Supplemental Information

November 29, 2017

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1 Introduction

We study the effect of disseminating politician performance information—culled from Advocates Coalition for Development and the Environment (ACODE)'s Local Government Councilor Score Card Initiative (LGCSCI)—to their constituents using a sample of 406 district councilors from 20 districts local governments in Uganda. In this Supplementary Information (SI) we provide additional information on the: (1) research design, (2) main results (including robustness checks), and (4) tangible benefits results and robustness. The study timeline depicting the research and partner activities can be seen in Figure 1.

ACODE activities																				
		2011		2012			2013			2014			2015							
Scorecard FY 2011/12																				
Scorecard FY 2012/13																				
ID meeting 1st round																				
Scorecard FY 2013/14																				
ID meeting 2nd round																				
Scorecard FY 2014/15																				

Figure	1:	Study	Timeline
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Research team activities																				
	2011			2012			2013			2014				2015						
Councilor baseline																				
Citizen baseline																				
Audit round 1																				
Audir round 2																				
Councilor endline																				
Technocrat survey																				
Financial year	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2

Note: The top panel depicts ACODE activities, while the bottom panel depicts the research team activities.

2 Expanded Research Design Section

ACODE, our NGO partner, implements its councilor scorecard Initiative program in twenty districts from across Uganda's four regions: Kanungu, Ntungamo, Rukungiri, Kabarole, Hoima, and Buliisa (Western region); Agago, Amuru, Gulu, and Lira (North and West Nile region); Amuria and Soroti (Eastern region); and Nakapiripirit and Moroto (Northeast or Karamajong region).

All the original data collected for this study was conducted in partnership with the Ugandan office of Innovations for Poverty Action (IPA). IPA describes itself in the following way on its website: *IPA is a research and policy non-profit that discovers and promotes effective solutions to global*

poverty problems. IPA brings together researchers and decision-makers to design, rigorously evaluate, and refine these solutions and their applications, ensuring that the evidence created is used to improve the lives of the world's poor. IPA provides an infrastructure to design and implement randomized evaluations to measure the effectiveness of programs and policies aimed at helping the poor. To this end, IPA provides in-country support such as an equipped office, field managers, data specialists, and survey enumerators. Principal Investigators are in charge of managing their own project staff housed at IPA to execute the research.

We received research permits from the Ugandan government (the Uganda National Council for Science and Technology (UNCST) and the president's office) as well as IRB clearance for the research arm of IPA.

2.1 Citizen Baseline Survey

We conducted a citizen survey with 6, 123 respondents between August to December 2012 to assess constituents' political attitudes and knowledge at baseline. The survey population consisted of a random sample of adult constituents in every subcounty in the study area districts. Respondents were selected using a multi-stage random sampling procedure. First, within each subcounty, two parishes were randomly selected. Second, within each selected parish, two villages were randomly selected. At this point, a "mobilizer" traveled to the sampled villages to further sample 9 respondents to participate in the in-person survey.

When arriving to a sampled village, IPA's mobilizer first introduced IPA and him/herself to the village chairperson, an elected position, and asked permission to survey in the village and to receive a copy of the household listings. With the help of the village chairperson (who was paid by the research team for conducting the listing exercise), the mobilizer created an accurate household listing by updating existing household lists. The mobilizer used a random number list provided by the research team to select the survey households based on the total number of households in the village. Next, the mobilizer designated the gender of the respondent from each selected household, in a way that ensured gender parity.

The mobilizer personally visited each sampled household, introduced him/herself and IPA, and asked a household member present to list all the household members of the preselected gender. The mobilizer then used numbered cards to randomly pick a respondent from this list and gave the respondent or the household member (if he/she was absent) an appointment slip. This slip informed them when an enumerator from IPA would visit their home for the interview. The mobilizer also sketched a map of the village indicating selected households using landmarks and indicating a central point and completed a tracking sheet for each respondent with the respondent's name, directions to the household, the respondent's contact number, his/her relationship to the household head, and the time of day of the appointment that was arranged for the interview.

On the survey day, enumerators were instructed to visit each sampled villager twice, before

a sampled respondent was replaced. Once a sampled villager was identified, a standard consent was confirmed prior to administering the survey instrument using handheld PDAs. The questionnaire elicited data about respondents' use of mobile technology, level of political participation, political knowledge, including knowledge of councilor duties and performance, perception of public service provision and attitudes towards women's political involvement, amongst other attitudes such as internal efficacy. IPA also conducted a short back-check survey on a random sample of respondents in order to audit the job of the enumerators, who were fully informed that they would be back-checked.

2.2 Councilor Surveys

We conducted a baseline survey of 396 district councilors between August and November 2012. The target population included all "regular" councilors, who are elected through popular vote to represent citizens in a single subcounty, and "special woman" councilors, who are elected through popular vote to represent citizens in special constituencies (one to three subcounties). The target population did not include youth councilors or person with disability councilors since they represent the district as a whole and are elected by special bodies rather than a geographically defined constituency. We achieved a 98% response rate of our target population.

We further conducted an endline councilor survey between June and August 2015. This survey was administered to 374 councilors. Attrition was minimal and reveals no systematic difference in attrition between treatment and control. Most of this study's councilor performance outcome measures—e.g., the scorecard, peer evaluation, technocrats' assessment and constituency development spending—do not rely on surveying councilors in-person, but rather, we use the survey to gather background characteristics of councilors. Of those that took the baseline survey, there were 5 councilors in the control area and 2 in the treated area that resigned, 2 control councilors and 1 treated councilor died in office, and 9 control and 8 treated councilors refused to take the endline survey.

Attrition Reason	Control	Treatment (ID)
Resigned	5	2
Died	2	1
Refused to be interviewed in Endline	9	8
Total	16	11

Table 1: Attrition at endline survey

IPA enumerators contacted councilors and made personal appointments with them to conduct the interview. Similar to the citizen survey, standard consent was confirmed prior to administering the survey instrument. IPA also conducted a short back-check survey on a random sample of councilors in order to audit the job of the enumerators, who were fully informed that they would be back-checked.

2.3 Bureaucrat Survey

In Uganda, civil servants are often referred to as "technocrats." The short technocrats' survey (22 questions) involved 77 respondents and took place between June and August 2015 (concurrent with the endline councilor survey). Survey respondents came from the same 20 districts, with between three and five from each district. The target population were district officers at health, water, education and chief administration offices. Technocrats were contacted and personal appointments made with the district officers. As in all our surveys, standard consent was confirmed prior to administering the survey instrument.

2.4 Councilors' background characteristics

We briefly describe some background characteristics of both the district councils and councilors. Uganda's 112 district governments, the government tier directly below the central government, are responsible for crafting local policy; formulating integrated development plans based on local priorities and needs; and implementing, regulating, and monitoring public service delivery. More information can be found in the Local Government Act (1997), which defines the duties of the councilors and the district council.

District local governments are comprised of a civil service bureaucracy and an elected legislative body, the district council. District councils are vested with the political and executive authority necessary to implement policy, including the powers to make laws in the form of district ordinances and bylaws (as long as they do not conflict with the constitution). Bureaucrats are chiefly responsible for implementing public services and projects according to the budget and work plan crafted annually in collaboration with the district's political arm and passed by the district council.

Councilors are elected to represent subcounties at the district level. Councils vary in size depending on the size of the district. The average district council in our sample has 20 members (range from 10 to 33). In 2006, Uganda implemented a gender quota mandating that at least one-third of councilors are female, in an effort to increase women's access to politics. To achieve this goal, "special woman" constituencies, in which only female candidates can compete, were overlaid on top of "regular" subcounty constituencies, such that special woman constituencies encompass between one and three subcounties, depending on the size of the population. Thus, citizens are represented by two councilors: a regular (usually male) councilor who represents a single subcounty, and a female councilor who represents up to two additional subcounties. Both types of councilors are elected in first-past-the-post, single-member constituency elections. We discuss this quota institution and how this informs the randomization of the treatment in more detail below.

The current partisan composition of the districts varies across Uganda. The map in Figure 2 shows the share of councilors in each district council caucusing with the ruling party - National Resistance Movement (NRM). Of the 20 districts in the study area, the opposition has a majority in only five (labeled by name).¹ Table 2, which provides information on the characteristics of councilors in the study area, shows the partisan breakdown. 71% are members of the ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM) party. Less than fifth of councilors (12% and 6% respectively) caucus with the two main opposition parties: The Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) and Uganda People's Congress (UPC). Nearly 10 percent of district councilors are independents.

Given that ACODE operates in all of the country's four regions, it is not surprising to find that councilors' ethnic background is diverse (Table 2). Councilors generally serve and reside within their group's ethno-regional origins, which comes as no surprise given the high ethnic fractionalization in Uganda and the high number of decentralized units. As a result, we find that a single ethnic group dominates each district council.² Table 2 displays the breakdown of ethnic groups across the councilors.

We also report further results from the baseline survey regarding the politicians' motivations and incentives. When asked what political position the politician would seek after their term was up, 47% report that they would seek the same position, 11% report they might try to run as a district chairperson and 4% said they would run for MP. Only 14% said they would retire. Consistent with our theoretical framework, a large majority of councilors are reelection seeking. When asked what was the most important reason for running for office other than serving the public good, the most commonly noted motivation was to gain access to people and opportunities (28%) and obtain status (28%), as well as gain control over resources (18%) and gain prestige with relatives and friends (14%). These responses support the idea that district councilors certainly care about their standing in their communities.

At the beginning of the term, the majority of the politicians report that people voted for them due in large part to their "personality and leadership skills and qualifications" (56%), 12% believe that they were voted back due to high performance during the previous term, 14% believe that their were voted in mostly because of the policies they champion, and only 7% because of their tribal affiliation. Thus, reputation is clearly salient to politicians in this context, but it is unclear what types of reputation is meant by personality, skills and qualifications - though competence seems clearly related. One striking finding here is that very few councilors cite policies, which is consistent with the fact that parties and candidates in Uganda are not easily placed on left-right ideological spectrum and that most candidates in our context campaign on valence development

¹Kampala is also an opposition majority district where ACODE works but is not included in our 20 district study area, due to different subnational political institutions that make it incomparable with other districts.

²Councilors of Acholi ethnic background, for instance, overwhelmingly serve in the Acholi sub-region.




Figure 2: Using data culled from the election commission, the map provides information on the share of councilors in each district council that caucus with the ruling NRM. We specifically highlight ACODE districts in which the share of NRM councilors in the district local government is lower than 50 percent.

issues. Similarly notable is that fact that very few district councilors cited their tribe as a reason for being elected to office. This finding underscores the fact that at local levels, ethnic identity does not play a key electoral role because the lower the level of government, the more ethnically homogenous constituencies are.

Moving to campaign strategies and costs, when asked how many shillings were spent on campaigning, one third of politicians reported over 5 million, 31% reported between 2 and 5 million, 19% reported between 1 and 2 million, and the remaining councilors reporting lower sums. Of these costs, councilors reported that they were mostly financing personal handouts: 10% reported covering a very large part, 23% reported funding a large part, 32% a medium part, and only 33% a small part. We also asked about how much money councilors spent on handouts in the last

	Mandate								
	Regul	ar councilor	Special	woman councilor	1	Гotal			
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%			
Party									
Democratic Party (DP)	5	2.1%	2	1.2%	7	1.8%			
Forum for Democratic Change (FDC)	29	12.3%	20	12.3%	49	12.3%			
National Resistance Movement (NRM)	164	69.5%	126	77.3%	290	72.7%			
Uganda People's Congress (UPC)	13	5.5%	11	6.7%	24	6.0%			
Uganda Federal Alliance	1	0.4%	0	0.0%	1	0.3%			
Independent	24	10.2%	4	2.5%	28	7.0%			
Total	236	100.0%	163	100.0%	399	100.0%			
Tribe councilor									
Acholi	33	14.1%	23	14.2%	56	14.1%			
Alur	18	7.7%	11	6.8%	29	7.3%			
Bafumbira	2	0.9%	1	0.6%	3	0.8%			
Baganda	31	13.2%	22	13.6%	53	13.4%			
Bagungu	6	2.6%	4	2.5%	10	2.5%			
Bahororo	7	3.0%	1	0.6%	8	2.0%			
Bakiga	20	8.5%	14	8.6%	34	8.6%			
Bakhonzo	2	0.9%	2	1.2%	4	1.0%			
Banyakole	14	6.0%	10	6.2%	24	6.1%			
Banyarwanda	0	0.0%	2	1.2%	2	0.5%			
Banyole	0	0.0%	1	0.6%	1	0.3%			
Banyoro	11	4.7%	10	6.2%	21	5.3%			
Basamia	0	0.0%	1	0.6%	1	0.3%			
Basoga	26	11.1%	13	8.0%	39	9.8%			
Batoro	15	6.4%	9	5.6%	24	6.1%			
Iteso	19	8.1%	15	9.3%	34	8.6%			
Jopadhola	1	0.4%	0	0.0%	1	0.3%			
Karimojong	12	5.1%	11	6.8%	23	5.8%			
Langi	16	6.8%	11	6.8%	27	6.8%			
Madi	0	0.0%	1	0.6%	1	0.3%			
Ugandan	1	0.4%	0	0.0%	1	0.3%			
Total	234	100.0%	162	100.0%	396	100.0%			

Table 2: **Councilor Characteristics.** Table provides information on councilors' party and tribal affiliation in the study area, as well as breakdown by councilor mandate.

30 days (this was part way into the first year of their term). We find that a majority (62%) spent over 100,000 Shillings. Thus, councilors are still expected to spend large sums of money on private transfers to constituents even outside of campaign season. When asked if they believe that paying handouts is part of their formal job responsibilities or not part of their responsibilities but nonetheless something they must do, 86% said they agreed with the latter. The largest source of campaign funds, according to 72% of councilors was personal resources, while 10% named their party, 8% their family and 9% their friends. The second source of campaign funds was cited to be at 38% parties, 27% friends, 18% family, and 15% personal resources. Last, we asked in this battery the main reason why politicians though citizens might be dissatisfied with politician performance. The most often cited category at 32% was that citizens don't understand councilor job duties. Second, at 19% was dissatisfaction with public services. third at 14% was not enough handouts, 10% said that they didn't like their party and another 10% said that they didn't visit the community enough.

2.5 ACODE Standard Activities

Advocates Coalition for Development and Environment (ACODE) is an independent non-partisan Ugandan public policy research and advocacy think tank. Since 1999, ACODE has been conducting evidence-based public policy research centered on governance, trade, the environment, and science and technology. In 2009, ACODE launched the Local Government Councilor Score Card Initiative (LGCSCI) in 10 pilot districts.³ It has since expanded the scorecard to 30 districts; though at the start of our study, ACODE was operating in 22 districts. ACODE deliberately selected the districts in which to implement the scorecard with the aim of achieving diversity in region, age of district (given creation of new districts after 1995), and levels of development.

Data for the construction of the scorecard is collected over a four-month period (from June to September) for the previous financial year, which runs July 1st through June 30th. Using a team of researchers that reside in the study districts, ACODE assesses specific actions taken by councilors that are consistent with their legally-defined job duties specified in the constitution. These include four components: legislative duties, contact with the electorate, participation in lower local governments, and monitoring public service points. The components and subcomponents are displayed in the main text Figure 1.

At the beginning of a legislative term, ACODE holds workshops with the councilors in plenum at the district council headquarters. At these workshops, ACODE trains the councilors on their legally-defined job duties. They then explain the design, methodology, and quality control of the scorecard program. ACODE further furnishes councilors with a "log book" which functions as a calendar (Ugandan English - diary) and contains the information presented in the workshop on job duties as well as other information such as documents that help councilors in fulfilling their job duties such as what public service delivery standards are and checklists to monitor compliance (e.g., for schools, to look whether the number of children exceeds the legal maximum).

2.5.1 Scorecard Methodology

ACODE's primary methodology for collecting data on councilors' performance includes several steps. First, ACODE engages in document review of service delivery and infrastructure reports, budgets, planning documents, minutes of district councils and their committees and other relevant documents. Second, ACODE researchers conduct interviews with councilors — and subsequently any assertions made by councilors are followed up with written evidence. Third, field visits are conducted with specific service delivery units and observation of service delivery units (e.g. schools, clinics). Fourth, ACODE facilitates focus group discussions with citizens at the subcounty level with a sampling methodology that seeks gender-parity of community leaders, as well

³In this effort, ACODE loosely partners with the Ugandan Local Government Association (ULGA), an associational group that represents and advocates for the constitutional rights and interests of local governments, and gives support and guidance to make common positions on key issues that affect local governments.

as representation of 'ordinary' citizens and youth. Last, interviews with technical staff in the bureaucracy are conducted at both the district and sub-county levels. These include, for example, interviews with the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) heading the district bureaucracy, heads of bureaucratic departments, and service delivery unit heads. Participants give informed consent and participation is voluntary. Data is entered, cleaned and analyzed with Atlas-ti, Epi-data, and Microsoft Excel.

The councilor scorecard is divided into four components with a range of indicators for each. Each indicator is assigned a score, awarded with a threshold approach. This means that a councilor who, for example, has pushed forward more motions in plenary sessions than the designated threshold of motions, receives the same number of points for that indicator as another councilor who has only just met the threshold. One disadvantage of this method is that score-conscious councilors do not have a strong incentive to exert further effort once the threshold for an indicator is reached, because they do not receive a higher score from doing so. However, there are also advantages to this scoring system. For one, councilors have different sized constituencies, and councilors with larger constituencies are not disadvantaged. Specifically, special woman constituencies often encompass two or three regular constituencies, and this scoring method does not disadvantage women councilors, on face value. A second advantage is that it is arguably the easiest type of scoring system for Ugandan councilors and citizens to comprehend. All indicators sum up to a maximum possible 100 points, similar to marks in Ugandan schools. Figure 3 depicts an example scorecard from Nakapiripirit District.⁴

Once ACODE completes assembling the scores of all councilors (including the council speaker and the district chairperson), it holds an annual dissemination event in each district's headquarters. ACODE invites to this event the legislative and bureaucratic district officials as well as other local stakeholders, such as journalists, civil society groups, and traditional and party leaders. In this workshop, ACODE explains the components of the scorecard and reports on each councilor's score. We refer to this event as "weak dissemination", since 'ordinary' citizens, who ultimately are responsible for holding councilors to account, are not present in this district-level event.

⁴Ssemakula, E., G., Longole, L., and Atyang, S., Local Government Councils' Performance and Public Service Delivery in Uganda: Nakapiripirit District Council Score-Card Report 2013/14, Kampala, ACODE Public Service Delivery and Accountability Report Series No.52, 2015.

Nakapiripirit	Na	ka	piri	pi	rit
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Name	Sub county	Political Party	Gender	Legisla- tive role	Contact with electorate	Participation in LLGs	Moni- toring NPPAs	Total
Ilukol Raphael Lorika	Lorengedwat	NRM	Male	22	20	10	23	75
Longelech John Marko	Loregae Marisetry	NRM	Male	21	11	10	24	66
Sagal William	Nakapiripirit T/C	NRM	Male	13	12	10	18	53
Nanyima Abraham	Lolachat	NRM	Male	12	7	10	21	50
Lochoto Richard Safari	Youth	FDC	Male	15	11	10	18	54
Lorukale Paul	Lorengedwat	NRM	Male	9	13	10	7	39
Loonye John K	Moruita	NRM	Male	5	13	2	13	33
Average Male				14	12	9	18	53
Hellen Pulkol		NRM	Female	17	16	4	17	54
Aluka Lucy	PWD	NRM	Female	14	13	8	18	53
Longole Maria	Lorengedwat	NRM	Female	10	17	10	16	53
Longole Erina	Loregae	NRM	Female	18	2	10	17	47
Aleper Agnes Lokuda	Nabilatuk	NRM	Female	9	17	10	9	45
Kodet Sofia Jane	Kakomon- gole T.C	NRM	Female	10	4	0	24	38
Chero Scholar Akol	Nabilatuk	NRM	Female	10	2	4	8	24
Lopuwa Lucy	Namalu	NRM	Female	6	5	2	8	21

Figure 3: Scorecard Example - Nakapiripirit District

2.5.2 Quality Control Measures

To strengthen the reliability of the disseminated scores, ACODE undertakes several quality-control measures. First, the scorecard undergoes periodic reviews by an expert Taskforce comprised of academics, officials from the Ministry of Local Government, representatives from the parliamentary committee on local governments, district technical and political leaders, and civil society representatives. Second, district research teams are made up of three people, comprising a lead researcher and two resident assistants of the district who speak the local languages. ACODE researchers are not allowed to be involved in electoral or partisan politics. Prior to data collection, the ACODE research teams are trained intensively over a centralized three-day Workshop accompanied by an official ACODE Researchers' Guide in basic methods, ethics, etc.

Third, after data collection, ACODE research teams come together for a three-day workshop to peer-review the information collected and compute scorecard marks. A team of experienced ACODE Lead Researchers directly monitor and supervise the research teams, and are also responsible for managing fieldwork and producing district reports, as well as doing on-spot checks.

Finally, the ACODE leadership team and a technical backstopping team are responsible for the final review and validation of data used in the scoring. Before publication of the scores, the report is externally reviewed and edited to ensure consistency and quality of content. Thus, the scorecard has a multi-layered review. A full description of the ACODE methodology and reporting can be found at http://www.acode-u.org/documents/PRS_64.pdf

2.5.3 Councilor Perception of the Standard Activities

Councilors receive relatively little training on their job-duties from the Ugandan government. Recall also, that this study takes place between the second and third multiparty elections in Uganda, and in the midst of rapid process of district creation (via splits). This means that district local governments are still weakly institutionalized. In initial qualitative research prior to our collaboration, we talked with councilors in out-of-sample districts about the standard ACODE activities, and attended some of ACODE's capacity building workshops. Generally, the councilors were very appreciative of ACODE's efforts. When asked why they attended the ACODE workshops, for which they were not paid, many expressed that they wanted to learn what their job duties are, and, without those workshops, they would not necessarily know what is exactly expected from them. Thus, ACODE was able to secure a relatively high buy-in with the councilors, offering a meaningful service to them as well as providing a civil society monitoring and oversight function.

According to our councilor surveys, the scorecard is salient to councilors. One way to measure its salience is to test whether councilors know their score. We assess the accuracy of councilors' knowledge of total score on the previous financial year's scorecard. According to the survey, 84% of respondents claimed they knew their score. Only 1% said they had never heard of the scorecard, 3% claimed they didn't receive their score, and 11% admit that could not remember their score. When asked to share their score, councilors' mean response was only 6 points off, on average (standard deviation 8.26). We also asked whether councilors would recommend scaling up the scorecard program to other districts. Almost all councilors (94%) believe that the program should be scaled up throughout Uganda.

2.6 Intense Dissemination Program

This research project was designed to test whether councilors would increase their performance when their scores were being shared with their constituents (in addition to the stakeholder event at the district headquarters). ACODE, in collaboration with the research team, thereby designed the Intense Dissemination (ID) program, in which councilors' scores were disseminating throughout their constituencies. Half of the councilors in the study area were randomly selected to the ID program (treatment), and half were randomly selected to a control group.

The program included parish-level community meetings, material handouts (e.g. posters, fliers, calendars), and text-message "blasts" (mass text messages). The community meetings were developed and executed by ACODE, as were the blast messages. For each community meeting, ACODE explicitly mobilized a selection of local community leaders to participate. In addition to local leaders, the district councilors were invited to attend, and were given the opportunity to comment on the scorecard initiative and their reported performance. Innovations for Poverty Action (IPA) researchers, as a part of the research team, were deployed to the first round of community meetings to gather data that would allow the research team to monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of the meetings in achieving its stated goals.

At these meetings the scorecard initiative was thoroughly explained after which the specific scores of councilors representing the citizens were reported and discussed. In addition to the councilors' absolute and relative scores, attendees were also informed of legally-defined public service delivery standards in health, water, roads and education as well as the formally stipulated roles and responsibilities of district councilors. The meetings offered attendees the opportunity to field questions to both ACODE facilitators and the councilors (if present), as well as an interactive quiz on the meeting content, designed to aid content retention. Citizens were given flyers, posters and calendars with a summary of the civic education and scorecard report for the district.

These community meetings were designed to set in motion a ripple of information dissemination throughout treatment communities. Attendees were encouraged to share the information with fellow community members and hang the materials in notable places (e.g. village council areas, schools, clinics, churches, markets, and other public spaces). Additionally, the mobile numbers of meeting attendees were collected and subsequently, targeted with periodic text-messages offering a reminder of the information delivered during the meeting. We expound on these activities in the following subsections.

2.6.1 Recruitment for ID Community Meetings and Meeting Schedule

Intensive dissemination (ID) program was implemented by organizing community meetings which were held at parish-level (typically three per sub-county). Two rounds of ID meetings took place. The first set of meetings took place between June and August 2013. The second round of meetings took place between March and July 2014.⁵ All meetings were conducted in the in the communities' local language.

While all community members were encouraged to attend those meetings, ACODE specifically sought to mobilize local opinion leaders to attend based on the idea that they would be able to spread the information most widely to others in the community after the meetings. The types of opinion leaders mobilized were:

- Lower level government leaders (village, and subcouncty officials);
- Public service providers (teachers, health workers);
- Community leaders (e.g., PTAs, School and Health Management Committees);
- Civil society organization leaders (e.g., women's, youth, and farmer groups); and
- Religious leaders (ministers, priests, imams).

The average number of attendees in the first round of meetings was 41 and in the second round 43, falling slightly short of ACODE's target of 50 participants. Only the meetings in the top 25th percentile achieved this stated goal. The majority of meetings had between 30 and 50 attendees, while a few isolated outliers had more than 100 attendees. Attendance was higher among males, given that community leaders are overwhelmingly male in rural Uganda. In the second set of meetings, for example, there were an average of 27 male and 16 female attendees.

2.6.2 Community Meeting Content and Quality Control

ACODE's facilitators were trained to discuss in the ID community meetings nine modules and implement two interactive learning activities covering the following goals:

- 1. Inform attendees about the scorecard initiative and its goals, as well as the construction and meaning of the scores,
- 2. Disseminate the absolute scores of councilors representing the constituency and relativizing them in a comparison to the scores of the other councilors in the district,

⁵In this second round, meetings took place in 19 of out 20 trial district – the single exception being Kanungu district due to ACODE capacity and financial constraints.

- 3. Educate attendees regarding the legally-defined job duties of councilors,
- 4. Educate attendees regarding legally-defined public service delivery standards,
- 5. Provide councilors an opportunity to interact with their constituencies regarding their performance.

Meeting attendees were also given posters, flyers and calendars (see Figure 6) and asked for their phone number to receive text messages about councilor scores in the future. Especially the calendars were popular, given that they are quite expensive, but very useful.

In the first round, research team enumerators (hired via IPA) were deployed to all community meetings in order to: (1) monitor the delivery of the meeting content according to the training checklists, and (2) survey randomly selected participants after each meeting—for a total 1,766 meeting participants—to measure content comprehension and retention. We find that the delivery of the meeting content was overall successful. The average length of a community meeting was 1 hour and 45 minutes, and facilitators covered almost all the topics as planned (if a module was not covered, the enumerators prompted meeting facilitators to complete the missing components. Of the nine topic units planned for discussion, all nine were covered at 81% of meetings prior to prompting from enumerators. In only four meetings were fewer than six topics discussed without prompting from quality control. Table 3 displays detailed results of implementation success for each of the nine components. More so, as part of the evaluation process, field officers were asked to give their opinion regarding the performance of the meeting facilitators. Only 2% of meetings did the field officer consider the performance of the facilitator to be poor. These findings are important since we should not expect treatment effects if the program has had weak implementation.

Covering a topic does not guarantee, however, that the information has been understood nor retained by meeting attendees. The enumerators thus did an exit survey of five randomly sampled attendees at the end of each community meeting. Researchers chose the n^{th} attendant while leaving the meeting, or every n^{th} from a list of attendees, where *n* is the maximum positive integer such that 5n is less or equal to the total number of attendees. Respondents were asked to recall meeting content *without looking at any of their handout materials*.

Table 4 reveals the extent to which meeting attendees were able to recall their councilors' scores. We find that 56% of surveyed meeting participants were able to correctly recall both their regular councilors score (or a range) and their women coucnilor.⁶ Furthermore, survey respondents were asked to list as many as they could remember of six councilor duties discussed in the community meeting.⁷ Sampled attendees were able to recall an average of 2.75 councilor duties (see Table 5). Only 2% could not recall a single duty at the community meeting.

The surveyed meeting attendees were also asked which of the public service delivery standards they could remember. In total, facilitators were expected to discuss 20 public service de-

⁶*Can you tell me the overall score of your district councilor? You can give a number or a range.*

⁷*Can you name some councilor duties? (If R can name a duty) Can you name any more? Prompt 3 times.*

	No.	%
Councilor Roles and Duties		
Missing	10	0.6%
Yes, topic was discussed	1,751	99.2%
Enum reminded facilitator and topic was discussed	5	0.3%
Total	1,766	100.0%
Roles Councilors Should NOT Play		
Missing	30	1.7%
Yes, topic was discussed	1,681	95.2%
Enum reminded facilitator and topic was discussed	50	2.8%
Never discussed even after enum reminder	5	0.3%
Total	1,766	100.0%
Meaning of Scorecard Scores	-	
Missing	15	0.8%
Yes, topic was discussed	1,676	94.9%
Enum reminded facilitator and topic was discussed	60	3.4%
Never discussed even after enum reminder	15	0.8%
Total	1,766	100.0%
Presentation of Scores - Regular Councilor	,	
Missing	165	9.3%
Yes, topic was discussed	1,481	83.9%
Enum reminded facilitator and topic was discussed	80	4.5%
Never discussed even after enum reminder	40	2.3%
Total	1,766	100.0%
Presentation of Scores - Special Woman Councilor	,	
Missing	125	7.1%
Yes, topic was discussed	1,481	83.9%
Enum reminded facilitator and topic was discussed	100	5.7%
Never discussed even after enum reminder	60	3.4%
Total	1,766	100.0%
Interactive Activity to Practice Reading Scores		
Missing	130	7.4%
Yes, topic was discussed	1,536	87.0%
Enum reminded facilitator and topic was discussed	80	4.5%
Never discussed even after enum reminder	20	1.1%
Total	1,766	100.0%
Public Service Standards - Health	,	
Missing	30	1.7%
Yes, topic was discussed	1,691	95.8%
Enum reminded facilitator and topic was discussed	, 45	2.5%
Total	1,766	100.0%
Public Service Standards - Education	,	
Missing	20	1.1%
Yes, topic was discussed	1,716	97.2%
Enum reminded facilitator and topic was discussed	30	1.7%
Total	1,766	100.0%
Interactive Activity about Public Service Standards		
Missing	40	2.3%
Yes, topic was discussed	1,661	94.1%
Enum reminded facilitator and topic was discussed	65	3.7%
Total	1,766	100.0%
	<u>-</u> ,. 00	200.070

Table 3: The number of topics covered in each first round community dissemination meeting

	No.	%
Knowledge of Regular Councilor Score		
DK/missing	462	26.2%
Inaccurate score/range	314	17.8%
Accurate score/range	989	56.0%
Total	1,765	100.0%
Knowledge of Special Woman Councilor Score		
DK/missing	419	23.7%
Inaccurate score/range	362	20.5%
Accurate score/range	984	55.8%
Total	1,765	100.0%

Table 4: The retention of councilor scores by attendees of first round intensive dissemination community meetings.

livery standards during the ID meeting: 5 in education, 5 in healthcare, 4 in water supply, and 2 pertaining to roads. Only 5% of respondents could not name any of the public service standards discussed during the community meeting.⁸ Table 5 lists the average number of public service standards survey respondents could recall broken down by the type of service. Table 6 is more detailed, providing information on the percentage recalling each service standard provided in the meeting. We note that not all the public service standards that were discussed during the meeting are equally salient and that discussions over councilors' scores were more central to the meeting.

In sum, we find that a majority of attendees were able to correctly recall their councilors' scores, and almost all (95% and 98%, respectively) could name at least one public service delivery standards (with an average of 6 out of 20 discussed), and at least one legally-defined councilor duty (with an average of 3 out of 6 discussed). Of course, citizens left the meeting with information on the scores on the handout materials, but the data show a relatively high level of retention even without referring to those materials. The meeting communicated quite a lot of information, and with the information being new to attendees, we find these retention levels to be quite high.

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Number of Councilor Duties Recalled	2.75	1.13	0	6
Number of Public Service Standards Recalled	6.09	3.11	0	16
Number of Education Standards Recalled	2.21	1.29	0	6
Number of Health Standards Recalled	1.56	1.14	0	5
Number of Water Standards Recalled	1.56	0.99	0	5
Number of Roads Standards Recalled		0.76	0	3
Ν		1765		

Table 5: Retention of public service sta	ndards and councilor	r duties by attendees	at first round
intensive dissemination meetings.			

⁸Can you name some public service standards? (If R can name a standard) Can you name any more? Prompt 3 times.

		Frequency	Percent			
Public Service Standards Recalled						
	Max class size	1098	62.21			
	Max classroom capacity	914	51.78			
Education Standards	Max students sharing textbook	609	34.50			
Education Standards	Max students sharing desk	902	51.10			
	Latrine child ratio	353	20.00			
	Other edu standard	19	1.08			
	Access clean water	994	56.32			
	Distance to water source	726	41.13			
Water Supply Standards	Working condition sources	519	29.41			
	Borehole persons ratio	492	27.88			
	Other water standard	27	1.53			
	Durable roads	637	36.09			
Roads Standards	Road maintenance	676	38.30			
	Other roads standard	36	2.04			
	HC II and HC II min	664	37.62			
	Distance to HC II	578	32.75			
Health Care Standards	No med stockouts	902	51.10			
Health Care Standards	HC II staffing minimum	388	21.98			
	HC II latrines	211	11.95			
	Other health standard	12	0.68			
Councilor Duties Recal	led					
	Rep community in council	1214	68.78			
	Subcounty council mtgs	646	36.60			
Councilor Duties	Monitor gov programs	1000	56.66			
Councilor Duties	Report decisions to community	973	55.13			
	By-laws for community devp	233	13.20			
	Elicit community opinions	746	42.27			

Table 6: Retention of public service standards and councilor duties

LOCAL GOVERNMENT COUNCILS' SCORE-CARD INITIATIVE (LGCSCI)

Empowering Citizens to Participate in Good Governance



FIND OUT HOW YOUR COUNCILOR 15 PERFORMING









g; Vice Charperson EGPC, Wrs.Saran Wusdke, Direct ty Development, Mrs.Sanyu Jane Mpagi; and Secretary Banyoya after the signing of the Sector Agreement offer and Social Development in Kampala. April 2012.

January

м	т	w	Т	F	s	S	
	1	2	3	4	5	6	
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	
14	15	16	17	18	19	20	
21	22	23	24	25	26	27	
28	29	30	31				
1st - New Years Day 26th - NRM Liberation Day							



Plot 96-98 Kanjokya Street Kamwokya P.O. Box 29836; Kampala Uganda. Email: acode@acode-u.org Website: www.acode-u.org

2013 CITIZENS' CALENDAR

WHAT THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT SCORECARD DOES:

- Helps local leaders to understand their duties and responsibilities to the voters
- Empowers citizens to demand for quality public services
- Creates a partnership between citizens and councilors in demanding for quality services and therefore helps government to fulfill its obligation to the citizens in ensuring quality standards of public services

LGCSC is an initiative by the Advocates Coalition of Development and Environment (ACODE) and the Uganda Local Governments Association (ULGA) whose goal is to strengthen offications domain of reflective service delivery and accountability. This initiative is supported by the Demonstic Governance Facility with the following contraction of the Kingdon, Demansk, Norway, Heatan, Sweden, Nethentaka, Austria and the EU.

February



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LOCAL GOVERNMENT COUNCILS' SCORE-CARD INITIATIVE (LGCSCI) Empowering Citizens to Participate in Good Governance



COUNCILOR SHOULD DO FOR YOU.



Represent and speakout community issues in the council



Monitor government programs and services within your sub-county



Report to you council decisions and aet vour opinion on issues affecting your community



Participate in the sub-county council meetings



Figure 4: First third of a calendar that was distributed in ACODE's community meetings with the intention of disseminating the performance information beyond meeting attendees.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT COUNCILS' SCORE-CARD INITIATIVE (LGCSCI)

Empowering Citizens to Participate in Good Governance



DEMAND FOR QUALITY SERVICES IN YOUR COMMUNITY



Your children need to enjoy good learning environment in order to perform well at school

A crowded Health Centre in Soroti district: Most Health centres do not have enough medical staff and supplies



vour community.

district: It is your right as a citizen to have good road networks in



A neglected borehole in Bududa: Local councilors should

check to see that water sources

are functional

Graded goats provided by NAADS: Quality agricultural services help citizens improve their household incomes





P.O. Box 29836; Kampala Uganda Email: acode@acode-u.org Website: www.acode-u.org

2013 CITIZENS' CALENDAR The government has set minimum standards for primary education,

water, roads, health and agriculture. It is the duty of your councilor to ensure quality services for your community!





LGCSC is an initiative by the Advocates Coalition of Development and Environment (ACODE) and the Uganda Local Governments' Association whose goal is to strengthen alteren' demand for effective service delivery and accountability. This initiative is supported by the Demoratile Governments' Association Facility with the following control. Unlike Kingdom, Demanak, Koway, Heisen, Sweden, Ketherlands, Austria and the EQU nents' Association (ULGA)

LOCAL GOVERNMENT COUNCILS' SCORE-CARD INITIATIVE (LGCSCI) Empowering Citizens to Participate in Good Governance





Figure 5: Second third of a calendar that was distributed in ACODE's community meetings with the intention of disseminating the performance information beyond meeting attendees.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT COUNCILS' SCORE-CARD INITIATIVE (LGCSCI) Empowering Citizens to Participate in Good Governance



LOCAL GOVERNMENT COUNCILS' SCORE-CARD INITIATIVE (LGCSCI)

Empowering Citizens to Participate in Good Governance




Figure 6: Last third of a calendar that was distributed in ACODE's community meetings with the intention of disseminating the performance information beyond meeting attendees.

2.6.3 Text Messages

ACODE sent periodic text messages to meeting attendees with information about the total score and score subcomponents. We list several examples of messages below. At the same time, councilors received a concurrent text-message informing them that their constituents had been sent a message with scorecard information. Constituents in ACODE's database were also periodically asked if they would like to sign someone else up for the blasts, and the new numbers were subsequently added. Text messages were translated into local languages: Acholi, Alur, Ateso, Nga'Karamajong, Langi, Luganda, Lusoga, Runyancole, Rutoro, Ruyoro.

Table 7: Text Message Blasts to Citizen Meeting Attendees

Samples of Text Messages Sent to Citizens

Dear [Name] you,will receive info on your LC5 regular councilor Hon [Name] Tuesdays and your,LC5 special woman councilor Hon [Name] Wednesdays Dear [Name] this,year your LC5 [regular/woman] councilor Hon [name] scored XX out of 100 Last,year they scored XX this is XX points of [improvement/decline] Dear [Name] your,LC5 [regular/woman] councilor Hon [name] scored XX out of 100 on the,201X/201X scorecard The district average is XX out of 100 Dear [Name] your,LC5 [regular/woman] councilor Hon [name] scored XX out of 100 for monitoring,schools the district average is XX out of 100 Dear [Name] your,LC5 [regular/woman] councilor Hon [name] scored XX out of 100 for monitoring,schools the district average is XX out of 100 Dear [Name] your,LC5 [regular/woman] councilor Hon [name] scored XX out of 100 for monitoring,health centers The district average is XX out of 100 Dear [Name] your,LC5 [regular/woman] councilor Hon [name] scored XX out of 100 for monitoring,water sources The district average is XX out of 100 Dear [Name] your,LC5 [regular/woman] councilor Hon [name] scored XX out of 100 for monitoring,water sources The district average is XX out of 100 Dear [Name] your,LC5 [regular/woman] councilor Hon [name] scored XX out of 100 for monitoring,public services The district average is XX out of 100 Dear [Name] your,LC5 [regular/woman] councilor Hon [name] scored XX out of 100 for meeting,their electorate The district average is XX out of 100 Dear [Name] your,LC5 [regular/woman] councilor Hon [name] scored XX out of 100 for their,office accessibility The district average is XX out of 100 Dear [Name] your,LC5 [regular/woman] councilor Hon [name] scored XX out of 100 for working,with subcounty gov The district average is XX out of 100 Dear [Name] your,LC5 [regular/woman] councilor Hon [name] scored XX out of 100 for working,with subcounty gov The district average is XX out of 100 Dear [Name] your,LC5 [regular/woman] councilor Hon [name] scored XX out of 100 for their legislative roles The district average is XX out of 100

Table 8: Text Message Blasts to Councilors Concurrently with Citizens

Samples of Corresponding Text Messages Sent to Councilors

Dear Hon,(councilor name) parish meetings were held [Month] in your constituency,on public services councilor responsibilities and scorecard performance Dear Hon [name],your constituents will receive weekly messages on the Local Government Dear Hon [Name],your constituents are receiving a comparison of the 201X/201X and 201X/201X scorecards Dear Hon [Name],your constituents are receiving information on the 201X/201X Scorecard Dear Hon [Name],your constituents are receiving your scorecard information on monitoring schools Dear Hon [Name],your constituents are receiving scorecard information on monitoring health centers Dear Hon [Name],your constituents are receiving scorecard information on monitoring water sources Dear Hon [Name],your constituents are receiving scorecard information on monitoring public services Dear Hon [Name],your constituents are receiving scorecard information on monitoring public services Dear Hon [Name],your constituents are receiving scorecard information on monitoring public services Dear Hon [Name],your constituents are receiving scorecard information on meeting the electorate Dear Hon [Name],your constituents are receiving scorecard information on accessibility of offices Dear Hon [Name],your constituents are receiving scorecard information on working with subcounty gov Dear Hon [Name],your constituents are receiving scorecard information on legislative roles Dear Hon [Name],your constituents are receiving scorecard information on legislative roles Dear Hon [Name],your constituents are receiving scorecard information on legislative roles

2.7 Assessing "newness" and saliency of disseminated information

We can draw on our citizen baseline survey to assess the extent to which the information presented at the community meetings was new to voters. When asked whether the respondent had heard of the scorecard program, we find that only 9% of our sample had heard of it.⁹ When asked to evaluate their councilors' performance, the majority of citizens did not know for either the regular councilor (51%) or the special woman councilor (56%).¹⁰ Moreover, of those who were willing to provide a rating of their councilors' performance across their four types of legally-defined job duties, the evaluations did not correlated at all with the actual ACODE scores.¹¹ Figure 7 presents the relationship between citizens' evaluation on the councilor performance and the actual score councilors received in the four components of the 2011-2012 baseline (pre-treatment) scorecard. It is evident that there is little correlation between the citizens' evaluation and the scorecard results.

In order to know what activities of a councilor are important to citizens, we thus asked citizens to name the most important activities of a district councilors in their view.¹² As Figure 8 makes clear, the activities that citizens tend to prioritize are highly correlated with the performance indicators that make up the councilors' legally-defined job duties, and thus, ACODE's scorecard. The most important duty cited by a plurality of citizens was visiting schools and health centers (the "monitoring services" role) followed by regularly visiting villages (the "contact with the electorate" role) and participating in council sessions and committees (the "legislative" role). Providing financial assistance to communities and participating in LC3 and LC1 meetings ("the lower local government participation" role) came next.

District councilors are not unimportant for citizens' welfare, however. High share of voters, for example, know the names of their district councilors. Indeed, 42% of respondents named the correct name for the regular councilor and 35% knew the special woman councilor's correct name (a further 20% and 22% respectively said they knew but couldn't remember).¹³ They also care about the councilor's relationship to public service delivery. Survey responses further show that, when asked what information first and foremost they would like to have about a candidate for district councilor, 51% said candidate proposals on public service improvements, followed by 23%

⁹Have you heard of the local government councilor scorecard? The scorecard is made up of the grades given to local government councilors on how well they are performing in their councilor jobs, similar to the report cards that students bring home.

¹⁰Some district councilors work very hard and others do not work very hard. However, ordinary Ugandans often do not see councilors "on the job" and do not know if they are good workers or bad workers. Do you know if the LC5 [regular/special woman] councilor is working hard?

¹¹I am going to show you pictures of activities undertaken by councilors. I want you to tell me how well you think your LC5 district councilor performed in each of these areas. A. Participating district council sessions and committees, B. Regularly visiting villages to hear concerns of sub-county residents, C. Visiting schools and health centers to ensure quality of service, E. Ensuring the district technical officers are doing their work well (e.g. DEO, DHO), F. Participating in meetings at lower government levels (LC1, LC3). The categorical answer choices were; 1 = "Performs very poorly", 2 = "Performs a little less than average", 3 = "Performs like the average councilor", <math>4 = "Performs a little more than average", 5 = "Performs very well".

¹²There are several ways in which district councilors can spend their time. What is the most important activities of a district councilor in your view?

¹³Do you know the name of the current district councilor that represents your sub-county? Do you know the name of the current special woman councilor that represents your sub-county?




Figure 7: Citizens' evaluation of councilor performance compared to their total 2011-2012 scorecard scores, at baseline.

Note: The y-axis is the score on the 2011/12 scorecard, while the x-axis is the citizens' evaluation on the performance of their councilors on different dimensions. Best fit line projected through the data.

educational and work background, followed by 12% councilor partisanship, 9% how generous giving handouts during campaign, and 4% religious beliefs.¹⁴

In sum, in line with the findings made by related studies evaluating the effect of information dissemination on citizen voting behavior, the information presented at ACODE's dissemination meetings is new, salient, and well-benchmarked.

¹⁴You are about to vote for the next LC5 district council. You don?t have much information about the candidates. What two kinds of information would best help you to make up your mind?




Figure 8: Citizens' prioritization of councilor activities

2.8 Were Councilors Actually Treated?

We assess the extent to which councilors were successfully treated. Councilors were made aware of the treatment in three ways. First, they were informed of the ID program details in an ACODE workshop. Second, they were invited to all community meetings in their constituency. Third, councilors were also sent text messages concurrent with the citizens (see messages Table 8). The text messages notify the treated councilors when the meetings take place. They also notify councilors periodically that citizens are reminded of their total score or score subcomponents.

We provide information on councilor meeting attendance, as well as their own knowledge of their scores and their perceptions of the extent to which citizens know their scores. First, some, but not all councilors attended the community meetings. For regular councilors, there were generally three opportunities for meetings in their constituency (three parishes), while for special woman councilors (whose constituencies span between one and three sub-counties), some would have had the opportunity to attend up to nine meetings. In the first round of meetings, regular district councilors were present at 83 of the 303 meetings for which data exists.¹⁵ Similarly, special woman councilors were present at 84 meetings. Both councilors attended 38 meetings. According to ACODE, about 25% of second round of ID community meetings were attended by regular councilors. All in all, 63% of regular councilors and 72% of special woman councilors did not attend a single meeting. Our data indicate that higher performing councilors were more likely to attend meetings.

We further assess councilor perceptions of their score in the endline survey. First, we asked councilors about their knowledge of their own score.¹⁶ Treated councilors were more likely to claim that they know their score, and when they stated their score, they were more likely to be accurate. For control councilors, 82 percent knew their score, while 14 percent said they heard but can't remember their score. For treated councilors, 86 percent knew their score, and 9 percent heard of it but can't remember. Of those that stated their score, 35% of ID treated but only 23% of control councilors knew their score exactly. The vast majority of both treated and control councilors were within 5 points of their score (70 percent of treated, and 64 percent of control). Second, councilors were asked asked the share of constituents who knew their score on a 5-point scale,¹⁷ ID treated councilors were significantly more likely to state that a larger proportion of constituents knew their score. Fifty percent of treated councilors thought the scorecard was known to a large or very large share of constituents, compared to 37 percent of control councilors. Further, we asked them whether the scorecard would affect reelection.¹⁸ Treated councilors were less likely to believe that the scorecard would not affect their reelection (26% versus 35%). Taken together, this evidence suggests councilors were aware of treatment and it affected their perceptions of constituent knowledge of their score.

¹⁵This does not include 51 meetings that have missing values for councilor attendance.

¹⁶What was your total score on the last Local Government Councilor Score Card?

¹⁷How many people in your constituency know approximately what your ACODE scorecard score is?

¹⁸*Using the scale, how much do you think that the scorecard will affect your reelection?*

3 Measurement and Data

In this section, we provide an explanation of each outcome variable as well as additional descriptive statistics.

3.1 ACODE Scorecard

For most councilors in the study area we have four scorecard results, whereby the score of 2011-2012 has been realized before councilors were assigned to their respective treatment groups. Note that ACODE's began operating in Agago district only in 2012. Thus for Agago district, we only have three years of scores, whereby the first scorecard (2012-2013) has been realized after treatment assignment.

Figure 9 shows the trends in total score by treatment group throughout the study's duration, while Figure 10 further show the kernel distribution of the total score in the baseline scorecard (2011-2012). There is a high degree of variation in pre-treatment score, but importantly, all have room for improvement. Further, we can see that all councilors' scores increased quite a lot between the first and second years, perhaps reflecting on the job learning. The ID treated group had slightly higher scores than the no-ID group in the pre-treatment year, but the difference is not statistically significant (manuscript, Table 5). Figure 11 describes the density distribution of the total score at endline (2014-2015), demonstrating that this outcome variable is well-behaved.




Figure 9: Changes in total scores overtime by treatment group.




Figure 10: Figure describes the distribution of ACODE's pre-treatment total score by councilor mandate.




Figure 11: Density distribution of the total score on the ACODE scorecard 2014-2015

3.2 Councilor Peer Evaluations

The peer councilor performance data were collected in the endline councilor survey, asking each councilor to rate five other councilors in their district on a scale from 1 to 5.¹⁹ For each councilor an average score is constructed by taking the mean score they received from the councilors in their district. Each councilor thus received between 3-7 peer evaluations (depending on the size of the district's council). The distribution of the average councilor evaluation is presented in Figure 12. Figure 13 provides information on the distribution of peer evaluations by treatment group.




Figure 12: Distribution of councilors' performance measure as captured by peers' evaluation.




Figure 13: The boxplot provides information on the (raw) distribution of peer evaluations by treatment group (red diamond depicts the grand mean).

¹⁹I am now going to give you a list with 5 names of councilors in your district, which we picked randomly. We don?t know them and chose them out of the list of the district councilors. Based on YOUR OWN ideas, could you privately rate the following 5 councilors? general performance? This information will be anonymously added to the responses of others and reported only in aggregate. Thus, privacy will be maintained. (Enum, please give the paper with the ID of the councilor you are surveying, explain the answer options and how to answer. Give the councilor some minutes. Ask him/her to put it in the box with the other responses)

3.3 Bureaucrat Evaluations

Each councilor was rated on four criteria by each bureaucrat (Ugandan English — technocrat) surveyed within their district (3-5 individuals).²⁰ Specifically, bureaucrats rated each councilor on the following four performance dimensions using a five-point scale:

- 1. The number of times a legislator has personally visited or called the technocrat office in the last six months,
- 2. How knowledgeable the district legislator is about standards, rules, and procedures for resource allocation,
- 3. The quality of the legislator's monitoring of public service delivery,
- 4. The level of effort the legislator puts into improving public service delivery to ensure standards are met or exceeded in their constituency.

To aggregate this information into a single measure of councilor performance, each councilor's score was averaged over the ratings they received from different technocrats working in their district, these scores were then standardized within districts²¹ to yield, for each question, a measure of each councilor's perceived performance by the technocrats within their district. These scores for each question were then averaged to produce a single index for councilor performance. Thus, the score of a councilor is in comparison to the other councilors working within their district.

Since the four performance measures are highly correlated with a Cronbach's alpha of 0.90, we further averaged councilors' ratings on these dimensions across surveyed technocrats, creating a single summary index. The kernel density distribution of technocrats' summary assessment is provided in Figure 14 while the (raw) distribution of technocrats' (summary) assessment by treatment group is shown in Figure 15.

²⁰This handout is a list of all the LC5 councilors in the district. We would like you to rank them across 4 indicators. 1 indicates not active at all, while 5 indicates the most active a councilor could possibly be in an ideal world. Please circle the ranking for each councilor. This information is confidential — it will be combined with the answers of over 100 other civil servants in the country and the data will not be shared with anyone. Further, It is personal opinion therefore there is no right or wrong answer. If you don't know you can mark IDK. Enum: After explaining the form please read the first question and wait for the respondent to answer for all councilors before reading the next question.

²¹That is to say, subtracting the district mean score, and dividing by the district standard deviation.




Figure 14: Figure describes the kernel density distribution of technocrats' assessment summary index.




Figure 15: Technocrats' assessment: the boxplot provides information on the (raw) distribution of technocrats' (summary) assessment by treatment (red diamond depicts the grand mean).

3.4 School grant applications

At the end of the endline councilor survey, councilors in the study area were informed of the Universal Primary Education School Development Grants program. In this program, councilors were presented with an opportunity to help schools in their constituency to apply for a grant of 300,000 Ugandan schillings (about US\$100) for a school improvement of their choice (roof repair, textbooks for children, etc.). More materials available upon request.

The number of complete grant applications a councilor turns in is a count measure. Thus, we test whether a poisson or negative binomial regressions would better fit the data for the analysis of the effect of the ID program on performance in the school grants. Figure 16 shows clearly that a negative binomial should be our preferred estimation, given the skew towards 0 of the data.




Figure 16: Figure describes the observed proportions along with the poisson and negative binomial probabilities for the number of complete grant applications, which is a count variable. Using the *nbvargr* userwritten Stata command, the poisson probabilities are computed using an estimate of the poisson mean. The negative binomial probabilities use the same mean and an estimate of the overdispersion parameter.




Figure 17: Kernel distribution of complete school grant applications.




Figure 18: School grant applications: the boxplot provides information on the (raw) distribution of complete school grant applications by treatment (red diamond depicts the grand mean).

3.5 Correlations in the Dependent Variables and Composite Index

The performance measures were designed to capture distinct but related aspects of councilors' performance. In this subsection, we show the results of an examination of whether these performance measures are related. Indeed, we find that they are positively correlated.

Figure 19 shows the relationship between ACODE's total score and the peer councilor assessment, while Figure 20 shows the relationship between ACODE's total score and the bureaucrats' mean assessments.




Figure 19: Figure describes the relationship between ACODE's total score and councilors' performance as rated by peers.




Figure 20: The relationship between councilors' 2013-2014 total scores, and their performance as judged by the district senior civil servants.

We further created a composite performance index using the four dimensions of councilor performance, which are positively correlated with a Cronbach's alpha of 0.49. Following Anderson (2008), this composite index is a weighted mean of the four performance measures after they have been standardized. For robustness we also construct an alternative composite index using the alpha command in Stata, which does not use casewise deletion and therefore maximizes the available information from the constituent variables: a score is created for every observation for which there is a response to at least one item. This score is then divided by the number of items from which the sum is calculated. Figure 21 shows the distribution of the main performance composite index.




Figure 21: Figure describes the kernel density distribution of the performance composite index.




Figure 22: The box-plot provides information on the (raw) distribution of the performance composite index by treatment group (red diamond depicts the grand mean).

4 Main Results

In this section we report regression results in tabular form. In each table, we report regression models testing *unconditional* treatment effects both with and without councilor and constituency pre-treatment covariates. Models of treatment effects *conditional* on political competition always include covariates, since competitiveness is not randomly assigned. Since the assignment of the ID treatment was blocked at the district level, all regression models include district fixed effects. Councilor-level controls include: NRM an indicator that is equal to one if the councilor caucuses with Uganda's long-standing ruling party, and zero otherwise; SWC an indicator that is equal to one for "special women" councilor and zero for "regular" councilors; and *Edu* a binary variable that is equal to one for councilors that have attained post-secondary education. We also control for SMS, a binary indicator that is equal to one for councilors randomly assigned to the SMS program, recalling that this treatment cross-cut the ID treatment. Constituency covariates, derived from the 2002 census, include a continuous measure of (log) population, a measure of ethnolinguistic fractionalization calculated using a Herfindahl concentration index (ELF) and constituency's poverty measure. For robustness, we report the treatment effects conditional on electoral pressure using two measures of competitiveness—Margin of Victory (MoV) and majority Distance (MD); for each of these measures we report results for both the continuous measure as well as a binary variable as defined in the main text.

4.1 Composite Index

We combine all councilor performance proxy measure into summary indices using two methods. First, following Kling *et al.* (2007) and Casey *et al.* (2012), we estimate mean treatment effect, which entails (1) recoding outcome variables so that higher values always indicate "better" outcomes; (2) standardizing those variables to allow comparability of effect magnitudes;²² (3) imputing missing values at the treatment assignment group mean; and (4) compiling a summary index that gives equal weight to each outcome component. The second method follows Anderson (2008), who recommends constructing the summary index at stage (4) as a weighted mean of the standardized outcome component, where the weights—the inverse of the covariance matrix—are used to maximize the amount of information captured by the index.²³

The effects of the ID treatment (unconditional and conditional on political competition) on councilor performance, are shown in Table 9 (mean effect) and Table 10 (weighted mean). First, we find that the average treatment effect of the ID program is no different from zero (columns 1 and 2 in both tables). However, the ID program has a positive and significant effect on councilor performance conditional on the competitiveness of the constituency. This effect is robust to using

²²Standardization is obtained by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation in the control group.

²³Inverse covariance weighting applies an assumption that there is one latent trait of interest, and constructs an optimal weighted average on the basis of that assumption.

the binary (columns 3 and 4) or the continuous measures of competitiveness (column 5-6). Note that even though the interaction term may fall slightly below conventional significance levels, the interaction only measures whether the difference between competitive and no-competitive constituencies is significant, not whether the effect of the treatment is significant in competitive constituencies. Figure 23 (binary moderators) and Figures 24-25 (continuous moderators) easily demonstrate these effects.²⁴

	Uncone	litional	Conditior	al (binary)	Conditio	nal (cont)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ID	0.074 (0.056)	0.039 (0.056)	-0.073 (0.091)	-0.054 (0.092)	0.155** (0.071)	0.119** (0.049)
Competitive (MoV)	· · /	· · ·	-0.257*** (0.063)	()	~ /	· · /
ID*Competitive (MoV)			0.242** (0.120)			
Competitive (MD)			. ,	-0.228*** (0.060)		
ID*Competitive (MD)				0.189 (0.117)		
Margin of Victory					-0.471*** (0.090)	
ID*Margin of Victory					0.332 (0.226)	
Majority distance						-0.859*** (0.152)
ID*Majority distance						0.586* (0.355)
District FE	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х
Controls		Х	X	Х	X	Х
Ν	399	399	399	399	399	399

Table 9: DV: mean performance summary index

Notes: The DV (index) has been constructed as the (non-weighted) mean of several standardized proxy performance measures. The mean value of councilor performance for the control group is equal zero, and effect sizes are thus in standardized units of the control group. Standard errors clustered at the district-level reported in parentheses.

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

²⁴The only time ID falls below the 90% significance level is when using the weighted mean index and competitiveness is proxied using the binary measure of Majority Distance.

	Uncon	ditional	Condition	al (binary)	Conditio	nal (cont)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ID	0.097 (0.102)	0.041 (0.097)	-0.163 (0.173)	-0.078 (0.165)	0.233* (0.127)	0.170** (0.084)
Competitive (MoV)	· · ·	、 ,	-0.409*** (0.085)	``	~ /	· · /
ID*Competitive (MoV)			0.434** (0.211)			
Competitive (MD)			(-0.334*** (0.088)		
ID*Competitive (MD)				0.242 (0.212)		
Margin of Victory				(0.212)	-0.843*** (0.149)	
ID*Margin of Victory					(0.14) 0.543 (0.453)	
Majority distance					(0.433)	-1.416***
ID*Majority distance						(0.278) 0.937 (0.707)
District FE	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х
Controls N	399	X 399	X 399	X 399	X 399	X 399

Table 10: **DV: weighted mean performance summary index**

Notes: The DV (composite index) in this table has been constructed using a mean of the standardized constituent variables. Standard errors clustered at the district-level reported in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01




Figure 23: Marginal effects of ID treatment conditional on the *binary* political competition measure derived from Margin of Victory (MoV), and from Majority Distance (MD). The dependent variables are the mean effect index and the weighted mean. Figure is derives from columns 3 (MoV) and 4 (MD) in Tables 9-10.




Figure 24: Marginal effects of ID treatment conditional on political competition measured as the Margin of Victory (top panels), and as Majority Distance (bottom panels). The dependent variables are the mean effect index (M – left panels) and the weighted mean (WM - right panels). Figure is derives from columns 5 (MoV) and 6 (MD) in Tables 9-10.




Figure 25: Figure provides results of ID treatment effect conditional on political competition measured as the Margin of Victory using the binned estimator developed by Hainmueller *et al.* (2016). The estimator shows clearly that the effect is only significant (at 90% confidence level) in competitive constituencies, where the MoV is lower than 0.2.

4.2 Analysis of Treatment Effects Conditional on Pre-Treatment Score

The ID program may be more effective in increasing performance amongst councilors that have initially poorer scores. We test this proposition by exploring the effect of the ID treatment conditional on the continuous measure of ACODE's total score at baseline (2011-2012) (Table 11, columns 1-2). In columns 3-4 we use instead, a binary version of the measure of initial high score (by dichotomizing the baseline total score by each district's median value). The table shows that there is no effect of ID conditional on pre-treatment score for either operationalization.

	Conti	nuous	Bin	ary
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ID	0.134	0.061	0.031	0.004
	(0.145)	(0.122)	(0.086)	(0.085)
High Score			0.414***	0.401***
<u> </u>			(0.075)	(0.072)
ID*High Score			0.050	0.025
0			(0.092)	(0.094)
Baseline score	0.020***	0.018***		
	(0.003)	(0.003)		
ID*baseline score	-0.002	-0.001		
	(0.003)	(0.003)		
Constant	-0.882***	-1.944**	-0.172**	-1.233
	(0.123)	(0.769)	(0.074)	(0.804)
District FE	Х	Х	Х	Х
Controls		Х		Х
Ν	375	375	375	375

Table 11: Heterogeneous effects by initial scores


Notes: Heterogeneous effects by initial scores. In columns 1-2 we explore the effect of the ID treatment conditional on the continuous measure of ACODE's total score at baseline (2011-2012), while in columns 3-4 we use a binary version of the measure of initial high score, by dichotomizing the baseline total score by each district's median value. Standard errors clustered at the district-level reported in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

In Figure 26 we provide further information on councilors' total scores overtime, disaggregated by treatment, competitiveness and performance level (high/low), whereby performance level is defined using the median of the baseline 2011-2012 score to categorize above median and below median performers as high versus low performers. The figure shows several important trends. First, focusing on high performers in non-competitive constituencies, we can see absolutely no difference between treatment and control councilors overtime. Those councilors start with a relatively high performance which is maintained throughout the term. Moving to the high performers in competitive constituencies, we can observe a positive ID treatment effects. This finding is important: it is not the case that only low performers in competitive areas feel pressured to improve performance in response to the CSO transparency initiative, but also high performers.

Second, moving to low performers, it is notable that across the board, irrespective of compet-

itiveness and treatment assignment low performers increase performance in years subsequent to the baseline. This finding is consistent with the idea that the scores of both treatment and control councilors are disseminated by ACODE, albeit only at a district-level event. Third, while there is virtually no discernible difference in scores overtime between treatment and control low performers in non-competitive constituencies, there is a clear difference in scores overtime between treatment and control low performers councilors in competitive areas.

In sum, while we see that treatment effects in competitive areas can be found for both high and low performers, the size of the effect is larger for the latter group of councilors. These results are consistent with our argument that fear of future sanctioning causes reelection seeking incumbents to increase performance early in the term.



Graphs by Initial score above median

Figure 26: Councilors' scores overtime, by treatment assignment, competitiveness and performance level.

4.3 ACODE Scorecard

Unlike all other measures, for the scorecard we have annual scores, allowing to test the robustness the finding reported in Figure 3 (cross sectional analysis), with a more robust difference-inindifference (DiD) estimator. Specifically, for each councilor we stack the scorecard score by year, and first run the following (unconditional) model:

$$Y_{it} = \delta_t + \gamma_i + \beta ID_i \times Post_{2011-12} + \epsilon_{it}$$

where Y_{it} is the total score of councilor *i* in year *t*. Year and councilor fixed effects— δ_t and γ_i — net out overall trends and time-invariant differences across councilors respectively. Our variable of interest is the coefficient on interaction term (β), where ID is the treatment indicator, and $Post_{2011-12}$ is a dummy equal to one for post-treatment scorecards (i.e., after the baseline year of 2011-2012); ϵ_{it} captures residual differences across councilors and years. Note that we run all models twice, including and excluding the 2014-2015, since the score that year was not disseminated down to the constituency level (i.e., only weak dissemination took place due to the proximity to the February 2016 elections)

Table 12 reveals that there is no statistically significant difference in the change in scores pretreatment to post-treatment for the ID treatment group, whether or not 2014-15 score is included. The first two columns show results for the total score, followed by the score sub-components.

In Table 13 we report results examining the effect of ID on ACODE's scores conditional on (the binary measure) of political competition. In the top panel competitiveness is derived from the *Margin of Victory* measure and in the bottom panel from the measure of *Majority Distance*. We find that the ID program has a significant effect on performance in the ACODE total score for councilors from competitive constituencies (ID \times Post \times competitive). When examining the subcomponents, the change is driven by an increase in performance in monitoring service delivery and lower local government attendance. Note again that our results are robust to including and excluding the 2014-15 score, the choice of competitive measure, and to using instead a continuous measure of competitiveness (Figure 28).

	Total Score		Legislative role		Contact electorate		Monitor services		Local govs	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
ID*Post	0.374 (1.794)	1.518 (1.866)	-0.376 (0.556)	0.137 (0.568)	-0.561 (0.637)	-0.455 (0.647)	0.729 (1.107)	1.181 (1.194)	0.582 (0.417)	0.655 (0.419)
Includes 2014-15 N	X 1434	1069	X 1434	1069	X 1434	1069	X 1434	1069	X 1434	1069

Table 12: DV: ACODE Scorecard total score (main effects).


Notes: The dependent variables are ACODE total score and its component. All models include both year and councilor fixed effects (and thus district fixed effects) and cluster standard errors at the councilor-level; even columns exclude 2014-2015 score-card.* p < 0.10, *** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01


	Total	Score	Legisla	tive role	Contact	electorate	Monitor	services	Loca	l govs
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
ID*Competitive (MoV)	-3.151	-1.995	0.295	0.678	-0.993	-0.945	-1.779	-1.217	-0.674	-0.511
-	(2.386)	(2.416)	(0.798)	(0.805)	(0.930)	(0.949)	(1.432)	(1.535)	(0.581)	(0.550)
Post*Competitive (MoV)	-2.540	-2.467	0.276	0.068	-0.052	0.126	-2.276	-2.094	-0.487	-0.567
1 , ,	(2.491)	(2.571)	(0.753)	(0.757)	(0.831)	(0.870)	(1.545)	(1.645)	(0.565)	(0.576
ID*Post*Competitive (MoV)	6.903*	6.880*	-1.301	-1.044	0.830	0.934	4.938**	4.719**	2.436***	2.271**
1 ()	(3.567)	(3.714)	(1.112)	(1.134)	(1.278)	(1.299)	(2.196)	(2.371)	(0.820)	(0.826)
Includes 2014-15	Х		Х		Х		Х		Х	
Ν	1434	1069	1434	1069	1434	1069	1434	1069	1434	1069
	Total Score		Legislative role		_					
	Total	Score	Legislat	ive role	Contact	electorate	Monitor	services	Local	govs
	(1)	(2)	(3)	ive role (4)	$\frac{\text{Contact of }}{(5)}$	(6)	$\frac{\text{Monitor}}{(7)}$	services (8)	(9)	govs (10)
ID*Competitive (MD)										<u> </u>
ID*Competitive (MD)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
ID*Competitive (MD) Post*Competitive (MD)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6) -0.979	(7)	(8)	(9) -0.287	(10) -0.114
	(1) -3.968* (2.351)	(2) -2.690 (2.385)		(4) -0.047 (0.864)	(5) -1.181 (0.885)	(6) -0.979 (0.893)	(7) -2.015 (1.420)	(8) -1.550 (1.530)	(9) -0.287 (0.619)	(10) -0.114 (0.590)
	(1) -3.968* (2.351) -2.722	(2) -2.690 (2.385) -2.786		(4) -0.047 (0.864) -0.541	(5) -1.181 (0.885) 0.114	(6) -0.979 (0.893) 0.192	(7) -2.015 (1.420) -2.062	(8) -1.550 (1.530) -2.066	(9) -0.287 (0.619) -0.155	(10) -0.114 (0.590) -0.370
Post*Competitive (MD)	(1) -3.968* (2.351) -2.722 (2.464)	(2) -2.690 (2.385) -2.786 (2.532)	$ \begin{array}{r} \hline $	(4) -0.047 (0.864) -0.541 (0.760)	(5) -1.181 (0.885) 0.114 (0.827)	(6) -0.979 (0.893) 0.192 (0.865)	(7) -2.015 (1.420) -2.062 (1.524)	(8) -1.550 (1.530) -2.066 (1.625)	(9) -0.287 (0.619) -0.155 (0.568)	(10) -0.114 (0.590) -0.370 (0.574)
Post*Competitive (MD)	(1) -3.968* (2.351) -2.722 (2.464) 8.553**	(2) -2.690 (2.385) -2.786 (2.532) 8.284**	$ \begin{array}{r} \hline (3) \\ -0.484 \\ (0.852) \\ -0.619 \\ (0.756) \\ 0.181 \\ \end{array} $	(4) -0.047 (0.864) -0.541 (0.760) 0.335	(5) -1.181 (0.885) 0.114 (0.827) 1.251	(6) -0.979 (0.893) 0.192 (0.865) 1.066	(7) -2.015 (1.420) -2.062 (1.524) 5.386**	(8) -1.550 (1.530) -2.066 (1.625) 5.360**	(9) -0.287 (0.619) -0.155 (0.568) 1.735**	(10) -0.114 (0.590) -0.370 (0.574) 1.523*

Table 13: DV: ACODE Scorecard (heterogenous effects).

Notes: The dependent variables are ACODE total score and its component. All models include both year and councilor fixed effects (and thus district fixed effects) and cluster standard errors at the councilor-level. In the top panel competitiveness is derived from the *Margin of Victory* measure and in the bottom panel from the measure of *Majority Distance*. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

ID conditional effect on ACODE scorecard component








Figure 28: DV: ACODE Scorecard total score.

4.4 Peer Councilors' Evaluation

We move to report the effect of the ID program on councilor performance using peer councilors' evaluations as the dependent variable. First, we report cross-sectional OLS models in which the the dependent variable is councilor's mean peer evaluation (Table 14). We test the robustness of our findings to stacking all evaluations that councilor *i* received from his peers (between 3-7), and clustering standard error at the councilor level (Table 15). In both estimation methods we report unconditional ID effects (columns 1 and 2), as well as treatment effects conditional on constituency competitiveness (columns 3-5). As the tables make clear, the effect of ID on peer evaluations, conditional on competitiveness, is stronger when using mean score than when stacking all evaluations in long format.

	Uncone	litional	Conditior	al (binary)	Conditio	nal (cont)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ID	0.010	-0.036	-0.196*	-0.180**	0.088	0.055
Competitive (MoV)	(0.067)	(0.051)	(0.100) -0.400*** (0.093)	(0.074)	(0.077)	(0.052)
ID*Competitive (MoV)			0.348***			
Competitive (MD)			(0.131)	-0.376*** (0.084)		
ID*Competitive (MD)				0.293**		
Margin of Victory ID*Margin of Victory				(0.118)	-0.618*** (0.141) 0.349	
Majority distance					(0.242)	-1.139*** (0.275)
ID*Majority distance						0.646* (0.360)
District FE	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х
Controls		Х	Х	Х	Х	Х
Ν	399	399	399	399	399	399

Table 14: DV: Councilor Peers' mean evaluation

Notes: Councilor Peers' evaluation. OLS cross-sectional linear regressions in which the dependent variable is the mean evaluation of councilor i by all surveyed co-councilor j. All models include district fixed effects and cluster standard errors at the district-level. Since the number of cluster is relatively small (20), standard errors are further bootstrapped, using 1000 resamples. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

	Uncone	ditional	Condition	al (binary)	Conditio	nal (cont)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ID	0.035	-0.011	-0.101	-0.110	0.063	0.044
Competitive (MoV)	(0.069)	(0.063)	(0.089) -0.298*** (0.106)	(0.083)	(0.099)	(0.078)
ID*Competitive (MoV)			0.212* (0.127)			
Competitive (MD)			. ,	-0.276**		
ID*Competitive (MD)				(0.108) 0.213* (0.124)		
Margin of Victory				· · · ·	-0.460**	
ID*Margin of Victory					(0.190) 0.197 (0.218)	
Majority distance						-0.850**
ID*Majority distance						(0.362) 0.366 (0.350)
Controls	1(00	X	X	X	X	X
N	1680	1680	1680	1680	1680	1680

Table 15: DV: Councilor Peers' evaluation

Notes: Councilor Peers' evaluation. linear regressions in which the dependent variable is the evaluation of councilor *i* by co-councilor *j*. In all models we include district fixed effects, cluster standard errors at the councilor-level and and weight observations by the inverse of treatment assignment probability. p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

4.5 **Bureaucrat Evaluations**

Recall that each councilor was evaluated by 3-4 district technocrats on four dimensions, summarized into a single index using the mean effect method of Kling *et al.* (2007). Table 16 shows the results of regressing the bureaucrat evaluations' performance summary index as well as the four index components on an ID indicator (unconditional effect), while Table 17 shows similar results, this time conditioning the effect of the ID program on constituency competitiveness. All models include fixed effects for both district and for the line ministry office (e.g., district education office or health office). Since we interviewed 3-4 technocrats in each district headquarters, we have multiple assessments per councilor. We thus stack these assessment (in long format), and cluster standard errors at the councilor level. All regressions weight observations by the inverse of treatment assignment probability.

Again, we find no evidence of an average treatment effects (Table 16), but the ID treatment yields a positive and significant effect when levels of political competition is high (Figure 29 and Figure 30), even though the difference between high and low competition itself is not significant (Table 17).

	Mean assessment		Office	Office Visits		dgeable	Moni	toring	Effort	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
ID	0.040 (0.040)	0.027 (0.037)	0.014 (0.049)	0.002 (0.046)	0.091** (0.045)	0.073* (0.040)	0.015 (0.044)	-0.002 (0.043)	0.039 (0.043)	0.035 (0.042)
Controls N	1387	X 1387	1387	X 1387	1387	X 1387	1387	X 1387	1387	X 1387

Table 16: DV: Technocrats' assessment (main effects)

Notes: Table reports results from a series of OLS regressions that include fixed effects for both district and line ministry (e.g., health, education and water). Robust Standard Errors clustered at the councilor level reported in parentheses. All models controls for technocrats' characteristics. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

	Mean ass	essment	Office	Visits	Knowle	dgeable	Monit	oring	Effe	ort
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
ID	0.019	0.007	0.002	-0.014	0.088	0.038	-0.034	-0.020	0.018	0.025
	(0.060)	(0.055)	(0.073)	(0.069)	(0.064)	(0.056)	(0.069)	(0.065)	(0.066)	(0.063)
Competitive (MoV)	-0.221***	· /	-0.270***	· /	-0.241***	· · ·	-0.194***	· /	-0.178***	```
1 ()	(0.056)		(0.068)		(0.066)		(0.065)		(0.063)	
ID*Competitive (MoV)	0.064		0.053		0.032		0.113		0.060	
1 ()	(0.079)		(0.098)		(0.091)		(0.089)		(0.085)	
Competitive (MD)	· · · ·	-0.119*	. ,	-0.136*	. ,	-0.198***	. ,	-0.072	. ,	-0.071
1 ,		(0.061)		(0.076)		(0.069)		(0.070)		(0.072)
ID*Competitive (MD)		0.048		0.042		0.083		0.041		0.025
1 ()		(0.075)		(0.096)		(0.082)		(0.086)		(0.083)
Controls	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х
Ν	1387	1387	1387	1387	1387	1387	1387	1387	1387	1387

Table 17: DV: Technocrats' assessment (heterogenous effects)

Notes: Table reports results from a series of OLS regressions that include fixed effects for both district and line ministry (e.g., health, education and water). Robust Standard Errors clustered at the councilor level reported in parentheses. All models controls for technocrats' characteristics. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01





Figure 29: ID treatment effect on Technocrats' assessment conditional on level of competitiveness. Estimates derived from Table 17, in which competitiveness is a binary measure of margin of victory (odd number columns).



Technocrats' assessement (summary index)

Figure 30: ID treatment effect on Technocrats' assessment conditional on level of competitiveness. Estimates derived from Table 17, in which competitiveness is a continuous measure of margin of victory (right-panel) and majority distance (left).

4.6 School Grant Applications

Table 18 reports regression results in which the dependent variable is the number of *complete* applications, as a function of the ID treatment with and without covariate adjustment. In columns 1 and 2, we report unconditional ID effects, while in columns 3-5 we report the effect of the ID program conditional on the competitiveness of the constituency. We find that the interaction between treatment and electoral pressure is significant when using the binary measure of competitiveness (columns 3 and 4) and close to significant when using the continuous margins of victory measure (column 5). Figure 31 uses model 5 to demonstrate how the effect of the ID program weakens at lower levels of electoral competition.

	Uncone	ditional	Condition	nal (binary)	Conditio	nal (cont)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ID	0.293	0.315	-0.190	-0.039	0.656**	0.554**
	(0.187)	(0.192)	(0.251)	(0.246)	(0.299)	(0.240)
Competitive (MoV)			-0.288			
			(0.294)			
ID*Competitive (MoV)			1.038***			
Competitive (MD)			(0.362)	-0.434		
Competitive (MD)				(0.336)		
ID*Competitive (MD)				0.769*		
I				(0.411)		
Margin of Victory				. ,	-1.013**	
					(0.503)	
ID*Margin of Victory					0.952*	
					(0.554)	1.070
Majority distance						-1.378
ID*Majority distance						(1.007) 1.874**
ID Majority distance						(0.903)
Constant	-2.465**	-0.424	-0.665	0.337	0.653	0.805
	(0.964)	(2.960)	(3.075)	(3.126)	(2.891)	(2.886)
lnα	1.183***	0.944***	0.912***	0.934***	0.928***	0.934***
	(0.123)	(0.123)	(0.128)	(0.123)	(0.126)	(0.125)
Controls		Х	Х	Х	Х	Х
Ν	376	350	345	346	346	347

Table 18: **DV: Complete school grant applications**


Notes: DV: completed grant applications. Table reports exponential coefficients from a set of negative binomial regressions, weighted by the inverse of treatment assignment probability. Standard errors are clustered at the special councilor constituency-level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

In Table 19, we check the robustness of our findings to an alternative DV: total number of grant applications, including incomplete ones (e.g., those submitted slightly after the deadline or one that are missing a signature of say the headmaster or the PTA). The results are robust.

	Uncon	ditional	Condition	nal (binary)	Conditio	nal (cont)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ID	0.111 (0.133)	0.170 (0.140)	-0.213 (0.175)	-0.077 (0.171)	0.309 (0.211)	0.237 (0.179)
Competitive (MoV)	()	()	-0.328 (0.232)	()	(1)	()
ID*Competitive (MoV)			0.769*** (0.251)			
Competitive (MD)				-0.482* (0.248)		
ID*Competitive (MD)				0.538* (0.276)		
Margin of Victory					-0.078 (0.376)	
ID*Margin of Victory					0.469 (0.395)	
Majority distance						-0.127 (0.738)
ID*Majority distance						0.701 (0.674)
Constant	0.137 (0.378)	1.260 (2.285)	1.566 (2.392)	2.063 (2.428)	1.475 (2.125)	1.567 (2.124)
$\ln \alpha$	0.719*** (0.124)	0.383*** (0.134)	0.323** (0.139)	0.333** (0.137)	0.349** (0.139)	0.343** (0.139)
Controls N	376	X 350	X 345	X 346	X 346	X 347

Table 19: DV: All grant applications (including incomplete)

Notes: DV: Submitted grant applications (including incomplete applications). Table reports exponential coefficients from a set of negative binomial regressions, weighted by the inverse of treatment assignment probability. Standard errors are clustered at the special councilor constituency-level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01



ID conditional effect on school grant applications

Figure 31: Marginal effects of ID treatment conditional on political competition measured as the margin of victory in the 2011 local election. The negative binomial model uses the complete number of school grant applications as dependent variable with district fixed effects and councilor covariates.

5 Expanded Public Service Delivery Section

5.1 Project Spending from Annual Budget

Note that the unit of observation for the budget data is not the individual councilor, but rather the sub-county, for which we have spending information at a given fiscal year. Recall that every sub-county is represented by two councilors: a 'regular' and 'special women'. Since our unit of randomization has been the 'special women councilor', we have assured that both councilors representing a constituency, in effect, have the same treatment status. As for competitiveness, we created a new *competitive* variable that is equal to one if at least one of the sub-county's councilors hails from a competitive constituency.

In Table 20 we demonstrate robustness to the result report in Table 5 in the main text, using a multi-level poisson model for the count dependent variable of the number of development projects (rather than linear model for the log outcome). In Table 21 we repeat the analysis using development projects spending as the dependent variable (see main text Table 6), using instead per capita spending. Finally, we report finding for the share of total development spending in the sub-county, using multi-level models in which councilors are nested within subcounties (Table 22) as well as a Generalized linear model (Table 23). Whether using spending per capita in the subcounty or share spending, we do not find a discernible difference between treatment and control sub-counties.

	Uncon	ditional	Low	matition	Uich cor	nnatition
	Uncone			npetition	High con	npetition
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ID	-0.023	-0.046	-0.005	0.001	-0.008	-0.048
	(0.042)	(0.041)	(0.054)	(0.044)	(0.059)	(0.063)
Post	-0.543***	-0.543***	-0.695***	-0.694***	-0.442***	-0.442***
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.032)	(0.032)
$ID \times Post$	0.075***	0.074***	0.016	0.011	0.091***	0.090***
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.032)	(0.032)
Constant	-8.147***	-10.070***	-8.694***	-12.172***	-8.891***	-9.785***
	(0.532)	(0.714)	(0.817)	(0.920)	(0.729)	(1.018)
$\ln \alpha$	-2.621***	-2.811***	-3.299***	-4.485***	-2.440***	-2.564***
	(0.109)	(0.112)	(0.198)	(0.290)	(0.134)	(0.136)
Year FE	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х
District FE	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х
Controls		Х		Х		Х
Model	POISSON	POISSON	POISSON	POISSON	POISSON	POISSON
Ν	550	550	204	204	346	346

Table 20: DV: Number of development projects

Notes: Poisson * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

	Uncond	itional	Low com	petition	High competition			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)		
ID	0.013	-0.077	0.210	0.020	-0.054	-0.189		
	(0.119)	(0.100)	(0.161)	(0.130)	(0.161)	(0.142)		
Post	0.272***	0.268**	0.136	0.113	0.482***	0.484***		
	(0.105)	5) (0.105) (0.143)		(0.144)	(0.123)	(0.124)		
$ID \times Post$	0.048 0.051		-0.145 -0.085		0.128	0.117		
	(0.100)	(0.100)	0.100) (0.141)		(0.131)	(0.130)		
Constant	-15.652***	-5.198	-11.736***	-1.651	-21.604***	-11.398***		
	(2.952)	(3.367)	(4.340)	(4.642)	(3.062)	(3.690)		
$\sqrt{\psi_{(2)}}$	-0.460***	-0.770***	-0.617***	-1.363***	-0.408***	-0.681***		
•	(0.094)	(0.086)	(0.154)	(0.293)	(0.109)	(0.103)		
σ_e	-0.592***	-0.595***	-0.495***	-0.496***	-0.722***	-0.723***		
	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.117)	(0.114)	(0.102)	(0.102)		
Year FE	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х		
District FE	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х		
Controls		Х		Х		Х		
Ν	561	561	210	210	351	351		

Table 21: DV: Development projects spending per capita (log)

Notes: $\sqrt{\psi_{(2)}}$ refers to variability between councilors, and σ_e is the estimated standard deviation of the overall error term. All models controls for technocrats' characteristics. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

	Uncone	Unconditional		npetition	High competition		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
spensdingshare (standardized)							
ID	-0.020	-0.053	0.114	0.116	-0.098	-0.187	
	(0.121)	(0.120)	(0.126)	(0.115)	(0.180)	(0.185)	
Post	-0.108	-0.101	-0.048	-0.049	-0.148	-0.132	
	(0.107)	(0.107)	(0.102)	(0.102)	(0.191)	(0.191)	
$ID \times Post$	0.147	0.137	-0.049	-0.045	0.266	0.241	
	(0.119)	(0.118)	(0.105)	(0.107)	(0.187)	(0.185)	
Constant	2.623	1.362	2.758	0.000	2.923	1.853	
	(2.520)	(3.338)	(2.882)	(3.874)	(4.431)	(5.316)	
lns1_1_1							
Constant	-0.554***	-0.638***	-0.875***	-1.055***	-0.495***	-0.628***	
	(0.111)	(0.105)	(0.172)	(0.157)	(0.137)	(0.137)	
lnsig_e							
Constant	-0.497***	-0.496***	-0.795***	-0.792***	-0.385***	-0.384***	
	(0.100)	(0.100)	(0.169)	(0.168)	(0.120)	(0.119)	
Year FE	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	
District FE	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	
Controls		Х		Х		Х	
Ν	561	561	210	210	351	351	

Table 22: DV: share of total development spending in the sub-county

Notes: Multilevel models whereby $\sqrt{\psi_{(2)}}$ refers to variability between sub-counties, and σ_e is the estimated standard deviation of the overall error term. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

	Uncond	ditional	Low con	npetition	High competition		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
spensdingshare							
ID	-0.008	-0.020	0.117	0.093	-0.067	-0.102	
	(0.111)	(0.104)	(0.135)	(0.111)	(0.152)	(0.147)	
Post	-0.071	-0.061	-0.014	-0.025	-0.103	-0.082	
	(0.100)	(0.102)	(0.122)	(0.123)	(0.143)	(0.149)	
$ID \times Post$	0.105	0.088	-0.088	-0.066	0.195	0.163	
	(0.100)	(0.101)	(0.115)	(0.119)	(0.144)	(0.146)	
Constant	0.123	-1.351	0.707	-2.124	0.278	-0.652	
	(2.383)	(3.140)	(3.471)	(4.231)	(3.226)	(4.069)	
Model	GLM	GLM	GLM	GLM	GLM	GLM	
Year FE	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	
District FE	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	
Controls		Х		Х		Х	
Ν	561	561	210	210	351	351	

Table 23: DV: share of total development spending in the sub-county

Notes: Generalized linear model; the dependent variable is share of total development spending in the sub-county * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

5.2 Public Service Unannounced Audits

Two audits were undertaken of health centers and schools, the first between May and July 2014 (Midline) and the second between October and November 2015 (Endline) by Innovations for Poverty Action enumerators visiting providers in person to interview the most senior staff member. For both schools and health centers, we estimate the effects of the ID program using two separate cross-sectional set of regressions: one using the midline data and one the endline.

The health center audits included questions on the infrastructure at the health center, provision of medication, staff hiring and firing practices as well as the health centers relationship with their district councilors and local health technocratic office. The surveys took a median time of 73 minutes to complete and were conducted in 181 trial sub-counties, 93 of which were treated areas. Some variables directly measure the effort-level of health clinic staff. These include Absenteeism, which measures the share of staff that is not present at the clinic at the time of the audit; StaffMeeting, a count measure of the number of staff meetings held in the past six months; and Outreach, a count of variable capturing the number of outreach campaigns the health clinic had undertaken in the past six months (e.g., to immunize and/or educate citizens). We also have two variables capturing staffing changes. These include DHO requests, which measures the number of applications submitted to the DHO for hiring/firing in previous six months, and New Employee, which is a count of the number of new staff that had joined the clinic in the previous six months. Although less likely to be affected than labor inputs and requests, we also checked capital inputs regarding infrastructure and supplies. We have indicators for *Stockouts* (for malaria, antibiotics, and immunizations) in the last six months, as well as indicators for the existence of *Modern Lighting*, *Stoves* (for cleaning and sterilizing equipment), and *Pit Latrine*.

The school audits included questions on similar items on labor and capital inputs. These include *Absenteeism*, which measures the share of staff that is not present at the school at the time of the audit; *Teacher:pupils ratio*, which measures the number of full time teachers per pupil; *Teachers hired*, which is a count of the number of government teachers hired in the past six months; *Teacher apps*, measuring the number of government teacher applications to DEO in past six months; *StaffMeeting*, a count measure of the number of staff meetings held in the past six months; and *Latrine:pupils*, which measures the number of working pit latrines per pupil.

Table 24 and Table 25 report the unconditional ATE of the ID program on service delivery outcomes, using the health clinics and schools data, respectively. Table 26 and Table 27 report the marginal effect of the ID program conditional on the constituency's competitiveness. Note that we use the same competitiveness variable as in the spending data: *competitive* is equal to zero if both councilors represent low-competitive constituencies; and is equal to one if at least one of the councilors represents a competitive constituency.

We find no consistent effects of the ID program on public service audits. Descriptive statistics for public service delivery are reported in Table 28.

	Absenteeism		DHO applications		New Employees		Outreach campaigns		Staff meetings					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)				
Midline														
ID	0.008	0.017	-0.089	-0.106	-0.055	-0.029	0.038	0.068	0.154	0.108				
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.098)	(0.097)	(0.074)	(0.073)	(0.097)	(0.085)	(0.680)	(0.708)				
Endline														
ID	0.011	0.006	-0.071	-0.011	0.048	0.024	0.069	0.154	0.555	0.215				
	(0.031)	(0.034)	(0.152)	(0.143)	(0.092)	(0.089)	(0.119)	(0.111)	(1.083)	(0.905)				
District FE	х	Х	Х	Х	х	Х	Х	Х	х	Х				
Controls		Х		Х		Х		Х		Х				
Ν	152	152	179	179	180	180	178	178	180	180				

Table 24: DV: health center unannounced audits (main effects)

Notes: OLS regression with and without covariate adjustment. All models include district fixed effects and clustered standard errors at the district level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

	Absen	teeism	Teacher-puppils ratio		STeachers hired		Teacher a	pplications	Staff meetings	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
				Midli	ne					
ID	-0.011	-0.006	1.269	0.067	-0.109	-0.112*	0.089	0.060	-0.137*	-0.158*
	(0.030)	(0.033)	(2.831)	(3.130)	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.121)	(0.137)	(0.077)	(0.080)
				Endli	ne					
ID	-0.002	-0.007	1.285	0.428	0.054	0.088	0.012	0.035	0.075	0.078
	(0.017)	(0.018)	(1.883)	(2.011)	(0.056)	(0.057)	(0.238)	(0.252)	(0.074)	(0.065)
District FE	Х	х	Х	Х	х	х	Х	Х	Х	Х
Controls		Х		Х		Х		Х		Х
Ν	177	177	200	200	111	111	200	200	200	200

Table 25: DV: School unannounced audits (main effects)

Notes: OLS regression with and without covariate adjustment. All models include district fixed effects and clustered standard errors at the district level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

	Absenteeism		DHO applications		New Employees		Outreach campaigns		Staff meetings			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)		
Midline												
ID	0.035	0.047	-0.028	-0.047	-0.044	0.008	0.028	0.091	-1.395	-1.229		
	(0.055)	(0.050)	(0.153)	(0.156)	(0.113)	(0.087)	(0.141)	(0.158)	(1.108)	(0.880)		
Competitive	-0.004	0.006	0.274	0.298	-0.049	-0.052	0.051	0.075	-1.870	-2.526		
	(0.056)	(0.059)	(0.173)	(0.174)	(0.110)	(0.104)	(0.150)	(0.123)	(1.579)	(1.766)		
ID× Competitive	-0.040	-0.046	-0.095	-0.098	-0.016	-0.055	0.014	-0.038	2.391	2.138		
	(0.067)	(0.064)	(0.186)	(0.187)	(0.119)	(0.112)	(0.198)	(0.210)	(1.392)	(1.303)		
Endline												
ID	0.001	-0.012	0.188*	0.258*	-0.002	-0.014	0.112	0.170	-0.092	-0.028		
	(0.069)	(0.066)	(0.099)	(0.147)	(0.034)	(0.058)	(0.151)	(0.137)	(0.981)	(0.868)		
Competitive	0.020	0.020	0.289	0.306	0.169*	0.159*	0.046	0.060	-0.207	-0.265		
	(0.088)	(0.085)	(0.244)	(0.214)	(0.080)	(0.079)	(0.171)	(0.163)	(1.072)	(0.933)		
$\text{ID} \times \text{Competitive}$	0.013	0.027	-0.392	-0.420	0.065	0.048	-0.065	-0.026	0.952	0.375		
	(0.074)	(0.066)	(0.231)	(0.275)	(0.134)	(0.128)	(0.153)	(0.175)	(1.579)	(1.433)		
District FE	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	х	х		
Controls		Х		Х		Х		Х		Х		
Ν	152	152	179	179	180	180	178	178	180	180		

Table 26: DV: health center unannounced audits (heterogenous effects)

Notes: OLS regression with and without covariate adjustment. All models include district fixed effects and clustered standard errors at the district level. Competitive is measured as a binary variable equal one if at least one of the councilors representing the sub-county hails from a competitive constituency. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

	Absenteeism		DHO ap	plications	New En	New Employees		campaigns	Staff meetings			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)		
Endline												
ID	-0.003	0.015	5.468	4.356	-0.190*	-0.160	-0.427**	-0.438**	-0.124	-0.154		
	(0.036)	(0.044)	(4.509)	(2.830)	(0.108)	(0.117)	(0.164)	(0.164)	(0.097)	(0.101)		
Competitive	0.010	0.017	8.047	7.496	-0.070	-0.053	-0.292*	-0.328*	-0.027	0.007		
	(0.036)	(0.038)	(5.100)	(5.706)	(0.116)	(0.117)	(0.151)	(0.167)	(0.112)	(0.110)		
$\mathrm{ID}\times\mathrm{Competitive}$	-0.013	-0.033	-6.870	-7.158	0.123	0.079	0.812***	0.797***	-0.018	-0.007		
	(0.042)	(0.046)	(6.671)	(4.707)	(0.128)	(0.146)	(0.210)	(0.211)	(0.149)	(0.161)		
Endline												
ID	0.007	0.013	2.059	2.815	0.100	0.103	0.276	0.363	-0.107	-0.081		
	(0.033)	(0.031)	(2.820)	(2.742)	(0.063)	(0.071)	(0.312)	(0.278)	(0.131)	(0.122)		
Competitive	0.035	0.046	2.098	1.336	0.163**	0.117*	0.433	0.456	-0.070	-0.051		
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(3.299)	(3.165)	(0.060)	(0.059)	(0.371)	(0.340)	(0.089)	(0.095)		
$\text{ID} \times \text{Competitive}$	-0.017	-0.036	-1.352	-3.726	-0.085	-0.037	-0.432	-0.542	0.273	0.244		
	(0.043)	(0.040)	(3.593)	(2.993)	(0.081)	(0.097)	(0.361)	(0.372)	(0.191)	(0.173)		
District FE	х	Х	Х	Х	х	Х	Х	Х	Х	х		
Controls		Х		Х		Х		Х		Х		
Ν	177	177	200	200	111	111	200	200	200	200		

Table 27: DV: School unannounced audits (heterogenous effects)

Notes: OLS regression with and without covariate adjustment. All models include district fixed effects and clustered standard errors at the district level. Competitive is measured as a binary variable equal one if at least one of the councilors representing the sub-county hails from a competitive constituency. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table 28: Descriptive Statistics Public Service Delivery

	mean	sd	min	max	obs.
Budget: Total Spending (million)	1083.29	1172.84	29.50	16050.81	556
Budget: Number of Project	49.84	29.03	3.00	218.00	546
Health Audit: Dummy for having had stockouts of malaria kits or antibiotic or immun kits	0.75	0.43	0.00	1.00	215
Health Audit: Number of new staff in previous 3 months	0.26	0.50	0.00	3.00	388
Health Audit: Number of applications to DHO for hiring/firing in previous 3 months	0.41	0.85	0.00	6.00	386
Health Audit: Percentage of staff not present at the hospital	0.52	0.20	-1.00	1.00	336
Health Audit: Dummy for having modern lighting	0.56	0.50	0.00	1.00	387
Health Audit: Dummy for having stoves for sterilization and cooking	0.50	0.50	0.00	1.00	386
Health Audit: Categorical for the number of staff meetings held in the past six months	1.28	0.71	0.00	2.00	386
Health Audit: Number of outreach campaigns in the past 3 months	7.49	6.46	0.00	45.00	386
Health Audit: Day of week audit took place	2.93	1.44	0.00	6.00	395
School Audit: Number of working pit latrines per student	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.08	440
School Audit: Number of full time teachers per student	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.08	440
School Audit: Number of government teachers hired in the past 3 months	0.15	0.36	0.00	2.50	330
School Audit: Number of government teacher applications to DEO in past 3 months	0.64	1.00	0.00	8.00	400
School Audit: Percentage of teachers not signed in the attendance book	0.23	0.16	0.00	1.00	411
School Audit: Categorical for the number of staff meetings held in the past six months	2.61	0.51	1.00	3.00	440
School Audit: Day of week audit took place	3.00	1.37	0.00	6.00	440

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