Online Appendix: Office-Selling, Corruption, and Long-Term Development in Peru (Not Intended for Publication)

July 27, 2018

Data Appendix

Office Prices. The time series for the prices of governor positions were coded from primary sources located at the Spanish Colonial Archives (*Archivo General de Indias*). I examine the prices of governorships from 1673 until 1752, when the last recorded sale was made. The prices for governorships includes 49 provinces out of 51 provinces in Peru.[1] The price coding was cross-checked with historical accounts (Moreno Cebrián 1977) containing some of the provinces included in this study.

Figure A.1: Governor Title



[Source: Ministerio de Cultura, Archivo General de Indias, Lima, 633, N.25]

Figure A.2: Price Paid For Province



[Source: Ministerio de Cultura, Archivo General de Indias, Lima, 633, N.55]

A close up of the price is shown above, in this case, the bidder paid five thousand pesos to become governor of Andes del Cuzco (a province of the former Incan capital). Because prices were given in various denominations of Spanish currency, I use historical exchange rates described below. In addition, since inflation might have affected the willingness to purchase seats, all estimates account for yearly inflation using changes in the price of silver

[1] The province of Huamachuco has only one recorded sale so effectively not included in the analysis; and Urubamba has no sale records due to its late creation.

collected by Arroyo-Abad (2005).

Main Archival Sources		
Archival Citation File	Description	Location
Lima,633	Titles of Governors	AGI
Lima,634	Titles of Governors	AGI
Lima,635	Titles of Governors	AGI
Lima,636	Titles of Governors	AGI
Lima,637	Titles of Governors	AGI
Cross-Validation Sources		
Archival Citation File	Description	Location
Lima,476	*Corregimientos* Sold	AGI
Charcas,427	*Corregimientos* Sold	AGI
Lima,615	Government and Military Appointments	AGI
Lima,616	Government and Military Appointments	AGI
Contratacion,5475	Various Appointments	AGI
Indiferente,1847	All Positions Sold in Indies	AGI
Contaduria,235	All Positions Sold in Indies	AGI

AGI: Spanish Colonial Archives; *Archivo Colonial de Indias*

Inflation. I calculate inflation using silver prices (vellón maravedí in grams of fine silver) from the *Prices and wages in Spain, 1351-1800* by the Global Price and Income History Group.[2]

Exchange Rates. Following previous historical works, the exchange rate of the various denominations in which prices were paid are the following: 1 ducado = 375 *maravedíes*; 1 *real de vellón* = 34 *maravedíes*; 1 peso de a 10 reales = = 340 *maravedíes*; 1 peso de a 8 reales = 272 *maravedíes*; 1 peso escudo = 272 *maravedíes*; 1 doblón = 1088 *maravedíes*; 1 peso de a 15 reales = 510 *maravedíes*; 1 peso de a 20 reales = 680 *maravedíes*; 1 peso de oro = 850 maravedíes. Source: John J. TePaske, Herbert S. Klein et al. 1980, 1990. *The Royal Treasuries of the Spanish Empire in America.* 4 volumes. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press.

European Wars. Based on historical accounts of warfare during the late 17th century (Childs and Keegan 2001) and beginning of the 18th century (McKay 1983; Blanning 2008; Lindsay 1957), which include the year of start and end of European wars as well as descriptions of the geopolitical motivations behind each event. The European wars in which Spain was involved were: the Franco-Dutch War (1672–1678), War of the Reunions (1683–1684), Nine Years' War (1688–1697), War of the Spanish Succession (1701–1714), War of the Quadruple Alliance (1718–1720), Anglo-Spanish War (1727–1729), War of the Polish Succession (1733–1738), War of Jenkins' Ear (1739–1742), and the War of the Austrian Succession (1740–1748).

***Corregidor* Individual Characteristics.** To evaluate the negative selection mechanism (e.g. individuals with certain traits self-selecting into profitable provinces), I use data on the social status of local officials – whether they belong to the nobility, the military or neither. Those belonging to the nobility or military classes were the preferred choice of

[2]Available at http://www.iisg.nl/hpw/data.php#spain

the Crown and considered more competent in office:

- *Knighted nobility*: Caballero de Órdenes Nobiliarias: Santiago, Álcantara, Calatrava y Santo Tomás.
- *Other nobility:* Marqués, Duque, Conde, Vizconde, etc.
- *Military*: Maestre de Campo, Capitán, Teniente, Coronel, Sargento, etc.
- *Other occupations:* abogado, contador, guardadamas, abogado, médico de cámara, etc.
- *Civil:* not belong to either of the above.

Repartimiento or Forced Sales Quotas. Moreno (1977: 293-294) provides a list of the *repartimiento* quota in pesos for each province as established in 1754. He also provides a detailed breakdown of the quota by the type of good that will be traded (mules, textiles, clothing, iron, or other merchandise) in pages 356 to 359.

Agricultural Suitability. Obtained from the 2001 "Agricultural Suitability of Global Soils" Map by Ramankutty, N., J.A. Foley , J. Norman, and K. McSweeney. Available at: https://databasin.org/datasets/fdfcc35510ba44ac8c174221f1762e2d. Full reference: Ramankutty, N., J.A. Foley , J. Norman, and K. McSweeney. 2001."The global distribution of cultivable lands: current patterns and sensitivity to possible climate change." Submitted to Global Ecology and Biogeography.

Agricultural Market Hubs. Indicator based on O'Phelan (1988: 61) describing different productive activities in the provinces such as wine, salt, textiles, coca or flour production which mainly supplied mining centers and Lima. The information is based on a list of provinces that serve as agricultural suppliers to mining centers. In turn such information is coded from the British Museum documents 17,592, f. 227,233. (O'Phelan 1988: 61).

Mita. This variable captures whether the province was assigned to provide forced labor or not. Under this system, indigenous communities had to send 1/7 of their adult male population to work in the Potosí and Huancavelica mines. The coding is based on the memoirs of the Peruvian viceroys collected by Golte (1980, Map 13), which lists the provinces subjected to the *mita* assignment to either the Potosí or Huancavelica mines. A similar list of the regions subjected to different mining *mitas* is provided by O'Phelan (1988).

Indigenous Rebellions. This variable captures the number and type of indigenous rebellions in each province in a given year (O'Phelan 1988; Golte 1980). Examples:

- *1708 Huánuco - El corregidor Don Francisco y Fernández de Sandoval fue muerto por various vecinos.* Coded from: O'Phelan (1988).
- *1726 Andahuaylas - Revuelta contra el corregidor don Gregorio Hortis de Landaeta. El cacique don Bernardo de Minaya y el clérigo don Gaspar de Prado y Mansilla estuvieron comprometidos en los hechos.* Coded from O'Phelan (1988).

Based on this description, rebellions are coded as *anti-governor* if a target of the uprising is the *corregidor*. Rebellions are coded as anti-taxes if the target of the uprising are

any form of tax-collecting authorities either from the colonial state or from the Church. Rebellions can also be coded as both anti-governor and anti-taxes.

Revenue Data. The Spanish Crown collected revenues via regional *cajas* which kept detailed records of their income and expenditures throughout the year as shown by Tepaske and Klein (1982). I use such records to control for the possibility that high governorship prices led to a drop in revenue which may suggest graft but not necessarily extraction from the population. The drawback of this information is that *cajas* had jurisdiction over more than one province; hence the variation captured is in *caja*-year not province-year. The revenue variables collected include: total income per year; tax income due to commercial and trade activities (*alcabala*); income due to head taxes (*tributo*); and finally, income derived through mining proceeds.

2013 Household and Individual Traits. These include household consumption, years of schooling (in categories), migrant status, mother tongue (whether Quechua), group self-identification and measures of trust. All coded from 2013 ENAHO (*Encuesta Nacional de Hogares sobre Condiciones de Vida y Pobreza*).

Household consumption is calculated using total household consumption minus transfers per equivalent household member, as in Dell (2010: 1877-78).

Years of schooling is calculated based on the last school year approved ("último grado de estudios que aprobó"). Coding: no schooling = 0, preschool = 3, incomplete primary = 6; complete primary = 9; incomplete secondary = 10.5; complete secondary = 12; incomplete high school (*superior no universitaria*) = 13.5; complete high school (*superior no universitaria*) = 15; incomplete university = 17; complete university = 19; post-graduate studies = 21).

Mother language ("cuál es el idioma o lengua materna que aprendió de niño?"). Coding: Quechua = 1, 0 all others, including Spanish (*castellano*).

Migrants ("nació en este distrito?"). Coding: 1 = yes, 0 if born in another district.

Indigenous peasant community ("con qué grupo se siente más identificado....? su comunidad campesina indígena"). Coding: 1= indigenous peasant community, 0 other identities.

Trust in... national elections jury (JNE), national office of electoral processes (ONPE), provincial government, district government, regional government, police, army, judicial system, newspapers, and radio and tv sources. Coding: 1=sufficient, a lot; 0 = none or little.

Public Good Provision 2007 Obtained from INEI - *Censos Nacionales 2007: XI de Población y VI de Vivienda*. Provides the share of households in the district with floors made of mud and lacking an indoor toilet. Other measures include: electricity provision, water provision, percentage of individuals with incomplete primary, percentage of women with incomplete studies, among others. Such information is geo-referenced, thus suitable to be matched with colonial districts. Available at: http://censos.inei.gob.pe/Censos2007/redatam/#

Gold and silver mines. Given the prices paid for provincial offices may reflect access to natural resources, I coded provinces in which the production of gold or silver was their main economic activity (Golte 1980: Mapa 11).

Wages. Data on wages are provided by Moreno (1977) and my own coding from primary sources (governor titles).

GDP in 1827. Estimates of provincial GDP in 1827 are provided by De Marzi and Díaz (2014). The estimates are based on population measures based on Gootenberg, P. (1991). *Population and Ethnicity in Early Republican Peru: Some Revisions.* Latin American Research Review 23(3): 109-157.

Annual Silver Production. "Annual Silver Data Colonial Lower & Upper Peru 1559-1821" Original Dataset Assembled by John Jay TePaske, available at: http://www.insidemydesk.com/TPfiles/PeruSex.xls and http://www.insidemydesk.com/TPfiles/MiscSex.xls

Peruvian Inflation. "Peru Prices" from Pablo Macera et al., Los Precios de Perú: Siglo xvi-xix, Fuentes, 3 vols., Lima: Banco Central del Reserva, 1992. Available at: http://www.insidemydesk.com/ladata/limapricesex.xls

Other controls: Spanish Crown's revenue (Dincecco 2009), expenditure (Jurado-Sánchez 2006), exchange rate, and inflation (Hamilton 1969).

Figure A.3: **Time-variation in Prices**



Table A.1: **Wages Per Province in Peru and Bolivia Provinces 1673-1752 (pesos)**

Province	**Wage (Pesos per Year)**
Abancay	1000
Aimaraes	1000
Amparaes	1000
Andahuaylas	1000
Angaraes con Huancavelica	2600
Arequipa	2000
Arica	1500
Atacama	1000
Azángaro y Asilo	1000
Cailloma	1200
Cajamarca	1500
Cajamarquilla	537
Cajatambo	1000
Calca y Lares	1000
Camana	800
Cañete	1000
Canta	800
Carabaya	832
Caranga	1000
Castrovirreina	1200
Cercado	1000
Chachapoyas	900
Chancay	750
Chayanta y Conchucos	1000
Chiclayo	1000
Chilques y Masques	1000
Chucuito	1000
Chumbivilcas	1000
Ciudad Cuzco	3000
Cochabamba	1000
Conchucos	1000
Condesuyos	1000
Cotabamba	1100
Huamachuco	1000
Huamalíes	1000
Huamanga	2000
Huanta	800
Huánuco	1500
Huarochíri	800
Huaylas	1000
Jauja	1400
La Paz	2000
Lampa	1000
Larecaja	1000
Lipes	500
Lucanas	1000
Luya y Chillaos	600

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Table A.1 – continued from previous page

Province	Wage (Pesos per Year)
Mendoza	.
Mizque	1000
Moquegua	900
Omasuyo	1000
Oruro	1500
Pacages	1200
Paria	1000
Parinacochas	1200
Paucartambo	2000
Pilaya y Paspaya	1000
Piura	1200
Porco	1000
Potosí	3000
Puno o Paucarcolla	1000
Quispicanchi	1000
Saña	1000
Santa	545
Sicasica	1000
Tarija	800
Tarma	1000
Tinta	1000
Tomina	1000
Trujillo	2000
Urubamba	.
Vilcashuamán	1000
Yauyos	800
Yca, Pisco y Nazca	775

Descriptive Statistics

Table A.2: **Descriptive Statistics**

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
Panel A: Province Time-Varying Traits 1673-1751					
Log(Price)	8.250	0.803	6.197	10.325	518
Price Pesos	5336.592	4988.352	491.087	30486.51	518
Appointed?	0.172	0.378	0	1	632
Nobility Title (all)?	0.139	0.346	0	1	627
Knighted Nobility?	0.097	0.297	0	1	627
Military Career?	0.209	0.407	0	1	627
Length of War	4.755	4.821	0	16	632
War	0.703	0.458	0	1	632
Years to/from next war	3.922	5.833	-7	16	632
Succession Wars	3.859	5.102	0	16	632
Year	1714.532	21.793	1673	1751	632
Anti-governor rebellions	0.008	0.089	0	1	632
Log Total Revenue	11.287	1.276	6.837	14.812	381
Log Sales Tax Revenue	9.332	1.438	5.193	13.066	357
Log Head Tax Revenue	9.109	1.677	3.912	11.786	330

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Table A.2 – *continued from previous page*

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
Log Mine Tax Revenue	8.867	1.524	2.485	12.774	313
Panel B: Province Traits					
High *Repartimiento*	0.467	0.505	0	1	45
Log(*Repartimiento*)	11.422	0.494	9.220	12.206	45
Bishop Seat	0.106	0.312	0	1	47
Pop 1754 '0000	2.368	1.329	0.62	6.291	47
Log Pop 1754	9.932	0.535	8.731	11.049	47
Indigenous Pop 1754 '0000	1.306	0.658	0.458	2.969	47
Log Indigenous Pop 1754	9.356	0.501	8.429	10.299	47
Forced labor province? (*mita*)	0.468	0.504	0	1	47
Mining province?	0.574	0.5	0	1	47
Market Hub province?	0.404	0.496	0	1	47
Wage	1142.426	433.949	537	3000	47
Log(Wage)	6.989	0.308	6.286	8.006	47
Log Pop 1827	10.097	0.552	9.124	11.145	47
Gross Log GDP 1827	16.071	1.268	11.072	18.013	47
Gross Log GDP per capita	6.236	0.199	5.991	7.04	47
# Rebellions 1708-51	0.957	2.116	0	13	47
# Anti-governor rebellion 1708-51	0.383	0.739	0	4	47
# Other rebellion 1708-51	0.489	1.177	0	7	47
# Rebellion 1752-80	1.979	2.048	0	9	47
# Anti-governor rebellions 1752-80	1.128	1.541	0	7	47
# Other rebellion 1752-80	0.596	1.097	0	5	47
Panel C: District Traits					
% Indigenous 1780	0.651	0.262	0	1	372
% Indigenous 1876	0.663	0.272	0	1	456
% Illiteracy 1876	0.883	0.102	0.358	1	456
Population 1572	4079.425	7284.946	81	74988	160
Log (Pop) 1572	7.622	1.205	4.394	11.225	160
Log (Head Tax) Rate	1.525	0.515	-1.97	2.364	168
Log # Head taxpayers	5.865	1.318	1.609	9.786	265
% 1572 Taxes Priests	0.208	0.068	0.04	0.608	158
% 1572 Taxes Governors	0.13	0.043	0.011	0.386	156
% 1572 Taxes Caciques	0.047	0.045	0.003	0.512	152
% 1572 Taxes Encomenderos	0.386	0.158	0.024	0.735	148
% Head taxpayers 1572	0.211	0.058	0.103	0.697	160
% Old population 1572	0.046	0.019	0.01	0.139	160
% Boys 1572	0.217	0.048	0.069	0.54	160
% Women 1572	0.525	0.061	0.212	0.628	160
Panel D: Province Log per Capita Prices, Sales					
Avg Price War	-1.497	0.719	-3.41	-0.24	47
Min Price Peace	-2.061	0.733	-3.649	-0.561	47
# Sold	0.467	0.289	0.137	1.613	47
Avg Price Peace	-1.315	0.737	-3.318	0.311	47
First Price Peace	-1.968	0.702	-3.541	-0.561	47
Panel E: Spain Economic Outcomes 1673-1751					
Log total revenue	15.356	0.359	14.468	15.801	50
GDP per capita	875.263	22.756	853	920	80
Log crown expenditure	12.24	0.147	11.952	12.549	39
Log exchange rate	0.042	0.008	0.028	0.063	80
Inflation rate (egg, silver prices)	3.495	1.178	1.98	7.38	80
Panel F: Peru Economic Outcomes 1673-1751					
Log (silver)	13.867	0.592	12.417	15.277	66
Log (silver) from Minting	14.741	0.541	13.308	15.72	66
Avg Price Index (inflation)	103.937	13.026	69.767	130.347	66
Panel G: Contemporary Household Traits (2013)					
Log (HH consumption) normal prices	8.396	0.868	1.923	11.841	14494
Log (HH consumption) Lima prices	8.604	0.832	2.13	11.841	14494
Years of schooling (categories)	10.446	5.003	0	21	14493
# HH adults	2.85	1.403	1	10	14494

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Table A.2 – *continued from previous page*

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
# HH infants	0.283	0.555	0	7	14494
# HH kids	0.995	1.21	0	12	14494
Age	53.011	15.284	17	98	14494
Male	0.737	0.44	0	1	14494
Quechua speaker?	0.306	0.461	0	1	14492
"Indigenous peasant" group ID	0.214	0.41	0	1	6837
Born and live in district? (no migrant)	0.511	0.5	0	1	14494
Trust JNE?	0.24	0.427	0	1	5605
Trust ONPE?	0.276	0.447	0	1	5689
Trust district gov?	0.215	0.411	0	1	6464
Trust munic gov?	0.194	0.395	0	1	6283
Trust region gov?	0.159	0.366	0	1	5992
Trust police?	0.177	0.382	0	1	6466
Trust army?	0.288	0.453	0	1	6217
Trust judiciary?	0.146	0.353	0	1	6196
Trust written press?	0.184	0.388	0	1	6097
Trust radio/TV?	0.298	0.457	0	1	6417
Panel H: Contemporary District Traits					
% Indoor toilet HH	19.255	21.765	0	93	890
% Mud walls HH	74.102	28.388	0	100	890
Bordering other provinces?	0.512	0.5	0	1	897
Log (pop) 1990	8.370	1.308	5.501	12.885	871
Suitability Index	0.292	0.378	0	0.992	890
Distance to Lima kms	446.97	252.149	1.7	1010.149	890
Log (Distance to Lima)	5.850	0.869	0.531	6.918	890
Elevation meters	2716.663	1168.786	5	4672	890
Log (Elevation) z	7.529	1.344	1.609	8.449	890
Longitude	-74.95	2.859	-81.272	-69.093	890
Latitude	-11.985	3.079	-18.014	-3.571	890
Panel I: Peruvian Civil Conflict 1980-83					
# Total attacks	2.06	10.614	0	145	897
# Guerrilla attacks	0.913	5.5	0	88	897
# Political authority victims	0.207	1.085	0	11	897

Supplementary Tables and Figures

Table A.3: Office Prices and Quartile Measures of *Repartimiento* in War versus Peace

	(1)	(2)	(3)
DV: Log Real Prices (pesos)			
$WarLength \times Reparto_{2ndQuartile}$	-0.004	-0.004	-0.005
	(0.655)	(0.649)	(0.610)
	[0.704]	[0.688]	[0.686]
$WarLength \times Reparto_{3rdQuartile}$	0.015	0.015	0.014
	(0.117)	(0.119)	(0.140)
	[0.116]	[0.118]	[0.152]
$WarLength \times Reparto_{4thQuartile}$	0.019**	0.019**	0.014
	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.129)
	[0.05]	[0.052]	[0.16]
R-squared	0.833	0.833	0.828
Mean DV	8.216	8.216	8.238
Observations	463	463	502
Number of Provinces	44	44	48
Rebellion indicator	No	Yes	Yes
Provinces Bolivia	No	No	Yes

OLS estimates. Omitted category: 1st quartile. p-values in parentheses. Cluster-robust wild-bootstrap p-values in brackets. All specifications include province FE, year FE and time-trends for individual bishop regions. Column 3 includes four provinces ruled by the Audiencia of Charcas at the time (not Lima) but currently part of Peru. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Robustness: *Repartimiento* quota. To further corroborate the *repartimiento* quota I collected additional evidence on whether these quotas actually reflect these activities by examining the letters sent by every priest of the Cusco region in 1689-1690 to the King in Spain denouncing this practice. Although these letters encompass a limited number of provinces (14 or 30% of the total sample) and only reflects the early period of office-selling, it can provide some evidence of the reliability of this measure. From this correspondence I find that the provinces which were above the median of priest denunciations (weighted by number of parishes in the province) in 1690 are associated with higher *repartimiento* quotas in 1754. Specifically, being a province above the median of priest denunciations in Cusco is associated with a 40% higher *repartimiento* quota in 1754 compared to those below the median. More denunciations in 1690 are also associated with slightly higher prices for the positions in that period (1670-1690), although less precisely estimated, possibly due to the lower number of observations. The figures below summarize the findings.

Figure A.4: Repartimiento Quota and Priest Denunciations.



Table A.4: Office Prices and *Repartimiento* in War versus Peace: Only Succession Wars

	(1)	(2)	(3)
DV: Log Prices (pesos)			
Panel A			
$WarLength \times HighReparto$	0.020***	0.020***	0.016**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.011)
	[0.014]	[0.014]	[0.046]
Observations	463	463	502
R-squared	0.834	0.834	0.828
Provinces	44	44	48
Mean DV	8.216	8.216	8.238
Panel B			
$War \times HighReparto$	0.187***	0.187***	0.148**
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.029)
	[0.04]	[0.042]	[0.09]
Observations	463	463	502
R-squared	0.833	0.833	0.827
Provinces	44	44	48
Mean DV	8.216	8.216	8.238
Rebellion indicator	No	Yes	Yes
Provinces Bolivia	No	No	Yes

OLS estimates. p-values in parentheses. Cluster-robust wild-bootstrap p-values in brackets. All specifications include province FE, year FE and time-trends for individual bishop regions. Column 3 includes four provinces ruled by the Audiencia of Charcas at the time (not Lima) but currently part of Peru. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Figure A.5: Leaving One Province Out: t-statistics and β coefficient (red line: t=1.96)



- In general, non-nobles were not likely to enter offices with high extraction potential (as seen by more "negative" differences). However, when they did, it occurred overwhelmingly during wars.

Figure A.6: % Non-nobility appointments during war and peace



Table A.5: Office Prices and *Repartimiento* quotas: Including flexible province-specific time trends

	(1)	(2)	(3)
DV: Log Prices (pesos)			
Province-Specific Quadratic Time Trends			
$WarLength \times HighReparto$	0.017**	0.016**	0.012*
	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.099)
	[0.04]	[0.044]	[0.124]
Observations	463	463	502
R-squared	0.900	0.900	0.894
Clusters	44	44	48
Mean DV	8.216	8.216	8.238
Rebellion indicator	No	Yes	Yes
Provinces Bolivia	No	No	Yes

OLS estimates. p-values in parentheses. Cluster-robust wild-bootstrap p-values in brackets. All specifications include a rebellion indicator, province FE, year FE and time-trends for individual bishop regions. Column 3 includes four provinces ruled by the Audiencia of Charcas at the time (not Lima) but currently part of Peru. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.6: Comparing Social Status of Appointed Governors and to Post-Sales Period

	(1)	(2)	(3)
DV:	**Nobility?**	**Knighted Nobility?**	**Military?**
Panel A: Appointed versus Sold 1673-1752			
Appointed	0.126**	0.083*	0.298***
	(0.016)	(0.056)	(0.000)
	[0.146]	[0.286]	[0.004]
Observations	627	627	627
R-squared	0.188	0.254	0.281
Provinces	51	51	51
Mean DV	0.139	0.0973	0.209
Panel B: Pre and Post Sales 1673-1780			
$Pre1752 \times HighReparto$	-0.073	-0.073	-0.313***
	(0.385)	(0.288)	(0.002)
	[0.34]	[0.29]	[0.034]
Observations	700	700	700
R-squared	0.214	0.281	0.309
Provinces	49	49	49
Mean DV	0.130	0.0886	0.240
Rebellion indicator	No	Yes	Yes
Provinces Bolivia	No	No	Yes

OLS estimates. p-values in parentheses. Cluster-robust wild-bootstrap p-values in brackets. All specifications include rebelion indicator, province FE, year FE and time-trends for individual bishop regions. Column 3 includes four provinces ruled by the Audiencia of Charcas at the time (not Lima) but currently part of Peru. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.7: Wars in Europe and Economic Fundamentals in Peru: 1673-1752

	(1)	(2)	(3)
DV:	**Silver 1**	**Silver 2**	**Inflation**
Panel A: War Length			
$WarLength$	-0.020	-0.006	0.266
	(0.151)	(0.651)	(0.391)
Mean DV	13.87	14.74	103.9
Observations	66	66	66
R-squared	0.211	0.155	0.206
Panel B: War Indicator			
War	-0.019	-0.020	1.261
	(0.898)	(0.883)	(0.695)
Mean DV	13.87	14.74	103.9
Observations	66	66	66
R-squared	0.184	0.152	0.199

OLS estimates. p-values in parentheses. All specifications include a year trend. Silver 1 is calculated using tax proceeds, while Silver 2 uses mint production (more details in the Appendix). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.8: Wars in Europe and Economic Fundamentals in Spain: 1673-1752

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	War Length					War Indicator				
DV:	**Revenue**	**GDP PC**	**Expenditure**	**Exch Rate**	**Inflation**	**Revenue**	**GDP PC**	**Expenditure**	**Exch Rate**	**Inflation**
WarLength	-0.003	-0.043	0.004	-0.000*	-0.014					
	(0.296)	(0.797)	(0.439)	(0.091)	(0.463)					
WarIndicator						-0.023	-0.706	0.071	-0.003	-0.356**
						(0.437)	(0.651)	(0.124)	(0.108)	(0.041)
Mean DV	15.36	875.3	12.24	0.0425	3.495	15.36	875.3	12.24	0.0425	3.495
Observations	50	80	39	80	80	50	80	39	80	80
R-squared	0.933	0.920	0.153	0.250	0.622	0.932	0.920	0.194	0.247	0.640

OLS estimates. p-values in parentheses. All specifications include a year trend. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.9: Office Prices in War and Peace: Accounting for Wages

	(1)	(2)	(3)
DV: Log Prices (pesos)			
$WarLength \times HighReparto$	0.020***	0.020***	0.017**
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.011)
	[0.02]	[0.022]	[0.034]
$WarLength \times Wages$	0.007	0.007	0.007
	(0.515)	(0.510)	(0.542)
Observations	463	463	502
R-squared	0.833	0.833	0.828
Clusters	44	44	48
Mean DV	8.216	8.216	8.238
Rebellion indicator	No	Yes	Yes
Provinces Bolivia	No	No	Yes

OLS estimates. p-values in parentheses. Cluster-robust wild-bootstrap p-values in brackets. All specifications include province FE, year FE and time-trends for individual bishop regions. Column 3 includes four provinces ruled by the Audiencia of Charcas at the time (not Lima) but currently part of Peru. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.10: Office Prices and *Repartimiento* in War versus Peace: Mining, Forced Labor and Population Size

	(1)	(2)	(3)
DV: Log Prices (pesos)			
Panel A: Other Provincial Traits			
$WarLength \times HighReparto$	0.019***	0.019***	0.017**
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.013)
	[0.02]	[0.02]	[0.038]
$WarLength \times Mita$	-0.002	-0.002	-0.003
	(0.789)	(0.792)	(0.668)
$WarLength \times Mine$	-0.002	-0.002	-0.003
	(0.811)	(0.807)	(0.692)
$WarLength \times LogPopSize1754$	-0.001	-0.001	-0.004
	(0.791)	(0.793)	(0.494)
Mean DV	8.230	8.230	8.252
Observations	459	459	498
R-squared	0.833	0.833	0.829
Clusters	43	43	47
Rebellion indicator	No	Yes	Yes
Provinces Bolivia	No	No	Yes

OLS estimates. p-values in parentheses. Cluster-robust wild-bootstrap p-values in brackets. All specifications include province FE, year FE and time-trends for individual bishop regions. Column 3 includes four provinces ruled by the Audiencia of Charcas at the time (not Lima) but currently part of Peru. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.11: Office Prices and *Repartimiento* in War versus Peace: Agricultural Suitability & Market Hubs

	(1)	(2)	(3)
DV: Log Real Prices (pesos)			
Panel A: Market Hub			
$WarLength \times MarketHub$	0.014**	0.014**	0.013**
	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.042)
	[0.094]	[0.094]	[0.072]
Observations	479	479	518
R-squared	0.833	0.833	0.829
Clusters	47	47	51
Mean DV	8.230	8.230	8.251
Panel B: Agricultural Suitability			
$WarLength \times Suitability$	0.017*	0.017*	0.016*
	(0.080)	(0.078)	(0.090)
	[0.14]	[0.142]	[0.14]
Observations	479	479	518
R-squared	0.832	0.832	0.828
Clusters	47	47	51
Mean DV	8.230	8.230	8.251
Panel C: Include Both			
$WarLength \times HighReparto$	0.020***	0.020***	0.018***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.010)
	[0.016]	[0.016]	[0.03]
$WarLength \times MarketHub$	0.004	0.004	0.005
	(0.562)	(0.557)	(0.491)
	[0.63]	[0.63]	[0.512]
$WarLength \times Suitability$	0.020*	0.020*	0.020*
	(0.056)	(0.055)	(0.057)
	[0.088]	[0.088]	[0.086]
Observations	463	463	502
R-squared	0.835	0.835	0.831
Clusters	44	44	48
Mean DV	8.216	8.216	8.238
Rebellion indicator	No	Yes	Yes
Provinces Bolivia	No	No	Yes

OLS estimates. p-values in parentheses. Cluster-robust wild-bootstrap p-values in brackets. All specifications include province FE, year FE and time-trends for individual bishop regions. Column 3 includes four provinces ruled by the Audiencia of Charcas at the time (not Lima) but currently part of Peru. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.12: Office Prices and Revenue Collection

	(1)	(2)	(3)
DV: Log(Prices) in Pesos			
Panel A: Sales (*alcabala*) Taxes			
$WarLength \times HighReparto$	0.026***	0.026***	0.022**
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.013)
	[0.024]	[0.024]	[0.054]
$SalesTaxes$	0.003	0.001	-0.009
	(0.959)	(0.990)	(0.865)
Observations	280	280	301
R-squared	0.828	0.829	0.832
Clusters	42	42	45
Panel B: Head (*tributo*) Taxes			
$WarLength \times HighReparto$	0.022**	0.022**	0.018*
	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.062)
	[0.102]	[0.104]	[0.178]
$HeadTaxes$	-0.001	0.001	0.011
	(0.989)	(0.980)	(0.785)
Observations	255	255	276
R-squared	0.818	0.818	0.822
Clusters	40	40	43
Panel C: Mining Taxes			
$WarLength \times HighReparto$	0.031***	0.031***	0.024**
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.028)
	[0.178]	[0.172]	[0.254]
$MiningTaxes$	0.054	0.055	0.056
	(0.204)	(0.204)	(0.176)
Observations	241	241	266
R-squared	0.818	0.819	0.820
Clusters	38	38	41
Panel D: All Taxes			
$WarLength \times HighReparto$	0.027**	0.027**	0.021*
	(0.047)	(0.050)	(0.086)
	[0.246]	[0.25]	[0.34]
$MiningTaxes$	0.066	0.068	0.087*
	(0.204)	(0.192)	(0.087)
$TotalTaxes$	-0.037	-0.057	-0.151
	(0.825)	(0.744)	(0.373)
$SalesTaxes$	0.049	0.045	0.037
	(0.599)	(0.636)	(0.683)
$HeadTaxes$	-0.027	-0.020	0.009
	(0.669)	(0.760)	(0.883)
Observations	210	210	227
R-squared	0.806	0.806	0.811
Clusters	38	38	40
Rebellion indicator	No	Yes	Yes
Provinces Bolivia	No	No	Yes

OLS estimates. p-values in parentheses. Cluster-robust wild-bootstrap p-values in brackets. All specifications include a province FE, year FE and time-trends for individual bishop regions. Column 3 includes four provinces ruled by the Audiencia of Charcas at the time (not Lima) but currently part of Peru. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.13: Appoint versus Sell and *Repartimiento*

	(1)	(2)	(3)
DV: Appointed (= 1)			
Panel A: Including War Length			
$WarLength \times HighReparto$	0.002	0.002	0.001
	(0.757)	(0.766)	(0.820)
	[0.796]	[0.802]	[0.838]
Observations	556	556	605
R-squared	0.520	0.520	0.521
Provinces	44	44	48
Mean DV	8.216	8.216	8.238
Panel B: Including War Indicator			
$War \times HighReparto$	0.026	0.026	0.037
	(0.643)	(0.649)	(0.502)
	[0.674]	[0.672]	[0.552]
Observations	556	556	605
R-squared	0.520	0.520	0.521
Provinces	44	44	48
Mean DV	8.216	8.216	8.238
Rebellion indicator	No	Yes	Yes
Provinces Bolivia	No	No	Yes

OLS estimates. p-values in parentheses. Cluster-robust wild-bootstrap p-values in brackets. All specifications include a province FE, year FE and time-trends for individual bishop regions. Column 3 includes four provinces ruled by the Audiencia of Charcas at the time (not Lima) but currently part of Peru. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.14: Gap in Office Prices and Geographic Traits

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	Difference in Prices					**Share Positions Sold**				
DV:	Elevation	Distance	Suitability	Longitude	Latitude	Elevation	Distance	Suitability	Longitude	Latitude
$AvgPrice_{war}$	0.311	-0.016	0.030	0.215	-0.936					
	(0.170)	(0.859)	(0.911)	(0.716)	(0.166)					
$MinPrice_{peace}$	0.164	-0.072	0.011	0.964	-0.722					
	(0.441)	(0.457)	(0.956)	(0.205)	(0.299)					
$SharePositionsSold$						0.948	-0.093	-0.392	1.300	-2.831**
						(0.128)	(0.572)	(0.417)	(0.315)	(0.045)
Observations	890	890	890	890	890	890	890	890	890	890
Clusters	47	47	47	47	47	47	47	47	47	47
R-squared	0.053	0.024	0.001	0.076	0.122	0.038	0.005	0.015	0.016	0.064

OLS estimates. Clustered robust p-values at the province level in parentheses. Prices and share of positions sold are weighted by population size in 1754. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.15: Gap in Office Prices and Other Provincial Traits

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	Difference in Prices						**Share Positions Sold**					
DV	Log(Reparto)	Mine?	Mita?	Market Hub?	Log(Ind Pop)	Anti-Gov Reb?	Log(Reparto)	Mine?	Mita?	Market Hub?	Log(Ind Pop)	Anti-Gov Reb?
$AvgPrice_{war}$	0.204	0.191*	0.182	0.051	-0.251*	-0.020						
	(0.222)	(0.096)	(0.152)	(0.708)	(0.086)	(0.920)						
$MinPrice_{peace}$	0.106	-0.082	-0.134	-0.182	-0.177	-0.098						
	(0.362)	(0.475)	(0.276)	(0.130)	(0.137)	(0.642)						
$SharePositionsSold$							0.044	0.121	0.254	-0.323	-1.166***	-0.668
							(0.878)	(0.643)	(0.364)	(0.275)	(0.000)	(0.283)
Observations	872	897	897	897	897	897	872	897	897	897	897	897
Clusters	45	47	47	47	47	47	45	47	47	47	47	47
R-squared	0.158	0.051	0.039	0.047	0.309	0.008	0.001	0.005	0.020	0.033	0.411	0.043

OLS estimates. Clustered robust p-values at the province level in parentheses. Prices and share of positions sold are weighted by population size in 1754. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.16: Gap in Office Prices and Pre-Office-selling (1572) Taxation Rates per Province

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Difference in Prices			**Share Positions Sold**		
DV:	Log Pop 1572	Tax Rate 1572	Log Taxed Pop	Log Pop 1572	Tax Rate 1572	Log Taxed Pop
$AvgPrice_{war}$	0.277	-0.019	0.333*			
	(0.210)	(0.776)	(0.092)			
$MinPrice_{peace}$	-0.262	-0.008	0.012			
	(0.182)	(0.931)	(0.954)			
$SharePositionsSold$				0.404	-0.139	0.469
				(0.549)	(0.448)	(0.397)
Observations	160	168	265	160	168	265
Clusters	29	33	46	29	33	46
R-squared	0.021	0.001	0.035	0.011	0.007	0.011

OLS estimates. Clustered robust p-values at the province level in parentheses. Prices and share of positions sold are weighted by population size in 1754. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.17: Gap in Office Prices and Pre-Office-selling (1572) Administrative Capacity per Province

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Difference in Prices				**Share Positions Sold**			
DV:	% Priest	% Governor	% Cacique	% Encomienda	% Priest	% Governor	% Cacique	% Encomienda
$AvgPrice_{war}$	0.009	0.001	-0.009	-0.049				
	(0.249)	(0.934)	(0.175)	(0.138)				
$MinPrice_{peace}$	-0.015	0.001	0.007	0.024				
	(0.150)	(0.888)	(0.302)	(0.353)				
$SharePositionsSold$					0.018*	0.013	-0.002	-0.042
					(0.061)	(0.141)	(0.741)	(0.242)
Observations	158	156	152	148	158	156	152	148
R-squared	0.016	0.000	0.012	0.028	0.007	0.009	0.000	0.007
Clusters	32	32	31	32	32	32	31	32

OLS estimates. Clustered robust p-values at the province level in parentheses. Prices and share of positions sold are weighted by population size in 1754. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.18: Gap in Office Prices and Pre-Office-selling (1572) Demographics per Province

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Difference in Prices				**Share Positions Sold**			
DV:	% Tax Payer	% Old	% Boys	% Women	% Tax Payer	% Old	% Boys	% Women
$AvgPrice_{war}$	-0.012	0.000	0.009*	0.003				
	(0.226)	(0.924)	(0.059)	(0.720)				
$MinPrice_{peace}$	-0.007	-0.002	0.009	0.001				
	(0.344)	(0.370)	(0.161)	(0.910)				
$SharePositionsSold$					-0.014	-0.004	0.009	0.009
					(0.211)	(0.531)	(0.257)	(0.440)
Observations	160	160	160	160	160	160	160	160
R-squared	0.035	0.005	0.042	0.001	0.006	0.004	0.003	0.002
Clusters	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29

OLS estimates. Clustered robust p-values at the province level in parentheses. Prices and share of positions sold are weighted by population size in 1754. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.19: Determinants of Province Profitability: Average Office Prices and Provincial Traits

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
DV: Log(Average Office Prices)					
Log(Elevation)	0.132*				
	(0.075)				
Suitability Index		-0.189			
		(0.437)			
Log(Distance Lima)			0.047		
			(0.618)		
Log(Repartimiento Quota)				0.532***	
				(0.001)	
Log(Wages)					0.601*
					(0.064)
Observations	48	48	48	48	48
R-squared	0.056	0.017	0.006	0.330	0.142
DV: Log(Average Office Prices)					
Mines?	0.246				
	(0.116)				
Forced Labor?		0.174			
		(0.224)			
Market Hub?			0.183		
			(0.189)		
Log(Indigenous Pop)				0.207**	
				(0.039)	
# Anti-Governor Rebellions					2.055
					(0.453)
Observations	48	48	48	47	48
R-squared	0.059	0.030	0.031	0.108	0.009

OLS estimates. Clustered robust p-values at the province level in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.20: Table 5 from Main Text Reporting All Controls

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: Baseline				
	Household-Level		*District-Level*	
DV	Log (Household Consumption)	Years of Education	Indoor Toilet?	Dirt Floor?
$AvgPrice_{war}$	-0.317***	-1.134***	-5.174***	10.939***
	(0.000)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)
	[0.006]	[0.066]	[0.022]	[0.01]
$MinPrice_{peace}$	0.190**	0.638	1.887	-7.045**
	(0.021)	(0.136)	(0.395)	(0.048)
	[0.156]	[0.31]	[0.532]	[0.138]
Log Elevation	-0.119***	-0.256**	-7.626***	12.425***
	(0.000)	(0.017)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Suitability Index	-0.168	-1.271	-0.819	7.412*
	(0.197)	(0.108)	(0.760)	(0.082)
Log Distance Lima	-0.005	0.017	-4.152**	3.645
	(0.843)	(0.875)	(0.041)	(0.253)
Latitude	-0.038*	-0.359***	-0.607	0.384
	(0.092)	(0.008)	(0.573)	(0.872)
Longitude	-0.004	-0.302	-0.081	-2.685
	(0.896)	(0.102)	(0.947)	(0.278)
$HHAdults$	0.010	0.255***		
	(0.457)	(0.000)		
$HHInfants$	-0.051***	-0.120*		
	(0.004)	(0.098)		
$HHChildren$	-0.116***	-0.540***		
	(0.000)	(0.000)		
Age	-0.019***	-0.127***		
	(0.000)	(0.000)		
Male?	0.093***	1.686***		
	(0.000)	(0.000)		
Observations	14,494	14,493	889	889
R-squared	0.273	0.238	0.297	0.398
Clusters	47	47	47	47

OLS estimates. Clustered robust p-values at the province level in parentheses. Cluster-robust wild-bootstrap p-values in brackets. Prices are weighted by population size in 1754. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.21: Office Prices and Contemporary Development: Alternative Measures of Prices

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Household-Level		*District-Level*	
DV	Log (Household Consumption)	Years of Education	Indoor Toilet?	Dirt Floor?
	Panel A			
$MeanPrice_{war}$	-0.211***	-0.681*	-4.240**	8.252*
	(0.004)	(0.080)	(0.042)	(0.068)
	[0.028]	[0.174]	[0.114]	[0.108]
$MeanPrice_{peace}$	0.063	0.077	0.519	-3.236
	(0.357)	(0.834)	(0.818)	(0.494)
	[0.422]	[0.884]	[0.864]	[0.608]
Observations	14,494	14,493	889	889
R-squared	0.266	0.235	0.295	0.385
Clusters	47	47	47	47
	Panel B			
$MeanPrice_{war}$	-0.252***	-0.851**	-4.518***	8.869***
	(0.002)	(0.032)	(0.007)	(0.008)
	[0.034]	[0.126]	[0.046]	[0.018]
$FirstPrice_{peace}$	0.123	0.318	1.043	-4.557
	(0.141)	(0.496)	(0.634)	(0.214)
	[0.334]	[0.682]	[0.694]	[0.336]
Observations	14,494	14,493	889	889
R-squared	0.269	0.236	0.296	0.389
Clusters	47	47	47	47

OLS estimates. Clustered robust p-values at the province level in parentheses. Cluster-robust wild-bootstrap p-values in brackets. In addition, all specifications include: elevation, distance to Lima, latitude, longitude, and agricultural suitability index. Household specifications also include: number of adults, infants, and kids in the household, age and gender. Prices are weighted by population size in 1754. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.22: Office Prices and Contemporary Development: Adding Controls

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Household-Level		*District-Level*	
DV	Log (Household Consumption)	Years of Education	Indoor Toilet?	Dirt Floor?
	Panel A: Add Forced Labor (Mita)			
$AvgPrice_{war}$	-0.231***	-0.904**	-4.935**	10.598***
	(0.002)	(0.017)	(0.011)	(0.003)
	[0.022]	[0.088]	[0.046]	[0.008]
$MinPrice_{peace}$	0.117*	0.443	0.931	-5.678*
	(0.087)	(0.269)	(0.680)	(0.084)
	[0.25]	[0.45]	[0.754]	[0.192]
$Mita$	-0.365***	-0.972*	-5.187	7.415
	(0.000)	(0.077)	(0.116)	(0.136)
	[0.008]	[0.104]	[0.112]	[0.176]
R-squared	0.296	0.243	0.306	0.409
	Panel B: Add Mine Indicator			
$AvgPrice_{war}$	-0.259***	-0.932**	-4.436**	10.883***
	(0.001)	(0.016)	(0.011)	(0.003)
	[0.012]	[0.078]	[0.042]	[0.006]
$MinPrice_{peace}$	0.150**	0.496	1.092	-6.985*
	(0.023)	(0.172)	(0.556)	(0.067)
	[0.15]	[0.346]	[0.67]	[0.198]
$Mine$	-0.277**	-0.961*	-6.368**	0.484
	(0.013)	(0.090)	(0.044)	(0.934)
	[0.036]	[0.15]	[0.072]	[0.97]
R-squared	0.287	0.243	0.310	0.398
	Panel C: Add Bishop Seat			
$AvgPrice_{war}$	-0.289***	-0.996***	-4.384**	10.366***
	(0.000)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.007)
	[0.006]	[0.082]	[0.044]	[0.014]
$MinPrice_{peace}$	0.174**	0.548	1.326	-6.724*
	(0.020)	(0.153)	(0.516)	(0.066)
	[0.104]	[0.248]	[0.306]	[0.116]
$Bishop$	0.540***	2.937***	30.600***	-17.540
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.354)
	[0.026]	[0.046]	[0.082]	[0.466]
R-squared	0.298	0.257	0.360	0.418
	Panel D: Add Wages			
$AvgPrice_{war}$	-0.294***	-1.018**	-4.030**	10.550***
	(0.000)	(0.010)	(0.027)	(0.008)
	[0.006]	[0.086]	[0.09]	[0.02]
$MinPrice_{peace}$	0.157**	0.463	1.249	-6.828*
	(0.027)	(0.188)	(0.457)	(0.066)
	[0.174]	[0.38]	[0.594]	[0.176]
$Wages$	0.000***	0.002***	0.017***	-0.006
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.475)
	[0.002]	[0.016]	[0.012]	[0.584]
R-squared	0.303	0.262	0.348	0.402
	Panel E: Add Size Indigenous Pop			
$AvgPrice_{war}$	-0.315***	-1.145***	-4.957**	12.960***
	(0.000)	(0.004)	(0.016)	(0.003)
	[0.006]	[0.068]	[0.068]	[0.022]
$MinPrice_{peace}$	0.195**	0.613	2.065	-5.388*
	(0.024)	(0.174)	(0.337)	(0.090)
	[0.164]	[0.336]	[0.532]	[0.206]
$IndigPopSize1754$	0.015	-0.077	0.721	6.705
	(0.798)	(0.815)	(0.670)	(0.103)
	[0.832]	[0.868]	[0.73]	[0.228]
R-squared	0.274	0.238	0.297	0.415
Observations	14,494	14,493	889	889
Clusters	47	47	47	47

OLS estimates. Clustered robust p-values at the province level in parentheses. Cluster-robust wild-bootstrap p-values in brackets. All specifications include: elevation, distance to Lima, latitude, longitude, and agricultural constraints suitability index. Household specifications also include: number of adults, infants, and kids in the household, age and gender. Prices are weighted by population size in 1754. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.23: Placebo Test: Assigning office prices to groups of district randomly

	(1)	**(2)**	**(3)**	**(4)**
	Household-Level		*District-Level*	
DV	Log (Household Consumption)	Years of Education	Indoor Toilet?	Dirt Floor?
$PlaceboAvgPrice_{war}$	0.012	0.016	0.730	0.417
	(0.442)	(0.848)	(0.289)	(0.742)
$PlaceboMinPrice_{peace}$	-0.015	-0.052	0.680	-1.976
	(0.260)	(0.410)	(0.533)	(0.101)
Observations	14,494	14,493	889	889
R-squared	0.266	0.229	0.284	0.364
Clusters	47	47	47	47

OLS estimates. Clustered robust p-values at the province level in parentheses. Prices are weighted by population size in 1754. Estimates may vary depending on the initial value of random-number used (seed) and / or sorting of observations. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.24: Gap in Office Prices and Geographic Traits in Neighboring Districts Sample

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	Difference in Prices					**Share Positions Sold**				
DV:	Elevation	Distance	Suitability	Longitude	Latitude	Elevation	Distance	Suitability	Longitude	Latitude
$AvgPrice_{war}$	0.257	0.015	-0.138	0.012	-0.673					
	(0.112)	(0.862)	(0.465)	(0.985)	(0.325)					
$MinPrice_{peace}$	0.029	-0.078	0.034	0.629	-0.315					
	(0.828)	(0.396)	(0.826)	(0.289)	(0.555)					
$SharePositionsSold$						0.353	0.041	-0.376	0.112	-1.120
						(0.292)	(0.833)	(0.324)	(0.926)	(0.240)
Observations	459	459	459	459	459	459	459	459	459	459
R-squared	0.036	0.015	0.013	0.026	0.054	0.010	0.001	0.022	0.000	0.015
Clusters	47	47	47	47	47	47	47	47	47	47

OLS estimates. Clustered robust p-values at the province level in parentheses. Prices and share of positions sold are weighted by population size in 1754. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.25: Gap in Office Prices and Pre-Office-Selling (1572) Taxation Rates in Neighboring Districts Sample

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Difference in Prices			**Share Positions Sold**		
DV:	Log Pop 1572	Tax Rate 1572	Log Taxed Pop	Log Pop 1572	Tax Rate 1572	Log Taxed Pop
$AvgPrice_{war}$	0.293	0.031	0.460*			
	(0.292)	(0.691)	(0.065)			
$MinPrice_{peace}$	-0.474**	-0.008	-0.265			
	(0.040)	(0.922)	(0.276)			
$SharePositionsSold$				0.187	0.020	0.330
				(0.791)	(0.834)	(0.608)
Observations	109	113	156	109	113	156
Clusters	28	30	44	28	30	44
R-squared	0.045	0.001	0.034	0.003	0.000	0.007

OLS estimates. Clustered robust p-values at the province level in parentheses. Prices and share of positions sold are weighted by population size in 1754. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.26: Gap in Office Prices and Pre-Office-Selling (1572) Administrative Capacity in Neighboring Districts Sample

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Difference in Prices				**Share Positions Sold**			
DV:	% Priest	% Governor	% Cacique	% Encomienda	% Priest	% Governor	% Cacique	% Encomienda
$AvgPrice_{war}$	0.013	-0.005	0.001	-0.053				
	(0.253)	(0.574)	(0.873)	(0.140)				
$MinPrice_{peace}$	-0.006	0.005	-0.003	0.020				
	(0.600)	(0.455)	(0.602)	(0.413)				
$SharePositionsSold$					0.023*	0.010	0.004	-0.042
					(0.056)	(0.251)	(0.539)	(0.312)
Observations	106	104	102	99	106	104	102	99
R-squared	0.009	0.004	0.003	0.033	0.012	0.006	0.002	0.008
Clusters	30	30	29	29	30	30	29	29

OLS estimates. Clustered robust p-values at the province level in parentheses. Prices and share of positions sold are weighted by population size in 1754. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.27: Gap in Office Prices and Pre-Office-Selling (1572) Demographic Traits in Neighboring Districts Sample

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Difference in Prices				**Share Positions Sold**			
DV:	% Tax Payer	% Old	% Boys	% Women	% Tax Payer	% Old	% Boys	% Women
$AvgPrice_{war}$	-0.019	0.001	0.012**	0.006				
	(0.120)	(0.844)	(0.039)	(0.536)				
$MinPrice_{peace}$	0.001	-0.002	-0.001	0.002				
	(0.889)	(0.601)	(0.794)	(0.795)				
$SharePositionsSold$					-0.013	-0.006	0.017***	0.002
					(0.274)	(0.190)	(0.004)	(0.829)
Observations	109	109	109	109	109	109	109	109
R-squared	0.036	0.003	0.027	0.005	0.005	0.012	0.018	0.000
Clusters	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	28

OLS estimates. Clustered robust p-values at the province level in parentheses. Prices and share of positions sold are weighted by population size in 1754. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.28: Office Prices and Reported Migration: 1754

	(1)	(2)	(3)
DV:	**% Locals**	**% Foreigners**	**Log(# Tax Payers)**
$AvgPrice_{war}$	0.052	-0.058	-0.014
	(0.453)	(0.414)	(0.948)
	[0.478]	[0.442]	[0.948]
$MinPrice_{peace}$	0.046	-0.071	-0.263
	(0.434)	(0.231)	(0.145)
	[0.442]	[0.27]	[0.112]
Observations	47	47	47
R-squared	0.216	0.267	0.399

OLS estimates. Clustered robust p-values at the province level in parentheses. Cluster-robust wild-bootstrap p-values in brackets. All specifications include: elevation, distance to Lima, latitude, longitude, and agricultural suitability index. Prices are weighted by population size in 1754. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.29: Office Prices, Contemporary Migration and Development Outcomes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Sample without...	bottom 25th pct	25th-50th pct	50th-75th pct	top 25th pct
migrant presence...	*high*	*medium high*	*medium low*	*low*
	Panel A: DV: Log(HH Consumption)			
$AvgPrice_{war}$	-0.247***	-0.342***	-0.311***	-0.279***
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)
	[0.05]	[0.012]	[0.014]	[0.006]
$MinPrice_{peace}$	0.156***	0.222**	0.178*	0.144*
	(0.008)	(0.025)	(0.071)	(0.054)
	[0.158]	[0.13]	[0.196]	[0.158]
p-value coef comparison test to baseline:	0.255	0.411	0.819	0.207
Observations	7,284	10,846	12,452	12,959
R-squared	0.268	0.292	0.243	0.242
Clusters	45	47	47	47
	Panel B: DV: Years of Schooling			
$AvgPrice_{war}$	-0.996***	-1.044*	-1.087**	-0.955**
	(0.002)	(0.053)	(0.017)	(0.08)
	[0.072]	[0.16]	[0.098]	[0.08]
$MinPrice_{peace}$	0.583**	0.582	0.557	0.455
	(0.038)	(0.294)	(0.251)	(0.316)
	[0.282]	[0.45]	[0.354]	[0.488]
p-value coef comparison test to baseline:	0.71	0.69	0.73	0.15
Observations	7,284	10,845	12,451	12,958
R-squared	0.313	0.240	0.206	0.207
Clusters	45	47	47	47

OLS estimates. Clustered robust p-values at the province level in parentheses. Cluster-robust wild-bootstrap p-values in brackets. All specifications include: elevation, distance to Lima, latitude, longitude, and agricultural suitability index. Household specifications also include: number of adults, infants, and kids in the household, age, and gender of head of household. Prices are weighted by population size in 1754. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.30: Office Prices and Self-Reported Trust

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Self-Reported Trust Measures: 2013 ENAHO				
DV:	*Overall*	*Local Government*	*Electoral*	*Judicial*	*Media*
$AvgPrice_{war}$	-0.148	-0.052	-0.051**	-0.049	-0.011
	(0.238)	(0.286)	(0.024)	(0.257)	(0.602)
	[0.21]	[0.386]	[0.05]	[0.284]	[0.566]
$MinPrice_{peace}$	-0.045	-0.009	0.017	0.016	-0.046**
	(0.692)	(0.834)	(0.459)	(0.700)	(0.027)
	[0.686]	[0.868]	[0.522]	[0.722]	[0.074]
Observations	5,013	5,821	5,521	5,947	6,065
R-squared	0.024	0.023	0.016	0.025	0.013
Clusters	47	47	47	47	47

OLS estimates. Clustered robust p-values at the province level in parentheses. Cluster-robust wild-bootstrap p-values in brackets. All specifications include: elevation, distance to Lima, latitude, longitude, and agricultural suitability index. Household specifications also include: number of adults, infants, and kids in the household, age, and gender of head of household. Prices are weighted by population size in 1754. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

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