

# Effective for Whom? Ethnic Identity and Nonviolent Resistance

## *Online Appendix*

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# 1 Overview

This appendix provides additional information, summary statistics, and supplementary analysis. Section 2 presents information on the observational data used to generate Figure 1 in the article. Section 3 provides additional information on the survey experiments we conducted on national samples in the United States and Israel.

## 2 Observational Data

To examine whether the success of nonviolent resistance varies by ethnic group identity, we draw on the Nonviolent and Violent Campaign Outcomes (NAVCO) 2.0 dataset (Chenoweth and Lewis, 2013), as well as the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset (Vogt et al., 2015), which were recently combined by Thurber (2018). These data include information on the social and political status of 220 groups that were involved in violent and nonviolent resistance between 1946 and 2006 in 110 countries around the world. Campaigns are included in the dataset if they lasted for at least one week and consisted of at least 1,000 participants (Chenoweth and Lewis, 2013). In addition, campaigns had to have been initiated by groups that were identified as ‘politically relevant’ in the Ethnic Power Relations dataset; that is, they were politically represented by at least one political actor, or they faced discrimination by the state (Vogt et al., 2015). This broad definition captures a wide range of groups—both majority/dominant and minority/marginalized groups.

Since our goal is to study the link between group identity and the outcomes of nonviolent resistance, we focus on the group-year as the unit of analysis. The dataset assembled by Thurber (2018) consists of information on the social and political status of groups that engaged in violent and nonviolent resistance, including cases where multiple groups were involved in a campaign. Groups’ status comes from the EPR dataset, and is measured along two dimensions: (i) the group’s size as a share of the total population, and (ii) the group’s political status in each country. The latter measure includes various categories ranging from complete exclusion to complete control of state power. The explanations for each category can be found in the EPR codebook.<sup>1</sup>

In order to study variation in campaign success, we merged into Thurber’s combined dataset the ‘success’ variable from NAVCO 2.0. A campaign is defined as successful if it achieved all of its stated goals within a year of the peak of its activities (Chenoweth and Lewis, 2013). In the analysis presented in the article, we regress the success variable on an indicator measuring the initiation of a nonviolent resistance campaign by a group, interacted with a measure of that group’s status. In our regressions, we include covariates that account for various structural and time-varying variables that have been identified as important for the initiation and success of nonviolent campaigns. Table A1 presents summary statistics for this dataset. Table A2 reports the proportion of violent and non-violent resistance campaigns documented in the NAVCO 2.0 dataset that ended in success and

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<sup>1</sup>See: [https://icr.ethz.ch/data/epr/core/EPR-2018\\_Codebook.pdf](https://icr.ethz.ch/data/epr/core/EPR-2018_Codebook.pdf)

failure, disaggregated by group status.

Table A1: Summary Statistics: Observational Group-Year Dataset

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Pctl(25)	Pctl(75)	Max
Year	2,628	–	–	1946	1962	1984	2006
Campaign success	2,591	0.075	0.264	0	0	0	1
NV campaign	2,135	0.190	0.392	0	0	0	1
EPR group size	2,628	0.244	0.301	0	0.027	0.380	1
EPR status	2,377	2.920	2.005	1	1	4	7
EPR Status: excluded	2,628	0.619	0.486	0	0	1	1
Country population (logged)	2,628	10.003	1.355	6.332	9.057	11.104	13.902
Country GDP per capita (logged)	2,628	7.601	0.893	4.965	6.993	8.178	10.536
Prior participation in nonviolence	2,444	0.137	0.481	0	0	0	4
Prior participation in violence	2,444	0.187	0.461	0	0	0	3
Level of democracy	2,605	0.267	0.178	0.025	0.153	0.351	0.838
Physical integrity index	2,609	0.374	0.235	0.022	0.140	0.603	0.961
Neighboring kin in power	2,628	0.328	0.470	0	0	1	1
Downgraded	2,377	0.067	0.250	0	0	0	1
Horizontal inequality	2,128	0.106	0.317	0	0.0005	0.043	3.238
Nonviolent years	2,628	1.977	1.405	0	0.7	3	6
Violent years	2,628	1.852	1.451	0	0.7	2.925	6

Table A2: Distribution of Violent and Non-Violent Campaign Outcomes by Group Status

	Non-excluded groups		Excluded groups	
	Non-violent resistance	Violent resistance	Non-violent resistance	Violent resistance
Campaign failure	0.50	0.85	0.79	0.93
Campaign success	0.50	0.15	0.21	0.07

*Note:* The table reports the proportion of violent and non-violent resistance campaigns documented in the NAVCO 2.0 dataset that ended in success and failure, disaggregated by group status. Data on group status comes from the Ethnic Power Relations dataset.

## 2.1 Observational Results

Table A3 shows the results when examining the interaction between nonviolent resistance and group status. In Columns (1) to (3), group status is measured as an ordinal variable ranging from 1 to 7, where 1 indicates the lowest status and 7 indicates the highest.<sup>2</sup> In Columns (4) to (6) group status is a binary variable coded 1 for excluded groups (groups with status of self-exclusion, powerless, or discriminated) and 0 for non-excluded groups. We find that the success of nonviolent campaigns is strongly moderated by group status, where more socially dominant groups are much more likely to succeed when engaging in nonviolent resistance than disadvantaged groups. In fact, the data

<sup>2</sup>The full range of values is as follows: 1=Discriminated; 2=Powerless, 3=Self-Exclusion; 4=Junior Partner; 5=Senior Partner; 6=Dominant; and 7=Monopoly (Vogt et al., 2015).

show that for disadvantaged groups, nonviolent resistance is not significantly related to the success of a campaign. We find the same pattern when using group size rather than group status as a moderating variable, as shown in Table A4. Table A5 presents tabular results for Figure 1 in the article.

Figure A1 present a cross-tabulation of campaign goals (as defined in NAVCO 2.0) and group status (from EPR). The figure shows that while regime change tends to be the most common goal for all resistance campaigns, certain goals, such as anti-occupation and greater autonomy, tend to be associated almost exclusively with marginalized ethnic groups. Figure A2 shows that even when holding the goal of the campaign constant, marginalized ethnic groups have lower rates of success when engaging in nonviolence – a finding that holds for all types of campaign goals. We also find that nonviolent campaigns with goals that are most associated with marginalized groups (anti occupation and greater autonomy) are almost always likely to fail.

Since in this study we focus on groups that are defined as ‘politically relevant’ in the EPR dataset, we exclude a small number of NAVCO campaigns from our analysis. Out of 250 campaigns in NAVCO 2.0, we exclude 28 campaigns, either because they involve ethnic groups that are defined as ‘politically irrelevant’ (Number of campaigns = 23), or involve non-ethnic groups that are not included in the EPR dataset (Number of campaigns = 5). As a robustness test, we examine how campaigns by non-ethnic groups, or ethnic groups that are politically irrelevant, compare to the campaigns in our dataset. Table A6 shows that nonviolence is more effective for both of these groups, mimicking the results that we find for majority, non-excluded groups.

Table A3: Nonviolent Campaign Success and Group Status

	<i>Group Status (Ordinal)</i>			<i>Excluded Groups (Binary)</i>		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
NV campaign	0.001 (0.024)	−0.001 (0.028)	−0.026 (0.029)	0.226*** (0.017)	0.226*** (0.021)	0.272*** (0.023)
EPR Status	0.003 (0.003)	0.004 (0.005)	0.002 (0.005)			
EPR Status × NV Campaign	0.031*** (0.006)	0.033*** (0.006)	0.049*** (0.007)			
EPR Status: Excluded				−0.008 (0.011)	−0.001 (0.016)	−0.003 (0.021)
EPR Status: Excluded × NV Campaign				−0.202*** (0.025)	−0.188*** (0.028)	−0.233*** (0.031)
EPR group size		−0.040 (0.031)	−0.027 (0.036)		−0.008 (0.025)	−0.016 (0.033)
Constant	0.022** (0.010)	0.307*** (0.072)	0.402*** (0.080)	0.035*** (0.009)	0.322*** (0.070)	0.384*** (0.081)
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Cubic polynomials for time	✗	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓
Observations	1,944	1,746	1,569	2,099	1,901	1,569
R <sup>2</sup>	0.072	0.088	0.125	0.096	0.105	0.128

*Note:* The table reports regression estimates of the success of a resistance campaign on an interaction of campaign tactic (nonviolent or violent) with the status of the group initiating the campaign. Data come from the Nonviolent and Violent Campaign Outcomes (NAVCO) 2.0 and the Ethnic Power Relations datasets (Chenoweth and Lewis, 2013; Vogt et al., 2015; Thurber, 2018). \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Figure A1: Cross Tabulation of Campaign Goals and Group Status





Figure A2: Nonviolent Campaign Success by Campaign Goal and Group Status



*Note:* The figure presents the proportion of nonviolent resistance campaigns that end with success in the NAVCO 2.0 dataset, by the political status of the groups initiating the campaign. It can be seen that even when holding the goal constant, marginalized ethnic groups have lower rates of success when engaging in nonviolence. The figure also shows that nonviolent campaigns that have goals that are most associated with marginalized groups (anti occupation and greater autonomy, see Figure A1) are almost always likely to fail.

Table A4: Nonviolent Campaign Success and Group Size

	(1)	(2)	(3)
NV campaign	0.070*** (0.019)	0.082*** (0.021)	0.086*** (0.023)
EPR group size	0.026 (0.019)	0.013 (0.023)	0.016 (0.029)
EPR group size $\times$ NV campaign	0.134*** (0.035)	0.116*** (0.038)	0.148*** (0.043)
Constant	0.023*** (0.007)	0.362*** (0.069)	0.438*** (0.080)
Controls	✓	✓	✓
Cubic polynomials for time	✗	✓	✓
R <sup>2</sup>	0.070	0.086	0.098
Observations	2,099	1,901	1,569
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01		

*Note:* The table reports regression estimates of the success of a resistance campaign on an interaction of campaign tactic (nonviolent or violent) with the size of the group initiating the campaign. Group size captures the size of the group as a percentage of country’s total population (Vogt et al., 2015). Data come from the Nonviolent and Violent Campaign Outcomes (NAVCO) 2.0 and the Ethnic Power Relations datasets (Chenoweth and Lewis, 2013; Vogt et al., 2015; Thurber, 2018). \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

### 3 Experimental Data

To test our hypotheses regarding the mechanisms that lead minority groups to be less successful when engaging in non-violence, we conducted online survey experiments in the United States and Israel. Study 1 was administered in the United States in three waves between November 2018 and January 2019, on a sample of 2,269 respondents. The Israeli survey was conducted in two waves between February and March 2019 on a sample of 3,063 respondents. The U.S. survey was administered by YouGov, with respondents matched to a sampling frame based on gender, age, race, region, and education. The Israeli survey was administered by iPanel, Israel’s largest opt-in Internet survey firm, which uses quota sampling to generate samples that conform to the demographics of the Israeli population. The samples were stratified by gender, age, religiosity and region. In Study 1 we oversampled black Americans and Arab Israelis. To present the attitudes of the entire population, we use sample weights to correct for this oversampling.

Study 2 was administered in June 2020, to a sample of 3,013 respondents in the U.S. and 3,465 respondents in Israel. The U.S. survey was administered by Lucid, on a sample matched to the general population by gender, age, region, education, and ethnicity. The Israeli survey was administered by iPanel, on a sample matched to the general population by gender, age, religiosity, and region. Tables A7, A8, and A9 report summary statistics for the U.S. and Israeli (Jewish and Arab) samples in Study 1, and Tables A10 and A11 report summary statistics for the U.S. and Israeli samples in Study 2.

All survey companies (Yougov, Ipanel, Lucid) compensate participants according to local standards for opt-in internet panels. Survey respondents were all adults 18 and over, provided informed consent in the beginning of the survey, and all data is anonymous with no identifying features. The

Table A5: Predicted Probabilities: Nonviolent Campaign Success by Group Status

	Pr(success)	Std. Err.	Min95	Max95	Tactic	Status
<b>Group Status</b>						
1	0.25	0.05	0.16	0.35	Non-violent	Not excluded
2	0.02	0.05	-0.08	0.11	Non-violent	Excluded
3	0.04	0.02	0.00	0.08	Violent	Not excluded
4	0.05	0.01	0.02	0.07	Violent	Excluded
<b>Group Size</b>						
5	0.27	0.04	0.18	0.35	Non-violent	Group size $\geq$ mean
6	0.03	0.04	-0.05	0.11	Non-violent	Group size $<$ mean
7	0.04	0.01	0.02	0.06	Violent	Group size $\geq$ mean
8	0.03	0.01	0.02	0.05	Violent	Group size $<$ mean

*Note:* The figure presents tabular results for Figure 1 in the article.

Table A6: Nonviolent Campaign Success for Politically Irrelevant Groups

	Non-ethnic groups	Politically irrelevant ethnic groups
Nonviolent campaign	0.030 (0.053)	0.516*** (0.058)
Constant	0.074*** (0.018)	0.017 (0.020)
Observations	246	130
R <sup>2</sup>	0.001	0.383
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	-0.003	0.378

*Note:* The table reports regression estimates of the success of a resistance campaign on campaign tactic (nonviolent or violent) for groups that are coded as non-ethnic or or ‘politically irrelevant’ in the Ethnic Power Relations dataset. \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

studies were reviewed by IRBs at both coauthors’ institutions.

### 3.1 Experimental Design

Our experiment presented respondents with simulated news articles, based on real news articles, describing nonviolent activism. In the news articles of study 1, we randomly varied the *identity* of the protesters between dominant and marginalized groups, as well as the *tactics* employed in the campaign. In the U.S. survey, protester identity included two experimental conditions: white (majority) and black (minority); in the Israeli survey there were three conditions: white Jews (majority), Ethiopian Jews (minority), and Israeli Arabs (minority). The tactics arm consisted of three levels that varied from least to most violent: marching in streets, shutting down traffic, and destroying property. This generated a  $2 \times 3$  factorial design for the American survey and  $3 \times 3$  factorial design for the Israeli survey.

In study 2, we randomly varied the *identity* of the protesters, the protest *goal*, and whether protesters explicitly stated their *commitment* to nonviolence. Protest goal was randomly assigned as either a generic goal (protesting layoffs) or a group-based goal (protesting racial prejudice and

Table A7: Summary Statistics: U.S. Sample (Study 1)

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Age	2,269	47.374	17.544	18	91
Female	2,269	0.539	0.499	0	1
Education: No high school	2,269	0.052	0.221	0	1
Education: High school graduate	2,269	0.343	0.475	0	1
Education: Some college	2,269	0.211	0.408	0	1
Education: 2-year college	2,269	0.114	0.318	0	1
Education: 4-year college	2,269	0.183	0.387	0	1
Education: Post-graduate	2,269	0.097	0.297	0	1
Income: Less than \$10,000	2,269	0.076	0.265	0	1
Income: \$10,000 - \$19,999	2,269	0.111	0.314	0	1
Income: \$20,000 - \$29,999	2,269	0.118	0.323	0	1
Income: \$30,000 - \$39,999	2,269	0.103	0.304	0	1
Income: \$40,000 - \$49,999	2,269	0.084	0.278	0	1
Income: \$50,000 - \$59,999	2,269	0.071	0.258	0	1
Income: \$60,000 - \$69,999	2,269	0.063	0.244	0	1
Income: \$70,000 - \$79,999	2,269	0.056	0.229	0	1
Income: \$80,000 - \$99,999	2,269	0.056	0.230	0	1
Income: \$100,000 - \$119,999	2,269	0.046	0.210	0	1
Income: \$120,000 - \$149,999	2,269	0.035	0.183	0	1
Income: \$150,000 - \$199,999	2,269	0.029	0.167	0	1
Income: \$200,000 - \$249,999	2,269	0.012	0.108	0	1
Income: \$250,000 - \$349,999	2,269	0.003	0.055	0	1
Income: \$350,000 - \$499,999	2,269	0.003	0.055	0	1
Income: \$500,000 or more	2,269	0.003	0.055	0	1
Income: Prefer not to say	2,269	0.130	0.336	0	1
Party ID: Democrat	2,031	0.462	0.499	0	1
Party ID: Independent	2,031	0.282	0.450	0	1
Party ID: Republican	2,031	0.256	0.437	0	1
Ideology: Very liberal	2,269	0.120	0.325	0	1
Ideology: Liberal	2,269	0.188	0.391	0	1
Ideology: Moderate	2,269	0.291	0.454	0	1
Ideology: Conservative	2,269	0.184	0.387	0	1
Ideology: Very conservative	2,269	0.118	0.322	0	1
Ideology: Not sure	2,269	0.100	0.300	0	1
Race: White	2,269	0.561	0.496	0	1
Race: Black	2,269	0.241	0.428	0	1
Race: Hispanic	2,269	0.126	0.332	0	1
Race: Asian	2,269	0.025	0.155	0	1
Race: Native American	2,269	0.010	0.098	0	1
Race: Middle Eastern	2,269	0.002	0.042	0	1
Race: Mixed	2,269	0.022	0.147	0	1
Race: Other	2,269	0.014	0.116	0	1
Perceived degree of violence	2,269	4.064	3.190	0	10
Police action required	2,269	5.081	3.295	0	10
Recall violence	2,269	0.293	0.524	0	2



Table A8: Summary Statistics: Israel Jewish Sample (Study 1)

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Age: 18-22	2,538	0.117	0.322	0	1
Age: 23-29	2,538	0.167	0.373	0	1
Age: 30-39	2,538	0.223	0.416	0	1
Age: 40-49	2,538	0.177	0.382	0	1
Age: 50-70	2,538	0.315	0.465	0	1
Age: 71 and above	2,538	0.0004	0.020	0	1
Female	2,538	0.506	0.500	0	1
Education: no high school	2,527	0.013	0.115	0	1
Education: high school graduate	2,527	0.226	0.418	0	1
Education: vocational	2,527	0.243	0.429	0	1
Education: some college	2,527	0.079	0.269	0	1
Education: college graduate	2,527	0.279	0.449	0	1
Education: studying toward a graduate degree	2,527	0.025	0.155	0	1
Education: graduate degree	2,527	0.135	0.342	0	1
Religion: Secular	2,520	0.505	0.500	0	1
Religion: Religious	2,520	0.146	0.353	0	1
Religion: Traditional	2,520	0.319	0.466	0	1
Religion: Haredi	2,520	0.031	0.172	0	1
Ethnicity: Ashkenazi	2,520	0.364	0.481	0	1
Ethnicity: Ethiopia	2,520	0.004	0.063	0	1
Ethnicity: Mixed	2,520	0.129	0.336	0	1
Ethnicity: Mizrachi	2,520	0.405	0.491	0	1
Ethnicity: Other	2,520	0.025	0.155	0	1
Ethnicity: Soviet Union	2,520	0.073	0.260	0	1
Income: less than 2,500 NIS	2,140	0.083	0.276	0	1
Income: 2,501-5,000 NIS	2,140	0.098	0.298	0	1
Income: 5,001-7,500 NIS	2,140	0.178	0.382	0	1
Income: 7,501-10,000 NIS	2,140	0.223	0.417	0	1
Income: 10,001-15,000 NIS	2,140	0.236	0.425	0	1
Income: 15,001-20,000 NIS	2,140	0.117	0.321	0	1
Income: 20,001 - 25,000 NIS	2,140	0.039	0.194	0	1
Income: 25,001-30,000 NIS	2,140	0.018	0.132	0	1
Income: 30,001 and more NIS	2,140	0.008	0.089	0	1
Party ID: Right	2,198	0.524	0.500	0	1
Party ID: Center	2,198	0.046	0.209	0	1
Party ID: Left	2,198	0.430	0.495	0	1
Ideology	2,538	3.024	1.531	1	7
Interest in the news	2,538	3.120	0.999	1	4
Perceived degree of violence	2,538	5.346	2.673	0	10
Police action required	2,538	5.825	2.861	0	10
Recall violence	2,538	0.284	0.576	0	2

Figure A3: The Correlation Between Group Status and Size in NAVCO/EPR




Table A9: Summary Statistics: Israel Arab Sample (Study 1)

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Age: 8-24	525	0.337	0.473	0	1
Age: 25-34	525	0.453	0.498	0	1
Age: 35-40	525	0.166	0.372	0	1
Age: 41-65	525	0.044	0.205	0	1
Female	525	0.619	0.486	0	1
Religion: Christian	519	0.079	0.270	0	1
Religion: Druze	519	0.089	0.284	0	1
Religion: Muslim	519	0.832	0.374	0	1
Education: no high school	522	0.025	0.156	0	1
Education: high school graduate	522	0.184	0.388	0	1
Education: vocational	522	0.170	0.376	0	1
Education: some college	522	0.205	0.404	0	1
Education: college graduate	522	0.308	0.462	0	1
Education: studying towards a graduate degree	522	0.044	0.205	0	1
Education: graduate degree	522	0.063	0.244	0	1
Income: Less than 2,500 NIS	418	0.199	0.399	0	1
Income: 2,501-5,000 NIS	418	0.258	0.438	0	1
Income: 5,001-7,500 NIS	418	0.189	0.392	0	1
Income: 7,501-10,000 NIS	418	0.179	0.384	0	1
Income: 10,001-15,000 NIS	418	0.141	0.349	0	1
Income: 15,001-20,000 NIS	418	0.026	0.160	0	1
Income: 20,001-25,000 NIS	418	0.002	0.049	0	1
Income: 25,001-30,000 NIS	418	0.002	0.049	0	1
Income: 30,001 and more	418	0.002	0.049	0	1
Party ID: Right	225	0.111	0.315	0	1
Party ID: Center	225	0.018	0.132	0	1
Party ID: Left	225	0.871	0.336	0	1
Ideology	525	4.653	1.778	1	7
Interest in news	525	2.415	1.106	1	4
Perceived degree of violence	525	4.284	2.647	0	10
Police action required	525	6.659	2.839	0	10
Recall violence	525	0.145	0.407	0	2

Table A10: Summary Statistics: U.S. Sample (Study 2)

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Age: 18-24	3,013	0.110	0.313	0	1
Age: 25-34	3,013	0.195	0.396	0	1
Age: 35-44	3,013	0.202	0.401	0	1
Age: 45-54	3,013	0.153	0.360	0	1
Age: 55-64	3,013	0.163	0.369	0	1
Age: 65 and up	3,013	0.178	0.382	0	1
Female	3,013	0.514	0.500	0	1
Education: Did not complete high school	3,013	0.025	0.157	0	1
Education: High school / GED	3,013	0.232	0.422	0	1
Education: Some college	3,013	0.208	0.406	0	1
Education: Associate's degree	3,013	0.126	0.332	0	1
Education: Bachelor's degree	3,013	0.234	0.424	0	1
Education: Some graduate school	3,013	0.029	0.167	0	1
Education: Graduate degree	3,013	0.145	0.352	0	1
Income: Less than \$25,000	3,013	0.218	0.413	0	1
Income: \$25,000-\$49,999	3,013	0.257	0.437	0	1
Income: \$50,000-\$74,999	3,013	0.193	0.395	0	1
Income: \$75,000-\$99,999	3,013	0.119	0.324	0	1
Income: \$100,000-\$124,999	3,013	0.080	0.271	0	1
Income: \$125,000 and above	3,013	0.133	0.339	0	1
Party ID: Democrat	2,789	0.411	0.492	0	1
Party ID: Independent	2,789	0.250	0.433	0	1
Party ID: Republican	2,789	0.339	0.474	0	1
Ideology: extremely liberal	3,013	0.085	0.279	0	1
Ideology: liberal	3,013	0.174	0.379	0	1
Ideology: slightly liberal	3,013	0.088	0.283	0	1
Ideology: Moderate, middle of the road	3,013	0.339	0.473	0	1
Ideology: slightly conservative	3,013	0.094	0.292	0	1
Ideology: conservative	3,013	0.149	0.356	0	1
Ideology: extremely conservative	3,013	0.072	0.258	0	1
Race: White / Caucasian	3,013	0.691	0.462	0	1
Race: Black / African American	3,013	0.111	0.314	0	1
Race: Latino or Hispanic American	3,013	0.126	0.332	0	1
Race: Asian / Asian American	3,013	0.042	0.202	0	1
Race: Native American	3,013	0.005	0.073	0	1
Race: Multiracial	3,013	0.016	0.125	0	1
Race: Other	3,013	0.008	0.089	0	1
Perceived degree of violence	3,013	3.699	3.177	0	10
Police action required	3,008	4.517	3.151	0	10
Recall violence	3,013	0.408	0.759	0	2

Table A11: Summary Statistics: Israel Sample (Study 2)

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Age: 18-22	3,465	0.122	0.328	0	1
Age: 23-29	3,465	0.177	0.382	0	1
Age: 30-39	3,465	0.229	0.421	0	1
Age: 40-49	3,465	0.186	0.389	0	1
Age: 50-70	3,465	0.285	0.452	0	1
Female	3,465	0.510	0.500	0	1
Education: no high school	3,434	0.009	0.093	0	1
Education: high school graduate	3,434	0.216	0.412	0	1
Education: vocational	3,434	0.228	0.420	0	1
Education: some college	3,434	0.074	0.261	0	1
Education: college graduate	3,434	0.304	0.460	0	1
Education: studying towards a graduate degree	3,434	0.022	0.145	0	1
Education: graduate degree	3,434	0.147	0.355	0	1
Religiosity: Jewish Secular	3,415	0.447	0.497	0	1
Religiosity: Jewish Religious	3,415	0.116	0.321	0	1
Religiosity: Jewish Traditional	3,415	0.356	0.479	0	1
Religiosity: Jewish Haredi	3,415	0.081	0.273	0	1
Ethnicity: Jewish, Soviet Union	3,415	0.066	0.249	0	1
Ethnicity: Jewish, Mizrahi	3,415	0.411	0.492	0	1
Ethnicity: Jewish, Ashkenazi	3,415	0.355	0.479	0	1
Ethnicity: Jewish, Ethiopia	3,415	0.005	0.068	0	1
Ethnicity: Jewish, Mixed	3,415	0.139	0.345	0	1
Ethnicity: Jewish, Other	3,415	0.024	0.152	0	1
Income: Less than 2,500 NIS	2,956	0.091	0.287	0	1
Income: 2,501-5,000 NIS	2,956	0.121	0.326	0	1
Income: 5,001-7,500 NIS	2,956	0.168	0.374	0	1
Income: 7,501-10,000 NIS	2,956	0.192	0.394	0	1
Income: 10,001-15,000 NIS	2,956	0.235	0.424	0	1
Income: 15,001-20,000 NIS	2,956	0.119	0.324	0	1
Income: 20,001-25,000 NIS	2,956	0.044	0.206	0	1
Income: 25,001-30,000 NIS	2,956	0.018	0.133	0	1
Income: 30,001-35,000 NIS	2,956	0.012	0.107	0	1
Ideology	3,465	2.989	1.517	1	7
Party ID: Left	3,227	0.434	0.496	0	1
Party ID: Right	3,227	0.566	0.496	0	1
Perceived degree of violence	3,465	4.117	2.877	0	10
Police action required	3,465	4.661	2.961	0	10
Recall violence	3,465	0.242	0.593	0	2

police brutality). Protester commitment was randomly assigned as either no explicit commitment, or explicit commitment to nonviolent resistance. In the U.S. survey, we were able to leverage actual protests, so that both whites and Blacks could be depicted protesting each goal. In Israel (as would usually be the case), we did not include a condition where Israeli Jews protested, on their own, for Ethiopian or Arab based goals, since that would not be a realistic scenario. Consequently, our U.S. survey was a  $2 \times 2 \times 2$  factorial design, while the Israeli survey was a  $3 \times 2 \times 2$  factorial design with two conditions omitted (White Jews protesting for minority group-based goals with commitment, White Jews protesting for minority group-based goals without commitment), for a total of 10 experimental conditions.

Section 3.2 shows the vignettes for all experimental conditions in Study 1, and Section 3.3 shows the vignettes for all experimental conditions in Study 2. Table A12 presents the gender composition of each image. Figures A6 to A9 present balance tests, showing that the randomization was implemented successfully – the demographic covariates are balanced across experimental conditions.<sup>3</sup>

### 3.2 Experimental Vignettes: Study 1

We presented respondents with simulated news articles, based on real articles, describing nonviolent activism. First, participants read the following introductory text:

*Citizens sometimes mobilize to change policies that they oppose. We will describe one such event to you and ask you a few questions about your reactions. While the description is based on real events, some aspects are fictional for scientific validity. We are asking you to imagine how you would feel about these events if they were happening in the real world today. Please read the description carefully, as we will ask you questions about specific details at the end.*

In the articles, we randomly varied the *identity* of the protesters between dominant and disadvantaged groups, as well as the *tactics* employed in the campaign. In the U.S. survey, protester identity included two conditions: white (majority) and Black (minority); in the Israeli survey there were three conditions: white Jews (majority), Ethiopian Jews (minority), and Israeli Arabs (minority). In both surveys, the tactics arm consisted of three levels that varied from least to most intense: marching in streets, shutting down traffic, and destroying property. This generated a  $2 \times 3$  factorial design for the American survey and  $3 \times 3$  design for the Israeli survey. Below are the vignettes used for each condition. **Blue** indicates the tactics condition, and **red** indicates the group identity condition.

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<sup>3</sup>Given the different definitions of the age variable across surveys, we are not able to display it in the graphs. However, the data show that the age is balanced across experimental conditions. In Study 1 In the U.S. survey, the average age ranges between 46.8 to 47.8 in all experimental conditions; in the Israeli Jewish sample, the average age in all experimental conditions is the third age category: 30-39. In the Israeli Arab sample, the average age in all experimental conditions is the second age category: 25-34. In Study 2, the average age in all experimental conditions in the U.S. and Israeli samples is the third age category: 35-44 (U.S.) and 30-39 (Israel).

### 3.2.1 U.S. Survey

In Washington, Protesters [March in Streets] [March in Streets and Shut Down Traffic] [March in Streets and Destroy Police Cars]

WASHINGTON - Protesters made themselves heard in the nation's capital Friday, where they [marched in the streets] [marched in the streets and shut down traffic] [marched in the streets, clashed with police and destroyed several police cars] in the vicinity of the National Mall. Demonstrators were holding signs demanding policy change and were chanting as they marched. The group, which expected more than 10,000 participants, planned to gather in the afternoon at McPherson Square, where a stage and sound system would feature a series of speakers. "I wanted my voice to be heard," said [Tyron] [Charlie], one of the demonstrators. "I hope people will wake up because we deserve better."

### 3.2.2 Israel Survey

מאות [ ] [ערבים-ישראלים] [יוצאי אתיופיה] [הפגינו וצעדו] [הפגינו וחסמו כבישים] [הפגינו והבעירו פחים] בירושלים

ירושלים – מאות מפגינים [ ] [ערבים-ישראלים] [אתיופים] צעדו והפגינו הבוקר בקרבת קריית הממשלה. המפגינים [ ] [חסמו כבישים סמוך לכניסה לעיר] [חלקם רעולי פנים, התעמתו עם שוטרים, הבעירו כמה פחים במקום, ואף ניפצו שמשות של ניידת משטרה], נשאו שלטים בגנות הממשלה וקראו קריאות הדורשות שינוי מייד. "רציתי שקולי ישמע, אמר [ארז] [מחמוד] [אבי], אחד המפגינים במקום. "אני מקווה שאנשים יתעוררו כי אנחנו לא מוכנים לספוג יחס כזה יותר."

English translation:

Hundreds [ ] [of Arab Israelis] [of Ethiopian Israelis] [Protested and Marched] [Protested and Shut Down Traffic] [Protested and Destroyed Garbage Cans] In Jerusalem

Jerusalem – Hundreds of [ ] [Arab Israeli] [Ethiopian Israeli] protesters marched and demonstrated this morning near the government compound. The protesters [ ] [blocked roads near the entrance to the city] [some masked, confronted police, set fire to several garbage cans on the spot, and even smashed the windows of a police car], carried signs condemning the government and shouted calls for immediate change. "I wanted my voice to be heard," said [Erez] [Mahmoud] [Avi], one of the protesters. "I hope people wake up because we are not willing to take such an attitude anymore."

### 3.3 Experimental Vignettes: Study 2

Study 2's vignettes were very similar to those used in Study 1, and accompanied by the same photos. *In the vignettes below, blue indicates the goals condition, red indicates the group identity condition, and green indicates the commitment condition.*

#### 3.3.1 U.S. Survey

##### **In Washington, Protesters March in Streets Against [Layoffs] [Police Brutality]**

WASHINGTON - Protesters made themselves heard in the nation's capital Friday, where they marched in the streets in the vicinity of the National Mall. Demonstrators were holding signs [demanding compensation for the recent wave of layoffs] [protesting racism and police brutality] [and were chanting as they marched] [and calling for nonviolent action, chanting "in peace we call for justice for all."]. The group, which expected more than 10,000 participants, planned to gather in the afternoon at McPherson Square, where a stage and sound system would feature a series of speakers. "I wanted my voice to be heard," said [Tyrone] [Charlie], one of the demonstrators. "I hope people will wake up because we deserve better."

#### 3.3.2 Israel Survey

##### **מאות [ ] [ערבים-ישראלים] [יוצאי אתיופיה] הפגינו וצעדו בירושלים [על המצב הכלכלי] [נגד אלימות משטרתית]**

ירושלים – מאות מפגינים [ ] [ערבים-ישראלים] [אתיופים] צעדו והפגינו הבוקר בקרבת קריית הממשלה. המפגינים [נשאו שלטים הדורשים פיצוי על גל האבטלה האחרון] [נשאו שלטים נגד גזענות ואלימות משטרתית], [וקראו קריאות הדורשות שינוי מייד] [וקראו לאחרים להצטרף למאבק לא-אלימים למען שוויון מייד]. "רציתי שקולי ישמע, אמר [ארז] [מחמוד] [אבי], אחד המפגינים במקום. "אני מקווה שאנשים יתעוררו כי אנחנו לא מוכנים לספוג יחס כזה יותר."

English translation:

##### **Hundreds [ ] [of Arab Israeli] [of Ethiopian Israeli] Protested and Marched in Jerusalem [on the Economic Situation] [Against Police Violence]**

Jerusalem – Hundreds of [ ] [Arab-Israeli] [Ethiopian-Israeli] protesters marched and demonstrated this morning near the government compound. The protesters [carried signs demanding compensation for the latest wave of unemployment] [carried signs against racism and police violence], [and called for immediate change] [and called others to join a non-violent struggle for immediate equality]. "I wanted my voice to be heard," said [Erez] [Mahmoud] [Avi], one of the protesters. "I hope people wake up because we are not willing to take such an attitude anymore."

Figure A4: The Ethnic Identity of the Protesters (U.S.)

White protesters



Black protesters



*Note:* The figure shows pictures used in the survey experiment's vignette to signal the identity of the protesters.

Figure A5: The Ethnic Identity of the Protesters (Israel)

Arab protesters



Ethiopian protesters



White protesters




*Note:* The figure shows pictures used in the survey experiment's vignette to signal the identity of the protesters.

### 3.4 Balance Tests




Figure A6: Balance Tests: U.S. Sample (Study 1)



*Note:* The figure presents means and standard deviations for demographic covariates in the U.S. sample in Study 1, showing that the randomization was implemented successfully.

Figure A7: Balance Tests: Israel Sample (Study 1)




*Note:* The figure presents means and standard deviations for demographic covariates in the Israeli sample in Study 1, showing that the randomization was implemented successfully.

### 3.5 Experimental Results: Additional Tables

#### Study 1


Table A13 shows that the results reported in Tables 1 in the article hold when controlling for demographic covariates. Table A14 mirrors the information presented in Figure 3 in the article. Table A15 shows the results when interacting ethnic identity and tactic.

Figure A8: Balance Tests: U.S. Sample (Study 2)



*Note:* The figure presents means and standard deviations for demographic covariates in the U.S. sample in Study 2, showing that the randomization was implemented successfully.

Figure A9: Balance Tests: Israel Sample (Study 2)



*Note:* The figure presents means and standard deviations for demographic covariates in the Israeli sample in Study 2, showing that the randomization was implemented successfully.

In Table A16, we examine whether the tendency to view nonviolent minority protesters as violent is driven by respondents from the majority group. We focus on the nonviolent, ‘march in streets’ condition, and evaluate heterogeneity in perceptions of nonviolent protests by minority and majority group. The table reports estimated means for our three outcomes, the difference between means, its p-value, and the percent change reflected in the difference. Each row in the table displays the

Table A12: Gender Composition in Treatment Images

Survey	Treatment	Number of females	Number of visible protesters	Prop. female
U.S.	White protesters	4	53	0.075
U.S.	Black protesters	6	89	0.067
Israel	White protesters	5	35	0.143
Israel	Ethiopian protesters	3	24	0.125
Israel	Arab protesters	3	24	0.125

attitudes of respondents from different groups.<sup>4</sup>

We find a very clear pattern, where nonviolence by minorities is seen as violent by majorities. Minority groups marching in the streets are perceived by majority-group respondents as 25-30% more violent than majority groups, and are up to 47% more likely to be viewed as requiring police action. The table further shows that the ethnicity of the protesters does not, in general, exercise a significant impact on the perceptions of respondents from minority groups. This underscores the challenges that ethnic minority groups face when seeking to build cross cutting coalitions that can enable large-scale mobilization.

## Study 2

Table A17 shows that the results reported in Tables 2 in the article hold when controlling for demographic covariates. Table A18 shows how minorities in Israel are perceived when protesting layoffs (a generic protest goal). It shows that even when protesting non-group based goals, Ethiopian and Arab Israelis are perceived as more violent and requiring more policing.

Figures A10 and A11 show the effects of commitment to nonviolence on recalling protesters are violent and supporting police intervention, by group identity.

Figure A12 examines whether greater exposure to the news moderates respondents' perceptions of nonviolent protests. In principle, if the media is responsible for a lot of the negative stereotyping of minority groups, we would expect to see more negative reactions associated with more media consumption. Using one of our survey questions that asked respondents how often they follow the news, we find that there is no difference in the perceptions of respondents based on their self-reported level of media usage.

<sup>4</sup>We were not able to sample sufficient numbers of Ethiopian respondents, due to coverage limitations of the survey company. Ethiopian citizens comprise less than 2% of the Israeli population.

Table A13: Study 1: Group Identity Protest Tactic (With Demographic Covariates)

	Perceived degree of violence (1)	degree of violence Recall violence (2)	Police action required (3)
<i>(A) U.S. Sample</i>			
Black protesters	0.256** (0.113)	0.036** (0.018)	0.313*** (0.120)
Shut down traffic	0.318** (0.139)	0.017 (0.022)	0.497*** (0.147)
Destroy police cars	3.399*** (0.138)	0.650*** (0.022)	3.002*** (0.147)
Intercept	1.844*** (0.376)	0.034 (0.060)	1.417*** (0.398)
Demographic covariates	✓	✓	✓
Observations	2,269	2,269	2,269
R <sup>2</sup>	0.303	0.355	0.271
<i>(B) Israel Sample</i>			
Ethiopian protesters	0.498*** (0.115)	0.092*** (0.026)	0.266** (0.127)
Arab protesters	0.637*** (0.115)	0.047* (0.026)	1.008*** (0.127)
Shut down traffic	0.269** (0.115)	-0.037 (0.026)	0.430*** (0.127)
Destroy garbage cans	2.536*** (0.114)	0.403*** (0.026)	2.180*** (0.126)
Intercept	4.924*** (0.274)	0.207*** (0.062)	6.084*** (0.303)
Demographic covariates	✓	✓	✓
Observations	2,534	2,534	2,534
R <sup>2</sup>	0.229	0.143	0.182

*Note:* The table reports regression results from ordinary least squares regressions, where the dependent variables reported in the columns are regressed on the two treatment variables: protesters' ethnic identity and tactic. The results are reported for the entire sample, weighted to reflect the demographic composition of the population. Demographic covariates include respondents' age, gender, income, education, ideology, and race/ethnicity. \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table A14: Attitudes towards Nonviolent Resistance by Group Identity and Tactic

	Estimate	Std. Err.	Outcome	Tactic
<b>Perceptions of Blacks (U.S.)</b>				
1	0.14	0.07	Perceived degree of violence	March in streets
2	0.08	0.07	Perceived degree of violence	Shut down traffic
3	-0.01	0.07	Perceived degree of violence	Destroy police cars, garbage cans
4	0.14	0.07	Police action required	March in streets
5	0.09	0.07	Police action required	Shut down traffic
6	0.01	0.07	Police action required	Destroy police cars, garbage cans
7	0.03	0.05	Recall violence	March in streets
8	0.09	0.06	Recall violence	Shut down traffic
9	0.10	0.09	Recall violence	Destroy police cars, garbage cans
<b>Perceptions of Ethiopians (Israel)</b>				
10	0.39	0.08	Perceived degree of violence	March in streets
11	0.36	0.07	Perceived degree of violence	Shut down traffic
12	-0.04	0.06	Perceived degree of violence	Destroy police cars, garbage cans
13	0.53	0.08	Police action required	March in streets
14	0.46	0.08	Police action required	Shut down traffic
15	0.04	0.06	Police action required	Destroy police cars, garbage cans
16	0.18	0.06	Recall violence	March in streets
17	0.10	0.04	Recall violence	Shut down traffic
18	-0.02	0.09	Recall violence	Destroy police cars, garbage cans
<b>Perceptions of Arabs (Israel)</b>				
19	0.36	0.07	Perceived degree of violence	March in streets
20	0.32	0.07	Perceived degree of violence	Shut down traffic
21	-0.19	0.06	Perceived degree of violence	Destroy police cars, garbage cans
22	0.32	0.07	Police action required	March in streets
23	0.16	0.07	Police action required	Shut down traffic
24	-0.28	0.06	Police action required	Destroy police cars, garbage cans
25	0.25	0.06	Recall violence	March in streets
26	0.26	0.05	Recall violence	Shut down traffic
27	-0.04	0.10	Recall violence	Destroy police cars, garbage cans

*Note:* The table provides tabular representation of Figure 3 in the manuscript. For presentation purposes, the dependent variables are standardized.

Table A15: Study 1: Group Identity Protest Tactic, Interacted

	Perceived degree of violence (1)	Recall violence (2)	Police action required (3)
<i>(A) U.S. Sample</i>			
Black protesters	0.454** (0.202)	0.016 (0.032)	0.467** (0.220)
Shut down traffic	0.364* (0.202)	0.0005 (0.032)	0.510** (0.220)
Destroy police cars	3.617*** (0.202)	0.626*** (0.032)	3.188*** (0.220)
Black protesters x Shut down traffic	-0.187 (0.286)	0.034 (0.045)	-0.161 (0.310)
Black protesters x Destroy police cars	-0.471 (0.286)	0.037 (0.045)	-0.435 (0.311)
Intercept	2.664*** (0.143)	0.064*** (0.022)	3.737*** (0.155)
Observations	2,269	2,269	2,269
R <sup>2</sup>	0.235	0.322	0.161
<i>(B) Israel Sample</i>			
Ethiopian protesters	0.966*** (0.184)	0.138*** (0.040)	0.931*** (0.203)
Arab protesters	1.061*** (0.188)	0.100** (0.041)	1.514*** (0.209)
Shut down traffic	0.331* (0.187)	-0.018 (0.040)	0.637*** (0.207)
Destroy garbage cans	3.435*** (0.186)	0.506*** (0.040)	3.209*** (0.206)
Ethiopian protesters x Shut down traffic	-0.111 (0.262)	0.006 (0.057)	-0.480* (0.289)
Arab protesters x Shut down traffic	-0.085 (0.265)	-0.045 (0.057)	-0.200 (0.293)
Ethiopian protesters x Destroy garbage cans	-1.484*** (0.259)	-0.161*** (0.056)	-1.745*** (0.287)
Arab protesters x Destroy garbage cans	-1.181*** (0.261)	-0.112** (0.057)	-1.389*** (0.289)
Intercept	3.580*** (0.134)	0.055* (0.029)	4.232*** (0.148)
Observations	3,063	3,063	3,063
R <sup>2</sup>	0.204	0.140	0.143


*Note:* The table reports regression results from ordinary least squares regressions, where the dependent variables reported in the columns are regressed on an interaction of protesters' ethnic identity and tactic. \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table A16: Perceptions of Nonviolent Protests by Majority and Minority Group Respondents

	Mean (Majority Protesters)	Mean (Minority Protesters)	Difference	P-value	Percent Change
<b>(A) United States (Minority: Blacks)</b>					
Perceived degree of violence by Whites	2.35	3.02	0.66	0.01	28.16%
Perceived degree of violence by Blacks	3.50	3.32	-0.18	0.72	-5.21%
Police action required by Whites	3.38	3.90	0.52	0.07	15.45%
Police action required by Blacks	4.56	4.83	0.27	0.59	5.97%
<b>(B) Israel (Minority: Arabs)</b>					
Perceived degree of violence by White Jews	3.66	4.79	1.12	0.00	30.69%
Perceived degree of violence by Arabs	3.09	3.45	0.36	0.48	11.75%
Police action required by White Jews	3.84	5.64	1.80	0.00	46.82%
Police action required by Arabs	7.00	6.51	-0.49	0.42	-7.00%
<b>(C) Israel (Minority: Ethiopians)</b>					
Perceived degree of violence by White Jews	3.66	4.60	0.94	0.00	25.56%
Perceived degree of violence by Arabs	3.09	4.26	1.17	0.01	38.06%
Police action required by White Jews	3.84	4.94	1.09	0.00	28.47%
Police action required by Arabs	7.00	6.62	-0.38	0.50	-5.38%

*Note:* Estimated means of perceptions of violence for majority and minority protesters who engage in non-violent resistance ('march in streets'), as well as for support for police action against them.

Figure A10: Recalling Violence by Explicit Commitment and Group Identity



*Note:* The figure shows the effect of commitment to nonviolence on recalling protesters as violent (*recall violence*), by group identity.

Table A17: Study 2: Group Identity, Protest Goal, and Commitment to Nonviolence (With Demographic Covariates)

	Perceived degree of violence (1)	de- violence (2)	Recall violence (3)	Police action required (3)
<i>(A) U.S. Sample</i>				
Black protesters	0.364*** (0.112)		0.048* (0.027)	0.406*** (0.112)
Minority group goal	0.581*** (0.112)		0.165*** (0.027)	0.513*** (0.112)
Commitment to nonviolence	-0.244** (0.112)		-0.017 (0.027)	-0.222** (0.112)
Intercept	3.408*** (0.421)		0.437*** (0.102)	3.638*** (0.421)
Demographic covariates	✓		✓	✓
Observations	3,013		3,013	3,008
R <sup>2</sup>	0.079		0.060	0.068
<i>(B) Israel Sample</i>				
Ethiopian protesters	1.079*** (0.148)		0.310*** (0.031)	0.920*** (0.149)
Arab protesters	0.623*** (0.147)		0.077** (0.031)	0.855*** (0.149)
Minority group goal	0.513*** (0.116)		0.112*** (0.024)	0.512*** (0.117)
Commitment to nonviolence	-0.314*** (0.102)		0.008 (0.021)	-0.160 (0.103)
Intercept	4.774*** (0.238)		0.199*** (0.050)	5.187*** (0.240)
Demographic covariates	✓		✓	✓
Observations	2,888		2,888	2,888
R <sup>2</sup>	0.108		0.092	0.145

*Note:* The table reports regression results from ordinary least squares regressions, where the dependent variables reported in the columns are regressed on the three treatment variables: protesters' ethnic identity, protest goal, and protester commitment. Demographic covariates include respondents' age, gender, income, education, ideology, and race/ethnicity. \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01




Table A18: Perceptions of Arab and Ethiopian Israelis Protesting Layoffs

	Perceived degree of violence (1)	Recall violence (2)	Police action required (3)
Ethiopian protesters	1.063*** (0.145)	0.280*** (0.026)	0.850*** (0.152)
Arab protesters	0.479*** (0.146)	0.068*** (0.026)	0.687*** (0.153)
Commitment to nonviolence	-0.451*** (0.120)	-0.015 (0.021)	-0.252** (0.126)
Intercept: White protesters, generic goal, no commitment	3.493*** (0.116)	0.063*** (0.020)	3.965*** (0.122)
Observations	2,098	2,098	2,098
R <sup>2</sup>	0.031	0.057	0.018


Note: The table compares how minorities in Israel are perceived when protesting layoffs (a generic protest goal). Even when protesting non-group-based goals, Ethiopian and Arab Israelis are perceived as more violent and as requiring more policing that white, Jewish Israelis. \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Figure A11: Supporting Police Action Against Protesters by Explicit Commitment and Group Identity



Note: The figure shows the effect of commitment to nonviolence on supporting policing against the protesters (*police action required*), by group identity.

Figure A12: Perceptions of Nonviolent Minority Protests By Media Exposure



Note: The figure shows the average degree of violence perception of nonviolent protests by minority groups in the U.S. and Israel. We find almost no differences between respondents based on their self-reported level of media usage.

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