

Online Appendix A : The Police Nationale Congolaise (North Kivu)

DR Congo is divided into 26 provinces, and each province is subdivided into cities and territories. Each territory is comprised of sectors / chefferies, and each city is made up of distinct communes. Within each commune and sector / chefferie, there are *quartiers* and *groupements*, and within each *groupement* there are distinct villages.¹

North Kivu is divided into six administrative territories (Masisi, Beni, Lubero, Rutshuru, Walikale, Nyiragongo), 17 cities and chiefdoms, and 5,178 villages.²

The majority of interviews for this project were undertaken in Goma and the territories of Masisi, Nyiragongo and Rutshuru between 2012 and 2018. I have been conducting research in the Kivus since 2008. Informational interviews, and immersive research also took place in other locations around the country between 2008 – 2018.




Figure 2: Map of North Kivu (Source: MONUSCO, 2016)

The *Police Nationale Congolaise* (PNC) was first established under President Mobutu Sese Seko in 1966, created by presidential decree n°66/423. The decree served the objective of centralizing the police force under a single point of command, and was mandated to maintain public order, ensure public safety, and carry out police patrols. It formalized the distribution of personnel

¹ As laid down in the *Organic law n° 08/016 of October 07, 2008* relating to the composition, organization and functioning of Decentralized Territorial Entities and their relations with the State and the Provinces.

² The number of villages is contested and variable. In 2015, MONUSCO (*Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en République démocratique du Congo North Kivu Fact Sheet*, January 2015) identified 5,178 villages in North Kivu, and in 2018, CENI identified 86,270 nationwide (Commission Électorale Nationale Indépendante, 27 July 2017; *Rapport Annuel Juin 2016–Mai 2017*, pg 55, Table 10). Elsewhere different figures can be found.

across the provincial police forces of DR Congo, but in practice served a political objective to protect and ensure the survival of Mobutu's regime (Nlandu Mayamba Mbuya 2012).³

Following the Congo wars from 1996 – 1997 and 1998 – 2003, the 2006 Constitution paved the way for decentralization and security sector reform (Schnabel and Born 2011). As part of these reforms, architects of security sector reform strove to reform the PNC in order to bolster the stability and security of the nation, and to be more responsive to civilian populations.⁴

In 2002, legal decrees n°002/2002 formally reinstated the organization and operations of the PNC, and n°042/2002 enshrined police ranks in law. In 2006, the new constitution called for a new organic law on the police (Art 182-186), which was finally introduced in 2011, and creates the framework for the operation and organization of the PNC today. The PNC, modeled on Belgian policing, integrates the former national police force and urban police units, the *Garde Civile* and *Gendarmerie*. A range of decrees have been introduced from 2013 onwards. As part of the disarmament and demobilization processes of 2003 onwards, known colloquially as *brassage* (Baaz, Stearns, and Verweijen 2013; Stearns 2012), a variety of civilians and ex-combatants have been integrated without any formal training, creating myriad obstacles and barriers to professionalization (Nlandu Mayamba Mbuya 2012; Schatzberg 1991). Formal responsibility over security provision is shared between provincial and central authorities.⁵

The PNC is organized at the provincial level, and within each group sit *escradons* corresponding to cities or provincial territories. Beneath each *escradon* sit *files* and *détachements*, but these can be inconsistent, depending largely on the de facto organization of particular units and commissariats.⁶ Almost none of the police officers I interviewed could explain the hierarchy and organization of the PNC, and those who drew organigrams of their division for me, tended to draw the military structure, using the language of *brigades*, *companies*, *battalions*, and *peltons*.

There are a number of different departments / groups / units within the PNC, including the *Police de police* (charged with overseeing the conduct of the PNC) ; the *Police de circulation routière* (charged with maintaining order and security on the roads) ; *Police des frontières* (charged with overseeing security at the border) ; *Police des mines* (charged with guarding and overseeing the mines); the *Police d'intervention rapide* ; the *Escradon de protection de l'enfant et prévention des violences sexuelles* (EPEPVS), charged with investigating violence against women and children and known in North Kivu as the *Police pour la lutte contre les violences faites aux femmes* (PVP or PSP), among others (see *Décret n° 15/027 du 09 décembre 2015*, Article 17).

³ For an overview of the security services in DR Congo, and the roles and responsibilities of the PNC vis-à-vis the *Garde Civile*, see Nlandu Mayamba Mbuya (2012); Schatzberg (1991); and the *Loi organique 11/013 du 11 août portant organisation et fonctionnement de la Police Nationale Congolaise*

⁴ See the 2002 reforms, as well as Article 187 of the Congolese Constitution (“The National Congolese Police is tasked with ensuring public safety, the safety of people and their property, maintaining and restoring public order, and protecting those in the highest echelons of power”)

⁵ See the *Loi organique 11/013 du 11 août portant organisation et fonctionnement de la Police Nationale Congolaise* and the *Loi organique n° 08/016 du 7 octobre 2008 portant composition, organisation et fonctionnement des Entités Décentralisées et leurs rapports avec l'État et les Provinces*.

⁶ See also the *Décret n° 15/027 du 09 décembre 2015 déterminant l'organisation et le fonctionnement des Commissariats provinciaux de la Police Nationale Congolaise*.

The end of the Congo wars, and the introduction of the 2006 constitution, demarcated the PNC as an area of concern for international assistance. 2005 saw the creation of the *Groupe Mixte de Réflexion sur la Réforme et la Réorganisation de la Police Nationale Congolaise* (GMRRR) consisting of 23 members, and dominated by international partners.⁷ In 2006, the GMRRR submitted a report to parliament, and in 2007 the Congolese government held a three-day National Seminar on Police Reform in Kinshasa, including consultations with civil society and members of parliament. One outcome of these consultations the establishment of the *Comité de Suivi de la Reforme de la Police* (CSRP) in September 2007, to oversee reforms implemented under the leadership of the PNC. The CSRP has often been criticized for prioritizing institutional reform, and the interests of the PNC hierarchy, with little concern for the security and stabilization of the provinces, or the interests of civilians (Hendrickson et al. 2010: 14).

In this period, the UK Government was among the largest donors in the sector of police reform, pioneering the ‘Security Sector Accountability and Police Reform’ (SSAPR) program, as well as contributions to other European Union security sector reform programs. The SSAPR ran from 2009- 2014, and the vast majority of its total budget (£60 million GBP) focused on building capacity and coordination within the PNC in three provinces (Hendrickson et al. 2010: 17).⁸

The European Commission, another significant donor in the sector, contributed approximately EUR 11 million for a three-year police reform program in the same period. The program was the main funder of the CSRP, and included support for the development of a Human Resource Management system for the PNC, formalizing pay under a system of *bancarisation*; continued support for the registration and matriculation of all police officers through a police census; support for the planning and co-ordination of police reform; support for the reorganisation of budget and financial management in the PNC and the management of PNC infrastructure; and the reconstruction and rehabilitation of some police training facilities.

MONUSCO / MONUC UNPOL has undertaken a number of training efforts since these reforms, as well as joint operations with the PNC. Further, the Japanese government, Price Waterhouse Cooper (PWC), GIZ, Belgium, France, Canada, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the UNDP have also each embarked on programs of assistance to build capacity, ensure stabilization through police reform, and improve police-community relations. The US International Narcotic and Law (INL) provide funding to IOM for migration and border police, as well as promoting community policing initiatives.

At its inception, the SSAPR was divided into four components: the Police Support Project (PSP), Control and Coordination of the Security Sector (CCOSS), External Accountability, and Monitoring and Evaluation (UK Aid 2015). The PSP aimed to support the national police reform process and capacity-building for the PNC. It focused on the development of a common curriculum for all matriculated police officers, which began as a three-month program, reduced later to one-month, and then just a single week. The CCOSS, on the other hand, supported cross-government coordination; accountability; and internal oversight of security sector institutions (both national and provincial levels). Support aimed to strengthen the capacity of these institutions to monitor and evaluate service delivery in the security and justice sectors and

⁷ Only 6 of the 23 members of the GMRRR were Congolese.

⁸ See also UK Stabilization Unit (2016) for a discussion of UK Government approaches to security sector reform.

address the issue of financial sustainability of the police reform process by assessing the future budgetary needs of the PNC. Finally, the External Accountability component aimed to strengthen civilian participation, oversight and control mechanisms. It also provided support for state institutions like Parliament, the Security and Justice Commissions, civil society, the media, academic institutions and policy or research think tanks based in DR Congo. By 2016, the PNC had matriculated 10,828 officers in North Kivu, and 3,749 in the city of Goma. The PNC registered 71 vehicles to cover ten districts, of which 31 were operational in 2016. In 2016, MONUSCO had trained 1,700 PNC in North Kivu.

The most frequent and visible markers of these programs along the Goma-Nyiragongo-Rutshuru axis were donor investment in radio communications equipment, vehicles, uniforms, shoes, and ad hoc trainings. In the city of Goma, a number of buildings have been refurbished as part of PNC reform efforts, and a number of vehicles donated. Outside of Goma, there was only limited evidence of building maintenance, IT support, or auto-vehicles, although many posts had received motorbikes, furniture, radio equipment. Topics covered in trainings attended by my interviewees included: intervening in public affairs; maintaining public order; training in the *Code Militaire* governing police behavior, and the *Code Pénale* (the Congolese criminal code); how to act during public demonstrations; and first aid. Trainings were typically led by MONUSCO or EUPOL, although some were led by NGOs or other actors in partnership with the PNC hierarchy.

In 2012, a community policing model known as *police de proximité* was revived in four locations across the country (Bukavu, Bunia, Kananga, and Matadi) as part of a pilot pioneered by the SSARP. Inspired by European approaches to “democratic” or community policing, the PdP sought to ensure police were embedded within communities, and responsive to the security concerns and needs of their inhabitants (Denney and Jenkins 2013; Hoffman et al 2018; UNDP 2015a and 2015b). This model privileges police–community partnership, accountability, and preventative policing.

The program adopted a two-pronged approach, focusing on institutional reform and capacity building in Kinshasa, while simultaneously carrying out outreach and sensitization among civilians, and establishing channels of accountability and coordination between police, urban administrations, and communities (Nlandu Mayamba Mbuya 2013; Thill and Cimanuka 2020). The *police de proximité* model relied heavily on training in community responsiveness, including the implementation of the *Conseil local pour la sécurité de proximité* (CLSP, Local Council for Proximity Security) which were enshrined in law in 2013. The program also introduced *Forums de quartier* (FQ, Neighbourhood Forums), as well as coaching and mentoring for low-level commanders and station chiefs. In theory, these innovations centered the security needs of the communities in which officers were embedded (CSRP n.d.).

The SSARP program provided intensive training and coaching to over 1,500 officers, many of whom had never before attended a police training. The program reported some notable successes. In an important study of the program’s effectiveness in Bukavu in 2018, Thill, Njangala, and Musamba (2018) found that officers enrolled in the program had a cognitive as well as a material transformation in their understanding of their responsibilities to the community. However, the program was never implemented on a national scale and, while the

training and outreach efforts that comprised the *police de proximité* were successful, structural constraints meant that earlier practices tended to return after the program's conclusion (Thill, Njangala, and Musamba 2018).

Evidence from the interviews conducted as part of this research supports the findings of Thill, Njangala, and Musamba. Given that logics of victimization and appropriate behavior tend to prevail in the context of material, informational, and coordination-based resources, it is plausible that an approach that both seeks to more holistically embed police officers within the communities they are intended to serve, and facilitate participatory training that undoes logics of appropriate behavior would have engendered greater success. Some studies of armed groups and militaries have found that unit-level command structures serve as crucial venues for socialization, and therefore, for the control and production of violence (Hoover Green 2016), suggesting that entire units could benefit from intensive resocialization. However, such approaches also reveal a problem of politics, as studies find that bottom-up training and resocialization are unlikely to have lasting effects if those at the top of command structures are not also committed to reform (Hoffmann et al 2018; Manekin 2020; Schroeder, Chappuis, and Kocak 2014).

Online Appendix B: Methodological Decisions

The reflections presented in this article were collated between 2012-2018, predominantly from research conducted along the Goma-Nyiragongo-Rutshuru axis. Background and contextual interviews were conducted elsewhere in the country, and much of the knowledge that informed this research derived from projects I have been involved in since I began working in the Kivus in 2008. Data assumed a number of forms (Fujii 2015), from knowledge accumulated living and traveling around the Kivus between 2012-2013; to ethnographic observations at police stations and checkpoints in 2013 and 2014 (and then later for research associated with other projects); to informational and background interviews conducted with UN, government and NGO representatives conducted between 2008 and 2018; to in-depth interviews with civilian inhabitants of conflict-political orders conducted between 2012 and 2017. These data were supplemented with interviews with police officers stationed in the *petit nord*, conducted predominantly between 2016 – 2018. I draw on research reviewed by Institutional Review Boards at the University of Washington (42090) and Arizona State University (00004368 and 00004808). Research and travel permissions were also granted by DR Congo's Ministry of Arts and Culture, and later research on these themes was approved by the London School of Economics' Research Ethics Committee (50658).

The project took place in two phases, with early interviews focusing on experiences of war, peace, justice, the rule of law, policing, and stabilization more broadly. These interviews revealed state actors to be integral to experiences of war in the *petit nord*. The second phase focused on policing behavior, and how police officers in particular understood their own roles and practices vis-à-vis the goals of security and stabilization.

During the latter phase of the research, conversations were unfolding about the forthcoming – and later postponed – 2016 elections. As 2016 progressed, the police deployed increasing levels of violence against protesters, prompting conversations about the professionalization of the PNC. While I was conducting research, a number of days of “*ville morte*” saw the complete shutdown

of cities across the country, accompanied by other expressions of public protest and resistance to election delays. Protests and public demonstrations were often met with excessive police brutality and force. Against this backdrop, I conducted a number of informational interviews with practitioners and UN personnel on police capacity-building and professionalization.

As an inductive project, the data from Phase 1 informed Phase 2's slightly more focused goals and methodological approach, as well as the genesis of a comparative project on policing in postwar contexts.⁹ Interviews in Phase 2 more explicitly probed how differently-situated stakeholders at various nodes within the security-peacebuilding-development system made sense of the surrounding security landscape. The research thus encompassed three subject populations:

1. Street-level police officers who wear the uniform of the state, and are frequently the most visible manifestations of the state's coercive authority in citizens' minds. These officers, alongside other security sector actors, embody top-down efforts to harness the state's monopoly on violence.
2. Civilian inhabitants of conflict, revealing the ways war is experienced by those in its midst.
3. Security architects working in the arenas of state capacity-building and security sector reform, including national and international stakeholders, representatives of the UN Mission, and other actors involved in peacebuilding, stabilization and recovery. This subject population sheds light on the objectives of state-building and security sector reform from the perspectives of donors, technocrats, and government officials, and provides background on various stabilization and capacity-building efforts.

I conducted the majority of interviews associated with this project myself, either one-on-one, or with the assistance of a research partner or interpreter. Interviews with police were split between myself and a research partner I had worked with for a number of years. I conducted 16 of the 43 police interviews alone, usually in the officer's home, dwelling, or in a private location such as under the shade of a tree, or behind a building. The remaining 27 interviews were conducted by my research partner. Because we had worked together for many years, and been involved in other collaborative projects together, we were very familiar with one another's research styles and approaches before embarking on the project. We extensively discussed reflexivity and positionality, our respective (and divergent) strategies for building trust and rapport, and how our identities and personalities shaped the interview dynamic.

The 43 police work-life history interviews covered the experiences and reflections of predominantly rural police officers. Rather than being led solely by the research participant, I grounded the project in the work of policing in my introductions, directing the conversation towards the interviewee's professional / employment trajectory. I drafted a loose interview script to introduce the project. Following in a feminist research tradition, I sought to break down the formalities of the "scholar-as-authority" and "informant-as-subject" (Blee 1993) to create a dialogic research space that centered the police officers I was interviewing as the primary experts and authorities on their own life histories and experiences (Halpern 1998; Shesterinina 2020). While taking seriously the words, language, and sentiments police used to express and communicate these histories to me, we treated the entire interview space as a site of data production, rather than focusing solely on the words imparted. This approach permitted a variety

⁹ See Dreier and Lake 2019. A qualitative comparative project is ongoing.

of non-verbal, situational, and relationally constructed information to shape my analysis and interpretation of the subject matter, including body language that contradicted or added nuance to the words imparted (Fujii 2010; 2018). This was particularly important when interviewees used euphemisms to describe behavior, or expressed regret, shame, pride or frustration through facial expressions, tone of voice, or other physical forms of communication. My research partner and I discussed strategies for following up on these forms of non-verbal information through gentle probes. We communicated these details about subtext and body language in square brackets in our interview notes.

A number of the 43 officers were known to me or to my research partner at the time of the interview, either through prior contacts and relationships, as a result of earlier visits to towns and villages, or by virtue of my research during the 2012 – 2013 conflict. Most were stationed in smaller towns and villages, although nine were stationed in or in the environs Goma itself.¹⁰ I called the officers for whom I had telephone numbers or approached them through other contacts. Friends, colleagues or acquaintances introduced me to others. I sought to leverage some spatial variation for these interviews, with regard to levels of conflict exposure. Where possible, I had a prior in-person conversation before the interview, to talk a bit about the project and my goals and objectives, and to reestablish a personal relationship. Where such a meeting wasn't possible because of the need to travel, I sought a meeting by phone or through another contact, and engaged in this preamble prior to the interview.

My research partner, who is Congolese, could relate differently to our interviewees, and tap into different “insider” identities in his interactions. He thus employed different techniques for building rapport, and probed topics of interest in ways I was unable to access (Thapa-Björkert and Henry 2004). Due to our different identities and positionalities, we were able to experiment with divergent techniques for engaging interviewees in constructive and free-flowing conversation. For example, I often needed to ask patience of my interviewees as I formulated follow up questions and responded to what they were telling me. Struggles with language frequently helped to foster humor and goodwill, especially as many respondents were initially surprised that I was eager to talk to them in a mixture of Swahili and French. After extended introductions explaining how I came to be there, we often went over concepts related to the interview a few times. I would also often repeat what I understood from their descriptions and responses, in order to ensure I had captured the essence and sentiment of their words. In most cases, we could transition between Swahili and French when I wanted to clarify something important, or when there were elements of our conversation that I was struggling to understand in appropriate depth.

There were advantages and disadvantages to conducting these interviews alone. On the one hand, there were clear barriers to comprehension posed by my lack of fluency in Swahili, and the nature of the conversation often became more formal and less intimate when we switched to French. On the other, in almost all of my interviews, these struggles with language, translation, and arriving at a shared meaning, created deep humility, warmth, sincerity, and patience, which, at least in my impressions of our exchange, broke down some of the hierarchies and formalities

¹⁰ Most of these lived just outside Goma, although two lived in the city. They had each been stationed elsewhere in North Kivu for long periods, either during or preceding the M23 conflict, and the interviews covered periods spent in the city and elsewhere.

that would otherwise have stilted our conversation. This dynamic was very different when my research partner was present in the interview. Whenever we conducted interviews together, the atmosphere gravitated towards more formal exchange, and the intimacy that was built from struggling towards constructing shared meaning was far harder to foster. Often, in these joint interviews, our respondents would speak directly to my research partner, except when they wanted to convey something to me about their own wellbeing and security, which was sometimes followed by a request for assistance or remuneration. These types of requests did not occur with frequency when I was alone. The interviews my partner and I conducted together typically felt a little less intimate. However, when my partner conducted interviews alone, his exchanges were frank and open. He remarked on the self-reflection displayed by his interviewees; qualities that were not as apparent when we interviewed people together. However, in contrast to mine, and as a result of my partner's fluency in multiple local languages, his interviews usually lasted longer, and could cover topics in more depth and with more nuance and precision. Ultimately, for the purposes of this project, his interviews provided richer data, leading to our decision that he would carry out the majority of the remaining police interviews without me present.

Visiting, living, and working in North Kivu, and conducting research on the rule of law over a period of ten years, permitted me a number of further ethnographic and observational insights that informed the development of my interview protocols, and contributed to the overarching contours of the project. These observations included a period of nearly two months spent observing the actions of police officers engaging with victims of crimes at police stations in Goma and Bukuvu in 2013 that served to inform and motivate aspects of this project. While traveling for my dissertation, I always sought to visit local police stations, and spend time there conducting interviews or shorter observations where it was possible and appropriate to do so. This more immersive work allowed me to triangulate information gleaned in my interviews, and place descriptions from civilians and police officers in a broader context.

The time I had spent in the Kivus as a researcher, and working with other research and NGO teams, also equipped me to recognize and identify moments of what Robben terms "ethnographic seduction" (Robben 1996: 84).¹¹ Robben uses the term "seduction" to describe the tactics and strategies interviewees use to elicit sympathy and to guide the interviewer to feel that they have arrived at a deeper and more profound and intimate "truth" in the exchange. Robben writes: "it is only later the interviewee realizes seduction has been mistaken for empathy and rapport". These moments occurred at some point in most of my interviews, particularly when discussing themes of poverty, hunger, lack of pay, and lack of opportunity. These moments of ethnographic seduction, often seemingly seeking sympathy either to excuse or contextualize an admission of improper behavior, or to preface a request of some sort, meant that I was frequently balancing an impetus to take the words my interviewees shared with me at face value, imbuing those words – and the environment and conversation that produced them – with meaning and significance in their own right, with a desire to further triangulate and verify the stories and information imparted to me. These exchanges, and the questions that followed, contributed to my analysis of the role that victimcy (Utas 2005) and victim identity play in constructing the professional identities and justifying the behaviors of a rural police officer in the *petit nord*.

¹¹ See also Parkinson 2021.

Interviews with police and other state agents were designed to probe perceptions of their own roles within security hierarchies, as well as the many different subject positions they occupy in landscapes of violence and insecurity, and their relationships with other state and non-state actors. I also scrutinized their relationships with the civilian communities they were enmeshed within and intended to serve. These interviews typically began with questions about education, family life and career ambitions, how the officer in question came to the PNC, as well as questions about pay, training, and other forms of capacity-building. Interviewees were also asked about their daily routines, subsistence, command structures, social relationships, policies, protocols, and legal frameworks, and questions about the organizational structure of the PNC. One distinct goal of the broader project was to unveil the behavioral logics underpinning quotidian interactions between police and civilians. My interviews focused on safety and security, peacebuilding, and stabilization, vis-à-vis the war and more broadly. As the “face” of the state within their communities, I sought to understand what the concept of “the state” meant to police officers, as well as how ideas of security and statehood were promoted, received, and interpreted by those wearing its uniform. Of his study of democracy, Schaffer (2006: 186) writes:

Scholars often posit a causal link between free elections and democratic accountability, a link, not incidentally, that today provides one of the theoretical underpinnings for many US and World Bank governance and democracy-building programs around the world. But this link is tenable only if voters do indeed expect elected officials to act in the public interest and in accordance with the law. For this reason, it is necessary to verify that voters do, in fact, hold such expectations. Looking at how voters use words like “vote,” “democracy,” or “accountability” reveal the kinds of expectations they actually hold.

State capacity-building similarly rests on an implied logic that state agents will deploy enhanced capacity towards enhanced security. Like Schaffer, this implied logic provoked me to scrutinize the meanings and associations security agents, the architects of reform, and civilians attached to the idea of the state, but also to their own roles and responsibilities, through the language they used and the meanings they attached to various concepts. I was interested in how different actors understood and interpreted concepts such as “protection,” “war,” “peace,” and “security” in the context of their lives and work.

In addition to covering the work of policing, therefore, my interviews also explored understandings of and paths to stability, experiences of in/security, definitions of war and peace, avenues to conflict termination, ideas about statehood and state capacity, understandings of civilian protection, and the goals of policing. In an effort to better understand how and why agents of the state engaged in acts of violence and predation, as well as how these types of habitual interactions interfaced with other dynamics of violence and conflict, I further probed the respective hierarchies in which individuals inhabiting conflict orders were embedded, the relationships between state agents and their supervising officers, and the connections between security agents and other conflict-affected populations, including armed groups and customary authorities (Beek 2016; Gupta 1995; Lombard 2016; Mitchell 1999; de Sardan 2012).

Consent

Throughout my research, I employed a process of oral consent, in order to preserve the anonymity of my respondents and interlocutors. While the vast majority (although not all) of the

police I interviewed could read or write, many of the civilians I interviewed could not. In order to maintain consistency and to avoid asking that people sign hard-copy documents that I would then need to carry across borders, I deemed an oral consent process to be appropriate for all components of this project, as well as many of my other projects. My Institutional Review Boards have always approved this decision.

At the start of each conversation, my research partner or I emphasized to respondents that the interview was confidential and that nothing they shared with us would be conveyed to anyone else. With the exception of some of the earlier interviews conducted as part of my dissertation research, we did not record any interviews. This choice was particularly important in the context of the 43 police interviews. Respondents were asked permission to take handwritten notes, which myself and my collaborator wrote up and uploaded to the cloud as soon as possible after the interview. No names were saved in these documents, although interviews were all password protected, as they included identifying information, such as place names, family members, biographical details such as place of birth, postings, and other such information.

Due to the fact that I was often travelling in NGO vehicles for security and because I was simultaneously working on other projects, there were inevitable limitations and constraints associated with establishing informed consent. In contexts saturated by NGOs, and home to high levels of unemployment, poverty, and unrest, researchers and practitioners are easily confused (Lewis et al 2018). Nevertheless, with the assistance of my research collaborator and other friends and partners, I believe we were effectively able to communicate our interest in hearing our respondents' stories without raising expectations or implying that we were humanitarians with access to support or resources (Campbell 2018; Fujii 2010; Cronin-Furman and Lake, 2018).

Data Protection

The risks of surveillance manifest very differently in DR Congo than elsewhere in the world (Parkinson 2014, 2017; Thomson 2009). Nevertheless, much of the research for this article occurred in the build-up to national elections, which created a heightened sense of unease across the country. For these reasons, I was always careful about transporting data or drawing attention to my work. I introduced myself to the relevant authorities in each location I visited, which sometimes required lengthy and time-consuming formalities. Due to our network of contacts within the PNC, and the close personal relationships we formed over the course of our research, we were not overly worried about our physical security. Nevertheless, an abundance of caution is always necessary when conducting research in climates affected by violence and unrest. For these reasons, we did not keep any hard copies of our interview notes any longer than necessary, and all electronic documents were password protected on our computers until we could upload them to the cloud, and then onto a thumb drive on return. Originals were deleted from researchers' computers.

Coding and Analysis

Once all of the interviews were complete, I used the qualitative coding software Dedoose to analyze the interviews. Because this was an inductive project, my reflections and preconceptions evolved considerably throughout the research and writing process. I revisited each interview a number of times, learning new information on each new reading. I employed a

flexible coding process derived from Deterding and Waters (2018). Because these were not direct transcripts, but rather detailed interview notes, it is difficult to treat quotes as verbatim. Indeed, both myself and my collaborator included our own reflections and observations in square brackets [as such] in the notes. All notes from my research partner were written and then typed up in French, usually translated from conversations that took place in Kiswahili or Kinyarwanda. My notes were handwritten in a mixture of French and English, with some Swahili words and phrases noted down. Most of these were typed up in English, with some parts in French. Therefore, all quotes are approximations of what was conveyed, translated first from the language the interview took place, and then into French or English for the purposes of coding, and then into English in the body of the article. Where either of us thought we might quote something, we tried our best to always ask for clarification, repeat the quote back, and to capture the meaning as best as possible in each language. We indicated these phrases in quotation marks in our notes, highlighting where we had double checked them with our interviewees. Most interviews generated between 10 - 20 pages of notes, with the majority around 12 pages long.

As part of my coding process, on my first reading I simply coded key themes that emerged from my initial reading of the data, usually corresponding to key questions asked. Codes and themes were broad and diverse, including concepts such as “war,” “security,” “pay,” “recruitment,” “armed group membership,” “poverty,” “training,” “capacity-building,” “community-relations,” “chain of command,” “rapportage,” “victimization,” and other such concepts that emerged intuitively from my reading of the uploaded notes. On my second reading, and in analysing the themes that emerged in the first phase, I became attuned to various patterns that were emerging. Importantly, the logics of victimization and appropriate behaviour emerged as important underlying motivations invoked by officers to legitimate and explain their interactions with members of the public. At this point, I inserted “child codes” beneath relevant codes. For example, “capacity building” derived the child codes: “material capacity building;” “informational resources;” and “professionalization.” “Predation” derived the child codes of “causes” and “descriptions,” and beneath “causes,” came “legitimate behavior,” “poverty,” “victimization,” and “rapportage.” These emerged as I sought to categorize themes, trends and patterns emerging from the data for the purposes of analytical clarity. While capacity-building activities, and particularly trainings, also fell into different substantive categories (e.g., counter-terrorism operations, human rights, protest policing, gender sensitivity, among other topics), the categories “material,” “informational,” and “coordination-based” emerged as the most intuitive way to capture the nature of activities undertaken with a degree of analytical clarity. Different activities generated slightly different implications for policing work, as reflected in Table 1.

I did not code my ethnographic field notes in Dedoose, but I did read back over many years of field notes subsequent to the first round of work-life history coding in order to pull out any new, complementary, or contradictory information. Finally, in writing up the work-life history profiles excerpted in Appendix C, I re-read all coded data by theme, permitting me a more comprehensive overview of patterns and trends.

Additional Ethical Considerations

It is impossible to separate the ethical considerations that arose throughout this project from the methodological decisions I made. In this section, I raise three further issues not discussed above, concerning agency; attribution; and representation.

Because I approached many of the police officers through personal relationships and acquaintances, the interviews themselves were friendly and informal. The collegial atmosphere sometimes created conditions where it was easy to forget that the conversation was for the benefit of an academic project. Both myself and my research partner made sure to remind participants that the information they disclosed was for the purpose of a research project, and each of us would reestablish consent iteratively throughout the interview. Honoring the agency of interviewees who claim that they are comfortable sharing information with me, and taking responsibility as a scholar by limiting the terrain covered to “safe” topics, is often a delicate balance.

This dynamic was further complicated by the fact that my interviewees often simultaneously occupied positions of power, and positions of considerable vulnerability, in their communities. Because of these dynamics, in my introduction to the interviewee I chose to explain my research, and my role as a researcher, as fully and openly as I could. I chose to trust my respondents in their decisions on what to share. I did not seek further permission to share specific quotes after the interview itself, in part because it would have been difficult to contact many of my respondents again. For this reason, I sought to establish full consent within the interview itself.

The second issue is the question of attribution. This work was collaboratively produced. While this is the case for almost all field-based scholarship, some projects benefit from more assistance and collaboration than others (Nyenyezi et al 2020). Many friends, colleagues, respondents, and interlocutors played key roles in shaping the evolution and development of the project, as well as informing my insights and analysis. It is not possible to credit many of them here, and indeed to do so could be dangerous, given the volatile security climate in the Kivus.

My interview partner in particular played an essential role in the second phase of the project. Without his work, this research would have looked markedly different. For security and confidentiality, however, we agreed from the outset that he would not be mentioned by name anywhere in the research. At the same time, in ensuring his anonymity, I do not wish to invisibilize the contributions he made in this collaborative project. Thus, in an effort towards reflexive transparency, it is important to note the different roles each of us played in producing the final research outputs: I was solely responsible for the design of the project, the themes covered, the formal coding and analysis, and the project’s contribution to academic literature. My research partner played a crucial role in conducting interviews and providing interpretation, translation and contextual analysis.

The third issue is one of representation. In a 13,000-word article it is challenging, to say the least, to do justice to the complexities of the information amassed over the course of a multi-year immersive project. Perhaps the most challenging of all is the depiction of the police officers themselves, when I am only able to impart small excerpts of their lives and experiences. Many police officers I encountered over the course of my research had engaged in acts of violence, and partaken in behavior with which it was difficult to empathize (Shesterinina 2019; 2020). I struggled with how to represent police officers as perpetrators of violence on the one hand, and as victims of a violent system on the other. It is certainly the case that the vast majority of the

police I interviewed held both of these identities together, as do many perpetrators of violence (Baaz and Stern 2008; Jessee 2017, 2019; Krystalli 2017; Thomson 2010).

This question of representation was made especially challenging against the global backdrop of calls for police reform and abolition (e.g., in the United States, Nigeria, and the Philippines). This discourse can be unforgiving of the individuals who come to occupy these roles. In this article, I have hoped to capture the institution of the police as violent, rather than the individuals themselves. Many police participate in violent acts. In many places, including DR Congo, most of them are also themselves victims of extreme poverty, neglect, and social marginalization. I do not intend to diminish the agency they exert over the choices they make, nor to gloss over variation in officers' decisions to participate in acts of violence (Manekin 2017). I also do not wish to minimize or excuse inexcusable actions (Blee 1993; 1998; 2002; Gallaher, 2009). However, I do seek to understand the processes through which ordinary people become socialized into systems of violence, as well as the structures that propel their continued participation. Such an analysis demands withholding judgement, alongside an effort to occupy the subject positions of others. As Yanow and Schwartz-Shea (2006: 22) observe, interpretivist research is built on empathy for one's subjects, wherein "empathy constitutes an intentional embracing of the other's meaning." Thus, from an analytical perspective as well as from the perspective of a feminist and a human being, understanding how police have come to inhabit the roles they assume in society demands radical empathy for the roles, structures and systems they find themselves in, and for the descriptions and rationalizations they draw on to make sense of these roles (Baaz and Stern 2008).

Finally, and relatedly, in depicting the institution of policing as productive of violence, the article risks essentializing the Congolese state and bureaucracy as uniquely predatory. While this article focuses on a single case, it does not seek to portray the Congolese police as more prone to violence or predation than police elsewhere. As such, throughout the article I draw on a long history of scholarship on policing in other contexts (e.g., Akbar 2019; González 2020; Zimring 2017) to demonstrate similar dynamics at play across a variety of institutional settings. This article centers DR Congo specifically in order to examine the effects of police violence, and the role of state capacity-building, against the backdrop of war, where the deeper erosion of trust in the state can have particularly destabilizing repercussions.

Online Appendix C: Work-Life History Profiles

Below, I present condensed and deidentified profiles of the 43 police officers with whom myself and my collaborator conducted interviews. I highlight in gray the excerpts that are referenced in the article's footnotes. All names are changed, and all identifiers such as place, rank, and position, have been obscured from these profiles, with summary statistics reported in the tables in Appendix D. I also obscure other identifying details, and do not allude to current placements or job descriptions. The number of respondents from each province can be found in Appendix D.

These excerpts are not biographical. Rather, they present further evidence of recurring themes discussed in the body of the article. Some summaries offer more detail than others, either because consent to share particular details was less definitively established, or because the interview's content was less informative and pertinent to this article's themes.

1. Alexis

Alexis was interviewed at what he called his office, which had the appearance of a small house. Civilians were also residing or sleeping there. Alexis wanted to finish high school, but he received notification that the PNC were recruiting, so he left school to join up. After six months of training, he was assigned to his first posting. Alexis noted that he heard that the government wanted to train people to become police, and thought that it was a good time to join. He has been in his post since 2009 without a matriculation number. He earns an income through a combination of agriculture and the little money that he earns at the office when he is on duty. He explains that this money normally comes from resolving disputes between two or more individuals. “After someone finds justice for a problem, both parties must give a little money for the operation of the office. The supervisor can then decide to give us a sum, according to what he wants. This, though, is rare. It’s not every day. It also happens that when we have cash receipts the chef will not disperse this money, because this goes to him and to the public treasury. These funds bring a maximum amount of \$30 USD each month.”

Alexis notes that he primarily allocates these funds to grow sorghum and bean seeds. He also contributes to a mutual savings fund each week in his village. Some officers he works with are matriculated, and their numbers come with money each month. “I feel a little upset about this because they are going to eat with their family members, but I also tell myself that my turn will come.”

When discussing why the public fear the police, Alexis reflects on the practices agents employ in their interactions with the public. “A police officer will ask civilians to exhibit their identity documents. He does this in order to find someone who does not possess one of the documents he is required to carry, so that he can impose a fine. The officer will eat this money, after intimidating the civilian... For example, if I cross paths with you along the way, I ask you for your documents [including the *carte d'électeur, jeton de recensement, l'impôt* and sometimes the *salongo* token]. If, for example, a census token is missing, I would force you to give me \$10 USD so that you are released. I am not allowed to do this, and that’s why we call it *tracasserie*; ordinarily, I should take you to the office and issue the paperwork, so that the fine can be paid to my supervisor. That is to say, I do this process without authorization, and the money you give me does not go into the public treasury. I'm going to eat this money. You can see that certain fines are paid into the public treasury, and others we use for our own needs. This includes buying soap that can help with laundry detergent, shopping for units and other daily needs.” He adds: “The main problem [for police] is a lack of motivation. We do patrols all night without eating. You can also work a shift of 48 hours without going home to eat, and the service provides no food.”

2. Aloys

Aloys was interviewed in a small shack, in the shelter from the rain, and in private. Before joining the PNC, he wanted to be a teacher, but then he saw teachers do not earn anything, and his parents could not afford to send him to school. From there he worked in security, but also did not earn anything. There was recruitment to the PNC in 2016, and after he taking a test, he could join. Although he is matriculated, he tells us that in order to survive it is necessary to go to the field to cultivate crops. “With the little money I find, I give it to my wife to use in her rural activities (farming). This is how we live, depending on the arrests... We are the ones who know

how to distinguish people in the community. This is why, when I go out, if I meet a civilian, I must have at least 2000cf for my children to eat...”

Aloys continued: “The fear of the population is explained in the sense that when we meet a person, we require her to show us her card, and after she has shown the card, we ask her for other impossible things so that she feels guilty and afraid. This is so we can take everything she has by force (telephone, money, etc.)... Police officers work long hours without being paid. They have worked for 10 years for example, in these conditions, and their salary is released for two months or not at all. After, they will be told that their names have been omitted from the payroll. A policeman like that, because he already tasted the salary once but no longer has, he instead lives on *tracasserie*.”

Aloys explained that the supervisors will often try to motivate junior officers and those without serial numbers, by telling them that they will have theirs soon. He noted that it is very difficult to get promoted in the PNC, unless you cultivate a relationship with a supervisor by bringing him goats, and other gifts. Although the grades come from Kinshasa, a supervisor can put in a recommendation for you. He also explains that border police officers, traffic, mine police officers, and naval police officers have an easier position, because there is more opportunity to earn revenue in those roles. But to get those roles, you must have someone who can plead for you. “If I had the means to pay for corruption or to give a goat, I could do that job too.”

When he spoke about *tracasserie*, he told us: “If we meet someone on the street who does not have a census token, for a low-grade police like myself, I can't bring him to the office. I instead tell him it is an offense to travel without a voter card. Then he has to give me something - a little money and I can release him. If I bring him to the office, only the commanders will eat, without remembering who brought the case. This is why we work on the ground to finish the file.”

3. *Alphonse*

Alphonse was interviewed outside, close to his posting, on two small chairs. He talked about the presence of a number of armed groups where he grew up. His father was murdered by elements close to one of the groups, and his mother still lives in that village. His brothers and sisters all left, because the security has deteriorated significantly. He is very worried for his mother who is often harassed by bandits and soldiers. Before joining the police, he worked in another profession, similar to construction. But the security situation made it impossible to continue in that work without a gun. After M23 left, things deteriorated further, and he could no longer stay as a civilian with no weapons to protect himself. So he joined the PNC, in order to secure a livelihood and some protection.

4. *Amani*

Amani was interviewed in his home. He reflected that when he got into the police, he thought he would find his life there, and that he would be able to send money home so that his children could study. However, unfortunately, when they finished their initial training, they were sent to their posts and told their service numbers would reach them. But they never arrived, even though others in the same service received their numbers. At this point, he realized that life in the PNC was worse than life in the village, because they arrive home without bringing anything. “We could not find school fees for the children, clothes for our wives, or anything... This is why we are in pain... The only way to make any money is when we bring a detainee to the office; then

we must be given a small sum for travel (for transportation).” Amani told us that this is made easier with resources, like motorbikes, or pens or paper, because they can more easily bring people to the station for offences and that makes it possible to live.

Amani also noted that civilians are often afraid of the police because of this. Because of their need, they can arrest the population suddenly without cause. The fines demanded also exceed their [the population’s] economic capacity. For example, here in [village] when the police arrive in a neighborhood, the population will hide so as not to lose their field, their plot, or their house, or even have a heart attack because of the fines the police will ask without just cause. In short, the greatest cause of fear among the population is these police fines. “If the police hunt down people in the community for these fines, the population will always be afraid.” He offered an example: “For example, you meet with a police officer as a civilian, and he asks you to show your voter card. Even if you show it, he will bring you directly to prison and so whoever saw this scene will always be afraid of the police.... From time to time, a police officer is sent on a mission by his superiors with the sole objective of finding those who do not have these census tokens or paperwork, so that he can demand food or money, which means the superiors get to drink or profit in terms of money.”

5. *Anthony*

Anthony was interviewed at his home. He had only spent a few years in the PNC, and before that he tended to a plot of land in his family’s village. He came to the PNC because he observed that everyone in his village who was doing well in life had some land they could use to profit. Because his family had nothing, he needed to search for other means to survive. Because he had no inheritance or land, he sought other sources of revenue, and through that path he arrived at the PNC. With the PNC, he is able to earn a living. Anthony tells us that whenever he finds someone who has committed an infraction, or can be accused, they are brought to the station or the prison. At this point, they must pay the *migulu ya police*. Anthony recounts: “The more a civilian delays paying, the more they will be tortured in order to force them to release the money as quickly as possible.” In addition to the *migulu ya police*, they must also pay a contribution to buy food, or oil that will be used in prison for lighting. In this way, the prison can be paid, but so can the officers.

6. *Bahati*

Bahati was interviewed at his home. Due to insufficient wages, he remains separated from his family. “That is to say, when we are enlisted, it is difficult to move with the family because we do not know where to stay, or what sanitary, economic, educational, or other conditions our families will face. All this is due to the lack of money we receive. It makes it impossible to plan, so I live away from my family. I’m always afraid my family will be sick and no one will take care of them... This means that I live alone in pain. Nobody prepares food for me to eat, and when I am sick, it is not possible for my wife to come to visit me. My family also remains in pain, and faces great difficulty in finding food, and schooling”.

Bahati, with his family, farms a small plot of land in his village. He notes that he could not remain in the PNC if he did not also work in the fields. After the harvest, he says he can take a breath because the children can eat corn, and not starve. Bahati can also sell beans after the harvest, which allows him to pay for schooling, healthcare and clothes.

Bahati came to the PNC through the military. When he was young, he had planned to be a teacher, but a friend taught him the military language of Lingala. “Since I was with him, he showed me that teachers suffer compared to the military, while the military have many advantages over teachers. He convinced me, so that I mastered the language of Lingala and offered to go into military service. But I knew that soldiers died on the front lines during the war, so I made a decision instead to go into the service of the PNC”.

Bahati was one of the few interviewees who explicitly invoked armed groups in his definition and reflections on war and security. He noted: “We work surrounded by many negative armed groups, such as APCLS, Nyatura, Mai Mai, FDLR and other rebel groups. It is enough to dream a little, because now we wake up to the shots of the bullets heard in our camp. It is not God who saves human lives, because many die on these occasions. Today it is this group who disturbs, tomorrow another, the day after tomorrow it is another, and so on. We are often afraid to go and arrest the young people of the neighborhood no matter what they are offending because we know that everyone in this environment has enlisted in one of the rebel groups. This makes it difficult to fine someone, the fact that he might be a member of the rebels. So we don’t eat.”

7. Baraka

Baraka was interviewed close to his office. He had first joined the PNC following demobilization from RCD Goma. After defecting with M23, he returned to the PNC. He has never been matriculated, and only receives payment through his superior, who pays out a portion of the fines the office collects each week. He mentions that all police officers were registered at the time he was with M23, so he missed out on that opportunity. The sum he receives is insufficient to buy clothes or other belongings, and only provides enough for food for him and his family. Before becoming a soldier, Baraka worked as a farmer and cultivated a plot of land. He turned to the military and police because he sought to be a respectful agent of the state. This position would leave him well protected, but he adds: “the misfortune was that I had not found the chance to join my colleagues on the payroll.”

8. Bartholémie

The interview with Bartholémie began in his home, although after around 30 minutes, Bartholémie requested to continue the conversation while walking around the village and towards the fields. We visited Bartholémie on two subsequent occasions to continue the conversation. He is not assigned to a company in the PNC and predominantly engages in daily patrols.

Bartholémie has been in the PNC for 16 months, and was formerly a farmer. He observed many of his classmates from school become state officials, which brought them some status and respect in the community. He decided he would also commit to being an agent of the state, so that he could protect himself and his family. He was integrated into the PNC, and matriculated at that point. However, despite the fact he receives a monthly salary, he often finds it very difficult to find enough to eat for himself and his family.

9. Celestin

Celestin was interviewed behind a local church where two chairs were set up. Celestin is not matriculated, and has never been. Instead, civilians pay 100 FC or 200 FC when they go to the market. Celestin began as a soldier in 2006, and then moved to the PNC. “I decided to become a

soldier because I found my life in a very difficult situation, characterized by poverty, and the frequent looting and burning of houses, as well as the mistreatment of the population by the rebel forces.” He needed to turn to military service in order to protect himself. He continued: “You understand that the life of a soldier is characterized by war every day. As for the police, we can find some rest. I have time to greet my family, as I have either two or three days off per month. In the police there is time to work, but also a little time to take a rest.” Yet, he noted that for the PNC, there is little money and soldiers are paid more. Police, he notes, must stay with the population, and must protect them in order to survive. “I thought that [being a police officer] would allow me to live well, but unfortunately nothing has changed, and my misery has increased from day to day... I became a police officer thinking that I should work for the state in exchange for a salary, which could help me educate my children and meet other needs such as having a plot and building a house. This has not yet come to pass.”

10. Charles

Charles was interviewed at his office. He does not have a matriculation number, but from time to time the village chief provides him with some funds for soap or food for his family. He sought to become a police officer after his wife died, in order that he could have a better life. He talks about also securing money to feed his children through the practice of demanding identity documents (including census tokens, taxes, and electoral cards) from civilians. “It’s one way of looking for money. We’re going to ask him for money and tell him to go find his voter card. If he comes up empty, I can take him to the relevant authorities... If the Commander is informed of this; he is going to put that person in jail, and he will then need to pay a fine in order to get out... If I am fortunate, I will be given a portion of the fine by my superiors in this instance.”

11. David

David was interviewed in his home where he lived with his family. He was recruited to the police elsewhere in the country, after being recruited into the RCD. For many years, he survived by asking the population for beans and bananas in order to eat. “As soon as people saw our guns, they were afraid and would give us food to eat immediately, and without hesitation... Nowadays, if I meet someone and he doesn't have his voter card, I would tell him to give me 1,000cf to let him go, and so on.”

12. Denis

Denis was interviewed in his home where he lived with his wife and children. He entered military service at the age of 18. He spoke at length about the practices of police officers, and had significant experience on which to draw, as he had been in a number of different posts in North Kivu. He told us that good police officers live in harmony and collaboration with the population. “For example, when the Commander wants to write a warrant to bring in someone I know, I have to go tell that person that soon we will come to arrest him. If he thinks he's at fault... or if we know the law well... he has to figure out how to avoid the case so that he doesn't get arrested and brought to jail. He could use money or gifts to resolve his situation without being taken to prison and charged fines.” When he discussed the fines in greater detail, he noted that all fines belong to police commanders. Depending on the offence, they can fine either \$ 100, \$50, or \$30. It is the commanders who decide how to allocate that money. If they want, they eat because nobody is going to ask them for the report on that.”

Denis observed that it is wise for civilians to treat police in their community well. For example, if a civilian shared bread or sweets with a police officer, and then that person from the community is later incarcerated, the police officer will do everything to put him in good conditions, despite being in prison. Denis also talked about police officers who prey deliberately on the population in order to eat. He notes: “they take from the pockets of civilians to steal what they have, like phones, money and other important materials. They may use intimidation. These practices are often done in the evening during the hours when everyone returns home after dark. And these practices are done from time to time when the police are on an arrest mission in a neighborhood.”

13. Emmanuel

Emmanuel was interviewed at his home. Before joining the PNC, he served in the FARDC. During the CNDP war, he suffered a great deal, and at the end of that war, he took the opportunity to join the police in 2009. Emmanuel explained that life as a police officer is still difficult. Those who have the best life are the traffic or road police, because they can stop cars and “they never run out of money in their hands.” In his position, there are several offenses but they are not as common, and they require resources to investigate, like transport. For example, assault, battery, fraud, and threats. Emmanuel notes that police are paid according to their ranks. Low class officers may earn 120,000cf per month, but our supervisor might subtract some of this. Emmanuel normally remains 115,000cf per month. He laments that this figure is not enough, for instance, if you have a child in the hospital, if you are sick. You also have food, clothes, and other needs. He also notes that those who are not matriculated might not receive this sum. In such cases, either the wife cultivates the field in order to feed the family, or the policeman might find something, like money, to motivate his work. “A police cannot spend the night hungry, so when you imprison someone you know there is a little motivation for you.”

He adds: “Fines are different from this motivation, according to the constitution. Fines must have a receipt, while what is requested for motivation does not have a receipt. This money [fines] is eaten by the superiors, and there is also the money that we send to the company and the district, so some of these fines end up in the public treasury.”

14. Evariste

Evariste was interviewed in his home. He began his career in the FARDC, and spent periods of his life working with government and customary authorities. Evariste spoke about those higher-ranking officers who lead a better life. He explains: “Those who do well begin with the lieutenants in the hierarchy. They lead a good life because everything happens through them... For example, when they fine people, they’re eating a lot of money... The fine depends on the fault committed by the civilian, so when he gets into a fight, or when he owes a debt; we need to ask him for a fine, which will then go to the supervisor.”

He goes on to note that: “There are police officers who intimidate people too much, or who ask civilians for tobacco money or cigarettes. For example, there are times when a police officer asks someone for an identity card, and if he doesn’t have this, the police officer will pursue him. This can cause civilians to always be afraid of the police... Also, when they are going to arrest someone, they will always ask for money for their transport. If they are on guard for a prisoner, a police officer will first ask for 1000cf, or for someone who is in prison, to get him out they will ask for 2000cf.” Evariste noted that even if they do have their identity documents in order, they

will likely still be asked for money for cigarettes, but this request will be smaller, just to maintain friendly relations. And if he doesn't have them, he will certainly be imprisoned "for lack of his identity documents and for lack of salary for these police officers."

15. *Faustin*

Faustin was interviewed at home where he lived with his wife, and children. He talked about his mother and father, who were plagued by poverty. His family can only survive because his father is a stone mason. But this does not bring enough money to send children to school. If he finds someone to buy the stones he sells, the family can eat, but if not, "we spend the night fearful of days without food." In order to pay for schooling, the whole family must beg for help from their neighbors and friends. In discussing a host of other family problems, Faustin notes that "with all these difficulties, I felt myself to be disgusted with my life, which was a struggle and a disappointment. I took the decision at this point to go into the military or the police." A friend helped him to see that with the police, you share many of the same advantages as the military, but that it is stable and less risky. "It is for these reasons I embraced this career." Faustin laments that his family often has to spend days and nights without eating, but that with his uniform, he can ask his neighbors for help and they must oblige.

Faustin talks about the war as a state of constant uncertainty. He notes: "I am disturbed by bandits or criminals, who come to loot or bother the population. They keep people in catastrophic poverty. That is to say they loot and steal the goods of the population; they loot from people in their own homes, night and day; they even kill members of the community, and we don't know for what reason."

16. *Felixe*

Felixe was one of the respondents interviewed at an earlier point in the research process. He worked on a plot of land with his wife, in addition to serving in his capacity as a police officer. He reflected on the circumstances brought about by the war, and the difficulties he encountered in simply subsisting day-to-day. Felixe noted: "I am desperate to seek peace for myself and my family, and to find a better life. If I could find food for my children, either by doing small jobs daily, then my children could eat, and maybe I could also find the school fees for my children. When others are paid in my office, I feel bad when they can eat and the rest of us cannot. I wish to leave this service and go home to work in the fields. Those who go to the fields do daily work to make sure they can ensure the survival of their children, and find medical care for the family when they need it, and your friends and family will not forget you if you have needs. This is a better life than being a thief. In my current work, you can meet someone, you ask them for their voter card and also tell them to put everything they have in their hands on the floor and empty their pockets so you can eat. This is not an honorable life."

Felixe also discusses his relationship with his supervisor, and the fines that are levied on civilians who have committed infractions. He explains that the fine depends on the severity of the fault. "We often use the saying: "*ahaciye icaha, bahashira icyiro*" which means "where there is a sin, there must be a fine". Based on the severity of the act committed [assault and battery, for example], you can perhaps give a chicken to ask forgiveness from your brother. You might also pay a fine of 20 liters of drink as reconciliation in order to continue living together as before."

17. *Fidel*

Fidel was interviewed in his home. He has been in the PNC since 2009, prior to which he was in RCD. Fidel does not see a big difference between life as a soldier and life as a police officer. He reflected that his primary reason to join was to find a better life. “The life of a police officer was seen as a good life, in which children cannot miss studies due to the lack of school fees, food can be easily found, and we can find clothes for our families without difficulty... A policeman has many advantages related to his service. For example, he can be on secondment and he will be motivated [financially] aside from his salary. He might escort a customary chief who can also motivate him, and when he secures the population, he might receive compensation from the community.” When asked about this compensation, he mentioned that if, for example, the community was in the midst of a bean harvest, the policeman would be given one or two kilograms of beans because he is a policeman. “They can give beans to the police so that they do not have a fearful night's sleep.”

He also spoke about the problems posed by this life, especially when pay does not arrive. Fidel explains that if a salary is late or does not arrive, it usually leads to officers going to arrest someone and demanding that they pay for travel or transportation without an invoice. “In reality, these transportation costs are informal; they are not provided for by the law that governs the police. These are activities outside the law for your own gain.” Fidel tells us that there are many officers who are matriculated and do receive a salary from the bank each month, but even then, this salary is often “eaten” by their superiors. Of formal fines levied by the station, Fidel notes: “because of insufficient wages, and because of hunger, the authorities create fines so that their children can find food, their wives find a little money which can be useful to them and meet other needs, so that their children cannot starve.”

Reflecting on the sum of these fines, Fidel observes that “those who are hungry take everything that comes before them. There is no set amount. It depends on the person the police officer seeks to fine, but also on the police officer himself. Give him 10,000 CF, 5000 CF, 2000 CF, or even 1000 CF, and many will take and let him go, because the policeman is hungry.”

18. Gabriel

Not included.

19. Gasore

Gasore was interviewed outside his home, where he lived with his children. He feels betrayed by the government, who is leaving his children to become bandits. He is matriculated, but sometimes goes for many months without pay. He tells us that there are others who are not matriculated. When asked how they survive, he notes that the state motivates them [financially], and if it does not motivate them there are other ways. You might find something from people who commit infractions, or crimes, or who make mistakes. That can help you. He continues: “there are fines, but also there are small contributions that can help these people who are not paid. But this is not a salary, because a salary is the state that pays. If he does not receive this, a policeman will continue to work, because he cannot remove his uniform or he will have nothing. “You cannot fail to earn fail to when you have been given an outfit and a weapon.”

Gasore had served in RCD, CNDP, M23, and the FARDC. He explains that civilians are often afraid of the police because they engage in torture and harassment. When asked to elaborate, he discusses torture as making someone suffer without cause and before they have been judged by

the law. He says this usually happens so that they give you something like money, or because of a conflict or vengeance. Harassment, on the other hand, is when agents of the state take your money without reason. This may take the form of accusing someone for a debt of 500, but asking for 12,000cf in place of 500 CF. This is not a fine, but just money for the officer to eat or drink. When asked what drives them to behave in this way, Gasore notes that it is usually because of poverty, a lack of money, or insufficient wages. He says that sometimes officers go for two months without pay, and this can push them to theft. If the state sends the officer his wages, sometimes they end up elsewhere and we do not know why. He adds later, normally it's the chief who steals. "In Congo, from the lowest man to the highest, everyone is trying to earn profit from one another."

In discussing his experience of demobilization and integration into the PNC, Gasore notes: "In principle, we were civilians [when we demobilized], but the state makes us suffer. It does not give us what was promised to us. Because of this, we learn to be bad. We are taught by the state. Being demobilized and treated this way makes us think of doing bad things that we have never done. Many have returned to rebellion. Many others have behaved badly. The rest have bandits because of this bad life, after the state promised us aid and assistance."

20. Gerard

Gerard was interviewed at his home. Before joining the PNC, he lived through RCD, which he characterizes as a time of poor security. "[Joining the PNC] is how we were able to secure ourselves. We could then guarantee our own security, without joining an external [rebel] force. This is how I got into the police." He notes, however, that security remains elusive. "There are rebellions every morning and our goods are disappearing every day. The war leaves us with nothing." He goes on to say, though, that "But it's okay because being a police officer at least allows us to avoid being targets of banditry, theft, and other things. In that sense, our uniform protects us."

Gerard is not matriculated, but in his unit, the customary chief makes contributions to pay him approximately \$11 USD per month. Gerard also notes that before he joined the PNC, he was part of another armed group [redacted]. He describes the situation of insecurity in his village, and notes that because they had nothing, and were living in fear, it only made sense to organize into an armed movement to defend their interests. "The group leader, accompanied by soldiers and other authorities, called a meeting with the population asking the young people of the village to unite in arms, as we know each other like family. Our goal was to maintain the security of our village. We recruited young people and whoever did not want to join, we took him by force. I appreciated this life, which was similar to being a police, because we could maintain the security of each village ourselves, as we knew each other."

Gerard notes that the population respects the police because the police are there for their protection. "For example, someone cannot steal from a shop in our presence, because we, the police, can arrest them. We can go to the field without disturbance, and we can go back home." Gerard also told us that during harvest time, the police will increase their activities. For example, it is easy to prosecute people for beating their wives. At this time, the police will ask for a lot of fines. "For example, [in the recent harvest] this man locked up his wife to hit her. Whoever is guilty must be fined according to the law. Another example is someone who does not want to pay a debt to a neighbor. You can go and accuse them, and the police will come and arrest them."

We can accuse them of a rape case and then the police will arrest the perpetrator, and then he must pay a fine.”

21. Hakizimana

Hakizimana was interviewed in his office earlier in the research process, in 2013. He was working with M23 at the time of the interview. He notes that peace, for him, would be a situation in which the population could move around without disturbances. “People should sleep well, without anyone disturbing them, and intruding on their property during the night.” He discusses his relationship with his supervisor, as well as his hopes for the future.

22. Luc

Luc was interviewed in his home. He was recruited to the PNC in 2000. In order to subsist, his family sells tomatoes and flour at market. Although he is matriculated and receives a regular monthly salary of \$45 USD (90,000 FC), he reports that it is incredibly difficult to survive with this:

“[Before I joined the PNC...] I thought that a police officer could easily live without stealing. I thought I would have sufficient funds to pay for a small plot for my family, and to educate my children. But then I found that this is not the reality if you are at a lower grade... On the one hand, you cannot live on a salary of less than \$45 USD a month... On the other hand, not every policeman is a thief. There are those who arrange themselves differently”.

Nevertheless, he reports: “I feel proud to be an agent of the state. I have my matriculation number which is not going to expire while I am alive. While I’m an agent of the state, a civilian owes me respect”.

23. Jacques

Jacques was interviewed in his home, but the interview was frequently interrupted by a number of phone calls from colleagues.

Jacques is matriculated and receives a regular salary of 90,000FC. He has received this salary since pay was systematized in 2014. Jacques notes that before these reforms, he typically earned more than \$100 USD per month, but since 2014 he has withdrawn his salary of \$45 USD directly from the bank using his matriculation number. He notes that at the end of each month, his supervisor informs him when the money is available in his account. But he notes that others receive their salaries directly from their supervisor. In such circumstances, the supervisor must be paid by the officer with a bottle of alcohol and also transport money which he will use to collect the money on behalf of the agent. In addition to the bottle of alcohol, officers are typically expected to give either 3000 FC or 5000 FC to their supervisor. Even Jacques, who withdraws his money directly from the bank, will be expected to leave his supervisor a small sum (e.g., FC 2000), and a bottle of something.

In addition to his police work, Jacques also farms a small plot of land. He lives separately from his wife and children, who remain in his home village. His family tends to the plot while he is away, growing corn, sorghum, and beans, which they sell at market. These funds help to pay the school fees for the children, as well as rent and other subsistence expenses.

Jacques reports that he did not plan to become a police officer, and when he was young he was deeply afraid of the military and police uniforms. He came to the PNC through administrative work, and once he came to know a number of officers, he became sensitized into this work. He notes: “I am proud of the fact that I can defend myself in case of danger or war. As a police officer, I defend myself and my family. This is because no one can touch or intimidate my family in the sense that everyone knows I am a police officer. The honor that my status gives me leaves people obeying me.”

Speaking about predation, Jacques notes that no junior officer can live off the salary he receives. He explains that some may live off trade or other activities, but many must turn to the population to survive. He recalls that he tried to live solely off his police salary for a few months, but that there was “too great a risk of burying the children who would die of hunger. That is why we made the decision to return to the village.”

Jacques provides an example of a typical interaction in his work, following training in the 2006 Sexual Offences Act. He notes that a boy had taken a girl without consent (by force). “The girl’s parents told us, and we went to pick up the boy. As it is a family affair, the boy’s family begged for this matter to be dealt with by the family, through an *arrangement amiable*. We released the boy after he paid the fine we charged him, as well as the *migulu ya police* (to motivate the police officers who spent the night guarding the boy). The police officers who went to pick him up kept the *migulu ya police*, and the *amande* (fine) went with some additional ‘motivation’ to the *chef* (superior officer).”

Jacques continued: “When we are sent on a mission to arrest someone, if he gives us a little motivation, and we find that this sum is valid, we might release him and call him back another day, rather than keep him in detention. We may also give him time to settle his file amicably.”

24. Jon

Jon was interviewed at home. Before becoming a police officer, he worked solely as a farmer. When he was younger, he recalled that he felt scared whenever he saw a police officer in uniform. He recalled that when he saw young people of the neighborhood who did not have opportunities to study, like him, wearing uniform, that he realized it was a good career to embrace. He remembered in the village when the police arrived at someone’s house, families would gift them with hens and roosters or goats, while they were passing by. When it was necessary for civilians to request assistance or interventions from the police, it was necessary to motivate them with goods such as small livestock, food products, or money. It was for this reason that he decided to also go to the police department to seek a uniform, like those men, in order to protect himself and his family. At the time of interviewing, Jon had been with the PNC for nearly ten years.

Most of those he worked with were people from his village who he knew well. He attended a military training center with them, and first became a soldier, but quickly deserted the FARDC to rejoin his friends in the PNC. He noted that he preferred the work of a police officer, and feels proud of his position because he is an employee of the state, recognized by the government, and by members of the community. “Wearing the uniform of the police, for me, is very beneficial.” He notes that there are many police officers who behave aggressively towards civilians in the

community. They might rob a civilian or engage in intimidation or harassment after night falls.

25. Jean-Bosco

Jean-Bosco was interviewed in his office. He is unable to send them to school, due to a lack of funds. He is paid a regular salary of 50,000 CF per month, by his superior, and he does not have any other source of income. In order to eat, his children accompany his wife to the field to farm the land, and sell produce that they cultivate. This affords them something to eat each week. Life is difficult, and each Thursday, on the day of market, Jean Bosco can traverse the route to see if there is anyone who can give him a small sum to buy soap or to eat. Jean-Bosco noted that often civilians are afraid of police officers, because they are worried about being fined. Many civilians do not think that police officers respect the law, and therefore even if you have your documents you can be fined. He notes: "The strength of a policeman is his weapon."

26. Josephat

Josephat was interviewed at home, where he lived with his family. Prior to joining the PNC, he was with the FARDC. He left to join the military, because it was a bad life. "Living only by farming is challenging, and sometimes we don't harvest properly. I imagined that soldiers are better paid and live more easily."

Josephat told us it was difficult in the army, because soldiers move around from one place to the next, whereas the PNC remain stable, so you can be with your family. He told us that his matriculation number had not yet been released, so he lives only on fines. "If anyone is fined, the chef will take care of those of us who have no salary. And when we are going to arrest someone, he had to pay us first before arriving at the prison. These are the costs that an inmate pays directly to the police or the military who come to arrest him, as transportation."

Josephat notes that, being in the PNC: "people in the community respect my family because they know I am an agent of the state. No one can come and sabotage my daughter, for example. They are afraid of me. My job is a protection that I provide to my family for their safety."

Later, when discussing how much people should give as a fine to the police, Josephat explains: "It depends on the person. There is no fixed price. I do not know how much I have to say. Sometimes, as we work with the people with whom we share food and drink every day, it is very difficult to fine these people, because they are our friends and colleagues from the village. If they don't have their card, they can just buy a bottle or two of Primus [beer] and we can let them go."

27. Laurent

Laurent was interviewed in his home. When he was a child, he wanted to go to school, but there was no money. Before the PNC, he was with the army for four years, but could not bear military life. There was no rest, and not even any chance to wash. He joined the police in 2009, and did not receive even 100 CF until the M23 insurgency. Even though there was no pay, the life of a police officer was preferable to the army. When M23 took over, they were given 60,000 CF per month and this maintained after M23 left. Laurent told us if they need to eat, they might bring an inmate who can give 2000 CF. This is different from the *amende*.

“The *amende* is not ours but it is for our commanders. We only eat with prison money. For example when you have taken someone, they give you either 5,000 CF or 3,000 CF and that's what you eat; so that's your part.”

He adds that civilians are more afraid of the police than the FARDC and that might be why. He tells us about stopping people to ask them for their documents.

“He [the civilian] will say, for example, I have no money and that is why I have not bought the token yet. After that, you tell him that you will bring him to the chef, and we will imprison him because of his negligence and lack of ID. There, he will give a fine, and the chef will ask him if he paid the transport for the police officers (*migulu ya police*), then he asks the police officers if they have received these funds, and the chef orders that the accused gives the police officers five dollars for example for the transport. We tell him \$10 USD. If you know each other, he will beg you and may even give you 3000 CF. My colleague and I will either forgive him and accept the money, or ask him to increase the money. But as for the fine for the document, it's \$20 USD. That is to say, if there is a process he must pay \$20 USD to close his file. So that is why we ask something for our part; even if it is 2000 CF, this is a smaller sum for him. Then we can find something to give to our wives.”

28. *Lionel*

Lionel was interviewed in his home. He entered the PNC in 2005, and prior to that he was a farmer. He became a policeman for lack of any other work. Every day, he went to cultivate his land and saw that “the police do not live on the hoe, rather they are salaried. This is how I came to envy them. Unfortunately, as soon as I got there, I didn't find what I had thought. When I learned that the police were not paid, I wanted to withdraw to farm again.” He noted that he lives a bad life, and attributes this to the fact that I was unable to get a service (matriculation) number. “By waiting for your registration number, the others are salaried and find the money to meet their needs and those of their families. But the one who is not salaried, we work without funds.” He talked about how he was able to live without a matriculation number or any salary. “When we find a mission to go and arrest someone, we might find a portion of money for travel, known as *migulu ya police*. With that little money we are given, we might be able to get soap for washing clothes.” Lionel told us that he was quite lucky, because he managed to get a chicken with the little money he found, and this allowed him to raise it at home. Then, in case of need, he could sell it to meet his basic needs. Lionel also talked about the need to find people without their voter cards, in order to empty their pockets. It is easier to find people with motorbikes, as you can travel further.

29. *Manase*

Manase was interviewed in his home. He joined the PNC in 2016, when there was an official recruitment drive. He suspended his studies to join the PNC.

He recalled: “While waiting for our official postings and matriculation, we started to despair and the morale of the workforce diminished by seeing how things were so slow. A year passed, and we realized we did not want to stay in this situation, arriving at the station without pay, we start to consider ourselves as worthless. And if we go home, the population considers us as bandits. So if we stay at home for a long time, if a civilian even misses his chicken, he will say that these are the police who have returned to the neighborhood who stole it.” He later added:

“You know that the police are like rivals vis-à-vis the population, because when we arrive on the ground, even if it is just to stroll, they panic directly and think that we are always coming to pick them up. Because of our work [of collecting fines], that makes them afraid.”

Manase recounts the process undertaken by police when they encounter civilians in the street. He explains that the customary chiefs issue tokens to all who were present for *salongo* [*Salongo*, like *Umuganda* in Rwanda, is the day of compulsory labor that all citizens undertake]. He adds: “We are also on the ground to enforce taxes [*“c'est la taxe que toute personne entant que citoyen paye aux services étatiques comme la contribution aux dépenses de l'État.”* This is payable to the customary authorities, after which you will receive a paper receipt to confirm you have paid].” Finally, he notes that police, must enforce the census (*jeton de recensement*), and ensure that all citizens have their voter cards (*carte d'électeur*). He explains that sometimes, people are in a rush and leave these documents at home. Sometimes, he has not paid, or he has lost his proof of payment. “Then we take it to the office and ask him for his citizenship and passport photo, and he pays a fine. Then we write it down, and at the end we send it to the CENI in order to issue another card, so that he can use this certificate while waiting for the card... If he pays us something like a drink, or even a small fee, we might let him go... It will depend on the types of agents who arrested him. If he has a good relationship or collaboration with them, he can even give them 5,000 CF or 10,000 CF. But if there is no collaboration, he risks giving up to 30,000 CF.”

Manase noted that at the point of joining, the police officers received documents that were processed in 2015, including the names of all matriculated officers so that they could be added to the payroll. However, many of the matriculation numbers included on these documents came out without money, even though officers were assigned their numbers. “We are waiting this coming month, to see if those numbers issued in 2015 will come back with money attached this time. For those who are not commanders, and who wait without pay, their life is really poor... If you are the commander anyway, your life is a bit better, because you might have even \$5 USD per day, either from the money he receives at the end of the month, or from the fines.”

Manase explains that for files such as a breach of contract, assault, battery, rape or some other infraction, the fine will go into the central treasury, but some will also go to the commander.

30. Marcelín

Marcelín was first interviewed at his office, with a follow up visit later the same week to continue the conversation. He had been with the PNC since 2009, before which he was with the FARDC. He wanted to make the change from the military to the police, because he observed that the children of soldiers do not go to school. Marcelín noted that soldiers do not have money, and it is a very difficult and challenging life. Being a police officer is preferable, as you get some of the same advantages but it is not such a hardship. Prior to his current posting, Marcelín worked on night patrol, which was very dangerous and taxing. Every night, he faced attacks by bandits, who came to pillage the police.

31. Mathieu

Mathieu was interviewed in his home. In order for their family to survive, his wife cultivates tomatoes, peanuts, and sugarcane. Mathieu expresses that he is proud to be a police

officer “because it is a function that others seek but cannot find.” He is matriculated and received a salary each month, but this was set at \$45 USD, which he finds insufficient. He reflects his continued hope that “policy can change and leave us with a good salary, which will allow us to solve certain problems in life. The money we find today is for consumption only, in that we can only use it to buy food, and have nothing left.”

32. Michel

Not included.

33. Moise

Not included.

34. Nepo

Nepo was interviewed in his home. Nepo had participated in armed insurrections previously, including the RCD Goma, in order to try to seek a better life. He joined the FARDC, and later the PNC as part of the demobilization process. He was matriculated when he first joined, and was paid regularly for a period of four months. Subsequently, his salary was frozen and he no longer received funds. He was told his name no longer appeared on the list. Nepo reflected that “it was the lack of money that led me to hate the police. I told myself that I cannot remain in the service without being paid, and watch my children become thieves while I still have the strength to cultivate.”

35. Paulin

Paulin was interviewed in his home. Paulin has been in the PNC for almost ten years, prior to which he was in the FARDC, and the CNDP. When he was younger, soldiers would make him and other civilians help to transport firewood and supplies, as well as ammunition. He was also engaged in helping FARDC troops load and unload their vehicles, and collecting potatoes, bananas, and fou fou from the population to distribute to the forces. Paulin reflected: “All this harassment [by soldiers] led me to think that I also had to be a soldier in order to have my needs met by civilians on my orders. When a soldier speaks, everyone complies without hesitation.” Paulin explains that instead of going to school to study, he chose to spend his time in the military camp, learning Lingala, the language of the military. The soldiers would dress him in uniform, and eventually he became a soldier. After the CNDP, he did not want to return to the FARDC, so he transitioned to work in the PNC, where he got many of the same benefits but the work was not as difficult. Paulin notes that despite their dire financial situation and lack of pay, police officers still manage to find food from the community. He comments that if you find fault with a member of the public, they will be compelled to find you something to eat, or some money to divert your attention elsewhere. For this reason, Paulin claims:

“I am a policeman without pride. I would be proud if I had enough money to survive. However, my salary is insufficient and often civilians have to be charged with offenses in order for me to earn money. Others in my service say that they can never miss a meal when they have a gun on their shoulders. That is, they can use the gun to intimidate people for the offenses they may have committed, and taxing or levying fines. This is the work that we do, and that is why this work cannot make me proud.”

36. Prince

Prince was interviewed in the plot next to his dwellings, where no one was present and could follow what was being said. Prince did not have a formal posting or a matriculation number. He did undergo a six-month training when he first joined the PNC, but has not been registered since then. His primary source of revenue is a small plot of land that he and his wife cultivate together. He noted that he was afraid while he was on patrol, that his wife and family were alone in the house. Because it is not close to other officers, he worried his absence at home would negatively affect his family, and bandits in the community could come and loot house, or his daughter and wife could be subjected to violence. While this has not yet happened, he notes that he is always worried about this.

Prince recalls that he had always wanted to be a soldier since he was a young child. He felt that he would be respected as an agent of the state. He is proud to defend his community so that there is not someone who can sabotage it. He recalls: “since I started primary studies, it seemed I had an attachment to this service. With all the games that children played, including playing football, cars, playing ball games, and others, I preferred to make an object in the form of a weapon, and point it at a person or vehicle, and pretend I was riding with the truck that bring the soldiers to the village.”

37. Reginald

Reginald was interviewed under a structure in the village in 2016. He was matriculated but did not receive a regular salary. He noted that this caused problems in his unit, because even when he received his pay, others sometimes had numbers that came out empty. He said: “I will serve the police; but this can create problems for our community, and for my brothers. Because if I get paid and you don't, we are uneven. I don't want to get paid while you don't have anything to eat, but I don't have enough to share with you. This situation will push anyone to go stealing to supplement their salary. You will also engage in harassment and *tracasserie*, so that you have something to eat.

We are pushed to this situation because of the war of hunger we face every day. It is because of our hunger, and our lack of means... I cannot say that we are ungrateful. Because whatever it is, it is some salary which is better than none at all. But in Congo, everyone is trying to cheat each other. This is how we live.”

38. Roland

Roland was interviewed in the house of a neighbor, who was not home. The house was undergoing construction, and nobody was in it, so he judged it to be a safe space to talk. In addition to his police work, he cultivates a small plot of land, and tends to two cows and some goats and chickens, together with his wife. Although he is married, he only went through a customary marriage and not state marriage, due to a lack of funds. He is matriculated, but often his number is returned without pay. He talks about the difficult working conditions he faces. He notes that on three occasions, he has received his salary directly from the bank, and other times he collects it from the hands of his supervisor.

He tells us people are afraid of the police, because they are afraid of torture and beatings and fines. Later in the conversation, Roland admits: “we find ourselves intimidating and torturing people in the community, especially in the village, so that we can make money there. This is because no one takes care of our needs or no one understands our complaints.” Roland was in the

FARDC before becoming a police officer. He recalled his motivation to become an agent of the state as follows:

“At the time of my childhood, I did not have an aspiration of being a soldier. I ended up there due to the influence of a friend. It was a close friend of mine from when I was young who was a soldier, and he was the one who made me aware of going into this service. He said that to be a soldier is to be above everyone, and above the law. He said that no one can touch, hurt, or speak badly about a soldier. He also told me that a soldier cannot have a crisis of any nature, because everything that belongs to the population belongs to him.”

39. Simon

Simon was interviewed at his station, in private, in 2013. He joined the PNC to find a better life. He thought that he would be proud as an officer of the state, with a salary, and a uniform that could allow him to provide for his family and protect his loved ones. “However, because of wars and other problems; I ended up with less than nothing.”

40. Sylvain

Sylvain was interviewed at his home. Before becoming a police officer, he was a farmer, cultivating potatoes, beans, cabbage and other vegetables. The potatoes in particular were very profitable; more so than policing work. After the harvest, he engaged in other projects with the revenue, such as building the house, and expanding the family’s land. Since joining the PNC four years earlier, he continues with some of the crops, because otherwise he would not be able to eat.

Sylvain was not recruited to M23, but he suffered under the occupation. His plot was destroyed, and his goats lost during the occupation. He was forced to work along with many others, transporting boxes of ammunition. He joined the PNC afterwards, claiming “I never thought of being a police officer until then. It only occurred to me because of the harassment I suffered while M23 was here.” He continued: “I am proud to be a police officer because I know I am a state agent and an employee. When I wear the police uniform, it gives me power because this uniform can be recognized by the whole nation. It is a uniform that others outside of the PNC cannot wear. There are certainly others who need it, but they have never managed to integrate, or pursue a career as a police officer.”

41. Sylveste

Sylveste was interviewed at home. He was in various local government and customary positions on and off since 1999, including a stint in the FARDC. During the CNDP and M23 eras, he joined the insurgencies, but was reintegrated into the PNC after each group’s demise. He notes that since the M23 war, his children no longer study, and he has nothing left. “I am zero.” He reflects at length on the war, the reasons for the war, and the hardships the war has wrought on his life. He notes:

“If the war is here, then there is no development. Even you, who are a police officer or a soldier, a leader in the community. You cannot develop and prosper. There is no happiness. My children will not study, as war means we do not have the money to send them to school. This means they can never know peace. If there is no peace in front of you, you will get nothing, and even if you are paid, that money will be in vain.”

42. *Thierry*

Thierry was interviewed at his work station. He was matriculated, but often went for long stretches without pay. He worked in the PNC through the M23 occupation, and talks about being made hostage by M23. “We fought for their interests, and when they failed we handed us over to the government and the government brought us to [demobilization camp]. From there, we were trained for 3 years, but nothing of what the government had promised to give us arrived. Now we are here like street kids who have nothing. Even stealing is hard, because I don’t have the strength to do it.”

Thierry talked extensively about the hardships of his work. “It is hard because of famine, and the lack of means. My wife misses any income, even though I work every day. Normally it’s the chief who steals, because he is the one with power. He can take the money from the ones he governs.” Thierry adds: “If there is no collaboration between the *chef de groupement* and the police, you cannot have peace in the community, and it is the civilians who suffer. The important thing is to work in collaboration, so that they contribute together for peace with the population, because if they don’t do that, we have nothing.”

43. *Yves*

Yves was interviewed in his home on two different occasions. The interview therefore took place in two parts. Yves was a widow who lived alone with his two young children. He could not afford to send them to school, although he tried to educate them alone with the help of a young niece. He talked of the struggles of his work, and how he had no one to help him farm land. At one point, he had chickens, but there was no one to take care of them while he was on patrol, and so they were thieved by bandits while he was gone. He was adamant that he refused to engage in any form of intimidation with civilians, but he worried about feeding his children. He worried that they would starve, or would grow up to be bandits and thieves, because that was the only life they knew. He explained that when he got to the police, he thought he would find his life there. “I thought to myself that maybe when I had the money, I could send it home to my children, so that my children could study. The unfortunate thing was that when we finished our training in Kisangani, we were told to go to our posts and that our service numbers should reach us there. As soon as everyone arrived at their post, the numbers did not reach us, although there were some who found their salary.” He noted that some months, he was paid \$30 USD by his chef. But he did not appreciate the work of policing, because he saw problems of corruption and mismanagement with his supervisors. He noted that most problems began with the supervisors: “When we talk about improving our work, we have to start with the police superiors, because when we bring a detainee who arrives in their office, that detainee gives them payment, and those superiors put all the money in their pockets. They forget about us, always looking out for their own interests and leaving us to starve... But when I go home to my village, I know that life had also become more difficult than before my departure. This is why we are in misery. The children in the village do not go to school, even today, they are at home. So we are in total misery, and when there are murders in the neighborhood, the population always says that it is us who are the perpetrators. We feel in anguish and we do not know where to go, or where to live. We live an empty life.”

Online Appendix D : Summary Statistics

The below five tables present summary statistics for the 43 officers represented in this project. Brief biographies of the 43 officers are presented in Appendix C. However, in order to preserve interviewee anonymity, placements, ranks, and other identifiers are deliberately obscured.

Table 1: Territory

Territory	Number
Rutshuru	21
Nyiragongo	10
Masisi	3
Goma	9

Table 2: Armed Group Affiliations

Armed Group Affiliation	Number
Former RCD	6
Former CNDP	6
Former M23	10
Demobilized other	1
Former FARDC	12
PNC Only	16

Note: Many interviewees had been in more than one armed group prior to joining the PNC. Some had been integrated into the FARDC or PNC, defected, and later reintegrated. Table 2 captures the respondents who reported affiliations with different armed movements, including the FARDC. Because many were in the FARDC in addition to other armed groups, the number of reported affiliations does not correspond to the number of respondents.

Table 3: Ranks of Respondents

Rank	Number
Commissaire Supérieur adjoint	2
Commissaire	3
Brigadier	1
Brigadier en chef	1
Agent de Police principal	3
2 nd Class Police Officer	18
1 st Class Police Officer	15

Note: The ranks reflect interviewees' own self-reported articulations of their ranks, which generally correspond to ranks detailed in the *Loi organique 11/013 du 11 août portant organisation et fonctionnement de la Police Nationale Congolaise* (Articles 65 – 71)

Table 4: Primary Placement / Activity

Role	Number
Patrol (usually night patrol)	8

Guard (town / village)	6
Guard (rural)	6
Secondment (village / chefferie)	12
Station	9
Warrant officer	2

Note: The activities in Table 4 capture respondents' roles at the time of the interview. The language used reflects the terminology respondents themselves used to capture their roles and activities.

Table 5: Matriculation

Matriculated	Number
Matriculation number (regular salary)	11
Matriculation number (irregular salary)	13
No matriculation number	19

Note: In theory, bancarization entitles officers to receive their pay directly from the bank, rather than via their superior. This reform sought to mitigate supervisors withholding pay from junior officers. However, in practice, a significant number of officers, particularly in more rural settings, remain without a matriculation number; many of those who are matriculé report their number "coming up empty" when they arrive at the bank; and yet others report still being paid via their supervisor.

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