APPENDICES

Elections Activate Partisanship Across Countries

A CSES Elections and Interview Timing

The 86 election surveys from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) included in our sample are listed in Figure A.1, along with information on the minimum, average, and maximum time from the election to the interview for each survey.



Figure A.1: Time From the Election to the Interview Across Surveys

Note: The solid circles represent the average number of days from the election to an interview within each survey. The left brackets indicate the number of days from the election until the beginning of the survey interviews, and the right brackets indicate the number of days from the election until the end of the survey interviews.

B Predicted Random Effects

In our models, displayed in Equations 1, 2, and 3 in Appendix C, in addition to allowing for random intercepts, we allow the effects of our covariates to vary randomly over the 86 CSES country-year surveys in our sample. Here, we show these predicted effects for each survey.

First, Figure B.1 shows that predicted effect of the *time since election* variable on having a partisan attachment for each country-year survey. The outcome is the linear latent propensity to have a partisan attachment (specifically, in this logit setup, it is the log-odds of having an attachment, which is used in the generation of the predicted probabilities shown in Figure 1 of the main text; see Equation 1 in this appendix). Figure B.2 shows that predicted effect of the *time since election* variable on partisan attachment strength for each country-year survey. The outcome is the linear latent strength of one's attachment (which is used in conjunction with the estimated cutpoints shown in the Main Estimation column of Table C.2 to generate the three sets of predicted probabilities depicted in Figure 2 of the main text; see Equation 2 in this appendix).

In the linear model depicted in Figure 3 of the main text, in which the outcome variable is incumbent evaluations measured on a self-reported 0-10 scale, we include an interaction between the *time since election* and *copartisanship* covariates. We also allow the conditional effects of each to vary randomly over country-year surveys (see Equation 3 in this appendix). Figures B.3 and B.4 show the predicted conditional effects of both variables on incumbent evaluations for each country-year survey.

Figure B.3 shows that the effect of identifying with the incumbent party on incumbent evaluations for each country-year survey (estimated at the mean of the *time since election*) is unsurprisingly positive and generally precisely estimated. And, Figure B.4 shows that the predicted effect of *time since election* on incumbent evaluations for each country-year survey (estimated for those who do not identify with the incumbent political party, for whom *copartisanship* = 0) tends to be indistinguishable from zero. This is also unsurprising, in that nothing would lead us to expect that the time from the election to the interview should impact incumbent evaluations; in this model, we are interested only in the extent to which the *time since election* measure conditions the effect of *copartisanship*.



Figure B.1: Partisan Attachments and Time From the Election to the Interview, Random Effects

Note: The solid circles represent the predicted effect of the logged days from the election until the interview for a given country-year survey. The outcome is the linear latent propensity to have a partisan attachment. Brackets represent 95% confidence intervals.

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Figure B.2: Partisan Attachment Strength and Time From the Election to the Interview, Random Effects

Note: The solid circles represent the predicted effect of the logged days from the election until the interview for a given country-year survey. The outcome is the linear latent strength of one's partisan attachment. Brackets represent 95% confidence intervals.

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Figure B.3: The Impact of Copartisanship on Incumbent Evaluations, Random Effects

Note: The solid circles represent the predicted effect of copartisanship with the incumbent on evaluations of the incumbent party for a given country-year survey, evaluated at the mean of the logged days from the election until the interview. Brackets represent 95% confidence intervals.



Figure B.4: The Impact of Time From the Election to the Interview on Incumbent Evaluations, Random Effects

Note: The solid circles represent the predicted effect of the logged days from the election until the interview for a given country-year survey for those who do not identify with the incumbent political party. Brackets represent 95% confidence intervals.

C Model and Estimation Details and Numerical Results

In Equations 1, 2, and 3, we algebraically present our generalized linear mixed models, the estimates of which are used in the creation of Figures 1, 2, and 3, respectively. These models also correspond to the numerical results presented in Tables C.1, C.2, and C.3. In each equation, the *time since election* variable, which is measured as the natural log of the number of days between an election and the interview date of respondent i in country-year j, is represented by x_{ij} .

$$logit\{Pr(PID_{ij} = 1 | x_{ij}, \delta_{0j}, \delta_{1j})\} = (\beta_0 + \delta_{0j}) + (\beta_1 + \delta_{1j})x_{ij}$$
(1)

In Equation 1, PID_{ij} is a binary variable that separates those with and without a party identification, who take on values of 1 and 0, respectively. The random component of the intercept is captured with δ_{0j} , and δ_{1j} is the random component of the effect of *time since election*. These random effects are assumed to be distributed normally with a mean of zero, meaning β_0 represents the average intercept, and β_1 represents the average effect of *time since election*.

$$logit\{Pr(Strength_{ij} > s | x_{ij}, \delta_{0j}, \delta_{1j})\} = \delta_{0j} + (\beta_1 + \delta_{1j})x_{ij} - \kappa_s$$

$$\tag{2}$$

In Equation 2, $Strength_{ij}$ is an ordinal variable that classifies individuals according to the strength of their party identification. It is coded 1 for those who feel not very close to the party with which they identify, 2 for those who feel somewhat close, and 3 for those who feel very close. These three ordinal categories are indexed with s, and the S - 1 cutpoints that separate them are captured with κ_s . There is no overall intercept, which is not identified due to each of the cutpoints being free parameters, though there is a country-year-specific random intercept, δ_{0j} . As in Equation 1, δ_{1j} is the random component of the effect of *time since election*, β_1 . Both random effects are again assumed to be distributed normally with a mean of zero.

$$IncEval_{ij} = (\beta_0 + \delta_{0j}) + (\beta_1 + \delta_{1j})q_{ij} + (\beta_2 + \delta_{2j})x_{ij} + \beta_3 q_{ij}x_{ij} + e_{ij}$$
(3)

In Equation 3, $IncEval_{ij}$ captures an individual's 0–10 evaluation of the incumbent party. Here, the *time since election* variable, x_{ij} , is taken to condition the impact of identifying with the incumbent party on these evaluations. Thus, it enters the equation in interaction with a binary indicator for copartisanship, q_{ij} , which is coded 1 for those who identify with the incumbent party and 0 for those who do not. There is a random component associated with the intercept, δ_{0j} , with the conditional effect of copartisanship, δ_{1j} , and with the conditional effect of the time between the election and the interview, δ_{2j} . Each of these random effects is again assumed to be distributed normally with a mean of zero, as is the individual-specific residual, e_{ij} .

Each of the three equations is estimated with maximum likelihood, and integration for Equations 1 and 2 is performed with mean and variance adaptive Gauss-Hermite quadrature. The model results are largely insensitive to the maximization routine or software program (i.e., Stata or R) employed, as demonstrated in Tables C.1, C.2, and C.3. The standard errors associated with predicted values, which are used in the creation of the confidence intervals shown in Figures 1, 2, and 3, are calculated using the delta method. We constrain the covariance between the random term in the intercept and in the coefficient(s) to be zero in each estimation, though allowing for correlations between the random parameters does not alter our findings, as shown in Appendix H.

The data used in the estimation of each model come from survey respondents in 86 election surveys from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES). The number of observations varies across models, as some respondents did not answer the questions needed to create the variables employed. Notably, the number of respondents used in the estimations summarized in Table C.2 is relatively low. This is because the relevant dependent variable is the strength of one's party attachment, and naturally only respondents with a party attachment have an attachment strength.

	Main	BHHH	DFP	BFGS	R	
	Estimation	Algorithm	$\mathbf{Algorithm}$	Algorithm	Estimation	
Variable	Coefficient	Coefficient	Coefficient	Coefficient	Coefficient	
	(Std. Err.)	(Std. Err.)	(Std. Err.)	(Std. Err.)	(Std. Err.)	
	Fixed Components					
time since election	-0.112	-0.112	-0.112	-0.112	-0.111	
	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	
intercept	0.285	0.285	0.296	0.285	0.292	
	(0.095)	(0.119)	(0.095)	(0.095)	(0.093)	
	Random Components					
var(time since election)	0.004	0.004	0.005	0.004	0.005	
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(n/a)	
var(intercept)	0.572	0.572	0.557	0.572	0.534	
	(0.106)	(0.053)	(0.107)	(0.106)	(n/a)	
number of observations	127327	127327	127327	127327	127327	
number of surveys	86	86	86	86	86	
log-likelihood	-83106.5	-83106.5	-83107.9	-83106.5	-83107.9	
AIC	166221.1	166221.1	166223.7	166221.1	166225.7	

Table C.1: Partisan Attachments and Time From the Election to the Interview, Multilevel LogitEstimations

Note: Results are from estimations of Equation 1. The observations are survey respondents, who are clustered in election surveys. The dependent variable is a dichotomous measure of partisan identification. The independent variable is the natural log of the number of days from an election until a respondent's interview date. The results shown in the "Main Estimation" column were produced using the melogit command in Stata, and maximization was performed with Stata's modified Newton-Raphson algorithm. Results from this estimation are shown graphically in Figure 1 of the main text. The results shown in the "BHHH Algorithm" column were produced using the melogit command in Stata, and maximization was performed with the Berndt-Hall-Hall-Hausman algorithm. The results shown in the "DFP Algorithm" column were produced using the melogit command in Stata, and maximization was performed with the Davidon-Fletcher-Powell algorithm. The results shown in the "BFGS Algorithm" column were produced using the melogit command in Stata, and maximization was performed with the Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shanno algorithm. The results shown in the "R Estimation" column were produced using the glmer command of the lme4 package in R. The glmer command does not produce standard errors associated with the random effect variances.

	Main	BHHH	DFP	BFGS	R
	Estimation	$\mathbf{Algorithm}$	Algorithm	Algorithm	Estimation
Variable	Coefficient	Coefficient	Coefficient	Coefficient	Coefficient
	(Std. Err.)	(Std. Err.)	(Std. Err.)	(Std. Err.)	(Std. Err.)
	Fixed Components				
time since election	-0.105	-0.098	-0.100	-0.106	-0.107
	(0.017)	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.017)	(0.018)
κ_1	-1.672	-1.602	-1.593	-1.672	-1.684
	(0.083)	(0.082)	(0.072)	(0.083)	(0.089)
κ_2	0.988	1.057	1.067	0.988	0.976
	(0.082)	(0.082)	(0.072)	(0.082)	(0.089)
	Random Components				
var(time since election)	0.003	0.016	0.015	0.003	0.004
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(n/a)
var(intercept)	0.331	0.222	0.228	0.331	0.382
	(0.061)	(0.023)	(0.036)	(0.061)	(n/a)
number of observations	75806	75806	75806	75806	75806
number of surveys	86	86	86	86	86
log-likelihood	-72503.5	-72447.8	-72453.2	72503.5	-72505.3
AIC	145016.9	144905.6	144916.4	145016.9	145022.6

Table C.2: Partisan Attachment Strength and Time From the Election to the Interview, Multilevel Ordered Logit Estimations

Note: Results are from estimations of Equation 2. The observations are survey respondents, who are clustered in election surveys. The dependent variable is a trichotomous measure of the strength of partisan identification, with higher values meaning stronger identification. The independent variable is the natural log of the number of days from an election until a respondent's interview date. The results shown in the "Main Estimation" column were produced using the meologit command in Stata, and maximization was performed with Stata's modified Newton-Raphson algorithm. Results from this estimation are shown graphically in Figure 2 of the main text. The results shown in the "BHHH Algorithm" column were produced using the meologit command in Stata, and maximization was performed with the Berndt-Hall-Hall-Hausman algorithm. The results shown in the "DFP Algorithm" column were produced using the meologit command in Stata, and maximization was performed with the Davidon-Fletcher-Powell algorithm. The results shown in the "BFGS Algorithm" column were produced using the meologit command in Stata, and maximization was performed with the

Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shanno algorithm. The results shown in the "R Estimation" column were produced using the clmm command of the ordinal package in R. The clmm command does not produce standard errors associated with the random effect variances.

	Main	DFP	BFGS	R	
	Estimation	Algorithm	Algorithm	Estimation	
Variable	Coefficient	Coefficient	Coefficient	Coefficient	
	(Std. Err.)	(Std. Err.)	(Std. Err.)	(Std. Err.)	
	Fixed Components				
copartisanship	4.312	4.312	4.312	4.271	
	(0.159)	(0.159)	(0.159)	(0.158)	
time since election	0.012	0.012	0.012	-0.009	
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.036)	
copartisanship \times	-0.130	-0.130	-0.130	-0.114	
time since election	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.037)	
intercept	4.259	4.259	4.259	4.352	
	(0.114)	(0.114)	(0.114)	(0.153)	
	Random Components				
var(copartisanship)	0.862	0.862	0.862	0.899	
	(0.143)	(0.143)	(0.143)	(n/a)	
var(time since election)	0.014	0.014	0.014	0.052	
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(n/a)	
var(intercept)	0.716	0.716	0.716	1.305	
	(0.125)	(0.125)	(0.125)	(n/a)	
number of observations	117134	117134	117134	117134	
number of surveys	86	86	86	86	
log-likelihood	-275870.6	-275870.6	275870.6	-275825.2	
AIC	551757.2	551757.2	551757.2	551672.4	

 Table C.3: The Impact of Copartisanship on Incumbent Evaluations and Time From the Election to the Interview, Multilevel Linear Estimations

Note: Results are from estimations of Equation 3. The observations are survey respondents, who are clustered in election surveys. The dependent variable is a 0-10 evaluation of the incumbent party, with higher values meaning a better evaluation. The independent variables are a dichotomous indicator of copartisanship with the incumbent, which takes a value of 1 for those who identify with the incumbent party and a value of 0 for those who do not, and the natural log of the number of days from an election until a respondent's interview date. The results shown in the "Main Estimation" column were produced using the mixed command in Stata, and maximization was performed with Stata's modified Newton-Raphson algorithm. Results from this estimation are shown graphically in Figure 3 of the main text. The results shown in the "DFP Algorithm" column were produced using the mixed command in Stata, and maximization was performed with the Davidon-Fletcher-Powell algorithm. The results shown in the "BFGS Algorithm" column were produced using

the mixed command in Stata, and maximization was performed with the Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shanno algorithm. The results shown in the "R Estimation" column were produced using the lmer command of the lme4 package in R. The lmer command does not produce standard errors associated with the random effect variances.

D Covariate Balance and Results with Control Variables

By our assumption of as if random assignment within election surveys, an individual interviewed just after an election should, on average, be the same as an individual interviewed for the same survey several months later (aside from differences in the distance between the interview date and the election). Because we leverage a naturally occurring treatment, interview timing, here we explore whether the treatment process worked in a manner that precludes the need to control for potential confounders. To do so, we predict the natural log of the number of days between an election and the date on which a respondent was interviewed (*time since election*, our treatment variable) as a function of income, education, age, urbanness, and electoral participation. Income is measured in quintiles within election surveys, education is dichotomous, coded 1 for those with a college education and 0 otherwise, and age is measured in tens of years. Urbanness is measured with a four-point scale containing the following categories: rural area or village; small or mid-sized town; suburbs of large town or city; large town or city. Electoral participation is measured dichotomously, with respondents who reported voting in the recent election coded 1 and others coded 0. Data are from responses to CSES survey questions.

We estimate the relationship between *time since election* and the covariates using multilevel linear regression, and we allow the effects of the covariates and the constant to vary randomly across election surveys. We also include two survey-level variables to probe the extent to which macrolevel characteristics might affect the mean distance between the election and the interview date across election surveys. These are democratic development and economic development. Democratic development is captured with the Polity IV Index, which theoretically ranges from -10 to 10, with higher values indicating consolidated democracy. Economic development is measured as GDP per capita at the time of the survey, adjusted for purchasing power and reported in constant thousands of US dollars. Data are from the World Bank.

As shown in Figure D.1, within each survey, we find only weak or insignificant relationships between demographic characteristics and the date on which one was interviewed. The effect of each of the individual-level covariates on the predicted logged number of days between the election and the interview is near zero (and, in the case of education and urbanness, it is not statistically different from zero). A unit increase in income quintile is associated with a 0.007-unit increase in



Figure D.1: The Impact of Potential Confounders on Time From the Election to the Interview

Note: Figure is created from a multilevel linear estimation. The observations are survey respondents, who are clustered in election surveys. The dependent variable is the natural log of the number of days from an election until a respondent's interview date. The individual-level independent variables are income quintile, a dichotomous indicator of education, coded 1 for those with a college education and 0 otherwise, age in tens of years, a four-point ordinal scale of urbanness, and a measure of voting in the recent election, coded 1 for voters and 0 for abstainers. The survey-level independent variables, democratic development and economic development, are measured as a country's Polity IV score and PPP-adjusted GDP per capita at the time of the election. The coefficients on the individual-level independent variables and the intercept are allowed to vary across surveys. Brackets represent 95% confidence intervals.

the number of logged days between the election and one's interview date. This means that the number of the days from the election until the interview for someone in the middle income quintile is expected to be about one percent higher than for someone in the lowest quintile. As for age, which is measured in tens of years, the coefficient of -0.017 indicates that a ten-year increase in age is associated with about a two percent decrease in the expected number of days between the election and one's interview date. The coefficient of -0.035 on electoral participation indicates that the expected number of days between the election and the interview for those who did and did not report voting differs by about three percent. We also find no evidence of an impact of democratic or economic development on the logged number of days between the election and the interview. The effect of each variable is close to null and, for both, the associated 95% confidence interval includes zero.

We are thus confident that the relationships shown in Figures 1-3 are truly an effect of the

election-interview time gap. That is, we are confident in our assumption of as if randomly assigned interview dates within surveys. Still, to further demonstrate the exogeneity of *time since election*, we also re-estimate our primary models with controls for each of the individual- and survey-level covariates shown in Figure D.1. Results are depicted in Figures D.2, D.3, and D.4, which correspond with Figures 1, 2, and 3 of the main text, respectively. As is clear from a comparison of the figures, our results are not sensitive to the inclusion of the controls.



Figure D.2: Partisan Attachments and Time From the Election to the Interview, with Controls

Note: Figure corresponds with Figure 1 of the main text, but is based on a model with additional controls for income, education, age, urbanness, electoral participation, democratic development, and economic development. Dashed lines represent 95% confidence interval.



Figure D.3: Partisan Attachment Strength and Time From the Election to the Interview, with Controls

Note: Figure corresponds with Figure 2 of the main text, but is based on a model with additional controls for income, education, age, urbanness, electoral participation, democratic development, and economic development. Dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals.



Figure D.4: The Impact of Copartisanship on Incumbent Evaluations and Time From the Election to the Interview, with Controls

Note: Figure corresponds with Figure 3 of the main text, but is based on a model with additional controls for income, education, age, urbanness, electoral participation, democratic development, and economic development. Dashed lines represent 95% confidence interval.

E Results Without Mail-Back Questionnaires

About 84 percent of the respondents in our sample were interviewed solely by telephone or in person. For the other 16 percent, interviews were either done entirely by mail or done by mail in conjunction with a telephone or face-to-face interview. Allowing respondents to mail back their questionnaires on their own time potentially harms our assumption of as if random interview timing. This would hamper our identification strategy if, for example, those with partisan ties tend to complete and return questionnaires in less time than those without a partisan attachment. To account for this, we re-estimate our models with those who were not interviewed solely by telephone or in person removed from the sample.

Results are shown in Figures E.1, E.2, and E.3, which correspond with Figures 1, 2, and 3 of the main text, respectively. As is clear from a comparison of the figures, our results are not driven by the inclusion or removal of respondents who were interviewed fully or partially via a mail-back survey questionnaire.



Figure E.1: Partisan Attachments and Time From the Election to the Interview, No Mail-Back Questionnaires

Note: Figure corresponds with Figure 1 of the main text, but is based on a model with respondents who were not interviewed solely by telephone or in person removed from the sample. Dashed lines represent 95% confidence interval.



Figure E.2: Partisan Attachment Strength and Time From the Election to the Interview, No Mail-Back Questionnaires

Note: Figure corresponds with Figure 2 of the main text, but is based on a model with respondents who were not interviewed solely by telephone or in person removed from the sample. Dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals.



Figure E.3: The Impact of Copartisanship on Incumbent Evaluations and Time From the Election to the Interview, No Mail-Back Questionnaires

Note: Figure corresponds with Figure 3 of the main text, but is based on a model with respondents who were not interviewed solely by telephone or in person removed from the sample. Dashed lines represent 95% confidence interval.

F Time Since the Election, Left-Right Self-Placement, and Left-Right Party Placements

Here, we probe the validity of our measure of election salience, the natural log of the number of days from the election date to one's interview date. ? (2018) note that individuals who fail to cognize the left-right ideological spectrum are also less likely to place themselves and political parties on this scale. Such incognizance is more likely to manifest when elections are less salient and therefore the information environment is less rich.

Thus, if the time since the election is inversely related to election salience, it should also be inversely related to the likelihood that survey respondents will place themselves and political parties on the left-right ideological scale. To test this, we created two variables. The first is a dichotomous measure coded 1 for individuals who placed themselves along the left-right scale and coded 0 for those who did not.¹ The second is also dichotomous, coded 1 for individuals who placed both of the top two vote getting parties on the left-right scale and 0 for those who did not.²

We estimated multilevel logit models with these measures as the dependent variables and our *time since election* measure as the independent variable. In each estimation, we allowed the coefficient on the independent variable and the intercept to vary across CSES surveys. Results, which are shown in Figures F.1 and F.2, lend support to our claim that elections become less salient as time passes. Individuals become significantly less likely to provide ideological placements for themselves and for successful political parties as an election recedes into the past.

¹The CSES question used to create this variable is: "In politics people sometimes talk of left and right. Where would you place yourself on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?"

²The CSES question used to create this variable is: "In politics people sometimes talk of left and right. Where would you place [name of party] on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?"



Figure F.1: Self Placements and Time From the Election to the Interview

Note: Figure produced from the results a multilevel logit estimation in which the observations are survey respondents clustered in election surveys. In the model, the dependent variable is a dichotomous measure of placing oneself on a left-right ideological scale, and the independent variable is the natural log of the number of days from an election until a respondent's interview date. The coefficient on the independent variable and the intercept were allowed to vary across surveys. Dashed lines represent 95% confidence interval.



Figure F.2: Party Placements and Time From the Election to the Interview

Note: Figure produced from the results a multilevel logit estimation in which the observations are survey respondents clustered in election surveys. In the model, the dependent variable is a dichotomous measure of placing the top two vote getting parties on a left-right ideological scale, and the independent variable is the natural log of the number of days from an election until a respondent's interview date. The coefficient on the independent variable and the intercept were allowed to vary across surveys. Dashed lines represent 95% confidence interval.

G Accounting for Anticipatory Considerations

The spacing of national elections varies across countries. And, in some countries campaigning may be nearly constant, as in the United States in particular. If partial partial particular is affected by anticipation of subsequent elections, our results could be shaped by the inclusion in our data set of countries with closely spaced elections, consistent campaigning, or both.

To examine whether anticipatory considerations influence our findings, we gathered timing information on the election subsequent to each of the 86 post-election surveys in our data set. Figure G.1 displays a density plot of the number of days between the average interview date in our 86 surveys and the subsequent election date. The figure also includes a strip plot of each of these gaps.



Figure G.1: Density of the Time from the Mean Interview to the Next Election

Note: Each open circle correspond to an election survey. The points are jittered to prevent overlapping.

Of our 86 our post-election surveys, ten were followed by additional national-level elections within two years of the average survey date.³ Of these, only one was followed by an election that

³These include countries with regularly scheduled interim elections. The ten elections that were followed by another within two years are: Canada 2004; Czech Republic 1996; Japan 2007; the Netherlands 2002; Poland 2005; Slovakia 2010; Taiwan 2001; United States 1996; United States 2004; and United States 2008.

took place less than a year later: the 2002 election in the Netherlands was followed by another about eight months later, in January 2003. The post-election survey interviews in the Netherlands in 2002 were fielded and completed relatively quickly (see Figure A.1), meaning the 2003 contest was thus held about seven months after the mean survey interview. Despite this short inter-election period, it is very unlikely that the prospective 2003 contest in the Netherlands affected the 2002 post-election survey responses. This is because the 2003 election was held rather abruptly, coming after the October 2002 resignation of the government; the 2002 survey respondents were very likely unaware that a new election was approaching rapidly.

Nevertheless, we wish to empirically verify that our results are not shaped by any anticipatory considerations. Thus, we have re-estimated each of our three primary models—those used to create Figures 1-3 in the main text—with the Netherlands 2002 contest removed from our data. We have also re-estimated each of our three primary models with any election from the United States, where campaigning is a nearly constant feature of political life, removed. And, we re-estimated each of our three primary models with all ten contests that were followed by additional national-level elections within two years of the average survey date removed.

In Figures G.2-G.4, shown here, we display the results of these analyses. The figures make it clear that our results are unlikely to have been shaped by the any anticipatory dynamics. In all three, the estimated relationships are very similar with or without the inclusion of the surveys that were soon followed by another election.



Figure G.2: Partisan Attachments and Time From the Election to the Interview, Accounting for Anticipatory Considerations

Note: Figure corresponds to Figure 1 of the main text. Dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals.



Figure G.3: Partisan Attachment Strength and Time From the Election to the Interview, Accounting for Anticipatory Considerations

Note: Figure corresponds to Figure 2 of the main text. Dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals.



Figure G.4: The Impact of Copartisanship on Incumbent Evaluations and Time From the Election to the Interview, Accounting for Anticipatory Considerations

Note: Figure corresponds to Figure 3 of the main text. Dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals.

H Results With Covariance Parameters Included

Our main models constrain the covariance between the random term in the intercept and in the coefficient(s) to be zero. Here, probe the extent to which our results might be an artifact of this decision. We re-estimated each of our three main models, this time including a covariance parameter (in the case of our third model, three covariance parameters). As demonstrated by Figures H.1-H.3, our findings are robust to the inclusion of the covariance parameters. The estimated covariance parameters are themselves provided in Table H.1.



Figure H.1: Partisan Attachments and Time From the Election to the Interview, with Covariance Parameter

Note: Figure corresponds to Figure 1 of the main text, but is based on a model that includes a covariance parameter for the random effects. Dashed lines represent 95% confidence interval.



Figure H.2: Partisan Attachment Strength and Time From the Election to the Interview, with Covariance Parameter

Note: Figure corresponds to Figure 2 of the main text but is based on a model that includes a covariance parameter for the random effects. Dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals.



Figure H.3: The Impact of Copartisanship on Incumbent Evaluations and Time From the Election to the Interview, with Covariance Parameters

Note: Figure corresponds to Figure 3 of the main text but is based on a model that includes covariance parameters for the random effects. Dashed lines represent 95% confidence interval.

	Partisan	Attachment	Copartisanship and Incumbent Evals.	
	Attachments	$\mathbf{Strength}$		
	effect of	effect of	effect of	effect of
Random	time since	time since	$time \ since$	<i>CO</i> -
Parameter	election	election	election	part is an ship
intercept	0.020	-0.005	-0.173*	-0.678*
effect of <i>copartisanship</i>	-	-	0.011	-

Table H.1: Estimated Covariances Between the Random Parameters

Note: The cells contain estimated covariances between the random components. These were obtained from re-estimations of the Main Estimations reported in Tables C.1, C.2, and C.3 in this appendix, and displayed graphically in Figures 1, 2, and 3 of the main text, that allowed for nonzero correlation between the pair(s) of random components in each model. *p < .05, two-sided

I Results With Fixed Effects

As we discuss in the main text, we allow the effect of the *time since election* variable to vary across surveys in our multilevel setup: we account for the possibility that an increase in time in one country-year survey will impact the outcomes differently than an increase in time in another. Taking another approach to accounting for confounding from country-specific factors, we also estimated each of our three primary models with fixed effects for each country-year survey. As demonstrated by Figures I.1-I.3, our findings are robust to the fixed effects approach.



Figure I.1: Partisan Attachments and Time From the Election to the Interview, Fixed Effects Note: Figure corresponds to Figure 1 of the main text, but is based on a model with fixed effects for country-years.

Dashed lines represent 95% confidence interval.



Figure I.2: Partisan Attachment Strength and Time From the Election to the Interview, Fixed Effects

Note: Figure corresponds to Figure 2 of the main text, but is based on a model with fixed effects for country-years. Dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals.



Figure I.3: The Impact of Copartisanship on Incumbent Evaluations and Time From the Election to the Interview, Fixed Effects

Note: Figure corresponds to Figure 3 of the main text, but is based on a model with fixed effects for country-years. Dashed lines represent 95% confidence interval.