Supporting Information for "When the Money Stops: Fluctuations in Financial Remittances and Incumbent Approval in Central Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia"

A1. Descriptions of the Surveys

Life in Transition Surveys (LiTS) I and II

The Life in Transition Survey (LiTS I) was conducted jointly by the EBRD and the World Bank in 2006. Almost 29,000 individuals across 29 countries were interviewed between August and October 2009. Interviews were conducted face-to-face, in respondents' homes. Face-to-face interviews are the norm in the post-Soviet region, where telephone and internet penetration are low, and generally insufficient in order to achieve a nationally representative sample.

In the analysis we present in the manuscript, we include 26 countries. Due to local sensitivities, questions about trust in the presidency were not asked in Belarus.[1] This leaves us with a total of 28 countries. Of these 28 countries, neither Mongolia, nor Turkey are in Central Eastern Europe (CEE), or the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). For this reason, these countries are not part of the analysis. Yet, as we show below, the results remain consistent when both Mongolia and Turkey are included in the sample. The 26 countries included in the analysis are the following: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Montenegro, FYR Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.

The 2010 Life in Transition Survey (LiTS II) was conducted jointly by the EBRD and the World Bank in late 2010. In addition to repeating the survey in the same 29 countries covered initially by LITS I, LITS II surveyed respondents in Kosovo, and along with five Western European comparator countries. Altogether, almost 39,000 households in 35 countries were surveyed. Of the countries included in the survey, we exclude those that do not geographically belong in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and/or in Central Eastern Europe (CEE). Just like with the 2006 survey, we drop Mongolia and Turkey, as well as Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Sweden. This leaves us with a sample of 28 countries. The countries included in the analysis are the following: Albania, Armenia,

[1] Life in Transition Executive Summary, p.8. Available to download here: http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/research/economics/microdata/litsrepo.pdf

Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Montenegro, FYR Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.

The Life in Kyrgyzstan Surveys

The Life in Kyrgyzstan Study (LIK) is an open-access, multi-topic longitudinal survey of individuals and households in Kyrgyzstan. The survey, which was established by Professor Tilman Bruck, tracks the same 3,000 households in all seven Kyrgyz oblasts (regions) and the two cities of Bishkek and Osh across the four-time points, 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013. Interviews are conducted once a year, around October-November. The original 3,000 households were drawn through a stratified two-stage random sampling process. Interviews were conducted face-to-face, in respondents' homes. Questionnaires were first developed in English and later translated into Kyrgyz and Russian. The survey has been implemented by the data collection company Sotseconik, which is based in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. The data are representative at both the national and regional level. 81.6 percent of all 3000 households identified in the original sample in 2010 participated in all four waves (LiK, Updated July 2017).

From 2010 to 2012, the Life in Kyrgyzstan study was funded by the German Volksagen Foundation, as part of a multilateral project with the participation of several institutions in Central Asia and Europe. From 2013 to 2015, the survey was funded by the Department for International Development, as part of the Growth and Labour Market Low Income Country Programme. A description of the studies is available here: https://lifeinkyrgyzstan.org.

A2 Descriptive Statistics

Table A.1 Descriptive Statistics, LiTS I 2006

	Range	Mean (SD)
President Trust	1-5	3.17 (1.4)
Satisfaction with National Economic Conditions	1-5	2.62 (1.1)
Household Economic Assessments (1-10 poorer to richer households)	1-10	4.25 (1.7)
Has Remittances	0-1	.07 (.25)
Employed: Worked for income in the last week	0-1	.5 (.49)
Education (1-3 categories, lower to higher)	1-3	1.94 (.65)
Age	17-97	46 (17.7)
Gender	0-1	.4 (.49)
Wealth Index	0-7	2.26 (2.1)
Settlement (rural, urban, metropolitan)	1-3	1.8 (.74)
GDP growth[2]	3.1-34.5	8.25 (5.6)

The wording of questions on economic assessments and support for incumbents are as follows: 1) "Please imagine a ten-step ladder where on the bottom, the first step, stand the poorest people and on the highest step, the tenth, stand the richest. On which step of the ten is your household today?"2) "On the whole, I am satisfied with the present state of the economy" 3) "To what extent do you trust the following institutions? The presidency". The first item is measured on a 10-point scale, while the latter two on a five-point one, with higher values denoting greater satisfaction with economic assessments, and greater trust in the presidency. The primary dependent variable, measured at the individual level, is whether households have access to "help from relatives or friends living abroad, including alimonies". We recoded responses into a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the respondents indicate that they have remittances and zero otherwise. The wealth index is constructed as the sum of

[2] Data on growth come from the World Bank World Development Indicators. Data extracted on 22 Mar 2016 10:00 UTC (GMT) from UKDS.Stat. The highest growth was observed in Azerbaijan.

households' material possessions. Households are asked whether they own: a car (2.09_1); a secondary residence (2.09_2); a bank account (2.09_3); a credit/debit card (2.09_4); a mobile phone (2.09_5); a computer (2.09_6); access to internet at home (2.09_7). The scale's Cronbach alpha reliability coefficient is 0.8.

Table A.2 Descriptive Statistics, Life in Kyrgyzstan Survey 2010-2013

	2010	**2011**	**2012**	**2013**
Change in Trust in President $_{t-(t-1)}$ (-3 to 3)	-	0.20 (1.16)	0.06 (1.24)	0.29 (1.21)
Change in amount of remittances $_{t-(t-1)}$	-	0.04 (0.89)	0.10 (0.68)	0.99 (4.54)
Change in Frequency of Remittances $_{t-(t-1)}$ (-4 to 5)	-	0.42 (1.63)	0.14 (1.39)	0.36 (1.59)
Change in Remittances Index $_{t-(t-1)}$ (-5 to 4)	-	-0.01 (1.24)	-0.05 (0.36)	0.77 (1.39)
Reduction in Remittances (0-1)	-	0.14 (0.36)	0.15 (0.36)	0.17 (0.37)
Agricultural Profit Loss (0-1)	0.13 (0.34)	0.15 (0.36)	0.12 (0.33)	0.10 (0.29)
Affected by Landslides (0-1)	0.12 (0.32)	0.14 (0.35)	0.17 (0.38)	0.06 (0.24)
Gender (0-1)	0.53 (0.50)	0.51 (0.50)	0.51 (0.50)	0.51 (0.50)
Age (18-106)	36.58 (15.34)	36.45 (15.44)	36.79 (15.57)	36.44 (15.60)
Marital Status (0-1)	0.58 (0.49)	0.55 (0.50)	0.57 (0.50)	0.56 (0.50)
Ethnicity (0-1)	0.70 (0.46)	0.74 (0.44)	0.78 (0.41)	0.80 (0.40)
Employed (0-1)	0.24 (0.43)	0.22 (0.41)	0.18 (0.39)	0.12 (0.32)
Intention to Migrate (0-1)	0.08 (0.28)	0.08 (0.27)	0.06 (0.24)	0.06 (0.24)
Illiterate (0-1)	0.01 (0.10)	0.01 (0.11)	0.01 (0.12)	0.01 (0.10)
Primary Education (0-1)	0.13 (0.34)	0.10 (0.30)	0.09 (0.28)	0.11 (0.31)
Secondary Education (0-1)	0.74 (0.44)	0.76 (0.43)	0.80 (0.40)	0.79 (0.41)
University Education (0-1)	0.11 (0.32)	0.12 (0.33)	0.10 (0.30)	0.09 (0.29)
Wealth Index (1-17)	7.84 (3.89)	9.59 (3.84)	10.20 (3.96)	8.07 (4.00)
Total Income	94.03 (80.08)	169.63 (112.77)	209.24 (144.29)	250.18 (234.52)
Risk Attitudes (0-10)	6.20 (2.45)	4.63 (2.72)	4.85 (2.97)	4.45 (2.63)
Life Satisfaction (0-10)	3.77 (3.39)	6.53 (2.07)	7.01 (2.05)	6.44 (1.71)

Table A.3 Question Wordings, Life in Kyrgyzstan Survey 2010-2013

	Question Wording
Trust in President	On a scale from 1 (trust not at all) to 4 (a lot of trust), how much do you generally trust the following? President / Central government officials
Trust in Local Community Leaders	On a scale from 1 (trust not at all) to 4 (a lot of trust), how much do you generally trust the following? Community Leaders
Remittances Received	During the last 12 months, did you receive any money from abroad sent by migrants who are members of this household?
Amount of Remittances Received	How much money did household migrants send over the last 12 months?
Frequency of Remittances Received	How many times within the last 12 months did migrants send/bring money?
Remittances Index	For more information on coding of variable see Table A.5
Agricultural Profit Loss	During the last 12 months, has your household been affected by the following shocks? Suffered agricultural loss: 0) no, 1) yes
Affected by Landslides	During the last 12 months, has your household been affected by the following shocks? Landslides: 0) no, 1) yes
Gender	What is your sex? 0) female, 1) male
Age	What is your year of birth? (We subtract year of survey from year of birth)
Marital Status	What is your marital status? 0) not married (divorced, living together, separated, widowed, single) 1) married
Ethnicity	What is your ethnicity? 0) Kyrgyz, 1) Uzbek/ Russian/ Dungan/ Uigur/ Tajik/ Kazak/ Other
Employed	During the past 7 days, have you worked for someone who is not a member of your household, e.g. an enterprise, company, farm, the government, or any other individual?
Intention to Migrate	Are you planning to move abroad within the following 12 months for more than 1 month? (excluding vacation, family visits, business trips)
Education Level	What is the highest certificate / diploma / degree you obtained so far? 1) illiterate, 2) primary or basic, 3) secondary general, primary/secondary technical, 4) university/candidate/doctor nauk
Wealth Index	Now I would like to ask you about the assets your household possesses, including additional housing, transport, home appliances and livestock.

	The wealth index captures if respondents have the following: property/ vehicles (main dwelling, another house/ apartment/ garage/ bicycle/ motorcycle, scooter/ car, minbus, tractor, truck or other agricultural machine) domestic appliances, furniture (refrigerator, gas stove, electric stove, microwave, air conditioner, sewing machine, washing machine, vacuum cleaner, sofa, wardrobe, bed, kitchen furniture), media appliances (radio, music system, TV, video or DVD player, photo camera, digital photo camera, laptop, satellite dish), communication (mobile phone, landline phone, internet connection), livestock (cows and bulls, sheep, horses, donkeys, pigs, rabbits, check and poultry, bees).
Risk Attitudes	How do you see yourself, are you generally a person who is fully willing to take risks or do you avoid taking risks? Please rate from 0 (completely unwilling to take risks) to 10 (completely willing to take risks).
Life Satisfaction	How satisfied are you today with the living standard of your household? Please rate from 0) completely dissatisfied to 10) completely satisfied.

Table A.4 Currency Exchange Rates Used

In the LiK surveys, respondents were asked to report the amount of money received from migrants in the currency in which they received it, that is to say Kyrgyz Som, Russian Rubles, US Dollars, or Euros. In order to ensure that the magnitudes of changes in the amount of remitted income are comparable, we transferred all amounts into Kyrgyz Som by using the average exchange rate over the year reported in Table A.4. We then divided these changes by a factor of 100,000.

	Exchange Rate with Som			
Currency	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**	**2013**
US Dollar	46	47	47	48
Ruble	1.5	1.6	1.5	1.5
Euro	60	64	60	65

Notes: The table shows soms per foreign currency.The annual average exchange rates come from the National Bank of the Kyrgyz Republic ((http://www.nbkr.kg/index1.jsp?item=1562&lang=RUS)

Table A.5 Construction of Remittances Index, Life in Kyrgyzstan Survey 2010-2013

Components	**Questions Used**	**Coding**
Substantial: Amount of Remittances Received	How much money did household migrants send over the last 12 months?	We recoded the amounts in Som in three categories: 1) between minimum and mean value, 1-76623 Som 2) between mean value and 1 standard deviation above mean: 76624-284000 Som 3) value above 1 standard deviation value, 280000-4550000 Som
Reliable: Regularity of Remittances Received	Did you receive the money sent by migrants always at the same point of time (is the receiving of money regular)?	We recoded original answer categories (1 yes, 2 no, 3 different for different senders) to 1) No 2) Different for different senders 3) Yes
Combined: Additive Index		Based on these two components we created an additive index ranging from minimum value of 2 and maximum value of 6.

Table A.6: Descriptive Statistics, Life in Transition Survey 2010

Variable	**Question Wording**	**Range**	**Mean (SD)**
Government Approval	Please rate the overall performance of the national government	1: Very Bad 5: Very Good	2.83 (0.99)
Blame Attribution	Which of these do you think are responsible for the global economic crisis?	1: Our Government 0: Not our government	0.37 (0.48)
Independent Variables			
Remittances Reduced	How has the economic crisis affected you and your household in the past 2 years?	1: Remittances Reduced 0: Remittances did not Reduce	0.21 (0.41)
Employment status	Did you work for income in the past twelve months?	1: Yes 0: No	0.49 (0.49)
Age	How old are you?	18-91	45.6 (17.4)
Gender	What is your gender?	1: male 0: female	0.38 (.48)
Marital status	What is your marital status?	1: married/ cohabiting 0: Not	.60 (.49)
Education	What is the highest level of education you already completed?	1: primary 2: secondary 3: higher	2.23 (0.66)
Wealth Index	Sum of owning: car, secondary house, bank account, debit or credit card, mobile phone, computer and internet connection (Cronbach's alpha: 0.76)	1-8	3.15 (2.16)
Risk attitudes	Please rate your willingness to take risks in general, on a scale from 1 to 10.	1-10	4.7 (2.6)
Life satisfaction	All things considered, I am satisfied with my life now	1-5	3.08 (1.08)
GDP	OECD (2016), Gross Domestic Product (GDP)	-2.87 – 8.5	3.12 (2.9)

A3 Additional Descriptive Figures



Figure A.1: Percentage of households with remittances in LITS I (2006)



Figure A.2: Percentage of households affected by the recession in LITS II (2010)



Figure A.3: Percentage of respondents affected by the recession who report a decline in remittances in LITS II (2010)

Section B: Full results for the Tables presented in the manuscript

Table B.1: We present full results accompanying Table 1: Effect of Remittances on Economic Satisfaction and Trust in the President. LiTS I (2006)

COVARIATES	Pocketbook Assessments Model (1)	Sociotropic Assessments Model (2)	Trust in the President Model (3)	Trust in the President Model (4)
Remittances	0.135***	0.048*	0.070**	0.056*
	(0.041)	(0.027)	(0.032)	(0.031)
Pocketbook				0.027***
				(0.005)
Sociotropic				0.230***
				(0.008)
Employed	0.122***	-0.019	0.026	0.028
	(0.022)	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.017)
Education	0.289***	0.015	0.046***	0.035***
	(0.018)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Age	-0.005***	-0.001	0.005***	0.005***
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Male	-0.024	0.010	-0.041***	-0.043***
	(0.020)	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Wealth	0.288***	0.065***	0.028***	0.005
	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Rural	0.026	0.039***	0.121***	0.112***
	(0.023)	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Metropolitan	-0.042	-0.095***	-0.139***	-0.116***
	(0.029)	(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Growth	-0.026*	0.027*	0.051**	0.046**
	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.021)	(0.019)
Constant	3.419***	2.243***	2.325***	1.718***
	(0.159)	(0.147)	(0.213)	(0.193)
Log Likelihood	-47618	-36722	-41312	-40778
AIC	95259	73468	82649	81584.59
BIC	95357	73566	82747	81698.61
Individuals	25,438	25,438	25,438	25,438
Countries	26	26	26	26

Notes: The table reports coefficients from hierarchical linear models with standard errors in parentheses. The baseline category for settlement status is urban. *** significant at p≤0.01, ** p≤0.05, * p≤0.10 level.

Table B.1: Extended discussion: Models 1 and 2 study the effect of remittances on satisfaction with household and national economic conditions. Models 3 and 4 explore whether remittances affect trust in the president. Model 4 replicates the analysis presented in Model 3, and also controls for the two 'mediator' variables: pocketbook and national economic assessments. If part of the effect of remittances on approval flows through the economic assessments channel, then we would expect the inclusion of the mediators to reduce the overall effect of remittances on approval.

Results are consistent with our theoretical expectations. Similar to Bravo's (2012) results, we find that financial remittances increase satisfaction with household (Model 1) conditions. Holding all covariates at their empirical mean, we see that satisfaction with household economic conditions is 0.15 higher among remittance holders (95% CI: 0.05, 0.21). For both groups of respondents, however, satisfaction with pocketbook conditions is around 4 (i.e. it hoovers below the mean of the 10-point variable). Satisfaction with national economic conditions is also 0.05 higher among respondents with access to remittances. The effect of remittances on trust towards the country's president in Model 3 is also positive, and statistically significant. Focusing on model 3, we see that holding all other covariates at their empirical means, support for the president is approximately 0.10 higher among remittance holders (95% CI: 0.01, 0.13). In Model 4, which controls for the two mediators, the difference in support for the president between the two groups of respondents is halved (~0.05). This implies that some of the overall effect of remittances on trust is mediated through the economic assessments channel. Albeit substantively reduced, however, the effect of remittances on support for the president remains robust, even after we control for economic satisfaction at the household, and national level.

Turning to the controls, these largely behave as anticipated. Employed respondents report greater satisfaction with household economic conditions than their counterparts who are either unemployed, or not part of the labor market. Better educated respondents also report greater satisfaction with household conditions, and trust in the presidency. Older respondents are less satisfied with their pocketbook conditions, yet also more likely to trust the incumbent. Households with access to a more robust portfolio of household assets report ameliorated assessments of pocketbook and national conditions, as well as trust in the president.

Table B.2: Full Results accompanying Figure 3: The effect of reductions in remittances on trust in the President, Life in Kyrgyzstan

COVARIATES	Change in Trust in President $_{t-(t-1)}$ Model (1)
Reduction in Remittances	-0.485***
	(0.132)
Agricultural Loss	-0.561***
	(0.197)
Affected by Landslides	-0.375**
	(0.175)
Primary Education	0.062
	(0.385)
Secondary Education	0.062
	(0.370)
University Education	0.160
	(0.400)
Married	-0.033
	(0.110)
Gender	-0.024
	(0.072)
Age	0.003
	(0.003)
Ethnicity	0.289
	(0.568)
Employed	0.008
	(0.110)
Intent to Migrate	-0.059
	(0.178)
Wealth Index	0.011
	(0.019)
Total Income	-0.001**
	(0.000)
Life Satisfaction	0.067***
	(0.026)
Risk Attitude	0.006
	(0.018)
Constant	0.188
	(1.072)
Individual Observations:	1,247
Groups:	825
R^2 Between	0.63

Notes: Model 1 presents regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses based on a panel data GLS model that regresses changes in trust in the President on various household shocks (reduction in remittances, agricultural profit loss and being affected by landslides), includes household and survey wave fixed effects and random effects varying at the individual level with standard errors in parentheses. Being illiterate is the reference category for education. Significant at the *** p≤0.01, ** p≤.05, * p≤0.10 level. Source: LIK Panel Survey, 2010-2013.

Table B.3: Full Results accompanying Figure 4: The effect of changes in remittances on trust in the President by political information, Kyrgyzstan panel data

	Change in Trust in President $_{t-(t-1)}$
COVARIATES	**Model (1)**
Change in Amount of Remittances $_{t-(t-1)}$	0.160**
	(0.082)
Political Information	0.053
	(0.054)
Change in Remittances * Political Information	-0.040
	(0.031)
Change in Frequency of Remittances $_{t-(t-1)}$	0.094***
	(0.032)
Primary Education	0.032
	(0.386)
Secondary Education	0.039
	(0.371)
University Education	0.121
	(0.402)
Married	-0.005
	(0.110)
Gender	-0.028
	(0.073)
Age	0.004
	(0.003)
Ethnicity	0.293
	(0.569)
Employed	-0.017
	(0.111)
Intent to Migrate	0.000
	(0.178)
Wealth Index	0.004
	(0.019)
Total Income	-0.001*
	(0.000)
Life Satisfaction	0.068***
	(0.026)
Risk Attitude	0.025
	(0.019)
Constant	0.022
	(1.084)
Observations (Individuals, Groups)	1,231
	819
R^2 Between	0.63

Notes: Regression coefficients are based on a panel data GLS model that regresses changes in trust in the President on changes in remittances and political information. The analysis includes household and survey wave fixed effects and random effects varying at the individual level standard errors in parentheses. Being illiterate is the reference category for education. Significant at the *** $p \leq 0.01$, ** $p \leq 0.05$, * $p \leq 0.10$ level. LIK panel study survey data.

Section C: Robustness Checks

Robustness checks for Table 1 in the manuscript 'Remittances, economic assessments, and support for the president', LiTS I (2006)

- Table C.1 replicates the analysis presented in Table 1 while including Mongolia and Turkey in the sample of countries considered;
- Table C.2 probes the robustness of the results using Nearest Neighbor Matching;
- Table C.3 probes the robustness of the results using the LiK survey 2010.

Table C.1: Mongolia and Turkey included in the sample, LiTS I (2006)

COVARIATES	Pocketbook Assessments Model (1)	Sociotropic Assessments Model (2)	Trust in the President Model (3)	Trust in the President Model (4)
Remittances	0.134***	0.055**	0.068**	0.052*
	(0.040)	(0.026)	(0.032)	(0.031)
Employed	0.112***	-0.015	0.029*	0.029*
	(0.022)	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Education	0.287***	0.010	0.047***	0.036***
	(0.017)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.013)
Age	-0.004***	-0.0004	0.005***	0.005***
	(0.001)	(0.0004)	(0.0005)	(0.001)
Male	-0.0391**	0.004	-0.033**	-0.033**
	(0.020)	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.015)
Wealth Index	0.298***	0.069***	0.026***	0.001
	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Rural Status	0.019	0.042***	0.133***	0.123***
	(0.023)	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.017)
Metropolitan	-0.085***	-0.092***	-0.155***	-0.132***
	(0.027)	(0.018)	(0.022)	(0.021)
Growth	-0.024*	0.027*	0.050**	0.045**
	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.020)	(0.018)
Pocketbook Evaluations				0.030***
				(0.005)
Sociotropic Evaluations				0.223***
				(0.007)
Constant	3.387***	2.243***	2.336***	1.734***
	(0.155)	(0.141)	(0.206)	(0.187)
AIC	102578.6	79344.72	89690.22	88604.61
BIC	102677.2	79443.33	89788.83	88719.66
Observations (Individuals	27,381	27,381	27,381	27,381
Groups)	28	28	28	28

Notes: Models 1-4 present coefficients from hierarchical linear models where individuals are nested in countries with standard errors in parentheses. The baseline category for settlement status is urban. Significant at the *** p≤0.01, ** p≤.05, * p≤0.10 level. Source: 2006 Life in Transition Survey (LiTS).

Table C.2: Nearest Neighbor Matching Results

	Pocketbook Assessments		**Sociotropic Assessments**		**Trust in the President**	
	Coefficients	**Standard Error**	**Coefficients**	**Standard Error**	**Coefficients**	**Standard Error**
Remittances	0.300	0.056	0.103	0.038	0.089	0.046
	Means					
	Raw	**Matched**	**Raw**	**Matched**	**Raw**	**Matched**
Employed	0.44	0.33	0.44	0.33	0.44	0.33
Education	1.94	1.92	1.94	1.92	1.94	1.92
Age	46.88	43.80	46.88	43.80	46.88	43.80
Male	0.417	0.371	0.417	0.371	0.417	0.371
Wealth	2.32	1.52	2.32	1.52	2.32	1.52
Rural	0.42	0.54	0.42	0.54	0.42	0.54
Metropolitan	0.22	0.20	0.22	0.20	0.22	0.20
Growth	8.312	7.447	8.312	7.447	8.312	7.447

Notes: Source: 2006 LiTS survey.

Table C.3: Results from 2010 Wave of LiK Survey

COVARIATES	Trust in President Model (1)
Receives Remittances	5.922**
	(2.986)
Primary Education	-0.091
	(0.263)
Secondary Education	-0.182
	(0.258)
University Education	-0.279
	(0.274)
Married	-0.048
	(0.073)
Gender	-0.077
	(0.052)
Age	-0.002
	(0.002)
Ethnicity	-0.218
	(0.378)
Employed	0.035
	(0.079)
Intent to Migrate	0.247**
	(0.113)
Wealth Index	-0.559*
	(0.325)
Household Income	-0.010
	(0.009)
Life Satisfaction	-0.018
	(0.018)
Risk Attitude	-0.007
	(0.012)
Constant	4.688**
	(1.913)
Observations	829
R^2	0.74

Notes: Model 1 presents regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses based on an OLS regression that regresses trust in the President on receiving remittances with household fixed effects. Being illiterate is the reference category for education. Significant at the *** p≤0.01, ** p≤.05, * p≤0.10 level. Source: Life in Kyrgyzstan Panel Survey, 2010.

Robustness checks for Table 2 in the manuscript 'Changes in remittances and changes in trust in President', Life in Kyrgyzstan panel data

- Table C.4 replicates the analysis in Table 2 using hierarchical linear models, where individuals are nested by households*wave observations;
- Table C.5 replicates the analysis in Table 2 controlling for respondents' employment sector;
- Table C.6 probes the robustness of the results presented in Table 2 using Nearest Neighbor Matching using our dichotomous measure of *Reduction in Remittances*;
- Table C.7 probes the robustness of the results presented in Table 2 using Nearest Neighbor Matching using our dichotomous measure of *Reduction in Remittances* and while matching on other household income shocks.

Table C.4: Hierarchical Linear Model Results

	Change in Trust in President $_{t-(t-1)}$		
COVARIATES	**Model (1)**	**Model (2)**	**Model (3)**
Change in Amount of Remittances $_{t-(t-1)}$	0.036**		
	(0.015)		
Change in Frequency of Remittances $_{t-(t-1)}$		0.071***	
		(0.022)	
Change in Remittances Index $_{t-(t-1)}$			0.046*
			(0.025)
Primary Education	0.035	0.090	0.032
	(0.303)	(0.302)	(0.303)
Secondary Education	-0.146	-0.122	-0.144
	(0.287)	(0.287)	(0.288)
University Education	0.130	0.130	0.127
	(0.308)	(0.307)	(0.308)
Married	-0.048	-0.039	-0.051
	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.085)
Gender	-0.004	-0.008	-0.010
	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.068)
Age	0.002	0.002	0.002
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Ethnicity	-0.087	-0.088	-0.083
	(0.087)	(0.087)	(0.087)
Employed	0.042	0.023	0.030
	(0.090)	(0.091)	(0.090)
Intention to Migrate	-0.043	-0.033	-0.050
	(0.151)	(0.151)	(0.152)
Wealth Index	-0.034***	-0.029***	-0.033***
	(0.010)	(0.001)	(0.010)
Household Income	-0.001**	-0.0004*	-0.0005**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Life Satisfaction	0.054***	0.051***	0.053***

	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Risk Attitude	0.024*	0.022*	0.026**
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Constant	0.288	0.219	0.278
	(0.341)	(0.340)	(0.341)
AIC/	3938.778/	3891.61/	3941.183/
BIC	4025.935	3978.603	4028.34
Observations	1,245	1,233	1,245
Number of groups	328	326	328

Notes: Models 1-3 present regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses based on a HLM where individuals are nested in household*wave observations. Being illiterate is the reference category for education. Significant at the *** p≤0.01, ** p≤.05, * p≤0.10 level. Source: Life in Kyrgyzstan Panel Survey, 2010-2013.

Table C.5: Controlling for Employment Sector

	Change in Trust in President $_{t-(t-1)}$		
COVARIATES	**Model (1)**	**Model (2)**	**Model (3)**
Change in Amount of Remittances $_{t-(t-1)}$	0.046**		
	(0.022)		
Change in Frequency of Remittances $_{t-(t-1)}$		0.095***	
		(0.032)	
Change in Remittances Index $_{t-(t-1)}$			0.045
			(0.034)
Agricultural Sector	-0.181	0.171	0.176
	(0.124)	(0.123)	(0.124)
Manufacturing Sector	0.076	-0.026	0.070
	(0.270)	(0.271)	(0.271)
Construction Sector	0.225	0.179	0.215
	(0.237)	(0.240)	(0.237)
Trade Sector	0.174	0.164	0.176
	(0.226)	(0.229)	(0.226)
Transport Sector	0.154	0.124	0.131
	(0.216)	(0.215)	(0.216)
Education Sector	-0.076	-0.052	-0.079
	(0.196)	(0.197)	(0.197)
Social Work Sector	0.246	0.263	0.249
	(0.282)	(0.281)	(0.283)
Other Sector	0.186	0.161	0.176
	(0.201)	(0.201)	(0.202)
Primary Education	0.001	0.014	-0.002
	(0.391)	(0.389)	(0.392)
Secondary Education	-0.070	-0.019	-0.013
	(0.079)	(0.376)	(0.378)
University Education	0.114	0.100	0.113
	(0.409)	(0.407)	(0.409)
Married	-0.024	-0.021	-0.029
	(0.113)	(0.112)	(0.113)
Gender	-0.070	-0.048	-0.065
	(0.079)	(0.078)	(0.079)
Age	0.004	0.004	0.004
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Ethnicity	0.326	0.309	0.324
	(0.576)	(0.574)	(0.577)
Intent to Migrate	0.002	-0.010	-0.017
	(0.180)	(0.179)	(0.181)
Wealth Index	0.003	0.009	0.000
	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.018)
Household Income	-0.001**	-0.001	-0.0005*
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Life Satisfaction	0.075***	0.061**	0.071***

	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Risk Attitude	0.005	-0.000	0.006
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.019)
Constant	0.065	0.063	0.098
	(1.099)	(1.095)	(1.100)
Observations (Individuals, Groups)	1,245 823	1,233 821	1,245 823
R^2 Between	0.63	0.63	0.63

Notes: Models 1 to 3 present regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses based on a panel data GLS model that regresses changes in trust in the President on changes in the remittances received, includes household and survey wave fixed effects and accounts for random effects varying at the individual level with standard errors in parentheses. Being illiterate is the reference category for education, and either being unemployed or not part of the labor force is the reference category for employment sector. Significant at the *** $p \leq 0.01$, ** $p \leq .05$, * $p \leq 0.10$ level. Source: Life in Kyrgyzstan Panel Survey, 2010-2013.

Table C.6: Nearest Neighbor Matching Results

	Change in Trust in President $_{t-(t-1)}$	
	Coefficient	**Standard error**
Reduction in Remittances	-0.209	0.104
	Standardized Differences	
	Raw	**Matched**
Agricultural Sector	-0.33	-0.06
Manufacturing Sector	-0.07	0.00
Construction Sector	-0.03	0.00
Trade Sector	-0.06	0.00
Transport Sector	0.07	0.00
Education Sector	0.02	0.00
Social Work Sector	-0.08	0.00
Other Sector	0.05	-0.004
Primary Education	0.01	-0.03
Secondary Education	-0.03	0.06
University Education	0.03	-0.05
Married	0.06	0.07
Gender	-0.01	0.01
Age	-0.02	0.02
Ethnicity	-0.07	0.05
Intent to Migrate	-0.10	-0.04
Wealth Index	-0.22	-0.07
Household Income	-0.32	-0.21
Life Satisfaction	-0.15	-0.07
Risk Attitude	-0.24	-0.10

Notes: Being illiterate is the reference category for education, and either being unemployed or not part of the labor force is the reference category for employment sector. Source: Life in Kyrgyzstan Panel Survey, 2010-2013.

Table C.7: Nearest Neighbor Matching Results Including Matching on Other Household Income Shocks

	Change in Trust in President $_{t-(t-1)}$	
	Coefficient	**Standard error**
Reduction in Remittances	-0.149	0.109
	Standardized Differences	
	Raw	**Matched**
Agricultural Loss	-0.15	-0.10
Affected by Landslides	-0.01	-0.12
Agricultural Sector	-0.33	-0.10
Manufacturing Sector	-0.07	0.00
Construction Sector	-0.03	0.00
Trade Sector	-0.06	0.00
Transport Sector	0.07	0.00
Education Sector	0.02	-0.004
Social Work Sector	-0.08	0.00
Other Sector	0.05	-0.00
Primary Education	0.01	-0.03
Secondary Education	-0.03	0.07
University Education	0.03	-0.06
Married	0.07	0.09
Gender	-0.01	0.02
Age	-0.02	0.06
Ethnicity	-0.07	0.02
Intent to Migrate	-0.10	-0.05
Wealth Index	-0.22	-0.11
Household Income	-0.32	-0.25
Life Satisfaction	-0.15	-0.09

Risk Attitude	-0.24	-0.16
Wave 12	-0.03	0.01
Wave 13	0.13	0.04

Notes: Being illiterate is the reference category for education, and either being unemployed or not part of the labor force is the reference category for employment sector. Source: Life in Kyrgyzstan Panel Survey, 2010-2013.

Robustness checks for Table B2 in the SI (Figure 3 in the manuscript - 'The effect of household shocks on trust in the president'), Life in Kyrgyzstan panel data

- Table C.8 replicates the analysis presented in Table B.2 of the SI using hierarchical linear models, where individuals are nested by households*wave observations;
- Table C.9 replicates the analysis presented in Table B.2 of the SI controlling for employment sector;
- Table C.10 probes the robustness of the results using Nearest Neighbor Matching.

Table C.8: Hierarchical Linear Model Results

	Change in Trust in President $_{t-(t-1)}$
COVARIATES	**Model (1)**
Reduction in Remittances	-0.231**
	(0.094)
Agricultural Loss	-0.381***
	(0.106)
Affected by Landslides	-0.211**
	(0.108)
Primary Education	0.011
	(0.302)
Secondary Education	-0.160
	(0.286)
University Education	0.091
	(0.307)
Married	-0.048
	(0.085)
Gender	-0.010
	(0.067)
Age	0.002
	(0.002)
Ethnicity	-0.048
	(0.087)
Employed	0.011
	(0.090)
Intent to Migrate	-0.069
	(0.151)
Wealth Index	-0.025**
	(0.010)
Total Income	-0.001***
	(0.000)
Life Satisfaction	0.055***
	(0.018)
Risk Attitude	0.025**
	(0.013)
Constant	0.317
	(0.340)

AIC/ BIC	3934.164/ 4031.606
Observations (Individuals, Groups)	1,247 329

Notes: Model 1 presents regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses based on a HLM that regresses changes in trust in the President on various household shocks (reduction in remittances, agricultural profit loss and being affected by landslides), while nesting individuals in household*wave observations. Being Illiterate is the reference category for education. Significant at the *** $p \leq 0.01$, ** $p \leq .05$, * $p \leq 0.10$ level. Source: Life in Kyrgyzstan Panel Survey, 2010-2013.

Table C.9: Controlling for Employment Sector

COVARIATES	Change in Trust in President $_{t-(t-1)}$ Model (1)
Reduction in Remittances	-0.484***
	(0.132)
Agricultural Loss	-0.549***
	(0.199)
Affected by Landslides	-0.369**
	(0.175)
Agricultural Sector	0.163
	(0.122)
Manufacturing Sector	0.032
	(0.268)
Construction Sector	0.214
	(0.234)
Trade Sector	0.134
	(0.224)
Transport Sector	0.118
	(0.213)
Education Sector	-0.029
	(0.195)
Social Work Sector	0.235
	(0.280)
Other Sector	0.148
	(0.200)
Primary Education	0.021
	(0.387)
Secondary Education	-0.010
	(0.374)
University Education	0.118
	(0.405)
Married	-0.036
	(0.112)
Gender	-0.055
	(0.078)
Age	0.004
	(0.003)
Ethnicity	0.303
	(0.571)
Intent to Migrate	-0.053
	(0.179)
Wealth Index	0.010
	(0.019)
Total Income	-0.001**
	(0.000)
Life Satisfaction	0.068***
	(0.026)
Risk Attitude	0.003

	(0.018)
Constant	0.069
	(1.088)
Observations (Indi-	1,247
viduals, Groups)	825
R^2 Between	0.62

Notes: Model 1 presents regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses based on a panel data GLS model that regresses changes in trust in the President on various household shocks (reduction in remittances, agricultural profit loss and being affected by landslides), includes household and survey wave fixed effects and random effects varying at the individual level with standard errors in parentheses. Being illiterate is the reference category for education, and either being unemployed or not part of the labor force for sector employment. Significant at the *** p≤0.01, ** p≤.05, * p≤0.10 level. Source: Life in Kyrgyzstan Panel Survey, 2010-2013.

Table C.10: Nearest Neighbor Matching Results

	Change in Trust in President $_{t-(t-1)}$	
	Coefficient	**Standard error**
Reduction in Remittances	-0.149	0.109
	Standardized Differences	
	Raw	**Matched**
Agricultural Loss	-0.15	-0.10
Affected by Landslides	-0.01	-0.12
Agriculture Sector	-0.33	-0.10
Manufacturing Sector	-0.07	0.00
Construction Sector	-0.03	0.00
Trade Sector	-0.06	0.00
Transport Sector	0.07	0.00
Education Sector	0.02	-0.00
Social Work Sector	-0.08	0.00
Other Sector	0.05	-0.00
Primary Education	0.01	-0.03
Secondary Education	-0.03	0.07
University Education	0.03	-0.06
Married	0.06	0.09
Gender	-0.01	0.02
Age	-0.02	0.06
Ethnicity	-0.07	0.00
Intent to Migrate	-0.10	-0.05
Wealth Index	-0.22	-0.11
Household Income	-0.32	-0.24
Life Satisfaction	-0.15	-0.09
Risk Attitude	-0.24	-0.16

Wave 12	-0.03	0.01
Wave 13	0.13	0.04

Notes: Being illiterate is the reference category for education, and either being unemployed or not part of the labor force is the reference category for employment sector. Source: Life in Kyrgyzstan Panel Survey, 2010-2013.

Robustness checks for Table 3 in the manuscript 'Changes in remittances and concern about personal economic situation, Life in Kyrgyzstan panel data

- Table C.11 replicates the analysis presented in Table 3 of the manuscript using a hierarchical linear model, where individuals are nested by households*wave observations;
- Table C.12 replicates the analysis presented in Table 3 of the manuscript controlling for employment sector;
- Table C.13 probes the robustness of the results using Nearest Neighbor Matching.

Table C.11: Hierarchical Linear Model Results

	Change in Economic Concern $_{t-(t-1)}$		
COVARIATES	**Model (1)**	**Model (2)**	**Model (3)**
Change in Amount of Remittances $_{t-(t-1)}$	-0.062*		
	(0.038)		
Change in Frequency of Remittances $_{t-(t-1)}$		-0.239***	
		(0.057)	
Change in Remittances Index $_{t-(t-1)}$			-0.028
			(0.063)
Primary Education	0.675	-0.519	0.679
	(0.788)	(0.786)	(0.789)
Secondary Education	0.944	0.869	0.941
	(0.751)	(0.749)	(0.751)
University Education	0.480	0.475	0.477
	(0.803)	(0.802)	(0.804)
Married	-0.237	-0.250	-0.234
	(0.212)	(0.212)	(0.212)
Gender	-0.159	-0.159	-0.151
	(0.166)	(0.166)	(0.166)
Age	-0.006	-0.006	-0.006
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Ethnicity	0.175	0.224	0.165
	(0.233)	(0.235)	(0.234)
Employed	0.084	0.151	0.105
	(0.224)	(0.225)	(0.224)
Intent to Migrate	-1.345***	-1.353***	-1.342***
	(0.378)	(0.376)	(0.378)
Wealth Index	-0.037	-0.055**	-0.040
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)
Household Income	0.001	0.000	0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Life Satisfaction	0.039	0.033	0.045
	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.046)

Risk Attitude	-0.006	0.001	-0.008
	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.032)
Constant	-0.630	-0.366	-0.636
	(0.896)	(0.896)	(0.897)
Observations (Individuals, Groups)	1242 332	1230 330	1242 332
AIC/ BIC	6181.269/ 6268.385	6108.433/ 6195.384	6183.816/ 6270.932

Notes: Model 1 through 3 present regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses based on a HLM that regresses changes in economic concerns on changes in remittances, while nesting individuals in household observations. Being illiterate is the reference category for education. Significant at the *** p≤0.01, ** p≤.05, * p≤0.10 level. Source: Life in Kyrgyzstan Panel Survey, 2010-2013 waves.

Table C.12: Controlling for Employment Sector

	Change in Economic Concern $_{t-(t-1)}$		
COVARIATES	**Model (1)**	**Model (2)**	**Model (3)**
Change in Amount of Remittances $_{t-(t-1)}$	-0.188***		
	(0.055)		
Change in Frequency of Remittances $_{t-(t-1)}$		-0.251***	
		(0.078)	
Change in Remittances Index $_{t-(t-1)}$			-0.181***
			(0.082)
Agricultural Sector	-0.709**	-0.754***	-0.691**
	(0.292)	(0.291)	(0.294)
Manufacturing Sector	-0.393	-0.162	-0.371
	(0.644)	(0.646)	(0.647)
Construction Sector	0.252	0.123	0.291
	(0.555)	(0.562)	(0.556)
Trade Sector	-0.758	-0.853	-0.766
	(0.520)	(0.526)	(0.522)
Transport Sector	-0.311	-0.283	-0.215
	(0.512)	(0.510)	(0.514)
Education Sector	0.101	0.054	0.112
	(0.468)	(0.471)	(0.470)
Social Work Sector	0.227	0.149	0.215
	(0.667)	(0.674)	(0.679)
Other Sector	0.402	0.448	0.439
	(0.480)	(0.478)	(0.482)
Primary Education	1.819*	1.933*	1.853*
	(1.021)	(1.017)	(1.026)
Secondary Education	1.888*	1.989*	1.918*
	(0.992)	(0.988)	(0.995)
University Education	1.740	1.890*	1.765
	(1.074)	(1.071)	(1.079)
Married	-0.015	0.004	0.000
	(0.273)	(0.272)	(0.274)
Gender	-0.053	-0.063	-0.070
	(0.188)	(0.188)	(0.189)
Age	-0.005	-0.004	-0.004
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Ethnicity	0.205	0.208	0.218
	(1.373)	(1.367)	(1.378)
Intent to Migrate	-1.437***	-1.384***	-1.373***
	(0.431)	(0.429)	(0.432)
Wealth Index	0.104**	0.058	0.092**
	(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.044)
Household Income	-0.000	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Life Satisfaction	-0.039	-0.020	-0.019

	(0.065)	(0.064)	(0.064)
Risk Attitude	0.023	0.026	0.021
	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.045)
Constant	-4.984	-4.689*	-5.214
	(2.668)	(2.658)	(2.677)
Observations (Individuals, Groups)	1,242 831	1,230 829	1,242 831
R^2 Between	0.70	0.70	0.70

Notes: Model 1 through 3 present regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses based on a panel data GLS model that regresses changes in trust in Economic Concerns changes in the remittances received, includes household and survey wave fixed effects and random effects varying at the individual level with standard errors in parentheses. Being illiterate is the reference category for education, and either being unemployed or not part of the labor force for sector employment. Significant at the *** p≤0.01, ** p≤.05, * p≤0.10 level. Source: Life in Kyrgyzstan Panel Survey, 2010-2013.

Table C.13: Nearest Neighbor Matching Analysis

	Change in Economic Concern $_{t-(t-1)}$	
	Coefficient	**Standard error**
Reduction in Remittances	0.702	0.234
	Standardized Differences	
	Raw	**Matched**
Agricultural Loss	-0.12	-0.06
Affected by Landslides	-0.01	-0.06
Primary Education	0.05	-0.02
Secondary Education	-0.04	0.05
University Education	0.02	-0.04
Married	0.10	0.11
Gender	-0.00	0.04
Age	-0.01	0.08
Ethnicity	-0.08	0.01
Employed	-0.10	-0.04
Intent to Migrate	-0.10	-0.00
Wealth Index	-0.23	-0.12
Household Income	-0.31	-0.24
Life Satisfaction	-0.16	-0.08
Risk Attitude	-0.23	-0.11
Wave 12	-0.04	0.01
Wave 13	0.13	0.02

Notes: Being illiterate is the reference category for education, and either being unemployed or not part of the labor force is the reference category for employment sector. Source: Life in Kyrgyzstan Panel Survey, 2010-2013.

Table C.14: Nearest Neighbor Matching Analysis

	Change in Economic Concern $_{t-(t-1)}$	
	Coefficient	**Standard error**
Reduction in Remittances	0.686	0.269
	Standardized Differences	
	Raw	**Matched**
Agricultural Loss	-0.12	-0.08
Affected by Landslides	0.01	-0.11
Agriculture Sector	-0.34	-0.10
Manufacturing Sector	-0.06	0.00
Construction Sector	-0.03	0.00
Trade Sector	-0.03	0.00
Transport Sector	0.07	0.00
Education Sector	0.03	-0.00
Social Work Sector	-0.08	0.00
Other Sector	0.05	-0.00
Primary Education	0.05	-0.03
Secondary Education	-0.04	0.08
University Education	0.02	-0.07
Married	0.10	0.10
Gender	-0.00	0.04
Age	-0.01	0.03
Ethnicity	-0.08	0.00
Intent to Migrate	-0.09	-0.05
Wealth Index	-0.23	-0.14
Household Income	-0.31	-0.25
Life Satisfaction	-0.16	-0.11
Risk Attitude	-0.23	-0.16

Wave 12	-0.04	0.00
Wave 13	0.13	0.07

Notes*:* Being illiterate is the reference category for education, and either being unemployed or not part of the labor force is the reference category for employment sector. Source: Life in Kyrgyzstan Panel Survey, 2010-2013.

Robustness checks for Table 4 in the manuscript 'A reduction in remittances on government approval and economic blame attribution', LiTS II, 2010 data

Table C.15: We probe the robustness of the results using Nearest Neighbor Matching.

Table C.15: Nearest Neighbor Matching Results

	Government Approval		**Economic Blame Attribution**	
	Coefficient	**Standard Error**	**Coefficient**	**Standard Error**
Remittances Reduced	-0.024	0.022	0.027	0.010
	Means			
	Raw	**Matched**	**Raw**	**Matched**
Worked for Income	0.54	0.41	0.54	0.41
Education	2.28	2.07	2.28	2.07
Age	44.13	47.49	44.13	47.49
Co-habiting	0.61	0.60	0.61	0.60
Male	0.39	0.40	0.39	0.40
Wealth Index	3.48	3.14	3.48	3.14
Life Satisfaction	3.02	2.83	3.02	2.83
Risk Attitudes	4.76	4.56	4.76	4.56

Notes: Source: 2010 LiTS survey.

Robustness Checks for Table B3 in the SI (Figure 4 in the manuscript)

- Table C.16 examines the effect of changes in remittances on trust in the President by political information via personal networks, Kyrgyzstan panel data;
- Figure C.1 presents the graphical presentation of the interaction effect based on the results presented in Table C.15.

Table C.16: Examining the effect of changes in remittances on trust in the President by political information via personal networks, Kyrgyzstan panel data

COVARIATES	Change in Trust in President $_{t-(t-1)}$ Model (1)
Change in Amount of Remittances $_{t-(t-1)}$	0.197**
	(0.097)
Political Information via Personal Networks	0.094
	(0.064)
Change Amount Remittances * Personal Networks	-0.060
	(0.040)
Change in Frequency of Remittances $_{t-(t-1)}$	0.099***
	(0.032)
Primary Education	0.050
	(0.386)
Secondary Education	0.062
	(0.370)
University Education	0.153
	(0.401)
Age	0.004
	(0.003)
Gender	-0.026
	(0.073)
Married	0.000
	(0.110)
Employed	-0.028
	(0.111)
Ethnicity	0.316
	(0.568)
Intent to Migrate	-0.016
	(0.178)
Wealth Index	0.005
	(0.019)
Household Income	-0.001*
	(0.0003)
Life Satisfaction	0.066*
	(0.026)
Risk Attitude	0.004

	(0.018)
Household Fixed Effects	✓
Wave Fixed Effects	✓
Constant	-0.057
	(1.083)
Observations (Individuals,	1,231
groups)	819
R^2 between	0.63

Notes: Model 1 presents regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses based on a dynamic panel data model that regresses changes in trust in the President changes in the amount of remittances interacted with political information, includes household and survey wave fixed effects and accounts for repeated observations per individual with standard errors in parentheses. Being illiterate is the reference category for education. Significant at the *** p≤0.01, ** p≤.05, * p≤0.10 level. Source: Life in Kyrgyzstan Panel Survey, 2010-2013.

Figure C.1: Examining the effect of changes in remittances on trust in the President by political information via personal networks, Kyrgyzstan panel data



Notes: The figure presents the marginal effect of changes in the amount of remittances on changes in trust in the President at different levels of access to political information via personal networks with 95 per cent confidence intervals based on a panel GLS estimation with random effects varying across individuals and household and wave fixed effects based on Table C.15. Source: Life in Kyrgyzstan Panel Survey, 2010-2013.

Section D: Additional Analysis

D1: Instrumental Variable Regressions

The findings reported in the manuscript suggest that fluctuations in remittances influence incumbent approval. In limiting the analysis to remittance recipients only, we are able to address concerns regarding unobserved differences between households with and without remittances. This is an advantage of our work, as remittance-recipient households differ in significant ways from households that do not receive remittances. Moreover, the empirical approach we adopt in the manuscript looks at how changes in remittances affect changes in support for the president (we regress the first differences of political trust on the first differences of the amount of remittances households receive from abroad), while controlling for levels of income, household wealth, education, and ethnicity. These controls help us isolate the effect of remittances on the outcomes of interests.

In addition, models use household and survey wave (year) fixed effects and random effects varying at the individual level. Household fixed effects help isolate the effect of omitted variables that are constant over time, but which vary across households. Survey wave (or year) fixed effects help isolate the effect of omitted variables that are constant across households but vary over time (such as economic performance in Kyrgyzstan, or in immigrant host economies for example). Household dummies take out all between-household variation, just like year dummies take out all between-year variation.

Yet, we may still be concerned that the amount of remittances households receive is correlated with broader economic conditions in Kyrgyzstan, that are simultaneously affecting support for the president. Existing research suggests that remittances respond to (random) income shocks in immigrant sending economies (Yang and Choi, 2007; Singer 2010; Kapur 2004; Agarwal and Horowitz 2002; Mahopatra et al. 2009; Page and Plaza 2006). If positive performance in immigrant sending economies, however, were the cause of lower remittances, we could anticipate declines in remittances to be associated with higher, and not lower support for the President. Moreover, and as already noted, time, or wave fixed effects, help us control for variables that evolve over time, such as economic performance in immigrant sending economies.

To further address endogeneity concerns, we also employ an instrumental variable (IV) regression. As an instrument, we use year-to-year changes in unemployment in Russia – the

major destination country for Kyrgyz immigrants - interacted with (or weighted by) the share of females in the household. Because of the lack of affordable child and elderly care, women in Kyrgyzstan have a lower probability of finding a job than men. For years, women in the country have had longer unemployment spells, higher unemployment rates and lower participation in the labor market.[3] We thus assume that immigrants in households with a larger share of women will remit more than immigrants with a lower share of women. To estimate the ratio of women in the household, we divide the total number of women in any household by the total number of household members. This instrument is correlated with the amount of remittances households receive and is only expected to affect support for the government in the Kyrgyz case through its effect on remittances. Data on unemployment come from the Russian Economic Report published by the World Bank in 2015.[4] While we expect changes in unemployment levels in Russia to be highly correlated with the amount of remitted income into Kyrgyzstan, we are less certain about the expected sign. Increases in unemployment could decrease the amount of remitted income, but also increase it, as during periods of economic contraction, labor may be displaced to the informal sector, or the shadow economy. It is particularly telling that during the recent period of economic decline in Russia (between 2015 and 2016 growth in Russia was -2.8 and -.2 respectively) the informal sector in the country grew to record levels. This is important as several Kyrgyz migrants in Russia are employed in this shadow sector, or occupy multiple, short-term contracts, not always reported to the authorities. Immigrants can even be paid under the table, in legally registered companies. The Russian Federal Statistical Service also estimates that from 2010 to 2013, i.e. the period covered in our data the informal sector increased from 16.4 to 19.7 percent of the workforce in the country.[5] While the instrument also incorporates the idea, common in previous studies, that growth in immigrants' host country is likely to be a key driver of remittances (e.g. Singer, 2012, Acosta et al. 2008, Doyle 2015; Barajas et al. 2009), it is better adjusted to the individual-level panel data we employ for this analysis by weighting it by household characteristics.

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[3] World Bank Kyrgyz Republic poverty assessment (2007). The report can be accessed here: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ECAEXT/Resources/publications/454763-1191958320976/Poverty_assessment_Vol2.pdf

[4] The report can be accessed here: http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/russia/publication/russia-economic-report-33

[5] See for example: '*Gde rabotaet armiya trodovix migrantov iz Kirgizii*; (Where the army of worker immigrants from Kyrgyzstan works'. (2016) *Vedomosti.* 31.08.2016. Available online: https://www.vedomosti.ru/management/articles/2016/09/01/655211-migrantov-kirgizii (in Russian). See also: '*Neformalnaya ekonomika v Rossii virosla do rekordnix razmerov'* (The informal economy in Russia grew to record levels' (2017) RBK. Available online: https://www.rbc.ru/economics/17/04/2017/58f4b8789a7947c1418ff1af (in Russian).

We report the second-stage results from the IV regressions in Table D.1. The coefficient for the instrument from the first-stage regressions in Model 1 is positive and statistically significant [1.312, 95% CI (0.914, 1.711)]. The F-statistic for the instrument is approximately 41.79, well above the suggested threshold of 10 (e.g. Staiger and Stock 1997, Stock and Yogo 2005). The results presented in Model 1 in Table D.1 indicate that remittances have a significant positive effect on support for the president. The instrumented remittances variable is positively signed, and statistically significant. This increases confidence in the robustness of our main results.

It is also important to acknowledge that economic performance in Russia, which we proxy with unemployment in the country, may also have a direct impact on Kyrgyz politics, over and above any indirect impact they could have on remittance flows. Economic performance in Russia for example, is likely to be correlated with trade flows with Kyrgyzstan, which in turn would be expected to have an independent impact on presidential approval. To account for this, we replicate the IV analysis in Model 2 in Table D.1 controlling for trade-export generated income at the oblast level in Kyrgyzstan. Oblasts in Kyrgyzstan are the administrative equivalent of US states, or Russian regions. The assumption here is that regions more heavily dependent on exports would suffer more in the event of a downturn in the Russian Federation. Data on regional exports come from the National Statistics Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic and are available for download here: http://www.stat.kg/ru/opendata/category/2/. The results remain robust when we control for trade-export generated income at the oblast level in Kyrgyzstan, see Model 2 in Table D.1.

Table D.1: Results from Instrumental Variable Analysis, 2nd stage regressions

	Female-to-Male Ratio in Household Weighted by Annual Change in Russian Unemployment	
COVARIATES	**Model (1)**	**Model (2)**
Instrumented Change in Amount of Remittances $_{t-(t-1)}$	0.201*	0.222**
	(0.109)	(0.111)
Primary Education	-0.001	-0.008
	(0.398)	(0.399)
Secondary Education	0.039	0.031
	(0.382)	(0.383)
University Education	0.102	0.100
	(0.414)	(0.415)
Gender	-0.044	-0.040
	(0.075)	(0.075)
Age	0.005*	0.005*
	(0.003)	(0.003)
Married	-0.015	-0.018
	(0.113)	(0.113)
Ethnicity	0.343	0.335
	(0.585)	(0.586)
Employed	0.043	0.052
	(0.115)	(0.116)
Intention to Migrate	0.039	0.034
	(0.184)	(0.184)
Wealth Index	-0.030*	-0.037*
	(0.019)	(0.019)
Household Income	-0.001**	-0.001**
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Risk Attitude	0.012	0.010
	(0.019)	(0.019)
Life Satisfaction	0.096***	0.096***
	(0.034)	(0.034)
Regional Exports		0.003
		(0.001)
F-Test	41.79	40.25
Observations	1,199	1,199

Notes: Notes: Table entries are second-stage coefficients from an instrumental variable regression. We implement the analysis using the xtivreg2 package in Stata. Being illiterate is the reference category for education. Standard errors in parentheses, significant at the *** p≤0.01, ** p≤.05, * p≤0.10 level.

D2 Evaluating the Mechanism

In our study we theoretically argued and empirically demonstrate that changes in remittances drive fluctuations in economic optimism and evaluations of the incumbent. We have also suggested that this relationship can be understood as a form of misattribution, in the sense that voters are rewarding or punishing incumbents for economic developments originating from elsewhere. While this behavior is rational, particularly in a context where economic performance is largely driven by exogenous shocks, it has implications for the economic vote as an instrument of accountability. There may be another mechanism at work here however, where households update their evaluations of incumbent competence, because they think the incumbent facilitates, or hinders remittance transfers. If that were the case, we would expect that fluctuations in remittances should exclusively influence support for the president. Yet, as we show in Table D.2 below, fluctuations in remittances also influence support for local community leaders. Arguably, it is unlikely that local community leaders could manipulate remittance inflows, or that voters would expect them to, as they lack authority to manipulate the official exchange rate or to introduce schemes to encourage migrants to remit more.

One could argue that households affected by a decline in remittances are holding incumbents accountable for either failing to prevent declines in remittances, and/or for failing to 'treat' the welfare consequences of the decline. As Ashworth, Bueno de Mesquita and Friedenberg (2018) have argued, even exogenous shocks provide an opportunity for voters to learn new information about an incumbent. Here the change in remittances would be such a shock, and the ability of the government to respond to this shock, or their preparedness to compensate its consequences could give voters new information about the incumbent (e.g. Acevedo 2016). As such, voters who experience a decline in remittances may disapprove of the incumbent not because of a mechanism underpinned by misattribution, but one rooted in an increased need for national public services. If this were the case, voters could be punishing governments for their response to the exogenous shock, rather than for the decline in remittances. This is what we call the *treatment responsibility* mechanism (Javeline 2003). Yet as shown in Tables D.3 and D.4, we find little empirical support for the argument that households that experience a decline in remittances increase their demand for public safety nets, in the form of welfare provision or public goods using the LiK panel data. Moreover, leveraging evidence from the 2010 LiTS Surveys, we show in Table D.5 that satisfaction with the provision of welfare benefits that does moderate responsibility attributions for the decline in remitted income households experience to the incumbent.

Table D.2: Fluctuations in remittances also influence support for local community leaders

COVARIATES	Change in Trust in Local Community Leaders $_{t-(t-1)}$ Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)
Change in Amount of Remittances $_{t-(t-1)}$	0.269***		
	(0.075)		
Change in Frequency of Remittances $_{t-(t-1)}$		0.108***	
		(0.037)	
Change in Remittances Index $_{t-(t-1)}$			0.084**
			(0.036)
Primary Education	-0.013	0.046	0.023
	(0.399)	(0.401)	(0.401)
Secondary Education	-0.215	-0.173	-0.183
	(0.388)	(0.390)	(0.390)
University Education	-0.015	0.051	0.033
	(0.413)	(0.416)	(0.415)
Gender	-0.039	-0.025	-0.032
	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.074)
Age	-0.001	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Ethnicity	-0.565	-0.561	-0.554
	(0.538)	(0.542)	(0.542)
Married	0.207*	0.191*	0.182
	(0.114)	(0.115)	(0.115)
Employed	-0.111	-0.106	-0.129
	(0.109)	(0.111)	(0.109)
Intention to Migrate	0.299*	0.236	0.236
	(0.179)	(0.180)	(0.180)
Wealth Index	0.034	0.065**	0.051**
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Household Income	-0.002***	-0.002***	-0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)
Life Satisfaction	0.052*	0.045	0.056*
	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.028)
Risk Attitude	-0.023	-0.037*	-0.030
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Constant	-0.110	-0.352	-0.266
	(0.983)	(0.989)	(0.988)
Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓
Household	✓	✓	✓
Survey Wave			
Observations	883	879	883
(Individuals,			
Groups)	651	651	651
R^2 Between	0.75	0.74	0.74

Notes: Models 1 through 3 present regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses based on a dynamic panel data model that regresses changes in trust in local community leaders on changes in remittances, includes household and survey wave fixed effects and accounts for repeated observations per individual with standard errors in parentheses. Significant at the *** p≤0.01, ** p≤.05, * p≤0.10 level. Source: Life in Kyrgyzstan Panel Survey, 2010-2013.

Table D.3: Changes in remittances and satisfaction with public service provision, Kyrgyzstan panel data wave 2013

	Satisfaction with Public Services Provision		
COVARIATES	**Model (1)**	**Model (2)**	**Model (3)**
Change in Amount of Remittances $_{t-(t-1)}$	-0.064		
	(0.450)		
Change in Frequency of Remittances $_{t-(t-1)}$		-0.061	
		(0.419)	
Change in Remittances Index $_{t-(t-1)}$			-0.025
			(0.176)
Primary Education	0.372	0.369	0.372
	(0.440)	(0.441)	(0.440)
Secondary Education	0.212	0.204	0.212
	(0.418)	(0.419)	(0.418)
University Education	0.364	0.404	0.364
	(0.459)	(0.462)	(0.459)
Married	0.022	0.025	0.022
	(0.097)	(0.098)	(0.097)
Gender	-0.022	-0.017	-0.022
	(0.068)	(0.069)	(0.068)
Age	-0.000	-0.001	-0.000
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Ethnicity	-0.546	-1.092	-0.204
	(5.373)	(8.893)	(3.452)
Employed	0.228	0.235*	0.228
	(0.127)	(0.129)	(0.127)
Intent to Migrate	0.025	0.026	0.025
	(0.149)	(0.150)	(0.149)
Wealth Index	-0.019	-0.077	-0.035
	(0.147)	(0.257)	(0.098)
Household Income	0.002	0.002	0.003
	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.010)
Life Satisfaction	0.008	0.011	0.008
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)
Risk Attitude	-0.057***	-0.060***	-0.057***
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Constant	3.130	3.995	2.806
	(5.969)	(11.445)	(4.160)
Fixed Effects			
Household	✓	✓	✓
Observations	391	383	391
Adjusted R^2	0.42	0.43	0.42

Notes: Models 1 through 3 present regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses based on an ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation with household fixed effects. For full results see Table D.4 and for robustness checks, see Tables D.5 of the SI. Being illiterate is the reference category for education. Significant at the *** p≤0.01, ** p≤.05, * p≤0.10 level. Source: Life in Kyrgyzstan Panel Survey, 2012-2013.

Table D.4: We Replicate Table D.3 Using a Hierarchical Linear Model

	Satisfaction with Public Services Provision		
COVARIATES	**Model (1)**	**Model (2)**	**Model (3)**
Change in Amount of Remittances $_{t-(t-1)}$	0.012		
	(0.010)		
Change in Frequency of Remittances $_{t-(t-1)}$		-0.023	
		(0.030)	
Change in Remittances Index $_{t-(t-1)}$			-0.023
			(0.031)
Primary Education	0.349	0.312	0.337
	(0.342)	(0.346)	(0.342)
Secondary Education	0.032	-0.002	0.024
	(0.325)	(0.329)	(0.325)
University Education	0.119	0.112	0.109
	(0.353)	(0.359)	(0.354)
Married	0.096	0.103	0.098
	(0.077)	(0.078)	(0.077)
Gender	-0.049	-0.046	-0.051
	(0.061)	(0.062)	(0.061)
Age	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Ethnicity	-0.059	-0.067	-0.054
	(0.118)	(0.120)	(0.118)
Employed	0.215**	0.207**	0.203**
	(0.101)	(0.104)	(0.101)
Intent to Migrate	0.028	0.023	0.022
	(0.131)	(0.132)	(0.131)
Wealth Index	-0.026**	-0.024*	-0.022*
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Household Income	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Life Satisfaction	0.047**	0.040*	0.039*
	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.022)
Risk Attitude	-0.038***	-0.037**	-0.036**
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Constant	2.973***	3.074***	3.034***
	(0.388)	(0.400)	(0.391)
Observations (Indi-	391	383	391
viduals, Groups)	161	157	161
AIC/	796.5407/	786.6433/	797.3593/
BIC	864.0087	853.7599	864.8273

Notes: Model 1 through 3 present regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses based on a HLM that regresses satisfaction with public service provision in the wave of 2013 on changes in remittances between the waves in 2012 and 2013, while nesting individuals in household observations. Being illiterate is the reference category for education. Significant at the *** p≤0.01, ** p≤.05, * p≤0.10 level. Source: Life in Kyrgyzstan Panel Survey, 2012-2013 waves.

Table D.5: Reduction in remittances, satisfaction with public services and government approval, LiTS 2010

Type of Benefit	Child	Housing	TSA[6]	Unemployment
	Government Approval			
	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)
Covariates				
Remittances decline	0.036	-0.158	-0.269	0.055
	(0.171)	(0.336)	(0.244)	(0.208)
Benefits satisfaction	0.064	-0.099	0.039	0.017
	(0.045)	(0.095)	(0.074)	(0.057)
Reduction X Satisfaction	-0.029	0.155	0.132	-0.013
	(0.025)	(0.100)	(0.113)	(0.010)
Age	0.002	0.002	0.004	0.005**
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Gender	-0.068	-0.046	-0.179**	-0.141**
	(0.053)	(0.102)	(0.083)	(0.062)
Married	0.006	-0.01	-0.089	0.041
	(0.054)	(0.10)	(0.080)	(0.064)
Employed	-0.026	0.005	0.003	-0.077
	(0.053)	(0.109)	(0.085)	(0.064)
Wealth Index	-0.012	-0.017	-0.002	0.007
	(0.016)	(0.029)	(0.024)	(0.018)
Education	0.002	-0.132*	-0.018	0.039
	(0.044)	(0.080)	(0.063)	(0.051)
Life Satisfaction	0.175***	0.127**	0.246***	0.201***
	(0.024)	(0.051)	(0.038)	(0.030)
Risk Attitude	0.010	-0.003	0.003	0.018
	(0.010)	(0.020)	(0.015)	(0.013)
GDP growth	0.09***	0.085*	0.079***	0.064**
	(0.021)	(0.045)	(0.03)	(0.026)
Constant	1.855***	2.506***	1.769***	1.608***
	(0.192)	(0.358)	(0.272)	(0.217)
Log Likelihood	-1643.854	-496.276	-810.7982	-1092.492
AIC	3317.708	1022.552	1651.596	2214.984
BIC	3395.086	1081.173	1717.6	2286.197
Observations				
(Individuals	1,285	368	602	852
Countries)	28	23	28	26

Notes: Models 1-4 present HLM regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses where individuals are nested in countries. The satisfaction with benefits in model 1 refers to child support, in model 2 to housing support in model 3 to targeted social assistance, and in model 4 to unemployment benefit. The dependent variable across all models is government approval, the same item employed for the analysis reported in Table 4 of the manuscript. Significant at the *** p≤0.01, ** p≤.05, * p≤0.10 level. Source: Life in Transition Survey, 2010. Results are robust when we use simple OLS models, with country fixed effects instead.

[6] Targeted social assistance (TSA) programmes were accessible to all households regardless of whether they had children or not, and whether members were previously employed. These provided a monthly subsidy to families below a welfare threshold.

Section E: Additional Analysis for Corrigendum[7]

Table E.1 presents the full results accompanying the revised Tables 2-3 in the corrigendum.

Tables E.1: Changes in remittances, changes in trust in the president and concern about personal economic situation, Kyrgyzstan panel data

	Change in Trust in President $_{t-(t-1)}$			Change in Concern about Personal Economic Situation $_{t-(t-1)}$		
COVARIATES	**Model (1)**	**Model (2)**	**Model (3)**	**Model (4)**	**Model (5)**	**Model (6)**
Change in Amount of Remittances $_{t-(t-1)}$	0.045**			-0.187***		
	(0.023)			(0.055)		
Change in Frequency of Remittances $_{t-(t-1)}$		0.094***			-0.248***	
		(0.032)			(0.078)	
Change in Remittances Index $_{t-(t-1)}$			0.046			-0.185**
			(0.033)			(0.082)
Primary Education	0.043	0.065	0.041	1.647	1.730*	1.680*
	(0.389)	(0.387)	(0.389)	(1.018)	(1.014)	(1.022)
Secondary Education	0.063	0.063	0.062	1.647*	1.715*	1.680*
	(0.374)	(0.372)	(0.374)	(0.984)	(0.981)	(0.988)
University Education	0.142	0.152	0.145	1.567	1.659	1.584
	(0.404)	(0.403)	(0.405)	(1.065)	(1.062)	(1.069)
Gender	-0.029	-0.016	-0.027	-0.126	-0.141	-0.134
	(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.176)	(0.176)	(0.177)
Age	0.004	0.003	0.003	-0.004	-0.003	-0.003
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Married	-0.018	-0.020	-0.024	-0.108	-0.079	-0.086
	(0.111)	(0.110)	(0.111)	(0.269)	(0.269)	(0.271)
Ethnicity	0.302	0.296	0.303	0.344	0.353	0.346
	(0.573)	(0.571)	(0.574)	(1.371)	(1.365)	(1.376)
Employed	0.013	-0.020	0.003	0.202	0.262	0.244
	(0.111)	(0.111)	(0.111)	(0.263)	(0.265)	(0.264)
Intention to Migrate	-0.000	-0.021	-0.022	-1.468***	-1.406***	-1.391***
	(0.179)	(0.178)	(0.180)	(0.430)	(0.428)	(0.432)
Wealth Index	-0.003	0.010	0.000	0.100**	0.053	0.088**
	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.044)
Household Income	-0.001**	-0.001	-0.001*	-0.000	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Life Satisfaction	0.074***	0.061**	0.071***	-0.035	-0.016	-0.016
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.064)
Risk Attitude	0.007	0.003	0.008	0.019	0.021	0.017
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.045)
Constant	0.213	0.181	0.231	-4.941*	-4.715*	-5.119**
	(1.082)	(1.078)	(1.084)	(2.639)	(2.630)	(2.648)
Fixed Effects						
Household	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Survey Wave	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

[7] We thank the Center for Open Science (COS) and their Systemizing Confidence in Open Research and Evidence (SCORE) program. When we were unable to reconcile the differences between the Life in Kyrgyzstan sample size of our study and their pre-analysis plan, we decided to conduct a full audit of all datasets used in our paper.

Observations (Individuals, Groups)	1,245 823	1,233 821	1,245 823	1,242 831	1,230 829	1,242 831
R^2 Between	0.63	0.63	0.62	0.70	0.70	0.70

Notes: Models 1 through 3 present regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses based on a panel GLS estimation with random effects varying across individuals and household and wave fixed effects. Being illiterate is the reference category for education. For robustness checks, see Tables C.4-C.7 of the revised SI. Significant at the $*** p \leq 0.01$, $** p \leq 0.05$, $* p \leq 0.10$ level. Source: Life in Kyrgyzstan Panel Survey, 2010– 2013.

Tables E.2-E.4 present specifications that use alternative codings of the changes in trust in the president and life satisfaction items used in the Life in Kyrgyzstan survey accompanying the corrigendum. In Table E.2, we use two alternative ways to measure trust in the president in 2013. In the 2010, 2011 and 2012 waves of the Life in Kyrgyzstan survey, respondents were asked how much they generally trust the Kyrgyz "President / Central government officials". In the 2013 wave of the survey, this question was split in two, as respondents were asked how much they generally trust the "President of Kyrgyzstan" and the "Government of Kyrgyzstan" respectively. Responses to these two items are highly correlated (Pearson's r=.8). In our revised Table 2-3 in the corrigendum, we rely on the average of their responses to both answer categories[8] in order to be consistent with the previous three waves, in models 1 through 3 in Table E.2 we only use trust in the Kyrgyz government in 2013 to construct the changes and in models 4 through 6, we only use trust in the Kyrgyz president in to construct the changes in trust.

[8] If one of the two variables is missing we take the non-missing value, and where necessary, to ensure consistency in units with previous waves, we round up the mean to the nearest whole number. The results remain consistent without rounding.

Table E.2: Changes in remittances and changes in trust in the president, Kyrgyzstan panel data

COVARIATES	Change in Trust in President $_{t-(t-1)}$ using trust in Kyrgyz government in 2013			Change in Trust in President $_{t-(t-1)}$ using trust in Kyrgyz president in 2013		
	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)	Model (5)	Model (6)
Change in Amount of Remittances $_{t-(t-1)}$	0.042*			0.031		
	(0.023)			(0.023)		
Change in Frequency of Remittances $_{t-(t-1)}$		0.090***			0.102***	
		(0.032)			(0.032)	
Change in Remittances Index $_{t-(t-1)}$			0.049			0.040
			(0.034)			(0.033)
Primary Education	0.040	0.062	0.036	0.044	0.059	0.039
	(0.390)	(0.389)	(0.391)	(0.391)	(0.387)	(0.391)
Secondary Education	0.047	0.049	0.045	0.089	0.085	0.087
	(0.375)	(0.373)	(0.375)	(0.375)	(0.372)	(0.375)
University Education	0.141	0.152	0.141	0.201	0.203	0.201
	(0.406)	(0.404)	(0.406)	(0.406)	(0.403)	(0.406)
Gender	-0.030	-0.015	-0.028	-0.034	-0.025	-0.033
	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.073)	(0.074)
Age	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.004	0.004	0.004
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Married	0.006	0.004	-0.000	-0.032	-0.032	-0.036
	(0.111)	(0.111)	(0.111)	(0.111)	(0.110)	(0.111)
Ethnicity	0.304	0.299	0.307	0.223	0.224	0.227
	(0.575)	(0.573)	(0.576)	(0.576)	(0.570)	(0.576)
Employed	0.027	-0.011	0.017	-0.013	-0.039	-0.021
	(0.111)	(0.112)	(0.111)	(0.112)	(0.112)	(0.111)
Intention to Migrate	-0.021	-0.041	-0.043	-0.006	-0.022	-0.023
	(0.180)	(0.179)	(0.180)	(0.180)	(0.178)	(0.180)
Wealth Index	-0.001	0.010	0.002	-0.000	0.012	0.001
	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.018)
Household Income	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.001**	-0.001	-0.001*
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Life Satisfaction	0.074***	0.060**	0.072***	0.066**	0.054**	0.064**
	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.027)
Risk Attitude	0.006	0.002	0.008	0.006	0.001	0.007
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Constant	0.191	0.170	0.205	0.355	0.303	0.364
	(1.086)	(1.082)	(1.087)	(1.086)	(1.077)	(1.087)
Fixed Effects						
Household	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Survey Wave	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations (Individuals,	1,242	1,230	1,242	1,241	1,229	1,241
Groups)	822	820	822	821	819	821
R^2 Between	0.61	0.61	0.61	0.63	0.64	0.63

Notes: Models 1 through 3 present regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses based on a panel GLS estimation with random effects varying across individuals and household and wave fixed effects. Being illiterate is the reference category for education. For robustness check, see Tables C.4-C.7 of the SI. Significant at the *** $p \leq 0.01$, ** $p \leq 0.05$, * $p \leq 0.10$ level.
Source: Life in Kyrgyzstan Panel Survey, 2010– 2013.

In the corrigendum we proxy life satisfaction using respondents' satisfaction with their household's living standard. In Table E.3 we show the results for changes in trust in president and changes in economic concerns using satisfaction with household income as a control.[9]

Table E.3: Changes in remittances, changes in trust in the president and changes in economic concern Kyrgyzstan panel data

	Change in Trust in President $_{t-(t-1)}$ using Household Economic Satisfaction			Change in Economic Concern $_{t-(t-1)}$ using Household Economic Satisfaction		
COVARIATES	**Model (1)**	**Model (2)**	**Model (3)**	**Model (4)**	**Model (5)**	**Model (6)**
Change in Amount of Remittances $_{t-(t-1)}$	0.035			-0.172***		
	(0.023)			(0.054)		
Change in Frequency of Remittances $_{t-(t-1)}$		0.084***			-0.220***	
		(0.033)			(0.079)	
Change in Remittances Index $_{t-(t-1)}$			0.038			-0.125
			(0.034)			(0.083)
Primary Education	0.282	0.290	0.274	1.642	1.720*	1.660
	(0.429)	(0.427)	(0.430)	(1.018)	(1.014)	(1.022)
Secondary Education	0.399	0.385	0.394	1.652*	1.718*	1.680*
	(0.413)	(0.411)	(0.413)	(0.984)	(0.981)	(0.988)
University Education	0.476	0.471	0.474	1.476	1.572	1.486
	(0.449)	(0.446)	(0.449)	(1.065)	(1.062)	(1.071)
Gender	-0.044	-0.031	-0.042	-0.090	-0.141	-0.134
	(0.075)	(0.075)	(0.074)	(0.176)	(0.176)	(0.177)
Age	0.005*	0.005*	0.005*	-0.004	-0.003	-0.003
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Married	-0.040	-0.044	-0.047	-0.119	-0.079	-0.086
	(0.115)	(0.114)	(0.112)	(0.269)	(0.269)	(0.271)
Ethnicity	0.352	0.347	0.353	0.321	0.353	0.346
	(0.575)	(0.572)	(0.575)	(1.366)	(1.365)	(1.376)
Employed	0.013	-0.018	0.006	0.329	0.262	0.244
	(0.113)	(0.113)	(0.113)	(0.265)	(0.265)	(0.264)
Intention to Migrate	0.001	-0.007	-0.009	-1.442***	-1.406***	-1.384***
	(0.180)	(0.179)	(0.180)	(0.429)	(0.428)	(0.431)
Wealth Index	0.001	0.010	0.003	0.079*	0.053	0.088**
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.044)
Household Income	-0.001**	-0.001*	-0.001*	-0.000	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Life Satisfaction	0.072***	0.068***	0.072***	-0.035	-0.016	-0.016
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.064)
Risk Attitude	0.011	0.006	0.012	0.019	0.021	0.017
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.045)
Constant	0.136	0.064	0.146	-4.994*	-4.715*	-5.046*
	(1.095)	(1.089)	(1.095)	(2.602)	(2.629)	(2.614)
Fixed Effects						
Household	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Survey Wave	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	1,245	1,203	1,215	1,225	1,213	1,225
(Individuals, Groups)	823	810	812	825	823	825
R^2 Between	0.63	0.63	0.62	0.70	0.70	0.62

[9] Alternative proxies for life satisfaction yield consistent results.

Notes: Models 1 through 3 present regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses based on a panel GLS estimation with random effects varying across individuals and household and wave fixed effects. Being illiterate is the reference category for education. Significant at the *** $p \leq 0.01$, ** $p \leq 0.05$, * $p \leq 0.10$ level. Source: Life in Kyrgyzstan Panel Survey, 2010–2013.

Finally, in Table E.4 we show the results of the reduction in remittances to capture the effect of changes in remittances whilst using satisfaction with household income as a control for the two alternative ways to measure trust in the president in 2013.

Table E.4: Reduction in remittances and changes in trust in the president, Kyrgyzstan panel data

	Change in Trust in President $_{t-(t-1)}$ using trust in Kyrgyz government in 2013	**Change in Trust in President $_{t-(t-1)}$ using trust in Kyrgyz president in 2013**
COVARIATES	**Model (1)**	**Model (2)**
Reduction in Remittances	-0.410***	-0.456***
	(0.136)	(0.136)
Agricultural Loss	-0.551***	-0.464**
	(0.199)	(0.199)
Affected by Landslides	-0.319*	-0.341*
	(0.179)	(0.179)
Primary Education	0.282	0.270
	(0.427)	(0.426)
Secondary Education	0.369	0.404
	(0.411)	(0.410)
University Education	0.481	0.539
	(0.446)	(0.445)
Married	-0.029	-0.062
	(0.115)	(0.115)
Gender	-0.037	-0.040
	(0.074)	(0.074)
Age	0.004	0.005
	(0.003)	(0.003)
Ethnicity	0.338	0.265
	(0.572)	(0.571)
Employed	0.027	-0.018
	(0.112)	(0.112)
Intent to Migrate	-0.067	-0.042
	(0.180)	(0.180)
Wealth Index	0.014	0.011
	(0.019)	(0.019)
Total Income	-0.001**	-0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Life Satisfaction	0.066***	0.072***
	(0.025)	(0.025)
Risk Attitude	0.009	0.008
	(0.019)	(0.019)
Constant	0.098	0.214
	(1.089)	(1.087)
Individual Observations:	1,214	1,213
Groups:	813	812

R^2 Between	0.60	0.63

Notes: Models 1 through 3 present regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses based on a panel GLS estimation with random effects varying across individuals and household and wave fixed effects. Being illiterate is the reference category for education. Significant at the $*** p \leq 0.01$, $** p \leq 0.05$, $* p \leq 0.10$ level. Source: Life in Kyrgyzstan Panel Survey, 2010–2013.