**Online Appendix**

**Appendix A. Question Wording/Coding**

*Country*

Canada (0)

United States (1)

**Pre-Experiment Survey:**

*Pre-Treatment Trade Preference Index*

Do you think government should try to encourage international trade or try to discourage international trade?

Do you believe that globalization, especially the increasing connections of our economy with others around the world, is good or bad for the United States?

Should foreign companies be encouraged or discouraged from investing in the United States, for example, by building one of their factories in this country?

Do you favor or oppose the federal government in Washington negotiating more free trade agreements like NAFTA?

Do you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of the WTO, the World Trade Organization?

Respondents answered each item using a four-point scale. Their responses were averaged across the five items (α=.83 for U.S., and .85 for Canada) to construct *Pre-Treatment Trade Preference Index.*

**Survey Experiment:**

*Condition*

Trading partner country gains jobs/Home country loses jobs

Trading partner country loses jobs/Home country gains jobs

Trading partner country gains jobs/Home country gains jobs

Within each three condition, we varied how much the home country and trading partner country gain or lose from a given trade policy, by 1, 10, 100, and 1,000 jobs. Using this 3 by 7 full-factorial design, respondents were randomly assigned to see one of the twenty-one descriptions of the trade policy.

*Example*: Condition 1 [1/10]
English: "For each 1 person in the [US/Canada] who loses a job and has less money to support their family, 10 people in a country that we trade with will gain new job and now be better able to provide for their family."

French: "Pour chaque 1 personne au Canada qui perd un emploi et a moins d'argent pour soutenir sa famille, 10 personnes dans un pays avec lequel nous commerçons obtiendront de nouveaux emplois et seront plus en mesure de soutenir leur famille."

*Trade Support (Dependent Variable)*

Would you be likely to support this trade policy or oppose this trade policy?

Strongly support

Somewhat support

Somewhat oppose

Strongly oppose

*Social Dominance Orientation*

There are many kinds of groups in the world: men and women, ethnic and religious groups, nationalities, political factions. How much do you support or oppose these ideas about groups in general?

In setting priorities, we must consider all groups.

We should not push for group equality.

Group equality should be our ideal.

Superior groups should dominate inferior groups.

Responses were initially measured on a '1' (extremely oppose) – '10'(extremely favor) scale. After taking the mean across four items, respondents were split into two groups based on their levels of social dominance orientation: low '0' and high '1' in social dominance orientation. The split point was the sample median, 4.25.

**Manipulation Check**

*Perceptions of Trade Benefits*

1. Think back to the trade policy that was described to you earlier in the survey. Based on what you were told, will people in [the U.S./Canada] or people in other countries benefit more, or will they both benefit the same amount from this trade policy?
2. Will our trading partners benefit a lot more or a little more than [the U.S./Canada]?
3. Will [the U.S./Canada] benefit a lot more or a little more than our trading partners?

Manipulation check items were coded for the home country and trading partner countries on a 0-2 scale, with '0' does not gain more, '1' gains a little more, and '2' gains a lot more, to represent *Perception of the Home Country Gain*, and *Perception of Trading Partner Gain*.

**Appendix B. Tables**

**Table B1.** **Ethnocentric Valuation:** Trade Support by Who Wins versus Loses

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Partial SS** | **df** | **F** |  |
| Model | 660.771 | 16 | 46.56 | \*\*\* |
| U.S.  (vs. Canada)  | 1.498 | 1 | 1.69 |  |
|  Trading Partner Loses/Home Country Gains (vs. Trading Partner Gains/Home Country Loses) | 424.107 | 1 | 478.15 | \*\*\* |
|  **U.S.**  **x Trading Partner Loses/Home Country Gains** | 87.828 | 1 | 99.02 | \*\*\* |
|  Magnitude of Trade's Impact | 23.166 | 6 | 4.35 | \*\*\* |
|  Magnitude of Impact  x Trading Partner Loses/Home Country Gains | 75.340 | 6 | 14.16 | \*\*\* |
|  Pre-Experiment Trade Preference | 14.248 | 1 | 16.06 | \*\*\* |
| Residual | 2477.339 | 2793 |  |  |
| Total  | 3138.110 | 2809 |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Number of Observations  | 2810 |  |  |  |

*Note*. The table presents the results of an analysis of variance. \*\*\**p*<.001

**Table B2.** **Moral Exclusion**: Trade Support by Whether Trading Partner Also Wins

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Partial SS** | **df** | **F** |  |
| Model | 252.504 | 16 | 19.17 | \*\*\* |
| U.S.  (vs. Canada)  | 1.175 | 1 | 1.43 |  |
|  Trading Partner Gains/Home Country Gains (vs. Trading Partner Loses/Home Country Gains) | 44.943 | 1 | 54.59 | \*\*\* |
|  **U.S.**  **x Trading Partner Gains/Home Country Gains** | 57.742 | 1 | 70.14 | \*\*\* |
|  Magnitude of Trade's Impact | 95.264 | 6 | 19.29 | \*\*\* |
|  Magnitude of Impact  x Trading Partner Gains/Home Country Gains | 13.163 | 6 | 2.66 | \* |
|  Pre-Experiment Trade Preference | 35.683 | 1 | 43.35 | \*\*\* |
| Residual | 2351.963 | 2857 |  |  |
| Total  | 2604.467 | 2873 |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Number of Observations  | 2874 |  |  |  |

*Note*. The table presents the results of an analysis of variance. \*\**p*<.01, \*\*\**p*<.001

**Table B3.** Social Dominance Orientation Moderates Ethnocentric Valuation

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Pooled Sample**  | **Partial SS** | **df**  | **F** |  |
| Model | 487.954 | 16 | 33.80 | \*\*\* |
|  Trading Partner Loses/Home Country Gains (vs. Trading Partner Gains/Home Country Loses) | 325.502 | 1 | 360.74 | \*\*\* |
|  High Social Dominance Orientation (vs. Low SDO) | 21.294 | 1 | 23.60 | \*\* |
|  **High SDO**  **x Trading Partner Loses/Home Country Gains#** | 16.345 | 1 | 18.11 | \*\* |
|  Magnitude of Trade's Impact | 23.621 | 6 | 4.36 | \*\* |
|  Magnitude of Impact  x Trading Partner Gains/Home Country Gains | 74.347 | 6 | 13.73 | \*\*\* |
|  Pre-Experiment Trade Preference | 24.787 | 1 | 27.47 | \*\* |
| Residual | 2170.980 | 2406 |  |  |
| Total  | 2658.934 | 2422 |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Number of Observations  | 2423 |  |  |  |

**#**Three-way interactions between treatment, SDO, and country are not significant, suggesting that the treatment by SDO interactions do not differ between countries.

**Analysis by Country**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **U.S.**  | **Partial SS** | **df**  | **F** |  |
| Model | 421.253 | 16 | 34.51 | \*\*\* |
|  Trading Partner Loses/Home Country Gains (vs. Trading Partner Gains/Home Country Loses) | 324.095 | 1 | 424.85 | \*\*\* |
|  High Social Dominance Orientation (vs. Low SDO) | 5.574 | 1 | 7.31 | \*\* |
|  **High SDO**  **x Trading Partner Loses/Home Country Gains** | 7.518 | 1 | 9.86 | \*\* |
|  Magnitude of Trade's Impact | 14.829 | 6 | 3.24 | \*\* |
|  Magnitude of Impact  x Trading Partner Gains/Home Country Gains | 44.776 | 6 | 9.78 | \*\*\* |
|  Pre-Experiment Trade Preference | 8.225 | 1 | 10.78 | \*\* |
| Residual | 826.169 | 1083 |  |  |
| Total  | 1247.422 | 1099 |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Number of Observations  | 1100 |  |  |  |

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Canada**  | **Partial SS** | **df** | **F** |  |
| Model | 142.066 | 16 | 9.19 | \*\*\* |
|  Trading Partner Loses/Home Country Gains (vs. Trading Partner Gains/Home Country Loses) | 58.995 | 1 | 61.06 | \*\*\* |
|  High Social Dominance Orientation (vs. Low SDO) | 17.760 | 1 | 18.38 | \*\*\* |
|  **High SDO**  **x Trading Partner Loses/Home Country Gains** | 3.575 | 1 | 3.70 |  |
|  Magnitude of Trade's Impact | 12.865 | 6 | 2.22 | \* |
|  Magnitude of Impact  x Trading Partner Gains/Home Country Gains | 37.241 | 6 | 6.42 | \*\*\* |
|  Pre-Experiment Trade Preference | 12.353 | 1 | 12.79 | \*\*\* |
| Residual | 1261.804 | 1306 |  |  |
| Total  | 1403.870 | 1322 |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Number of Observations  | 1323 |  |  |  |

*Note*. Tables present the results of an analysis of variance. \**p*<.05, \*\**p*<.01, \*\*\**p*<.001

**Table B4.** Social Dominance Orientation Moderates Moral Exclusion

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Pooled Sample**  | **Partial SS** | **df** | **F** |  |
| Model | 234.032 | 16 | 17.65 | \*\*\* |
|  Trading Partner Gains/Home Country Gains (vs. Trading Partner Loses/Home Country Gains) | 55.064 | 1 | 66.46 | \*\*\* |
|  High Social Dominance Orientation (vs. Low SDO) | 10.273 | 1 | 12.4 | \*\*\* |
|  **High SDO**  **x Trading Partner Gains/Home Country Gains#** | 32.038 | 1 | 38.67 | \*\*\* |
|  Magnitude of Trade's Impact | 83.206 | 6 | 16.74 | \*\*\* |
|  Magnitude of Impact  x Trading Partner Gains/Home Country Gains | 18.092 | 6 | 3.64 | \*\* |
|  Pre-Experiment Trade Preference | 39.220 | 1 | 47.34 | \*\*\* |
| Residual | 2036.446 | 2,458 |  |  |
| Total  | 2270.478 | 2,474 |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Number of Observations  | 2475 |  |  |  |

**#**Three-way interactions between treatment, SDO, and country are not significant, suggesting that the treatment by SDO interactions do not differ between countries.

**Analysis by Country**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **U.S.**  | **Partial SS** | **df** | **F** |  |
| Model | 95.854 | 16 | 7.13 | \*\*\* |
|  Trading Partner Gains/Home Country Gains (vs. Trading Partner Loses/Home Country Gains) | .054 | 1 | 0.06 |  |
|  High Social Dominance Orientation (vs. Low SDO) | .889 | 1 | 1.06 |  |
|  **High SDO**  **x Trading Partner Gains/Home Country Gains** | 17.441 | 1 | 20.76 | \*\*\* |
|  Magnitude of Trade's Impact | 57.803 | 6 | 11.47 | \*\*\* |
|  Magnitude of Impact  x Trading Partner Gains/Home Country Gains | 10.488 | 6 | 2.08 |  |
|  Pre-Experiment Trade Preference | 9.101 | 1 | 10.83 | \*\*\* |
| Residual | 914.765 | 1089 |  |  |
| Total  | 1010.619 | 1105 |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Number of Observations  | 1106 |  |  |  |

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Canada**  | **Partial SS** | **df** | **F** |  |
| Model | 198.597 | 16 | 15.82 | \*\*\* |
|  Trading Partner Gains/Home Country Gains (vs. Trading Partner Loses/Home Country Gains) | 95.874 | 1 | 122.17 | \*\*\* |
|  High Social Dominance Orientation (vs. Low SDO) | 10.312 | 1 | 13.14 | \*\*\* |
|  **High SDO**  **x Trading Partner Gains/Home Country Gains** | 9.826 | 1 | 12.52 | \*\*\* |
|  Magnitude of Trade's Impact | 30.493 | 6 | 6.48 | \*\*\* |
|  Magnitude of Impact  x Trading Partner Gains/Home Country Gains | 14.871 | 6 | 3.16 | \*\* |
|  Pre-Experiment Trade Preference | 28.549 | 1 | 36.38 | \*\*\* |
| Residual | 1061.000 | 1352 |  |  |
| Total  | 1259.597 | 1368 |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Number of Observations  | 1369 |  |  |  |

*Note*. Tables present the results of an analysis of variance. \**p*<.05, \*\**p*<.01, \*\*\**p*<.001

**Table B5.** Empathy Moderates Ethnocentric Valuation

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Pooled Sample**  | **Partial SS** | **df**  | **F** |  |
| Model | 482.770 | 16 | 33.32 | \*\*\* |
|  Trading Partner Loses/Home Country Gains (vs. Trading Partner Gains/Home Country Loses) | 335.921 | 1 | 370.97 | \*\*\* |
|  High Empathy  (vs. Low Empathy) | 24.461 | 1 | 27.01 | \*\*\* |
|  **High Empathy**  **x Trading Partner Loses/Home Country Gains#** | 7.545 | 1 | 8.33 | \*\* |
|  Magnitude of Trade's Impact | 21.276 | 6 | 3.92 | \*\*\* |
|  Magnitude of Impact  x Trading Partner Gains/Home Country Gains | 73.540 | 6 | 13.54 | \*\*\* |
|  Pre-Experiment Trade Preference | 21.054 | 1 | 23.25 | \*\*\* |
| Residual | 2178.667 | 2,406 |  |  |
| Total  | 2661.436 | 2,422 |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Number of Observations  | 2423 |  |  |  |

**#**Three-way interactions between treatment, empathy, and country are not significant, suggesting that the treatment by empathy interactions do not differ between countries.

**Analysis by Country**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **U.S.**  | **Partial SS** | **df**  | **F** |  |
| Model | 414.391 | 16 | 33.67 | \*\*\* |
|  Trading Partner Loses/Home Country Gains (vs. Trading Partner Gains/Home Country Loses) | 341.694 | 1 | 444.17 | \*\*\* |
|  High Empathy  (vs. Low Empathy) | 2.765 | 1 | 3.59 |  |
|  **High Empathy**  **x Trading Partner Loses/Home Country Gains** | 3.855 | 1 | 5.01 | \* |
|  Magnitude of Trade's Impact | 14.524 | 6 | 3.15 | \*\* |
|  Magnitude of Impact  x Trading Partner Gains/Home Country Gains | 45.940 | 6 | 9.95 | \*\*\* |
|  Pre-Experiment Trade Preference | 6.915 | 1 | 8.99 | \*\* |
| Residual | 832.370 | 1082 |  |  |
| Total  | 1246.761 | 1098 |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Number of Observations  | 1099 |  |  |  |

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Canada**  | **Partial SS** | **df** | **F** |  |
| Model | 147.904 | 16 | 9.60 | \*\*\* |
|  Trading Partner Loses/Home Country Gains (vs. Trading Partner Gains/Home Country Loses) | 61.751 | 1 | 64.11 | \*\*\* |
|  High Empathy (vs. Low Empathy) | 23.872 | 1 | 24.78 | \*\*\* |
|  **High Empathy**  **x Trading Partner Loses/Home Country Gains** | 3.093 | 1 | 3.21 |  |
|  Magnitude of Trade's Impact | 11.419 | 6 | 1.98 |  |
|  Magnitude of Impact  x Trading Partner Gains/Home Country Gains | 34.444 | 6 | 5.96 | \*\*\* |
|  Pre-Experiment Trade Preference | 10.713 | 1 | 11.12 | \*\*\* |
| Residual | 1258.854 | 1307 |  |  |
| Total  | 1406.758 | 1323 |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Number of Observations  | 1324 |  |  |  |

*Note*. Tables present the results of an analysis of variance. \**p*<.05, \*\**p*<.01, \*\*\**p*<.001

**Table B6.** Empathy Moderates Moral Exclusion

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Pooled Sample**  | **Partial SS** | **df** | **F** |  |
| Model | 225.715 | 16 | 16.95 | \*\*\* |
|  Trading Partner Gains/Home Country Gains (vs. Trading Partner Loses/Home Country Gains) | 46.080 | 1 | 55.35 | \*\*\* |
|  High Empathy (vs. Low Empathy) | 6.089 | 1 | 7.31 | \*\* |
|  **High Empathy**  **x Trading Partner Gains/Home Country Gains#** | 28.168 | 1 | 33.84 | \*\*\* |
|  Magnitude of Trade's Impact | 79.627 | 6 | 15.94 | \*\*\* |
|  Magnitude of Impact  x Trading Partner Gains/Home Country Gains | 16.872 | 6 | 3.38 | \*\* |
|  Pre-Experiment Trade Preference | 36.314 | 1 | 43.62 | \*\*\* |
| Residual | 2046.245 | 2,458 |  |  |
| Total  | 2271.960 | 2,474 |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Number of Observations  | 2475 |  |  |  |

**#**Three-way interactions between treatment, empathy, and country are not significant, suggesting that the treatment by empathy interactions do not differ between countries.

**Analysis by Country**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **U.S.**  | **Partial SS** | **df** | **F** |  |
| Model | 87.761 | 16 | 6.47 | \*\*\* |
|  Trading Partner Gains/Home Country Gains (vs. Trading Partner Loses/Home Country Gains) | .188 | 1 | 0.22 |  |
|  High Empathy (vs. Low Empathy) | .234 | 1 | 0.28 |  |
|  **High Empathy**  **x Trading Partner Gains/Home Country Gains** | 9.912 | 1 | 11.69 | \*\*\* |
|  Magnitude of Trade's Impact | 56.576 | 6 | 11.12 | \*\*\* |
|  Magnitude of Impact  x Trading Partner Gains/Home Country Gains | 11.011 | 6 | 2.16 | \* |
|  Pre-Experiment Trade Preference | 8.503 | 1 | 10.03 | \*\* |
| Residual | 922.795 | 1088 |  |  |
| Total  | 1010.556 | 1104 |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Number of Observations  | 1105 |  |  |  |

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Canada**  | **Partial SS** | **df** | **F** |  |
| Model | 201.266 | 16 | 16.06 | \*\*\* |
|  Trading Partner Gains/Home Country Gains (vs. Trading Partner Loses/Home Country Gains) | 89.207 | 1 | 113.88 | \*\*\* |
|  High Empathy (vs. Low Empathy) | 7.173 | 1 | 9.16 | \*\* |
|  **High Empathy**  **x Trading Partner Gains/Home Country Gains** | 16.489 | 1 | 21.05 | \*\*\* |
|  Magnitude of Trade's Impact | 27.272 | 6 | 5.80 | \*\*\* |
|  Magnitude of Impact  x Trading Partner Gains/Home Country Gains | 13.215 | 6 | 2.81 | \* |
|  Pre-Experiment Trade Preference | 26.592 | 1 | 33.95 | \*\*\* |
| Residual | 1059.847 | 1353 |  |  |
| Total  | 1261.112 | 1369 |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Number of Observations  | 1370 |  |  |  |

*Note*. Tables present the results of an analysis of variance. \**p*<.05, \*\**p*<.01, \*\*\**p*<.001

**Table B7.** Zero-Sum Perceptions Moderate Ethnocentric Valuation

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Pooled Sample**  | **Partial SS** | **df**  | **F** |  |
| Model | 650.096 | 16 | 45.65 | \*\*\* |
|  Trading Partner Loses/Home Country Gains (vs. Trading Partner Gains/Home Country Loses) | 500.501 | 1 | 562.28 | \*\*\* |
|  Zero-Sum Perceptions (vs. No Zero-Sum Perception) | 14.626 | 1 | 16.43 | \*\*\* |
|  **Zero-Sum Perceptions** **x Trading Partner Loses/Home Country Gains#** | 64.704 | 1 | 72.69 | \*\*\* |
|  Magnitude of Trade's Impact | 24.147 | 6 | 4.52 | \*\*\* |
|  Magnitude of Impact  x Trading Partner Gains/Home Country Gains | 73.866 | 6 | 13.83 | \*\*\* |
|  Pre-Experiment Trade Preference | 8.230 | 1 | 9.25 | \*\* |
| Residual | 2481.695 | 2,788 |  |  |
| Total  | 3131.791 | 2,804 |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Number of Observations  | 2805 |  |  |  |

**#**Three-way interactions between treatment, zero-sum perceptions, and country are not significant, suggesting that the treatment by zero-sum perceptions interactions do not differ between countries.

**Analysis by Country**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **U.S.**  | **Partial SS** | **df**  | **F** |  |
| Model | 566.408 | 16 | 44.87 | \*\*\* |
|  Trading Partner Loses/Home Country Gains (vs. Trading Partner Gains/Home Country Loses) | 472.008 | 1 | 598.30 | \*\*\* |
|  Zero-Sum Perceptions (vs. No Zero-Sum Perceptions) | 3.518 | 1 | 4.46 | \* |
|  **Zero-Sum Perceptions** **x Trading Partner Loses/Home Country Gains** | 16.485 | 1 | 20.90 | \*\*\* |
|  Magnitude of Trade's Impact | 15.254 | 6 | 3.22 | \*\* |
|  Magnitude of Impact  x Trading Partner Gains/Home Country Gains | 46.313 | 6 | 9.78 | \*\*\* |
|  Pre-Experiment Trade Preference | 2.547 | 1 | 3.23 |  |
| Residual | 1158.921 | 1469 |  |  |
| Total  | 1725.330 | 1485 |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Number of Observations  | 1486 |  |  |  |

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Canada**  | **Partial SS** | **df** | **F** |  |
| Model | 148.375 | 16 | 9.64 | \*\*\* |
|  Trading Partner Loses/Home Country Gains (vs. Trading Partner Gains/Home Country Loses) | 76.832 | 1 | 79.90 | \*\*\* |
|  Zero-Sum Perceptions (vs. No Zero-Sum Perceptions) | 12.390 | 1 | 12.89 | \*\*\* |
|  **Zero-Sum Perceptions** **x Trading Partner Loses/Home Country Gains** | 18.384 | 1 | 19.12 | \*\*\* |
|  Magnitude of Trade's Impact | 12.143 | 6 | 2.10 |  |
|  Magnitude of Impact  x Trading Partner Gains/Home Country Gains | 34.209 | 6 | 5.93 | \*\*\* |
|  Pre-Experiment Trade Preference | 5.118 | 1 | 5.32 | \* |
| Residual | 1251.926 | 1302 |  |  |
| Total  | 1400.302 | 1318 |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Number of Observations  | 1319 |  |  |  |

*Note*. Tables present the results of an analysis of variance. \**p*<.05, \*\**p*<.01, \*\*\**p*<.001

**Table B8.** Zero-Sum Perceptions Moderate Moral Exclusion

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Pooled Sample**  | **Partial SS** | **df** | **F** |  |
| Model | 217.142 | 16 | 16.25 | \*\*\* |
|  Trading Partner Gains/Home Country Gains (vs. Trading Partner Loses/Home Country Gains) | 25.072 | 1 | 30.02 | \*\*\* |
|  Zero-Sum Perceptions (vs. No Zero-Sum Perceptions) | 0.181 | 1 | 0.22 |  |
|  **Zero-Sum Perceptions** **x Trading Partner Gains/Home Country Gains#** | 26.457 | 1 | 31.67 | \*\*\* |
|  Magnitude of Trade's Impact | 95.509 | 6 | 19.06 | \*\*\* |
|  Magnitude of Impact  x Trading Partner Gains/Home Country Gains | 12.881 | 6 | 2.57 | \* |
|  Pre-Experiment Trade Preference | 32.214 | 1 | 38.57 | \*\*\* |
| Residual | 2381.402 | 2,851 |  |  |
| Total  | 2598.544 | 2,867 |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Number of Observations  | 2868 |  |  |  |

**#**Three-way interactions between treatment, zero-sum perceptions, and country are not significant, suggesting that the treatment by zero-sum perceptions interactions do not differ between countries.

**Analysis by Country**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **U.S.**  | **Partial SS** | **df** | **F** |  |
| Model | 102.123 | 16 | 7.65 | \*\*\* |
|  Trading Partner Gains/Home Country Gains (vs. Trading Partner Loses/Home Country Gains) | .586 | 1 | 0.70 |  |
|  Zero-Sum Perceptions (vs. No Zero-Sum Perceptions) | .392 | 1 | 0.47 |  |
|  **Zero-Sum Perceptions** **x Trading Partner Gains/Home Country Gains** | 8.864 | 1 | 10.62 | \*\* |
|  Magnitude of Trade's Impact | 71.650 | 6 | 14.31 | \*\*\* |
|  Magnitude of Impact  x Trading Partner Gains/Home Country Gains | 8.245 | 6 | 1.65 |  |
|  Pre-Experiment Trade Preference | 9.659 | 1 | 11.57 | \*\*\* |
| Residual | 1241.185 | 1487 |  |  |
| Total  | 1343.308 | 1503 |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Number of Observations  | 1504 |  |  |  |

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Canada**  | **Partial SS** | **df** | **F** |  |
| Model | 176.092 | 16 | 13.74 | \*\*\* |
|  Trading Partner Gains/Home Country Gains (vs. Trading Partner Loses/Home Country Gains) | 62.872 | 1 | 78.48 | \*\*\* |
|  Zero-Sum Perceptions (vs. No Zero-Sum Perceptions) | 0.199 | 1 | 0.25 |  |
|  **Zero-Sum Perceptions** **x Trading Partner Gains/Home Country Gains** | 2.824 | 1 | 3.52 |  |
|  Magnitude of Trade's Impact | 28.018 | 6 | 5.83 | \*\*\* |
|  Magnitude of Impact  x Trading Partner Gains/Home Country Gains | 13.104 | 6 | 2.73 | \* |
|  Pre-Experiment Trade Preference | 23.451 | 1 | 29.27 | \*\*\* |
| Residual | 1079.084 | 1347 |  |  |
| Total  | 1255.175 | 1363 |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Number of Observations  | 1364 |  |  |  |

*Note*. Tables present the results of an analysis of variance. \**p*<.05, \*\**p*<.01, \*\*\**p*<.001

**Appendix C. Manipulation Checks**

**Figure C1.** Manipulation Checks for Perception of U.S. Gain and Trading Partner Gain, by Experimental Conditions 1 and 2 in Figure 2

**Figure C2.** Manipulation Checks for Perception of Canada Gain and Trading Partner Gain, by Experimental Conditions 1 and 2 in Figure 2

**Figure C3.** Manipulation Checks for Perception of Trading Partner Gain in US and Canadian Experiments, by Experimental Conditions 2 and 3 in Figure 2

*Note.* Columns represent mean perception of extent to which a country is perceived to gain more than the other on 0-2 scale where 0=does not gain more, 1=gains a little more, and 2=gains a lot more. Mean values were significantly different by experimental condition in the direction anticipated for all manipulation check comparisons in Figures C1, C2 and C3 above (p<.001).

**Appendix D. Experimental Conditions**

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*Note.* In each cell, the number before the slash corresponds to the number of jobs gained or lost by the trading partner. The number after the slash corresponds to the number of jobs gained or lost by the home country on each row.

**Appendix E. Summary Statistics for Key Variables**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | US Sample | Canada Sample |
|  | *M* (*SD*) | *M* (*SD*) |
| Post-treatment trade support (1-4 scale) | 2.39 (1.05) | 2.55 (1.03) |
| Social dominance orientation (0-1) | 0.56 (0.50) | 0.48 (0.50) |
| Empathy (0-1) | 0.53 (0.50) | 0.54 (0.50) |
| Zero sum perception (0-1) | 0.48 (0.50) | 0.27 (0.44) |
| Pre-treatment trade support | 2.69 (0.64) | 3.01 (0.56) |

**Appendix F.** Demographic Profiles of Study Samples Compared to the Population Estimates

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|   | United States, 2013 | Canada, 2016 |
|  | StudySample | U.S. Adults | Study Sample | CanadianAdults |
| **Gender** |  |  |  |  |
|  Male | 52.0% | 48.1% | 48.2% | 49.2% |
|  Female | 48.0 | 51.9 | 51.8 | 50.8 |
| **Age** |  |  |  |  |
|  18-24 | 8.5 | 12.7 | 4.7 | 11.4 |
|  25-34 | 14.1 | 17.5 | 16.4 | 17.2 |
|  35-44 | 15.6 | 16.8 | 19.5 | 16.4 |
|  45-54 | 17.7 | 18.4 | 23.4 | 17.5 |
|  55-64 | 22.5 | 16.3 | 17.0 | 16.9 |
|  65+ | 21.6 | 18.3 | 19.2 | 20.5 |
| **Race / Ethnicity** |  |  |  |  |
|  White, Non-Hispanic | 74.7 | 66.0 |  |  |
|  Black or African American, Non-Hispanic | 8.6 | 11.6 |  |  |
|  Other, Non-Hispanic  | 3.2 | 6.3 |  |  |
|  Two or more races, Non-Hispanic | 3.6 | 1.3 |  |  |
|  Hispanic | 10.0 | 15.0 |  |  |
| **Educational Attainment** |  |  |  |  |
|  No high school diploma | 8.9 | 12.6 | 6.0 | 11.5 |
|  High school or equivalent | 29.3 | 29.6 | 20.6 | 23.7 |
|  Some college, less than 4-yr degree | 29.4 | 28.9 | 42.3 | 36.3 |
|  Bachelor's degree or higher | 32.4 | 28.9 | 31.2 | 28.5 |
| **Household Income** |  |  |  |  |
|  Less than $10,000 | 4.9 | 5.2 |  |  |
|  $10,000 to $24,999 | 12.6 | 13.3 |  |  |
|  $25,000 to $49,999 | 23.0 | 22.7 |  |  |
|  $50,000 to $74,999 | 19.3 | 18.4 |  |  |
|  $75,000 to $99,999 | 14.3 | 13.4 |  |  |
|  $100,000 and over | 25.9 | 27.1 |  |  |
| **Family Income**  |  |  |  |  |
|  Less than $10,000 |  |  | 3.0 | 1.7 |
|  $10,000 to $24,999 |  |  | 13.3 | 4.7 |
|  $25,000 to $49,999 |  |  | 28.1 | 18.0 |
|  $50,000 to $79,999 |  |  | 26.6 | 22.4 |
|  $80,000 to $99,999 |  |  | 12.5 | 13.1 |
|  $100,000 and over |  |  | 16.6 | 40.2 |

*Note*. U.S. population estimates are from the 2013 Current Population Survey (CPS), Annual Social and Economic Supplement. Canada’s population estimates are from the Statistics Canada.

Percentages for each demographic variable may not sum to 100 percent du e to rounding errors.

**Appendix G. Gender Differences in Trade Preferences**

**United States**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Ethnocentric Valuation (Who Wins vs. Loses)  |  | *M* (*S.E.*) |
|  | Partner Country Gains / Home Country Loses | Male | 1.609 (0.044) |
|  | Female | 1.685 (0.049) |
|  | Partner Country Loses / Home Country Gains | Male | 2.855 (0.044) |
|  | Female | 2.657 (0.050) |
| Moral Exclusion (Whether Trading Partner Also Wins)  |  |  |
|  | Partner Country Loses / Home Country Gains | Male | 2.851 (0.045) |
|  | Female | 2.680 (0.051) |
|  | Partner Country Gains / Home Country Gains | Male | 2.722 (0.047) |
|  | Female | 2.752 (0.047) |

*Note.* Numbers in cell are the predicted values of trade support adjusted for pre-treatment trade preferences. The gender by treatment interactions are statistically significant for ethnocentric valuation and (*p*<.01) and moral exclusion (*p*<.05), indicating that the experimental treatments work differently for men and women.

**Canada**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Ethnocentric Valuation (Who Wins vs. Loses)  |  | *M* (*S.E.*) |
|  | Partner Country Gains / Home Country Loses | Male | 2.112 (0.060) |
|  | Female | 2.067 (0.055) |
|  | Partner Country Loses / Home Country Gains | Male | 2.613 (0.053) |
|  | Female | 2.390 (0.053) |
| Moral Exclusion (Whether Trading Partner Also Wins)  |  |  |
|  | Partner Country Loses / Home Country Gains | Male | 2.613 (0.048) |
|  | Female | 2.397 (0.048) |
|  | Partner Country Gains / Home Country Gains | Male | 3.058 (0.050) |
|  | Female | 3.034 (0.049) |

*Note.* Numbers in cell are the predicted values of trade support adjusted for pre-treatment trade preferences. The gender by treatment interactions are statistically significant for moral exclusion (*p*<.05), indicating that the experimental treatments work differently for men and women.

**Appendix H. Experimental Analysis Using Sampling Weights**

Regression analysis was used to compare the unweighted and weighted results because Stata does not allow the use of sampling weights for ANOVA.

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Ethnocentric Valuation (H1) | Moral Exclusion(H2) |
| U.S. (vs. Canada) | -0.279\*\*\* | 0.357\*\*\* |
|  | (0.069) | (0.067) |
| Treatment |  |  |
|  Who Wins vs. Loses  | -0.103 |  |
|  | (0.135) |  |
|  Whether Trading Partner Also Wins |  | 0.737\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.128) |
| **Treatment x US**  | **0.622\*\*\*** | **-0.522\*\*\*** |
|  | **(0.094)** | **(0.083)** |
| Pre-Experiment Trade Preference | 0.112\*\* | 0.167\*\*\* |
|  | (0.043) | (0.040) |
| Intercept | 1.930\*\*\* | 1.666\*\*\* |
|  | (0.156) | (0.161) |
| Magnitude of Trade’s Impact | Yes | Yes |
| Magnitude x Treatment  | Yes | Yes |
| *N* | 2810 | 2874 |

*Note*. Standard errors in parentheses. \**p*< 0.05, \*\**p*< 0.01, \*\*\**p*< 0.001

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Ethnocentric Valuation by SDO (H3) | Moral Exclusion by SDO (H4) |
| Treatment |  |  |
|  Who Wins vs. Loses  | -0.023 |  |
|  | (0.137) |  |
|  Whether Trading Partner Also Wins |  | 0.835\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.132) |
| High SDO (vs. Low SDO) | 0.102 |  |
|  | (0.070) |  |
| **Treatment x SDO** | **0.284\*\*** | **-0.482\*\*\*** |
|  | **(0.099)** | **(0.090)** |
| Pre-Experiment Trade Preference | 0.161\*\*\* | 0.190\*\*\* |
|  | (0.042) | (0.040) |
| Intercept | 1.579\*\*\* | 1.473\*\*\* |
|  | (0.158) | (0.157) |
| Magnitude of Trade’s Impact | Yes | Yes |
| Magnitude x Treatment  | Yes | Yes |
| *N* | 2423 | 2475 |

*Note*. Standard errors in parentheses. \**p*< 0.05, \*\**p*< 0.01, \*\*\**p*< 0.001

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Ethnocentric Valuation by Empathy (H5) | Moral Exclusion by Empathy (H6) |
| Treatment |  |  |
|  Who Wins vs. Loses | 0.273 |  |
|  | (0.140) |  |
|  Whether Trading Partner Also Wins |  | 0.343\* |
|  |  | (0.134) |
| High Empathy (vs. Low Empathy) | -0.088 | -0.365\*\*\* |
|  | (0.071) | (0.072) |
| **Treatment x Empathy** | **-0.275\*\*** | **0.475\*\*\*** |
|  | **(0.101)** | **(0.091)** |
| Pre-Experiment Trade Preference | 0.147\*\*\* | 0.183\*\*\* |
|  | (0.043) | (0.040) |
| Intercept | 1.718\*\*\* | 1.889\*\*\* |
|  | (0.158) | (0.160) |
| Magnitude of Trade’s Impact | Yes | Yes |
| Magnitude x Treatment  | Yes | Yes |
| *N* | 2423 | 2475 |

*Note*. Standard errors in parentheses. \**p*< 0.05, \*\**p*< 0.01, \*\*\**p*< 0.001

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Ethnocentric Valuation by Zero-Sum Perceptions (H7) | Moral Exclusionby Zero-Sum Perceptions (H8) |
| Treatment |  |  |
|  Who Wins vs. Loses  | 0.007 |  |
|  | (0.132) |  |
|  Whether Trading Partner Also Wins |  | 0.588\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.124) |
| Zero-Sum Perceptions | -0.479\*\*\* | 0.166\* |
|  | (0.067) | (0.071) |
| **Treatment x Zero-Sum Perceptions** | **0.632\*\*\*** | **-0.373\*\*\*** |
|  | **(0.095)** | **(0.088)** |
| Pre-Experiment Trade Preference | 0.074 | 0.145\*\*\* |
|  | (0.043) | (0.039) |
| Intercept | 2.049\*\*\* | 1.854\*\*\* |
|  | (0.156) | (0.155) |
| Magnitude of Trade’s Impact | Yes | Yes |
| Magnitude x Treatment  | Yes | Yes |
| *N* | 2805 | 2868 |

*Note*. Standard errors in parentheses. \**p*< 0.05, \*\**p*< 0.01, \*\*\**p*< 0.001