intergenerational Status Discordance and Party Choice

	RadRight	AFD	CDU/CSU	MS Right	MS Left	Green	SPD	Linke
Status Discordance	0.095*** (0.026)	0.086*** (0.025)	-0.104* (0.046)	-0.200*** (0.048)	0.015 (0.047)	0.003 (0.034)	0.016 (0.040)	0.019 (0.026)
Female (1=yes)	-3.477*** (0.731)	-3.448*** (0.724)	3.921** (1.301)	2.545 (1.378)	3.057* (1.334)	2.608** (0.970)	0.299 (1.143)	-1.388 (0.740)
Age	-0.065 (0.037)	-0.053 (0.037)	0.158* (0.066)	0.118 (0.070)	0.216** (0.067)	-0.070 (0.049)	0.291*** (0.058)	0.112** (0.037)
Migration Background (1=yes)	-0.365 (1.319)	-0.401 (1.307)	-2.649 (2.348)	-3.997 (2.487)	0.699 (2.408)	-2.166 (1.751)	2.776 (2.063)	0.898 (1.336)
Educ: Elementary	-9.980* (4.960)	-10.450* (4.916)	12.108 (8.832)	11.938 (9.352)	-3.151 (9.056)	-4.727 (6.586)	1.518 (7.760)	4.501 (5.024)
Educ: Lower Second.	-16.354*** (4.930)	-16.683*** (4.885)	16.445 (8.778)	19.404* (9.295)	2.016 (9.000)	0.249 (6.546)	1.659 (7.712)	5.422 (4.993)
Educ: Secondary	-18.928*** (5.077)	-18.953*** (5.031)	19.555* (9.040)	19.326* (9.573)	7.384 (9.269)	10.213 (6.741)	-2.840 (7.942)	7.023 (5.142)
Educ: University Prep.	-22.620*** (4.994)	-22.680*** (4.949)	16.954 (8.892)	21.112* (9.416)	11.796 (9.117)	12.022 (6.631)	-0.402 (7.813)	9.585 (5.058)
Educ: Tertiary I	-21.201*** (5.017)	-21.303*** (4.972)	20.006* (8.934)	23.121* (9.460)	6.869 (9.160)	10.725 (6.662)	-4.006 (7.849)	9.475 (5.081)
Educ: Tertiary II	-21.918*** (4.988)	-22.020*** (4.944)	11.631 (8.882)	15.343 (9.405)	17.838 (9.107)	19.623** (6.623)	-2.277 (7.804)	9.621 (5.052)
Emp. Status: not in labor force	-0.133 (1.554)	0.464 (1.540)	3.603 (2.767)	1.640 (2.930)	-1.605 (2.837)	-0.159 (2.064)	-1.235 (2.431)	-2.928 (1.574)
Emp. Status: other	0.923 (2.473)	1.747 (2.451)	-0.959 (4.404)	-3.113 (4.663)	-2.944 (4.515)	-1.024 (3.284)	-1.755 (3.869)	-1.880 (2.505)
Income (log)	0.537 (0.527)	0.423 (0.522)	3.291*** (0.938)	4.199*** (0.993)	-0.194 (0.962)	-1.344 (0.700)	1.148 (0.824)	-2.072*** (0.534)
Location: Returned	-1.333 (1.778)	-1.271 (1.762)	-4.321 (3.166)	-5.613 (3.353)	5.320 (3.246)	7.328** (2.361)	-1.807 (2.782)	1.713 (1.801)
Location: Moved Away	-0.679 (0.712)	-0.748 (0.706)	-6.295*** (1.269)	-6.409*** (1.343)	2.592* (1.301)	3.257*** (0.946)	-0.657 (1.115)	2.687*** (0.722)
In 1989: West	-3.639** (1.298)	-3.714** (1.286)	2.727 (2.311)	1.921 (2.447)	12.340*** (2.370)	6.565*** (1.723)	5.807** (2.031)	-7.328*** (1.315)
In 1989: Abroad	4.783 (3.004)	4.959 (2.977)	2.815 (5.349)	0.460 (5.664)	-7.312 (5.484)	-2.410 (3.989)	-4.578 (4.699)	-5.428 (3.042)
In 1989: Born later	-4.484** (1.682)	-4.494** (1.667)	-0.753 (2.996)	0.015 (3.172)	7.306* (3.071)	1.180 (2.234)	6.451* (2.632)	-2.411 (1.704)
Intercept	27.371*** (6.834)	27.039*** (6.773)	-25.466* (12.169)	-24.071 (12.886)	20.909 (12.477)	17.479 (9.075)	3.177 (10.692)	17.102* (6.922)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.065	0.062	0.029	0.032	0.067	0.092	0.039	0.041
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.060	0.057	0.023	0.027	0.062	0.087	0.034	0.036
Num. obs.	5923	5923	5923	5923	5923	5923	5923	5923

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ . All models include regional (Bundesland) fixed effects.

**Table A6:** Status Discordance and Radical Voting, by Education and Father Status

	AFD	AFD	Linke	Linke	AFD	AFD	Linke	Linke
Status Discordance	0.128*** (0.025)	0.159*** (0.030)	0.002 (0.026)	-0.021 (0.031)	0.105*** (0.026)	0.190*** (0.043)	0.023 (0.027)	-0.061 (0.044)
College Degree	-4.637*** (0.822)	-5.334*** (0.905)	3.251*** (0.834)	3.787*** (0.918)				
Father Status: Middle					-0.428 (0.847)	-0.727 (0.861)	-0.139 (0.867)	0.088 (0.880)
Father Status: High					-2.396** (0.907)	-2.741** (0.919)	-0.541 (0.928)	-0.123 (0.940)
Status Discordance x College Degree		-0.093 (0.051)		0.072 (0.051)				
Status Discordance x Father Status Middle						-0.106 (0.055)		0.079 (0.056)
Status Discordance x Father Status High						-0.127* (0.054)		0.151** (0.055)
Female (1=yes)	-4.386*** (0.721)	-4.331*** (0.722)	-1.130 (0.732)	-1.172 (0.733)	-3.426*** (0.724)	-3.380*** (0.724)	-1.383 (0.740)	-1.408 (0.740)
Age	-0.022 (0.037)	-0.020 (0.037)	0.100** (0.037)	0.099** (0.037)	-0.063 (0.037)	-0.057 (0.037)	0.110** (0.038)	0.102** (0.038)
Migration Background (1=yes)	-0.086 (1.317)	-0.127 (1.317)	0.821 (1.336)	0.853 (1.336)	-0.563 (1.308)	-0.578 (1.307)	0.861 (1.337)	0.869 (1.337)
Educ: Elementary					-10.246* (4.914)	-10.037* (4.913)	4.548 (5.025)	4.341 (5.023)
Educ: Lower Second.					-16.048** (4.890)	-15.515** (4.893)	5.568 (5.000)	4.943 (5.003)
Educ: Secondary					-18.113*** (5.040)	-17.549*** (5.043)	7.214 (5.154)	6.536 (5.157)
Educ: University Prep.					-21.352*** (4.971)	-20.816*** (4.975)	9.883 (5.083)	9.205 (5.087)
Educ: Tertiary I					-19.945*** (4.994)	-19.439*** (4.997)	9.779 (5.107)	9.159 (5.110)
Educ: Tertiary II					-20.359*** (4.976)	-20.012*** (4.977)	9.990* (5.089)	9.576 (5.089)
Emp. Status: not in labor force	0.070 (1.551)	0.067 (1.551)	-2.829 (1.574)	-2.827 (1.574)	0.373 (1.540)	0.365 (1.539)	-2.948 (1.575)	-2.933 (1.574)
Emp. Status: other	0.692 (2.469)	0.814 (2.469)	-1.527 (2.505)	-1.621 (2.506)	1.695 (2.450)	1.898 (2.451)	-1.890 (2.506)	-2.063 (2.506)
Income (log)	-0.021 (0.523)	0.020 (0.523)	-1.975*** (0.531)	-2.007*** (0.531)	0.529 (0.524)	0.564 (0.524)	-2.048*** (0.535)	-2.068*** (0.536)
Location: Returned	-1.832 (1.775)	-1.781 (1.774)	1.982 (1.801)	1.942 (1.801)	-1.216 (1.761)	-1.167 (1.761)	1.725 (1.801)	1.636 (1.801)
Location: Moved Away	-1.141 (0.710)	-1.135 (0.710)	2.862*** (0.720)	2.857*** (0.720)	-0.687 (0.706)	-0.679 (0.706)	2.701*** (0.722)	2.688*** (0.722)
In 1989: West	-3.108* (1.289)	-3.144* (1.289)	-7.355*** (1.308)	-7.327*** (1.308)	-3.677** (1.286)	-3.652** (1.285)	-7.320*** (1.315)	-7.341*** (1.314)
In 1989: Abroad	6.237* (2.997)	6.319* (2.997)	-5.763 (3.041)	-5.827 (3.041)	4.784 (2.976)	4.976 (2.976)	-5.468 (3.044)	-5.650 (3.043)
In 1989: Born later	-4.976** (1.672)	-4.871** (1.673)	-1.917 (1.697)	-1.998 (1.698)	-4.436** (1.667)	-4.462** (1.667)	-2.401 (1.705)	-2.357 (1.704)
Intercept	13.479** (4.960)	12.990** (4.966)	22.533*** (5.033)	22.909*** (5.040)	26.825*** (6.774)	26.046*** (6.778)	17.068* (6.927)	17.891** (6.931)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.046	0.046	0.038	0.038	0.063	0.064	0.041	0.042
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.041	0.041	0.034	0.034	0.058	0.058	0.036	0.036
Num. obs.	5923	5923	5923	5923	5923	5923	5923	5923

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ . All models include regional (Bundesland) fixed effects.

## A6 Additional Results and Robustness

### A6.1 Standardized Coefficients




Figure A9: Effect Magnitude in Comparison

### A6.2 Alternative Specifications

The **reduced model** is based on an operationalization of status discordance based on a random forest model that relies on a smaller set of predictors (see A3). This results in a larger number of observations in the main models at the cost of lower explained variation in the prediction exercise. All other parameters are unchanged.

The **percentile** (or ranking) models are based on the same measure of status discordance as in the main models but transformed into a ranking variable ranging from 0 (highest value of positive status discordance, i.e. upward mobility) to 100 (highest value of negative status discordance, i.e. downward mobility). In contrast to the main operationalization, the ranking variable does not directly rely on an interpretation of small absolute difference in raw values, which are calculated in a relatively noisy procedure.



**Table A7:** Status Discordance and Political Alienation (Reduced Model)


	Abstain	No Party ID	Vote Radical	Vote Mainstream
Status Discordance	0.123*** (0.026)	0.151*** (0.040)	0.080* (0.031)	-0.187*** (0.038)
Female (1=yes)	-0.063 (0.743)	7.833*** (1.154)	-5.348*** (0.897)	5.473*** (1.095)
Age	-0.306*** (0.038)	-0.478*** (0.059)	0.044 (0.046)	0.365*** (0.056)
Migration Background (1=yes)	5.142*** (1.281)	9.052*** (1.895)	0.664 (1.547)	-4.914** (1.889)
Educ: Elementary	-10.046* (4.709)	2.403 (7.263)	1.734 (5.685)	10.092 (6.942)
Educ: Lower Second.	-18.089*** (4.677)	-5.752 (7.214)	-2.482 (5.647)	21.687** (6.895)
Educ: Secondary	-24.561*** (4.847)	-14.850* (7.486)	-3.971 (5.853)	28.355*** (7.147)
Educ: University Prep.	-28.159*** (4.754)	-20.688** (7.335)	-5.991 (5.739)	33.480*** (7.008)
Educ: Tertiary I	-25.684*** (4.775)	-16.602* (7.368)	-3.649 (5.765)	30.283*** (7.040)
Educ: Tertiary II	-26.343*** (4.741)	-23.958** (7.301)	-4.743 (5.724)	32.672*** (6.990)
Emp. Status: not in labor force	0.551 (1.604)	3.900 (2.500)	-3.754 (1.936)	3.197 (2.365)
Emp. Status: other	2.479 (2.533)	4.222 (3.828)	-3.218 (3.058)	-1.208 (3.734)
Income (log)	-1.396** (0.537)	0.831 (0.833)	-1.899** (0.649)	3.859*** (0.792)
Location: Returned	0.315 (1.865)	-4.284 (2.926)	-0.254 (2.252)	-0.209 (2.750)
Location: Moved Away	1.076 (0.734)	-1.772 (1.142)	1.555 (0.886)	-2.642* (1.082)
In 1989: West	-3.733** (1.281)	-11.984*** (1.984)	-11.680*** (1.547)	16.828*** (1.889)
In 1989: Abroad	9.719*** (2.738)	3.915 (3.867)	-2.424 (3.306)	-4.356 (4.037)
In 1989: Born later	-0.822 (1.746)	-4.042 (2.715)	-8.269*** (2.108)	10.401*** (2.574)
Intercept	55.093*** (6.726)	75.898*** (10.442)	42.634*** (8.121)	-11.082 (9.917)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.094	0.095	0.061	0.133
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.090	0.092	0.057	0.129
Num. obs.	7449	8286	7449	7449

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ . All models include regional (Bundesland) fixed effects.

**Table A8:** Status Discordance and Party Choice (Reduced Model)

	RadRight	AFD	CDU/CSU	MS Right	MS Left	Green	SPD	Linke
Status Discordance	0.093*** (0.023)	0.085*** (0.023)	-0.117** (0.040)	-0.208*** (0.042)	0.016 (0.041)	-0.013 (0.029)	0.031 (0.035)	-0.012 (0.023)
Female (1=yes)	-4.206*** (0.667)	-4.098*** (0.662)	3.560** (1.143)	2.190 (1.214)	3.563** (1.169)	3.161*** (0.839)	0.183 (1.005)	-1.195 (0.667)
Age	-0.052 (0.034)	-0.042 (0.034)	0.182** (0.058)	0.124* (0.062)	0.232*** (0.060)	-0.068 (0.043)	0.304*** (0.051)	0.098** (0.034)
Migration Background (1=yes)	-0.404 (1.151)	-0.417 (1.141)	-2.125 (1.972)	-4.027 (2.094)	-1.165 (2.016)	-3.409* (1.448)	2.106 (1.734)	1.042 (1.150)
Educ: Elementary	-3.255 (4.229)	-3.664 (4.194)	6.049 (7.249)	7.093 (7.697)	3.197 (7.408)	-3.747 (5.321)	6.971 (6.373)	5.015 (4.227)
Educ: Lower Second.	-8.945* (4.200)	-9.229* (4.166)	10.891 (7.200)	14.344 (7.646)	7.570 (7.359)	1.202 (5.285)	6.264 (6.330)	6.528 (4.199)
Educ: Secondary	-11.556** (4.353)	-11.643** (4.318)	13.546 (7.462)	14.023 (7.924)	14.148 (7.627)	9.816 (5.478)	4.424 (6.561)	7.646 (4.352)
Educ: University Prep.	-15.042*** (4.269)	-15.260*** (4.234)	11.901 (7.318)	16.284* (7.771)	18.402* (7.479)	12.120* (5.372)	5.860 (6.434)	9.211* (4.268)
Educ: Tertiary I	-12.962** (4.288)	-13.211** (4.253)	13.528 (7.351)	16.974* (7.806)	13.674 (7.513)	10.811* (5.396)	2.832 (6.463)	9.488* (4.287)
Educ: Tertiary II	-14.268*** (4.258)	-14.423*** (4.223)	6.132 (7.299)	10.882 (7.751)	22.234** (7.460)	17.822*** (5.358)	4.113 (6.417)	9.599* (4.256)
Emp. Status: not in labor force	-1.154 (1.440)	-0.410 (1.429)	4.417 (2.469)	2.694 (2.622)	-0.109 (2.523)	0.797 (1.812)	-0.489 (2.171)	-3.148* (1.440)
Emp. Status: other	-0.316 (2.275)	0.615 (2.256)	-1.381 (3.899)	-3.562 (4.141)	1.076 (3.985)	0.383 (2.862)	1.136 (3.428)	-3.540 (2.274)
Income (log)	0.126 (0.483)	0.069 (0.479)	2.619** (0.827)	3.390*** (0.878)	0.561 (0.845)	-0.858 (0.607)	1.344 (0.727)	-2.046*** (0.482)
Location: Returned	-1.798 (1.675)	-1.698 (1.661)	-3.141 (2.871)	-3.678 (3.049)	3.629 (2.935)	7.365*** (2.108)	-3.460 (2.524)	1.475 (1.674)
Location: Moved Away	-1.465* (0.659)	-1.489* (0.654)	-5.012*** (1.130)	-5.306*** (1.200)	2.632* (1.155)	3.699*** (0.829)	-1.005 (0.993)	2.974*** (0.659)
In 1989: West	-4.484*** (1.151)	-4.518*** (1.141)	3.440 (1.972)	3.120 (2.094)	13.748*** (2.016)	5.803*** (1.448)	7.906*** (1.734)	-7.134*** (1.150)
In 1989: Abroad	5.231* (2.459)	5.308* (2.439)	5.661 (4.216)	4.213 (4.477)	-8.820* (4.309)	-6.781* (3.095)	-1.684 (3.706)	-7.551** (2.458)
In 1989: Born later	-5.455*** (1.568)	-5.389*** (1.555)	1.257 (2.688)	2.012 (2.854)	8.532** (2.747)	0.698 (1.973)	8.033*** (2.363)	-2.670 (1.567)
Intercept	25.652*** (6.040)	24.839*** (5.991)	-18.386 (10.355)	-16.039 (10.995)	4.688 (10.583)	12.137 (7.601)	-7.205 (9.103)	17.489** (6.038)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.062	0.060	0.025	0.028	0.071	0.088	0.040	0.039
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.058	0.056	0.020	0.024	0.066	0.084	0.035	0.035
Num. obs.	7449	7449	7449	7449	7449	7449	7449	7449

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ . All models include regional (Bundesland) fixed effects.



**Figure A10:** Vote Choice Results (Reduced Model)

**Table A9:** Status Discordance and Political Alienation (Rank Model)


	Abstain	No Party ID	Vote Radical	Vote Mainstream
Status Discordance	0.043** (0.015)	0.079** (0.025)	0.060** (0.019)	-0.097*** (0.023)
Female (1=yes)	-0.189 (0.815)	7.550*** (1.311)	-4.888*** (0.992)	5.426*** (1.214)
Age	-0.308*** (0.041)	-0.510*** (0.067)	0.049 (0.050)	0.344*** (0.061)
Migration Background (1=yes)	4.239** (1.470)	8.356*** (2.247)	0.579 (1.790)	-2.941 (2.191)
Educ: Elementary	-2.352 (5.528)	0.118 (9.001)	-5.541 (6.733)	8.535 (8.239)
Educ: Lower Second.	-9.851 (5.494)	-6.730 (8.949)	-11.005 (6.692)	21.011* (8.189)
Educ: Secondary	-15.824** (5.659)	-16.924 (9.208)	-11.884 (6.892)	26.652** (8.434)
Educ: University Prep.	-19.924*** (5.567)	-21.880* (9.065)	-13.010 (6.780)	31.769*** (8.297)
Educ: Tertiary I	-17.345** (5.593)	-17.371 (9.110)	-11.694 (6.812)	29.290*** (8.336)
Educ: Tertiary II	-18.841*** (5.560)	-24.940** (9.054)	-12.314 (6.772)	32.404*** (8.287)
Emp. Status: not in labor force	0.554 (1.732)	3.236 (2.820)	-2.723 (2.110)	0.568 (2.582)
Emp. Status: other	1.409 (2.757)	3.935 (4.307)	-0.501 (3.357)	-4.769 (4.108)
Income (log)	-2.057*** (0.586)	0.262 (0.943)	-1.568* (0.714)	4.024*** (0.874)
Location: Returned	0.101 (1.982)	-3.968 (3.209)	0.414 (2.414)	-0.716 (2.954)
Location: Moved Away	1.365 (0.794)	-0.510 (1.276)	2.003* (0.967)	-3.883** (1.184)
In 1989: West	-2.194 (1.447)	-11.413*** (2.330)	-11.127*** (1.762)	14.313*** (2.156)
In 1989: Abroad	7.858* (3.348)	-0.093 (5.274)	-0.830 (4.078)	-6.566 (4.990)
In 1989: Born later	0.154 (1.875)	-3.901 (3.025)	-7.180** (2.284)	7.154* (2.795)
Intercept	48.481*** (7.790)	79.547*** (12.647)	41.287*** (9.488)	1.537 (11.611)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.093	0.096	0.064	0.135
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.088	0.091	0.059	0.130
Num. obs.	5923	6550	5923	5923

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ . All models include regional (Bundesland) fixed effects.

**Table A10: Status Discordance and Party Choice (Rank Model)**

	RadRight	AFD	CDU/CSU	MS Right	MS Left	Green	SPD	Linke
Status Discordance	0.053*** (0.014)	0.047*** (0.014)	-0.062* (0.024)	-0.110*** (0.026)	0.011 (0.025)	0.006 (0.018)	0.006 (0.022)	0.009 (0.014)
Female (1=yes)	-3.455*** (0.731)	-3.430*** (0.724)	3.869** (1.302)	2.500 (1.378)	3.076* (1.335)	2.634** (0.971)	0.286 (1.144)	-1.393 (0.740)
Age	-0.064 (0.037)	-0.052 (0.037)	0.159* (0.066)	0.116 (0.070)	0.215** (0.067)	-0.071 (0.049)	0.292*** (0.058)	0.113** (0.037)
Migration Background (1=yes)	-0.355 (1.319)	-0.392 (1.307)	-2.649 (2.348)	-4.017 (2.486)	0.695 (2.407)	-2.174 (1.751)	2.783 (2.063)	0.903 (1.336)
Educ: Elementary	-10.007* (4.960)	-10.475* (4.915)	12.109 (8.831)	11.995 (9.351)	-3.140 (9.055)	-4.704 (6.586)	1.496 (7.759)	4.486 (5.023)
Educ: Lower Second.	-16.334*** (4.929)	-16.666*** (4.885)	16.354 (8.777)	19.359* (9.294)	2.055 (9.000)	0.307 (6.546)	1.624 (7.712)	5.405 (4.993)
Educ: Secondary	-18.870*** (5.077)	-18.903*** (5.032)	19.408* (9.040)	19.202* (9.573)	7.437 (9.270)	10.285 (6.742)	-2.878 (7.943)	7.008 (5.142)
Educ: University Prep.	-22.562*** (4.994)	-22.631*** (4.949)	16.782 (8.892)	20.987* (9.416)	11.862 (9.118)	12.116 (6.632)	-0.455 (7.813)	9.562 (5.058)
Educ: Tertiary I	-21.104*** (5.018)	-21.219*** (4.973)	19.753* (8.935)	22.913* (9.461)	6.962 (9.162)	10.851 (6.663)	-4.073 (7.851)	9.449 (5.083)
Educ: Tertiary II	-21.848*** (4.988)	-21.962*** (4.944)	11.376 (8.882)	15.192 (9.405)	17.944* (9.108)	19.776** (6.624)	-2.368 (7.804)	9.579 (5.052)
Emp. Status: not in labor force	-0.146 (1.554)	0.453 (1.540)	3.629 (2.767)	1.667 (2.930)	-1.614 (2.837)	-0.170 (2.064)	-1.230 (2.431)	-2.927 (1.574)
Emp. Status: other	0.931 (2.473)	1.754 (2.451)	-0.978 (4.403)	-3.131 (4.663)	-2.938 (4.515)	-1.016 (3.284)	-1.760 (3.869)	-1.882 (2.505)
Income (log)	0.539 (0.526)	0.423 (0.521)	3.237*** (0.936)	4.193*** (0.992)	-0.167 (0.960)	-1.300 (0.698)	1.119 (0.823)	-2.088*** (0.533)
Location: Returned	-1.312 (1.778)	-1.252 (1.762)	-4.345 (3.166)	-5.657 (3.352)	5.324 (3.246)	7.330** (2.361)	-1.804 (2.782)	1.717 (1.801)
Location: Moved Away	-0.684 (0.712)	-0.753 (0.706)	-6.284*** (1.269)	-6.397*** (1.343)	2.589* (1.301)	3.252*** (0.946)	-0.655 (1.115)	2.688*** (0.722)
In 1989: West	-3.629** (1.298)	-3.705** (1.286)	2.707 (2.311)	1.899 (2.447)	12.346*** (2.370)	6.573*** (1.724)	5.804** (2.031)	-7.329*** (1.315)
In 1989: Abroad	4.787 (3.004)	4.962 (2.977)	2.790 (5.348)	0.451 (5.663)	-7.301 (5.484)	-2.393 (3.989)	-4.588 (4.699)	-5.433 (3.042)
In 1989: Born later	-4.471** (1.682)	-4.483** (1.667)	-0.791 (2.995)	-0.014 (3.172)	7.320* (3.072)	1.200 (2.234)	6.441* (2.632)	-2.415 (1.704)
Intercept	24.467*** (6.989)	24.436*** (6.926)	-21.636 (12.444)	-17.965 (13.177)	20.091 (12.760)	16.821 (9.281)	3.061 (10.934)	16.737* (7.079)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.065	0.062	0.029	0.033	0.067	0.092	0.039	0.041
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.060	0.057	0.023	0.027	0.062	0.087	0.034	0.036
Num. obs.	5923	5923	5923	5923	5923	5923	5923	5923

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ . All models include regional (Bundesland) fixed effects.



**Figure A11:** Vote Choice Results (Rank Model)

### A6.3 East vs. West

Figures A12 and A13 show separate results for respondents living in East and West German regions (Bundesländer). Of course, the split-sample approach reduces observations by model and hence statistical power, resulting in less precisely estimated coefficients. Still, the results demonstrate that the general pattern of party vote choice in response to experiencing status discordance is robust in both regions. One remarkable difference is the stronger support for the radical left party "Die Linke" in the East. We have a closer look at this party choice by region in the following two tables.




Figure A12: Vote Choice Results in East German Bundesländer




Figure A13: Vote Choice Results in West German Bundesländer

Tables [A11](#) and [A12](#) show split-sample models for supporting the radical left party "Die Linke" by socialization (columns 1-2 and 4-5) or current residence in (columns 3 and 6) in the former East or West of Germany. Of course, the split-sample approach reduces observations by model and hence statistical power, resulting in imprecisely estimated coefficients. Still, a general tendency, which conforms with the existing literature, is visible: the radical left clearly enjoys more support among status discordant voters socialized or living in the (former) East. This finding, in combination with studies exploring the roots of East-West differences in Die Linke support, may shed light on why we find weaker effects of status discordance on support for Die Linke, as the party faces some challenges building a East-West coalition (Bowyer and Vail [2011](#)).



**Table A11:** Status Discordance and Radical Left in East and West

	Birth East	East 1989	East Now	Birth West	West 1989	West Now
Status Discordance	0.061 (0.092)	0.118 (0.081)	0.118 (0.086)	-0.020 (0.034)	-0.006 (0.026)	0.005 (0.026)
Female (1=yes)	-3.322 (2.486)	-1.291 (2.292)	0.074 (2.344)	-1.801 (0.938)	-1.858* (0.734)	-1.988** (0.745)
Age	0.249* (0.103)	0.289** (0.110)	0.125 (0.101)	-0.001 (0.036)	-0.016 (0.030)	0.021 (0.031)
Migration Background (1=yes)	-3.051 (7.810)	-4.692 (6.900)	-1.419 (6.509)	0.780 (1.883)	0.918 (1.138)	0.672 (1.168)
Educ: Elementary	1.560 (36.964)	1.225 (18.380)	2.178 (18.148)	3.999 (8.240)	4.981 (4.821)	4.827 (4.935)
Educ: Lower Second.	11.187 (36.704)	10.028 (17.904)	12.281 (17.737)	4.540 (8.227)	5.577 (4.804)	5.826 (4.916)
Educ: Secondary	14.135 (37.267)	17.942 (19.028)	8.487 (18.642)	7.697 (8.360)	6.280 (4.929)	7.171 (5.049)
Educ: University Prep.	22.472 (36.827)	16.151 (18.121)	16.445 (17.921)	8.416 (8.276)	9.900* (4.859)	10.163* (4.975)
Educ: Tertiary I	20.970 (36.929)	16.945 (18.219)	22.049 (18.097)	8.986 (8.313)	8.837 (4.888)	8.656 (5.000)
Educ: Tertiary II	26.199 (36.870)	25.028 (18.104)	25.988 (17.987)	7.629 (8.285)	7.589 (4.860)	8.449 (4.971)
Emp. Status: not in labor force	-4.981 (5.730)	-2.984 (5.428)	-6.879 (5.393)	-1.292 (1.899)	-3.425* (1.528)	-2.657 (1.563)
Emp. Status: other	5.448 (8.276)	3.650 (13.046)	4.315 (7.953)	-0.986 (2.822)	-1.600 (2.318)	-2.853 (2.491)
Income (log)	-3.804* (1.935)	-3.148 (1.898)	-2.423 (1.888)	-2.285*** (0.660)	-2.183*** (0.511)	-2.322*** (0.521)
Location: Returned	6.711 (7.806)	-6.070 (7.018)	1.870 (6.414)	0.979 (2.324)	2.797 (1.715)	1.201 (1.776)
Location: Moved Away	3.159 (2.479)	1.704 (2.198)	3.351 (2.405)	3.303*** (0.950)	2.673*** (0.707)	2.933*** (0.707)
Intercept	23.462 (40.006)	15.318 (23.829)	17.574 (23.109)	17.836 (9.600)	19.207** (6.239)	18.041** (6.405)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.043	0.036	0.036	0.016	0.015	0.013
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.028	0.022	0.021	0.010	0.012	0.010
Num. obs.	959	1093	992	2834	4832	4931

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ .

**Table A12:** Status Discordance and Radical Left in East and West, by Education

	Birth East	East 1989	East Now	Birth West	West 1989	West Now
Status Discordance	-0.076 (0.109)	0.048 (0.098)	0.053 (0.102)	-0.071 (0.041)	-0.041 (0.030)	-0.040 (0.031)
College	13.156*** (3.240)	11.399*** (2.821)	12.680*** (3.131)	3.268** (1.193)	2.073* (0.912)	2.445** (0.909)
SD X College	0.268 (0.174)	0.099 (0.156)	0.094 (0.168)	0.103 (0.068)	0.059 (0.051)	0.082 (0.052)
Female (1=yes)	-2.242 (2.457)	-0.369 (2.267)	0.831 (2.323)	-1.707 (0.930)	-1.726* (0.727)	-1.775* (0.737)
Age	0.175 (0.100)	0.245* (0.108)	0.117 (0.099)	-0.021 (0.035)	-0.034 (0.029)	0.001 (0.030)
Migration Background (1=yes)	-3.296 (7.822)	-5.559 (6.906)	-2.243 (6.505)	0.747 (1.884)	0.834 (1.139)	0.556 (1.169)
Emp. Status: not in labor force	-4.194 (5.718)	-2.151 (5.412)	-6.260 (5.397)	-1.224 (1.894)	-3.291* (1.529)	-2.522 (1.563)
Emp. Status: other	5.941 (8.289)	6.579 (13.057)	5.304 (7.964)	-0.735 (2.822)	-1.232 (2.320)	-2.381 (2.492)
Income (log)	-3.194 (1.921)	-2.039 (1.867)	-1.840 (1.876)	-2.302*** (0.653)	-2.199*** (0.509)	-2.280*** (0.518)
Location: Returned	7.110 (7.826)	-6.562 (7.038)	1.746 (6.419)	1.279 (2.322)	3.131 (1.715)	1.480 (1.777)
Location: Moved Away	3.563 (2.481)	2.045 (2.201)	3.481 (2.405)	3.488*** (0.948)	2.748*** (0.706)	3.052*** (0.706)
Intercept	33.192* (15.576)	18.129 (16.162)	24.446 (14.965)	24.147*** (5.295)	26.168*** (4.177)	24.795*** (4.317)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.031	0.026	0.027	0.012	0.011	0.009
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.019	0.016	0.016	0.009	0.008	0.007
Num. obs.	959	1093	992	2834	4832	4931

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ .

## A6.4 Sensitivity

Table A13 presents a sensitivity analysis of the model regressing radical right support on status discordance (column 1 in Table 1 in the main body of the text). Each row shows estimates, standard errors and resulting p-values of a model with the same covariates, whereby status discordance is calculated based on random forest algorithms with varying specifications (see Table A1). Column "spec" indicates numbers of trees and numbers of splits. The specification in bold is the main specification, models are arranged according to the estimate.

	npredictors	spec	est	se	pval
1	extended	1000_10	0.087	0.025	<.001
2	extended	500_10	0.088	0.025	<.001
3	reduced	1000_5	0.091	0.023	<.001
4	reduced	500_5	0.091	0.023	<.001
5	reduced	1000_4	0.092	0.023	<.001
6	reduced	500_4	0.092	0.023	<.001
7	<b>reduced</b>	<b>1000_3</b>	<b>0.093</b>	<b>0.023</b>	<b>&lt;.001</b>
8	reduced	500_3	0.093	0.023	<.001
9	extended	1000_5	0.094	0.025	<.001
10	extended	500_5	0.094	0.025	<.001
11	<b>extended</b>	<b>1000_4</b>	<b>0.095</b>	<b>0.026</b>	<b>&lt;.001</b>
12	extended	500_4	0.095	0.026	<.001
13	reduced	1000_2	0.096	0.024	<.001
14	reduced	500_2	0.097	0.024	<.001
15	extended	500_3	0.099	0.026	<.001
16	extended	1000_3	0.1	0.026	<.001
17	extended	1000_2	0.109	0.027	<.001
18	extended	500_2	0.109	0.027	<.001

**Table A13:** Sensitivity Analysis

## A7 Attitudes

Our reasoning about the existence of different types of status discordant voters who respond quite differently to an otherwise comparable situation of disappointed expectations has straightforward observable implications when it comes to political attitudes, particularly on key issues like immigration and the economy. We briefly explore these implications with some of the few attitudinal items available in the SOEP in the following.

Higher levels of status discordance are associated with higher levels of concern with regard to all issues, which is in line with evidence showing that social pessimism drives support for radical parties (Steenvoorden and Harteveld 2018). With respect to economic attitudes, we do not find significant differences between different types of status discordant voters. However, concerns about immigration are indeed especially pronounced among voters with weaker socio-economic backgrounds. Status discordant voters who went to college and whose fathers worked in professional occupations are less likely to be concerned about immigration. This attitudinal difference supports our interpretation of the above results that fading job prospects among less privileged voters may be partly attributed to immigration, hence making support for the radical right more likely. Of course, such attitudes are not formed in isolation and are at least in part the result of political discourse shaped by supply-side actors. It is also possible that populist attitudes condition the relationship between positions on certain political issues and vote choice (van Hauwaert and van Kessel 2018). Still, the significant attitudinal differences between different types of status discordant voters give an indication of why and when disappointed expectations translate into either votes for radical left or for radical right parties.

Another available subjective question asks about political interest. In line with our core hypotheses that downward mobility fuels political alienation, status discordant respondents show lower levels of political interest. However, this difference is entirely driven by those who did not go to college and who have fathers with a lower occupational status. We interpret this as evidence that the strong abstention effects shown previously are a political response that is particularly prevalent among voters from lower socio-economic backgrounds, which aligns with existing evidence (Levi and Stoker 2000).

**Table A14:** Status Discordance and Attitudes, Direct and by Education

	Pol Interest	Pol Interest	Worry: Mig	Worry: Mig	Worry: Econego	Worry: Econego	Worry: Econso	Worry: Econso
Status Discordance	-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.005*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.005*** (0.001)	0.002** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)
College	0.337*** (0.022)	0.364*** (0.025)	-0.347*** (0.022)	-0.376*** (0.024)	-0.154*** (0.019)	-0.112*** (0.019)	-0.109*** (0.020)	-0.109*** (0.020)
SD X College		0.004** (0.001)		-0.004** (0.001)				0.000 (0.001)
Female (1=yes)	-0.299*** (0.019)	-0.301*** (0.019)	0.020 (0.019)	0.022 (0.019)	0.081*** (0.016)	0.023 (0.016)	0.023 (0.016)	0.023 (0.016)
Age	0.013*** (0.001)	0.013*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)	-0.006*** (0.001)	-0.006*** (0.001)	-0.006*** (0.001)
Migration Background (1=yes)	-0.005 (0.034)	-0.003 (0.034)	0.060 (0.033)	0.058 (0.033)	0.001 (0.028)	0.121*** (0.028)	0.121*** (0.028)	0.121*** (0.028)
Emp. Status: not in labor force	-0.055 (0.042)	-0.055 (0.042)	0.103* (0.042)	0.103* (0.042)	-0.043 (0.035)	-0.087* (0.035)	-0.087* (0.035)	-0.087* (0.035)
Emp. Status: other	0.043 (0.065)	0.039 (0.065)	-0.028 (0.064)	-0.023 (0.064)	-0.117* (0.054)	-0.130* (0.054)	-0.130* (0.054)	-0.130* (0.054)
Income (log)	0.045** (0.014)	0.044** (0.014)	-0.009 (0.014)	-0.008 (0.014)	-0.019 (0.012)	-0.118*** (0.012)	-0.118*** (0.012)	-0.118*** (0.012)
Location: Returned	0.032 (0.048)	0.030 (0.048)	-0.093* (0.047)	-0.091 (0.047)	0.003 (0.040)	0.048 (0.040)	0.048 (0.040)	0.048 (0.040)
Location: Moved Away	0.063*** (0.019)	0.063*** (0.019)	-0.126*** (0.019)	-0.125*** (0.019)	-0.003 (0.016)	0.022 (0.016)	0.022 (0.016)	0.022 (0.016)
In 1989: West	0.100** (0.035)	0.101** (0.035)	-0.170*** (0.034)	-0.171*** (0.034)	0.000 (0.029)	-0.055 (0.029)	-0.055 (0.029)	-0.055 (0.029)
In 1989: Abroad	-0.069 (0.079)	-0.072 (0.079)	0.098 (0.078)	0.101 (0.078)	0.136* (0.066)	-0.031 (0.066)	-0.031 (0.066)	-0.031 (0.066)
In 1989: Born later	0.120** (0.045)	0.116* (0.045)	-0.222*** (0.044)	-0.217*** (0.044)	-0.020 (0.038)	-0.180*** (0.038)	-0.180*** (0.038)	-0.180*** (0.038)
Intercept	1.456*** (0.134)	1.472*** (0.134)	1.984*** (0.132)	1.968*** (0.132)	1.938*** (0.112)	2.903*** (0.112)	2.903*** (0.112)	2.903*** (0.112)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.170	0.171	0.122	0.123	0.038	0.085	0.085	0.085
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.166	0.167	0.118	0.119	0.033	0.081	0.081	0.081
Num. obs.	6570	6570	6562	6562	6568	6572	6572	6572

\*\*\*p < 0.001; \*\*p < 0.01; \*p < 0.05. All models include regional (Bundesland) fixed effects.

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