

Supplementary Materials for “Under the Microscope: Gender and Accountability in the U.S. Congress”

Jaclyn Kaslovsky*
Rice University

Jon C. Rogowski†
University of Chicago

August 24, 2021

*Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, 6100 Main St, Houston, TX 77005; jk83@rice.edu.

†Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, 5828 S. University Ave, Chicago, IL 60637; jrogowski@uchicago.edu.

A Descriptive Statistics, Robustness Checks, and Extensions

Table A.1: Policies included in Disagreement Measure by CCES Year

CCES Year	Question Label	Date	Clerk Session Vote Num.	Topic
2008	CC316a	05-10-2007	330	Withdrawal of Troops from Iraq
2008	CC316b	01-10-2007	18	Increase Minimum Wage
2008	CC316c	06-07-2007	443	Stem Cell Funding
2008	CC316d	06-20-2008	437	Allow U.S. to Eavesdrop on Overseas Terror Suspects (FISA)
2008	CC316e	09-25-2007	906	SCHIP
2008	CC316g	08-04-2007	832	Foreclosure Assistance
2008	CC316h	11-08-2007	1060	NAFTA Extension to Peru and Colombia
2008	CC316i	10-03-2008	681	Bank Bailout/TARP/Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008
2010	CC332A	01-28-2009	46	ARRA / Stimulus Bill
2010	CC332B	01-14-2009	16	SCHIP
2010	CC332C	06-26-2009	477	Climate Bill/ American Clean Energy and Security Act
2010	CC332D	11-07-2009	887	Health Care Reform Bill*
2010	CC332D	03-21-2010	165	Health Care Reform Bill
2010	CC332F	12-11-2009	968	Financial Reform Bill
2010	CC332F	06-30-2010	413	Financial Reform Bill*
2010	CC332G	05-27-2010	317	Don't Ask, Don't Tell Repeal
2012	CC332A	04-15-2011	277	Ryan Budget Bill
2012	CC332B	03-28-2012	145	Simpson-Bowles Budget
2012	CC332F	10-12-2011	783	US-Korea Free Trade Bill
2012	CC332G	01-19-2011	14	Repeal of Affordable Care Act/ Obamacare*
2012	CC332G	07-11-2012	460	Repeal of Affordable Care Act/ Obamacare
2012	CC332H	04-18-2012	170	Keystone Pipeline
2014	CC14_325_1	04-10-2014	175	Ryan Budget Bill
2014	CC14_325_2	02-06-2013	36	Simpson-Bowles Budget
2014	CC14_325_5	02-11-2014	61	Debt Ceiling
2016	CC16_351E	12-02-2015	665	Education Reform
2016	CC16_351G	07-14-2016	478	Iran Sanctions Act
2016	CC16_351I	02-03-2015	58	Repeal Affordable Care Act*
2016	CC16_351I	10-23-2015	568	Repeal Affordable Care Act
2018	CC18_322d_new	06-27-2018	297	Border Security and Immigration Reform Act of 2018
2018	CC18_327e	05-04-2017	256	American Health Care Act
2018	CC18_328d	07-25-2017	413	Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act
2018	CC18_328e	05-04-2017	257	Korean Interdiction and Modernization of Sanctions Act
2018	CC18_326	11-16-2017	637	Tax Cuts and Jobs Act

Questions included in "Women's Issues" are in bold. Questions marked with an asterisk are the alternative votes.

Table A.2: The Relationship Between Legislative Behavior and Constituent Evaluations, Omitting Respondents who are Not Sure

	(1)	(2)
Member is a Woman=1	-0.039** (0.012)	-0.034** (0.011)
Policy Disagreement	-0.292** (0.005)	-0.144** (0.004)
Member is a Woman=1 × Policy Disagreement	-0.033** (0.012)	-0.025** (0.009)
District fixed effects	✓	✓
Party-year fixed effects	✓	✓
Controls		✓
Observations	247246	247246

Entries are linear regression coefficients with standard errors (clustered on legislator) in parentheses. Data includes the 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016, and 2018 CCES. Controls include copartisan status with the respondent, the legislator's seniority, and whether the legislator is a member of the majority party, a committee chair, or serves on a powerful committee (Appropriations, Ways and Means, or Rules). * indicates $p < .10$ and ** indicates $p < .05$ (two-tailed tests).

Table A.3: The Relationship Between Legislative Behavior and Constituent Evaluations, Using Alternative Votes

Panel A. Approval	(1)	(2)
Member is a Woman=1	-0.011 (0.012)	-0.001 (0.011)
Policy Disagreement	-0.247** (0.005)	-0.123** (0.004)
Member is a Woman=1 × Policy Disagreement	-0.023** (0.011)	-0.018** (0.009)
District fixed effects	✓	✓
Party-year fixed effects	✓	✓
Controls		✓
Observations	311710	311710
Panel B. Vote for Incumbent		
Member is a Woman=1	0.011 (0.015)	0.017* (0.009)
Policy Disagreement	-0.388** (0.006)	-0.142** (0.004)
Member is a Woman=1 × Policy Disagreement	-0.025** (0.012)	-0.014** (0.007)
District fixed effects	✓	✓
Party-year fixed effects	✓	✓
Controls		✓
Observations	175217	175217

Note: Entries are linear regression coefficients with standard errors (clustered on legislator) in parentheses. Data includes the 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016, and 2018 CCES. Controls include copartisan status with the respondent, the legislator's seniority and whether the legislator is a member of the majority party, a committee chair, or serves on a powerful committee (Appropriations, Ways and Means, or Rules). * indicates $p < .10$ and ** indicates $p < .05$ (two-tailed tests).

Table A.4: The Relationship between Legislator Gender and Constituent Evaluations: Alternative Measurement Strategy

	Democratic Legislators		Republican Legislators	
	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)
Panel A. Approval				
Member is a Woman=1	0.025 (0.024)	0.043** (0.018)	-0.020 (0.027)	-0.009 (0.026)
Ideological Self Placement	-0.554** (0.016)	-0.252** (0.013)	0.717** (0.009)	0.398** (0.009)
Member is a Woman=1 × Ideological Self Placement	-0.055* (0.030)	-0.064** (0.024)	0.036 (0.032)	0.044 (0.029)
District fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls		✓		✓
Observations	135325	135325	159712	159712
Panel B. Vote for Incumbent				
Member is a Woman=1	-0.006 (0.020)	-0.002 (0.015)	0.003 (0.031)	0.020 (0.021)
Ideological Self Placement	-0.944** (0.018)	-0.364** (0.012)	1.072** (0.008)	0.471** (0.009)
Member is a Woman=1 × Ideological Self Placement	0.022 (0.035)	0.013 (0.019)	-0.008 (0.024)	-0.004 (0.019)
District fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls		✓		✓
Observations	80755	80755	90294	90294

Note: Entries are linear regression coefficients with standard errors (clustered on legislator) in parentheses. Controls include seniority, whether the legislator is a member of the majority party, a committee chair, or serves on a powerful committee. The dependent variable is the respondent's approval evaluation of the representative. Ideological self placement goes from 0 to 1, with 0 being liberal and 1 being conservative. Using the legislator approval dependent variable, increased ideological conservatism is associated with more negative evaluations in districts with Democratic legislators, and this relationship is stronger for women legislators. Likewise, in districts with Republican legislators, increased conservative is associated with more positive evaluations; this relationship is also stronger for women legislators. However, the coefficients for the interaction term are not statistically significant for the vote choice dependent variable. * indicates $p < .10$ and ** indicates $p < .05$ (two-tailed tests).

Table A.5: The Relationship between Legislative Behavior and Constituent Evaluations by Legislator Party

	Democratic Legislators		Republican Legislators	
	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)
Panel A. Approval				
Member is a Woman=1	-0.004 (0.022)	0.003 (0.017)	-0.012 (0.021)	0.011 (0.021)
Policy Disagreement	-0.253** (0.008)	-0.135** (0.006)	-0.243** (0.006)	-0.114** (0.005)
Member is a Woman=1 × Policy Disagreement	-0.023 (0.014)	-0.019* (0.011)	-0.014 (0.021)	-0.012 (0.015)
District fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls		✓		✓
Observations	143039	143039	168569	168569
Panel B. Vote for Incumbent				
Member is a Woman=1	-0.008 (0.022)	-0.010 (0.016)	-0.041 (0.034)	0.014 (0.019)
Policy Disagreement	-0.414** (0.009)	-0.161** (0.006)	-0.368** (0.008)	-0.129** (0.005)
Member is a Woman=1 × Policy Disagreement	-0.015 (0.015)	-0.013 (0.008)	-0.005 (0.023)	0.003 (0.012)
District fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls		✓		✓
Observations	82898	82898	92319	92319

Note: Entries are linear regression coefficients with standard errors (clustered on legislator) in parentheses. Data includes the 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016, and 2018 CCES. Controls include seniority and whether the legislator is a member of the majority party, a committee chair, or serves on a powerful committee (Appropriations, Ways and Means, or Rules). * indicates $p < .10$ and ** indicates $p < .05$ (two-tailed tests).

Table A.6: The Relationship Between Legislative Behavior, Legislator Characteristics, and Constituent Evaluations

	Approval		Vote for Incumbent	
	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)
Member is a Woman=1	0.001 (0.012)	-0.030** (0.014)	0.023** (0.011)	0.004 (0.012)
Policy Disagreement	-0.121** (0.004)	-0.126** (0.006)	-0.141** (0.004)	-0.147** (0.005)
Member is a Woman=1 × Policy Disagreement	-0.014 (0.011)	-0.033** (0.014)	0.003 (0.009)	-0.012 (0.011)
Legislative Effectiveness	0.001 (0.002)		-0.001 (0.002)	
Member is a Woman=1 × Legislative Effectiveness	-0.003 (0.006)		-0.006 (0.006)	
Policy Disagreement × Legislative Effectiveness	-0.001 (0.002)		-0.001 (0.002)	
Member is a Woman=1 × Policy Disagreement × Legislative Effectiveness	-0.007 (0.008)		-0.020** (0.006)	
Seniority		0.002** (0.001)		-0.003** (0.001)
Member is a Woman=1 × Seniority		0.012** (0.003)		0.003 (0.002)
Policy Disagreement × Seniority		0.001 (0.001)		0.001 (0.001)
Member is a Woman=1 × Policy Disagreement × Seniority		0.003 (0.002)		-0.000 (0.002)
District fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Party-year fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	311608	311608	175217	175217

Entries are linear regression coefficients with standard errors (clustered on legislator) in parentheses. Data includes the 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016, and 2018 CCES. Controls include copartisan status with the respondent, the legislator's seniority and whether the legislator is a member of the majority party, a committee chair, or serves on a powerful committee (Appropriations, Ways and Means, or Rules). * indicates $p < .10$ and ** indicates $p < .05$ (two-tailed tests).

Table A.7: The Relationship between Legislative Behavior and Constituent Evaluations by Party Recall

	Correct Recall		Incorrect Recall	
	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)
Panel A. Approval				
Member is a Woman=1	-0.025** (0.012)	-0.023** (0.010)	-0.020 (0.016)	-0.007 (0.015)
Policy Disagreement	-0.352** (0.006)	-0.149** (0.004)	-0.007 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.005)
Member is a Woman=1 × Policy Disagreement	-0.019 (0.012)	-0.013 (0.009)	0.007 (0.011)	0.006 (0.011)
District fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Party-year fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls		✓		✓
Observations	207615	207615	101960	101960
Panel B. Vote for Incumbent				
Member is a Woman=1	0.006 (0.016)	0.011 (0.008)	0.002 (0.031)	0.036 (0.024)
Policy Disagreement	-0.422** (0.006)	-0.152** (0.004)	-0.259** (0.009)	-0.100** (0.007)
Member is a Woman=1 × Policy Disagreement	-0.026** (0.012)	-0.015** (0.007)	0.006 (0.024)	0.000 (0.017)
District fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Party-year fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls		✓		✓
Observations	137527	137527	36669	36669

Note: Entries are linear regression coefficients with standard errors (clustered on legislator) in parentheses. Data includes the 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016, and 2018 CCES. Controls include copartisan status with the respondent, the legislator's seniority and whether the legislator is a member of the majority party, a committee chair, or serves on a powerful committee (Appropriations, Ways and Means, or Rules). * indicates $p < .10$ and ** indicates $p < .05$ (two-tailed tests).