

Swords and Plowshares Appendix

1 Introduction

This is the Appendix for the article Swords and Plowshares: Property Rights, Collective Action, and Non-state Governance in the Jewish Community of Palestine 1920-1948. In the sections that follow, I present a full table of summary statistics (means) for all variables utilized in the regression models presented in the main text. I also present the full table of results for the Principal Components Analysis along with a Scree, or Elbow, plot showing the optimal number of latent factors in the data to be 5. Finally, I provide robustness results in regression tables for each of the two statistical models as reported in the main text.

2 Summary Statistics for Theoretical and Control Variables

Below is a table with the mean values for each variable utilized in the regression models in the main text as per footnote 2 in the main text.

Variable Name	Kibbutzim	Moshavim
Working in Settlement	0.673	0.436
Outside Options	0.825	0.794
Public Sector	0.155	0.066
Childcare	0.415	0.403
Proportion Hired	0.000	0.078
Private Property	0.000	0.167
Intermarriage	0.889	0.891
Population	313.7	279.7
Settlement Age	9.812	13.21
Settler Age	22.85	23.48
Males per Capita	0.565	0.531
Monitoring Capacity	0.099	0.116
Fractionalization	0.650	0.627
Ideology	0.261	0.261


3 Principal Components Analysis: Full Table and Elbow Plot

Here I present a table with the factor loadings and elbow plot for the Principal Components Analysis as discussed in footnote 3 of the main text.

Table 1: Factor Loadings for Principal Components Analysis

	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5
Private Property	0.91				
Public Sector	-0.56				
Wages	0.78				
Working in Settlement	-0.30	0.85	-0.37		
Outside Options		0.63			
Males per Capita		0.65		-0.56	
Population Size			0.68		
Settlement Age			0.72		
Intermarriage				0.54	
Mode Settler Age					0.56
Childcare		-0.37	0.34		-0.32
Monitoring				-0.39	
Fractionalization			0.32		
Ideology			0.37		0.31
Proportion Variance Explained	0.14	0.13	0.11	0.07	0.05
Cumulative Variance Explained	0.14	0.27	0.38	0.45	0.50

Below is presented an elbow plot showing that 5 factors is an optimal number for the PCA model. Recall that the propose of this test was exploratory rather than confirmatory. I was only seeking to answer the question of whether a latent Individualism construct existed in the census data. The results of this test confirm such a factor exists. While the other factors are difficult to interpret, this is besides the point. The first factor, which explains the largest proportion of variance in the data, confirms this factor exists. The existence of any other latent factors is superfluous for the proposes of this article.



4 Robustness Checks

This section presents robustness results for the two regression models presented in the main text. As can be clearly seen in the tables, the results in the main text – there exist two opposing institutional structures which switch signs between the security and economic development models – holds across all robustness checks. Model 4 in each table is the same full model presented in the main text. The coefficients reported below are not standardized, where in the text, the variables had been transformed into z-scores by centering and scaling each variable. I did this in the main text, as noted there, for ease of interpretation of the graph. Of course, standardizing the variables does not alter the results in any way.

Table 2: Robustness Results: Security Provision

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Working in Settlement	3.51* (1.49)	3.15 (1.64)	3.78* (1.70)	3.45* (1.74)
Outside Options	-9.03*** (2.13)	-8.72*** (2.24)	-9.02*** (2.39)	-9.97*** (2.60)
Public Sector	5.18* (2.17)	5.23* (2.18)	4.73* (2.24)	4.75* (2.34)
Childcare	5.28* (2.20)	5.60* (2.20)	6.73** (2.31)	6.35* (2.44)
Proportion Hired	-0.33 (4.42)	-0.13 (4.49)	-0.62 (4.69)	0.79 (4.76)
Private Property	5.53 (2.56)	4.89 (3.36)	4.60 (3.52)	3.88 (3.56)
Intermarriage	5.83* (2.56)	6.31* (2.64)	5.79* (2.62)	5.40* (2.55)
Population		-0.00 (0.00)	-0.0012 (0.0009)	-0.001 (0.001)
Settlement Age		0.002 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Settler Age			0.04* (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)
Males per Capita			-2.28 (4.68)	-3.14 (4.79)
Monitoring			1.06 (1.80)	0.99 (1.80)
Ethnic Fractionalization				4.46 (2.82)
Ideology				0.75 (1.36)
Constant	-5.19 (2.97)	-5.54 (2.99)	-5.59 (3.52)	-6.45 (3.43)
Number of Observations	270	270	270	270
AIC	221.96	224.96	225.56	226.46

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Table 3: Robustness Results: Economic Development

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Working in Settlement	-1.74*** (0.38)	-1.87*** (0.42)	-1.80*** (0.45)	-1.76*** (0.47)
Outside Options	1.22 (0.67)	1.39* (0.70)	-1.48* (0.75)	0.43 (0.91)
Public Sector	-7.96*** (1.67)	-7.71*** (1.67)	-8.07*** (1.66)	-7.83* (1.63)
Childcare	-2.65*** (0.61)	-2.48*** (0.64)	-2.43** (-0.67)	-2.14** (0.66)
Proportion Hired	4.27*** (0.81)	4.40*** (0.86)	4.07*** (0.67)	4.51*** (0.91)
Intermarriage	0.14 (0.37)	0.22 (0.38)	-0.21 (0.51)	-0.34 (0.51)
Population		-0.0001 (0.0002)	-0.0008 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.002)
Settlement Age		-0.004 (0.01)	-0.004 (0.01)	0.07 (0.09)
Settler Age			0.0008 (0.005)	0.008 (0.005)
Males per Capita			-1.10 (1.32)	-0.76 (1.29)
Monitoring			-0.28 (0.55)	0.03 (0.61)
Ethnic Fractionalization				1.644 (0.863)
Ideology				0.83 (0.52)
Constant	-0.83 (0.71)	-0.98 (0.73)	-0.26 (1.19)	-0.95 (1.28)
Number of Observations	270	270	270	270
AIC	108.71	111.96	114.08	113.24

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$