Online Appendix:

"Overcoming History through Exit or Integration – Deep-rooted Sources of Support for the European Union" (Kai Gehring)

List of Tables

List of Figures

A Descriptives

Table A.1: Variable Description and Sources 1

Variable	Definition	Source
Dependent Variables		
Vote Share 'Yes' 1992	Share of Yes votes in the 1992 referendum (Maastricht Treaty)	Centre de données socio-politiques (CDSP)
Vote Share 'Yes' 2005	Share of Yes votes in the 2005 referendum (European Constitution)	Centre de données socio-politiques (CDSP)
Eurosceptic Parties	Vote Share of Parties in Euro. Parl. Elections (1994, 1999 and 2004) with a larger EU-Negativity than Positivity Score	CDSP & Manifesto Project Database
w/o Front National	Vote Share of Eurosceptic Parties in Euro. Parl. Elections (1994, 1999 and 2004) excluding Front National. In 2004, FN is the only eurosceptic party.	CDSP & Manifesto Project Database
Euroscepticism Index	Vote Share of Parties in Euro. Parl. Elections (1994, 1999 and 2004) weighted by their EU-Negativity Score	CDSP & Manifesto Project Database
Control Variables		Author computations using ArcGIS
Distance to German Border	Nearest distance of municipal centroid to the German-French border	Author computations using ArcGIS
Distance to Metz	Nearest distance of municipal centroid to the municipal centroid of Metz	Author computations using ArcGIS
Distance to Nancy	Nearest distance of municipal centroid to the municipal centroid of Nancy	Author computations using ArcGIS
Distance to Strasbourg	Nearest distance of municipal centroid to the municipal centroid of Strasbourg	Author computations using ArcGIS
Distance to Mulhouse	Nearest distance of municipal centroid to the municipal centroid of Mulhouse	Author computations using ArcGIS
X-Coordinate	Position of municipal centroid on X-axis of the coordinate system (measured in meters)	Author computations using ArcGIS
Y-Coordinate	Position of municipal centroid on Y-axis of the coordinate system (measured in meters)	Author computations using ArcGIS

Notes: Variable description and source for all variables used in the paper and the online appendix.

Table A.2: Variable Description and Sources 2

Variable	Definition	Source
Pre-Treatment Variables		
Ruggedness	Index of variance in elevation in each municipality	Global elevation data set
Elevation	Meter over sea level	NASA SRTM data set
Std. Dev. Elevation	Variation in elevation in standard deviations	NASA SRTM data set
Suitability (Potato)	Soil suitability for production of potatoes (medium input intensity and irrigation)	IIASA/FAO, 2012
Suitability (Wheat)	Soil suitability for production of wheat (medium input intensity and irrigation)	IIASA/FAO, 2012
Suitability (Barley)	Soil suitability for production of barley (medium input intensity and irrigation)	IIASA/FAO, 2012
Suitability (Sunflower)	Soil suitability for production of sunflower (medium input intensity and irrigation)	IIASA/FAO, 2012
Suitability (Onion)	Soil suitability for production of onion (medium input intensity and irrigation)	IIASA/FAO, 2012
River Length	Total length of all rivers (in meters)	Andreadis, Schumann, and Pavelsky (2013)
Population	Population in 1866	French Census 1866
Population Density	Population in 1866 divided by area (in square km)	French Census 1866
Cropland	Total area of arable land and permanent crops in the municipality in 1860	HYDE 3.2
Grazing Land	Total land area used for mowing or grazing livestock in the municipality in 1860	HYDE 3.2
Road Length	Total length of road network in the municipality in 1860	Perret, Gribaudi, and Barthelemy (2015)
Railway Station	Presence of railway station in municipality in 1860	Mimeur et al. (2018)
Railway Quality	Linear hierarchy about the infrastructure in the municipality in 1860 (0 : no / 1 : fast)	Mimeur et al. (2018)
Share Children	Share of children in the workforce on the arrondisment-level in Lorraine	Chanut et al. (2001)
Income PC	Average income of industrial worker on the arrondisment-level in Lorraine	Chanut et al. (2001)
Worker Productivity	Total industrial production divided by total number of workers on the arrondisment-level in Lorraine	Chanut et al. (2001)
Firm Productivity	Total industrial production divided by total number of firms on the arrondisment-level in Lorraine	Chanut et al. (2001)
Post-Treatment Variables		
Urban municipality	Dummy variably according to INSEE definition (1 - urban, 0 - rural) in 1999	INSEE
Population density	Population per square kilometer (1990, 1999)	INSEE
Income	Median income in municipality (2001, 2008)	INSEE
Age	Mean age in municipality (1990, 1999, 2006)	INSEE
Foreign residents	Share of foreign residents in 2006	INSEE
Education	Share of people over 15 years old with a high school degree in 1999	INSEE
Employment	Share of blue-collar workers (1999, 2006)	INSEE
Single parents	Share of single parents (1990, 1999)	INSEE
Non-married parents	Share of non-married parents (1990, 1999)	INSEE
Health Care (1998)	Dummy variable (1 - at least one health care establishment, 0 - otherwise) in 1998	INSEE
Health Care (2013)	Number of health care establishments (medium-term stay) per 1000 inhabitants in 2013	INSEE
High School (1998)	Dummy variable (1 - at least one high school, 0 - otherwise) in 1998	INSEE
High School (2013)	Number of high schools with general and/or technological education per 1000 inhabitants in 2013	INSEE
Vocational School (1998)	Dummy variable (1 - at least one vocational school, 0 - otherwise) in 1998	INSEE
Vocational School (2013)	Number of secondary schools with vocational training per 1000 inhabitants in 2013	INSEE
Post Office (1998)	Dummy variable (1 - at least one post office, 0 - otherwise) in 1998	INSEE
Post Office (2013)	Number of post offices per 1000 inhabitants in 2013	INSEE
Change Population 1866-1946	Difference in population in a municipality between 1866 and 1946	
Change Population 1916-1946	Difference in population in a municipality between 1916 and 1946	
Change Population 1926-1946	Difference in population in a municipality between 1926 and 1946	
Change Population 1936-1946	Difference in population in a municipality between 1936 and 1946	

Notes: Variable description and source for all variables used in the paper and the online appendix.

Table A.3: Survey Questions (i.)

Variable	Question	Categories/Scale	Source
French Identity	"Could you tell me whether you feel very attached, rather attached, not very attached or not attached at all to France?"	4 = very attached; 3 = rather attached; 2 = not very attached; 1 = not attached at all; standardized with mean 0 and standard deviation 1	OIP 1995/95/99 & 2001
European Identity	"Could you tell me whether you feel very attached, rather attached, not very attached or not attached at all to Europe?"	4 = very attached; 3 = rather attached; 2 = not very attached; 1 = not attached at all; standardized with mean 0 and standard deviation 1	OIP 1995/95/99 & 2001
European relative to National Identity		Relation of the two identities; standardized with mean 0 and standard deviation 1	OIP 1995/95/99 & 2001
Regional Identity	"Could you tell me whether you feel very attached, rather attached, not very attached or not attached at all to [Insert Region]?"	4 = very attached; 3 = rather attached; 2 = not very attached; 1 = not attached at all; standardized with mean 0 and standard deviation 1	OIP 1995/95/99 & 2001
European Citizen	"I see myself as a European citizen."	The higher the value, the more favorable are respondents to the claim.	OIP 1987/89/93/96/97 & 2001/03
European Pride	"How proud of being European are you?"	The higher the value, the prouder the respondent.	OIP 1998
Interregional Cooperation in EU	"Concerning development strategies, should the regional council seek cooperation with other European regions?"	The higher the value, the more respondents want regions to cooperate with other European regions.	OIP 1998
EU (generally)	Opinion of respondents towards the impact of the European project on their region.	The higher the value, the more positive the respondent's opinion	OIP 1995/97
Common Market	"Is the creation of an European common market going to worsen or improve the economic diculties of your region?"	The higher the value, the more benetial the common market is perceived by respondents.	OIP 1989/93
Evaluation of European Union	"Generally, do you think the fact that France is part of the EU is a good or a bad thing?"	1 = good thing; 0 = bad thing; standardized with mean 0 and standard deviation 1	PEF2002 V2
Evaluation of Democracy in EU	"And in the European Union, do you believe that democracy is working very well, rather well, not very well or not well at all?"	4 = very well; 3 = rather well; 2 = not very well; 1 = not well at all; standardized with mean 0 and standard deviation 1	OIP 2000 Q10

Notes: Description of survey questions from the Observatoire Interrégional du Politique (OIP), as well as the panel électoral français. The values of the categories are reversed compared to the original question categories. Questions were originally in French and have been translated.

Table A.4: Descriptive Table 1

	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Treatment & Distance Variable	35				
Treatment (Dummy)	3237	0.50	0.50	0.00	1.00
Distance to Border (in km)	3237	31.33	21.43	0.26	92.82
Dependent Variables					
Vote Share 'Yes' 1992	3230	53.59	11.78	0.00	100.00
Vote Share 'Yes' 2005	3235	45.65	10.28	0.00	100.00
Eurosceptic Parties 1994	3230	2.61	3.77	0.00	57.33
Eurosceptic Parties 1999	3233	25.38	7.94	0.00	75.00
Eurosceptic Parties 2004	3235	13.97	6.40	0.00	50.00
w/o Front National 1994	3230	2.61	3.77	0.00	57.33
w/o Front National 1999	3233	17.03	7.17	0.00	66.67
w/o Front National 2004	3235	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Euroscepticism Index 1994	3230	17.33	7.87	0.00	82.25
Euroscepticism Index 1999	3233	24.10	16.44	0.00	210.94
Euroscepticism Index 2004	3235	2875.34	995.79	0.00	8589.00
Control Variables					
Distance to German Border (in km)	3237	51.76	35.66	0.33	141.55
Distance to Metz (in km)	3237	83.12	44.02	1.60	203.16
Distance to Strasbourg (in km)	3237	108.62	50.57	0.02	223.02
Distance to Nancy (in km)	3237	73.61	34.71	0.06	164.98
Distance to Mulhouse (in km)	3237	125.88	58.08	0.00	258.53
Treatment Border Segment 1 (Dummy)	3237	0.24	0.42	0.00	1.00
Treatment Border Segment 2 (Dummy)	3237	0.23	0.42	0.00	1.00
Treatment Border Segment 3 (Dummy)	3237	0.29	0.45	0.00	1.00
Treatment Border Segment 4 (Dummy)	3237	0.14	0.35	0.00	1.00
Treatment Border Segment 5 (Dummy)	3237	0.11	0.31	0.00	1.00

Notes: This table presents the following statistics for the components of the running variable, as well as the dependent and control variables: Number of Observations, Average Value, Standard Deviation, Maximum and Minimum Value. The description of the variables can be found in the Table A.1.

Table A.5: Descriptive Table 2

	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Pre-Treatment Variables					
Elevation	3237	300.79	118.86	110.80	1039.54
Ruggedness	3237	68.28	62.80	2.29	549.24
St. Dev. Elevation	3237	32.06	35.49	0.00	301.98
River Length (in km)	3237	75.10	112.81	0.00	2507.36
Road Length (in km)	3237	4.42	5.83	0.00	74.39
Railway Station	3229	0.04	0.21	0.00	1.00
Railway Quality	3229	0.11	0.37	0.00	2.00
Cropland	3237	20.45	11.40	0.00	51.89
Grazing Land	3237	23.37	13.10	0.00	45.43
Population Density 1866	3229	84.64	117.67	0.00	3234.54
Population 1866	3229	823	2526	0	84167
Suitability (Barley)	3206	5585	1771	794	10000
Suitability (Maize)	3206	3118	1783	0	7776
Suitability (Onion)	3206	5091	1584	0	8988
Suitability (Wheat)	3206	5801	1788	798	10000
Suitability (Potato)	3206	3713	1047	730	5882
Suitability (Sunflower)	3206	5105	1721	0	8887
Post-Treatment Variables					
Change Population 1866-1946	3226	52	2305	-4495	91348
Change Population 1916-1946	3222	-88	642	-13928	8814
Change Population 1926-1946	3228	-38	336	-8332	4429
Change Population 1936-1946	3232	-80	545	-17604	1111
Turnout 1992	3230	74.57	6.28	33.33	100.00
Turnout 2005	3235	73.48	6.68	50.79	100.00
Age	3237	39.71	3.21	28.26	69.38
Income	2647	31559.20	5998.64	17691.00	53547.00
Education	3234	0.10	0.03	0.00	0.50
Employment	3236	0.19	0.08	0.00	1.00
Health Care	3143	0.01	0.11	0.00	3.33
High School	3143	0.01	0.09	0.00	2.50
Vocational School	3143	0.01	0.06	0.00	2.50
Post Office	3143	0.08	0.32	0.00	10.00

Notes: This table presents the following statistics for the Pre- and Post-treatment variables: Number of Observations, Average Value, Standard Deviation, Maximum and Minimum Value. The description of the variables can be found in the Table A.2.

Figure A.1: Location of Cahiers Units

Notes: These are the locations at which the historical Cahier data were collected by the French authorities. The dots reflect the center of an area of collection, rather than a precise point. The French bureaucrats collected their information in the cities on the maps, as well as in the surrounding area. Hyslop (1968) translated the written reports into numerical values, which I rely on.

Replication of GIS Data

The geographical data for this paper were georeferenced (where necessary), processed, transformed and computer using ESRI ArcGIS version 10.6. The tools that were used included the geoprocessing capabilities of ArcGIS, spatial analyst to compute area averages, as well as the NEAR tool for distance calculations.

The projection used to transform data from the geographic coordinate systems to the projected coordinate systems was ETRS 1989 / UTM Zone 32N (sref.Name=="ETRS_-1989_UTM_Zone_32N"). This covers all relevant areas of France and has little distortions along any dimensions. Hence it can be used to compute area averages as well as distances between points and borders.

The source of all files, including the geographic data, are provided in the descriptive tables. Most files are official data directly from the French authorities. Some borders and maps were georeferenced by hand, the respective sources are provided below the figures and in this online appendix. When trying to replicate and work with the data, make sure to first define the appropriate geographic coordinate systems, and then transform all (!) files to the same projected coordinate system before performing any computations. Please contact the author if there are specific questions about particular parts or an interest in some of the historical maps and borders.

B Overview of Repressive Policies

Table B.1: Detailed Overview of Repressive Policies in Alsace and Lorraine

Time Period	Ruled By	Policy	Policy Category	Source
1871-1902	Germany	Reactivation of the 1849 "dictatorship paragraph": permitted house searches, the expulsion of agitators and prohibiting political organizations.	Social, political, military freedom, equality	Carrol (2010); Grasser (1998)
Beginning 1871/72	Germany	Bismarcks *Kulturkampf*: government seriously restricted Catholic education as well as the Catholic press. Moreover, some religious orders were expelled from the Reichsland.	Regional institutions and administrative personnel	Silverman (1966)
May 1872	Germany	Strasbourg University is reopened as "Kaiser-Willhelm-Universitaet."	Language	Höpel (2012)
Oct. 1872	Germany	Introduction of obligatory military service.	Social, political, military freedom, equality	Grasser (1998)
1873	Germany	French is prohibited to be taught in schools.	Language	Grasser (1998)

1878	Germany	Legislation to restrict the political participation of the people.	Social, political, military freedom, equality	Carrol (2010)
1882	Germany	The use of French is prohibited in the Delegation.	Language	Grasser (1998)
1887	Germany	Choral and gymnastic societies are banned as they are seen as opportunities for the coming-together of pro-French minded people.	Social, political, military freedom, equality	Carrol (2010)
1890 onward	Germany	Unwelcome legislation (e.g. German trade regulations) is introduced in Alsace-Lorraine.	Regional institutions and Administrative Personnel	Höpel (2012)
1890 onward	Germany	German becomes the only official language and district and county councils become obliged to embrace German as their only language.	Language	Grasser (1998)
Until 1898	Germany	Restrictions are imposed on the press.	Media	Silverman (1966)

1914	Germany	Citizens sympathizing with the French are taken in "protective detention" without trial.	Separation and segregation; Social, political, military freedom, equality	Harvey (1999)
1917/18	France	Approximately 100 000 Germans are deported.	Separation and segregation	Carrol and Zanoun (2011), Callender (1927)
1918	France	Establishment of French Currency.	Regional institutions and administrative personnel	Callender (1927)
Dec. 1918	France	An identity-card system is implemented: Locals are classified and receive a specific civil status according to the origin of their parents. Lower classification is often associated with discrimination.	Separation and segregation	Harvey (1999)

Dec. 1918 to Oct. 1919	France	"Commissions de Triage" are established: Designed to assert the Frenchness of the population in re-annexed areas, individuals suspected of faulty loyalties are investigated and either exonerated, placed under surveillance, taken into custody or expelled from France. In this context, some pro-German Alsatiens are forcefully emigrated.	Separation and segregation; Social, political, military freedom, equality	Carrol and Zanoun (2011); Harvey (1999)
1920	France	French becomes the only language to be taught in schools. The so-called "direct method," where students are immersed in the French language with no reference to German, leads to considerable dificulties for a majority of French-speaking Alsatiends.	Language	Grasser (1998); Goodfellow (1993)

1920s	France	French becomes the official legal language. Due to this, many bureaucrats, who had previously built their career under the German system, are in danger of losing their jobs or being denied promotions as the French government now regards them as incompetent or politically problematic.	Language	Goodfellow (1993)
June 1924	France	The Ministerial Declaration by Premier Edouard Herriot introduces a centralised French administration as well as all French laws and institutions into the recovered territories. The Declaration also introduces the separation of church, secular education and a number of anti-clerical laws.	Regional institutions and administrative personnel	Carrol and Zanoun (2011); Goodfellow (1993)
1925	France	The post of Commissioner General is abolished and the regional government returned to the Government of Paris	Regional institutions and administrative personnel	Callender (1927)

1927/28	France	Three autonomist journals become banned as they are seen to have had a central role in a campaign against the French: The "Volksstimme" ("voice of the people"), the "Wahrheit" ("truth") and the "Zukunft" ("future").	Media	Goodfellow (1993)
1927/28	France	Colmar trials: 15 prominent autonomists are arrested and tried with the reason given that they had participated in a plot to separate Alsace from France. 4 of the 15 are sentenced to 1 year in prison, while 5 are sentenced to be exiled.	Social, political, military freedom, equality	Goodfellow (1993)
1939	France	15 autonomists are arrested for relations with the enemy. One autonomist leader is later executed by a fire squad in 1940 in Champigneulles.	Social, political, military freedom, equality	Goodfellow (1993)
1940	Germany	The French language is prohibited from use and street signs must be renamed in German. French names must be replaced by German equivalents.	Language	www.nithart.com; Encyclopédie

1940	Germany	Germans prohibit the Alsatian dialect as it is regarded as a means of protest against the Nazi-government.	Language	Encyclopédie
1940	Germany	Germans prohibit typically Alsatian gatherings and celebrations as they are seen as expressions of specifically regional culture and therefore against the Germanisation efforts of the Nazi regime.	Social, political, military freedom, equality	Encyclopédie
1940	Germany	German is made the official language of the administration.	Language	Grasser (1998)
1945-1952	France	Teaching of German is de jure prohibited in schools, de facto this is applied in about half of the schools.	Language	www.alsace-lorraine.org; Anderson (1972)
1953	France	Bordeaux trials: 13 Alsatian *malgré-nous* are sentenced to death due to their involvement in the massacre of Oradour-sur-Glane.	Social, political, military freedom, equality	Boswell (2008) Collins (2007)

Notes: Encyclopédie refers to `www.encyclopedie.bseditions.fr`.

C   Mechanisms and Background on Nested Identities

C.1   Further Evidence on Migration, Socioeconomics, Public Goods, Identity

This section describes the tests related to potential mechanisms in more detail. This part discusses population changes, socio-economic and public good provision in detail, and the next part discusses European identity.

Population in- or outflows might have contributed to explaining the observed differences in EU support. Historians document at least two big migration waves in and out of the treatment area as a whole, one when becoming German after 1871 and one after WWI when returning to France. The overall numbers at the département level added up to be in the tens of thousands, but historians disagree about the exact numbers (Harvey 1999). To work as a mechanism in the RD specifications, migration must be related to changes for municipalities at the border. For the years between 1866 and 1956, I managed to gather municipal level historical census data. Migration can affect EU support directly by changing the norms and identities in an area or by changing the composition of the population with regard to socioeconomic factors.

Panel A in Figure C.1 begins by testing for discontinuities in population changes at the treatment border. The coefficient plots indicate no such discontinuities, suggesting that migration was not a direct mechanism. Prior research shows that socioeconomic factors like education, age, employment or income are related to political choices. Even though panel A did not indicate net population changes at the border, the composition could still have been altered. The treatment period could also have influenced these factors by changing incentives, norms or institutions. For instance, the remaining legal differences, the so-called "local laws", differences in religiosity (the treated area is more catholic and still features obligatory religious lessons at school) or the political influence of 50 years of German rule could affect these aspects. Nonetheless, Figure C.1 provides no evidence

that these factors are the decisive mechanisms.

Finally, the third plausible socioeconomic channel is change in public good provision by the respective départements. For instance, the German occupation period might not have solely been an exposure to negative policies by a nation-state, but to some degree, citizens in the treated area might also have adapted to the more decentralized German system. A better functioning département could also plausibly explain higher support for policies that weaken the national level compared to other levels. Panel C, however, provides no empirical evidence in favor of this mechanism either.

Figure C.2 provides an extended coefficient plot with outcomes from additional years, as well as some additional outcomes. All results further suggest that those categories do not reflect the main mechanism of persistence.[1]

Figure C.2 provides an extended version of panel B and C with data from additional years.

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[1]Moreover, Table D.20 shows that religiousness and religious denomination are not significantly related to EU support in France during the sample period.

Figure C.1: Mechanisms: Population Changes, Socioeconomic Factors, and Public Goods

Notes: Panel A-C show RD, panel D OLS coefficients, with 95% confidence interval. Public good provision is measured per capita. All variables were standardized with mean zero and variance one. Detailed results in Table D.3.

Figure C.2: Mechanisms - Extended Panel B and Panel C

Notes: Figure shows RD coefficients with 95% confidence interval. Public good provision is measured per capita. All variables were standardized with mean zero and variance one. Compared to Figure 7, this figure contains data for additional years of the same variables, as well as two variables measuring single-and non-married parents as a further test for existing differences in family structure.

C.2   European Identity

We can define identity formally by adapting Shayo (2009). An individual i can identify with multiple groups j that are potentially nested in each other. People in the control and treated area have at least three identities that can differ in strength: regional Alsatian or Lorrainian, national French identity, and European identity. Group identity depends on the *perceived* distance to the "prototypical" member of group j, so that

$$h^{i,j} = 1 - \left(\sum_{k \in K} \omega_k (p_k^i - p_k^j)^2 \right)^{1/2}$$

.

$j \in \{R, N, EU\}$, with R, N and EU corresponding to region, nation and Europe. This section will focus on whether the treated area on average has a stronger European identity, and whether this comes at the cost of national identity. Appendix C considers

the relationship between all three nested identities in more detail.

How strong an individual i identifies with a group j depends on the weight ω_k she puts on individual attributes p_k that she shares with the other group members, compared to those that distinguish her from the group. Individual attributes are predetermined, so that the weights determine the identity strength. If, for instance, historical events cause individuals to emphasize the common suffering by all Europeans during the complicated and conflict-prone history of the continent more, their European identity becomes stronger.

Table C.1: Mechanisms: Stronger European Identity

| | A. European and National Identity | |
	European Identity	French National Identity
Treatment vs. Control	0.277	-0.016
	(0.030)	(0.029)
	[0.000]	[0.582]
Observations	5553	5619
	B. European Identity (Alternative)	
	European Citizen	European Pride
Treatment vs. Control	0.201	0.258
	(0.022)	(0.063)
	[0.000]	[0.000]
Observations	10023	1347

Sources: Individual-level survey from the Observatoire Interregional du Politique (OIP). *"X" Identity*: "Could you tell me whether you feel very attached, rather attached, not very attached or not attached at all to X?" X refers to Europe and the nation (France in this case), asked in separate questions (95, 97, 99 and 01). *European Citizen*: "I see myself as a European citizen." (87, 89, 93, 96, 97, 01 and 03). *European Pride*: "How proud of being European are you?" (98). The higher the value, the higher the agreement of the respondents. All outcome variables are standardized with mean zero and variance one. Regressions control for age, employment status, education and sex. Standard errors in brackets and p-values below.

Table C.1, panel A begins by showing that attachment to Europe, a common proxy for identity, is clearly stronger in the treated area. This holds when setting European relative to national French identity. European identity remains between a quarter and a third of a standard deviation stronger in the treated area. Both differences are statistically significant at the 1%-level. Panel B uses whether respondents perceive themselves as European citizens and whether they are proud of being European as alternatives. Again,

there is a consistently stronger European identity in the treated area. The differences are meaningfully large in size and statistically highly significant. To sum up, the higher EU support and lower share of Eurosceptic parties is also reflected in a stronger European identity in the part of the region historically more negatively affected by the actions of nation-states.[2]

In Table C.2, I test whether the stronger European identity in the treated area is driven by higher perceived economic benefits for the region. A significant difference would suggest that people who expect higher economic gains are also the ones driving the differences in European identity. This does not seem to be the case. Interacting the treatment variable with three different indicators of perceived economic benefits always yields a positive and significant treatment effect, but this effect is not moderated by economic perceptions.

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[2]Remember that the survey data are available at the département instead of municipal level, i.e., we are essentially comparing conditional means in the three treated and three control départements.

Table C.2: Differences in European Identity and Perceived Economic Benefits

	Europ. Citizen	Europ. Identity	Europ. Pride
Treatment vs. Control	0.286	0.121	0.217
	(0.042)	(0.039)	(0.062)
	[0.000]	[0.002]	[0.000]
- Common Market	0.153		
	(0.035)		
	[0.000]		
- EU Impact		0.504	
		(0.032)	
		[0.000]	
- Interregional cooperation in EU			0.189
			(0.060)
			[0.002]
Interaction	0.059	0.001	0.000
	(0.043)	(0.037)	(0.075)
	[0.172]	[0.976]	[0.996]
Observations	2399	2536	1294

Notes: Individual-level survey data from the Observatoire Interregional du Politique (OIP). *European Citizen*: "I see myself as a European citizen." (89 and 93). *European Pride*: "How proud of being European are you?" (98). *Cooperation Regions*: "Concerning development strategies, should the regional council seek cooperation with other European regions" (98). *European Identity*: "Could you tell me whether you feel very attached, rather attached, not very attached or not attached at all to Europe?" *Common Market*: "Is the creation of an European common market going to worsen or improve the economic difficulties of your region?" (89 and 93). *EU Impact*: Opinion of respondents towards the economic impact of the European project on their region (95 and 97). Main variables are standardized with mean zero and variance one. The higher the value, the higher the agreement of the respondent. Regressions control for age, employment status, education and sex. Standard errors in brackets and p-values below.

C.3 Relation between Multiple Identities

One crucial question when discussing contributions to stronger identification with a supranational identity like the European Union is whether this necessarily has to come at the cost of weaker lower-level identities. Although there is a literature about the possibility of dual identities, in particular in border regions, it seems that this is often implicitly assumed. To examine this, I also evaluate the effect of the treatment on regional and national identity. Such an approach is not entirely new and relates to existing studies. Hooghe and Marks (2004), for instance, find that stating a stronger national identity correlates with a stronger European identity using Eurobarometer data.

It is not straightforward to evaluate the relationship between identities at different levels using survey measures as proxies for the real identity. Using the OIP surveys, for instance, there is a positive correlation between identities at all levels. However, this is hard to interpret as it could be related to an individual-specific error term, like a general tendency to answer more positively or negatively. In addition to studying correlations at the individual level, we can also examine the correlations between département level regional, national and European identities. This way, the individual-specific error terms are canceled out. The result still suggests a positive correlation between the identities at different levels. Nonetheless, a causal interpretation could still be problematic as the differences cannot be distinguished from département-specific error terms.

Ideally, we would want to use real panel data to examine how the European identity of the same individual changes as her national or regional identity changes. Instead of such a panel, examining the effect of the treatment on the identities at all three levels is of equal interest. Given that we can interpret the treatment effect as the change within formerly homogeneous regions, we can also examine whether the observed increase in European identity comes at the cost of a lower national or regional identity.

Table C.3 shows the results. First, even though the treated areas were historically more negatively affected by the French nation state, the stronger European identity does not come at the expense of a much weaker national identity. French identity is only minimally weaker, and the difference is clearly statistically insignificant. My findings hence suggest that national identities are not an obstacle to European integration, contrasting prior correlational work (Carey 2002; Fligstein, Polyakova, and Sandholtz 2012). When examining regional identity, there is even a positive effect. That means that both European identity and regional identity are strengthened. This is explained by Dehdari and Gehring (2018). Due to the European Union being perceived as fostering the cause of regions in the 1990s and early 2000s, regional and European identity are perceived as aligned; in economic terms they could be described as substitute. Using the terminology in Hooghe

and Marks (2004), individuals defined their regional identity as inclusive with regard to European identity.[3]

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[3]Also note that the positive correlation between regional and European identity is much stronger in the treated area than in the rest of France.

Table C.3: Nested Identities: EU, National, and Regional Level (Alsace & Lorraine)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Panel A	**Strength of Identities**		
Dependent Variable	**Regional Identity**	**French Identity**	**European Identity**
Treatment vs. Control	0.179	-0.016	0.277
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.030)
	[0.000]	[0.582]	[0.000]
Observations	5620	5619	5553
Panel B	**Relationship between Nested Identities**		
Dependent Variable	**Regional Identity**	**French Identity**	**European Identity**
Variable of Interest	**French Identity**	**European Identity**	**Regional Identity**
V.o.I. X Treatment vs. Control	0.002	0.009	0.064
	(0.030)	(0.033)	(0.031)
	[0.941]	[0.776]	[0.038]
Observations	5611	5547	5545
Panel C	**Preference: Level of Decision-Making**		
Dependent Variable	**Regional Level**	**National Level**	**European Level**
Treatment vs. Control	0.157	-0.071	0.197
	(0.060)	(0.062)	(0.053)
	[0.009]	[0.255]	[0.000]
Observations	1322	1322	1322
Panel D	**Preference: Level of Decision-Making (relative to alternative)**		
Baseline	**Regional Level**	**National Level**	**European Level**
rather than	**National Level**	**European Level**	**Regional Level**
Treatment vs. Control	0.152	-0.333	0.185
	(0.076)	(0.099)	(0.080)
	[0.047]	[0.001]	[0.020]
Observations	902	427	725

Sources: Individual-level survey data from the Observatoire Interregional du Politique (OIP). *"X" Identity*: "Could you tell me whether you feel very attached, rather attached, not very attached or not attached at all to X?" The higher the value the more attached the respondent is to X. X refers to Europe, the nation (France in this case), and the region, asked in separate questions. These questions where available for the years 1995, 1997, 1999, 2001. Main question panel C and D: "In your opinion, should the development of your region occur according to a plan decided by the region, the state or the European Union?," only available in 1991. In panel C, *"X" Level* is a dummy variable indicating the choice of "X" (Region, State or EU). In panel D, for each column the sample is reduced only the respondents chosing either Option 1 or 2 (Option 1 = 1; Option 2 = 0). Regressions control for age, employment status, education and sex. Standard errors in brackets and p-values right below. All outcome variables are standardized with mean zero.

Panel B of Table C.3 explores for each possible identity pair, whether the relationship between two identities is stronger or weaker in the treated compared to the control area. To do so, I regress one identity on another and include the treatment dummy variable, as

well as the interaction between the two. Note that in this regression only the interaction between the treatment dummy and the other identity can be causally interpreted.

The results show that the differences between the treatment and control areas are not explained by a stronger relationship between regional and French or French and European identity. The interaction term becomes significant only when considering the relationship between European and regional identity. The correlation between the two is significantly stronger in the treated area than in the control area. Hence, the joint increase in both identities in panel A can be explained by the fact that both identities seem to be stronger substitutes in the treated area.

C.4 Further Details

Table C.4 explores the relationship between different identities in more detail, now using the same survey data for all of France, only excluding the area examined so far. Panel A explores whether each pair of identity variables is correlated positively at the individual level. This is clearly the case; there is a positive relationship for all three pairs, which is stronger for identity pairs that are conceptually closer to each other. That means regional and French identity, as well as French and European identity, are closer related with each other than European and regional identity. All individual level results are robust to including département- and year-fixed effects.

Of course, these individual level results might be driven by any omitted variable at the individual level, or framed differently, an individual specific error term. To overcome this concern as well as possible with the data at hand, I average the identity variables at the département level for panel C and D. With a sufficiently high number of observations per département, in this case about 100, the individual specific error terms should cancel each other out when averaging. Using a pooled cross section in panel C yields rather different results. The relationship between regional and French identity is not statistically insignificant, and the relationship between European and regional identity becomes nega-

tive. When including département and year fixed effects in panel D, and thus estimating off of only changes in the explanatory variables by département, the results change again. Regional and French identity are again positively correlated, and European and regional identity is positive but statistically insignificant.

The most robust positive relationship might come as a surprise for many politicians and scientific observers. National French identity and European identity are positively correlated in each specification. This holds even when identifying the effect only with changes over time in panel D. Hence, when thinking about achieving a stronger European identity in the future, the evidence, at least from France, suggests that a stronger national identity seems to be helpful rather than an obstacle in achieving this.

Table C.2 shows that the stronger European identity in the treated area does not seem to be driven by the perception of stronger economic benefits. Instead, it appears to be driven by a psychological change relating to the value of the EU in other non-economic dimensions, potentially its role in maintaining peace.

Table C.4: Identities as Substitutes (All of France w/o Alsace & Lorraine)

Dependent Variable Variable of Interest	Regional Identity French Identity	French Identity European Identity	European Identity Regional Identity
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Panel A		**Individual level**	
Variable of Interest	0.362	0.177	0.061
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Observations	44325	43658	43616
Panel B		**Individual level (Département- and year-fixed effects)**	
Variable of Interest	0.371	0.177	0.074
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Observations	44325	43658	43616
Panel C		**Départemental level**	
Variable of Interest	0.078	0.181	-0.100
	(0.095)	(0.050)	(0.042)
	[0.416]	[0.000]	[0.018]
Observations	300	300	300
Panel D		**Départemental level (Département- and year-fixed effects)**	
Variable of Interest	0.444	0.157	0.122
	(0.058)	(0.091)	(0.100)
	[0.000]	[0.089]	[0.227]
Observations	300	300	300

Notes: Individual-level survey daa from Observatoire Interregional du Politique (OIP) from the years 1995, 1997, 1999, and 2001. *"X" Identity*: "Could you tell me whether you feel very attached, rather attached, not very attached or not attached at all to X?" The higher the value the more attached the respondent is to X. X refers to Europe, the nation (France in this case) and the region, asked in separate questions. Regressions control for age, employment status, education and sex. Standard errors in brackets and p-values right below. All outcome variables are standardized with mean zero.

C.5 Qualitative Evidence about the Role of Regional Organizations in Maintaining Historical Memories in Alsace-Lorraine

This subsection provides evidence about the role of regionalist organizations during the treatment period, as well as the role they play afterwards in maintaining historical memories. First, Table C.5 provides a list of all regionalist organizations that I found which were established during the treatment period. There have been a lot of organizations in all kinds of different areas, ranging from parties to newspapers and private associations.

It is important to note that regional organizations were established both during the German and the French treatment period with harsh nation-building policies. Regional

organizations also played a role to organize resistance during war times. Hence, the role of regional organizations as a mechanism is not confined to specific negative experiences with nation-states, but seems to be a more general means of suppressed groups to engage in collective action and maintain their culture and identity.

It is also important to observe that those organizations were established and represent both German- and French-dialect speaking citizens. This is in line with the interpretation that the decisive "treatment" is the negative experiences with the central state, which were shared by all citizens in the regions. While any claim of comprehensively capturing all possible organizations would be exaggerated, I found little evidence of similar organizations being founded in comparable numbers in the control area.

Finally, it is interesting to observe that regional organizations play an important role both in the active resistance towards central state oppression as well as in maintaining historical memories in many other minority regions. When examining the history of other minority regions like Catalonia, Corsica, the Basque country or South Tyrol, regional organizations were always reported to be an important means in maintaining regional culture and keeping historical memories alive.

Table C.5: The Foundation of Regionalist Organizations in the Treated Area

Name	Category	Place	Time	Regionalist	Source
Union Républicaine Lorraine (URL)	Party	Moselle	1919	Yes	1
Christlich-Soziale Partei	Party	Moselle	1926	Yes	2
Parti Lorrain Indépendant (also "Groupe Lorrain")	Party	Moselle	1907	Yes	3
Elsaß-Lothringische Landespartei	Party	Alsace and Moselle	1903	Yes	4
Elsass-Lothringen Partei (also "Les Protestataires")	Party	Alsace and Moselle	1874	Yes	5
Les Autonomistes	Party	Alsace and Moselle	1877	Yes	6
Elsass-Lothringer Partei	Party	Alsace and Moselle	1936	Yes	7
Unabhängige Landespartei für Elsass-Lothringen	Party	Alsace and Moselle	1927	Yes	8
Elsass-Lothringisches Zentrum	Party	Alsace and Moselle	1906	Yes	9
Elsass-Lothringische Fortschrittspartei	Party	Alsace and Moselle	1929	Yes	10
Parti Communiste Français (PCF)	Party	Alsace and Moselle	1918	Yes	11
Indépendants d'action populaire (IAP)	Party	Alsace and Moselle	1932	Yes	12
Républicains du centre (DRC)	Party	Alsace and Moselle	1936	Yes	13
Elsass-Lothringisch-Autonomistische Partei (ELAP)	Party	Alsace and Moselle	1925	Yes	14
Kommunistische Partei-Opposition (KP-O)	Party	Alsace and Moselle	1929	Yes	15
Elsass-Lothringische Arbeiter und Bauernpartei (ELABP)	Party	Alsace and Moselle	1939	Yes	16
Faisceau	Party	Alsace	1925	Yes	17
Union Populaire Républicaine d'Alsace (UPRA; sometimes UPR	Party	Alsace	1919	Yes	18
Action Populaire Nationale d'Alsace (APNA)	Party	Alsace	1928	No	19
Parti Républicain Démocratique (PRD)	Party	Alsace	1919	No	20
Elsaesserpartei (EP)	Party	Alsace	1922	Yes	21
Elsaessischer Oppositionsblock (EOB)	Party	Alsace	1927	Yes	22
Elsassische Fortschrittspartei (EFP)	Party	Alsace	1926	Yes	23
Union Populaire Républicaine Nationale d'Alsace (UPRNA)	Party	Alsace	1924	Yes	24
Elsässische Arbeiter und Bauernpartei (EABP)	Party	Alsace	1935	Yes	25
Le Lorrain	Newpaper	Moselle	1883	No	26
Die Lothringer Zeitung (German-speaking); Metzer Tageblatt	Newspaper	Moselle	1878	No	27
Metzer Freies Journal (Le Républicain lorrain)	Newspaper	Moselle	1919	No	28
La Moselle Républicaine	Newspaper	Moselle	1921	No	29
Die Elsass-Lothringer Zeitung	Newspaper	Alsace and Moselle	1929	Yes	30
Journal d'Alsace et de Lorraine	Newspaper	Alsace and Moselle	1919	No	31
Die Zukunft	Newspaper	Alsace and Moselle	1925	Yes	32
Die Volksstimme	Newspaper	Alsace and Moselle	1925	Yes	33
Die Wahrheit	Newspaper	Alsace	1926	Yes	34
Das Neue Elsass	Newspaper	Alsace	1911	Yes	35
D'r Schliffstaan	Newspaper	Alsace	1919	Yes	36
Elsass-lothringische Einheitsfront	Other org.	Alsace and Moselle	1926	Yes	37
Elsass-Lothringischer Heimatbund	Other org.	Alsace and Moselle	1926	Yes	38
Liga zur Verteidigung Elsass-Lothringens	Other org.	Alsace and Moselle	1914	Yes	39
Elsassischer Bauernbund	Other org.	Alsace	1924	Yes	40

There is also evidence that regional organizations still matter today (note that selected parts of the qualitative evidence here are also cited in the paper directly in the Division of Alsace and Lorraine as a Natural Experiment section). Among regionalist parties, the "Parti Lorraine" highlights its aim for a "modern federal structure". "Unser Land" publicly claims that citizens in the region feel like "citizen's of second rank" in French states suffering from "centralist cholera," and the Parti DE Mosellans claims that as an answer "European integration must prove itself".[4] The national government is accused of "ensuring the domination of the center over regions". Recent demonstrations against a territorial reform that was perceived as dictated by the central government featured Posters with slogans like "hands off Alsace" and "Paris we don't need you". Demonstrators were chanting, "No to an annexation", and one group speaks specifically of "history repeating itself, Paris violating our identity". The political scientist Richard Kleinschamger explains that due to the specific history, "the region still suffers". This is also exemplified by the fact that individual young demonstrators are cited saying that central French government "have always oppressed us" and is "trampling on our identity".[5]

Museums and exhibitions like the Mémorial Alsace-Moselle, which displays photographs and document about the region's difficult history, also play an important role.[6] The private association "Elsass-Lothringischer Volksbund" aims to maintain the region's specific culture and history and advocates its "right of self-determination in a federal EU".

There are also regional TV productions like the series "Les Alsaciens ou les Deux Mathilde" which make the difficulties with both central states the subject of discussion as part of a family drama. In books like "Marianne m'a tuer" and "Le livre noir du jacobinisme scolaire en Alsace" (Bernard Wittmann), authors describe and complain about

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[4]See party websites, http://parti-lorrain.e-monsite.com/, https://www.unserland.org/unser-land/histoire-du-parti/, and https://www.57pdm.org/programme-2/programme/, last accessed 14.05.2020.

[5]Citations from the French newspaper "La Libération" (https://www.liberation.fr/france/2015/03/19/c-est-surement-notre-derniere-chance-d-agir-pour-l-alsace_1224282), and from Frankfurter Rundschau (https://www.fr.de/politik/autonomisten-versuchen-glueck-11151518.html), last accessed 14.05.2020.

[6]See - https://www.memorial-alsace-moselle.com/le-memorial/un-peu-d-histoire/1945-contribution-de-lalsace-moselle, last accessed 14.05.2020.

the mistreatment of Alsace and its culture by the central state. The magazine "Heb'di" aims to maintain and popularize the region's specific culture and history.[7] Nowadays, websites and online media of course also matter. For instance, a privately organized website aims to maintain the memories of the "Malgré-nous" with the German and then the French central state, and another one trying to keep memories of the region's history alive had more than 170,000 page views since 2011.[8]

Often, European integration plays an important role for these organizations. The Mémorial Alsace-Moselle also highlights the "story of European integration" in overcoming the region's history. The TV show about "les deux Matilde" highlights that the region can only "find its resolution in a reconciled Europe." Regionalist parties claim that, "being Alsatian means being an EU citizen." *Unser Land* specifically campaigns for a strong region embedded in a supra-national EU framework, the Parti des Mosellans highlights that in border regions like Alsace and Lorraine "European integration must prove itself", and the Parti Lorrain highlights European integration as one of its founding principles, together with other reforms that grant less power to the central state.

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[7]See https://www.hebdi.com/qui-sommes-nous/, last accessed 18.05.2020.
[8]See https://www.culture-bilinguisme-lorraine.org/fr/blog/2019/138-les-schirrmeister-chronique-d-une-famille-mosellane-1870-2014 and http://malgrenous.net, last accessed 14.05.2020.

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    (a) Carrol (2011), p. 476

    (b) https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Union_r%C3%A9publicaine_lorraine

2. Christlich-Soziale Partei

    (a) https://books.google.ch/books?id=nEdODrmH6ROC&pg=PA57&lpg=PA57&dq=%22christlich-soziale+partei%22+moselle&source=bl&ots=djlq0-CqiC&sig=ACfU3U31QRH2t1mfdf8PXuu9WzFmd9rZdg&hl=fr&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwi7OJqp2MDiAhWKPFAKHQXUCMYQ6AEwAXoECAgQAQ#v=onepage&q=%22christlich-soziale%20partei%22%20moselle&f=false

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3. Parti Lorrain Indépendant (also "Groupe Lorrain")

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    (b) Carrol (2011), p. 476

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8. Unabhängige Landespartei für Elsass-Lothringen

    (a) https://books.google.ch/books?redir_esc=y&id=Y-t3l5UJKCcC&q=landespartei#v=snippet&q=landespartei&f=true

    (b) https://books.google.ch/books?redir_esc=y&id=Y-t3l5UJKCcC&q=landespartei#v=snippet&q=landespartei&f=true

9. Elsass-Lothringisches Zentrum

    (a) Carrol (2011), p. 476, p. 480

    (b) https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elsa%C3%9F-Lothringische_Zentrumspartei

10. Elsass-Lothringische Fortschrittspartei

    (a) https://www.france-politique.fr/wiki/Elsass-Lothringische_Fortschrittspartei_(ELFP)

11. Parti Communiste Français (PCF)

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16. Elsass-Lothringische Arbeiter und Bauernpartei (ELABP)

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17. Faisceau

    (a) Goodfellow (2010), Fascism in interwar Alsace, p. 137

18. Union populaire républicaine

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19. Action Populaire Nationale d'Alsace (APNA)

    (a) http://www.webcitation.org/5kmXUnBss?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.geocities.com%2Fbfel%2Fgeschichte6.html

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    (a) https://www.france-politique.fr/wiki/Parti_R%C3%A9publicain_D%C3%A9mocratique_(PRD)_Alsace

21. Elsaesserpartei (EP)

    (a) https://www.france-politique.fr/wiki/Elsaessischer_Oppositionsblock_(EOB)

22. Elsaessischer Oppositionsblock (EOB)

    (a) https://www.france-politique.fr/wiki/Elsaessischer_Oppositionsblock_(EOB)

23. Elsassische Fortschrittspartei (EFP)

    (a) https://www.france-politique.fr/wiki/Elsass-Lothringische_Fortschrittspartei_(ELFP)

24. Union Populaire Républicaine Nationale d'Alsace (UPRNA)

    (a) https://www.france-politique.fr/wiki/Union_Populaire_R%C3%A9publicaine_Nationale_d%27Alsace_(UPRNA)

25. Elsässische Arbeiter und Bauernpartei (EABP)

    (a) https://www.france-politique.fr/wiki/Els%C3%A4ssische_Arbeiter_und_Bauernpartei_(EABP)

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    (a) https://www.cairn.info/revue-le-temps-des-medias-2007-1-page-193.html

    (b) http://academiemetz.canalblog.com/archives/2009/03/05/12832849.html

27. Die Lothringer Zeitung (German-speaking); Metzer Tageblatt

    (a) http://presselocaleancienne.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb41092927g

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        20Zeitung%22&f=false

28. Metzer Freies Journal (Le Républicain lorrain)

    (a) https://data.bnf.fr/fr/32815591/metzer_freies_journal/

    (b) wiki

29. La Moselle Républicaine

    (a) http://www.kiosque-lorrain.fr/exhibits/show/est-republicain_89-18/naissance-du-journal

30. Die Elsass-Lothringer Zeitung

    (a) http://www.webcitation.org/5kmXUnBss?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.geocities.com%2Fbfel%2Fgeschichte6.html

31. Journal d'Alsace et de Lorraine

    (a) https://books.google.ch/books?id=2EuMDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA526&lpg=PA526&dq=%22Journal+d%27Alsace+et+de+Lorraine%22&source=bl&ots=U_
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        %22Journal%20d'Alsace%20et%20de%20Lorraine%22&f=false p. 402

32. Die Zukunft

   (a) https://books.google.ch/books?id=4G29K4eTqK4C&pg=PA219&lpg=PA219&dq=die+volksstimme+alsace+lorraine&source=bl&ots=5qDc9OIDer&sig=ACfU3U3laKULdeNS_XeCNIUwP2ZpS_ab8g&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjIgJLV_oviAhU4xcQBHatlA9MQ6AEwAXoECAcQAQ#v=onepage&q=die%20zukunft&f=false

   (b) http://www.webcitation.org/5kmXUnBss?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.geocities.com%2Fbfel%2Fgeschichte6.html

33. Die Volksstimme

   (a) https://books.google.ch/books?id=iGHiwxONZ8EC&pg=PA177&lpg=PA177&dq=%22Die+Volksstimme%22+alsace&source=bl&ots=XFhUASWxIf&sig=ACfU3U3tGkXyDOjTOMeHTriKc15ypgGlYw&hl=fr&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiog5Ktn8XiAhWIalAKHfxDBWAQ6AEwA3oECAgQAQ#v=onepage&q=%22Die%20Volksstimme%22%20&f=false

34. Die Wahrheit

   (a) https://books.google.ch/books?id=4G29K4eTqK4C&pg=PA219&lpg=PA219&dq=die+volksstimme+alsace+lorraine&source=bl&ots=5qDc9OIDer&sig=ACfU3U3laKULdeNS_XeCNIUwP2ZpS_ab8g&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjIgJLV_oviAhU4xcQBHatlA9MQ6AEwAXoECAcQAQ#v=snippet&q=die%20wahrheit&f=false p. 190

35. Das Neue Elsass

   (a) https://books.google.ch/books?id=Y-t3l5UJKCcC&pg=PA97&lpg=PA97&dq=%22Das+neue+Elsass%22&source=bl&ots=rZ324aQcPs&sig=ACfU3UOBt1jSFu2iv15bNxDVHrxADf7qfw&hl=fr&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjE6ov7oMXiAhWPJVAKHWgAC24Q6AEwC3oECAkQAQ#v=onepage&q=%22Das%20neue%20Elsass%22&f=false

36. D'r Schliffstaan

   (a) https://data.bnf.fr/32865481/d_r_schliffstaan__strasbourg_/

   (b) https://www.wintersonnenwende.com/scriptorium/deutsch/archiv/10jahreversailles/10jv314.html

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38. Elsass-Lothringischer Heimatbund

   (a) http://blogerslorrainsengages.unblog.fr/2014/03/31/histoire-de-lautonomisme-alsacien-lorrain-1918-1939/

   (b) http://www.webcitation.org/5kmXUnBss?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.geocities.com%2Fbfel%2Fgeschichte6.html

39. Liga zur Verteidigung Elsass-Lothringens

   (a) https://www2.landesarchiv-bw.de/ofs21/olf/struktur.php?bestand=5543&sprungId=2111106&letztesLimit=suchen

   (b) https://biblio-archive.unog.ch/detail.aspx?ID=152941

   (c) https://biblio-archive.unog.ch/detail.aspx?ID=152940

   (d) https://books.google.ch/books?id=6xFBDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA813&lpg=PA813&dq=Liga+zur+Verteidigung+Elsass-Lothringens&source=bl&ots=WkP5EnNIKD&sig=ACfU3U2RSy45jadmk7JVmSebDdWkwS6FGA&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjq0obupIziAhVEz6YKHfJwBwIQ6AEwBnoECAcQAQ#v=onepage&q=Liga%20zur%20Verteidigung%20Elsass-Lothringens&f=false p. 624

   (e) https://books.google.ch/books?id=xd5KCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA385&lpg=PA385&dq=Liga+zur+Verteidigung+Elsass-Lothringens&source=bl&ots=RuZadmWCrT&sig=ACfU3U2Y7Ex5t5j-1N-Ndrr0s1HiQIY-3w&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjq0obupIziAhVEz6YKHfJwBwIQ6AEwBHoECAkQAQ#v=onepage&q=Liga%20zur%20Verteidigung%20Elsass-Lothringens&f=false p. 385

40. Bauernbund

   (a) http://www.cyberato.org/sites/default/files/cyberato/lerch-dominique/publications/e-eratosthene/lerch_bilger_cyberato.pdf

   (b) http://www.alsace-histoire.org/fr/notices-netdba/bilger-joseph-theodore.html

41. L'Est républicain

   (a) http://www.kiosque-lorrain.fr/exhibits/show/est-republicain_89-18/naissance-du-journal

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43. Le Progrès de la Meuse

   (a) http://presselocaleancienne.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb328202120

44. Courrier de Meurthe-et-Moselle

   (a) https://data.bnf.fr/fr/32750677/courrier_de_meurthe-et-moselle/

45. La Chronique des Vosges

   (a) https://data.bnf.fr/fr/32741724/la_chronique_des_vosges/

46. l'Union patriotique de l'Est Zentrum

   (a) Departmental Archive

   (b) https://books.google.ch/books?id=wnOKAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA123&lpg=PA123&dq=l%27Union+patriotique+de+l%27Est+Meurthe&source=bl&ots=
       bMraaBGGQ1&sig=ACfU3U3vr6KdRUc1nH-60VA6SaBIRUJHnQ&hl=fr&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwii9vSZqsDiAhUC2aYKHUqTBgE4ChDoATABegQICRAB#v=onepage&
       q=l'Union%20patriotique%20de%20l'Est%20Meurthe&f=false

47. l'Union républicaine de l'Est Fortschrittspartei

   (a) Departmental Archive

48. Cercle d'études des Marches de l'Est (PCF)

   (a) Departmental Archive

   (b) http://www.qucosa.de/fileadmin/data/qucosa/documents/8569/Dissertation_Padiou_Nicolas_1_End.pdf

49. le Cercle militaire clandestin de Nancy

   (a) Departmental Archive

50. le Groupe lorrain de la représentation proportionnelle

   (a) Departmental Archive

51. le Groupe d'études sociales de Nancy

   (a) Departmental Archive

   (b) https://books.google.ch/books?id=k6jJDgAAQBAJ&pg=PA260&lpg=PA260&dq=le+Groupe+d%27%C3%A9tudes+sociales+de+Nancy&source=bl&ots=
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       Fran%C3%A7ois%20Mariatte&f=false

C.6 Quantitative Evidence about Regional Parties Today

Regionalist parties are overall not as important in France with regard to their electoral success as in other European states, in particular due to the majoritarian election system that favors larger parties. However, there are regionalist parties in selected regions (e.g. also in other regions that experienced pensions with the central state, like Corsica), and they matter more in regional elections.

In the Alsace and Lorraine region, several regional parties exist still today. Still, their importance and influence was much higher during the treatment area. The vote share of regionalist parties during both the German and French treatment period was extremely high, sometimes more than 50% of the votes. However, most regional parties and newspapers were declared illegal, or lost ideological and financial support due to alleged or actual relations with Nazi Germany, after the treatment period. Hence, it is difficult to trace back the origins of current organizations to their historical predecessors and identify such organizations afterwards. The 2015 regional elections were the only regional election where all moderate regionalist parties in the untreated and treated area in Alsace and Lorraine ran on a joint list. This allows us to compare the relative success of regionalist parties in the treated compared to the control area today, and explore whether there seems to be a differential impact of both parties still today. This would be evidence in favor of their role in transmitting historical memories.

Figure C.3: Regionalist Parties in Regional Elections 2015

Notes: The coefficient plot displays the main and alternative RD treatment coefficients, with standard errors clustered on the cantonal level. The bandwidths from Table D.10 (Euroscepticism) was chosen. The outcome is the vote share of the list of regionalist parties in the 2015 regional election. The list represented the parties: Unser Land, l'Alliance écologiste indépendante, the Parti Lorrain and the Parti des Mosellans. Optimal bandwidth is selected following mean square error criterion (Calonico et al. (2017)). Included controls are distances to Germany (border), Metz, Strasbourg, Nancy, Mulhouse.

D Robustness

Table D.1: RD Smoothness Test: Pre-Treatment Variables

	Barley	Wheat	Potato	Onion	Sunflower
Treatment vs. Control	49.089	145.863	-69.233	10.633	59.347
	(445.953)	(443.440)	(242.320)	(364.771)	(441.175)
	[0.912]	[0.742]	[0.775]	[0.977]	[0.893]
Bandwidth (km)	10.000	10.000	11.537	10.000	10.000
Observations	614	614	706	614	614

	Elevation	Std. Dev. Elev.	Ruggedness	Pop. Density	Population
Treatment vs. Control	5.367	5.496	17.329	382.246	9.646
	(33.568)	(11.621)	(20.605)	(234.538)	(10.370)
	[0.873]	[0.636]	[0.400]	[0.103]	[0.352]
Bandwidth (km)	13.146	11.085	12.479	18.554	10.863
Observations	795	681	757	1098	670

	River Length	Road Length	Grazing Land	Cropland	
Treatment vs. Control	3404.949	954.125	0.844	-0.973	
	(14492.769)	(858.652)	(3.135)	(1.380)	
	[0.814]	[0.266]	[0.788]	[0.481]	
Bandwidth (km)	12.619	13.394	10.000	10.000	
Observations	764	811	619	619	

	Railway Station	Railway Quality			
Treatment vs. Control	-0.000	-0.073			
	(0.026)	(0.056)			
	[0.987]	[0.194]			
Bandwidth (km)	13.944	11.089			
Observations	846	681			

Notes: Tests for discontinuities in pre-treatment variables for the whole border. *Ruggedness* is the mean index of the variation in elevation, while *Elevation* is the mean elevation. *Std. Dev. Elev.* is the standard deviation of *Elevation*. *Potato*, *Wheat*, *Maize*, *Sunflower* and *Barley* refer to the soil suitability for potato, wheat, maize, sunflower and barley production, respectively. *Population* is the municipality's population 1866. *Pop. Density* is *Population* divided by its area (in square km). *River Length* is the total length of all rivers in a municipality. *Road Length* is the total length of all historical roads in a municipality. *Grazing Land* is the size of the area in a municipality that is used for grazing. *Cropland* is the size of the area in a municipality that is used for crop production. *Railway Station* is a dummy variable whether a municipality has a railway station. *Railway Quality* is a 4-stage variable measuring the quality of the railway infrastructure. Included controls: distance to Germany (border), distance to Metz, distance to Strasbourg, distance to Nancy and distance to Mulhouse and segment-fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered on the cantonal level. The bandwidth is optimally selected in regards to the Mean Square Error (Calonico et al. (2017)). Only if the bandwidth falls below 10km, we set 10km as the bandwidth. Standard errors are in brackets and p-values are positioned below them.

Table D.2: RD Smoothness Test: 1860 Economonic Indicators (Level of Arrondisment)

	Mean (Treatment)	Mean (Control)	T-test
Share Children	0.052	0.050	0.875
Income PC	178.353	187.329	0.387
Worker Productivity	6625.835	6968.153	0.728
Firm Productivity	1.30e+05	98487.290	0.418

Sources: This table shows the t-test for four variables measuring economic conditions on the arrondisment-level in the region of Lorraine. The data set comprises of seven arrondisments in the control and five arrondisments in the treatment group. *Share Children* measures the share of children in the workforce. *Income PC* is the average income of a worker in the arrondisment. *Worker Productivity* measures the average production output per worker. *Firm Productivity* shows the average production output per firm.

Table D.3: Smoothness: Post-Treatment Variables

	Educ. 99	Age 06	Occup. 06	Income 08
Treatment vs. Control	0.003	-0.547	0.016	1063.636
	(0.004)	(0.484)	(0.015)	(858.687)
	[0.411]	[0.259]	[0.283]	[0.215]
Bandwidth (km)	10.473	18.132	10.663	14.355
Observations	646	1078	658	723
	Health Care	**High School**	**Voc. School**	**Post Office**
Treatment vs. Control	0.011	-0.003	0.001	-0.020
	(0.013)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.043)
	[0.403]	[0.598]	[0.903]	[0.637]
Bandwidth (km)	22.388	10.445	14.179	10.000
Observations	1270	627	848	604
Population Change	**1866-1946**	**1916-1946**	**1926-1946**	**1936-1946**
Coefficient	-192.756	-57.978	46.097	71.715
	[190.986]	[99.369]	[53.388]	[50.219]
	0.313	0.560	0.388	0.153
Bandwidth (km)	10.000	10.354	14.332	22.078
Observations	618	633	871	1275

Notes: This table shows tests for discontinuities in covariates using all départements in Alsace and Lorraine. *Age 06* is the average (self-reported) age in 2006 and *Income 08* is the median income in 2008. *Educ. 99* refers to the share of people above 15 with a high school degree in 1999 and *Occup. 06* is the share of blue-collar workers in the total population in 2006. *High School*, *Voc. School*, *Post Office*, and *Health Care* measure the relative number of high schools with general and/or technological education, secondary schools with vocational training, post offices and health care establishments for medium-term stays per 1,000 inhabitants in 2013. *Population Change* measures the change in municipal population over four periods with different start years (1866, 1916, 1926, 1936) and one end year (1946). Included controls: distance to Germany (border), distance to Metz, distance to Strasbourg, distance to Nancy, distance to Mulhouse and five segment-fixed effects (one of those as reference category). The bandwidth is optimally selected with regards to the mean square error criterion (Calonico et al. (2017)). Standard errors are clustered at the cantonal level.

Table D.4: RD Specification - Turnout Referendum 1992 & 2005

	Turnout 1992		Turnout 2005	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment vs. Control	-1.270	-1.073	-0.483	-1.577
	(1.038)	(1.015)	(1.142)	(1.109)
	[0.221]	[0.291]	[0.672]	[0.155]
Bandwidth (km)	10.000	12.234	10.000	15.616
Observations	619	742	618	939
Mean of Outcome	73.76	73.80	73.04	73.04

Notes: Discontinuity at the treatment border using municipalities in Alsace and Lorraine. The outcome is the turnout in the referendum on the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and the French European Constitution Referendum in 2005. Included controls: distance to Germany (border), distance to Metz, distance to Strasbourg, distance to Nancy, distance to Mulhouse and segment-fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the cantonal level. Standard errors are displayed in brackets and p-values are right below them. For each outcome, in left column the regression is run using a narrow bandwidth of 10km, while the optimal bandwidth in the right column is selected with regards to the mean square error criterion (Calonico et al. (2017).

Table D.5: OLS Results - EU Support and Euroscepticism (1992 - 2005)

Panel A	EU Support (Share Yes-Votes 1992 and 2005)		
Dependent Variable	**1992**	**2005**	**1992 & 2005**
Treatment vs. Control	6.665	6.617	6.626
	(1.401)	(1.421)	(1.077)
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Observations	3230	3235	6465
Mean of Outcome	53.59	45.65	49.62
Panel B	**Euroscepticism (1994, 1999 and 2004)**		
Dependent Variable	**Eurosceptic Parties**	**w/o Front National**	**Euroscepticism Index**
Treatment vs. Control	-2.226	-2.588	-6.155
	(0.514)	(0.555)	(1.542)
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Observations	9698	9698	9698
Mean of Outcome	13.99	6.55	23.40

Notes: Comparison of treated and untreated municipalities in Alsace and Lorraine. In panel A, the outcome is the share of people voting "Yes" in the referendum on the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and the French European Constitution Referendum in 2005. In panel B, the outcome in Columns 1 and 2 is the share of people voting for eurosceptic parties in European parliamentary elections between 1994 and 2004. An eurosceptic party is defined by having a higher negativity than positivity score in regards to the European Union in their published manifestos between 1992 and 2003. The outcome in Column 3 and 4 is adapted to exclude the vote share for the party Front National. In Column 5 and 6 an index capturing Euroscepticism is used, which is a weighted vote share of eurosceptic parties. Weighting occurs by multiplying the vote share with the euro-negativity score. Included controls: distance to Germany (border), distance to Metz, distance to Strasbourg, distance to Nancy, and distance to Mulhouse. Standard errors are clustered at the cantonal level. Standard errors are displayed in brackets and p-values are right below them.

Table D.6: RD Specification - No Controls

Panel A — **EU Support (1992 and 2005)**

Dependent Variable	Yes Share 1992		Yes Share 2005		Yes Share 92 & 05	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Treatment vs. Control	5.029	5.990	2.255	1.893	3.641	4.182
	(2.132)	(1.996)	(2.820)	(2.413)	(1.499)	(1.357)
	[0.018]	[0.003]	[0.424]	[0.433]	[0.015]	[0.002]
Bandwidth (km)	10.000	19.866	10.000	14.548	10.000	17.347
Observations	619	1162	618	878	1237	2055
Mean of Outcome	52.62	53.47	43.51	44.26	48.07	48.91

Panel B — **Euroscepticism (1994, 1999 and 2004)**

Dependent Variable	Eurosceptic Parties		w/o Front National		Euroscepticism Index	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Treatment vs. Control	-1.442	-2.186	-2.290	-2.612	-3.307	-5.206
	(0.966)	(0.704)	(1.140)	(0.856)	(3.470)	(2.720)
	[0.135]	[0.002]	[0.045]	[0.002]	[0.341]	[0.056]
Bandwidth (km)	10.000	22.659	10.000	23.517	10.000	20.550
Observations	1855	3930	1855	4080	1855	3621
Mean of Outcome	14.62	14.31	7.51	7.05	25.41	24.56

Notes: Discontinuity at the treatment border using municipalities in Alsace and Lorraine. In panel A, the outcome is the share of people voting "Yes" in the referendum on the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and the French European Constitution Referendum in 2005. In panel B, the outcome in Columns 1 and 2 is the share of people voting for eurosceptic parties in European parliamentary elections between 1994 and 2004. A eurosceptic party is defined by having a higher negativity than positivity score in regards to the European Union in their published manifestos between 1992 and 2003. The outcome in Column 3 and 4 is adapted to exclude the vote share for the party Front National. In Column 5 and 6 an index capturing Euroscepticism is used, which is a weighted vote share of eurosceptic parties. Weighting occurs by multiplying the vote share with the euro-negativity score. Standard errors are clustered at the cantonal level. Standard errors are displayed in brackets and p-values are right below them. For each outcome, in left column the regression is run using a narrow bandwidth of 10km, while the optimal bandwidth in the right column is selected with regards to the mean square error criterion (Calonico et al. (2017)).

Table D.7: RD Specification - No Clusters

Panel A — EU Support (1992 and 2005)

Dependent Variable	Yes Share 1992		Yes Share 2005		Yes Share 92 & 05	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Treatment vs. Control	5.242	6.969	2.787	2.787	4.012	4.447
	(1.544)	(1.262)	(1.606)	(1.606)	(1.275)	(1.104)
	[0.001]	[0.000]	[0.083]	[0.083]	[0.002]	[0.000]
Bandwidth (km)	10.000	15.369	10.000	10.000	10.000	13.369
Observations	619	924	618	618	1237	1611
Mean of Outcome	52.62	53.13	43.51	43.51	48.07	48.58

Panel B — Euroscepticism (1994, 1999 and 2004)

Dependent Variable	Eurosceptic Parties		w/o Front National		Euroscepticism Index	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Treatment vs. Control	-1.086	-1.915	-1.873	-2.387	-3.172	-4.980
	(1.184)	(0.813)	(1.008)	(0.631)	(1.646)	(1.147)
	[0.359]	[0.018]	[0.063]	[0.000]	[0.054]	[0.000]
Bandwidth (km)	10.000	21.121	10.000	25.135	10.000	19.441
Observations	1855	3726	1855	4344	1855	3426
Mean of Outcome	14.62	14.31	7.51	7.00	25.41	24.31

Notes: Discontinuity at the treatment border using municipalities in Alsace and Lorraine. In panel A, the outcome is the share of people voting 'Yes" in the referendum on the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and the French European Constitution Referendum in 2005. In panel B, the outcome in Columns 1 and 2 is the share of people voting for eurosceptic parties in European parliamentary elections between 1994 and 2004. An eurosceptic party is defined by having a higher negativity than positivity score in regards to the European Union in their published manifestos between 1992 and 2003. The outcome in Column 3 and 4 is adapted to exclude the vote share for the party Front National. In Column 5 and 6 an index capturing Euroscepticism is used, which is a weighted vote share of eurosceptic parties. Weighting occurs by multiplying the vote share with the euro-negativity score. Included controls: distance to Germany (border), distance to Metz, distance to Strasbourg, distance to Nancy, distance to Mulhouse and segment-fixed effects. Standard errors are displayed in brackets and p-values are right below them. For each outcome, in left column the regression is run using a narrow bandwidth of 10km, while the optimal bandwidth in the right column is selected with regards to the mean square error criterion (Calonico et al. (2017)).

Table D.8: RD Specification - Controlling for Latitude and Longitude

Panel A   **EU Support (1992 and 2005)**

Dependent Variable	Yes Share 1992		Yes Share 2005		Yes Share 92 & 05	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Treatment vs. Control	5.071	6.552	2.251	2.049	3.661	3.809
	(1.749)	(1.678)	(2.109)	(1.936)	(1.365)	(1.278)
	[0.004]	[0.000]	[0.286]	[0.290]	[0.007]	[0.003]
Bandwidth (km)	10.000	15.247	10.000	12.282	10.000	13.961
Observations	619	920	618	743	1237	1695
Mean of Outcome	52.62	53.09	43.51	43.78	48.07	48.61

Panel B   **Euroscepticism (1994, 1999 and 2004)**

Dependent Variable	Eurosceptic Parties		w/o Front National		Euroscepticism Index	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Treatment vs. Control	-1.025	-1.578	-1.725	-2.174	-2.656	-3.730
	(0.705)	(0.587)	(0.669)	(0.629)	(2.086)	(1.962)
	[0.146]	[0.007]	[0.010]	[0.001]	[0.203]	[0.057]
Bandwidth (km)	10.000	15.238	10.000	18.464	10.000	16.300
Observations	1855	2754	1855	3276	1855	2904
Mean of Outcome	14.62	14.43	7.51	7.18	25.41	24.95

Notes: Discontinuity at the treatment border using municipalities in Alsace and Lorraine. In panel A, the outcomes is the share of people voting "Yes" in the referendum on the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and the French European Constitution Referendum in 2005. In panel B, the outcome in Columns 1 and 2 is the share of people voting for eurosceptic parties in European parliamentary elections between 1994 and 2004. An eurosceptic party is defined by having a higher negativity than positivity score in regards to the European Union in their published manifestos between 1992 and 2003. The outcome in Column 3 and 4 is adapted to exclude the vote share for the party Front National. In Column 5 and 6 an index capturing Euroscepticism is used, which is a weighted vote share of eurosceptic parties. Weighting occurs by multiplying the vote share with the euro-negativity score. Included controls: the coordinates on the x- and y-axis and segment-fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the cantonal level. Standard errors are displayed in brackets and p-values are right below them. For each outcome, in left column the regression is run using a narrow bandwidth of 10km, while the optimal bandwidth in the right column is selected with regards to the mean square error criterion (Calonico et al. (2017)).

Table D.9: RD Specification - Baseline Plus Pre-Treatment Controls

Panel A — **EU Support (1992 and 2005)**

Dependent Variable	Yes Share 1992		Yes Share 2005		Yes Share 92 & 05	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Treatment vs. Control	5.858	5.948	3.219	3.219	4.534	4.620
	(1.489)	(1.485)	(1.876)	(1.876)	(1.211)	(1.187)
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.086]	[0.086]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Bandwidth (km)	10.000	10.188	10.000	10.000	10.000	12.362
Observations	614	621	613	613	1227	1487
Mean of Outcome	52.62	52.65	43.51	43.51	48.07	48.35

Panel B — **Euroscepticism (1994, 1999 and 2004)**

| Dependent Variable	Eurosceptic Parties		w/o Front National		Euroscepticism Index	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Treatment vs. Control	-1.201	-1.667	-2.022	-2.347	-3.363	-4.245
	(0.715)	(0.505)	(0.673)	(0.564)	(2.043)	(1.823)
	[0.093]	[0.001]	[0.003]	[0.000]	[0.100]	[0.020]
Bandwidth (km)	10.000	19.995	10.000	18.893	10.000	14.057
Observations	1840	3486	1840	3321	1840	2551
Mean of Outcome	14.62	14.35	7.51	7.17	25.41	25.20

Notes: Discontinuity at the treatment border using municipalities in Alsace and Lorraine. In panel A, the outcome is the share of people voting "Yes" in the referendum on the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and the French European Constitution Referendum in 2005. In panel B, the outcome in Columns 1 and 2 is the share of people voting for eurosceptic parties in European parliamentary elections between 1994 and 2004. An eurosceptic party is defined by having a higher negativity than positivity score in regards to the European Union in their published manifestos between 1992 and 2003. The outcome in Column 3 and 4 is adapted to exclude the vote share for the party Front National. In Column 5 and 6 an index capturing Euroscepticism is used, which is a weighted vote share of eurosceptic parties. Weighting occurs by multiplying the vote share with the euro-negativity score. Included controls: distance to Germany (border), distance to Metz, distance to Strasbourg, distance to Nancy, distance to Mulhouse and segment-fixed effects, as well as all variables used in the pre-treatment balance test. Standard errors are clustered at the cantonal level. Standard errors are displayed in brackets and p-values are right below them. For each outcome, in left column the regression is run using a narrow bandwidth of 10km, while the optimal bandwidth in the right column is selected with regards to the mean square error criterion (Calonico et al. (2017)).

Table D.10: RD Specification - Robustness to Linguistic Border

| | EU Support | | Euroscepticism | |
	Baseline	Modified	Baseline	Modified
Treatment vs. Control	3.586	3.422	-1.489	-1.573
	(1.329)	(1.446)	(0.604)	(0.668)
	[0.007]	[0.018]	[0.014]	[0.019]
Bandwidth (km)	14.529	22.997	16.179	22.430
Observations	1755	1709	2898	2496
Mean of Outcome	48.69	48.66	14.43	14.49

Notes: Discontinuity at the baseline and modified treatment border using municipalities in Alsace and Lorraine. The outcome "EU Support" is the share of people voting "Yes" in the referendum on the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and the French European Constitution Referendum in 2005. The outcome "Euroscepticism" the share of people voting for eurosceptic parties in European parliamentary elections between 1994 and 2004. For each outcome, the regression is run once with the complete border (left) and once with a shorter border, having removed the sections overlapping with the language border and those border sections with no counterfactuals on the other side. The optimal bandwidth is selected with regards to the mean square error criterion (Calonico et al. (2017)). Included controls: distance to Germany (border), distance to Metz, distance to Strasbourg, distance to Nancy and distance to Mulhouse. These are the full regression results corresponding to Figure 6.

Figure D.1: Robustness: Modified Border - Francophone Municipalities Only and Controlling for Distance to Language Border


Notes: The coefficient plot displays the coefficients based on modified border excluding overlaps with linguistic border, with standard errors clustered on the cantonal level. This is an even stricter version of the initial robustness test, which still included some formerly German-speaking municipalities (not at the border, but within the bandwidth). In the first specification, only Francophone municipalities are included. In the second specification, I also control for distance to the language border. EU support is the average of the share of people voting "Yes" in Maastricht referendum 1992 and in European Constitution referendum in 2005. Euroscepticism is the weighted eurosceptic party share in European parliamentary elections between 1994 and 2004. Baseline is the complete border, modified only the part not overlapping with language border (see figure on the right). Optimal bandwidth is selected following mean square error criterion (Calonico et al. (2017)). Included controls are distances to Germany (border), Metz, Strasbourg, Nancy, Mulhouse. Bandwidths are chosen from Table D.10. Source linguistic border: Harp (1998).

Figure D.2: Robustness - Modified Border Excluding Overlaps with Linguistic Border, All Outcomes Displayed

Notes: In panel A, The outcomes are the share of people voting "Yes" in the referendum on the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and the French European Constitution Referendum in 2005. In panel B, the outcomes in Columns 1 is the share of people voting for eurosceptic parties in European parliamentary elections between 1994 and 2004. An eurosceptic party is defined by having a net negative EU related score in their manifestos between 1992 and 2003. The outcome in column 3 and 4 is adapted to exclude the vote share for the party Front National. In column 5 and 6 an index capturing Euroscepticism is used, which is a weighted vote share of eurosceptic parties. Weighting occurs by multiplying the vote share with the euro-negativity score. Baseline is the complete border, modified only the part not overlapping with language border (see figure on the right). Optimal bandwidth is selected following mean square error criterion (Calonico et al. (2017)). Included controls are distances to Germany (border), Metz, Strasbourg, Nancy, Mulhouse. Corresponding regression results in Table D.10. Source linguistic border: Harp (1998).

53

Figure D.3: Robustness Check - Bandwidth Choice

Notes: Discontinuity at the treatment border using all Municipalities in Alsace and Lorraine. The treatment effect for the main variables capturing EU support and Euroscepticism using a range of bandwidths smaller and larger than the MSE-optimal bandwidth (Calonico et al. (2017)). Included controls: distance to Germany (border), distance to Metz, distance to Strasbourg, distance to Nancy and distance to Mulhouse and segment-fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the cantonal level.

Table D.11: RD Results EU Support (1992 - 2005) - Full Results Table

| Dependent Variable | EU Support (Share Yes-Votes 1992 and 2005) | | | | | |
| | 1992 | | 2005 | | 1992 & 2005 | |
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Treatment vs. Control	5.242	6.254	2.787	2.787	4.012	4.728
	(1.853)	(1.901)	(2.029)	(2.029)	(1.441)	(1.455)
	[0.006]	[0.001]	[0.174]	[0.174]	[0.007]	[0.002]
Distance to Germany	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
	[0.063]	[0.037]	[0.022]	[0.022]	[0.011]	[0.009]
Distance to Metz	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
	[0.876]	[0.491]	[0.406]	[0.406]	[0.570]	[0.279]
Distance to Strasbourg	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
	[0.970]	[0.904]	[0.007]	[0.007]	[0.069]	[0.104]
Distance to Nancy	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
	[0.799]	[0.880]	[0.118]	[0.118]	[0.460]	[0.265]
Distance to Mulhouse	0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
	[0.484]	[0.193]	[0.039]	[0.039]	[0.457]	[0.992]
Border Segment 1	-4.136	-4.414	12.561	12.561	4.296	2.795
	(8.514)	(7.456)	(6.874)	(6.874)	(5.431)	(5.182)
	[0.629]	[0.555]	[0.072]	[0.072]	[0.432]	[0.591]
Border Segment 2	-4.681	-5.711	9.666	9.666	2.580	1.039
	(7.840)	(6.720)	(6.280)	(6.280)	(5.094)	(4.617)
	[0.552]	[0.398]	[0.128]	[0.128]	[0.614]	[0.822]
Border Segment 3	-8.411	-8.475	11.953	11.953	1.866	0.565
	(6.805)	(5.841)	(4.809)	(4.809)	(3.992)	(3.867)
	[0.221]	[0.150]	[0.015]	[0.015]	[0.642]	[0.884]
Border Segment 4	3.991	4.778	10.650	10.650	7.399	7.445
	(4.616)	(3.827)	(3.651)	(3.651)	(2.419)	(2.374)
	[0.390]	[0.215]	[0.005]	[0.005]	[0.003]	[0.002]
Bandwidth (km)	10.000	13.419	10.000	10.000	10.000	12.530
Observations	619	813	618	618	1237	1517

Notes: Discontinuity at the treatment border using municipalities in Alsace and Lorraine. The outcome is the share of people voting "Yes" in the referendum on the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and the French European Constitution Referendum in 2005. Included controls: distance to Germany (border), distance to Metz, distance to Strasbourg, distance to Nancy, distance to Mulhouse and 5 segment-fixed effects (one of those as reference category). Standard errors are clustered at the cantonal level. Standard errors are displayed in brackets and p-values are right below them. For each outcome, in left column the regression is run using a narrow bandwidth of 10km, while the optimal bandwidth in the right column is selected with regards to the mean square error criterion (Calonico et al. (2017)).

Table D.12: RD Results Euroscepticism (1992 - 2005) - Full Results Table

Euroscepticism (1994, 1999 and 2004)

Dependent Variable	Eurosceptic Parties		w/o Front National		Euroscepticism Index	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Treatment vs. Control	-1.086	-1.735	-1.873	-2.339	-3.172	-4.283
	(0.727)	(0.644)	(0.680)	(0.620)	(2.080)	(1.971)
	[0.140]	[0.008]	[0.008]	[0.000]	[0.132]	[0.032]
Distance to Germany	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
	[0.460]	[0.089]	[0.085]	[0.001]	[0.049]	[0.004]
Distance to Metz	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
	[0.155]	[0.557]	[0.089]	[0.456]	[0.658]	[0.886]
Distance to Strasbourg	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
	[0.026]	[0.022]	[0.376]	[0.913]	[0.035]	[0.026]
Distance to Nancy	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
	[0.914]	[0.935]	[0.635]	[0.800]	[0.226]	[0.307]
Distance to Mulhouse	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
	[0.011]	[0.068]	[0.007]	[0.319]	[0.010]	[0.090]
Border Segment 1	0.677	-0.371	1.332	2.389	-5.294	-2.817
	(2.388)	(2.033)	(1.911)	(1.299)	(6.388)	(5.378)
	[0.778]	[0.856]	[0.488]	[0.069]	[0.410]	[0.602]
Border Segment 2	-0.801	-1.510	-0.039	1.611	-7.872	-4.929
	(2.334)	(1.970)	(1.772)	(1.201)	(6.069)	(4.989)
	[0.732]	[0.445]	[0.982]	[0.183]	[0.199]	[0.326]
Border Segment 3	0.284	0.005	2.004	3.246	-7.894	-4.388
	(2.076)	(1.687)	(1.556)	(0.976)	(5.710)	(4.210)
	[0.891]	[0.998]	[0.202]	[0.001]	[0.171]	[0.300]
Border Segment 4	-1.190	-1.769	0.116	0.525	-5.586	-5.150
	(1.613)	(1.104)	(1.176)	(0.601)	(4.730)	(3.121)
	[0.463]	[0.112]	[0.922]	[0.384]	[0.242]	[0.102]
Bandwidth (km)	10.000	14.369	10.000	17.819	10.000	16.675
Observations	1855	2623	1855	3174	1855	2967

Notes: Discontinuity at the treatment border using municipalities in Alsace and Lorraine. The outcomes in Columns 1 is the share of people voting for eurosceptic parties in European parliamentary elections between 1994 and 2004. An eurosceptic party is defined by having a higher negativity than positivity score in regards to the European Union in their published manifestos between 1992 and 2003. The outcome in Column 3 and 4 is adapted to exclude the vote share for the party Front National. In Column 5 and 6 an index capturing Euroscepticism is used, which is a weighted vote share of eurosceptic parties. Weighting occurs by multiplying the vote share with the euro-negativity score. Included controls: distance to Germany (border), distance to Metz, distance to Strasbourg, distance to Nancy, distance to Mulhouse and 5 segment-fixed effects (one of those as reference category). Standard errors are clustered at the cantonal level. Standard errors are displayed in brackets and p-values are right below them. For each outcome, in left column the regression is run using a narrow bandwidth of 10km, while the optimal bandwidth in the right column is selected with regards to the mean square error criterion (Calonico et al. (2017)).

Table D.13: RD Specification - Placebo Borders

	Placebo Border (a)		Placebo Border (b)		Placebo Border (c)	
	EU Support	Euroscepticism	EU Support	Euroscepticism	EU Support	Euroscepticism
Treatment vs. Control	0.056	-0.386	-0.114	-0.386	1.636	-1.073
	(0.678)	(0.330)	(1.692)	(0.762)	(1.357)	(0.768)
	[0.934]	[0.243]	[0.946]	[0.613]	[0.228]	[0.162]
Bandwidth (km)	14.673	16.719	10.000	10.000	24.840	26.194
Observations	14386	24169	511	768	1799	2827
Mean of Outcome	42.68	14.10	48.17	14.71	43.25	14.66

Notes: Map (a) in Figure 8 shows the départements at the French border (black) and their adjacent départements (grey). This exludes the départements that constitute Alsace and Lorraine and the second-row département Haute Marne. Haute Marne has no counterfactual on the first-row side due to this exclusion of the Alsace and Lorraine regions. The border separating first and second row départements is used as a placebo border (bold orange line). Map (b) in Figure 8 displays the border between the former départements Meurthe and Moselle before 1871 (bold orange line). Map (c) in Figure 8 shows the border between the départements composing the control area in the main regression and their adjacent départements inland (bold orange line). This table displays the local treatment effect at these borders for the two main outcomes *EU Support* is the share of people voting "Yes" in the referendum on the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and the French European Constitution Referendum in 2005. *Euroscepticism* is the share of people voting for eurosceptic parties in European parliamentary elections between 1994 and 2004. The optimal bandwidth is selected with regards to the mean square error criterion (Calonico et al. (2017)). Included controls: distance to Germany (border), distance to Metz, distance to Strasbourg, distance to Nancy and distance to Mulhouse.

Sources and alternative specifications: Euroscepticism

Table D.14: Manifesto Dataset Scores for Each Party and List in Alsace and Lorraine

| Party	Year	EU Related Score	Rated as Eurosceptic
Front National	1994	0.005	No
PCF	1994	-0.681	Yes
UDF-RPR	1994	0.000	No
Europe Solidaire	1994	3.200	No
Union Des Ecolog.	1994	0.000	No
Bouge l'Europe	1999	-4.286	Yes
Avec l'Europe	1999	4.918	No
Front National	1999	-1.333	Yes
l'Union Pour l'Europe	1999	4.918	No
Construisons Notre Europe	1999	11.888	No
l'Ecologie, Les Verts	1999	14.583	No
LPS	2004	2.299	No
LUMP	2004	1.878	No
LFN	2004	-1.603	Yes
LPC	2004	7.500	No
LUDF	2004	9.510	No
LVE	2004	1.128	No

Notes: Table presents the EU related score for parties, which participated in European parliamentary elections between 1994 and 2004. A party is classified as Eurosceptic if it had a net negative EU related score.

Table D.15: RD results - Euroscepticism (1994, 1999 and 2004) based on Ray-Marks-Steenbergen Party Dataset

| Dependent Variable	Eurosceptic Parties (1)	w/o Front National (2)	Euroscepticism Index (3)
Treatment vs. Control	-2.196	-2.733	-5.586
	(0.858)	(0.824)	(3.255)
	[0.010]	[0.001]	[0.086]
Bandwidth (km)	16.214	17.204	19.779
Observations	2898	3075	3477
Mean of Outcome (Control)	20.97	16.46	230.11

Notes: Discontinuity at the treatment border using municipalities in Alsace and Lorraine. The outcomes in Column 1 is the share of people voting for eurosceptic parties in European parliamentary elections between 1994 and 2004. An eurosceptic party is defined according to the Ray-Marks-Steenbergen Party Dataset. The outcome in column 2 is adapted to exclude the vote share for the party Front National. In column 3 an index capturing Euroscepticism is used, which is a weighted vote share of eurosceptic parties. Weighting occurs by multiplying the vote share with the euro-negativity score based on Ray-Marks-Steenbergen Party Dataset. Included controls are the distances to Germany (border), Metz, Strasbourg, Nancy, Mulhouse and 5 segment-fixed effects. Standard errors, clustered on the cantonal level, are displayed in brackets and p-values are right below them. For each outcome, I use the efficient bandwidth (mean square error criterion, Calonico et al. (2017)).

Figure D.4: Eurosceptic Vote Share (1979-1989)

Notes: Election results were pulled from maps that can be found here: https://www.france-politique.fr/resultats-elections-europeennes-1989.htm. The vote share was recorded as the lowest number in the range category. The EU related scores were pulled from the manifesto data from the closest available year for all available parties. An eurosceptic party is defined by having a net negative EU related score in their manifestos.

Figure D.5: Euroscepticism Index (1979-1989)

Table D.16: Nested Identities - EU, National and Regional Level (all of France; extensive Table)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Panel A	**Strength of Identities**		
Dependent Variable	**Regional Identity**	**French Identity**	**European Identity**
Treatment vs. Control	0.192	-0.028	0.319
	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.016)
	[0.000]	[0.085]	[0.000]
Observations	49999	50027	49249
Panel B	**Relationship between Nested Identities**		
Dependent Variable	**Regional Identity**	**French Identity**	**European Identity**
Variable of Interest	**French Identity**	**European Identity**	**Regional Identity**
Treatment vs. Control	0.723	-0.324	-0.008
	(0.076)	(0.061)	(0.067)
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.907]
Variable of Interest	0.368	0.181	0.072
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Interaction	0.038	0.073	0.117
	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.018)
	[0.020]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Observations	49936	49205	49161

Sources: Individual-level survey data. Observatoire Interregional du Politique (OIP). *"X" Identity*: "Could you tell me whether you feel very attached, rather attached, not very attached or not attached at all to X?" The higher the value the more attached the respondent is to X. X refers to Europe, the nation (France in this case) and the region, asked in separate questions. Regressions control for age, employment status, education and sex. Standard errors in brackets and p-values right below. All outcome variables are standardized with mean zero.

Table D.17: Nested Identities - EU, National, and Regional Level (Alsace & Lorraine; Extensive Table)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Panel A	**Strength of Identities**		
Dependent Variable	**Regional Identity**	**French Identity**	**European Identity**
Treatment vs. Control	0.179	-0.016	0.277
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.030)
	[0.000]	[0.582]	[0.000]
Observations	5620	5619	5553
Panel B	**Relationship between Nested Identities**		
Dependent Variable	**Regional Identity**	**French Identity**	**European Identity**
Variable of Interest	**French Identity**	**European Identity**	**Regional Identity**
Variable of Interest	0.426	0.231	0.114
	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.026)
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Treatment vs. Control	0.122	0.126	0.307
	(0.049)	(0.052)	(0.072)
	[0.013]	[0.015]	[0.000]
Interaction	0.002	0.009	0.064
	(0.030)	(0.033)	(0.031)
	[0.941]	[0.776]	[0.038]
Observations	5611	5547	5545

Sources: Individual-level survey data. Observatoire Interregional du Politique (OIP). *"X" Identity*: "Could you tell me whether you feel very attached, rather attached, not very attached or not attached at all to X?" The higher the value the more attached the respondent is to X. X refers to Europe, the nation (France in this case) and the region, asked in separate questions. Regressions control for age, employment status, education and sex. Standard errors in brackets and p-values right below. All outcome variables are standardized with mean zero.

Table D.18: EU as Preferred Level of Decision-Making - Age Groups

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Panel B	**Preferred Level of Decision-Making**		
Dependent Variable	**18-35 years**	**36-55 years**	**56 years old and more**
Treatment vs. Control	0.187	0.217	0.206
	(0.082)	(0.099)	(0.104)
	[0.024]	[0.029]	[0.049]
Observations	543	419	360

Sources: Individual-level survey data from the Observatoire Interregional du Politique (OIP). Main question: "In your opinion, should the development of your region occur according to a plan decided by the region, the state or the European Union?," only available in 1991. The dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating the choice of the EU. Regressions control for age, employment status, education and sex. Column 1 shows the results for respondents aged 18-35 years, column 2 shows the results for respondents aged 55 years, and column 3 shows the results for respondents aged 56 years or more. Standard errors in brackets and p-values right below. All outcome variables are standardized with mean zero.

Table D.19: Survey evidence - Interactions Treatment with Demography

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Dependent Variable	**European Identity**			
Variable of Interest	**Age**	**Experience**	**Sex**	**Education**
Treatment vs. Control	0.169	0.253	0.281	0.298
	(0.084)	(0.036)	(0.040)	(0.033)
	[0.043]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Variable of Interest	0.008	0.099	0.064	0.395
	(0.002)	(0.055)	(0.051)	(0.068)
	[0.000]	[0.070]	[0.207]	[0.000]
Treatment X V.o.I.	0.002	0.059	-0.006	-0.106
	(0.002)	(0.064)	(0.059)	(0.076)
	[0.164]	[0.354]	[0.926]	[0.164]
Observations	5553	5553	5553	5553

Notes: Individual-level survey data. Observatoire Interregional du Politique (OIP) in 1995, 1997, 1999 and 2001. *European Identity*: "Could you tell me whether you feel very attached, rather attached, not very attached or not attached at all to Europe?" The higher the value the more attached the respondent is to Europe. *Age* measures your age in years. *Experience* is a binary variable indicating whether the respondent was at least 10 years old in 1945. *Sex* captures the respondent's sex (0 = male; 1 = female). *Education* measures whether someone finished an education higher than high school. Controls included: age, experience, education, sex and employment status. Standard errors in brackets and p-values right below. All outcome variables are standardized with mean zero.

Religiosity and EU Support (1992 and 2005 Referenda): One distinct feature in which the local laws in the treated area differ from the rest of France is with regard to religion. Historically, the church played a larger role in the average citizens life in the treated area until after WWI, and still does to some degree until today. In contrast to the rest of France, pupils in the area are still subjected to compulsory religious classes at school (usually two hours per week). This is not uncommon in other European countries, for instance, many of the southern German states feature a similar policy. Usually these classes are not dogmatic, but transmit information about religions in general, of course still with an emphasis on Christianity. If religion or religious denomination is related to a more favorable attitude towards the EU, part of the effect we measure and attribute to differences in exposure to intrusive policies might be driven by differences in religious identity.

However, the available literature indicates no direct relationship between religious attachments and European integration and "even indirect effects of religion on Euroscepticism are small or appear to cancel each other out"(Boomgaarden and Freire, 2009, p.1). To the opposite, albeit minimally, it is argued that "actors such as religious parties and the churches have strayed from the integrationist path and contributed to Euroscepticism" (Minkenberg 2009, p.1190).

To make sure this is really no concern, we examine the purported relationship in a more systematic way as well. In the specific French context, there are no municipal level measures on religious affiliation and the share of people who consider themselves secular, due to the specific secular constitution and approach in France. Nonetheless, we can use outcomes aggregated at the département level for all of France to assess the relationship between religion and voting in the EU referendum. Table D.20 shows results for two variables that measure the intensity of religiousness and religious denomination. *Attendance* measures how often subjects attend religious services, both as a continuous variable and coded as a set of dummies with *never attending* as the reference category.

Denomination relates to the share of people who perceive themselves as *Roman Catholic*, *Protestant*, *Christian Orthodox*, *Jewish*, *Muslim* or *other faiths*, with *no religious affiliation* as the reference category.

The results show no difference for *Attendance* in both 1992 and 2005. With *Attendance* coded as individual dummies, there is also no stable relationship. Only very enthusiastic churchgoers have a marginally significant positive correlation compared to those who never attend in 2005, but not in 1992. The pattern is similar for denomination. The only positive correlation which is significant at the 10 percent level is with *Protestant* in 1992, but it also disappears in 2005. Overall, this supports the existing literature that religion does not play a major role for attitudes towards the EU. Thus, the concern that religious differences would contaminate the results appears unfounded.

Table D.20: Share of Yes Votes and Religion, all of France.

	Share Yes 1992			Share Yes 2005		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Attendance: Average	-0.776			-0.467		
	(1.001)			(1.024)		
	[0.440]			[0.650]		
Attendance: Weekly		0.074			0.065	
		(0.059)			(0.066)	
		[0.212]			[0.330]	
Attendance: 2-3 times a month		-0.054			-0.059	
		(0.109)			(0.107)	
		[0.625]			[0.581]	
Attendance: Once a month		-0.076			-0.158	
		(0.096)			(0.062)	
		[0.431]			[0.013]	
Attendance: Sev. times a year		0.010			0.003	
		(0.031)			(0.030)	
		[0.751]			[0.921]	
Attendance: Never		0.036			-0.003	
		(0.039)			(0.042)	
		[0.359]			[0.946]	
Roman Catholic			0.021			0.000
			(0.027)			(0.029)
			[0.448]			[0.990]
Protestant			0.381			0.124
			(0.176)			(0.134)
			[0.033]			[0.355]
Christian Ortodox			0.275			0.592
			(0.524)			(0.371)
			[0.601]			[0.115]
Jewish			1.215			1.575
			(0.710)			(1.308)
			[0.091]			[0.232]
Moslem			-0.088			-0.013
			(0.105)			(0.150)
			[0.402]			[0.930]
Other religion			0.011			0.076
			(0.193)			(0.283)
			[0.956]			[0.789]
Observations	94	94	94	94	94	94

Notes: This table tests whether there is a clear relationship between religious affiliation and voting in the two referenda 1992 and 2005. The OLS estimates use aggregate survey results at the département-level. *Attendance* refers to how often the respondents attend religious services. *Never attending* is the omitted reference category for attendance, *no religious denomination* is the omitted reference category for religion. Controls: Sex, Age, Years of schooling, Urban vs Rural, Union membership, Degree, Income, and Household size. p-values in brackets. There is no systematic effect of religion, which is reassuring as the areas in former Alsace-Lorraine has a slightly different history with regard to schooling. Accordingly, these differences and schooling should not explain our results. *Short Interpretation*: Religious beliefs and denomination could affect voting in the referenda. We show for all of France that such a relationship never shows up significantly at any level, both for intensity of belief measured by church attendance, as well as when using denomination as the variable of interest. We conclude that there are some differences with regard to the treatment of religion between the départements, but none that closely influences or could explain our result.

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