

Online Appendix for “Public Perceptions of Women’s Inclusion and Feelings of Political Efficacy”

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A1 Details of Variable Construction

In this section, I provide additional information about the construction and coding of the control variables used in the analyses presented in the main text. A discussion of the dependent variables and main independent variable—perceptions of representation—is available in the main text.

Gender: Respondent gender is a binary indicator based on respondents' self-identification. Respondents identifying as female are given a score of 1; respondents identifying as male are scored 0.

Ideology: Ideology is a seven-point scale. Respondents were asked whether they considered themselves to be: 1) Very liberal, 2) Liberal, 3) Slightly liberal, 4) Moderate/Middle of the Road, 5) Slightly conservative, 6) Conservative, or 7) Very conservative. In the models presented in Table 2 of the main text, this variable is interacted with the measure of state-level ideology (see below) to capture congruence between survey respondents and their state legislatures (see Wolak 2018).

Party: Partisanship is measured using two indicators capturing whether respondents identified as Independents (1 = yes; 0 = no) or Republicans (1 = yes; 0 = no), with Democrats serving as the omitted category. Independent “leaners” are coded as partisans.

Strong Partisan: This measure is a binary indicator capturing whether respondents identified as “strong” Republicans or Democrats (1=strong partisan; 0=not strong partisan).

Political Knowledge: I employ two political knowledge variables in my analysis. The first measure used to capture the relationship between respondent estimates of women's representation in Congress is a six-point measure ranging from 0-5 and captures respondents' ability to identify the following: the party of both of their senators, the party of their representative, the party controlling the U.S. House of Representatives, and the Party controlling the U.S. Senate. In the analysis of state-level efficacy I use a measure of state specific knowledge. This is a four-point measure ranging from 0-3 and captures respondents' ability to identify the following: the party of their governor, the party in control of the lower chamber of the state house, and the party in control of the upper chamber of the state house.¹

Education: This variable is a binary indicator capturing whether respondents held a college degree (1 = yes; 0 = no).

Race: Race is a binary indicator capturing whether respondents identified as white (1=yes; 0=no).

Age: As part of the survey, respondents were asked to provide their year of birth. Age is calculated by subtracting birth year from the year in which respondents participated in the CCES.

Employed: This variable is a binary indicator capturing whether respondents reported having a full-time or part-time job. Results of all analyses presented in the main text and appendix are robust to the classification of employed as only those holding full-time jobs.

Religiosity: Consistent with previous research, I conceptualize religiosity as the frequency with which respondents attend religious services (Lawless 2004; Atkeson and Carrillo 2007). The resulting variable is a

¹As a unicameral legislature, Nebraska does not have an upper chamber. Respondents answering “other” were coded as correct on this measure.

six-point measure ranging from “never attend” to “more than once a week.”

Female Senator: This measure is a binary indicator capturing whether respondents were represented by a woman in the U.S. Senate. The measure is constructed using the roster of members of Congress available through the Center on American Women and Politics at Rutgers University.

Female Representative: This measure is a binary indicator capturing whether respondents were represented by a woman in the U.S. House of Representatives. The measure is constructed using the roster of members of Congress available through the Center on American Women and Politics at Rutgers University.

Women in State Legislature: This measure captures the percentage of seats held by women in respondents’ state legislature at the time they participated in the study. The measure is constructed using information about women’s representation in the American states, which is available through the Center on American Women and Politics at Rutgers University.

State Ideology: This measure uses Berry et al.’s (2010) updated measure of state government ideology (see also Berry et al. 1998). Higher scores on this measure represent higher levels of state government liberalism. Berry et. al’s original measure ranges from 0-100; for my analysis this measure is rescaled to range from 0-1. The analysis presented in the main text uses the 2017 scores to measure state government ideology.

Partisan Congruence with State Legislature: This measure captures whether respondents live in a state where their political party has unified control of the state legislature (congruence=1). Respondents living in states where the opposing party has unified control or party control is split across chambers are coded as 0’s.

A2 Results by Year

The analysis presented in Table 1 of the main text relied on a pooled sample of survey respondents who participated in the 2016 and 2018 waves of the CCES. The results of that analysis indicated that for *both* men and women, believing that women were included in Congress was associated with higher levels of external efficacy. The results presented in this section disaggregate the results by survey year to test for any differences in the relationship observed in the main text across the two waves of the study. Though there are some differences between 2016 and 2018—which I outline below—in general, the substantive conclusions presented in the body of the article hold. For the reader’s reference, results from Table 1 in the main text are reproduced in Table A1 and are labeled “Full.”

The results in the main text found evidence of a relationship between beliefs about women’s representation in Congress and feelings of political efficacy. Moreover, results from an interactive model uncovered evidence that this effect was present for both men and women and not significantly different across the two groups. Results for the same statistical models using only 2018 respondents produced similar results. The marginal effect was positive and significant ($p < .05$) for both men and women, and the magnitude of this effect was not significantly different across groups. Models using only respondents in 2016, produced some slightly different results. The term *Estimate % Women* in the interactive models is marginally significant ($p=0.069$) offering only weak evidence of an effect for men in this year. Moreover, in the interactive model for this year, the interaction between respondent gender and beliefs about women’s representation is significant, indicating beliefs were more positively associated with external efficacy for women than for men. The

marginal effect for women was 0.0039 ($p < .05$), an increase of about .0023 over men.

Though the results for 2016 paint a somewhat different picture than the results from 2018 and the pooled models, as I discuss in greater detail in the next section, these differences are largely the result of shifting relationships among partisan *men* across the two waves of the study. Specifically, disaggregating the results by year and party, we see that in 2016, beliefs about women’s inclusion were associated with higher levels of efficacy among *Democratic* men. For Republican men, no relationship was uncovered. In 2018, in contrast, beliefs about women’s inclusion are associated with higher levels of efficacy among *both* Democratic and Republican men, leading to an overall effect for men in 2018 and ultimately the pooled analysis. That Republican men can receive symbolic benefits from women’s perceived inclusion is consistent with recent research that suggests that women’s representation can have legitimizing effects for all citizens across gender and political parties (Clayton, O’Brien and Piscopo 2019). Importantly—and discussed in greater detail in subsequent sections—a positive relationship between perceptions of women’s representation and feelings of efficacy is consistently observed for women of both parties across years.

In total, the results presented here, and in the next section, indicate a robust and consistent relationship between beliefs about women’s inclusion and political efficacy among women. While the relationship is slightly more context dependent for men, the results nonetheless support the substantive conclusions presented in the main text: In some instances, men can also benefit from the belief that institutions are gender diverse.

A3 Untangling the Role of Respondent Partisanship

In this section, I reestimate the models reported in Table 1 of the main text to include interactions between perceptions and respondent partisanship. Because women are often stereotyped as more liberal (King and Matland 2003; Koch 2002), Democratic respondents who believe women are represented in Congress may also believe that their partisan identities are better represented. If this is the case, the results presented in the main text could be driven by Democratic respondents, and may have less to do with gender and more to do with party or the belief that certain substantive outcomes are more likely. Results presented here, however, lead to substantive conclusions that are largely consistent with those in the main text. Among both Democratic men and women, beliefs about women’s representation are consistently associated with higher levels of efficacy, as expected. Similarly, among Republican women, a consistent positive relationship emerges. In both 2016 and 2018, I find no evidence that the relationship between beliefs about inclusion and efficacy among women is moderated by partisanship. This suggests that efficacy is being driven by beliefs about women’s (rather than partisan) representation. Among men, in contrast, there is evidence of a moderated relationship in 2016. In this year, a positive and significant relationship emerges among Democratic men (marginal effect = .003; $p < .05$), while no such effect emerges among Republican men (marginal effect = $-.001$; $p = .385$). In 2018 however, there is no evidence indicating a moderated relationship and a positive and significant effect emerges among both Democratic and Republican men. This finding—that men of both parties can receive symbolic benefits from women’s perceived inclusion—is consistent with recent work that similarly finds that women’s representation confers institutional legitimacy across genders and partisan identities (Clayton, O’Brien and Piscopo 2019).

Table A1 Regression Models: Perceptions of Women’s Inclusion in Congress & External Efficacy (Results by Year)

	<i>Dependent variable: External Efficacy</i>					
	Full Sample		2016		2018	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Estimate % Women	0.003*** ($<.001$)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)
Female	-0.020* (0.011)	-0.038 (0.051)	-0.037** (0.015)	-0.068 (0.070)	-0.004 (0.017)	-0.001 (0.073)
Estimate % Women \times Female		0.001 (0.001)		0.002** (0.001)		-0.001 (0.001)
Ideology (lib. to cons.)	0.0001 (0.004)	0.0001 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.006)	-0.003 (0.006)	-0.002 (0.006)	-0.002 (0.006)
Independent	-0.059*** (0.019)	-0.059*** (0.019)	-0.083*** (0.025)	-0.084*** (0.025)	-0.021 (0.027)	-0.022 (0.027)
Republican	-0.016 (0.017)	-0.016 (0.017)	-0.095*** (0.022)	-0.094*** (0.022)	0.075*** (0.025)	0.074*** (0.025)
Strong Partisan	0.050*** (0.012)	0.050*** (0.012)	0.042** (0.017)	0.039** (0.017)	0.062*** (0.017)	0.061*** (0.017)
Political Knowledge	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.009* (0.005)	-0.009* (0.005)	0.007 (0.006)	0.007 (0.006)
Religiosity	0.014*** (0.004)	0.014*** (0.004)	0.015*** (0.005)	0.015*** (0.005)	0.013** (0.005)	0.013** (0.005)
Education	0.026** (0.012)	0.026** (0.012)	0.038** (0.017)	0.039** (0.017)	0.009 (0.017)	0.009 (0.017)
White	-0.025* (0.013)	-0.026* (0.014)	-0.001 (0.018)	-0.004 (0.018)	-0.046** (0.020)	-0.046** (0.020)
Age	-0.007*** (0.002)	-0.007*** (0.002)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.011*** (0.003)	-0.011*** (0.003)
Age Sq.	0.0001*** ($<.001$)	0.0001*** ($<.001$)	0.000 ($<.001$)	0.000 ($<.001$)	0.0001*** ($<.001$)	0.0001*** ($<.001$)
Employed	0.013 (0.013)	0.012 (0.013)	0.009 (0.018)	0.008 (0.018)	0.013 (0.018)	0.013 (0.018)
Woman Sen.	0.015 (0.013)	0.022 (0.018)	0.028 (0.018)	0.035 (0.025)	-0.001 (0.019)	0.009 (0.027)
Woman Sen. \times Female		-0.013 (0.024)		-0.011 (0.032)		-0.018 (0.036)
Woman Rep.	0.019 (0.014)	0.010 (0.021)	-0.001 (0.019)	-0.025 (0.026)	0.049** (0.022)	0.060* (0.033)
Woman Rep. \times Female		0.017 (0.029)		0.046 (0.037)		-0.018 (0.044)
Women in State Leg.	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.002 (0.002)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.002)
Women in State Leg. \times Female		0.0001 (0.002)		-0.001 (0.003)		0.001 (0.003)
Constant	0.372*** (0.054)	0.384*** (0.061)	0.321*** (0.076)	0.349*** (0.084)	0.442*** (0.076)	0.439*** (0.087)
N	1798	1798	893	893	905	905
Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓				
State Random Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Note:

*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
Standard errors in parentheses

Table A2 Regression Models: Partisanship, Perceptions of Women’s Inclusion in Congress & External Efficacy

	<i>Dependent variable: External Efficacy</i>							
	Women				Men			
	2016		2018		2016		2018	
Estimate % Women	0.004*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.002*** (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)	0.001* (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.004** (0.002)
Independent	-0.024 (0.035)	-0.080 (0.066)	0.007 (0.039)	0.012 (0.070)	-0.135*** (0.036)	-0.126* (0.065)	-0.064* (0.038)	0.008 (0.068)
Republican	-0.064** (0.029)	-0.056 (0.049)	0.119*** (0.031)	0.166*** (0.054)	-0.126*** (0.034)	-0.020 (0.055)	-0.0001 (0.040)	-0.008 (0.064)
Independent × Estimate % Women		0.002 (0.002)		-0.0002 (0.003)		-0.0004 (0.002)		-0.004 (0.003)
Republican × Estimate % Women		-0.0002 (0.002)		-0.002 (0.002)		-0.004** (0.002)		0.0002 (0.002)
Ideology (lib. to cons.)	-0.004 (0.008)	-0.004 (0.008)	-0.004 (0.008)	-0.005 (0.008)	-0.001 (0.009)	-0.002 (0.008)	0.005 (0.010)	0.005 (0.010)
Strong Partisan	0.035 (0.023)	0.036 (0.023)	0.073*** (0.023)	0.074*** (0.023)	0.036 (0.024)	0.030 (0.024)	0.048* (0.027)	0.046* (0.027)
Political Knowledge	-0.002 (0.006)	-0.002 (0.006)	0.009 (0.007)	0.010 (0.007)	-0.017** (0.007)	-0.017** (0.007)	0.006 (0.010)	0.005 (0.010)
Religiosity	0.015** (0.007)	0.015** (0.007)	0.008 (0.007)	0.008 (0.007)	0.013* (0.007)	0.012* (0.007)	0.020*** (0.007)	0.019** (0.007)
Education	0.074*** (0.024)	0.077*** (0.024)	0.028 (0.024)	0.027 (0.024)	0.010 (0.024)	0.010 (0.023)	-0.009 (0.025)	-0.005 (0.025)
White	-0.042* (0.025)	-0.042* (0.025)	-0.045* (0.025)	-0.043* (0.025)	0.033 (0.026)	0.035 (0.026)	-0.054* (0.032)	-0.055* (0.032)
Age	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.014*** (0.004)	-0.014*** (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.008* (0.004)	-0.008** (0.004)
Age Sq.	0.000 (<.001)	0.000 (<.001)	0.000*** (<.001)	0.000*** (<.001)	0.000 (<.001)	-0.000 (<.001)	0.000* (<.001)	0.000** (<.001)
Employed	0.007 (0.023)	0.007 (0.023)	-0.002 (0.024)	0.0001 (0.024)	0.007 (0.026)	0.007 (0.026)	0.028 (0.029)	0.031 (0.029)
Woman Sen.	0.029 (0.025)	0.028 (0.024)	-0.010 (0.025)	-0.010 (0.025)	0.032 (0.023)	0.032 (0.023)	0.008 (0.026)	0.008 (0.026)
Woman Rep.	0.012 (0.026)	0.010 (0.026)	0.047 (0.029)	0.043 (0.030)	-0.014 (0.026)	-0.010 (0.026)	0.056* (0.033)	0.053 (0.033)
Women in State Leg.	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)
Constant	0.244** (0.105)	0.248** (0.106)	0.506*** (0.096)	0.499*** (0.097)	0.379*** (0.104)	0.329*** (0.105)	0.382*** (0.118)	0.378*** (0.121)
N	471	471	501	501	422	422	404	404
State Random Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Note:

*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
Standard errors in parentheses

A4 Alternate Measures of Dyadic Representation: Familiarity with Elected Officials

The results presented in the main text control for the dyadic representation received by respondents using objective information about the gender of their senators and representatives. Given that the theoretical argument advanced in the main text contends that respondents' *perceptions* of collective representation are more informative than objective reality, controlling for actual dyadic representation may seem like a disconnect. I argue that measures of actual dyadic representation are justified because of the high levels of visibility senators and representatives have in the public. Because members of Congress are fairly visible, survey respondents are far more likely to be aware of the gender of their representatives than to know the overall gender composition of Congress (see Dolan 2011).

While it is likely that respondents are more accurate in their perceptions of the gendered dyadic representation they receive, in this section I present results from models using two alternate operationalizations of dyadic representation. Ideally, I would use a measure capturing whether or not respondents reported being represented by a woman in the Senate or House of Representatives. Unfortunately, the CCES does not ask respondents to identify the gender of their elected officials. However, the survey does ask respondents to identify the party of their senators and representative after providing the name of each individual. Included in this question is a response option where respondents can indicate having "never heard of" the individual in question. Using these partisan-knowledge questions, I create two alternate measures of dyadic representation. While these alternate measures do not directly capture whether respondents were aware that they were represented by women, they do capture the degree to which respondents were familiar with the women representing them.

The first alternate measure captures whether respondents were represented by a woman senator or representative in reality and whether they reported recognizing these individuals. These binary measures are coded 1 for respondents who were represented by a woman representative (senator) in reality *and* did not report "never hearing of" the individual. Respondents who were not represented by women in these positions were coded as 0's, as were respondents who were represented by women but reported having never heard of them. Results from models using this set of alternate measures are presented in Models 1 and 2 in Table A3.² The second alternate measure places a higher threshold on respondent familiarity with women senators and representatives. On these measures, respondents received a 1 if they were dyadically represented by a woman representative (senator) *and* if they were able to correctly identify her party. Respondents who were not represented by women and respondents who were represented by women but were unable to correctly identify the partisanship of these women were coded as 0's. In both cases, the results presented in the main text are robust to these alternate specifications.

²The models presented in Table A3 are identical to those reported in the main text, with the exception of the political-knowledge variable. Because questions asking respondents to identify the party of their representative and senators are now used to create measures of dyadic representation, these questions are excluded from the political-knowledge measure.

Table A3 Regression Models: Perceptions of Women’s Inclusion in Congress & External Efficacy. Models include alternate measures of the dyadic representation experienced by respondents.

	<i>Dependent variable: External Efficacy</i>			
	Alternate Measure 1		Alternate Measure 2	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Estimate % Women	0.003*** (0.0004)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.0004)	0.003*** (0.001)
Female	-0.022* (0.011)	-0.040 (0.051)	-0.022* (0.011)	-0.040 (0.051)
Estimate % Women × Female		0.001 (0.001)		0.001 (0.001)
Ideology	-0.000 (0.004)	-0.000 (0.004)	-0.000 (0.004)	-0.000 (0.004)
Independent	-0.061*** (0.019)	-0.060*** (0.019)	-0.060*** (0.019)	-0.060*** (0.019)
Republican	-0.016 (0.017)	-0.015 (0.017)	-0.017 (0.017)	-0.016 (0.017)
Strong Partisan	0.050*** (0.012)	0.050*** (0.012)	0.050*** (0.012)	0.050*** (0.012)
Political Knowledge	-0.013* (0.008)	-0.013* (0.008)	-0.014* (0.008)	-0.015* (0.008)
Religiosity	0.014*** (0.004)	0.014*** (0.004)	0.014*** (0.004)	0.014*** (0.004)
Education	0.027** (0.012)	0.028** (0.012)	0.027** (0.012)	0.027** (0.012)
White	-0.025* (0.013)	-0.026* (0.013)	-0.025* (0.013)	-0.026* (0.013)
Age	-0.007*** (0.002)	-0.007*** (0.002)	-0.007*** (0.002)	-0.007*** (0.002)
Age Sq.	0.000*** (<.001)	0.000*** (<.001)	0.000*** (<.001)	0.000*** (<.001)
Employed	0.012 (0.013)	0.012 (0.013)	0.012 (0.013)	0.012 (0.013)
Woman Sen.	0.015 (0.013)	0.022 (0.018)	0.017 (0.013)	0.020 (0.019)
Woman Sen. × Female		-0.012 (0.024)		-0.005 (0.025)
Woman Rep.	0.018 (0.015)	0.011 (0.021)	0.020 (0.017)	-0.008 (0.024)
Woman Rep. × Female		0.012 (0.029)		0.055* (0.033)
Women in State Leg.	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Women in State Leg. × Female		0.000 (0.002)		-0.000 (0.002)
Constant	0.377*** (0.054)	0.389*** (0.061)	0.380*** (0.054)	0.394*** (0.061)
N	1798	1798	1798	1798
Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
State Random Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓

Note: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
Standard errors in parentheses

A5 Linear Models: State Responsiveness

Results presented in Table 2 in the main text used a series of ordered probits to evaluate the relationship between beliefs about women’s presence in state legislatures and evaluations of legislative responsiveness. In this section, I use a series of linear models to estimate this relationship. The substantive conclusions in the main text are robust to this alternate specification. Believing women are included has a positive effect on feelings of legislative responsiveness among both men and women, and this effect is not significantly different across groups.

A6 Analysis on Restricted Samples

In order to ensure that the results presented in the main text are not an artifact of outliers in the data—i.e., respondents who grossly overestimated women’s representation—this section presents an alternate set of models that exclude respondents who provided estimates higher than three cutpoints: 55 percent, 50 percent, and 45 percent. In other respects the models follow the same specification indicated in the main text. Table A5 reports the results of models that regress external efficacy on perceptions of women’s representation in Congress (see Table 1 in the main text). Table A6 presents the results of a series of ordered probit models mirroring the state-level analysis presented in Table 2 in the main text. Finally, Table A7 provides an alternate set of the models presented in Table 3 in the main text. Overall, the results of these additional models support the substantive conclusions presented in the main text, and help to ensure that the observed relationship between beliefs about women’s representation and feelings of political efficacy are not the result of respondents who provided extreme estimates.

Table A4 Linear Models: Perceptions of Women’s Inclusion in State Legislatures & Evaluations of State Responsiveness

	<i>Dependent variable: State Responsiveness</i>	
	(1)	(2)
Women in State Leg.	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.006)
Estimate % Women	0.005*** (0.002)	0.006** (0.003)
Female	0.049 (0.053)	0.052 (0.219)
Women in State Leg. × Female		0.0005 (0.009)
Estimate % Women × Female		-0.001 (0.004)
Ideology (lib. to cons.)	0.228*** (0.041)	0.229*** (0.041)
State Ideology	2.496*** (0.375)	2.496*** (0.376)
Ideology × State Ideology	-0.607*** (0.087)	-0.607*** (0.087)
Congruence	0.254*** (0.071)	0.254*** (0.071)
Independent	-0.162* (0.086)	-0.162* (0.086)
Republican	0.047 (0.084)	0.046 (0.084)
Strong Partisan	0.015 (0.058)	0.016 (0.058)
Political Knowledge	-0.008 (0.027)	-0.008 (0.027)
Age	-0.023** (0.009)	-0.022** (0.009)
Age Sq.	0.0002*** (<.001)	0.0002*** (<.001)
White	-0.088 (0.060)	-0.088 (0.060)
Education	0.0004 (0.057)	-0.000 (0.057)
Employed	0.004 (0.057)	0.004 (0.057)
Religiosity	0.033* (0.017)	0.033* (0.017)
Constant	1.649*** (0.295)	1.642*** (0.324)
N	873	873
State Random Effects	✓	✓

Note: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
Standard errors in parentheses

Table A5 Regression Models: Perceptions of Women’s Inclusion in Congress & External Efficacy. In each set of models, respondents providing estimates above the listed “cutpoint” are excluded.

	<i>Dependent variable: External Efficacy</i>					
	Cutpoint: 55		Cutpoint: 50		Cutpoint: 45	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Estimate % Women	0.003*** (0.001)	0.002*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.002*** (0.001)	0.002*** (0.001)	0.002** (0.001)
Female	-0.021* (0.012)	-0.036 (0.052)	-0.022* (0.012)	-0.032 (0.052)	-0.019 (0.012)	-0.027 (0.053)
Estimate % Women × Female		0.001 (0.001)		0.0001 (0.001)		0.001 (0.001)
Ideology (lib. to cons.)	-0.0002 (0.004)	-0.0002 (0.004)	0.0002 (0.004)	0.0002 (0.004)	0.002 (0.004)	0.002 (0.004)
Independent	-0.057*** (0.019)	-0.057*** (0.019)	-0.057*** (0.019)	-0.058*** (0.019)	-0.056*** (0.019)	-0.056*** (0.019)
Republican	-0.011 (0.017)	-0.011 (0.017)	-0.012 (0.017)	-0.012 (0.017)	-0.014 (0.017)	-0.013 (0.017)
Strong Partisan	0.048*** (0.012)	0.048*** (0.012)	0.048*** (0.012)	0.048*** (0.012)	0.047*** (0.012)	0.046*** (0.012)
Political Knowledge	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.004)
Religiosity	0.013*** (0.004)	0.013*** (0.004)	0.013*** (0.004)	0.013*** (0.004)	0.013*** (0.004)	0.013*** (0.004)
Education	0.026** (0.012)	0.026** (0.012)	0.024** (0.012)	0.024** (0.012)	0.022* (0.012)	0.022* (0.012)
White	-0.024* (0.014)	-0.025* (0.014)	-0.024* (0.014)	-0.025* (0.014)	-0.023 (0.014)	-0.023* (0.014)
Age	-0.007*** (0.002)	-0.007*** (0.002)	-0.007*** (0.002)	-0.007*** (0.002)	-0.007*** (0.002)	-0.007*** (0.002)
Age Sq.	0.0001*** ($<.001$)	0.0001*** ($<.001$)	0.0001*** ($<.001$)	0.0001*** ($<.001$)	0.0001*** ($<.001$)	0.0001*** ($<.001$)
Employed	0.012 (0.013)	0.012 (0.013)	0.012 (0.013)	0.012 (0.013)	0.012 (0.013)	0.012 (0.013)
Woman Sen.	0.016 (0.012)	0.019 (0.018)	0.017 (0.012)	0.020 (0.018)	0.019 (0.012)	0.025 (0.018)
Woman Sen. × Female		-0.005 (0.024)		-0.005 (0.024)		-0.010 (0.025)
Woman Rep.	0.018 (0.014)	0.008 (0.021)	0.019 (0.014)	0.007 (0.021)	0.022 (0.015)	0.015 (0.021)
Woman Rep. × Female		0.019 (0.029)		0.021 (0.029)		0.012 (0.029)
Women in State Leg.	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.002 (0.001)
Women in State Leg. × Female		-0.0001 (0.002)		-0.000 (0.002)		-0.001 (0.002)
Constant	0.386*** (0.055)	0.396*** (0.062)	0.385*** (0.055)	0.392*** (0.062)	0.376*** (0.055)	0.382*** (0.063)
N	1775	1775	1768	1768	1721	1721
Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
State Random Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Note:

*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
Standard errors in parentheses

Table A6 Ordered Probit Models: Perceptions of Women’s Inclusion in State Legislatures & Evaluations of State Responsiveness. In each set of models, respondents providing estimates above the listed “cutpoint” are excluded.

	<i>Dependent variable: State Responsiveness</i>					
	Cutpoint: 55		Cutpoint: 50		Cutpoint: 45	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Women in State Leg.	-0.0002 (0.007)	0.001 (0.010)	0.002 (0.007)	0.004 (0.010)	0.001 (0.007)	0.004 (0.010)
Estimate % Women	0.009*** (0.003)	0.009** (0.005)	0.009*** (0.003)	0.010** (0.005)	0.008** (0.004)	0.007 (0.005)
Female	0.065 (0.079)	0.123 (0.327)	0.053 (0.080)	0.195 (0.332)	0.081 (0.082)	0.177 (0.339)
Women in State Leg. × Female		-0.003 (0.013)		-0.004 (0.013)		-0.005 (0.013)
Estimate % Women × Female		0.0004 (0.006)		-0.002 (0.006)		0.001 (0.007)
Ideology (lib. to cons.)	0.348*** (0.062)	0.349*** (0.062)	0.362*** (0.063)	0.364*** (0.063)	0.385*** (0.066)	0.386*** (0.066)
State Ideology	3.853*** (0.573)	3.861*** (0.574)	3.951*** (0.577)	3.962*** (0.578)	4.306*** (0.605)	4.321*** (0.607)
Ideology × State Ideology	-0.926*** (0.134)	-0.927*** (0.134)	-0.971*** (0.135)	-0.974*** (0.135)	-1.026*** (0.141)	-1.029*** (0.141)
Congruence	0.334*** (0.107)	0.333*** (0.107)	0.324*** (0.108)	0.324*** (0.108)	0.391*** (0.112)	0.390*** (0.112)
Independent	-0.239* (0.128)	-0.240* (0.128)	-0.239* (0.129)	-0.239* (0.129)	-0.194 (0.131)	-0.194 (0.131)
Republican	0.061 (0.128)	0.061 (0.128)	0.074 (0.129)	0.072 (0.129)	0.067 (0.133)	0.067 (0.133)
Strong Partisan	0.024 (0.086)	0.024 (0.086)	0.028 (0.086)	0.030 (0.086)	0.029 (0.089)	0.029 (0.089)
Political Knowledge	-0.010 (0.040)	-0.011 (0.040)	-0.017 (0.040)	-0.017 (0.040)	-0.015 (0.042)	-0.016 (0.042)
Age	-0.036*** (0.014)	-0.036*** (0.014)	-0.039*** (0.014)	-0.038*** (0.014)	-0.034** (0.014)	-0.034** (0.014)
Age Sq.	0.000*** ($<.001$)	0.000*** ($<.001$)	0.000*** ($<.001$)	0.000*** ($<.001$)	0.000*** ($<.001$)	0.000*** ($<.001$)
White	-0.109 (0.089)	-0.109 (0.089)	-0.103 (0.089)	-0.103 (0.089)	-0.134 (0.092)	-0.133 (0.092)
Education	-0.010 (0.084)	-0.011 (0.084)	-0.015 (0.085)	-0.017 (0.085)	-0.015 (0.087)	-0.015 (0.087)
Employed	0.036 (0.085)	0.036 (0.085)	0.036 (0.085)	0.036 (0.085)	0.029 (0.088)	0.029 (0.088)
Religiosity	0.044* (0.025)	0.044* (0.025)	0.043* (0.025)	0.043* (0.025)	0.037 (0.026)	0.037 (0.026)
Cut 1	0.061 (0.440)	0.091 (0.485)	0.059 (0.442)	0.154 (0.487)	0.294 (0.456)	0.344 (0.502)
Cut 2	1.123** (0.441)	1.154** (0.485)	1.120** (0.442)	1.216** (0.488)	1.359*** (0.457)	1.409*** (0.503)
Cut 3	2.947*** (0.450)	2.978*** (0.494)	2.954*** (0.452)	3.049*** (0.497)	3.279*** (0.470)	3.329*** (0.514)
N	856	856	848	848	809	809
State Random Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Note:

*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
Standard errors in parentheses

Table A7 Panel Models: Changes in Respondent Perceptions of Women’s Inclusion in Congress & Changes in External Efficacy. In each set of models, respondents providing estimates above the listed “cutpoint” are excluded.

	<i>Dependent variable: Δ Efficacy</i>											
	Cutpoint: 55			Cutpoint: 50			Cutpoint: 45					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Δ Perceptions	0.002*** (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)	0.002*** (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)	0.002*** (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)	0.002*** (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)	0.002** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.002** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)
Female		0.018 (0.017)		-0.004 (0.029)		0.018 (0.017)		-0.004 (0.029)		0.020 (0.018)		-0.001 (0.030)
Δ Perceptions \times Female		-0.001 (0.001)		-0.001 (0.001)		-0.001 (0.002)		-0.001 (0.002)		-0.001 (0.002)		-0.001 (0.002)
Δ Female Rep.			-0.004 (0.029)	0.009 (0.039)			-0.004 (0.029)	0.009 (0.039)			-0.006 (0.029)	0.009 (0.039)
Δ Female Sen.			-0.022 (0.018)	-0.010 (0.023)			-0.022 (0.018)	-0.010 (0.023)			-0.025 (0.018)	-0.011 (0.023)
Δ Women in State Leg.			-0.004 (0.003)	-0.007* (0.004)			-0.004 (0.003)	-0.007* (0.004)			-0.004 (0.003)	-0.007 (0.004)
Δ Female Rep. \times Female				-0.023 (0.056)				-0.023 (0.056)				-0.026 (0.057)
Δ Female Sen. \times Female				-0.020 (0.036)				-0.020 (0.036)				-0.023 (0.036)
Δ Women in State Leg. \times Female				0.004 (0.006)				0.004 (0.006)				0.004 (0.006)
Constant	0.053*** (0.009)	0.043*** (0.012)	0.062*** (0.015)	0.066*** (0.022)	0.053*** (0.009)	0.043*** (0.012)	0.062*** (0.015)	0.066*** (0.022)	0.054*** (0.009)	0.042*** (0.012)	0.062*** (0.015)	0.064*** (0.022)
N	872	872	871	871	871	871	870	870	856	856	855	855

Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Standard errors in parentheses

A7 Placebo Test: Do Beliefs About Congress Influence Attitudes Towards State Legislatures?

This section presents the results of the placebo analysis discussed in Footnote 26 of the main text. The primary goal of this analysis is twofold. First, this analysis allows me to test whether respondents hold distinct views about women's representation across different institutions, and how these views uniquely predict efficacy towards the institutions in question. If respondents do not differentiate between institutions when thinking about women's representation, perceptions of representation in Congress should predict state-level attitudes.

Second, this analysis helps to rule out the possibility that the estimates provided by survey respondents are in some way the result of expressive responding. For example, respondents who hold a more positive affect towards government generally may express approval for these institutions by reporting that they are both responsive *and* inclusive. As Dolan and Sanbonmatsu (2009) note, when asked to describe the ideal gender composition of Congress, many Americans express a desire for levels of inclusion that far outpace reality. Those with positive affect towards government may simply assume (or intentionally report) that reality is closer to their ideal than those with a negative orientation towards politics. If this is the case, the estimates provided by respondents may not capture distinct perceptions of women's representation across various institutions, but rather a general positive (negative) orientation towards politics.

In order to address this alternative explanation, I conduct a placebo analysis in which evaluations of state responsiveness are modeled as a function of respondent estimates of women's representation in Congress. If high (low) estimates reflect positive (negative) affect towards government generally, I expect that this should result in respondents providing higher estimates of women's representation for *both* Congress and their state legislature. If this is the case, I would expect that respondents' estimates of women in *Congress* would also predict evaluations of state legislative responsiveness. Table A8 presents the results of this analysis. I reestimate the models presented in Table 2 of the main text. Models 1-4 replace perceptions of women's representation in respondents' state legislatures with beliefs about Congress, using both linear and ordered models. Models 5-8 include measures for respondent estimates of both Congress and their state legislature. Though I find a moderate correlation between estimates of women in Congress and in state legislatures ($\rho = .64$), across model specifications estimates of congressional representation are a poor predictor of state-level attitudes.

Table A8 Ordered Probit Models: Placebo Test – Do Perceptions of Women’s Inclusion in Congress Influence Evaluations of State Responsiveness?

	<i>Dependent variable: State Responsiveness</i>							
	Congressional Estimates				Congressional & State Estimates			
	Ordered		Linear		Ordered		Linear	
Women in State Leg.	0.001 (0.007)	-0.0002 (0.009)	0.001 (0.004)	0.0003 (0.006)	-0.001 (0.007)	-0.003 (0.009)	-0.001 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.006)
Estimate % Women in Cong.	0.003 (0.003)	0.005 (0.004)	0.002 (0.002)	0.003 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.007)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.004)
Estimate % Women in State Leg.					0.010*** (0.003)	0.011* (0.006)	0.006*** (0.002)	0.007* (0.004)
Female	0.064 (0.078)	0.078 (0.337)	0.047 (0.054)	0.067 (0.231)	0.071 (0.078)	0.045 (0.338)	0.051 (0.053)	0.044 (0.231)
Women in State Leg. × Female		0.002 (0.012)		0.001 (0.008)		0.003 (0.013)		0.001 (0.009)
Estimate % Women in Cong × Female		-0.003 (0.006)		-0.001 (0.004)		0.001 (0.008)		0.001 (0.005)
Estimate Women in State Leg. × Female						-0.003 (0.007)		-0.002 (0.005)
Ideology (lib. to cons.)	0.327*** (0.061)	0.327*** (0.061)	0.227*** (0.041)	0.227*** (0.042)	0.331*** (0.061)	0.332*** (0.062)	0.228*** (0.041)	0.229*** (0.041)
State Ideology	3.749*** (0.558)	3.741*** (0.560)	2.573*** (0.376)	2.570*** (0.377)	3.631*** (0.561)	3.625*** (0.562)	2.479*** (0.376)	2.478*** (0.377)
Ideology × State Ideology	-0.878*** (0.130)	-0.877*** (0.130)	-0.609*** (0.087)	-0.608*** (0.087)	-0.879*** (0.130)	-0.879*** (0.130)	-0.606*** (0.087)	-0.606*** (0.087)
Congruence	0.374*** (0.104)	0.377*** (0.104)	0.262*** (0.071)	0.264*** (0.071)	0.360*** (0.104)	0.360*** (0.105)	0.253*** (0.071)	0.252*** (0.071)
Independent	-0.213* (0.125)	-0.214* (0.125)	-0.153* (0.086)	-0.153* (0.086)	-0.226* (0.126)	-0.227* (0.126)	-0.161* (0.086)	-0.161* (0.086)
Republican	0.088 (0.123)	0.084 (0.123)	0.062 (0.084)	0.060 (0.084)	0.064 (0.123)	0.062 (0.124)	0.047 (0.084)	0.046 (0.084)
Strong Partisan	0.035 (0.085)	0.036 (0.085)	0.015 (0.058)	0.015 (0.058)	0.043 (0.085)	0.045 (0.085)	0.019 (0.058)	0.020 (0.058)
Political Knowledge	-0.010 (0.039)	-0.009 (0.039)	-0.011 (0.027)	-0.011 (0.027)	-0.006 (0.039)	-0.005 (0.039)	-0.009 (0.027)	-0.009 (0.027)
Age	-0.033** (0.013)	-0.033** (0.013)	-0.023** (0.009)	-0.023** (0.009)	-0.032** (0.013)	-0.032** (0.013)	-0.022** (0.009)	-0.022** (0.009)
Age Sq.	0.0003*** ($<.001$)	0.0003** ($<.001$)	0.0002*** ($<.001$)	0.0002*** ($<.001$)	0.0003*** ($<.001$)	0.0003** ($<.001$)	0.0002*** ($<.001$)	0.0002*** ($<.001$)
White	-0.156* (0.087)	-0.158* (0.087)	-0.101* (0.060)	-0.101* (0.060)	-0.136 (0.088)	-0.136 (0.088)	-0.087 (0.060)	-0.087 (0.060)
Education	-0.010 (0.083)	-0.011 (0.084)	-0.001 (0.057)	-0.002 (0.057)	-0.013 (0.084)	-0.015 (0.084)	-0.003 (0.057)	-0.004 (0.057)
Employed	0.010 (0.083)	0.009 (0.083)	-0.003 (0.057)	-0.003 (0.057)	0.024 (0.084)	0.025 (0.084)	0.005 (0.057)	0.006 (0.057)
Religiosity	0.050** (0.025)	0.049** (0.025)	0.035** (0.017)	0.035** (0.017)	0.047* (0.025)	0.046* (0.025)	0.033** (0.017)	0.033** (0.017)
Constant			1.689*** (0.298)	1.670*** (0.329)			1.670*** (0.297)	1.669*** (0.328)
Cut 1	-0.026 (0.436)	-0.003 (0.482)			0.010 (0.437)	0.008 (0.483)		
Cut 2	1.025** (0.437)	1.047** (0.482)			1.064** (0.437)	1.062** (0.483)		
Cut 3	2.804*** (0.445)	2.829*** (0.490)			2.857*** (0.446)	2.856*** (0.491)		
N	873	873	873	873	873	873	873	873
State Random Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Note:

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Standard errors in parentheses

A8 Perceptions or Accuracy?

In the main text, I argue that respondent perceptions of women’s representation play a role in shaping their levels of political efficacy. However, it is possible that efficacy is shaped not by perceptions per se, but rather by the degree to which respondents are misinformed. In other words, for the respondent who estimates that women hold 45 percent of seats in Congress, is it the belief that women are near parity that shapes their levels of efficacy, or is it something about the degree to which they are uninformed (i.e., overestimating by 20 percent)? Though similar, these two concepts do have slightly different ramifications for the theoretical arguments advanced in this paper, as one is about respondent perceptions in their own right, and one is about the degree to which these perceptions diverge from reality. This subtle difference is one that the congressional data is unable to address. Because in any survey year the objective reality of women’s collective representation is the same for all respondents, any measure of accuracy will necessarily be perfectly correlated with respondent perceptions.

State-level data, however, does allow me to untangle perception and accuracy because of variation in women’s representation. For example, a respondent living in a state where women hold 40 percent of seats who estimates that women hold 30 percent of seats in the legislature is just as inaccurate as a respondent living in a state where women hold just 15 percent of seats who estimates that they hold 5 percent. Using this data, I create an accuracy measure that captures the absolute distance between respondent estimates and the reality of their state. For example, respondents living in a state with 40 percent women, estimates of 42 percent and 38 percent would both be coded as 2’s. Models including this measure are presented in columns 1 and 2 of Table A9. In Model 1 the accuracy term is not significant, indicating that the degree to which respondents misestimate women’s representation does not influence efficacy outside of the role this accuracy plays in shaping net respondent perceptions. Moreover, Model 2 indicates this null finding is not contingent on respondent gender.

I also test this relationship using a modeling strategy that allows me to account for both accuracy and direction (i.e., is there a difference between overestimating by 5 percent as opposed to underestimating?). In Models 3 and 4 in Table A9, I include an interaction between the accuracy measure discussed above and a dummy variable capturing whether respondents underestimated women’s representation. This interaction allows me to capture whether the effect of being inaccurate differs between underestimators and overestimators. Consistent with the preceding models, the results presented in Models 3 and 4 do not indicate that accuracy in and of itself plays a role in shaping efficacy. To the extent that accuracy plays a role in shaping efficacy then, it should be based on how deviations from reality inflate (or deflate) respondent raw perceptions rather than the size of these deviations themselves.

Table A9 Ordered Probit Models: Respondent Accuracy & Evaluations of State Responsiveness

	<i>Dependent variable: State Responsiveness</i>			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Female	0.073 (0.078)	0.068 (0.129)	0.066 (0.078)	0.054 (0.176)
Abs. Diff	0.004 (0.004)	0.003 (0.007)	-0.003 (0.007)	-0.004 (0.010)
Over Estimated			0.075 (0.130)	0.047 (0.199)
Abs. Diff × Female		0.0004 (0.008)		0.002 (0.013)
Abs. Diff × Over			0.010 (0.009)	0.013 (0.013)
Over × Female				0.045 (0.261)
Abs. Diff × Over × Female				-0.005 (0.017)
Ideology (lib. to cons.)	0.328*** (0.061)	0.328*** (0.061)	0.328*** (0.061)	0.329*** (0.061)
State Ideology	3.765*** (0.558)	3.764*** (0.558)	3.717*** (0.559)	3.717*** (0.559)
Ideology × State Ideology	-0.882*** (0.130)	-0.882*** (0.130)	-0.881*** (0.130)	-0.881*** (0.130)
Congruence	0.377*** (0.104)	0.376*** (0.104)	0.369*** (0.104)	0.370*** (0.104)
Independent	-0.200 (0.125)	-0.200 (0.125)	-0.226* (0.126)	-0.227* (0.126)
Republican	0.099 (0.123)	0.099 (0.123)	0.066 (0.124)	0.063 (0.124)
Strong Partisan	0.049 (0.084)	0.049 (0.084)	0.032 (0.085)	0.032 (0.085)
Political Knowledge	-0.013 (0.039)	-0.013 (0.039)	-0.009 (0.039)	-0.009 (0.039)
Age	-0.033** (0.013)	-0.033** (0.013)	-0.032** (0.013)	-0.032** (0.013)
Age Sq.	0.0003*** (i.001)	0.0003*** (i.001)	0.0003*** (i.001)	0.0003** (i.001)
White	-0.154* (0.087)	-0.154* (0.087)	-0.131 (0.088)	-0.130 (0.088)
Education	-0.015 (0.083)	-0.015 (0.083)	-0.008 (0.083)	-0.009 (0.083)
Employed	0.015 (0.083)	0.015 (0.083)	0.023 (0.083)	0.024 (0.084)
Religiosity	0.050** (0.025)	0.050** (0.025)	0.046* (0.025)	0.045* (0.025)
Cut 1	-0.057 (0.410)	-0.060 (0.416)	-0.054 (0.414)	-0.051 (0.426)
Cut 2	0.991** (0.411)	0.988** (0.416)	1.000** (0.415)	1.003** (0.426)
Cut 3	2.774*** (0.420)	2.770*** (0.426)	2.790*** (0.424)	2.793*** (0.435)
N	873	873	873	873
State Random Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓

Note:

*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
Standard errors in parentheses

A9 2018 Panel: Respondent Characteristics and Changes in Efficacy

In Table 3 of the main text, I use panel data to estimate the relationship between changes in respondent perceptions of women’s inclusion and changes in efficacy. Because the dependent and independent variable in these models are differenced, this modeling strategy is the equivalent of a respondent fixed effect. This allows me to account for *all* time invariant characteristics of my respondents. Inclusion of a constant in these models captures the overtime drift in efficacy across the two time periods and is the equivalent of a survey-wave fixed effect. However, one assumption of this modeling strategy is that individual characteristics (race, gender, partisanship) have the same relationship with efficacy in both time periods. Given the election that occurred between the two surveys, this assumption may not be tenable. To test the robustness of my results, in this section, I re-estimate the models from Table 3 below, this time including my standard battery of controls. Under this modeling approach, the coefficient associated with each control captures the overtime shift associated with each variable. Most controls are insignificant, suggesting the assumption of my original models hold for the majority of covariates. The party terms are significant and negative, indicating that Republicans and Independents had smaller shifts in efficacy between the two time periods compared to Democrats. This makes intuitive sense given the Democrats regaining control of the House of Representatives as a result of the midterm elections. However, as the results presented in Table A10 indicate, main results from Table 3 are generally robust to this alternate specification.

A10 2018 Panel: Do Effect Sizes Differ for Over- and Underestimators

Results presented in Table 3 of the main text examined how change in perceptions of representation influence changes in respondent levels of efficacy. While this estimation strategy provided evidence that changes in perceptions are associated with changes in efficacy, these models do not account for possible differences in effect sizes for overestimators and underestimators. In other words, for those who originally overestimated women’s presence, receiving information that representation was worse than they believed may have an effect larger in magnitude than underestimators learning representation is better than they believed, or vice versa. In this section I account for these possible differences in magnitude by estimating a new set of models accounting for differences between these two groups.

In these new models, change in efficacy is regressed on a measure that captures the magnitude of the correction received by respondents. This variable is calculated by taking the absolute value of respondents’ original estimates subtracted from 23.6 (the percentage of seats respondents were told would be held by women in the 116th Congress) to capture the magnitude, but not direction, of the correction. This measure is interacted with a dummy variable that is coded 1 if respondents originally underestimated women’s representation and 0 if respondents overestimated.³ This interaction allows me to capture whether respondents who overestimated women’s representation responded differently than those who underestimated representation.

Models 1 and 2 in Table A11 presents results for the overall sample. As expected, these models show that for underestimators, receiving updated information is associated with an *increase* in political efficacy

³No respondent provided an estimate of exactly 23.6 and thus all respondents over- or underestimated women’s representation to some extent, though some certainly more than others.

Table A10 Panel Models: Changes in Respondent Perceptions of Women’s Inclusion in Congress & Changes in External Efficacy

	<i>Dependent variable: Δ External Efficacy</i>			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Δ Perceptions	0.002** (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)	0.002** (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)
Female	0.004 (0.018)	0.005 (0.018)	0.004 (0.018)	-0.006 (0.031)
Female \times Δ Perceptions		-0.0003 (0.001)		-0.0003 (0.001)
Ideology (lib. to cons.)	-0.012* (0.007)	-0.012* (0.007)	-0.013* (0.007)	-0.013* (0.007)
Independent	-0.085*** (0.030)	-0.085*** (0.030)	-0.083*** (0.030)	-0.083*** (0.030)
Republican	-0.080*** (0.028)	-0.079*** (0.028)	-0.080*** (0.028)	-0.080*** (0.028)
Strong Partisan	0.004 (0.019)	0.004 (0.019)	0.003 (0.019)	0.003 (0.019)
Political Knowledge	0.003 (0.007)	0.003 (0.007)	0.004 (0.007)	0.004 (0.007)
Religiosity	0.007 (0.005)	0.007 (0.005)	0.008 (0.005)	0.008 (0.005)
Education	-0.039** (0.018)	-0.039** (0.018)	-0.039** (0.018)	-0.040** (0.018)
White	-0.007 (0.022)	-0.007 (0.022)	-0.007 (0.023)	-0.007 (0.023)
Age	0.001 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	0.000 (0.003)	0.000 (0.003)
Age Sq.	-0.000 ($<.001$)	-0.000 ($<.001$)	-0.000 ($<.001$)	-0.000 ($<.001$)
Employed	0.026 (0.020)	0.026 (0.020)	0.025 (0.020)	0.025 (0.020)
Δ Woman Rep.			-0.001 (0.031)	0.017 (0.039)
Δ Woman Sen.			-0.008 (0.018)	-0.004 (0.022)
Δ Women in State Leg.			-0.006** (0.003)	-0.007* (0.004)
Female \times Δ Woman Rep.				-0.031 (0.060)
Female \times Δ Woman Sen.				-0.008 (0.035)
Female \times Δ Women in State Leg.				0.002 (0.006)
Constant	0.113	0.112	0.139*	0.145*
N	878	878	877	877

Note:

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$
Standard errors in parentheses

(marginal effect = .004; $p < .05$). For overestimators receiving corrected information is associated with a decrease in efficacy (marginal effect = -0.003 ; $p < .05$). While the effect is slightly larger in magnitude for underestimators, substantively the ramifications of being corrected are similar for each group.

Models 3 and 4 test for gender differences through the inclusion of a triple interaction between respondent gender, the magnitude of the correction received, and whether respondents underestimated women's representation. The results of these models are consistent with the substantive conclusions drawn from Table 3 of the main text, and do not suggest that the relationships discussed in this section are moderated by respondent gender.

Table A11 Panel Models: Changes in Respondent Perceptions of Women's Inclusion in Congress & Changes in External Efficacy for Over- and Underestimators

	<i>Dependent variable: Change in Efficacy</i>			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Abs. Δ Perceptions	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.003** (0.002)	-0.005** (0.002)	-0.005** (0.002)
Under	-0.046 (0.028)	-0.046 (0.029)	-0.028 (0.038)	-0.026 (0.038)
Female			0.018 (0.037)	0.018 (0.038)
Abs. Δ Perceptions \times Under	0.007*** (0.002)	0.008*** (0.002)	0.008** (0.003)	0.008** (0.003)
Abs. Δ Perceptions \times Female			0.002 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)
Under \times Female			-0.034 (0.056)	-0.038 (0.056)
Abs. Δ Perceptions \times Under \times Female			-0.0001 (0.005)	-0.0001 (0.005)
Δ Woman Rep.		-0.005 (0.029)		-0.004 (0.029)
Δ Woman Sen.		-0.021 (0.018)		-0.023 (0.018)
Δ Women in State Leg.		-0.004 (0.003)		-0.004 (0.003)
Constant	0.072*** (0.019)	0.079*** (0.021)	0.064*** (0.024)	0.070*** (0.027)
N	878	877	878	877

Note:

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$
Standard errors in parentheses

A11 Are Findings the Result of Priming?

Readers may be concerned that the results presented in the main text are largely the product of priming. In the 2016 and 2018 (pre-election wave) CCES, respondents were asked to estimate the percentage of women in Congress immediately followed by the questions related to political efficacy. In this case, it is possible that respondents were primed to think about gender representation in a way that they otherwise would not when answering the efficacy questions, which would undermine my theoretical argument. This is less of a concern with the state-level analysis presented in Table 2 of the main text. While respondents were asked to estimate the percentage of women serving in their state legislature before being asked to evaluate legislative responsiveness, approximately nine and a half minutes of survey content separated the two survey items. In those nine and a half minutes, respondents were asked questions about race, economic inequality, immigration, judicial independence and executive action, among other things. Given the amount and nature of the content, it is unlikely that priming explains the observed relationship between beliefs about women's representation and evaluations of state legislative responsiveness.

While the nature of the survey used in the state-level analysis offers some assurance that my results are not an artifact of priming, I also conduct additional analyses to further exclude this possibility.

A11.1 Supplemental Analysis: Approval as the DV

To help rule out the possibility of priming, I conduct a supplemental analysis using congressional approval as an alternate measure of symbolic representation. Like external efficacy, approval has often been used as a measure of symbolic representation (i.e., Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005; Lawless 2004). Moreover, the concept should be linked to external efficacy, and many of the theoretical arguments advanced in the main text should hold for approval. Most critically for my purposes, the measures of approval I draw upon come from the common content of the CCES, which respondents completed *before* being asked to estimate the percentage of women in Congress. Thus, if I observe a positive relationship between beliefs about women's representation in Congress and congressional approval, I can be assured that this is not the result of priming.

Table A12 presents the results from 12 models using CCES data from 2016, 2017, and 2018. In 2016 and 2018, congressional approval is a four-point scale ranging from "strongly disapprove" to "strongly approve." In 2017, respondents were asked the extent to which they approved of the House and Senate separately. In this year I use approval of the House of Representatives as the dependent variable. Results from these models provide strong evidence linking beliefs about women's representation in Congress and institutional approval. In all years, as respondents believed women were increasingly included, their approval of the institution increased. As in the main text, positive effects are observed for both men and women, and these effects do not significantly differ. This further supports the argument outlined in the main text and helps to dispel concerns about priming.

Table A12 Perceptions of Women's Inclusion in Congress & Congressional Approval

	Dependent variable: Congressional Approval											
	2016					2017					2018	
	Linear	Ordered Probit	Linear	Ordered Probit	Linear	Ordered Probit	Linear	Ordered Probit	Linear	Ordered Probit	Linear	Ordered Probit
Estimate % Women	0.009*** (0.002)	0.012*** (0.003)	0.007** (0.003)	0.010** (0.004)	0.006*** (0.002)	0.010*** (0.003)	0.008*** (0.003)	0.015*** (0.005)	0.008*** (0.002)	0.013*** (0.004)	0.009*** (0.003)	0.014*** (0.005)
Female	0.093 (0.057)	0.163** (0.083)	-0.137 (0.260)	-0.124 (0.374)	0.094* (0.052)	0.160* (0.089)	0.038 (0.227)	0.034 (0.381)	0.058 (0.052)	0.106 (0.085)	0.312 (0.234)	0.641* (0.384)
Estimate % Women × Female			0.003 (0.004)	0.003 (0.006)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.008 (0.006)					-0.001 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.007)
Ideology (lib. to cons.)	0.104*** (0.021)	0.147*** (0.031)	0.102*** (0.021)	0.146*** (0.031)	0.062*** (0.019)	0.117*** (0.032)	0.063*** (0.019)	0.119*** (0.032)	0.094*** (0.020)	0.161*** (0.032)	0.094*** (0.020)	0.163*** (0.032)
Independent	-0.456*** (0.095)	-0.630*** (0.140)	-0.448*** (0.095)	-0.620*** (0.141)	-0.041 (0.082)	-0.062 (0.139)	-0.046 (0.082)	-0.072 (0.139)	-0.006 (0.088)	0.002 (0.146)	-0.002 (0.088)	0.003 (0.146)
Republican	-0.083 (0.082)	-0.063 (0.116)	-0.076 (0.082)	-0.057 (0.116)	0.561*** (0.080)	0.814*** (0.132)	0.555*** (0.080)	0.806*** (0.132)	0.503*** (0.080)	0.708*** (0.127)	0.507*** (0.080)	0.712*** (0.127)
Strong Partisan	0.007 (0.062)	0.010 (0.088)	0.006 (0.062)	0.010 (0.088)	-0.023 (0.057)	-0.082 (0.095)	-0.024 (0.057)	-0.083 (0.096)	0.012 (0.055)	-0.020 (0.090)	0.013 (0.055)	-0.021 (0.090)
Political Knowledge	-0.134*** (0.019)	-0.180*** (0.027)	-0.136*** (0.019)	-0.183*** (0.027)	-0.123*** (0.021)	-0.188*** (0.033)	-0.121*** (0.021)	-0.184*** (0.033)	-0.057*** (0.020)	-0.089*** (0.032)	-0.057*** (0.020)	-0.087*** (0.032)
Religiosity	0.018 (0.018)	0.028 (0.026)	0.016 (0.018)	0.025 (0.026)	0.024 (0.016)	0.038 (0.027)	0.022 (0.016)	0.035 (0.027)	0.034** (0.016)	0.054** (0.025)	0.033** (0.016)	0.052** (0.025)
Education	-0.030 (0.064)	-0.083 (0.094)	-0.026 (0.064)	-0.078 (0.094)	-0.133** (0.056)	-0.248*** (0.096)	-0.136** (0.056)	-0.253*** (0.096)	-0.158*** (0.054)	-0.261*** (0.090)	-0.160*** (0.055)	-0.265*** (0.090)
White	-0.153** (0.067)	-0.216** (0.097)	-0.155** (0.067)	-0.218** (0.097)	0.010 (0.059)	-0.007 (0.099)	0.009 (0.059)	-0.011 (0.099)	-0.102 (0.064)	-0.196* (0.104)	-0.105 (0.064)	-0.200* (0.104)
Age	-0.018* (0.010)	-0.024 (0.014)	-0.018* (0.010)	-0.023 (0.015)	0.001 (0.009)	0.001 (0.015)	0.001 (0.009)	0.002 (0.015)	-0.026*** (0.009)	-0.042*** (0.014)	-0.025*** (0.009)	-0.041*** (0.014)
Age Sq.	0.000* (<.001)	0.000 (<.001)	0.000 (<.001)	0.000 (<.001)	-0.000 (<.001)	-0.000 (<.001)	-0.000 (<.001)	-0.000 (<.001)	0.000** (<.001)	0.000** (<.001)	0.000** (<.001)	0.000** (<.001)
Employed	0.075 (0.067)	0.120 (0.096)	0.077 (0.067)	0.124 (0.096)	0.023 (0.057)	0.047 (0.096)	0.022 (0.057)	0.045 (0.096)	-0.025 (0.059)	-0.035 (0.097)	-0.026 (0.059)	-0.039 (0.097)
Woman Sen.	-0.016 (0.060)	-0.009 (0.089)	-0.026 (0.083)	-0.005 (0.125)	0.038 (0.054)	0.062 (0.091)	0.050 (0.076)	0.102 (0.133)	0.098* (0.057)	0.155 (0.094)	0.065 (0.081)	0.101 (0.135)
Woman Sen. × Female			0.010 (0.119)	-0.025 (0.171)	-0.027 (0.108)	-0.080 (0.183)					0.065 (0.113)	0.109 (0.187)
Woman Rep.	0.105 (0.069)	0.161 (0.099)	0.180* (0.095)	0.267* (0.137)	0.088 (0.079)	0.163 (0.130)	0.023 (0.118)	0.070 (0.199)	0.088 (0.068)	0.171 (0.111)	0.071 (0.102)	0.128 (0.166)
Woman Rep. × Female			-0.164 (0.136)	-0.227 (0.194)	0.120 (0.158)	0.167 (0.260)	0.120 (0.158)	0.260 (0.260)			0.029 (0.137)	0.080 (0.222)
Woman in State Leg.	-0.005 (0.005)	-0.008 (0.007)	-0.008 (0.007)	-0.014 (0.014)	0.003 (0.004)	0.004 (0.007)	0.000 (0.006)	-0.003 (0.010)	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.007)	0.004 (0.006)	0.007 (0.010)
Women in State Leg. × Female			0.007 (0.009)	0.011 (0.014)	0.006 (0.009)	0.014 (0.014)					-0.010 (0.008)	-0.020 (0.014)
Constant	2.290*** (0.283)	2.417*** (0.311)	2.417*** (0.311)	1.615*** (0.257)	1.626*** (0.282)	2.033*** (0.244)					1.880*** (0.279)	
Cut 1	-0.773* (0.407)	-0.931** (0.451)		0.171 (0.422)	0.147 (0.470)						-0.519 (0.389)	-0.204 (0.448)
Cut 2	0.248 (0.408)	0.093 (0.451)		1.245*** (0.424)	1.224*** (0.472)						0.451 (0.389)	0.767* (0.449)
Cut 3	1.353*** (0.412)	1.200*** (0.454)		2.670** (0.436)	2.651*** (0.482)						1.950*** (0.399)	2.268*** (0.459)
N	807	807	807	807	807	807	807	807	823	823	823	823
State Random Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Note: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
Standard errors in parentheses

A11.2 Supplemental Analysis: Mechanical Turk Study

In order to further ensure that the results presented in the main text are not an artifact of priming, I conducted a follow-up study on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. In this study, I use the same external efficacy measure used in Tables 1 and 3 of the main text and replicate the results presented in Table 1. I recruited 1,600 MTurk workers to participate in the study between March 19 and 21 of 2020.⁴ Participants were randomly assigned to one of two versions of the survey. Version one used the same question ordering as the 2016 and 2018 CCES (i.e., respondents estimated the percentage of women in Congress, followed by the efficacy battery). Columns 1 and 2 of Table A13 replicate the results presented in Table 1 of the main text using this subset of participants.

Version two of the survey began with the efficacy battery, and was followed by two survey experiments exploring factors affecting approval of government programs. Collectively, these experiments were roughly five minutes of survey content. After completing all other components of the survey, respondents were then asked to estimate the percentage of women in Congress. The mean estimate for respondents in Survey 2 did not significantly differ from those in Survey 1 (27.29 and 26.27; $p = .224$), assuring me that the survey experiments did not in any way prime respondents to make higher (lower) estimates than they otherwise would have.

Columns 3 and 4 of Table A13 present the results of the models run using this subset of respondents. As these results indicate, the relationship between beliefs about women’s representation and feelings of political efficacy remains positive and significant. Moreover, the magnitude of this effect is similar to the results presented in columns 1 and 2. Finally, columns 5 and 6 of Table A13 present the results of models that include all participants and an indicator variable capturing which version of the survey respondents received. This indicator is interacted with respondent estimates of women’s representation in Congress. The interaction term fails to reach statistical significance in either model, indicating that the relationship between beliefs about women’s representation and feelings of efficacy is not contingent upon survey version. Based on the similarities across Surveys 1 and 2, I can confidently rule out that the observed relationship is the result of priming.

⁴Before completing the survey online, respondents were taken to a landing page in which they were apprised of the risks and benefits of participating in the study. Respondents were also given information on how to contact the researcher and contact information for the University of South Carolina institutional review board. Respondents were then asked whether they consented to participation. If yes, the survey began. If no, the survey ended. Respondents were paid \$0.90 for their participation.

Table A13 Regression Models: Perceptions of Women’s Inclusion in Congress & External Efficacy (by survey version)

	<i>Dependent variable: External Efficacy</i>					
	Survey 1		Survey 2		Pooled	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Estimate % Women	0.002*** ($<.001$)	0.001** (0.001)	0.002*** ($<.001$)	0.002*** (0.001)	0.002*** ($<.001$)	0.002*** (0.001)
Female	-0.028* (0.015)	-0.034 (0.027)	-0.075*** (0.014)	-0.094*** (0.026)	-0.053*** (0.010)	-0.039 (0.026)
Estimate % Women \times Female		0.0001 (0.001)		0.001 (0.001)		0.0002 (0.001)
Survey Version					0.000 (0.019)	0.030 (0.026)
Survey \times Estimate % Women					0.0001 (0.001)	-0.0002 (0.001)
Survey \times Female						-0.059 (0.037)
Survey \times Estimate % Women \times Female						0.001 (0.001)
Ideology	-0.003 (0.005)	-0.003 (0.005)	0.011** (0.005)	0.010** (0.005)	0.003 (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)
Independent	0.008 (0.028)	0.008 (0.029)	0.021 (0.031)	0.020 (0.031)	0.014 (0.021)	0.015 (0.021)
Republican	0.059*** (0.019)	0.059*** (0.019)	0.003 (0.020)	0.004 (0.020)	0.034** (0.013)	0.035*** (0.013)
Strong Partisan	0.068*** (0.015)	0.068*** (0.015)	0.067*** (0.015)	0.068*** (0.015)	0.069*** (0.010)	0.069*** (0.010)
Political Knowledge	-0.025*** (0.007)	-0.025*** (0.007)	-0.021*** (0.007)	-0.021*** (0.007)	-0.023*** (0.005)	-0.023*** (0.005)
Religiosity	0.035*** (0.005)	0.035*** (0.005)	0.028*** (0.005)	0.028*** (0.005)	0.031*** (0.003)	0.031*** (0.003)
White	-0.024 (0.015)	-0.024 (0.015)	-0.006 (0.015)	-0.007 (0.015)	-0.016 (0.011)	-0.017 (0.011)
Employed	0.040** (0.017)	0.040** (0.017)	0.016 (0.016)	0.016 (0.016)	0.028** (0.012)	0.029** (0.012)
Age	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.005* (0.003)	-0.005* (0.003)
Age Sq.	0.000* ($<.001$)	0.000* ($<.001$)	0.000 ($<.001$)	0.000 ($<.001$)	0.000** ($<.001$)	0.000** ($<.001$)
Education	0.052*** (0.016)	0.052*** (0.016)	0.058*** (0.015)	0.058*** (0.015)	0.056*** (0.011)	0.056*** (0.011)
Woman Sen.	0.018 (0.014)	0.018 (0.014)	0.015 (0.014)	0.015 (0.014)	0.018* (0.010)	0.017* (0.010)
N	716	716	718	718	1434	1434
State Random Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Note:

*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
Standard errors in parentheses

A12 Who Misestimates Women’s Presence?

The results presented in the main text show that believing political institutions are more gender inclusive is associated with more positive feelings towards those institutions. However, a critical question remains: *Who* misestimates women’s presence in office? Are some groups more likely to be knowledgeable than others? Do some groups systematically underestimate women’s presence? Do others systematically overestimate women’s representation? In this section, I offer some insights into this question and the factors that underlie individual estimates. The results in this section offer an update on the results presented in Stauffer (2018).⁵ For an additional treatment of this topic, see Burden and Ono (forthcoming).

Analyses in these sections pool the 2016, 2017, and 2018 CCES data that is used in the main text, resulting in approximately 2,680 respondents after accounting for missing data. Models in this section include survey-year fixed effects and state random effects. Perceptions of women’s inclusion are modeled using two dependent variables in the analyses that follow. The first is the raw estimate provided by respondents. The second captures the distance between respondent estimates and the true percentage of women in Congress at the time of their respective survey, and was calculated by taking the absolute value of the difference between these two quantities (see Stauffer 2018 and Burden and Ono forthcoming). All analyses in this section relate to respondent perceptions of women’s representation in Congress. Recent work by Burden and Ono (forthcoming) finds that similar dynamics are at play when explaining respondent beliefs about the percentage of women serving in state legislatures compared to Congress.

Figure A1 shows the distribution of respondent estimates based on the individual level factors included in the models in the main text.⁶ As these plots show, while some groups may be slightly better at estimating women’s representation than others, a great deal of variation exists among almost all groups. Models 1 and 3 in Table A14 present the results of regressions in which my two dependent variables are regressed on these individual level factors. In addition to individual characteristics, I also consider how the actual representation received by respondents might influence their perceptions of women’s representation in Congress, again drawing on the variables used in the main text. Figure A2 presents distributions of estimates based on these variables. These variables are also included in Models 2 and 4 in Table A14.

At the individual level there are two particularly salient characteristics to examine: respondent sex and partisanship. Previous work by Sanbonmatsu (2003) finds that women are less likely than men to know the percentage of women in Congress, and that women are more likely to *overestimate* the presence of other women in the institution (see also Dolan 2011). However, I find minimal evidence of such a difference in my analysis. Respondent gender is not a significant predictor of respondent estimates. There is only weak evidence that women offer estimates that are more “off” than men, and substantively this effect is quite small (less than 1 percent). While these findings counter earlier results from Sanbonmatsu (2003), it is consistent with more recent research by Sanbonmatsu (2020), Burden and Ono (forthcoming), and Stauffer (2018), and in line with Dolan’s overall finding that gender gaps in measures of “gender-relevant political knowledge” are largely non-existent (Dolan 2011). As it relates to partisanship, the models do provide evidence that Republicans offer higher estimates than Democrats. However, these effects are relatively modest and amount to a less than 2 percent difference. Results from Models 3 and 4 suggest that while Republicans offer slightly higher estimates on average, they are not necessarily more wrong in their estimates than Democrats. Similar

⁵Stauffer (2018) uses data from the 2015, 2016, and 2017 CCES to examine who misestimates women’s representation. The results presented here use the 2016, 2017, and 2018 CCES data used in the main text.


⁶For variables that are not binary, plots either compare the minimum and maximum values of the variable, or the values associated with the 25th and 75th percentiles depending on the distribution of each variable.

Table A14 Regression Results: Influences on Respondent Estimates

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Estimate		Distance	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Female	0.485 (0.517)	0.525 (0.515)	0.664* (0.363)	0.666* (0.363)
Ideology (lib. to cons.)	0.462** (0.190)	0.486** (0.189)	0.247* (0.133)	0.248* (0.133)
Independent	1.192 (0.826)	1.208 (0.822)	0.532 (0.581)	0.537 (0.580)
Republicans	1.793** (0.764)	1.795** (0.761)	0.359 (0.537)	0.360 (0.536)
Strong Partisan	2.739*** (0.551)	2.816*** (0.548)	1.433*** (0.387)	1.434*** (0.386)
Political Knowledge	-1.028*** (0.172)	-1.033*** (0.172)	-0.890*** (0.121)	-0.889*** (0.121)
Religiosity	0.747*** (0.158)	0.785*** (0.158)	0.449*** (0.111)	0.450*** (0.111)
Education	-0.691 (0.548)	-0.822 (0.547)	-0.783** (0.385)	-0.776** (0.386)
White	-0.423 (0.595)	-0.229 (0.599)	-1.349*** (0.418)	-1.357*** (0.419)
Age	0.035 (0.088)	0.041 (0.088)	0.059 (0.062)	0.059 (0.062)
Age Sq.	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)
Employed	-0.495 (0.571)	-0.540 (0.568)	-0.566 (0.402)	-0.567 (0.401)
Woman Sen.		0.124 (0.644)		-0.078 (0.380)
Woman Rep.		1.062 (0.686)		-0.082 (0.479)
Women in State Leg.		0.069 (0.047)		0.011 (0.029)
Constant	23.333*** (2.159)	20.806*** (2.467)	11.082*** (1.518)	10.849*** (1.696)
Observations	2,680	2,679	2,680	2,679
Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
State Random Effects		✓		✓

*Note:**p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
Standard errors in parentheses

Figure A1 Distribution of respondent estimates based on individual characteristics.




results emerge when examining the effects of ideology.⁷

Of the remaining variables, strength of respondent partisanship, respondent political knowledge, level of education, race and level of religious commitment all exert a significant effect on respondent estimates. Strong partisans tend to offer higher estimates and to be more “off” on average than non-strong partisans. Meanwhile, the most politically knowledgeable offer lower estimates on average and tend to be closer to reality than the least knowledgeable. College graduates and white respondents likewise offer estimates that are closer to reality. Finally, the most religious respondents tend to give higher estimates and are more incorrect in their estimates than the least religious.⁸ However, to the extent individual level factors influence either metric, the effects tend to be fairly modest. Unsurprisingly, the factor that exerts the greatest effect on respondent estimates is their underlying level of political knowledge, with the most politically knowledgeable expected to offer an estimate that is more than 6 percent lower than the least politically knowledgeable.

Results from Models 2 and 4 offer no evidence that being represented by a female senator or representative influence respondent estimates or accuracy. Burden and Ono (forthcoming), however, offer evidence that the *belief* that respondents have ever been represented by a woman in Congress is associated with some small changes in estimates. Representation in the state legislature similarly appears to exert no influence on respondent beliefs about representation in Congress, suggesting that the actual gender representation experienced by respondents does not significantly influence their beliefs about women’s presence in Congress.⁹

Figure A2 Distribution of respondent estimates based on actual levels of women’s representation.



⁷This finding is consistent with Stauffer (2018) and Burden and Ono (forthcoming).

⁸Stauffer (2018) reports similar results for level of political knowledge and race. Burden and Ono (forthcoming) provide similar results for strength of party identification, and religiosity.

⁹The findings related to the effect of being represented by a female senator and the percentage of women in respondents’ state legislatures is consistent with Stauffer (2018).

A13 Appendix References

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