To Emerge? Breadwinning, Motherhood, and Women's Decisions to Run for Office

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Figure A-1.1: Applicant Score Sheets

Emerge CA Candidate Review and Selection Process – Form 1/4

"Application" Rating Sheet

Application Reader: [redacted] **Date:** [redacted]

Candidate Name: [redacted]

City [redacted] **County** [redacted]

Candidate Criteria	Points	Comments
Commitment to run for elected office ✓ Ability to articulate a personal vision ✓ Ability to sell themselves as a compelling candidate (for Emerge program and/or political candidacy) ✓ You can visualize them running in 3-5 years (not that they state it directly, but you can envision it)	(5 max) 3	Run for: State Senate or State Assembly or Congress. Didn't articulate vision, but mentioned interest in: education, immigration, financial issues, reproductive freedom & strong social services.
Political Campaign Participation ✓ Demonstrated track record in politics ✓ Participated in at least one political campaign/activist participation (electoral or initiative campaign, commission, 527 PAC)	(5 max) 4	[redacted] for Congress; Co-Chair, Health Food Task Force; Lead, School Quality Review Panel.
Leadership ✓ Previously or currently held leadership roles in an educational, non-profit or community organization ✓ Demonstrated success in setting and achieving organizational goals ✓ Demonstrated ability to bring together disparate groups to achieve a goal ✓ Ability to build effective networks	(5 max) 5	Set up first public Waldorf methods high school in CA. Built trust. Motivated community to support & raise $350K over last 5 yrs. Brd member, [redacted] Charter School; Brd, Alliance for Public Waldorf Education.
Commitment to Service ✓ Demonstrated and deepening involvement in any form of community, political or public service in the Bay Area	(5 max) 5	
Communication ✓ Demonstrated ability to inspire others ✓ Ability to clearly articulate ideas	(5 max) 4	
TOTAL Score 1 (Max. 25)	21	

5 = Demonstrates outstanding achievement in meeting this criteria. A candidate receiving this score must "knock your socks off," you can see this candidate running for office and winning in the next 3-5 years.

4 = Demonstrates notable achievement in meeting this criteria. A candidate receiving this score must show solid and important achievement or performance.

3 = Demonstrates satisfactory achievement in meeting this criteria. A candidate receiving this score must show average competence (i.e., shows some promise).

2 = Demonstrates some achievement in meeting this criteria. A candidate receiving this score shows uneven achievement in building this skill.

1 = Demonstrates no achievement in meeting this criteria. A candidate receiving this score shows lack of development in this area.

In addition to these score sheets, each applicant has a file of written materials, recommendation letters, and interview notes.

For the interview component of the application, interviewers follow a set list of questions and a scoring rubric for each question. We enclose an example interview rubric and questions from one year below.

Figure A-1.2: Interviewer Questions and Scoring Rubric

Interview Questions:

1. _____ Aside from applying to the Emerge California program, talk to us a little about your political engagement and involvement in your community.

2. _____ Which elected official(s) in your community stand out to you and what are some of the issues and/or projects that they've worked on that you especially admire?

3. _____ What's one local issue in your city or county that you're concerned about, what's your position on it and why?

4. _____ What specific traits and characteristics are important for being an effective political leader, which of these do you possess and are there any that you need to improve upon?

5. _____ What are you passionate about that motivates you to want to run for elected office?

6. _____ In terms of running for office, what stage would you say you're at: are you just thinking about it or have you definitely decided to run? And if you've decided to run, have you chosen a position and timeframe and how much money do you think you'll need to raise to be a viable candidate and run a successful campaign?

7. _____ Can you anticipate what some of your biggest challenges will be when you decide to run for office?

8. _____What do you hope to learn or gain from the Emerge California program?

Rubric:

5 = Demonstrates outstanding achievement in meeting this criteria. A candidate receiving this score must "knock your pumps off," you can see her running and winning an elective office in the next 3 years.
4 = Demonstrates notable achievement in meeting this criteria. A candidate receiving this score must show solid and important achievement or performance.
3 = Demonstrates satisfactory achievement in meeting this criteria. A candidate receiving this score must show average competence (i.e., shows some promise).
2 = Demonstrates some achievement in meeting this criteria. A candidate receiving this score shows uneven achievement in building this skill.
1 = Demonstrates no achievement in meeting this criteria. A candidate receiving this score shows lack of development in this area.

We compiled all scores and coded all information from notes for the *screening data* discussion in the paper.

Table A-2.1. California Interviewees Demographic Characteristics for Enrollees and Non-Enrollees

		Non-Enrolled		Enrolled		T-Test	
	Total Obs	N	mean	N	mean	Difference	p-value
California Interviewees (N=214)							
Enrolled		120		94			
Age in 2011	207	113	36.69	94	38.47	-1.78	0.92
White	169	78	0.45	91	0.51	-0.06	0.46
Requested Financial Aid	207	113	1.44	94	1.35	0.09	0.18
Income >100k*	38	19	0.26	19	0.53	-0.26	0.95
First Generation Immigrant	214	120	0.06	94	0.04	0.02	0.30
Union Member	214	120	0.05	94	0.05	0.00	0.54
Median District Wealth	208	113	82624	95	78583	4041.18	0.28
Mean District Wealth	208	113	106,250	95	100,775	5475.18	0.30
District Population	208	113	34,431	95	34,800	-369.79	0.89
Application Points Assessment**	149	84	18.30	65	20.35	-2.06	**0.00**
Ran for Office	213	117	0.24	96	0.53	-0.29	**0.00**

Note: We had access to 214 interview files for the California branch – the first and largest -- from 2008- 2012. *Emerge only asked about family income in 2012. **Emerge only began scoring applicants in 2009.

Table A-3.1: Representativeness of Survey Respondents using Intake Data for All Alumnae

		Did Not Take Survey		Took Survey		T-Test	
	Total Obs	N	mean	N	mean	Difference	p-value
Entire Population of Emerge Alumnae (N=2083)							
Age	1090	637	42.71	453	42.83	-0.108	0.882
Class Year	2072	1310	2011.49	762	2012.43	-0.940	**0.000**
White	2050	1298	0.587	752	0.653	-0.065	**0.003**
Has Kids	1059	589	0.713	470	0.674	0.038	0.175
LGBTQ	1734	1077	0.098	657	0.1080	-0.009	0.52

The intake data recorded by Emerge was somewhat incomplete. We did not assume that missing data meant "no" in the case of questions about sexual identity and children. We noted Alumnae who took the survey came from a slightly later class year (2012 among respondents, instead of 2011 among non-takers). Survey takers were also slightly more likely to be white (.65 versus .59). 33 of 2083 alumnae did not self-report ethnicity.

Table A-3.2: Representativeness of Survey Respondents using California Interview Data

		Did Not Take Survey		Took Survey		T-Test	
	Total Obs	N	mean	N	mean	Difference	p-value
Enrollees (N=94 of 214 interviewed)							
Union Member	94	56	0.02	38	0.11	-0.09	0.06
First Generation Immigrant	94	56	0.05	38	0.03	0.03	0.53
Income >100k*	19	10	0.30	9	0.78	-0.48	**0.04**
White	91	53	0.42	38	0.63	-0.22	**0.04**
Age in 2011	94	56	38.27	38	38.76	-0.50	0.78

Note: We had access to 214 interview files for the California branch – the first and largest -- from 2008- 2012. *Emerge only asked about family income in 2012.

APPENDIX B-1– SURVEY INSTRUMENT OVERVIEW

Training Outcome Measures
Have you run?
Have you won?
(if run) Why did you decide to run? (open-ended)
(if run) What was the biggest challenge? (open-ended)
(if run) Do you plan to run again?
(if yes) When?
(if no run) Why haven't you run yet? (open-ended)
(if no run) Do you still plan to run?
(if yes) When?
What assistance could Emerge give? (open-ended)

Opportunity Structure Measures
Participation in local Democratic Party
Time spent on political activities (battery)
Time spent on non-political activities (battery)
Reason for attending training
Local political environment (battery)

Political-Psychology Literature Measures
Discrimination fears (battery)
Views of politics (battery)
Traits needed to campaign (battery)
Traits needed to govern (battery)

Demographic and Personal Measures
Age
Race
Marital status
Children
Youngest child's age
Sexual orientation
Education level
Income
Employment
Occupation
Leadership in occupation
Breadwinning
State of residence
State of training
Year of training
Region of residence
Veteran status
Distance to state capitol
Home ownership

Table B-2.1: Summary statistics for the covariates used in the multivariate regressions of run rates for political novices in Figure 4 in the main body of the text. P-value for the difference of means between non-runners (0) and runners (1).

Table 1: Summary Statistics by Run for Office

	0 (N=345)	1 (N=217)	p value
Contribution to Household Income			0.006
Mean (SD)	2.73 (1.33)	2.40 (1.41)	
Median (Q1, Q3)	3.00 (2.00, 4.00)	3.00 (1.00, 4.00)	
Min - Max	0.00 - 4.00	0.00 - 4.00	
Total Household Income			0.571
Mean (SD)	3.86 (1.41)	3.95 (1.33)	
Median (Q1, Q3)	5.00 (3.00, 5.00)	5.00 (3.00, 5.00)	
Min - Max	1.00 - 5.00	1.00 - 5.00	
State			0.264
Arizona	25 (7.2%)	9 (4.1%)	
California	75 (21.7%)	49 (22.6%)	
Colorado	8 (2.3%)	5 (2.3%)	
District of Columbia	8 (2.3%)	3 (1.4%)	
Florida	1 (0.3%)	0 (0.0%)	
Georgia	0 (0.0%)	1 (0.5%)	
I do not reside in the United States	3 (0.9%)	1 (0.5%)	
Kentucky	20 (5.8%)	15 (6.9%)	
Maine	20 (5.8%)	19 (8.8%)	
Maryland	10 (2.9%)	8 (3.7%)	
Massachusetts	25 (7.2%)	16 (7.4%)	
Michigan	2 (0.6%)	0 (0.0%)	
Montana	0 (0.0%)	1 (0.5%)	
Nevada	12 (3.5%)	14 (6.5%)	
New Jersey	8 (2.3%)	4 (1.8%)	
New Mexico	28 (8.1%)	19 (8.8%)	
New York	2 (0.6%)	0 (0.0%)	
Oregon	34 (9.9%)	11 (5.1%)	
Pennsylvania	6 (1.7%)	2 (0.9%)	
Vermont	6 (1.7%)	7 (3.2%)	
Virginia	23 (6.7%)	7 (3.2%)	
Washington	1 (0.3%)	0 (0.0%)	
Wisconsin	28 (8.1%)	26 (12.0%)	
Emerge Graduation Year			< 0.001
Mean (SD)	2012.90 (3.35)	2011.65 (3.15)	
Median (Q1, Q3)	2014.00 (2011.00, 2015.00)	2012.00 (2010.00, 2014.00)	
Min - Max	2003.00 - 2016.00	2003.00 - 2016.00	
Ethnicity			0.410
AAPI	17 (4.9%)	9 (4.1%)	
Black	48 (13.9%)	25 (11.5%)	
Latinx	36 (10.4%)	21 (9.7%)	
Other/Prefer Not to Say	27 (7.8%)	10 (4.6%)	
White	217 (62.9%)	152 (70.0%)	
Education			0.963
Mean (SD)	6.11 (1.24)	6.07 (1.27)	
Median (Q1, Q3)	6.00 (5.00, 7.00)	6.00 (5.00, 7.00)	
Min - Max	2.00 - 9.00	2.00 - 8.00	
Area			0.007
Rural	34 (9.9%)	37 (17.1%)	
Suburban	128 (37.1%)	90 (41.5%)	
Urban	183 (53.0%)	90 (41.5%)	

	0 (N=345)	1 (N=217)	p value
LGBT			0.267
Mean (SD)	0.13 (0.33)	0.10 (0.30)	
Median (Q1, Q3)	0.00 (0.00, 0.00)	0.00 (0.00, 0.00)	
Min - Max	0.00 - 1.00	0.00 - 1.00	
Nascent Ambition			< 0.001
Mean (SD)	0.43 (0.34)	0.59 (0.39)	
Median (Q1, Q3)	0.50 (0.00, 0.50)	0.50 (0.50, 1.00)	
Min - Max	0.00 - 1.00	0.00 - 1.00	
Active in Local Democratic Party			< 0.001
Mean (SD)	1.42 (1.06)	1.87 (0.96)	
Median (Q1, Q3)	1.00 (1.00, 2.00)	2.00 (1.00, 3.00)	
Min - Max	0.00 - 3.00	0.00 - 3.00	
Psychological Fears Index			0.004
Mean (SD)	0.32 (0.18)	0.37 (0.22)	
Median (Q1, Q3)	0.31 (0.19, 0.44)	0.38 (0.19, 0.50)	
Min - Max	0.00 - 1.00	0.00 - 0.94	
Single (Unpartnered) Household			0.024
Mean (SD)	0.38 (0.49)	0.29 (0.45)	
Median (Q1, Q3)	0.00 (0.00, 1.00)	0.00 (0.00, 1.00)	
Min - Max	0.00 - 1.00	0.00 - 1.00	
Children			0.003
Mean (SD)	0.57 (0.50)	0.70 (0.46)	
Median (Q1, Q3)	1.00 (0.00, 1.00)	1.00 (0.00, 1.00)	
Min - Max	0.00 - 1.00	0.00 - 1.00	

Figure B-2.1: How Emerge recruited participants, according to survey responses.



Figure B-2.2: Why attend? Distribution of responses to our "nascent ambition" survey question.



Full response options:

- Had not really thought about running for office but was pushed to attend the training ("Pushed")
- Wasn't sure about running for office but liked the program and/or the idea of leadership training ("Curious")
- Was considering running for office and wanted to learn more about it ("Considering")
- Had previously run for or held office and wanted to improve my next campaign ("Previously")
- Had decided to run for office and wanted to learn tools and tricks of the trade ("Running")

Figure B-3.1: Structural/Resource Factors Dominate, Using Single Category Coding.



When responses are forced to pertain to one category only, rather than multiple categories, the ordering of the categories by frequency does not change from that presented in Figure 2 in the main body of the paper, though the percentages decrease by default.

APPENDIX C-1 – MULTIVARIATE MODEL SPECIFICATIONS

The models are identical for contribution to household income and total income, so only total income is shown below. As with previous figures, every model is run only on the subset of novices. Summary statistics for all covariates are provided in Appendix B-2, above.

Bivariate: Run ~ Income

+ Emerge Fixed Effects: Run ~ Income + State + Emerge Graduation Year

+ Demographics: Run ~ Income + State + Emerge Graduation Year + Ethnicity + Education + Area + LGBT

+ Political Environment: Run ~ Income + State + Emerge Graduation Year + Ethnicity + Education + Area + LGBT + Nascent Ambition + Active Dem Party

Additional explanation:

- "Nascent Ambition" is a 3-point scale, coded from responses about their initial motivations for participating in the Emerge training, recoded to vary from zero to one (0 meaning they were pressured or pushed to attend, or unsure; .5 meaning they hadn't seriously considered a run but wanted to learn more, and 1 meaning they had seriously considered a run or had filed for candidacy).
- "Active Dem Party" is a 4-point scale, coded based on how involved they indicated they were with their local Democratic party (0 meaning not at all active, 3 meaning very active).

+ Psychological Fears: Run ~ Income + State + Emerge Graduation Year + Ethnicity + Education + Area + LGBT + Nascent Ambition + Active Dem Party + Fear Index

Additional explanation:

- "Fear Index" varies from zero to one and is their mean response to fifteen questions, presented in a randomized order on a single page, about their fears (either before their first run for office if they ran, or at present if they had not run):
    - the difficulty of holding office
    - discrimination against me based on my class
    - losing out on income while campaigning
    - would take away from my time with family
    - would take away from my time for hobbies
    - the privacy of my family
    - fear that I would not be taken seriously by voters
    - fear that I would not be taken seriously by colleagues
    - discrimination against me based on my gender
    - negative advertising against me
    - the difficulty of running a campaign
    - the need to raise lots of money
    - discrimination against me based on my sexual orientation
    - fear of losing the election

- fear that I would not be taken seriously by party leaders.

+ Family Structure: Run ~ Income + State + Emerge Graduation Year + Ethnicity + Education + Area + LGBT + Nascent Ambition + Active Dem Party + Fear Index + Single Household + Children

Figure C-2.1: Replication of Figure 4 with Logistic Regressions



Analyses using logistic regressions deliver substantively and statistically similar results to the OLS regressions. P-values are calculated using Wald tests; the same three models for contributions to household income are significant (bivariate, fixed effects, and demographics). An odds ratio of 1 means there is no change in the odds of running for office with a one-unit change in contribution to household expenses (e.g., from 25% to 50%) or income (e.g., from $25,000 to $50,000).

Figure C-3.1: Replication of Figure 4 with Individual Models



In this figure, we add each set of controls individually, rather than cumulatively as in Figure 4. As a result, breadwinning stays substantively and statistically significant with all sets of controls save family structure (which includes controls for being single and having children). Income never achieves statistically significance with any set of controls.

Figure C-4.1: All Breadwinners Less Likely to Run. Bivariate regression coefficients are reported with 95% confidence intervals. Number of respondents in each category is reported in the bubble below each category. All Emerge respondents are included.



For all respondents, a t-test for the difference between all 0-50% and all 51-100% is significant at p=0.015 (difference in run rate of -9.67%). A linear OLS regression using all household income categories is significant at p=.001 (B=-4.46%). This means that for each income contribution category a woman goes up, she is approximately 4.5% less likely to run for office. Because this chart includes all women (compared to Figure 3), thanks to increasing sample size each bin has a) a higher mean estimate and b) lower variance.

Table D-1.1: Summary Statistics by Breadwinning for Single Mothers

	0% (N=14)	1-25% (N=3)	26-50% (N=5)	51-75% (N=9)	76-100% (N=51)	p value
Total Household Income						0.123
<$30k	6 (42.9%)	1 (33.3%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	3 (5.9%)	
$30-40k	3 (21.4%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	2 (22.2%)	3 (5.9%)	
$40-50k	1 (7.1%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	1 (11.1%)	4 (7.8%)	
$50-60k	0 (0.0%)	1 (33.3%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	6 (11.8%)	
$60-70k	2 (14.3%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	1 (11.1%)	7 (13.7%)	
$70-80k	1 (7.1%)	0 (0.0%)	1 (20.0%)	1 (11.1%)	6 (11.8%)	
$80-90k	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	1 (20.0%)	1 (11.1%)	1 (2.0%)	
$90-100k	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	5 (9.8%)	
$100k+	1 (7.1%)	1 (33.3%)	3 (60.0%)	3 (33.3%)	16 (31.4%)	
Currently Employed						< 0.001
No (Retired or Unemployed)	14 (100.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	
Yes (Full-/Part-time)	0 (0.0%)	3 (100.0%)	5 (100.0%)	9 (100.0%)	51 (100.0%)	
Ethnicity						0.635
AAPI	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	1 (11.1%)	2 (3.9%)	
Black	2 (14.3%)	0 (0.0%)	1 (20.0%)	2 (22.2%)	15 (29.4%)	
Latinx	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	1 (11.1%)	6 (11.8%)	
Other	3 (21.4%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	7 (13.7%)	
White	9 (64.3%)	3 (100.0%)	4 (80.0%)	5 (55.6%)	21 (41.2%)	
Age Category						
20-29	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	2 (3.9%)	
30-39	0 (0.0%)	2 (66.7%)	1 (20.0%)	1 (11.1%)	16 (31.4%)	
40-49	2 (14.3%)	1 (33.3%)	2 (40.0%)	7 (77.8%)	13 (25.5%)	
50-59	7 (50.0%)	0 (0.0%)	1 (20.0%)	1 (11.1%)	12 (23.5%)	
60-69	5 (35.7%)	0 (0.0%)	1 (20.0%)	0 (0.0%)	8 (15.7%)	
70-79	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	
80-89	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	
90+	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	

We see the expected relationships between contribution to household expenses, income, and employment status. Single mothers who are unemployed typically say they are temporarily between jobs, though some are retirees (in the qualitative data, which can be provided upon request), and single mothers who are breadwinners tend to make more money than those who are not (e.g., living off a pension).

Table D-1.2: Summary Statistics by Breadwinning for Partnered Mothers

	0% (N=38)	1-25% (N=33)	26-50% (N=69)	51-75% (N=79)	76-100% (N=34)	p value
Total Household Income						0.132
<$30k	1 (2.6%)	3 (9.1%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	1 (2.9%)	
$30-40k	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	1 (1.4%)	1 (1.3%)	0 (0.0%)	
$40-50k	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	1 (1.3%)	2 (5.9%)	
$50-60k	1 (2.6%)	1 (3.0%)	2 (2.9%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	
$60-70k	1 (2.6%)	0 (0.0%)	3 (4.3%)	4 (5.1%)	1 (2.9%)	
$70-80k	4 (10.5%)	1 (3.0%)	0 (0.0%)	4 (5.1%)	3 (8.8%)	
$80-90k	1 (2.6%)	3 (9.1%)	3 (4.3%)	4 (5.1%)	3 (8.8%)	
$90-100k	1 (2.6%)	2 (6.1%)	4 (5.8%)	9 (11.4%)	1 (2.9%)	
$100k+	29 (76.3%)	23 (69.7%)	56 (81.2%)	56 (70.9%)	23 (67.6%)	
Currently Employed						< 0.001
No (Retired or Unemployed)	38 (100.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	
Yes (Full-/Part-time)	0 (0.0%)	33 (100.0%)	69 (100.0%)	79 (100.0%)	34 (100.0%)	
Ethnicity						0.842
AAPI	1 (2.6%)	1 (3.0%)	4 (5.8%)	4 (5.1%)	0 (0.0%)	
Black	2 (5.3%)	4 (12.1%)	4 (5.8%)	11 (13.9%)	5 (14.7%)	
Latinx	3 (7.9%)	4 (12.1%)	7 (10.1%)	9 (11.4%)	5 (14.7%)	
Other	3 (7.9%)	0 (0.0%)	4 (5.8%)	4 (5.1%)	2 (5.9%)	
White	29 (76.3%)	24 (72.7%)	50 (72.5%)	51 (64.6%)	22 (64.7%)	
Age Category						0.038
20-29	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	2 (2.9%)	2 (2.5%)	0 (0.0%)	
30-39	4 (10.5%)	11 (33.3%)	17 (24.6%)	24 (30.4%)	7 (20.6%)	
40-49	9 (23.7%)	8 (24.2%)	30 (43.5%)	30 (38.0%)	15 (44.1%)	
50-59	11 (28.9%)	10 (30.3%)	13 (18.8%)	17 (21.5%)	5 (14.7%)	
60-69	11 (28.9%)	4 (12.1%)	6 (8.7%)	4 (5.1%)	6 (17.6%)	
70-79	2 (5.3%)	0 (0.0%)	1 (1.4%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	
80-89	1 (2.6%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	1 (1.3%)	0 (0.0%)	
90+	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	1 (1.3%)	1 (2.9%)	

As with single mothers, partnered mothers are more likely to be breadwinners when they are employed. Although the difference is not statistically significant, as partnered mothers contribute a greater percentage of household expenses, they are slightly less likely to have households in the highest income category ($100,000+). In general, partnered mothers who are breadwinners come from slightly younger age cohorts than those who contribute less of their household's income. This seems likely to reflect more general over-time trends in the U.S. economy away from a traditional

gendered division of labor, where the male partner works for pay outside the home and the female partner stays home to raise children and keep house.

Table D-1.3: Summary Statistics by Breadwinning for Single Non-Mothers

	0% (N=7)	1-25% (N=4)	26-50% (N=7)	51-75% (N=5)	76-100% (N=85)	p value
Total Household Income						0.303
<$30k	2 (28.6%)	2 (50.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	4 (4.7%)	
$30-40k	1 (14.3%)	1 (25.0%)	1 (14.3%)	0 (0.0%)	7 (8.2%)	
$40-50k	0 (0.0%)	1 (25.0%)	1 (14.3%)	1 (20.0%)	13 (15.3%)	
$50-60k	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	1 (14.3%)	0 (0.0%)	10 (11.8%)	
$60-70k	2 (28.6%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	1 (20.0%)	15 (17.6%)	
$70-80k	2 (28.6%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	1 (20.0%)	16 (18.8%)	
$80-90k	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	1 (14.3%)	1 (20.0%)	4 (4.7%)	
$90-100k	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	3 (3.5%)	
$100k+	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	3 (42.9%)	1 (20.0%)	13 (15.3%)	
Currently Employed						< 0.001
No (Retired or Unemployed)	7 (100.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	
Yes (Full-/Part-time)	0 (0.0%)	4 (100.0%)	7 (100.0%)	5 (100.0%)	85 (100.0%)	
Ethnicity						0.897
AAPI	0 (0.0%)	1 (25.0%)	1 (14.3%)	0 (0.0%)	5 (5.9%)	
Black	1 (14.3%)	0 (0.0%)	1 (14.3%)	0 (0.0%)	12 (14.1%)	
Latinx	0 (0.0%)	1 (25.0%)	1 (14.3%)	1 (20.0%)	8 (9.4%)	
Other	1 (14.3%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	5 (5.9%)	
White	5 (71.4%)	2 (50.0%)	4 (57.1%)	4 (80.0%)	55 (64.7%)	
Age Category						
20-29	3 (42.9%)	3 (75.0%)	2 (28.6%)	2 (40.0%)	22 (25.9%)	
30-39	1 (14.3%)	1 (25.0%)	3 (42.9%)	2 (40.0%)	28 (32.9%)	
40-49	1 (14.3%)	0 (0.0%)	2 (28.6%)	0 (0.0%)	21 (24.7%)	
50-59	1 (14.3%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	10 (11.8%)	
60-69	1 (14.3%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	1 (20.0%)	4 (4.7%)	
70-79	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	
80-89	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	
90+	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	

The most striking fact about single non-mothers is that they are very young. Many list themselves as students (qualitative data, provided upon request). Unsurprisingly, many are supporting themselves entirely, as most cannot draw upon pensions or investment income. Those who are not supporting themselves entirely tend to be students or recently unemployed; these individuals may be receiving financial support from family or via loans (e.g., for law/grad school).

Table D-1.4: Summary Statistics by Breadwinning for Partnered Non-Mothers

	0% (N=9)	1-25% (N=10)	26-50% (N=21)	51-75% (N=45)	76-100% (N=19)	p value
Total Household Income						0.013
<$30k	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	2 (4.4%)	1 (5.3%)	
$30-40k	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	1 (2.2%)	2 (10.5%)	
$40-50k	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	1 (4.8%)	1 (2.2%)	2 (10.5%)	
$50-60k	1 (11.1%)	2 (20.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	
$60-70k	0 (0.0%)	1 (10.0%)	0 (0.0%)	1 (2.2%)	5 (26.3%)	
$70-80k	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	1 (4.8%)	4 (8.9%)	1 (5.3%)	
$80-90k	2 (22.2%)	1 (10.0%)	4 (19.0%)	5 (11.1%)	0 (0.0%)	
$90-100k	0 (0.0%)	1 (10.0%)	0 (0.0%)	5 (11.1%)	0 (0.0%)	
$100k+	6 (66.7%)	5 (50.0%)	15 (71.4%)	26 (57.8%)	8 (42.1%)	
Currently Employed						< 0.001
No (Retired or Unemployed)	9 (100.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	
Yes (Full-/Part-time)	0 (0.0%)	10 (100.0%)	21 (100.0%)	45 (100.0%)	19 (100.0%)	
Ethnicity						0.736
AAPI	0 (0.0%)	2 (20.0%)	1 (4.8%)	2 (4.4%)	1 (5.3%)	
Black	1 (11.1%)	1 (10.0%)	2 (9.5%)	6 (13.3%)	0 (0.0%)	
Latinx	1 (11.1%)	0 (0.0%)	1 (4.8%)	6 (13.3%)	2 (10.5%)	
Other	0 (0.0%)	1 (10.0%)	0 (0.0%)	2 (4.4%)	1 (5.3%)	
White	7 (77.8%)	6 (60.0%)	17 (81.0%)	29 (64.4%)	15 (78.9%)	
Age Category						
20-29	0 (0.0%)	2 (20.0%)	7 (33.3%)	12 (26.7%)	3 (15.8%)	
30-39	2 (22.2%)	2 (20.0%)	8 (38.1%)	21 (46.7%)	9 (47.4%)	
40-49	3 (33.3%)	2 (20.0%)	4 (19.0%)	2 (4.4%)	5 (26.3%)	
50-59	3 (33.3%)	3 (30.0%)	2 (9.5%)	7 (15.6%)	2 (10.5%)	
60-69	0 (0.0%)	1 (10.0%)	0 (0.0%)	3 (6.7%)	0 (0.0%)	
70-79	1 (11.1%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	
80-89	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	
90+	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	

Partnered non-mothers, like single non-mothers, tend to be somewhat younger than mothers in our dataset, though there is more meaningful variation. Most of those who are not contributing to household expenses seem to be in high-earning households, suggesting that they may have chosen not to work. Like the partnered mothers, when the household is primarily supported by a woman, the household tends to have a lower overall income.

We begin with a simple visualization of the distribution of income levels by household contribution.

Figure D-2.1. Households with Equally Contributing Partners Tend to Have the Highest Incomes.



We can see a roughly inverted "U"-shaped distribution: when both partners contribute fairly equally, households are wealthiest; when one partner bears most of the burden, families are less well-off. The households with the lowest income on average are those where the Emerge alumna is not contributing any income.

Next, we break down this distribution by household composition. On average, partnered households have much higher incomes than single households. We do see substantial variation in income within single households, including some relatively high-earning households where the individual is not working (recall that this could be for many reasons—they might have substantial income from investments or retirement; they might have a family member or partner who supports them financially, as in the case of students; etc.).

Figure D-2.2. Single Households Have Much Lower Incomes, Especially for Breadwinners.



Finally, we examine potential interactions between income and breadwinning. As noted elsewhere, there is a significant negative correlation between the two variables (r=-0.133, two-tailed p = 0.002): the greater the respondent's percentage contribution of her household income, the lower that total income is likely to be. Accordingly, we must be cautious in running regression analyses (which may generate unstable estimates) and in interpreting the results (which may not be very generalizable, given that relatively few women are breadwinners of high-earning households).

To assess a possible interaction, we subset our breadwinning analysis to three income brackets: working-class (incomes at or below $50,000), middle-class (incomes between $50-100,000), and upper-class (incomes above $100,000).

If we subset to households earning more than $100,000 a year (n=287), and run a simple bivariate OLS regression of running on household contribution, we see results very similar to our original estimates. As women contribute a greater percentage of that $100,000+, they are significantly less likely to run (b=-5.58, two-tailed p=0.014). In other words, a woman contributing none of the household income in one of these wealthy households runs for office about 52% of the time; a woman who covers 76-100% of the household income in such a household only runs 22% of the time.

If we subset to households earning $50-100,000 a year (n=182)—what we might consider middle class—we again see similar results. For each additional contribution level, a woman is -6.12 percentage points less likely to run (two-tailed p=0.022). A woman contributing none of this income runs about 59% of the time; one contributing 76+% of the household's income is likely to run about 25% of the time. This estimate is not significantly different than that for the upper-class households (two-tailed p=0.86).

However, if we look at the working-class households (n=76)—those earning up to $50,000 a year—we see a different story. The relationship between contribution and run rate disappears (although this may be a small sample size issue). Women contributing none of the income run 27% of the time; women contributing all of it run 34% of the time (two-tailed p=0.61).

In sum, increasing household contributions predicts lower run rates for women in middle- and upper-class families as measured by income—but it does not predict run rates for women in the working class, and their average run rate, 32%, is significantly lower than all women in wealthier households, save the top breadwinners contributing more than 76% of household income. We cautiously interpret these findings to mean that even if one is the sort of ambitious and talented individual that gets admitted to Emerge, there may be an income threshold below which it is too costly to run, regardless of whether one can rely on a partner or other sources of income. This would be consistent with our hypothesized income constraint.

APPENDIX E-1 – ASSOCIATION BETWEEN YOUNGEST CHILD'S AGE AND RUN RATE

Other scholarship suggests that the age of children in the home may affect women's decisions to run, especially when those children are very young. We re-analyzed the data on mothers alone (n=386), using their youngest child's age as the new predictor variable, with run rate as the DV. First, we visualize the correlation using a simple bivariate OLS regression (Fig N.1).

Figure E-1.1. Mothers of Older Children More Likely to Run than Mothers of Younger Children.



Then, we recreate the full multivariate breadwinning regression (equivalent to the final regression in the coefficient plots, labelled "+ Family Structure") but using the youngest child's age rather than a dummy for children, and report the resulting regression coefficient. In this model, which in addition to youngest child's age includes the fixed effects for Emerge program and graduation year, ethnicity, education, area of residence, LGBTQ status, political involvement variables, the psychological fears battery, and whether the mother is single, we again find a positive, barely statistically significant effect of youngest child's age: a 0.4% increase in likelihood of running for every year older the youngest child is ($p = 0.098$). In other words, after controlling for many other factors, a mother of a 10-year old is 4% more likely to run than the mother of a newborn; a mother of a 20-year-old is 8% more likely; and so on. We of course urge caution in interpreting these results, as the child's age may very well be correlated with other factors like employment status, household income, etc., but we see some validation that our results are consistent with the findings of other scholarship.

APPENDIX E-2 – HOME OWNERS VS. RENTERS



One might reasonably ask whether the relationship between motherhood, breadwinning, and candidate emergence works similarly for any large financial responsibility, or whether there is something in particular about having children (e.g., caretaking responsibilities) that produces this result. When we look at homeowners (n=435) and renters (n=209) separately, we do not see evidence that breadwinning "bites" harder for homeowners than it does for renters. If the difference between mothers and non-mothers were solely a matter of having large and long-term financial obligations, we should see a difference, but we do not. One possible explanation for our failure to find a difference is that there is some pre-existing correlation between breadwinning and owning a home that attenuates our ability to observe an effect. Such a correlation would attenuate our ability

to observe an effect by reducing the variation in household contributions within each group (for instance, most of the breadwinners might be renters, and most of the non-working respondents might be homeowners with partners). Indeed, this is what we find. We observe a mild but meaningful positive Pearson's correlation between household contributions and renting ($r = .17$, $p < 0.001$). Breadwinners are significantly more likely to be renters.

However, this is not to say that there is no difference in the *intercept*—the base run rate—of the two groups. A simple t-test shows that homeowners are much more likely to run for office (44% do) than renters (27% do; the difference is significant at $p < 0.001$). Nevertheless, we do not see any evidence of an interaction effect with breadwinning the way we do with motherhood. Mothers and non-mothers make increasingly different decisions about running for office as their financial responsibilities increase. Homeowners and renters do not.

Figure E-3.1: Republican Women in ANES data More Likely to Identify as Homemakers



Figure E-3.2: Republican Women in ANES Data More Likely to Identify as Married Homemakers



In analysing ANES data from 1990-2016, we find that Republican women are persistently more likely to be stay-at-home moms than Democratic women (Figure K.1). These differences also hold when controlling for birth cohort. We also show that Republican women are also more likely to be married or partnered homemakers than Democratic women (Figure K.2).