APPENDIX

A COMPONENTS OF THE WORLD BANK RULE OF LAW INDEX

The World Bank rule of law index is a weighted average of the following 32 sources:

- Economist Intelligence Unit Riskwire & Democracy Index

    - Violent crime

    - Organized crime

    - Fairness of judicial process

    - Enforceability of contracts

    - Speediness of judicial process

    - Confiscation/expropriation

    - Intellectual property rights protection

    - Private property protection

- Gallup World Poll

    - Confidence in the police force

    - Confidence in judicial system

    - Have you had money property stolen from you or another household member?

    - Have you been assaulted or mugged?

- Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom

    - Property Rights

- Institutional Profiles Database

    - Degree of security of goods and persons

    - Violent activities by criminal organizations (drug trafficking, weapons, prostitution...)

- Degree of judicial independence vis-à-vis the State

- Degree of enforcement of court orders

- Timeliness of judicial decisions

- Equal treatment of foreigners before the law (compared to nationals)

- Practical ability of the administration to limit tax evasion

- Efficiency of the legal means to protect property rights in the event of conflict between private stakeholders?

- Generally speaking, does the State exercise arbitrary pressure on private property (e.g. red tape...)?

- Does the State pay compensation equal to the loss in cases of expropration (by law or fact) when the expropriation concerns land ownership?

- Does the State pay compensation equal to the loss in cases of expropration (by law or fact) when the expropriation concerns production means?

- Degree of observance of contractual terms between national private stakeholders

- Degree of observance of contractual terms between national and foreign private stakeholders

- In the past 3 years, has the State withdrawn from contracts without paying the corresponding compensation... vis-à-vis national stakeholders?

- In the past 3 years, has the State withdrawn from contracts without paying the corresponding compensation... vis-à-vis foreign stakeholders?

- Respect for intellectual property rights relating to... trade secrets and industrial patents

- Respect for intellectual property rights relating to... industrial counterfeiting

- Does the State recognize formally the diversity of land tenure system?

- Political Risk Services International Country Risk Guide

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- Law and Order

- US State Department Trafficking in People report

  - Trafficking in People

- Varieties of Democracy Project

  - Liberal component index (measuring rule of law, judicial independence, checks and balances)

- Global Insight Business Conditions and Risk Indicators

  - Expropriation. The risk that the state or other sovereign political authority will deprive, expropriate, nationalise, or confiscate the assets of private businesses, whether domestic or foreign.

  - State contract alteration. The risk that a government or state body alters the terms of, cancels outright, or frustrates (usually through delay) contracts it has with private parties without due process.

  - Contract enforcement. The risk that the judicial system will not enforce contractual agreements between private-sector entities, whether domestic or foreign, due to inefficiency, corruption, bias, or an inability to enforce rulings promptly and firmly.

- African Development Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessments

  - Property rights and rule based governance

- Afrobarometer

  - Over the past year, how often have you or anyone in your family feared crime in your own home?

  - Over the past year, how often have you or anyone in your family had something stolen from your house?

- Over the past year, how often have you or anyone in your family been physically attacked?

- How much do you trust the courts of law?

- Trust police

- Asian Development Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessments

  - Property rights and rule based governance

- Business Enterprise Environment Survey

  - How often is following characteristic associated with the court system: Fair and honest?

  - How often is following characteristic associated with the court system: Enforceable?

  - How often is following characteristic associated with the court system: Quick?

  - How problematic is crime for the growth of your business?

  - How problematic is judiciary for the growth of your business?

- Bertelsmann Transformation Index

  - Rule of Law

- Freedom House

  - Judicial Accountability

- Global Integrity Index

  - Public Management

  - Rights

  - Gender

- IFAD Rural Sector Performance Assessments

- – Access to land

- – Access to water for agriculture

- Latinobarometro

  - – Trust in Judiciary

  - – Trust in Police

  - – Have you been a victim of crime?

- World Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessments

  - – Property rights and rule based governance

- Vanderbilt University Americas Barometer

  - – Trust in supreme court

  - – Trust in justice system

  - – Trust in police

  - – Have you been a victim of crime?

- Institute for Management and Development World Competitiveness Yearbook

  - – Tax evasion is not a threat to your economy

  - – Justice is fairly administered

  - – Personal security and private property rights are adequately protected

  - – Parallel (black-market, unrecorded) economy does not impair economic development
    Intellectual property rights are adequately enforced

- World Justice Project Rule of Law Index

  - – Factor 5.1: Crime is effectively controlled (Order and Security)

- Factor 7: Civil Justice

- Factor 8: Criminal Justice

For a description of the methodology used to weight these sources, see https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#home.

B   COMPONENTS OF THE FREEDOM HOUSE RULE OF LAW INDEX

Freedom House relies on country experts to code the quality of the rule of law in each country covered by the *Freedom in the World* project. Country experts are asked the following questions:

- Is there an independent judiciary?

   - Is the judiciary subject to interference from the executive branch of government or from other political, economic, or religious influences?

   - Are judges appointed and dismissed in a fair and unbiased manner?

   - Do judges rule fairly and impartially, or do they commonly render verdicts that favor the government or particular interests, whether in return for bribes or for other reasons?

   - Do executive, legislative, and other governmental authorities comply with judicial decisions, and are these decisions effectively enforced?

   - Do powerful private entities comply with judicial decisions, and are decisions that run counter to the interests of powerful actors effectively enforced?

- Does due process prevail in civil and criminal matters?

   - Are defendants' rights, including the presumption of innocence until proven guilty, protected?

- Do detainees have access to independent, competent legal counsel regardless of their financial means?

- Are defendants given a fair, public, and timely hearing by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal?

- Is access to the court system in general dependent on an individual's financial means?

- Are prosecutors independent of political control and influence?

- Are prosecutors independent of powerful private interests, whether legal or illegal?

- Do law enforcement and other security officials operate professionally, independently, and accountably?

- Do law enforcement officials make arbitrary arrests and detentions without warrants, or fabricate or plant evidence on suspects?

- Do law enforcement and other security officials fail to uphold due process because of influence by nonstate actors, including organized crime, powerful commercial interests, or other groups?

- Is there protection from the illegitimate use of physical force and freedom from war and insurgencies?

  - Do law enforcement officials beat detainees during arrest or use excessive force or torture to extract confessions?

  - Are conditions in pretrial detention facilities and prisons humane and respectful of the human dignity of inmates?

  - Do citizens have the means of effective petition and redress when they suffer physical abuse by state authorities?

  - Is violent crime common, either in particular areas or among the general population?

  - Is the population subjected to physical harm, forced removal, or other acts of violence or terror due to civil conflict or war?

- Do laws, policies, and practices guarantee equal treatment of various segments of the population?

  – Are members of various distinct groups—including ethnic, religious, gender, LGBT, and other relevant groups—able to effectively exercise their human rights with full equality before the law?

  – Is violence against such groups considered a crime, is it widespread, and are perpetrators brought to justice?

  – Do members of such groups face legal and/or de facto discrimination in areas including employment, education, and housing because of their identification with a particular group?

  – Do noncitizens—including migrant workers and noncitizen immigrants—enjoy basic internationally recognized human rights, including the right not to be subjected to torture or other forms of ill-treatment, the right to due process of law, and the freedoms of association, expression, and religion?

  – Do the country's laws provide for the granting of asylum or refugee status in accordance with the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, its 1967 Protocol, and other regional treaties regarding refugees? Has the government established a system for providing protection to refugees, including against refoulement (the return of persons to a country where there is reason to believe they would face persecution)?

C   CODING UN SECRETARY-GENERAL BUDGET REQUESTS

I use the UN Secretary-General's annual budget requests to code the number of UN personnel assigned specifically to rule of law-related tasks. To do this, I search each budget request for any mention of police reform, court reform, prison reform, legal (or legislative or constitutional) reform, or the phrase "rule of law." Budget requests are unique in specifying personnel numbers

for each component of the mission's mandate. For example, in the budget request pictured in Figure A.3, the third component, "peace consolidation," includes a sub-component related to police reform, and the fourth component, "law and order," includes sub-components related to police, court, and prison reform.

Following Sannerholm et al. (2012), I generally exclude personnel assigned to disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), monitoring of ceasefires, or investigations of human rights abuses, unless the investigations specifically target state security, justice, or corrections personnel. I also exclude UN troops and Military Observers. While UN troops and Military Observers are sometimes listed under rule of law-related components, they rarely engage in rule of law reform. In Mali, for example, MINUSMA was initially tasked with "security stabilization in northern Mali," which included not only "protection provided to population centres," but also "enhanced operational capacity of the Malian police and other law enforcement agencies." UN troops were listed under this mandate component because of their role in providing protection, but it is clear from MINUSMA's budget requests that only UN police officers were expected to participate in enhancing the "operational capacity" of the Malian police. Including UN troops would artificially inflate my count of the number of personnel assigned specifically to rule of law-related tasks. If a component includes rule of law-related tasks in one year, I generally code it as including rule of law-related tasks in the following year as well, unless there is clear evidence of a shift in priorities.

Budget requests capture the number of personnel approved by the General Assembly, rather than the number deployed in the field. While there is always a gap between what the General Assembly approves and what the mission actually receives, in general, the correlation between approved and actual numbers is very close to 1. To see this, I use budget performance reports prepared by the UN's Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) to estimate the correlation between approved and actual personnel numbers. Unlike budget requests, budget performance reports include both approved and actual numbers. Among the countries in my sample, the correlation between approved and actual UN troops is 0.97; the correlation between approved and actual UN police officers is 0.96; the correlation between approved and actual UN

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Military Observers is 0.96; and the correlation between approved and actual civilian personnel is 0.97. These correlations suggest that approved numbers are a useful proxy for actual numbers.[1]

D   CODING UN SECRETARY-GENERAL PROGRESS REPORTS

In collaboration with Hannah Smidt, I use UN Secretary-General progress reports to code the extent to which UN missions actually pursue rule of law-related activities in the field. To do this, we hired a team of graduate and undergraduate coders to deconstruct each progress report into paragraphs. For each paragraph, coders determined whether a UN mission or some other third party was engaged in any of 37 activity categories, as well as the mechanism of engagement in that activity. In addition to police reform, court reform, prison reform, and legal reform, the activity categories include disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration; control of small arms and light weapons; protection of civilians; border control; voter education; and humanitarian relief, among others. The engagement categories include education (e.g. training and other forms technical assistance), inducement (e.g. funding and other forms of material assistance), persuasion (e.g. advocacy), oversight (e.g. monitoring), sanctions, and implementation of rule of law-related activities without host state involvement.[2]

While the format of progress reports varies somewhat across years and missions, they are always structurally similar, facilitating cross-country and over-time comparisons. Coders were randomly assigned progress reports in order to avoid the problem of coder fixed effects. To maximize data quality, roughly 40% of all progress reports were double- or triple-coded. Overuse of the passive voice and technical, bureaucratic language often leaves room for interpretation as to the nature of the activity being pursued, and/or the identity of the actor(s) pursuing it. Rather than attempt to adjudicate competing coding decisions on a paragraph-by-paragraph basis, we created two versions of the dataset, one that features all activities recorded by any coder, and another that

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[1]Of course, these correlations do *not* imply that UN missions receive as many personnel as the UN Security Council approves. They simply imply that the gap between approved and actual personnel numbers tends to be similar across countries and over time.

[2]A codebook developed for use by the coders is available at https://docs.google.com/document/d/16JqivsgzPv8AUu8wCZtuuDUZ2gN3mB34oskqp06BN_o/edit?usp=sharing.

features only activities recorded by multiple coders.

For example, if one coder records police reform but not military reform for a given paragraph, and the other records military reform but not police reform, the first version of the dataset would record both activities as occurring, while the second would record neither. For the roughly 60% of progress reports that were single-coded, these two versions of the dataset are identical. We randomly selected which progress reports would be single-coded and which would be double- or triple-coded. Fortunately, the degree of inter-coder reliability is generally high—78% or above for the activities in this paper—and many of the remaining discrepancies disappear when I aggregate from the paragraph level to the progress report level, and then from the progress report level to the country-year level. The two versions of the dataset provide upper and lower bounds on the activities that each mission pursued. My analysis in the paper uses the first version of the dataset, which features all activities recorded by any coder. My results are robust to the second version, as I show in Appendix Q below.

In aggregating from the report level to the country-year level, I code activities as occurring in the year the progress report was published. In some cases, however, the period covered by a progress report begins in one year and ends in the next. These cases are the minority: the start of the reporting period matches the year the progress report was published 75% of the time; the end of the reporting period matches the year the progress report was published 95% of the time; and both match 73% of the time. To avoid problems of reverse causality, when a progress report spans two years, I code the activities mentioned therein as occurring in the first year rather than the second. (None of the progress reports in my sample span more than two years.) For example, progress report S/2013/140* on South Sudan was published on March 8, 2013, and covers activities that occurred between November 8, 2012 and the date of publication (UN Secretary-General 2013). For purposes of my analysis, I code activities in that progress report as occurring in 2012. Unfortunately the progress reports typically do not specify the date or even the month in which a particular activity occurred, making it impossible to assign different years to different activities within the same progress report.

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In this paper I focus on four activities in particular: police reform, court reform, prison reform, and legal reform. Following Sannerholm et al. (2012) and consistent with the UN's own definition of the rule of law, I exclude transitional justice and military reform from these categories, and include human rights-related activities only when they target the host state's security, justice, or corrections sectors (e.g. in the case of human rights training for police officers). Promotion of human rights is considered a "cross-cutting" priority for peacekeeping operations (Blair, di Salvatore and Smidt 2020), meaning that it is (ostensibly) integrated into virtually everything that peacekeepers do, including activities that are not directly relevant to the rule of law (e.g. provision of humanitarian relief to refugees). Coding all activities that involve human rights as also involving the rule of law would artificially inflate my estimate for the extent to which UN missions actually pursue rule of law-related activities in the field. I also focus on four mechanisms of engagement: education, inducement, persuasion, and oversight. I exclude sanctions from my analysis because there is only one instance of a UN mission using sanctions to enforce compliance with rule of law principles in my sample—the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in 2005—and even that case is ambiguous.[3]

EXAMPLE

To illustrate, consider the following paragraph from the aforementioned progress report on South Sudan:

> To help reduce prolonged arbitrary detention, UNMISS provided technical support to the regular review of remand cases. Following the successful piloting of the Juvenile Remand Review Board in Juba Prison to reduce juvenile pretrial detention, UNMISS, together with the United States Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs and UNICEF, launched remand boards in Malakal, Rumbek, and Wau in January. During the reporting period, UNMISS assisted the South Sudanese au-

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[3]In 2005, MONUC compelled the Congolese government to fire the Auditor General of the city of Bunia on allegations of misconduct. Even in this case, while the Auditor General was punished, the punishment was more akin to "naming and shaming" than to the use of force, and was transmitted through the government itself.

thorities in resolving approximately 650 cases of prolonged arbitrary detention. (UN Secretary-General 2013, para. 50)

The first sentence in this paragraph would be coded under the activity category of prison reform, and under the engagement category of education, since UNMISS provided technical rather than material support.

The second sentence would be coded under the activity categories court reform (since remand boards are technically part of the court system), prison reform (since remand boards were designed to reduce pretrial detention), and protection of child rights (since remand boards were designed to reduce *juvenile* pretrial detention specifically). These activities would be coded as bypassing the host state, since there is no evidence that UNMISS collaborated with the South Sudanese government in establishing remand boards. (The US Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs and UNICEF would be coded as additional third parties.) Finally, the third sentence would be coded under the activity category of prison reform, and under the engagement category of education (in this case, training).

Even in this one paragraph, some points of potential disagreement arise. In particular, while the Juvenile Remand Review Board in Juba Prison was unambiguously designed to reduce juvenile pretrial detention, it is not obvious that the new remand boards in Malakal, Rumbek, and Wau had the same purpose. In this case there does not appear to be a "right" answer. But because the paragraph clearly includes at least one example of UNMISS providing technical support to the South Sudanese government to reduce juvenile pretrial detention, the ambiguity in the final clause of the second sentence would not affect the coding of the paragraph. I resolve many other ambiguities when aggregating from the paragraph to the progress report level, and from the progress report to the country-year level. (As it happens, S/2013/140* includes two paragraphs devoted specifically to protection of the rights of children, in which the aim of UNMISS's activities is clear.) And where further ambiguities remain, double- and triple-coding allows me to test the robustness of my results to different coding decisions.

COMPARISON TO RUGGERI, GIZELIS, AND DORUSSEN

The Peacekeeping Activities Dataset (PACT) is not the first attempt to leverage UN Secretary-General progress reports to generate cross-national data on peacekeeping activities in the field. PACT builds on, and was inspired by, two previous efforts by Ruggeri, Gizelis and Dorussen (2011) and Smidt (2016). The Ruggeri, Gizelis and Dorussen (2011) and Smidt (2016) datasets were pathbreaking in their efforts to operationalize dynamics of peacekeeping that simply cannot be captured through mandates or personnel numbers alone. But PACT also has several important advantages over its two predecessors. The Ruggeri, Gizelis and Dorussen (2011) Peacekeeping Location Event Dataset (PKOLED) uses progress reports to record 104 categories of peacekeeping-related events for all African countries from 1989 to 2006 (Dorussen and Gizelis 2013; Ruggeri, Gizelis and Dorussen 2011). PKOLED event categories vary widely, from "establishment of headquarters" to "letter writing" to "election preparation and monitoring." PKOLED's ability to capture this diversity of activities is a significant contribution to quantitative peacekeeping research.

But PKOLED is also limited in two crucial ways. First and most obviously, because it stops in 2006, it misses what proved to be one of the most important decades for UN peacekeeping in Africa, and especially for the UN's rule of law agenda on the continent. PKOLED excludes MONUSCO in DRC (deployed in 2010), UNMISS in South Sudan (2011), MINUSMA in Mali (2013), and MINUSCA in the Central African Republic (2014). It also only partly covers UNOCI in Côte d'Ivoire (deployed in 2004) and UNMIS in Sudan (2005). These missions were assigned some of the most ambitious rule of law-related mandates in the UN's history; by excluding them, PKOLED risks misrepresenting the nature of the UN's rule of law agenda as it is operationalized on the ground.

Second and potentially more significantly, because PKOLED is an event dataset, it omits many important activities that simply do not fit within an event data structure. To cite just one example, in Liberia, PKOLED records just one event related to "provision of technical assistance to policing" in 2005, gleaned from the UN Secretary-General's June 2005 progress report

(S/2005/391). In this event, the city of Antwerp provided UNMIL with weapons and ammunition for purposes of training the Liberian National Police (LNP) (para. 33). But the report mentions many other activities related to police reform that PKOLED's event data structure cannot accommodate. For example, UNMIL initiated a program to familiarize probationary police officers with "police operations in the country's interior" (para. 32); launched a training program for high-ranking officers from the LNP and Special Security Service (para. 34); monitored LNP officers as they provided perimeter security at voter registration sites (para. 40); advised the LNP on the development of "security plans" for the elections (para. 45); and advocated for the inclusion of a "gender perspective" in security sector reform (para. 77). These activities have potentially important implications for policing in Liberia, and thus for the rule of law more generally, but they do not appear in PKOLED. PACT captures these (and many other) rule of law-related activities in ways that PKOLED does not.

COMPARISON TO SMIDT

PACT also builds on Smidt (2016), who similarly uses progress reports to code UN activities on the ground. Smidt's dataset includes 21 activity categories. Crucially, however, Smidt focuses exclusively on the periods immediately preceding and following national elections. Unfortunately, this scope condition is quite limiting for my purposes. While national elections may create opportunities to train electoral commissions or assist state security forces, the tensions that often accompany these periods—and the resources required to mitigate those tensions—may preclude other activities that are crucial to the rule of law (reforming the judiciary, for example). Capturing these activities is key to understanding the UN's rule of law agenda as it is operationalized in the field. PACT includes more activity and engagement categories than Smidt (2016), and encompasses activities undertaken throughout each mission's mandate, rather than just around national elections.

Limitations

These advantages notwithstanding, PACT has limitations of its own. Beyond the issue of inter-coder reliability, UN Secretary-General progress reports may be selective, and may emphasize activities that the UN believes best reflect its achievements (Kathman et al. 2017). I am not aware of empirical evidence demonstrating that such a bias exists, but it is possible. Moreover, while progress reports are more thorough than any other data source I am aware of, they may nonetheless exclude relevant activities, especially those that are considered minor or routine (Sannerholm et al. 2012). Finally, while progress reports can be used to code the mechanism of engagement with host states—distinguishing monitoring from education, for example—they often omit potentially relevant details (for example, the number of state actors educated). Variation along these dimensions may be important, but I cannot observe it. The Smidt (2016) and Ruggeri, Gizelis and Dorussen (2011) datasets are limited in these ways as well. Despite their limitations, to the best of my knowledge, progress reports are the most comprehensive source of publicly available raw data on the activities of UN missions, with a more or less standardized structure that facilitates comparisons both across countries and over time.

E   Descriptive statistics

Figure A.1 plots the number of uniformed personnel deployed to each African country since the end of the Cold War, using data from the *Providing for Peacekeeping* (*P4P*) project.[4] Some countries host multiple UN missions in a single year. Since my dependent variable is operationalized at the country level, in these cases I calculate the *total* number of uniformed personnel deployed across all UN missions in a given country-year. The number of uniformed personnel in my sample ranges from 0 (in countries without UN missions) to 33,120 (in Sudan in 2011), with a standard deviation of 3,935.

Figure A.2 plots the number of civilian personnel since 1993, the first year data are available,

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[4]See http://www.providingforpeacekeeping.org/.

for the nine African countries for which UN budget performance reports are available. Budget performance reports always refer to the UN's fiscal year. Since all the other variables in my analysis refer to the calendar year, I code all personnel numbers in the first half of the fiscal year in order to avoid reverse causality. The number of civilian personnel ranges from 0 to 8,558 (again in Sudan in 2011), with a standard deviation of 889.

Figure A.4 plots the number of personnel assigned specifically to rule of law-related tasks since 2003, the first year data is available, for the nine African countries for which budget requests are available. Like budget performance reports, budget requests always refer to the UN's fiscal year. To avoid reverse causality, I code all personnel numbers in the first half of the fiscal year. The number of personnel assigned specifically to rule of law-related tasks ranges from 0 to 2,276 (in the Central African Republic in 2016), with a standard deviation of 491.

Table A.1 provides descriptive statistics for UN rule of law-related activities in Africa since 1989. I code rule of law-related activities using UN Secretary-General progress reports, following the coding rules described in Appendix D above.

Table A.2 provides descriptive statistics for the World Bank (top panel) and Freedom House (bottom panel) rule of law indices. The top row in each panel provides descriptive statistics for all conflict and post-conflict African countries in my sample. The second row provides descriptive statistics for all African countries during ongoing civil war. The third, fourth, and fifth rows provide descriptive statistics for all post-conflict African countries that have been at peace for at least one, two, or three years, respectively. Figures A.5 and A.6 visualize trends in the two indices over time. Gray shading denotes periods of civil war. Purple shading denotes periods when a UN mission was present.

F MISSING DATA

My data on civilian personnel and personnel assigned specifically to rule of law-related tasks cover fewer countries (and, in the latter case, fewer years) than my data on uniformed personnel or rule

of law-related activities in the field. In most cases missingness is caused by the fact that the corresponding budget requests and budget performance reports, while publicly available, do not provide enough detail to estimate the number of civilian personnel or the number of personnel assigned specifically to rule of law-related tasks. While missingness should not affect the internal validity of my results, it may affect their external validity, and potentially cause me to over- or underestimate the UN's efficacy in promoting the rule of law in Africa as a whole.

There are, however, reasons to believe that any threats to external validity are likely to be minor. I am missing data on six countries in particular: Angola, Chad, Eritrea, Mozambique, Rwanda, and Somalia. The UN missions in three of these countries—Mozambique, Rwanda, and Somalia—concluded before the rule of law even entered the UN's lexicon as a core peacekeeping task.[5] As a result, their mandates either did not include the rule of law at all (e.g. ONUMOZ in Mozambique), or included only minor rule of law-related components that were tangential to the mission's primary purpose (e.g. UNAMIR in Rwanda). UNMEE, deployed to enforce a ceasefire along the border between Eritrea and Ethiopia, similarly did not have a rule of law mandate.

MINURCAT was originally mandated to pursue rule of law-related reforms in Chad and CAR, but the mission abandoned this and most other components of its mandate. In his final progress report before MINURCAT withdrew in December 2010, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon describes the mission as an "unusual and unique United Nations peacekeeping operation in that it was *devoted solely to contributing to the protection of civilians, without an explicit political mandate*" (UN Secretary-General 2010, para. 73, my emphasis). Not coincidentally, PACT records no cases of MINURCAT pursuing rule of law-related activities in Chad at any time during the mission's mandate. PACT does record rule of law-related activities in CAR, but these are associated with three other UN missions deployed to that country since 1998: MINURCA, BINUCA, and MINUSCA. (Fortunately, I have data on civilian personnel and personnel assigned specifically

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[5]It was not until 1996 that the UN Security Council passed its first resolution that explicitly mentioned the phrase "rule of law" as a goal to which post-conflict countries should aspire (UN Security Council 1996). UNOMOZ concluded its mandate in Mozambique in 1994, UNAMIR in Rwanda in 1996, and UNOSOM II in Somalia in 1995. The UN currently maintains a small diplomatic mission in Somalia, UNSOM, deployed through the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs rather than the Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

to rule of law-related tasks in CAR.)

Of the six African countries for which I am missing data, Angola is the most potentially problematic. UNAVEM II (deployed in 1991) and its successor UNAVEM III (1995) were both mandated to monitor the neutrality of the Angolan police. (UNAVEM III had a broader mandate, though monitoring of the Angolan police was the only component directly related to the rule of law.) The much smaller MONUA replaced UNAVEM III in 1997, and was further mandated to monitor Angola's prisons. Ideally I could include data on civilian personnel and personnel assigned specifically to rule of law-related tasks within these missions. But I cannot.

Nonetheless, while missing data is a limitation, with one potential exception I am able to estimate the relationship between the rule of law and UN personnel and activities in the countries and years when the UN was most actively engaged in rule of law reform. These are the country-years that are most relevant for my purposes: from both a theoretical and practical perspective, we should evaluate the UN's efficacy in promoting the rule of law at times and places where the UN actually attempted rule of law promotion in the first place. Moreover, while I do not have data on civilian personnel or personnel assigned specifically to rule of law-related tasks in Angola, I do have data on uniformed personnel and rule of law-related activities in the field. My results are similar no matter how I operationalize UN personnel and activities, and it seems unlikely that including Angola in the analyses from which it is currently excluded would alter my conclusions in any substantive way.

G   MULTICOLLINEARITY

For most of my analysis I combine different categories of uniformed personnel (e.g. UN troops and Military Observers) and different categories of civilian personnel (e.g. government-provided personnel and UN Volunteers) into single aggregate counts. I also combine different categories of rule of law-related activities (e.g. police reform and court reform) into a single aggregate dummy. While I also analyze the latter categories separately, I do so using separate regressions, making it

difficult to compare the relative efficacy of different rule of law-related activities. I do this to avoid problems of multicollinearity. For example, among the countries in my sample, the correlation between UN troops and police officers is 0.81; the correlation between UN troops and Military Observers is 0.85; and the correlation between UN police officers and Military Observers is 0.68. Similarly, the correlations between police, court, and prison reform are all 0.9 or higher. The correlation between legal reform and police, court, and prison reform is roughly 0.75, 0.81, and 0.74, respectively.

Multicollinearity makes it difficult to interpret the coefficients on distinct categories of UN personnel and activities when they are included in the same regression. Empirically, multicollinearity increases the variance of coefficient estimates and reduces model stability. Conceptually, multicollinearity requires estimating off of variation that may not be of substantive interest—for example, the relatively few and idiosyncratic country-years in which the number of UN troops and the number of UN police officers happen not to rise or fall in tandem. Multicollinearity is rarely discussed in cross-national peacekeeping research, though it is likely to afflict any study that disaggregates UN personnel in this way. My approach allows me to avoid these problems.

H SPILLOVER

The effects of the UN's rule of law agenda may spill over from one country to another, potentially biasing my results. This could happen in one of at least two ways. First, if state actors in one country begin to adopt rule of law principles, they may intentionally or inadvertently transmit those principles to state actors in other countries (through, for example, diplomacy). Second, if a UN mission in one country learns how to instill rule of law principles efficiently and effectively, it may communicate those lessons to other UN missions. This is akin to the "second-level" learning that Howard (2008, 14) describes.

Fortunately, my use of country fixed effects should mitigate these sources of bias. I compare countries to themselves over time. To bias my results, spillover from country i to country j would

have to occur colinearly with changes in UN personnel and activities in country j itself. While this is possible, it does not strike me as an especially serious or likely threat to causal inference. Modeling these sorts of spillover effects quantitatively would be a valuable contribution to the literature, but is beyond the scope of this paper.

I PREDICTING UN PERSONNEL AND ACTIVITIES

If UN missions are more likely to pursue rule of law reform when threats to the rule of law are relatively mild, then my results will be biased away from the null. While I cannot eliminate this concern altogether, I can probe its likely severity. Tables A.4 through A.7 use lagged values of the World Bank index to predict the number of uniformed personnel deployed to each UN mission in Africa (Table A.4), the number of civilian personnel deployed to each UN mission in Africa (Table A.5), the number of personnel assigned specifically to rule of law-related tasks (Table A.6), and a dummy for any actual rule of law-related activities in the field (Table A.6). Tables A.8 through A.11 replicate this exercise using lagged values of the Freedom House index instead. All specifications include country fixed effects. Since these results are intended to be descriptive, I focus on the simple bivariate correlations, but for completeness I report results with controls as well.

I find that, in general, lagged values of the World Bank and Freedom House indices are weakly or even negatively correlated with UN personnel and activities. The only exception that is not sensitive to specification is the positive correlation between the World Bank index and the number of civilian personnel in countries that have experienced at least one year of peace, as I show in Table A.5. But this correlation is null in other specifications when I use the World Bank index, and is null or negative in all but one specification when I use the Freedom House index instead. In other words, if anything, UN missions are more rather than less likely to expand in size, and to pursue rule of law-related activities, in settings where threats to the rule of law are relatively severe.

It is also possible that UN missions are more likely to engage host states in the process of reform when threats to the rule of law are relatively mild, and more likely to bypass them when threats to the rule of law are relatively severe (for example, when host states are implicated in ongoing abuses against civilians). In this case, my estimates for the correlation between engagement and the rule of law would be biased away from the null, while my results for the correlation between bypassing and the rule of law would be biased towards it. Again, while I cannot eliminate this concern altogether, I can probe its likely severity. I find in Tables A.12 through A.15 that, if anything, lagged values of the World Bank and Freedom House indices are *negatively* correlated with the UN's decision to engage the host state. Lagged values of these indices are generally not correlated with the UN's decision to bypass the host state. Combined with my finding that UN missions are more likely to pursue rule of law-related activities during periods of conflict than periods of peace, these results belie concerns about bias induced by selection into "easy" cases. If anything, UN missions tend to intervene more aggressively in the hard cases, where threats to the rule of law are relatively severe.

J RESULTS DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN POLICE AND MILITARY PERSONNEL

In the paper I combine the number of UN troops, police officers, and Military Observers deployed to each UN mission in Africa into a single count. This avoids problems of multicollinearity, but sacrifices some conceptual precision. As discussed in the paper, in almost all UN missions, court, prison, and legal reform are overseen by civilian rather than military personnel. Police reform is overseen by a combination of civilian personnel and UN police officers. Intuitively, we should therefore expect the magnitude of the correlation between UN personnel and the rule of law to be larger for UN police officers than for UN troops or Military Observers.

Figures A.7 and A.8 explore this possibility by disaggregating uniformed personnel into military and police components, using the World Bank and Freedom House indices, respectively.

The scale of the x-axis is standardized for ease of comparison. While I am unable to estimate the relationship between the rule of law and military personnel *conditional* on police officers, my results are nonetheless consistent with the intuition that the marginal return on police officers is larger than the marginal return on uniformed personnel, at least for purposes of restoring the rule of law. My coefficients on military personnel are, however, much more precisely estimated, perhaps due to larger variance in the number of military personnel deployed to each UN mission. Importantly, both categories of uniformed personnel are consistently positively correlated with the rule of law after civil war termination.

K RESULTS DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN NATIONAL AND INTER-NATIONAL CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

In the paper I combine multiple categories of civilian personnel into a single count. Again, this avoids problems of multicollinearity, but sacrifices some conceptual precision. UN missions comprise a combination of national and international civilian personnel. The latter tend to be better paid and enjoy higher status than the former. Not coincidentally, they also tend to be more directly involved in efforts to retrain host state personnel and rehabilitate host state institutions. Intuitively, we should therefore expect the magnitude of the correlation between the rule of law and UN personnel to be larger for international civilian personnel than for national civilian personnel.

Figures A.9 and A.10 explore this possibility by disaggregating civilian personnel into national and international components, using the World Bank and Freedom House indices, respectively. While I am unable to estimate the relationship between the rule of law and national civilian personnel *conditional* on international civilian personnel, my results are nonetheless consistent with the intuition that the marginal return on international civilian personnel is larger than the marginal return on national civilian personnel, at least for purposes of restoring the rule of law. My coefficients on national civilian personnel are, however, much more precisely estimated, perhaps due to larger variance in the number of national civilian personnel deployed to each UN mission.

Importantly, both categories of civilian personnel are consistently positively correlated with the rule of law after civil war termination.

L   RESULTS USING POLITY IV EXECUTIVE CONSTRAINTS IN-DEX

In the paper I use World Bank and Freedom House indices to operationalize the rule of law. These indices are broad, designed to capture multiple components of the rule of law simultaneously. As a narrower alternative, Figure A.11 reports results using Polity IV's "executive constraints" index, designed to capture "the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-making powers of chief executives," and the "checks and balances between the various parts of the decision-making process."[6] My results are generally consistent with those reported in the paper. The only exception is that the relationship between executive constraints and the number of personnel assigned specifically to rule of law-related tasks is no longer statistically significant at conventional levels, though the coefficients are positive after one year of peace. This may be an artifact of the smaller number of country-years for which data on the number of personnel assigned specifically to rule of law-related tasks is available.

M   RESULTS USING V-DEM EQUALITY BEFORE THE LAW AND JUDICIAL CONSTRAINTS INDICES

As additional narrower alternatives to the World Bank and Freedom House indices, Figures A.12 and A.13 report results using two indices from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project.[7] V-Dem is based on surveys of country experts; while it focuses on democracy, it also includes two indices that capture particular dimensions of the rule of law. The first index, "judicial constraints,"

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[6]See https://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4manualv2016.pdf.
[7]See https://www.v-dem.net/en/.

captures the extent to which the executive respects the constitution and complies with the courts, and the extent to which the judiciary is "able to act in an independent fashion." The second index captures "equality before the law and individual liberty," and is designed to operationalize the extent to which laws are "transparent and rigorously enforced," public administration is impartial, and citizens enjoy access to "justice, secure property rights, freedom from forced labor, freedom of movement, physical integrity rights, and freedom of religion." This index contains elements that are central to the rule of law (access to justice, for example), but it also includes elements that are more tangential (like freedom of religion).

With this caveat, my results are generally consistent with those reported in the paper. The only exception is that the relationship between judicial constraints and the number of personnel assigned specifically to rule of law-related tasks is negative, though not statistically significant at conventional levels. Again, this may be an artifact of the smaller number of country-years for which data on the number of personnel assigned specifically to rule of law-related tasks is available.

N   RESULTS USING LINZER AND STATON JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE INDEX

As a final narrower alternative to the World Bank and Freedom House indices, Figure A.14 reports results using the Linzer and Staton (2015) index of judicial independence. Linzer and Stanton operationalize judicial independence using a latent variables framework that combines eight indicators of judicial independence (including Polity IV's executive constraints index) into a weighted average ranging from 0 to 1, available for 200 countries through 2012. My results are again consistent with those reported in the paper. The only exception is that the relationship between judicial independence and the number of personnel assigned specifically to rule of law-related tasks is no longer statistically significant at conventional levels, though the coefficients are positive. Again, this may be an artifact of the smaller number of country-years for which data on the number of personnel assigned specifically to rule of law-related tasks is available.

O CORRELATION MATRIX FOR DEPENDENT VARIABLES

Table A.16 provides a correlation matrix for the six dependent variables used in my analysis.

P RESULTS USING NON-RULE OF LAW-RELATED ACTIVITIES

Rule of law reform is just one dimension of the increasingly multidimensional mandates that UN missions are expected to fulfill. Are the correlations I observe in the paper specific to UN rule of law-related activities? Or might they be byproducts of other, more "traditional" activities that UN missions pursue in the field? Answering this question is challenging for two reasons, one theoretical and one empirical. Theoretically, even activities that fall outside the scope of rule of law reform as I define it might nonetheless promote the rule of law, if only indirectly. For example, efforts to stimulate economic growth may involve legal and institutional reforms, and those reforms may, in turn, increase the fairness and transparency of host country laws. Empirically, UN missions with multidimensional mandates typically pursue rule of law reform alongside many other activities, from protection of civilians to provision of humanitarian relief to voter education. This makes it impossible to disentangle the effects of these other activities from the effects of rule of law-related activities per se.

As a placebo test, I use PACT to code dummies for activities that are relatively unlikely to affect the rule of law, but also relatively weakly correlated with rule of law-related activities—in particular police, court, prison, and legal reform. The activities that best meet these requirements are related to monitoring and enforcement of arms embargoes. Arms embargoes are relatively unlikely to affect host state courts, prisons, or laws. They are also relatively unlikely to affect host state police forces, since most UN arms embargoes permit the supply of weapons to state security forces, as in Côte d'Ivoire and Somalia (since 2007).[8]

Arms embargoes are typical of more traditional peacekeeping operations (which do not usu-

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[8]Of course, even arms embargoes could conceivably affect the rule of law through some other mechanism. I focus on arms embargoes because they are *relatively* unlikely to affect the rule of law, not because they are certain not to.

ally include rule of law promotion in their mandates), and may or may not be included in the mandates of more multidimensional ones. Intuitively, this implies that the correlation between arms embargoes and rule of law-related activities should be relatively weak. Indeed, in my sample, the correlation between arms embargo-related activities and rule of law-related activities is 0.39. While still positive, this is much weaker than the correlation between rule of law-related activities and other activities that might seem equally unrelated to the rule of law, such as provision of humanitarian relief (0.86), promotion of public health (0.79), or support for economic development (0.64).

Tables A.17 and A.18 report the correlation between arms embargo-related activities and the World Bank and Freedom House rule of law indices, respectively, conditional on rule of law-related activities. Taken together, my results suggest that the correlations I observe in the paper are specific to UN rule of law promotion per se. The correlation between the World Bank index and arms embargo-related activities is null or negative across specification. The correlation between the Freedom House and arms embargo-related activities is null across specifications as well. While not conclusive, these results suggest that the mere presence of a UN mission may not suffice. Restoring the rule of law may require actually pursuing rule of law-related activities in the field.

Q   RESULTS USING RESTRICTIVE CODING OF UN SECRETARY-GENERAL PROGRESS REPORTS

In the paper I use UN Secretary-General progress reports to operationalize the extent to which UN missions actually pursue rule of law-related activities on the ground. However, progress reports are often ambiguous about the nature of the activity being pursued, and/or the identity of the actor(s) pursuing it. To allow me to test the robustness of my results to different ways of interpreting these ambiguities, roughly 40% of progress reports were double- or triple-coded. This allows me to create two versions of the PACT dataset, one that includes all activities recorded by any coder, and another that includes only activities recorded by multiple coders. In the paper I use the first and

less restrictive of these two versions of the dataset. Figures A.15 and A.16 replicate Figures 3 and 4, respectively, using the second, more restrictive version of the dataset instead. Figures A.17 and A.18 replicate Figures 5 and 6, respectively, again using the more restrictive version of the dataset. My results are consistent with those reported in the paper.

R RESULTS USING CONTINUOUS CODING OF UN SECRETARY-GENERAL PROGRESS REPORTS

In the paper I use dummies to operationalize rule of law-related activities. Given the way progress reports are structured, dichotomizing in this way allows me to avoid double-counting, since the same activity is often mentioned multiple times in the same report, and/or in multiple reports in the same year. As a robustness check, Figures A.19 and A.20 replicate Figures 3 and 4, respectively, using indices that count the number of reports in a given year that mention each category of activity (police, court, prison, and legal reform). (I do not count the number of mentions within a given report, since this would introduce an even greater risk of double- and triple-counting.) Figures A.21 and A.22 replicate Figures 5 and 6, respectively, using indices that count the number of reports in a given year that mention each mechanism of rule of law-related engagement with the host state (education, inducement, persuasion, and oversight). My results are somewhat noisier but otherwise consistent with those reported in the paper.

S RESULTS USING RANDOM EFFECTS

In the paper I use country fixed effects to estimate off of variation that arises within rather than between countries. This is advantageous for causal inference, since countries tend to be more plausible counterfactuals for themselves than for other countries. But it is disadvantageous because it does not allow me to compare countries that hosted peacekeeping operations to those that did not. My fixed effects estimator thus mitigates bias, but also limits the scope of my analysis. Figures

A.23 and A.24 replicate Figures 1 and 2, respectively, using a random effects estimator that exploits variation both within and across countries, and thus incorporates countries that did not host peacekeeping operations.

Because random effects estimators are susceptible to bias from unobserved time-invariant confounders, I add controls for ethno-linguistic fractionalization, maximum intensity of the civil war (based on UCDP's classification scheme), and maximum number of rebel groups involved in the civil war (again based on UCDP's estimates). These controls do not vary over time in my panel, and so are absorbed by country fixed effects in the paper. My results are substantively similar regardless of the estimator I use. This suggests that the positive correlation I observe between the rule of law and UN personnel and activities holds not only when I compare within countries, but when I compare both between and within them as well.

Figure A.1: UN uniformed personnel by country

Notes: Uniformed personnel data are from the International Peace Institute's *Providing for Peacekeeping* project. The y-axis is scaled differently for each mission for purposes of legibility.

Figure A.2: UN civilian personnel by country

Figure A.3: Example of a UN Secretary-General budget request for the UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire

Human resources[a]

	Military observers	Military contingents	United Nations police	Formed police units	International staff	National staff[b]	Temporary position[c]	United Nations Volunteers	Government-provided personnel	Civilian electoral observers	Total
Executive direction and management											
Approved 2011/12	—	—	—	—	25	16	—	1	—	—	**42**
Proposed 2012/13	—	—	—	—	27	16	—	1	—	—	**44**
Components											
Safe and secure environment											
Approved 2011/12	192	9 535	—	—	26	9	—	21	—	—	**9 783**
Proposed 2012/13	192	9 395	—	—	26	9	—	21	—	—	**9 643**
Humanitarian and human rights											
Approved 2011/12	—	—	—	—	32	73	—	34	8	—	**147**
Proposed 2012/13	—	—	—	—	32	73	—	34	8	—	**147**
Peace consolidation											
Approved 2011/12	—	—	—	—	26	108	25	169	—	—	**328**
Proposed 2012/13	—	—	—	—	26	108	—	14	—	—	**148**
Law and order											
Approved 2011/12	—	—	595	820	25	25	—	5	34	—	**1 504**
Proposed 2012/13	—	—	555	1 000	25	25	—	5	34	—	**1 644**
Support											
Approved 2011/12	—	—	—	—	310	577	44	123	—	—	**1 054**
Proposed 2012/13	—	—	—	—	309	577	20	114	—	—	**1 020**
Total											
Approved 2011/12	192	9 535	595	820	444	808	69	353	42	—	**12 858**
Proposed 2012/13	192	9 395	555	1 000	445	808	20	189	42	—	**12 646**
Net change	—	(140)	(40)	180	1	—	(49)	(164)	—	—	(212)

[a] Represents highest level of authorized/proposed strength.
[b] Includes National Officers and national General Service staff.
[c] Funded under general temporary assistance.

The actions to be taken by the General Assembly are set out in section IV of the present report.

Notes: Example of a UN Secretary-General budget request for the UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire, as reported in UN Secretary-General (2012, 4). Data on personnel assigned to rule of law-related activities are derived from these budget requests.

Figure A.4: UN personnel assigned to rule of law-related tasks by country

Notes: Deployment data for personnel assigned to rule of law-related tasks are from UN Secretary-General annual budget requests. The y-axis is scaled differently for each mission for purposes of legibility.

Table A.1: Rule of law-related activities across countries

|	All		With UN missions	
	Mean	N	Mean	N
Any rule of law reform	0.11	842	0.28	342
Any police reform	0.11	842	0.27	342
Any court reform	0.09	842	0.23	342
Any prison reform	0.09	842	0.23	342
Any legal reform	0.07	842	0.17	342
Any rule of law-related education	0.08	842	0.21	342
Any rule of law-related inducement	0.10	842	0.25	342
Any rule of law-related persuasion	0.06	842	0.14	342
Any rule of law-related oversight	0.09	842	0.23	342
Any rule of law-related bypassing of host state	0.05	842	0.12	342

Notes: Data on engagement in rule of law-related activities are from UN Secretary-General progress reports.

Table A.2: The rule of law across countries

|	Mean	S.D.	N
World Bank			
All African countries during and after conflict	-0.96	0.57	546
African countries during conflict	-1.15	0.57	195
Post-conflict African countries at peace for...			
≥1 year	-0.85	0.55	328
≥2 years	-0.81	0.55	282
≥3 years	-0.78	0.53	250
Freedom House			
All African countries during and after conflict	4.81	3.14	416
African countries during conflict	3.30	2.57	141
Post-conflict African countries at peace for...			
≥1 year	5.68	3.06	270
≥2 years	5.97	3.03	237
≥3 years	6.20	2.99	210

Notes: The World Bank rule of law index is one of six *Worldwide Governance Indicators*. It is standardized to have mean zero and unit standard deviation across all countries in the world. The Freedom House rule of law index is one of four components of the *Freedom in the World* "Civil Liberties" index. It is scaled from 0 to 16.

Figure A.5: Trends in the World Bank rule of law index across countries

Notes: Time series plots of the World Bank rule of law index for all conflict and post-conflict African countries. Grey shading denotes periods of civil war. Purple shading denotes periods when a UN mission was present.

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Figure A.5: Trends in the World Bank rule of law index across countries

Notes: Time series plots of the World Bank rule of law index for all conflict and post-conflict African countries. Grey shading denotes periods of civil war. Purple shading denotes periods when a UN mission was present.

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Figure A.5: Trends in the World Bank rule of law index across countries

Notes: Time series plots of the World Bank rule of law index for all conflict and post-conflict African countries. Grey shading denotes periods of civil war. Purple shading denotes periods when a UN mission was present.

Figure A.5: Trends in the World Bank rule of law index across countries


Notes: Time series plots of the World Bank rule of law index for all conflict and post-conflict African countries. Grey shading denotes periods of civil war. Purple shading denotes periods when a UN mission was present.

Figure A.6: Trends in the Freedom House rule of law index across countries

Notes: Time series plots of the Freedom House rule of law index for all conflict and post-conflict African countries. Grey shading denotes periods of civil war. Purple shading denotes periods when a UN mission was present.

Figure A.6: Trends in the Freedom House rule of law index across countries

Notes: Time series plots of the Freedom House rule of law index for all conflict and post-conflict African countries. Grey shading denotes periods of civil war. Purple shading denotes periods when a UN mission was present.

Figure A.6: Trends in the Freedom House rule of law index across countries

Notes: Time series plots of the Freedom House rule of law index for all conflict and post-conflict African countries. Grey shading denotes periods of civil war. Purple shading denotes periods when a UN mission was present.

Figure A.6: Trends in the Freedom House rule of law index across countries

Notes: Time series plots of the Freedom House rule of law index for all conflict and post-conflict African countries. Grey shading denotes periods of civil war. Purple shading denotes periods when a UN mission was present.

Table A.4: Correlation between uniformed personnel and lagged values of World Bank rule of law index

# of uniformed personnel

Lagged rule of law (World Bank)	0.80	0.17	-1.49	-0.75	-1.53	-1.05	-1.17	-0.83
	[1.19]	[1.27]	[0.56]***	[0.65]	[0.57]***	[0.67]	[0.61]*	[0.76]
Observations	186	182	303	291	262	252	235	226
Controls	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Country FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Years of peace	0	0	≥ 1	≥ 1	≥ 2	≥ 2	≥ 3	≥ 3

Notes: Results from OLS regressions with country fixed effects. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.5: Correlation between civilian personnel and lagged values of World Bank rule of law index

	# of civilian personnel							
Lagged rule of law (World Bank)	0.95	0.15	0.17	0.16	0.09	0.05	0.08	0.07
	[0.41]**	[0.44]	[0.08]**	[0.09]*	[0.07]	[0.08]	[0.06]	[0.07]
Observations	175	171	296	284	257	247	231	222
Controls	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Country FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Years of peace	0	0	≥ 1	≥ 1	≥ 2	≥ 2	≥ 3	≥ 3

Notes: Results from OLS regressions with country fixed effects. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.6: Correlation between personnel assigned to rule of law-related tasks and lagged values of World Bank rule of law index

Lagged rule of law (World Bank)	**# of personnel assigned to rule of law-related tasks**							
	-0.76	-0.81	-0.12	-0.05	-0.21	-0.09	-0.19	-0.09
	[0.24]***	[0.26]***	[0.09]	[0.10]	[0.10]**	[0.10]	[0.09]**	[0.10]
Observations	135	131	254	245	226	218	202	195
Controls	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Country FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Years of peace	0	0	≥ 1	≥ 1	≥ 2	≥ 2	≥ 3	≥ 3

Notes: Results from OLS regressions with country fixed effects. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.7: Correlation between any rule of law-related activities and lagged values of World Bank rule of law index

	Any rule of law-related activities							
Lagged rule of law (World Bank)	-0.04	-0.01	-0.14	-0.07	-0.07	0.02	-0.04	0.08
	[0.06]	[0.07]	[0.04]***	[0.05]	[0.04]*	[0.05]	[0.05]	[0.06]
Observations	196	192	308	296	266	256	239	230
Controls	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Country FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Years of peace	0	0	≥ 1	≥ 1	≥ 2	≥ 2	≥ 3	≥ 3

Notes: Results from OLS regressions with country fixed effects. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.8: Correlation between uniformed personnel and lagged values of Freedom House rule of law index

	# of uniformed personnel							
Lagged rule of law (Freedom House)	-0.28	-0.19	-0.38	-0.22	-0.41	-0.23	-0.36	-0.17
	[0.29]	[0.37]	[0.10]***	[0.11]**	[0.10]***	[0.12]**	[0.10]***	[0.12]
Observations	134	130	237	229	211	204	190	184
Controls	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Country FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Years of peace	0	0	≥ 1	≥ 1	≥ 2	≥ 2	≥ 3	≥ 3

Notes: Results from OLS regressions with country fixed effects. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.9: Correlation between civilian personnel and lagged values of Freedom House rule of law index

	# of civilian personnel							
Lagged rule of law (Freedom House)	-0.06	0.05	-0.00	0.01	-0.01	0.01	-0.01	0.01
	[0.07]	[0.10]	[0.01]	[0.01]	[0.01]	[0.01]	[0.01]*	[0.01]*
Observations	123	119	230	222	206	199	186	180
Controls	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Country FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Years of peace	0	0	≥ 1	≥ 1	≥ 2	≥ 2	≥ 3	≥ 3

Notes: Results from OLS regressions with country fixed effects. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.10: Correlation between personnel assigned to rule of law-related tasks and lagged values of Freedom House rule of law index

Lagged rule of law (Freedom House)	# of personnel assigned to rule of law-related tasks							
	-0.08	-0.10	0.00	0.02	-0.00	0.03	-0.02	0.01
	[0.03]***	[0.05]**	[0.01]	[0.02]	[0.01]	[0.01]*	[0.01]	[0.02]
Observations	123	119	230	222	206	199	186	180
Controls	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Country FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Years of peace	0	0	≥ 1	≥ 1	≥ 2	≥ 2	≥ 3	≥ 3

Notes: Results from OLS regressions with country fixed effects. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.11: Correlation between any rule of law-related activities and lagged values of Freedom House rule of law index

	Any rule of law-related activities							
Lagged rule of law (Freedom House)	-0.03	-0.01	-0.02	0.00	-0.01	0.02	-0.01	0.02
	[0.01]*	[0.02]	[0.01]**	[0.01]	[0.01]	[0.01]***	[0.01]*	[0.01]***
Observations	144	140	242	234	215	208	194	188
Controls	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Country FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Years of peace	0	0	≥ 1	≥ 1	≥ 2	≥ 2	≥ 3	≥ 3

Notes: Results from OLS regressions with country fixed effects. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.12: Correlation between any rule of-law related engagement with host state and lagged values of World Bank rule of law index

| **Any rule of law-related engagement with host state**							
Lagged rule of law (World Bank)	-0.04	-0.01	-0.18	-0.12	-0.13	-0.06	-0.11	-0.03
	[0.06]	[0.07]	[0.04]***	[0.05]**	[0.05]***	[0.06]	[0.05]**	[0.07]
Observations	196	192	308	296	266	256	239	230
Controls	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Country FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Years of peace	0	0	≥ 1	≥ 1	≥ 2	≥ 2	≥ 3	≥ 3

Notes: Results from OLS regressions with country fixed effects. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.13: Correlation between any rule of-law related bypassing of host state and lagged values of World Bank rule of law index

| Lagged rule of law (World Bank)				Any rule of law-related bypassing of host state				
	-0.04	-0.03	-0.04	-0.01	-0.09	-0.05	-0.04	0.03
	[0.06]	[0.07]	[0.05]	[0.06]	[0.05]	[0.07]	[0.06]	[0.07]
Observations	196	192	308	296	266	256	239	230
Controls	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Country FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Years of peace	0	0	≥1	≥1	≥2	≥2	≥3	≥3

Notes: Results from OLS regressions with country fixed effects. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.14: Correlation between any rule of-law related engagement with host state and lagged values of Freedom House rule of law index

Lagged rule of law (Freedom House)								
	Any rule of law-related engagement with host state							
	-0.03	-0.01	-0.02	-0.00	-0.01	0.01	-0.02	0.01
	[0.01]*	[0.02]	[0.01]***	[0.01]	[0.01]*	[0.01]	[0.01]**	[0.01]
Observations	144	140	242	234	215	208	194	188
Controls	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Country FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Years of peace	0	0	≥ 1	≥ 1	≥ 2	≥ 2	≥ 3	≥ 3

Notes: Results from OLS regressions with country fixed effects. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.15: Correlation between any rule of-law related bypassing of host state and lagged values of Freedom House rule of law index

Lagged rule of law (Freedom House)	**Any rule of law-related bypassing of host state**							
	-0.03	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01	-0.02	-0.00	-0.01	0.01
	[0.02]	[0.02]	[0.01]**	[0.01]	[0.01]	[0.01]	[0.01]	[0.01]
Observations	144	140	242	234	215	208	194	188
Controls	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Country FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Years of peace	0	0	≥ 1	≥ 1	≥ 2	≥ 2	≥ 3	≥ 3

Notes: Results from OLS regressions with country fixed effects. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Figure A.7: Correlation between World Bank rule of law index and UN police and military personnel


Notes: Each figure reports coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from four separate OLS regressions with controls and country fixed effects. Sample is restricted to periods during civil war (first row) and at least one, two, or three years after civil war (second, third, and fourth rows, respectively).

Figure A.8: Correlation between Freedom House rule of law index and UN police and military personnel


Notes: Each figure reports coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from four separate OLS regressions with controls and country fixed effects. Sample is restricted to periods during civil war (first row) and at least one, two, or three years after civil war (second, third, and fourth rows, respectively).

Figure A.9: Correlation between World Bank rule of law index and UN personnel, distinguishing between national and international civilian personnel

Notes: Each figure reports coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from four separate OLS regressions with controls and country fixed effects. Sample is restricted to periods during civil war (first row) and at least one, two, or three years after civil war (second, third, and fourth rows, respectively).

Figure A.10: Correlation between Freedom House rule of law index and UN personnel, distinguishing between national and international civilian personnel


Notes: Each figure reports coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from four separate OLS regressions with controls and country fixed effects. Sample is restricted to periods during civil war (first row) and at least one, two, or three years after civil war (second, third, and fourth rows, respectively).

Figure A.11: Correlation between Polity IV executive constraints index and UN personnel and activities


Notes: Each figure reports coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from four separate OLS regressions with controls and country fixed effects. Sample is restricted to periods during civil war (first row) and at least one, two, or three years after civil war (second, third, and fourth rows, respectively). UN activities are coded as country-year dummies indicating whether the activity was mentioned at least once in a UN Secretary-General progress report from the corresponding year.

Figure A.12: Correlation between V-Dem judicial constraints index and UN personnel and activities


Notes: Each figure reports coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from four separate OLS regressions with controls and country fixed effects. Sample is restricted to periods during civil war (first row) and at least one, two, or three years after civil war (second, third, and fourth rows, respectively). UN activities are coded as country-year dummies indicating whether the activity was mentioned at least once in a UN Secretary-General progress report from the corresponding year.

Figure A.13: Correlation between V-Dem equality before the law index and UN personnel and activities

Notes: Each figure reports coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from four separate OLS regressions with controls and country fixed effects. Sample is restricted to periods during civil war (first row) and at least one, two, or three years after civil war (second, third, and fourth rows, respectively). UN activities are coded as country-year dummies indicating whether the activity was mentioned at least once in a UN Secretary-General progress report from the corresponding year.

Figure A.14: Correlation between Linzer & Staton judicial independence index and UN personnel and activities

Civil war
1+ year of peace
2+ years of peace
3+ years of peace

Coefficient on # of civilian personnel

Coefficient on any rule of law-related activities

Coefficient on # of uniformed personnel

Coefficient on # of personnel assigned to rule of law-related tasks

Notes: Each figure reports coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from four separate OLS regressions with controls and country fixed effects. Sample is restricted to periods during civil war (first row) and at least one, two, or three years after civil war (second, third, and fourth rows, respectively). UN activities are coded as country-year dummies indicating whether the activity was mentioned at least once in a UN Secretary-General progress report from the corresponding year.

Table A.16: Correlation matrix for dependent variables

	Rule of law (World Bank)	Rule of law (Freedom House)	Executive constraints (Polity IV)	Judicial independence (Linzer & Stanton)	Equality before the law (V-Dem)	Judicial constraints (V-Dem)
Rule of law (World Bank)	1					
Rule of law (Freedom House)	0.74	1				
Executive constraints (Polity IV)	0.24	0.58	1			
Judicial independence (Linzer & Stanton)	0.64	0.78	0.76	1		
Equality before the law (V-Dem)	0.75	0.83	0.56	0.69	1	
Judicial constraints (V-Dem)	0.56	0.71	0.55	0.63	0.77	1

Notes: Pairwise correlations between the World Bank rule of law index, the Freedom House rule of law index, the Polity IV executive constraints index, the Linzer & Stanton judicial independence index, and the V-Dem equality before the law and judicial constraints indices.

Table A.17: Correlation between World Bank rule of law indices and UN activities, including arms embargoes

|	Rule of law (World Bank)			
Any rule of law-related activities	0.01	0.19	0.14	0.17
	[0.05]	[0.06]***	[0.06]**	[0.07]**
Any arms embargo-related activities	-0.19	0.06	0.03	-0.05
	[0.10]*	[0.08]	[0.09]	[0.11]
Observations	191	314	271	240
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Country FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Years of peace	0	≥ 1	≥ 2	≥ 3

Notes: Each panel reports results from a separate OLS regression with controls and country fixed effects. UN activities are coded as country-year continuous variables indicating the number of times the activity was mentioned in UN Secretary-General progress reports from the corresponding year. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.18: Correlation between Freedom House rule of law indices and UN activities, including arms embargoes

	Rule of law (Freedom House)			
Any rule of law-related activities	0.02	1.92	1.55	1.28
	[0.30]	[0.43]***	[0.56]***	[0.66]*
Any arms embargo-related activities	0.40	0.35	0.09	-0.08
	[0.55]	[0.46]	[0.54]	[0.62]
Observations	137	260	228	202
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Country FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Years of peace	0	≥ 1	≥ 2	≥ 3

Notes: Each panel reports results from a separate OLS regression with controls and country fixed effects. UN activities are coded as country-year continuous variables indicating the number of times the activity was mentioned in UN Secretary-General progress reports from the corresponding year. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Figure A.15: Correlation between World Bank rule of law index and UN activities disaggregated by target using restrictive coding


■ Civil war
▲ 1+ year of peace
● 2+ years of peace
◆ 3+ years of peace

Coefficient on any court reform (restrictive)

Coefficient on any legal reform (restrictive)

Coefficient on any police reform (restrictive)

Coefficient on any prison reform (restrictive)

Notes: Each figure reports coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from four separate OLS regressions with controls and country fixed effects. Sample is restricted to periods during civil war (first row) and at least one, two, or three years after civil war (second, third, and fourth rows, respectively). UN activities are coded as country-year dummies indicating whether the activity was mentioned at least once in a UN Secretary-General progress report from the corresponding year. UN activities are only coded as a 1 if all coders agree.

Figure A.16: Correlation between Freedom House rule of law index and UN activities disaggregated by target using restrictive coding


Notes: Each figure reports coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from four separate OLS regressions with controls and country fixed effects. Sample is restricted to periods during civil war (first row) and at least one, two, or three years after civil war (second, third, and fourth rows, respectively). UN activities are coded as country-year dummies indicating whether the activity was mentioned at least once in a UN Secretary-General progress report from the corresponding year. UN activities are only coded as a 1 if all coders agree.

Figure A.17: Correlation between World Bank rule of law index and UN activities disaggregated by mechanism of engagement with host state using restrictive coding


Notes: Each figure reports coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from four separate OLS regressions with controls and country fixed effects. Sample is restricted to periods during civil war (first row) and at least one, two, or three years after civil war (second, third, and fourth rows, respectively). UN activities are coded as country-year dummies indicating whether the activity was mentioned at least once in a UN Secretary-General progress report from the corresponding year. UN activities are only coded as a 1 if all coders agree.

Figure A.18: Correlation between Freedom House rule of law index and UN activities disaggregated by mechanism of engagement with host state using restrictive coding


Notes: Each figure reports coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from four separate OLS regressions with controls and country fixed effects. Sample is restricted to periods during civil war (first row) and at least one, two, or three years after civil war (second, third, and fourth rows, respectively). UN activities are coded as country-year dummies indicating whether the activity was mentioned at least once in a UN Secretary-General progress report from the corresponding year. UN activities are only coded as a 1 if all coders agree.

Figure A.19: Correlation between World Bank rule of law index and UN activities disaggregated by target using continuous coding


Notes: Each figure reports coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from four separate OLS regressions with controls and country fixed effects. Sample is restricted to periods during civil war (first row) and at least one, two, or three years after civil war (second, third, and fourth rows, respectively). UN activities are coded as country-year continuous variables indicating the number of times the activity was mentioned in UN Secretary-General progress reports from the corresponding year.

Figure A.20: Correlation between Freedom House rule of law index and UN activities disaggregated by target using continuous coding


Notes: Each figure reports coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from four separate OLS regressions with controls and country fixed effects. Sample is restricted to periods during civil war (first row) and at least one, two, or three years after civil war (second, third, and fourth rows, respectively). UN activities are coded as country-year continuous variables indicating the number of times the activity was mentioned in UN Secretary-General progress reports from the corresponding year.

Figure A.21: Correlation between World Bank rule of law index and UN activities disaggregated by mechanism of engagement with host state using continuous coding


Notes: Each figure reports coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from four separate OLS regressions with controls and country fixed effects. Sample is restricted to periods during civil war (first row) and at least one, two, or three years after civil war (second, third, and fourth rows, respectively). UN activities are coded as country-year continuous variables indicating the number of times the activity was mentioned in UN Secretary-General progress reports from the corresponding year.

Figure A.22: Correlation between Freedom House rule of law index and UN activities disaggregated by mechanism of engagement with host state using continuous coding


Notes: Each figure reports coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from four separate OLS regressions with controls and country fixed effects. Sample is restricted to periods during civil war (first row) and at least one, two, or three years after civil war (second, third, and fourth rows, respectively). UN activities are coded as country-year continuous variables indicating the number of times the activity was mentioned in UN Secretary-General progress reports from the corresponding year.

Figure A.23: Correlation between World Bank rule of law index and UN personnel and activities using random effects

Legend:
■ Civil war
▲ 1+ year of peace
● 2+ years of peace
◆ 3+ years of peace

Coefficient on # of civilian personnel

Coefficient on any rule of law-related activities

Coefficient on # of uniformed personnel

Coefficient on # of personnel assigned to rule of law-related tasks

Notes: Each figure reports coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from four separate OLS regressions with controls and random effects. Sample is restricted to periods during civil war (first row) and at least one, two, or three years after civil war (second, third, and fourth rows, respectively). UN activities are coded as country-year dummies indicating whether the activity was mentioned at least once in a UN Secretary-General progress report from the corresponding year.

Figure A.24: Correlation between Freedom House rule of law index and UN personnel and activities using random effects

Civil war
1+ year of peace
2+ years of peace
3+ years of peace

Coefficient on # of civilian personnel

Coefficient on any rule of law-related activities

Coefficient on # of uniformed personnel

Coefficient on # of personnel assigned to rule of law-related tasks

Notes: Each figure reports coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from four separate OLS regressions with controls and random effects. Sample is restricted to periods during civil war (first row) and at least one, two, or three years after civil war (second, third, and fourth rows, respectively). UN activities are coded as country-year dummies indicating whether the activity was mentioned at least once in a UN Secretary-General progress report from the corresponding year.