

SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS
for
“Authoritarian Rallying as Reputational Cascade?
Evidence from Putin’s Popularity Surge after Crimea”
American Political Science Review

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Draft: August 10, 2021

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A Human subjects research

This study was approved by George Washington University Committee on Human Research's Institutional Review Board as IRB031557. It was conducted in line with the Principles and Guidance for Human Subjects Research approved by the American Political Science Association Council. The subject pool for the survey reported in this paper was designed to be nationally representative (not disproportionately representing any group). Respondents received no material compensation.

B Survey questions and calculation of variables used to generate tables, English translations

The full set of questions in the 2012 and 2015 RES surveys, along with data and replication code for this article, can be found on the APSR Dataverse (<https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/6XGUWQ>).

B.1 Dependent variables

Rallier

Binary variable coded 1 (0 otherwise) if respondent did not claim to have voted for Putin in 2012 in the 2012 survey wave and said in 2015 that they would vote for him if a new presidential election were to be held tomorrow, according to the survey questions given here.

Survey questions in 2012 wave:

Did you cast a ballot in the presidential election on March 4 of this year?

1. Yes
2. No (Skip voting question)

Here is a list of the candidates for President. Would you mind saying for whom you voted?

Survey questions in 2015 wave:

The presidential election is still three years away—it is supposed to take place in March of 2018. But if it were to take place tomorrow, would you cast a ballot for President of Russia?

1. Yes
2. No (Skip voting question).

Please have a look at the card. If the list of candidates for President were the same as in 2012, for which of these politicians would you vote in the presidential election?

Dissembling rallier

Binary variable coded 1 (0 otherwise) if a rallier (as defined above) also claimed in the 2015 survey wave to have voted for Putin in the 2012 presidential election given the following specific questions:

Did you cast a ballot in the last presidential election, on March 4, 2012?

1. Yes
2. No (Skip voting question).

Here is a list of the candidates for President. Would you mind saying for whom you voted?

Sincere rallier

Binary variable coded 1 (0 otherwise) for ralliers who did not claim in the 2015 survey wave to have voted for Putin in the 2012 presidential election given the specific question wording just given.

B.2 Independent variables testing reputational cascade theory

Majority backs Putin (2012 and 2015)

Binary variable coded 1 (0 otherwise) for people who believe that at least a majority of the population supports Putin, based on the following question:

What do you think, how many people in our country approve of Vladimir Putin's activity as [2012: Prime Minister/2015: President]?

1. The overwhelming majority*
2. A majority*

3. Many, but not a majority
4. An insignificant minority
5. Practically no one

* Note: for the 2012 wave, these were collapsed into a single item: “A majority.”

TV (news) frequency (2012 and 2015)

A scale ranging from 0 to 5 based on the following coding. People are coded 0 if they respond “no” when asked one of the two simple yes-no questions: “Please tell me, do you watch television?”; “Do you ever watch daily news programs?” The latter is only asked of people who replied yes to the first question. The rest of the scale is based on the following question, asked only of those who said they did watch TV daily news, with answers of 1 coded 5 (most frequent daily news watching), 2 coded 4, 3 coded 3, 4 coded 2, and 5 coded 1 (that is, 1 represents people who did not watch news in the last week but sometimes do):

How often in the past seven days have you watched daily news programs?

1. Every day
2. Almost every day
3. Several times in the past 7 days
4. Only once in the past 7 days
5. Not once in the past 7 days

Social media variables: Odnoklassniki, VKontakte, Facebook (2012 and 2015)

These are dummy variables coded 1 (0 otherwise) if a respondent (who in a previous question said they used the Internet) answered “yes” to the option below corresponding to each social networking site:

Which of the social networking sites that I will name do you use? ... Do you use the network: (1) Odnoklassniki (“Classmates”) (2) VKontakte (“In Contact”) (3) Facebook.

Radio Ekho Moskvyy (2012 and 2015)

A binary variable coded 1 (0 otherwise) if a person named Ekho Moskvyy radio (without being given a list of possibilities) when asked “On which radio stations have you listened to news broadcasts in the last seven days?”

Internet main news source (2012 and 2015)

A binary variable coded 1 (0 otherwise) if a person responded “The Internet” when asked:

Which of the mass media (television, radio, newspapers, or the Internet) is the basic source of information for you about political events? Please select the one main one.

1. Television
2. Radio
3. Paper newspapers [Note: “Paper” was not included in the 2012 wave]
4. The Internet

Putin leader qualities index (2012 only)

Index created by averaging ratings of Putin on a series of 4-point scales for four personal qualities (items 1-4 below), reversing coding so that higher values correspond with more positive assessments. The wording used to compose the variables is:

When they talk about politicians, people use various words and characterizations. Would you say about Vladimir Putin that he . . . [Response options:

1. Yes. 2. Probably yes. 3. Probably no. 4. No.]

- (1) Is an intelligent and knowledgeable person
- (2) Is a strong leader
- (3) Is an honest and trustworthy person
- (4) Really cares about the interests of people like you.

Because these questions provide no opportunity for respondents to give a middle, “neutral” response, and any volunteered neutral responses were not recorded by the interviewers, it is reasonable to assume that a significant number of such positions would be captured in responses of hard to say, refusal, or (in a single instance for only one component of the index) failure to have a response recorded. The judgment was thus made (prior to

observing the results) that it is most appropriate (so as to take advantage of what we know about the likely substantive meaning of these responses) to code these “missing” values at the midpoint of 2.5 rather than, as is done for other variables on which there are missing values, at their means in the relevant sample in order to avoid listwise deletion of observations. The Pseudo R-squared is higher for all equations when missing values are coded as midpoint responses than when means are substituted for missing values. Statistical significance determinations also do not change if we substitute means for missings: Having liked Putin prior to the rally remains a statistically significant predictor of becoming a dissembling rallier but not a sincere rallier.

Pocketbook up 2000s (2012 only)

A five-point scale based on the following question, with values reversed so that higher numbers reflect more positive assessments and unprompted middle responses of “won some, lost some” coded as the middle value of 3:

If we talk about the period after Putin’s arrival, as a result of the reforms carried out in our country beginning in the year 2000, did you and your family...

1. Win
2. Mostly win
3. Mostly lose
4. Lose

RF economy up 2000s (2012 only)

Binary variable coded 1 if respondent selects answer 1 when asked the following question for the relevant year, 0 otherwise:

For 2012: What do you think, in the last 12 years since the year 2000, when Putin first became President, have the following things increased, decreased, or remained unchanged . . . The standard of living of the population.

1. Increased
2. No change
3. Decreased

Pocketbook up last year (2015 only)

A five-point scale based on the following question, with values reversed so that higher numbers reflect more positive assessments:

How has your family's material situation changed over this past twelve months?

1. Improved a lot
2. Improved a little
3. Remained unchanged
4. Worsened a little
5. Worsened a lot

RF economy up last year (2015 only)

A five-point scale based on the following question, with values reversed so that higher numbers reflect more positive assessments:

What do you think, over the past twelve months has the economy of Russia . . . ?

1. Gotten much better
2. Gotten somewhat better
3. Stayed the same
4. Gotten somewhat worse
5. Gotten much worse

War refugee contact (2015 only)

Binary variable coded 1 (0 otherwise) if respondent answers 1 to the following:

Have you personally met or talked by phone with any refugees from the Ukraine conflict who are in Russia?

1. Yes
2. No

RF troops (likely) in Ukraine (2015 only)

Binary variable coded as 1 (0 otherwise) if respondent selects EITHER item 4 from the following question...

Please tell me, which of the following statements do you suppose best describes the role of Russia in the situation in eastern Ukraine?

1. Russia is not involved at all in this war, only providing humanitarian relief to the population
2. Russia provides humanitarian and moral support, but not any military support, to Ukrainians struggling against the government in Kyiv
3. Along with moral and humanitarian support, Russia provides military training and arms to Ukrainians struggling against the government in Kyiv
4. Along with moral, humanitarian, and military training, Russian soldiers are fighting in Ukraine on the side of Ukrainians struggling against the government in Kyiv

... OR items 1 or 2 from the following question:

How likely do you think it is that Russian soldiers will be drawn into combat in the war in Ukraine in the next five years?

1. Very likely
2. Somewhat likely
3. Unlikely
4. Impossible

B.3 Independent variables: Conventional (sincere rallying) theories

Starting with the patriotism school, different versions of this theory posit different specific mechanisms, making it prudent to include variables capturing the main concepts in each as best possible. Mueller's (1973) seminal work posits the rally event generates a surge in patriotism, a sense of pride in the country as whole. The analysis, therefore, first includes a post-rally measure that should capture individuals' general level of patriotism at the time of the rally, *Pride in Russia up*, a binary variable coded 1 if people affirm that since the year 2000 "pride in being a Russian citizen" had increased, with the inclusive term for

“Russian” *rossiiskii* (associated with the country, the Russian Federation) used instead of the more (but not entirely) ethnocentric *russkii*.¹ The study also includes a pre-rally measure likely to capture predispositions to experience stronger feelings of patriotism: (*RF influence up*), a binary variable indicating whether someone affirmed in 2012 that “in the last twelve years since the year 2000, when Putin first became President...the influence of Russia in the world” had “increased.” Other accounts have linked rally-fueling surges in patriotism to the dominant ethnic group, so the study also includes a four-point scale (*RF for Russians*) capturing the propensity to experience a more ethnocentric nationalism based on the following question asked in 2012: “To what degree do you agree or disagree with the following statements...Russia should be for Russians (*russkie*),” with higher values coding the strongest agreement.

Additionally, political psychologists, fleshing out the general claim that rallying is about surges in “nationalism” or “patriotism,” have found rallying to be mediated by emotions but disagree on which. Some (mostly experimental) studies find conflicts like the September 11 attacks simultaneously raise the salience of “the nation” as a social category and trigger fear or anxiety among people who identify with the victimized category, leading them to rally around a leader to restore their feeling of security (Dumont et al., 2003; Kam and Ramos, 2008; Kosloff et al., 2010; Landau et al., 2004). While emotions themselves are not directly measured, the study does include measures of preferences that arguably make someone predisposed to experience the kinds of emotions central to the theories under analysis here. First, it incorporates a measure from 2012 expected to capture propensities to experience nationally inspired fear: a four-point scale by which higher numbers indicating stronger agreement that “the USA and NATO will weaken Russia if our president does not do enough to resist their influence.” Other psychological studies report that the key rally-mediating emotion is instead national anger, which leads people to desire a leader with the capacity to “retaliate against perceived aggressors” (Lambert et al., 2010, 888). Predisposition to this sort of emotive response is represented here by a four-point scale from 2012 with higher numbers indicating more hostile responses when asked: “There are various opinions about what relations should be like between Russia and the West. What do you think, how should Russia relate to the West?”²

¹On the difference, see Laruelle (2016).

²The given options were “as to an enemy,” “as to a rival,” “as to an ally” and “as to a friend.”

Nationalism, ethnocentric: RF for Russians (2012 only)

A four-point scale based on the following question, with values reversed so that higher numbers reflect stronger agreement:

Please tell me, to what degree do you agree or disagree with the following statements ... Russia should be for (ethnic) Russians [russkie].

1. Strongly agree
2. More or less agree
3. More or less disagree
4. Strongly disagree

Patriotism: RF influence up (2012, 2015)

A binary variable coded 1 if the respondent gives answer “1” to the below, 0 otherwise.

For 2012: What do you think, in the last 12 years since the year 2000, when Putin first became President, have the following things increased, decreased, or remained unchanged ... The influence of Russia in the world.

For 2015: What do you think, in the last 15 years since the year 2000, when Putin first became President, have the following things increased, decreased, or remained unchanged ... The influence of Russia in the world.

1. Increased
2. No change
3. Decreased

Patriotism: Pride in Russia up (2015 only)

A binary variable coded 1 if the respondent gives answer “1” to the below, 0 otherwise:

What do you think, in the last 15 years since the year 2000, when Putin first became President, have the following things increased, decreased, or remained unchanged ... Pride in being a Russian (rossiiskii) citizen.

1. Increased
2. No change
3. Decreased

Nationalism, fear: Fear West (2012 only)

A four-point scale based on the following question, with values reversed so that higher numbers reflect stronger agreement:

Tell me please, do you agree or disagree that the USA and NATO will weaken Russia if our president does not do enough to resist their influence?

1. Strongly agree
2. More or less agree
3. More or less disagree
4. Strongly disagree

Nationalism, anger: Hostile to West (2012 only)

A four-point scale based on the following question, with values reversed so that higher numbers reflect more anti-Western attitudes:

There are various opinions about what relations should be like between Russia and the West. What do you think of how Russia should relate to the West?

1. As to an enemy
2. As to a rival
3. As to an ally
4. As to a friend

Partisanship for Communist Party: KPRF partisan (2012 only)

Binary variable coded 1 if respondent is a “transitional partisan” for a given party, 0 otherwise. Transitional partisanship is a measure intended to capture partisan attachments in countries like Russia where party competition is relatively new (Colton, 2000). Transitional partisans for a party are those who give an affirmative response and name that party (without being given a list of parties to pick from) in answer to either the first pair of questions (A and B) or the second pair of questions (C and D) in the series below. Specifically:

- A. Please tell me, is there any one among the present parties, movements, and associations about which you would say, “This is my party, my movement, my association”?

1. Yes
2. No (go to C)
7. Hard to say (go to C)
8. REFUSAL (go to C).

B. Which party, movement, or association is that? Please name it for me. [Interviewer writes it down. Responses of “hard to say” and refusals to answer skip C and D]

C. Please tell me, does there exist a party, movement, or association which more than the others reflects your interests, views, and concerns?

1. Yes
2. No (skip D)
7. HARD TO SAY (skip D)
8. REFUSAL (skip D).

D. Which party, movement, or association would that be? Please name it for me. [Interviewer writes it down.]

B.4 Control variables (all measured only in 2012)

The econometric analysis reported in Table 6 controls for several factors that frequently feature in studies of voting behavior in Russia. First, these include basic demographic variables that some studies have linked (at least in theory) to both voting and propensities to engage in preference falsification (age, gender, education, ethnicity, and religion) (Hale and Colton, 2017; Kuran, 1995). Second, controls include several geographic measures: the size of each respondent’s community (a five-point scale), a binary variable for residence in ethnic minority-designated “republics,” and binary variables for residence in Russia’s South (below 54 degrees) and East (Siberia and the Far East). Voting patterns have frequently been found distinct in republics and larger/smaller communities (Reisinger and Moraski, 2017; Zubarevich, 2011), and the variables for South and East are meant to capture potentially politically meaningful spatial differences linked to concentrations of Soviet-era industry in Russia’s South (i.e., its “red belt”) and the remoteness from Moscow of Russia’s Far East (Colton, 2000). While there is no particular reason to expect these

geographic factors to be correlated with the propensity to dissemble, they are considered important control variables in studies of voting behavior in some canonical studies, so for the sake of prudence they are included here (Colton and McFaul, 2003; Colton, 2000). As it turns out, Figure 6 reports that only residence in Russia's East is predictive of either form of rallying analyzed here: Easterners are 9 percentage points more likely to be sincere ralliers and 21 points less likely to be dissembling ralliers.

Age

A person's age in the 2012 survey, calculated from the wording:

Please tell me in what year and what month you were born. In [write down] year [write down] number of the month.

Woman

Binary variable coded 1 if respondent is a woman (0 if a man) based on interviewer's on-the-spot coding.

Larger community

A five-point scale indicating the size of the population point in which the respondent lives by quintile (for example, a 5 means that a respondent lives in the fifth largest quintile of Russian population points).

South

Binary variable coded 1 (0 otherwise) if respondent's place of residence is below the 54th parallel.

East

Binary variable coded 1 (0 otherwise) if respondent lives in Siberia or the Far East.

Republic

Binary variable coded 1 (0 otherwise) if respondent lives in an ethnic "republic."

Education

A 6-point scale based on the following question, with categories 1 and 2 combined and categories 7 and 8 combined:

What is your education? 1. Without education, illiterate 2. Elementary 3. Incomplete secondary 4. Secondary 5. Secondary specialized 6. Incomplete higher 7. Higher 8. Scholarly degree.

Russian

Binary variable coded 1 for respondents who reply “Russian” (not from a list) to the following question, 0 otherwise:

Who do you consider yourself to be by nationality?

Orthodox

Binary variable coded 1 (0 otherwise) if respondent answers 1 to the following:

To which religion do you consider yourself to belong? 1. Orthodoxy 2. Catholicism 3. Protestantism 4. Islam 5. Judaism 6. Buddhism, Lamaism 7. Krishnaism 8. Hinduism 9. Other, specifically [write down]

C Panel attrition

The only variable of theoretical interest for reputational cascade theory correlated with panel attrition is Putin’s leadership qualities. Assessing Putin more positively in 2012 is associated with being reinterviewed. This can be seen in Table SM1, which reports a logit model, means substituted for missings, $*p < .05$.

Table SM1: Correlates of being reinterviewed in 2015 for 2012 respondents.

Factor	Logit coefficient	95-percent CI
Majority backs Putin 2012	.06	(-18, .29)
Putin leader qualities 2012	.22	(.07, .38)*
Pocketbook up 2000s 2012	-.06	(-.19, .06)
RF economy up 2000s 2012	.00	(-.27, .27)
Radio Ekho Moskvyy 2012	.09	(-.64, .82)
Internet main news 2012	-.15	(-.63, .33)
TV frequency 2012	-.02	(-.08, .05)
Odnoklassniki 2012	-.19	(-.47, .09)
Vkontakte 2012	.35	(-.09, .78)
Facebook 2012	.07	(-.42, .55)
RF for Russians 2012	-.12	(-.25, .01)
Fear West 2012	-.09	(-.21, .04)
Hostile to West 2012	.23	(.03, .42)*
RF influence up 2012	-.06	(-.27, .16)
Communist Party partisan 2012	.09	(-.55, .74)
Age	.00	(-.01, .01)
Woman	.30	(.08, .52)*
Population point size	-.42	(-.52, -.31)*
South (below 54 degrees)	.10	(-.17, .36)
East (Siberia and Far East)	-.32	(-.58, -.06)*
Republic	-.11	(-.79, .57)
Education	.04	(-.07, .15)
Russian	.08	(-.33, .48)
Orthodox	-.34	(-.72, .04)
N	1,682	
Pseudo R-squared	0.0714	

D Frequencies

Table SM2: Estimated distribution of dispositions captured by independent variables in 2012 and 2015 in the Russian Federation population (figures from panel only are in parentheses). Unless otherwise stated, where variables are scales rather than binaries, the given percentages reflect the percentage of the population estimated to be over the midpoint on that variable, with missings dropped.

Factor	2012	2015
Majority back Putin	47 (50)	84 (84)
Mean, Putin leader qualities index	3.3 (3.4)	3.6 (3.6)
Pocketbook up since 2000	37 (30)	44 (36)
Russia economy up since 2000	33 (33)	32 (31)
Radio Ekho Moskvyy	2 (1)	2 (2)
Internet main news	11 (10)	16 (13)
TV (news) frequency: daily	45 (45)	41 (41)
almost daily	24 (24)	23 (25)
several times/week	16 (17)	15 (15)
once/week	3 (2)	3 (3)
less than once/week	12 (11)	18 (16)
Odnoklassniki	31 (30)	34 (33)
Vkontakte	26 (26)	33 (27)
Facebook	5 (5)	9 (7)
RF for Russians	47 (44)	42 (43)
Fear West	81 (79)	85 (85)
Hostile to West	28 (28)	36 (35)
RF influence up	59 (60)	73 (72)
KPRF partisan	9 (8)	6 (6)
Age under 30	25 (23)	24 (18)
30s	18 (17)	17 (17)
40s	17 (18)	18 (17)
50s	18 (20)	17 (20)
60s	12 (12)	14 (16)
70s+	10 (9)	11 (12)
Female	55 (58)	56 (58)
South (below 54 degrees)	38 (43)	39 (43)
East (Siberia and Far East)	18 (18)	18 (18)
Republic	15 (18)	15 (18)
Education: top 2 categories	32 (31)	36 (33)
Russian	87 (84)	87 (85)
Orthodox	81 (79)	80 (79)
Pocketbook up last year	-	18 (19)
Russia economy up last year	-	17 (18)
War refugee contact 2015 ¹⁶	-	29 (28)
RF Troops (likely) in Ukraine 2015	-	48 (47)
Pride in Russia up	-	62 (62)
N	1.682 (1.027)	1.654 (1.027)

E Results when dissembling and sincere ralliers are lumped together into a single binary “rallier” dependent variable

Without the possibility the present study provides of isolating dissembling ralliers from fully sincere ralliers, one could not run the kind of analysis reported in Table 6 and would instead have to lump all ralliers together in a single dependent variable. Table SM4 reports the results from such an analysis. As can be seen, as in Table 6, variables included as tests of the reputational cascade theory (H2) are statistically significant predictors of rallying even when dissembling and sincere ralliers are mixed together, with coefficients in the expected directions. The same limited support is also found for both the patriotism and opinion leadership schools of conventional rallying theory.

Table SM3: Full effects of variables on a binary, pooled measure of rallying, logit, standard errors in parentheses, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$.)

	2012 vars only		2012 & 2015 vars	
H2a (What others think)				
2012 Majority backs Putin	0.03	(0.06)	0.05	(0.05)
2015 Majority backs Putin			0.31**	(0.04)
H2b (Media)				
2012 TV frequency	0.04	(0.07)	0.01	(0.05)
2012 Odnoklassniki	0.11*	(0.05)	0.08	(0.06)
2012 vKontakte	-0.07	(0.06)	-0.06	(0.06)
2012 Facebook	-0.04	(0.11)	-0.02	(0.09)
2015 TV frequency			0.12*	(0.05)
2015 Odnoklassniki			0.05	(0.06)
2015 VKontakte			0.01	(0.06)
2015 Facebook			0.29**	(0.09)
H2c1 (Priors)				
2012 Pocketbook up 2000s	0.48**	(0.12)	0.26*	(0.11)
2012 RF economy up 2000s	-0.08	(0.07)	-0.03	(0.06)
2012 Putin leader qualities	0.25*	(0.12)	0.14	(0.10)
H2c2 (Cost awareness)				
2015 War refugee contact			-0.11*	(0.05)
2015 RF troops in Ukraine			-0.06	(0.04)
2015 Pocketbook up last yr			0.16	(0.10)
2015 RF economy up last yr			0.11	(0.09)
Conventional theories				
2012 Hostile to West	0.07	(0.10)	0.05	(0.08)
2012 Fear West	0.12	(0.12)	0.11	(0.10)
2012 RF for Russians	0.08	(0.07)	0.09	(0.07)
2012 RF influence up	0.09*	(0.04)	0.01	(0.04)
2015 Pride in Russia up			0.14**	(0.04)
2012 KPRF partisan	-0.09	(0.07)	-0.09	(0.05)
2012 Ekho Moskvyy	-0.16	(0.16)	-0.03	(0.28)
2012 Internet main news	-0.05	(0.07)	-0.11	(0.06)
2015 Ekho Moskvyy			-0.21	(0.17)
2015 Internet main news			0.18**	(0.06)
Controls				
Age	-0.08	(0.10)	-0.04	(0.09)
Woman	0.08	(0.05)	0.08*	(0.04)
Population point size	-0.05	(0.07)	-0.05	(0.07)
South	-0.02	(0.06)	0.03	(0.05)
East	-0.11	(0.06)	-0.10	(0.06)
Republic	-0.01	(0.09)	-0.03	(0.07)
Education	0.04	(0.07)	-0.01	(0.07)
Russian	0.02	(0.08)	0.02	(0.08)
Orthodox	0.09	(0.06)	0.02	(0.06)
N	445		445	

F Results when dissembling and sincere ralliers are compared only to oppositionists

Table 6 includes only people who did not say in 2012 that they had voted for Putin in that year’s election, who are then separated into the categories defined in the main text as oppositionists, dissembling ralliers, and sincere ralliers. Within this population, Table 6 reports full effects of independent variables on the probability someone falls into the dissembling rallier category in 2015 (as opposed to either of the other two categories) and on the probability someone falls into the sincere rallier category in 2015 (as opposed to either of the other two categories). Table SM4 below reports the results if the comparison group for either category of ralliers is only oppositionists (that is, if one drops from the analysis people who display the other form of rallying).

As can be seen, the general patterns among dissembling ralliers predicted by reputational cascade theory remain essentially unchanged from Table 6.

Some patterns do change that could be significant for how we evaluate other theories, though. For one thing, believing that a majority supports Putin is found here to predict sincere rallying. This would provide some support for an argument that majority social pressures in Russia were prompting some people to rally fully sincerely, a phenomenon that may coexist with reputational cascading and that is discussed in the main text’s penultimate section (“On the Extent of Dissembling”) and in Appendix G in the SM. Interestingly, Facebook also becomes a significant predictor of both sincere and dissembling rallying, suggesting it may have been an important conveyor of social pressures that was not detected in Table 6’s analysis.

Table SM4: Full effects of variables on dissembling and sincere ralliers when comparison group is oppositionists only, logit, standard errors in parentheses, ** $p < .05$, * $p < .01$.)**

	Dissembling rallier				Sincere rallier			
2015 Majority backs Putin			0.29**	(0.05)			0.29**	(0.06)
2012 Majority backs Putin	0.03	(0.06)	0.04	(0.05)	0.08	(0.08)	0.10	(0.07)
2012 TV frequency	0.07	(0.07)	0.04	(0.06)	-0.03	(0.10)	0.01	(0.07)
2012 Odnoklassniki	0.12*	(0.06)	0.08	(0.06)	0.04	(0.09)	0.06	(0.08)
2012 VKontakte	-0.14*	(0.06)	-0.10	(0.06)	0.07	(0.09)	0.03	(0.09)
2012 Facebook	0.03	(0.12)	0.04	(0.09)	-0.19	(0.17)	-0.17	(0.14)
2015 TV frequency			0.15*	(0.06)			0.02	(0.08)
2015 Odnoklassniki			0.08	(0.06)			-0.02	(0.08)
2015 VKontakte			-0.01	(0.07)			0.07	(0.07)
2015 Facebook			0.32**	(0.10)			0.31*	(0.15)
2012 Pocketbook up 2000s	0.56**	(0.15)	0.36*	(0.14)	0.24	(0.17)	0.07	(0.14)
2012 RF economy up 2000s	-0.06	(0.07)	-0.03	(0.06)	-0.07	(0.08)	0.00	(0.07)
2012 Putin leader qualities	0.29*	(0.13)	0.13	(0.12)	0.08	(0.17)	0.07	(0.16)
2015 War refugee contact			-0.12*	(0.05)			-0.06	(0.06)
2015 RF troops in Ukraine			-0.08	(0.04)			-0.05	(0.06)
2015 Pocketbook up last yr			0.15	(0.11)			0.05	(0.10)
2015 RF economy up last yr			0.14	(0.10)			0.15	(0.11)
2012 RF influence up	0.09	(0.05)	0.02	(0.05)	0.09	(0.07)	-0.01	(0.06)
2015 Pride in Russia up			0.15**	(0.04)			0.17**	(0.05)
2012 RF for Russians	0.10	(0.07)	0.10	(0.07)	-0.05	(0.11)	0.03	(0.09)
2012 Fear West	0.09	(0.15)	0.06	(0.13)	0.12	(0.15)	0.10	(0.12)
2012 Hostile to West	0.00	(0.10)	0.03	(0.09)	0.15	(0.14)	0.10	(0.13)
2012 KPRF partisan	-0.14	(0.09)	-0.12	(0.06)	0.01	(0.09)	0.00	(0.07)
2012 Internet main news	-0.07	(0.10)	-0.15	(0.08)	-0.04	(0.08)	-0.05	(0.07)
2012 Ekho Moskvyy	-0.28	(0.20)	-0.21	(0.20)	-0.07	(0.19)	0.07	(0.26)
2015 Internet main news			0.23*	(0.09)			0.10	(0.08)
2015 Ekho Moskvyy			-0.14	(0.12)			-0.28	(0.27)
Age	-0.01	(0.13)	0.04	(0.11)	-0.30	(0.16)	-0.19	(0.18)
Woman	0.06	(0.05)	0.07	(0.05)	0.09	(0.06)	0.09	(0.05)
Population point size	-0.06	(0.09)	-0.05	(0.08)	-0.00	(0.09)	-0.03	(0.09)
South	0.00	(0.07)	0.04	(0.06)	-0.07	(0.07)	0.04	(0.06)
East	-0.20**	(0.07)	-0.18*	(0.07)	0.04	(0.05)	0.02	(0.07)
Republic	0.03	(0.11)	-0.01	(0.09)	-0.25	(0.15)	-0.21	(0.12)
Education	0.01	(0.07)	-0.02	(0.07)	0.08	(0.12)	-0.01	(0.08)
Russian	0.06	(0.11)	0.02	(0.10)	-0.02	(0.09)	0.00	(0.09)
Orthodox	0.07	(0.07)	0.02	(0.07)	0.06	(0.07)	0.01	(0.08)
N	379		379		235		235	

G An experiment: Did Crimea spark genuine support for Putin among people identified in the study as dissembling ralliers?

The section “On the Extent of Dissembling” in the main text, which points at important directions for future research, might be read as generating two competing hypotheses about the private preferences of the people this study has labeled dissembling ralliers. One is that dissembling ralliers are dissembling not only about past vote, but also about their post-rally preferences: The Crimea annexation did not actually turn them into sincere Putin supporters. The alternative is that Crimea did in fact spark sincere support for Putin among them and that their dissembling is limited to how they talk about their past behavior.

One way to test these rival hypotheses head-to-head is to conduct a priming experiment, a widely accepted method for identifying sincere cognitive associations. By priming an individual to have a particular consideration in mind, researchers raise the weight of that consideration for subsequent cognitive tasks, enabling them to identify the consideration’s influence when primed individuals are compared to a control group that is not given that prime (Sherman, Mackie, and Driscoll, 1990; Taber and Lodge, 2016). The natural design for such an experiment on the question at hand would be to prime a treatment group on Crimea before asking them about their support for Putin. If the primed individuals were truly led by Crimea to be sincere supporters of Putin, they should on average report higher levels of support for him than a control group that is not primed on Crimea. If the primed individuals are instead dissembling about current support for Putin, not having actually been converted by Crimea, we would expect the prime not to activate positive associations with Putin. This has the following implications. If the people identified in this study as dissembling ralliers are actually sincere when they say they support Putin, they should respond positively to a Crimea prime and the magnitude of their positive response should be on par with that among people we are confident are sincere Putin supporters. In contrast, if this study’s dissembling ralliers are dissembling when claiming support for Putin, we would expect them not to display the same positive response as do sincere Putin supporters.³

Such a test is possible thanks to the fact that a second experiment was embedded in the 2015 survey wave examined here. The relevant part of this experiment, originally


³It is possible that among dissembling ralliers, the Crimea prime could also activate the social desirability considerations associated with Crimea that are driving them to falsely claim to support Putin. Since this would tend to lead false Putin supporters to respond more like real ones, any finding of a difference here between the dissembling and sincere ralliers is likely to be an underestimate.

designed for a different purpose in a separate study by the same author (Hale, 2018), was conducted on about half of the 2015 survey’s respondents. In this experiment, after receiving an anchoring question about how much they trusted Putin in the past, all respondents in the experiment were asked “How much do you trust Vladimir Putin as president of Russia today?” A randomly selected half (roughly) of the sample (the *Crimea treatment* group) received a few additional words as a prime right before the question mark, so that their version of the question read: “How much do you trust Vladimir Putin as president of Russia today, *now that Crimea has rejoined the Russian Federation?*” The *control* group received no additional wording. All respondents were then instructed: “Please use the same 0-10 scale, where 0 means you do not trust him at all and 10 means you fully trust him.” Trust is well known to track closely with job approval and other forms of political support in Russia (Levada-Center, 2016). The competing hypotheses delineated above can be tested by comparing this experiment’s results among dissembling ralliers to the results among people we are confident are sincere Putin supporters.

Figure SM1 presents the results. The panel on the left reports the experiment’s results on the 97 people that this study has identified as dissembling ralliers and that were randomly selected into the experiment: Being primed about Crimea has no statistically significant effect on dissembling ralliers’ level of trust in Putin, as we would expect if they are dissembling about their support for him. In fact, if anything, the average effect of the prime among dissemblers is *negative*: their post-treatment level of trust in Putin is lower than in the control group. The panel on the right side of Figure SM1 shows the pattern is very different among people identified in the present study as sincere Putin supporters (N=277 in this experiment). People are coded as sincere Putin supporters if they are either sincere ralliers or loyalists (people who consistently supported Putin in both the 2012 and 2015 surveys).⁴ These sincere Putin supporters react rather strongly to the Crimea prime by expressing even more support for Putin than they usually do, as we would expect if they are truly his supporters and if the Crimea annexation positively contributed to this support. Remarkably, this is the case even though one might expect ceiling effects to make such results unlikely. Dissembling ralliers, arguably overstating their actual level of support, register a baseline average level of support for Putin of 9 points on the 0-10 scale in the control group. But the sincere Putin supporters’ control

⁴It is possible that some loyalists were insincere all along, which could mean some mismeasurement in the “sincere Putin supporter” category used in this experiment. Note, however, that any such mismeasurement would dampen the positive response of the sincere supporter category to the prime, making it more like the response of the dissemblers. If anything, therefore, the difference between sincere and dissembling ralliers’ responses to the Crimea prime reported in Figure SM1 is an underestimate, adding confidence in the conclusions advanced here.

Figure SM1: Effect of Crimea treatment on 11-point scale of trust in Putin among dissembling ralliers and among sincere Putin supporters (loyalists, who supported Putin in 2012 and 2015, and sincere ralliers), 95 percent confidence intervals.



group baseline is actually a fraction higher, yet the average level of trust they express in Putin still goes up considerably when receiving the prime.

Overall, this head-to-head test leans in favor of the supposition that ralliers known to be dissembling about pre-rally vote are also dissembling about their post-rally support for Putin, weighing against the notion that post-rally dissembling is limited to the misrepresentation of pre-rally behavior. Because dissembling ralliers were shown above to constitute three-quarters of all ralliers, this confirmatory evidence of insincere Putin support constitutes important backing for the claim that reputational cascading may be a major source of rallying around the flag, perhaps even the dominant source. While far from definitive given the small sample size, this result should at a minimum prompt researchers to question the sincerity of ralliers’ public statements in future studies and to test for the possibility of insincerity where they can.

Importantly, these findings—and the larger reputational cascade theory advanced here—do not invalidate arguments based on the idea that Russia’s Crimea annexation produced a surge of emotion that drew in many former non-supporters of Putin and converted some of them into sincere supporters (Greene and Robertson, 2019, 2020; Sharafutdinova, 2020). Instead, this study has argued there is a role for both processes in the Crimea rally and in rallying generally. Indeed, Hale (2018), and subsequent insights developed in Alexseev and Hale (2019), should be understood as addressing the sincere component of rallying. As a hypothesis for future research, the present study suggests that the emotional surge is likely to have occurred primarily among the majority of Russia’s population who

already supported Putin in some way before Crimea, transforming their affective relationship to him, with the social pressures coming along with this surge combining with other factors to bring in (in cascading fashion) new supporters, at least a quarter of which are likely to be sincere but up to three-quarters of which are likely to be insincere, engaging in preference falsification. Since we know that compliance and conversion are both common conformist responses to strong social pressures (Nail, MacDonald, and Levy, 2000), and since it seems clear that rallies commonly involve social pressures, the most important research question moving forward would seem to be not *is there* any dissembling involved in rallying but *what is the mix* of dissembling and sincerity.

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