APPENDIX

Appendix A: Validation of the Decision to Run for Office Measure, Among Lawyer-Donors

Due to the various data merges that were necessary to analyze the decision to run for state or federal office with the lawyer-donor sample, we conducted a series of additional searches to validate our measure. These searches were motivated by our concerns that 1) those who were coded *in our dataset* as non-candidates ("0") did, in fact, run for office, and 2) lawyers who ran for office and did, in fact, donate were not included in the lawyer-donor dataset and thus would *not be in our dataset but should have been*. We approached these concerns in two main ways. First, we drew a random sample of 1,000 lawyer-donors in our dataset who were coded as non-candidates and searched online for whether they had run for state or federal office from 2000 to 2016 using the same definition as our measure of a candidate in the analysis. Second, we drew a random sample of 100 state-level and 100 federal-level candidates from the DIME dataset. We entered their names in the FEC donor look-up tab to see whether they had ever donated to a candidate and compared this to whether or not they had a bonicacid identifier (i.e., a Bonica Contribution Identification Number indicating a contribution record) in the DIME dataset. After these efforts, we are more confident in our measure, and we are also more knowledgeable about its limitations.

With respect to the online search of the 1,000 non-candidates, we found that 47 of the 1,000 ran for elected office at some level in the 2000-2016 period. Of the 47, 31 ran for judicial positions (23 men and 8 women), 8 ran for local office (6 men and 2 women), 5 ran for the state legislature (4 men and 1 woman), 2 ran for the U.S. House (2 men and 0 women), and 1 ran for the U.S. Senate (1 man and 0 women). We had excluded judicial candidates from the analyses in the article, and we knew we would miss local offices because the DIME data does not include the vast majority of local offices. If anything, female lawyer-donors are more likely to run than male lawyer-donors when local offices and offices that do not require a similar level of fundraising are included, which conforms to the results in Kanthak and Woon (2015). We did not know how many state legislative and congressional candidates we would miss, but we do not think the 8 additional candidates we discovered here are especially problematic. And more to the point, we again see the dramatic disparity in the number of male and female lawyer-donors in this sample of 1,000 lawyer-donors (801 are men and 199 are women), which results in a much larger number of male runners here as well (36 men and 11 women).

Our second effort stemmed from the lessons we learned above. For the eight state legislative and congressional candidates who were not coded as candidates, the reason was because they did not have a bonicacid in the DIME candidate dataset so they did not merge with the bonicacid in the lawyer-donor dataset. We thus wanted to know how widespread it was that candidates who did, in fact, donate did not have bonicacids in the DIME candidate dataset. To be clear, Bonica has stated that the bonicacids are not comprehensive so this is not a shortcoming of the dataset. As noted above, we searched the names of 100 state-level candidates and 100 federal-level candidates in the FEC donor look-up tab. Of course, these samples include lawyer-donors and non-lawyer donors; we simply wanted to see how many candidates who were donors did not have bonicacids so we could think more seriously about how it might have affected our merge of lawyer-donors. Again, our concern was that individuals would be in the FEC donor database but did not have a bonicacid in the DIME dataset, because in the case of the 8 state

legislative and congressional candidates who did not merge, they were in the FEC donor database (as it is a sample of lawyer-donors) but did not have a bonicacid in the DIME dataset.

Of the 100 state-level candidates, 41 had bonicacids (12 women and 29 men). Of the 59 state-level candidates without a bonicacid, we found the names of 31 of these in the FEC donor look-up tab (8 women and 23 men). Of the 100 federal-level candidates, 39 had bonicacids (5 women and 34 men). Of the remaining 61 federal-level candidates without a bonicacid, we found the names of 35 in the FEC donor look-up tab (6 women and 29 men). These individuals did not have a bonicacid despite donating to a campaign, so they did not merge with the DIME candidate dataset. As a result, we know we are undercounting the number of lawyer-donors that ran for office. However, the candidates who do not have a bonicacid are not systematically different from the candidates who have a bonicacid with respect to their gender makeup, so we do not expect to be missing disproportionately more men or women based on our coding scheme.

The pool of lawyer-donors is especially critical for our argument about the huge gender disparity in the potential candidate pool, and we also used it to test the observable implication that the number of female candidates should increase as the number of women in the lawyer-donor pool increases. Yet we are aware of the limitations given our additional efforts to validate the decision to run for office. We have likely undercounted the number of male and female candidates, but we have little reason to believe that we undercounted men and women differently. Furthermore, the gender disparities that we reported here are very similar to those in the analysis. More generally, the goal of this article is to more seriously consider the dramatic overrepresentation of men across eligibility pools, and all of our samples and analyses provide overwhelming evidence of this point.

Appendix B: The Relationship Between Gender and the Decision to Run for Office, Across Samples

Data and Variables

Here we more fully examine the relationships in Table 1 after we account for a variety of electoral variables. Unlike most studies, the dependent variable in all models is the actual decision to run for office. In the sample of state legislators, we focus on the decision to run for the House from 2000 to 2010. In the sample of those who have been named as potential Senate candidates in newspapers, we focus on the decision to run for the Senate from 1994 to 2010. The lawyer-donor pool includes one observation per individual, and the dependent variable is whether they ran for office at the state or federal level from 2000 to 2016. The main independent variable is the sex of the potential candidate. A crucial extension of our work is that after we examine patterns of candidate emergence, we explore the interplay between rates of entry and the gender composition of the pool and consider the implications for representation.

Across models, we account for party, ideology, and experience. We use Shor and McCarty's (2011) scores to measure the ideology of state legislators, and we use Bonica's (2014) CFscores to measure the ideology of the potential Senate candidates and the lawyer-donors.[1] We expect that ideological moderates are less likely to run for office at the federal level, but not necessarily at the state level. To measure state legislator experience, we use the number of terms they served in office; for the Senate pool, we coded whether they previously held office (Jacobson 1989); and for the lawyer-donors, we measure career experience as the number of years since they were admitted to the bar.

Fewer electoral variables are included in the lawyer-donor models because the data are pooled over time. The year of the donation is not available across individuals so we do not know, for example, whether they were donors before or after a seat was open. We are thus interested in whether the lawyer-donors ran for office at all during this period rather than whether they ran in a given year.[2] However, in the non-lawyer-donor analyses, we do account for seat type and the size of the potential candidate pool as well as this value squared.[3] We use Cook's Partisan Voter Index (PVI) to measure the partisan tilt of the district or state, with higher values indicating same party favorability. We include district demographics in light of recent findings that women are more selective in where they run (Elder 2008; Lazarus and Steigerwalt 2018; Ondercin 2019). We use Palmer and Simon's (2012) measure of women-friendly congressional districts to account for districts with demographic profiles that are more favorable to the election of women, namely more urban, diverse, and wealthier districts.[4] For the analyses of potential Senate

[1] Including this variable reduces the number of observations as not all potential candidates have CFscores. The models without ideology are provided in Appendix C.

[2] Other pools that are based on professional attributes also do not account for electoral factors.

[3] We considered whether the number of potential women candidates in the pool was related to the entry of female candidates, but the interaction was not significant. The number of potential female candidates was highly correlated with all potential candidates so we did not include it in the models.

[4] As noted in the article, we interacted women-friendly district with gender to see if women were more likely to run in these districts, but the interaction is insignificant across models (see Appendix C). However, women do make up a greater proportion of the samples in women-friendly districts. For example, women comprise 29 percent of the sample of state legislators in more women-friendly districts (measured as the median and above), versus 17 percent

candidates, we collected state-level sociodemographic measures of percent urban, percent college educated, percent African American, and median household income from U.S. Census data (see Appendix C). In all models, we include state fixed effects to account for state-level factors that influence candidate entry like state legislative term limits and legislative professionalism, and the non-lawyer-donor models also include year fixed effects.

Finally, we add other variables in the lawyer-donor models that likely shape patterns of candidate entry in this sample. We include measures of whether the individual is employed by the government or as a prosecutor or district attorney, as these career paths likely attract more lawyers who are interested in public service. We include a variable for whether they graduated from a "Top 14" law school or from a law school that was not ranked in the top 100. It is unclear whether the type of law school is related to running for office, but this disparity would contribute to class inequalities in legislative institutions (Carnes 2018).

The Decision to Run for Office

Our first question is whether women in these pipelines are less likely to run for office than men. The results for the state legislators and potential Senate candidates named in newspapers are presented in Columns 1 and 2 in Table B1, respectively. The results for the lawyer-donors are presented in Columns 3 through 5. The dependent variable in Column 3 is whether they ran at the state or federal level, and the dependent variables in Columns 4 and 5 are whether they ran for state or federal office, respectively.

Among state legislators and those named in newspapers, the relationship between gender and the decision to run for office is not statistically significant in the full models.[5] Yet as discussed above, these data may obscure disparities that would appear in broader pools of potential candidates. Indeed, we see in the lawyer-donor models that women are less likely to run for office than their male counterparts, which is consistent with previous research. The predicted probability of running for either state or federal office is 0.35 percent for women and 0.51 percent for men.[6] The predicted probability of running for state-level office is 0.20 percent for women and 0.37 percent for men, and the predicted probability of running for federal-level office is 0.12 percent for men and 0.07 percent for women. All of these gender disparities are statistically significant. Still, these on-average differences tell us little about what these values are a percentage of, which is the primary focus of our article.

In terms of the control variables, moderates are less likely to run for the House and Senate than conservative Republicans and liberal Democrats. In the lawyer-donor sample, moderates are more likely to run for state-level office, but they too are less likely to run for

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in less women-friendly districts. As a result, the pool of likely women candidates is much larger, which lends additional support to the argument that the gender makeup of the eligibility pool plays a key role in patterns of women's representation.

[5] We ran separate models for experienced and inexperienced likely Senate candidates, and the results are the same. We also ran the models by party and interacted gender with each variable to explore whether the context mattered in different ways for women and men and whether women enter more strategically than men (i.e., Fulton et al. 2006; Lazarus and Steigerwalt 2018; Ondercin 2019; Palmer and Simon 2012). None of the interactions between gender and the electoral context are statistically significant (open seat, partisan favorability, and size of the candidate pool) (see Appendix C).

[6] All other variables are set at their mean or mode.

federal office, which suggests that institutional contexts shape patterns of candidate entry (Aldrich and Thomsen 2017). State legislators who have served more terms in office are more likely to run, but potential Senate candidates who have held office previously and lawyer-donors with more career experience are less likely to do so. Lawyer-donors are also less likely to run in women-friendly districts. The likelihood of running decreases as the size of the potential candidate pool increases, but this relationship is non-linear as indicated by the positive coefficient on the squared term. State legislators are more likely to run when the seat is open, and Republicans are more likely to run for office than Democrats in four of the five models. Lawyer-donors who work for the government and those who graduated from a "Top 14" law school are also more likely to seek office. Conversely, those who graduated from law schools that are not ranked in the top 100 are less likely to run for federal office, which likely has implications for the class makeup of Congress (Carnes 2018).

Table B1: The Decision to Run for Office Across State Legislators, Potential Senate Candidates, and Lawyer-Donors

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Sample:	State Legislators	Named in Papers	Lawyer-Donors	Lawyer-Donors	Lawyer-Donors
Office Sought:	U.S. House	U.S. Senate	State or Federal	State	Federal
Woman	-0.07	-0.22	-0.38**	-0.60**	-0.53**
	(0.12)	(0.15)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.13)
Moderate	-0.42**	-0.70**	0.04	0.12*	-0.46**
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.10)
Experience	0.31**	-1.51**	-0.02**	-0.02**	-0.01**
	(0.04)	(0.12)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Republican	0.56**	-0.12	0.25**	0.24**	0.37**
	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.09)
Women-Friendly District	0.55	—	-3.52**	-4.28**	-3.06**
	(0.84)		(0.33)	(0.40)	(0.63)
Open Seat	2.58**	0.19			
	(0.11)	(0.13)			
Same Party Advantage (PVI)	-0.01	-0.01			
	(0.01)	(0.01)			
Size of Potential Candidate Pool	-0.10**	-0.16**			
	(0.02)	(0.03)			
Size of Candidate Pool Squared	0.00**	0.00**			
	(0.00)	(0.00)			
Top 14 Law School			0.17*	0.18*	0.40**
			(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.13)
Not Top 100 Law School			0.01	0.06	-0.26*
			(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.11)
Government Lawyer			0.42**	0.45**	0.85**
			(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.21)
Prosecutor or District Attorney			-0.03	-0.08	0.16
			(0.16)	(0.19)	(0.32)
Constant	-5.57**	-1.37	-4.23**	-4.32**	-6.31**
	(0.63)	(3.49)	(0.18)	(0.21)	(0.41)
Observations	30,835	2,020	356,588	356,588	356,588

Note: Entries are logistic regression coefficients with standard errors clustered by individual in parentheses. The dependent variable is coded 1 if the individual ran for the specified office and 0 if not. Models 1-2 include state and year fixed effects, and Models 3-5 include state fixed effects. Model 2 includes the women-friendly sociodemographic variables identified above but they are not shown here (see Table C6). **p<0.01, *p<0.05, †p<0.10

Appendix C: Splitting the Samples by Party, Adding Interaction Terms, and Omitting Ideology

Table C1: The Decision to Run for Office Across Potential Candidates (Republicans)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Sample:	State Legislators	Named in Papers	Lawyer-Donors	Lawyer-Donors	Lawyer-Donors
Office Sought:	U.S. House	U.S. Senate	State or Federal	State	Federal
Woman	-0.04	-0.29	-0.40**	-0.67**	-0.84**
	(0.18)	(0.24)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.26)
Moderate	-1.08**	-0.79**	-0.55**	-0.44**	-0.93**
	(0.21)	(0.28)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.13)
Experience	0.34**	-1.32**	-0.02**	-0.03**	-0.02**
	(0.05)	(0.17)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Women-Friendly District	2.28	—	-3.63**	-4.48**	-1.29
	(1.88)		(0.55)	(0.66)	(0.95)
Open Seat	2.56**	0.18			
	(0.14)	(0.21)			
Same Party Advantage (PVI)	-0.00	-0.00			
	(0.01)	(0.04)			
Size of Potential Candidate Pool	-0.08**	-0.08†			
	(0.03)	(0.05)			
Size of Candidate Pool Squared	0.00	0.00			
	(0.00)	(0.00)			
Top 14 Law School			0.31**	0.31*	0.46*
			(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.20)
Not Top 100 Law School			0.09	0.14 †	-0.17
			(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.15)
Government Lawyer			0.33	0.39 †	0.81*
			(0.21)	(0.24)	(0.36)
Prosecutor or District Attorney			-0.31	-0.83*	0.57
			(0.28)	(0.41)	(0.42)
Constant	-5.08**	-3.13	-4.43**	-4.55**	-6.12**
	(0.75)	(5.93)	(0.28)	(0.33)	(0.49)
Observations	13,913	1,061	116,764	116,764	115,848
Log-Likelihood	-1052.89	-605.50	-5418.00	-4302.34	-1634.11

Note: Entries are logistic regression coefficients with standard errors clustered by individual in parentheses. The dependent variable is coded 1 if the individual ran for the specified office and 0 if not. Models 1-2 include state and year fixed effects, and Models 3-5 include state fixed effects. Model 2 includes the women-friendly sociodemographic variables identified above but they are not shown here (see Table C6). **p<0.01, *p<0.05, †p<0.10.

Table C2: The Decision to Run for Office Across Potential Candidates (Democrats)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Sample:	State Legislators	Named in Papers	Lawyer-Donors	Lawyer-Donors	Lawyer-Donors
Office Sought:	U.S. House	U.S. Senate	State or Federal	State	Federal
Woman	-0.05	-0.14	-0.32**	-0.53**	-0.37*
	(0.17)	(0.21)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.15)
Moderate	0.13	-0.78**	0.29**	0.37**	-0.31*
	(0.24)	(0.18)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.14)
Experience	0.30**	-1.83**	-0.01**	-0.02**	-0.01
	(0.06)	(0.18)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Women-Friendly District	0.90	—	-3.25**	-3.92**	-4.10**
	(1.74)		(0.42)	(0.51)	(0.84)
Open Seat	2.64**	0.27			
	(0.18)	(0.24)			
Same Party Advantage (PVI)	-0.00	0.01			
	(0.01)	(0.04)			
Size of Potential Candidate Pool	-0.12**	-0.50**			
	(0.04)	(0.08)			
Size of Candidate Pool Squared	0.00**	0.02**			
	(0.00)	(0.00)			
Top 14 Law School			0.11	0.12	0.39*
			(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.16)
Not Top 100 Law School			-0.06	-0.02	-0.36*
			(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.14)
Government Lawyer			0.48**	0.50**	0.84**
			(0.15)	(0.17)	(0.27)
Prosecutor or District Attorney			0.13	0.24	-0.21
			(0.19)	(0.21)	(0.51)
Constant	-4.34**	4.28	-4.22**	-4.27**	-6.73**
	(0.75)	(6.65)	(0.24)	(0.28)	(0.73)
Observations	15,043	921	239,824	239,824	232,448

Note: Entries are logistic regression coefficients with standard errors clustered by individual in parentheses. The dependent variable is coded 1 if the individual ran for the specified office and 0 if not. Models 1-2 include state and year fixed effects, and Models 3-5 include state fixed effects. Model 2 includes the women-friendly sociodemographic variables identified above but they are not shown here (see Table C6). **p<0.01, *p<0.05, †p<0.10.

Table C3: The Decision to Run for Office Among State Legislators and Potential Senate Candidates (With Interactions)

	(1)	(2)
Sample:	State Legislators	Named in Papers
Office Sought:	U.S. House	U.S. Senate
Woman	0.45	2.12
	(0.47)	(1.49)
Moderate	-0.48**	-0.79**
	(0.16)	(0.14)
Woman x Moderate	0.21	0.41†
	(0.29)	(0.25)
Experience	0.31**	-1.53**
	(0.04)	(0.12)
Woman x Experience	-0.01	0.00
	(0.06)	(0.33)
Republican	0.56**	-0.13
	(0.13)	(0.12)
Woman x Republican	-0.05	-0.05
	(0.27)	(0.29)
Women-Friendly District	0.45	—
	(0.96)	
Woman x Women-Friendly District	0.61	—
	(1.62)	
Open Seat	2.55**	0.24†
	(0.12)	(0.14)
Woman x Open Seat	0.14	-0.45
	(0.25)	(0.31)
Same Party Advantage (PVI)	-0.00	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Woman x Same Party Advantage (PVI)	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.02)
Size of Potential Candidate Pool	-0.10**	-0.16**
	(0.02)	(0.03)
Woman x Size of Candidate Pool	-0.03	0.08
	(0.02)	(0.08)
Size of Candidate Pool Squared	0.00**	0.00**
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Woman x Size of Pool Squared	0.00	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	-5.68**	-1.51
	(0.64)	(3.52)
Observations	30,835	2,020

Note: Entries are logistic regression coefficients with standard errors clustered by individual in parentheses. The dependent variable is coded 1 if the potential candidate ran for the U.S. House or Senate and 0 if not. The models include state and year fixed effects. Model 2 includes the women-friendly sociodemographic variables identified above but they are not shown here (see Table C6). **p<0.01, *p<0.05, †p<0.10.

Table C4: The Decision to Run for Office Among Lawyer-Donors (With Interactions)

	(3)	(4)	(5)
Sample:	Lawyer-Donors	Lawyer-Donors	Lawyer-Donors
Office Sought:	State or Federal	State	Federal
Woman	-1.32**	-1.21**	-1.78**
	(0.22)	(0.27)	(0.51)
Moderate	-0.00	0.09	-0.43**
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.11)
Woman x Moderate	0.30*	0.24	-0.15
	(0.13)	(0.15)	(0.28)
Experience	-0.02**	-0.03**	-0.02**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Woman x Experience	0.04**	0.03**	0.04**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Republican	0.25**	0.25**	0.41**
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.10)
Woman x Republican	-0.03	-0.13	-0.33
	(0.13)	(0.16)	(0.31)
Women-Friendly District	-3.64**	-4.29**	-3.24**
	(0.35)	(0.42)	(0.67)
Woman x Women-Friendly District	0.63	0.02	1.08
	(0.65)	(0.84)	(1.24)
Top 14 Law School	0.24**	0.22**	0.43**
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.13)
Woman x Top 14 Law School	-0.49*	-0.31	-0.15
	(0.21)	(0.26)	(0.37)
Not Top 100 Law School	-0.01	0.04	-0.30**
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.11)
Woman x Not Top 100 Law School	0.13	0.14	0.26
	(0.12)	(0.15)	(0.28)
Government Lawyer	0.35*	0.26	0.87**
	(0.15)	(0.17)	(0.24)
Woman x Government Lawyer	0.17	0.62*	-0.17
	(0.27)	(0.30)	(0.52)
Prosecutor or District Attorney	0.06	0.00	0.18
	(0.17)	(0.20)	(0.36)
Woman x Prosecutor or DA	-0.48	-0.53	-0.14
	(0.42)	(0.54)	(0.80)
Constant	-4.11**	-4.26**	-6.17**
	(0.18)	(0.22)	(0.41)
Observations	356,588	356,588	356,588

Note: Entries are logistic regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is coded 1 if the lawyer-donor ran for federal or state office, state office, or federal office, respectively, and 0 if not. The models include state fixed effects. **p<0.01, *p<0.05, †p<0.10.

Table C5: The Decision to Run for Office Across Potential Candidates (Without Ideology)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Sample:	State Legislators	Named in Papers	Lawyer-Donors	Lawyer-Donors	Lawyer-Donors
Office Sought:	U.S. House	U.S. Senate	State or Federal	State	Federal
Woman	-0.07	-0.25†	-0.42**	-0.64**	-0.54**
	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.13)
Experience	0.29**	-1.64**	-0.02**	-0.02**	-0.01**
	(0.04)	(0.09)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Republican	0.53**	0.04	0.26**	0.25**	0.40**
	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.09)
Women-Friendly District	0.84	—	-3.54**	-4.29**	-2.95**
	(0.84)		(0.33)	(0.39)	(0.63)
Open Seat	2.56**	0.23*			
	(0.11)	(0.11)			
Same Party Advantage (PVI)	0.00	0.01†			
	(0.00)	(0.01)			
Size of Potential Candidate Pool	-0.10**	-0.23**			
	(0.02)	(0.03)			
Size of Candidate Pool Squared	0.00**	0.01**			
	(0.00)	(0.00)			
Top 14 Law School			0.17*	0.16*	0.44**
			(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.12)
Not Top 100 Law School			0.03	0.08	-0.28**
			(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.11)
Government Lawyer			0.43**	0.46**	0.91**
			(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.21)
Prosecutor or District Attorney			0.05	0.00	0.16
			(0.15)	(0.18)	(0.32)
Constant	-5.34**	-1.33	-4.18**	-4.38**	-6.03**
	(0.63)	(2.85)	(0.17)	(0.21)	(0.40)
Observations	30,982	2,990	363,881	363,881	363,881

Note: Entries are logistic regression coefficients with standard errors clustered by individual in parentheses. The dependent variable is coded 1 if the individual ran for the specified office and 0 if not. Models 1-2 include state and year fixed effects, and Models 3-5 include state fixed effects. Model 2 includes the women-friendly sociodemographic variables identified above but they are not shown here (see Table C6). **p<0.01, *p<0.05, †p<0.10.

Table C6: Coefficients on Women-Friendly Variables Not Presented in Text (Potential Senate Candidates)

	(1) All	(2) Republicans	(3) Democrats	(4) With Interactions	(5) Without Ideology
Table in Appendix:	Table B1	Table C1	Table C2	Table C3	Table C5
Model in Table:	Model 2	Model 2	Model 2	Model 2	Model 2
Median Household Income	-0.91	-1.30	-4.90	-0.54	0.07
	(1.96)	(2.88)	(3.77)	(1.98)	(1.62)
Percent Urban	7.36*	11.33†	7.60	7.86*	6.06*
	(3.41)	(6.05)	(5.25)	(3.41)	(2.85)
Percent Black	-3.66	-35.32†	24.54	-4.84	-2.48
	(12.11)	(18.52)	(21.43)	(12.19)	(9.84)
Percent College Educated	2.83	1.26	7.87	0.81	5.89
	(10.53)	(18.66)	(20.38)	(10.70)	(8.86)
Woman x Median Household Income				-2.35	
				(1.70)	
Woman x Percent Urban				-1.40	
				(1.34)	
Woman x Percent Black				0.50	
				(1.81)	
Woman x Percent College Educated				3.10	
				(4.56)	
Constant	-1.37	-3.13	4.28	-1.51	-1.33
	(3.49)	(5.93)	(6.65)	(3.52)	(2.85)
Observations	2,020	1,061	921	2,020	2,990

Note: Entries are logistic regression coefficients with standard errors clustered by individual in parentheses. The dependent variable is coded 1 if the potential candidate ran for the U.S. Senate and 0 if not. The models include state and year fixed effects. **p<0.01, *p<0.05, †p<0.10.

Appendix D: Leveraging State-Level Differences in Female Lawyer-Donors

Our central argument is that the dearth of women in the pipeline matters for the number of Republican and Democratic women and men who seek elected office. One observable implication is that women should make up a greater proportion of state and federal candidates when they comprise a greater proportion of lawyer-donors. Another implication is that as the proportion of women in state legislative office increases, so should the proportion of female congressional candidates in that state.

Due to space constraints, we did not include these analyses in the article, but here we draw on several additional datasets to briefly explore these expectations. We obtained the proportion of female state legislative candidates by merging Rogers and Windett's (2019) data of state legislative candidates from 2000 to 2014 with Bonica's (2014) data and data from the Reflective Democracy Campaign (2014). The dataset includes 103,000 state legislative candidates, and through all of these datasets, we were able to identify the gender of more than 92,000 (89.3 percent) of these candidates. We obtained the proportion of female congressional candidates from Thomsen's (2019) data of the full sample of U.S. House primary candidates from 2000 to 2014, which includes candidate gender.[7] To examine whether the proportion of female state legislators is positively associated with the proportion of female congressional candidates, we used CAWP's (2019) data to calculate the proportion of women in state legislative office from 1980 to 2014 and Thomsen's (2020) data to calculate the proportion of women House candidates in the subsequent election (1982 to 2016).

The dependent variable in Models 1 and 2 is the proportion of female state legislative and congressional candidates, calculated by state and party.[8] The independent variable is the proportion of female lawyer-donors, calculated by state and party as well. The average proportion of female lawyer-donors across states is a mere 13 percent for Republican lawyer-donors and 23 percent for Democratic lawyer-donors. Even at the high end of the distribution, the maximum value is only 35 percent female, and men continue to dwarf the number of women in the potential candidate pool across states. In Models 1 and 2, we also account for the difference between women's and men's rates of entry by state and party, with positive values indicating that women are more likely to run than men. The correlation between these variables is low at 0.15. The dependent variable in Model 3 is the proportion of female House candidates calculated by state for all fifty states from 1982 to 2016. The independent variable is the proportion of women in state legislative office from 1980 to 2014, calculated by state.

The results are provided below. In Models 1 and 2, we can see that the relationship between the proportion of women in the lawyer-donor pool and the proportion of female candidates who ran for state and federal office from 2000 to 2014 is positive and statistically significant ($p<0.01$). The relationship between a female advantage in rates of entry and the proportion of female candidates is positive but does not reach statistical significance, yet there is also a lack of cases in which women's rates of entry are as high as they would need to be for female candidates to match the number of men. If women's rates of entry were double or triple those of men, the number of female candidates would almost certainly increase. However, as discussed in the article, the rate at which women would need to run in order to reach parity with

[7] Because the data extend across multiple cycles, election-specific dynamics are unlikely to matter for these averages. The number of legislative seats is also less relevant since we are using percentages.

[8] North Dakota is excluded because no male or female lawyer-donor in the sample ran for state or federal office. Nebraska is excluded from the model in Column 1 because the state legislature is non-partisan.

men depends on their numerical representation in the potential candidate pool. In Model 3, we can similarly see that the relationship between the proportion of women in state legislative office is positively associated with the proportion of female congressional candidates in that state.

Table D1: Relationship Between Proportion of Female Lawyer-Donors, Female State Legislators, and Female State and Federal Candidates

	(1) State Legislative Candidates, Proportion Female	(2) U.S. House Candidates, Proportion Female	(3) U.S. House Candidates, Proportion Female
Lawyer-Donors, Proportion Female	0.89**	0.49**	
	(0.09)	(0.14)	
Female Advantage in Rate of Entry	0.00	0.04	
	(0.00)	(0.02)	
State Legislators, Proportion Female			0.03**
			(0.00)
Constant	0.07**	0.08**	0.04*
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Observations	96	98	900
R-Squared	0.50	0.17	0.12

Note: Entries are OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable in Models 1 and 2 is the proportion of female state legislative and House candidates, respectively, calculated by state and party. Because the lawyer-donor data is pooled over time, the proportions are averages from 2000 to 2014. The dependent variable in Model 3 is the proportion of female House candidates calculated by state for all fifty states from 1982 to 2016; year fixed effects are included in the model. **p<0.01, *p<0.05, †p<0.10.

Figure D1 shows the predicted proportion of female state legislative and congressional candidates calculated from Models 1 and 2 in the left and right panels, respectively, across values of female lawyer-donors. A shift from the percentage of women among Republican lawyer-donors in Idaho (7 percent) to the percentage of women among Democratic lawyer-donors in Washington state (33 percent) corresponds to a 23 percentage point increase in the percentage of female state legislative candidates (from 13 to 36 percent) and a 13 point increase in the percentage of female congressional candidates (from 11 to 24 percent). The slope is steeper at the state legislative level, which perhaps reflects a slower turnover of members in Congress. Yet it is clear that variation in the gender skew in the potential candidate pool is associated with the number of women who run for state and federal office.

Figure D1: The Proportion of Female State Legislative and Congressional Candidates Increases as the Proportion of Female Lawyer-Donors Increases



Note: Predicted values are calculated from Models 1 and 2 in Table D1.

Of course, a variety of other state-level and district-level factors shape the percentage of female lawyer-donors, the percentage of female state legislators, and the percentage of female candidates at the state and federal level. Demand-side factors such as voter biases may also play a role in women's entry into politics. However, the analyses here offer a blunt test of one implication of our broader argument that the gender skew in the potential candidate pool has consequences for women's entry into politics. Future research should further explore the connections among rates of candidate entry, the presence of women in the pipeline, and the number of female candidates. Moreover, scholars could use the significant variation in rates of entry and the composition of the potential candidate pool across states and levels of office to assess the prognosis for gender parity in a variety of institutional contexts.

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