Supporting Materials for "Non-Representative Representatives: An Experimental Study of the Decision Making of Elected Politicians"

Contents

1 Sample Descriptives

1.1 Attrition Rates

The table below reports th proportion of participating MPs who completed the relevant experimental modules, out of all MPs beginning an interview. The large majority of MPs completed the experimental modules. In the time discounting module, where multiple responses were required, some MPs skipped some of the lines or refused to respond altogether, resulting in a relatively higher attrition rate compared to the rest of the modules. Nevertheless, 82% of MPs filled out the last line of this module.

Module	Belgium	Canada	Israel	All	Proportion
Round 1					
First Question	85	34	41	160	
Asian Disease Module	82	43	29	155	97%
Round 2					
First Question	269	76	65	410	
Sunk Cost Module	254	75	53	382	93%
Time Discounting Module (First line)	228	74	45	347	85%
Time Discounting Module (Last line)	216	74	46	336	82%
Sunk Cost Module	254	75	53	382	93%
Status Quo Module	251	74	52	377	92%

1.2 Politicians Sample by Partisan Proportionality

Parliament	Party	Proportion of Sample (N interviewed)	Proportion in Parliament (N Parliament)
Round I (2014)			
Chamber of Representatives, Belgium			
	CD&V	22.3%	22%
		19	22
	Groen	7.1%	6%
		6	6
	LDD	1.2%	1%
		1	1
	N-VA	28.2%	28%
		24	28

	Open VLD	12.9%	16%
		11	16
	sp.a	17.6%	16%
		15	16
	Vlaams Belang	10.6%	11%
		9	11
	Total	100%	100%
		85	100
House of Commons, Canada		%	%
		N	N
	Bloc Quebecois	0%	1.3%
		0	4
	Conservative	32.5%	53.9%
		14	166
	Green	0%	0.3%
		0	1
	Liberal	16.2%	11%
		7	34
	NDP	51.1%	33.4%
		22	103
	Total	100%	100%
		43	308
The Knesset, Israel		%	%
		N	N
	Balad	2.8%	2.5%
		1	3
	Hadash	8.3%	3.3%
		3	4
	Hatnua	8.3%	5%
		3	6
	Israel Beitenu	2.8%	10.8%
		1	13
	Jewish Home	8.3%	10%
		3	12
	Kadima	5.6%	1.6%
		2	2
	Labor	19.4%	12.5%
		7	15
	Likud	11.1%	15%
		4	18
	Meretz	11.1%	5%
		4	6
	Ra'am-Ta'al	2.8%	3.3%
		1	4
	Shas	2.8%	9.2%
		1	11
	Yehadut Hatorah	0%	5.8%
		0	7

	Yesh Atid	16.7%	15.8%
		6	19
	Total	100%	100%
		36	120
Round II (2015)			
Chamber of Representatives, Belgium		%	%
		N	N
	CD&V	14.6%	12.3%
		16	21
	Ecolo	2.6%	4.7%
		3	8
	FDP	1.7%	1.2%
		2	2
	Groen	4.4%	3.5%
		5	6
	MR	13.3%	15.8%
		15	27
	N-VA	26.5%	22.2%
		30	38
	Open VLD	9.7%	9.9%
		11	17
	PP	0.9%	1.2%
		1	2
	PS	10.6%	13.4%
		12	23
	PTB-GO!	0%	1.2%
		0	2
	Vlaams Belang	2.6%	1.7%
		3	3
	cdH	4.4%	5.3%
		5	9
	sp.a	8.8%	7.6%
		10	13
	Total	100%	100%
		113	171
Flemish Parliament, Belgium		%	%
		N	N
	CD&V	21.7%	22.6%
		23	30
	Groen	8.5%	7.5%
		9	10
	N-VA	33%	35.3%
		35	47
	Open VLD	17.9%	15.8%
		19	21
	UF	0%	0.7%
		0	1

	sp.a	14.1%	13.5%
		15	18
	Vlaams Belang	4.7%	4.5%
		5	6
	Total	100%	100%
		106	133
Waloon Parliament, Belgium		%	%
		N	N
	Ecolo	10%	5.5%
		5	6
	FDF	6%	2.7%
		3	3
	MR	26%	28.4%
		13	31
	PP	0%	0.9%
		0	1
	PS	36%	42.2%
		18	46
	PTB-GO!	0%	1.8%
		0	2
	cdH	22%	18.3%
		11	20
	Total	100%	100%
		50	109
House of Commons, Canada		%	%
		N	N
	Bloc Quebecois	2.2%	1.3%
		1	4
	Conservative	21.7%	53.9%
		10	166
	Green	0%	0.3%
		0	1
	Liberal	17.4%	11%
		8	34
	NDP	58.7%	33.4%
		27	103
	Total	100%	100%
		46	308
The Knesset, Israel		%	%
		N	N
	Israel Beitenu	0%	5%
		0	6
	Jewish Home	4.5%	6.7%
		2	8
	Joint Arab List	9.1%	10.8%
		4	13
	Kulanu	9.1%	8.3%

		4	10
	Likud	13.6%	25%
		6	30
	Meretz	11.4%	4.1%
		5	5
	Shas	2.3%	5.8%
		1	7
	Yehadut Hatorah	4.5%	5%
		2	6
	Yesh Atid	15.9%	9.2%
		7	11
	Zionist Camp	29.5%	20%
		13	24
	Total	100%	100%
		44	120
The Knesset (Exiting Members), Israel		% N	% N
	Balad	0	2.5%
		0	3
	Hadash	16.7%	3.3%
		3	4
	Hatnua	22.2%	5%
		4	6
	Israel Beitenu	5.6%	10.8%
		1	13
	Jewish Home	16.7%	10%
		3	12
	Kadima	0%	1.6%
		0	2
	Labor	5.6%	12.5%
		1	15
	Likud	0%	15%
		0	18
	Meretz	5.6%	5%
		1	6
	Ra'am-Ta'al	0%	3.3%
		0	4
	Shas	5.6%	9.2%
		1	11
	Yehadut Hatorah	0%	5.8%
		0	7
	Yesh Atid	22.2%	15.8%
		4	19
	Total	100%	100%
		18 (of 39 exiting)	120

2 Study 1

2.1 Summary Statistics

Table 2: Summary Statistics - MPs Participating in Round I of The Study

	Belgium		Canada		Israel	
	Mean	Range	Mean	Range	Mean	Range
Year of birth	1967	[1949 - 1987]	1961	[1943 - 1990]	1959	[1945 - 1978]
Year of first election	2005	[1985 - 2012]	2006	[1993 - 2012]	2006	[1981 - 2013]
Gender (% Female)	35.%		27.9%		17.2%	
Overall	82		43		29	

Country effects on age: $F = 8.26, p = .0004$

Country effects on year of first election: $F = 0.26, p = .774$

Country effects on gender: $F = 5.77, p = .003$

2.2 General Population Sample

We obtained comparison groups of citizens in all three participating countries. In Canada, we obtained a representative sample of 515 Canadian adults (mean age 49, proportion female: 50.1%), proportionally distributed across provinces. In Belgium, we obtained a representative sample of 537 Belgian adults (mean age 42, proportion female 52.2%) from the Dutch-speaking Flanders region, as the Belgian MP we surveyed in the first round of interviews (and who participated in the Asian Disease experiment) were exclusively from that region. In Israel, we obtained a representative sample of 505 Israel adults (mean age 41, proportion female 50.5%). In all countries, respondents participated in an online survey that included the Asian

Disease experiment.

Table 3 compares the distribution of responses between MPs and citizens. Overall, the change in risk preferences when moving from a gains to a losses frame is similar, but MPs are more risk-seeking (63% vs. 54% in the citizen sample).

2.3 Principal Results

	Subgroup	Proportion	95% CI
Overall	MPs	0.63	[0.53 - 0.71]
	Citizens	0.54	[0.51 - 0.57]
Belgium	MPs	0.64	[0.50 - 0.76]
	Citizens	0.54	[0.49 - 0.58]
Canada	MPs	0.59	[0.42 - 0.75]
	Citizens	0.55	[0.50 - 0.60]
Israel	MPs	0.61	[0.43 - 0.79]
	Citizens	0.53	[0.49 - 0.57]

Table 3: Clarify estimates of proportion preferring the risky choice in the Asian Disease experiment, by sample type and country. Results are Clarify predictions from logit regression models with experimental treatments as independent variables. See Table 6 for full regression results; predictions derived from Model 3 results. Overall means are obtained by setting treatment likelihoods to 0.5.

	Subgroup	Treatment	Proportion	95% CI
Overall	MPs	Gains	0.41	[0.32 - 0.52]
		Losses	0.80	[0.69 - 0.88]
	Citizens	Gains	0.36	[0.33 - 0.39]
		Losses	0.71	[0.67 - 0.74]
Belgium	MPs	Gains	0.41	[0.29 - 0.54]
		Losses	0.83	[0.66 - 0.93]
	Citizens	Gains	0.32	[0.27 - 0.38]
		Losses	0.74	[0.69 - 0.79]
Canada	MPs	Gains	0.34	[0.16 - 0.57]
		Losses	0.79	[0.60 - 0.91]
	Citizens	Gains	0.37	[0.31 - 0.43]
		Losses	0.72	[0.66 - 0.77]
Israel	MPs	Gains	0.53	[0.32 - 0.74]
		Losses	0.69	[0.38 - 0.91]
	Citizens	Gains	0.39	[0.34 - 0.46]
		Losses	0.66	[0.60 - 0.72]

Table 4: Clarify estimates of proportion preferring the risky choice in the Asian Disease experiment, by gain/loss treatment condition, sample type and country. Results are Clarify predictions from logit regression models with the experimental treatment as independent variable. See Table 6 for full regression results; predictions derived from Model 1 results.

	Subgroup	Treatment	Proportion	95% CI
Overall	MPs	Low Acc.	0.60	[0.49 - 0.71]
		Hi Acc.	0.54	[0.42 - 0.65]
	Citizens	Low Acc.	0.54	[0.50 - 0.57]
		Hi Acc.	0.53	[0.49 - 0.56]
Belgium	MPs	Low Acc.	0.65	[0.49 - 0.78]
		Hi Acc.	0.45	[0.30 - 0.60]
	Citizens	Low Acc.	0.53	[0.48 - 0.59]
		Hi Acc.	0.52	[0.47 - 0.58]
Canada	MPs	Low Acc.	0.52	[0.32 - 0.73]
		Hi Acc.	0.68	[0.48 - 0.85]
	Citizens	Low Acc.	0.57	[0.51 - 0.63]
		Hi Acc.	0.51	[0.45 - 0.57]
Israel	MPs	Low Acc.	0.57	[0.35 - 0.79]
		Hi Acc.	0.58	[0.30 - 0.83]
	Citizens	Low Acc.	0.51	[0.45 - 0.57]
		Hi Acc.	0.55	[0.49 - 0.61]

Table 5: Clarify estimates of proportion preferring the risky choice in the Asian Disease experiment, by accountability treatment condition, sample type and country. Results are Clarify predictions from logit regression models with the experimental treatment as independent variable. See Table 6 for full regression results; predictions derived from Model 2 results.

	Variable	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
		MPs	GP	MPs	GP	MPs	GP	MPs	GP
All									
	Loss Frame	1.72***	1.46***			1.74***	1.46***	1.91***	1.45***
		(0.377)	(0.108)			(0.379)	(0.108)	(0.147)	(0.109)
	Accountability			-0.263	-0.04	-0.33	-0.06	-0.45	-0.50
				(0.327)	(0.101)	(0.356)	(0.108)	(0.380)	(0.109)
	Gender							-0.61	-0.11
								(0.424)	(0.111)
	Age							-0.01	0.00
								(0.310)	(0.003)
	Canada (Dummy)							-0.53	0.04
								(0.476)	(0.136)
	Israel (Dummy)							-0.10	-0.04
								(0.503)	(0.133)
	Intercept	-0.34	-0.57***	0.43*	0.15**	-0.193	-0.54**	39.34	-2.40
		(0.215)	(0.074)	(0.223)	(0.071)	(0.265)	(0.091)	(38.763)	(7.207)
	N	154	1557	154	1557	154	1557	148	1534
	Log-likelihood	-92.946	-979.23	-104.543	-1075.856	-92.509	-979.070	-85.952	-964.350
	Variable	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
		MPs	GP	MPs	GP	MPs	GP	MPs	GP
BE									
	Loss Frame	1.99***	1.78***			1.97***	1.78***	2.00***	1.78***
		(0.565)	(0.190)			(0.573)	(0.190)	(0.581)	(0.194)
	Accountability			-0.85*	-0.02	-0.80	-0.06	-0.919***	-0.01
				(0.456)	(0.172)	(0.500)	(0.190)	(0.517)	(0.193)
	Gender							-0.28	-0.09
								(0.542)	(0.195)
	Age							-0.03	-0.00

								(0.027)	(0.007)
	Intercept	-0.38	-0.74***	0.62**	0.11	-0.02	-0.70***	77.24	13.64
		(0.282)	(0.129)	(0.309)	(0.122)	(0.362)	(0.159)	(54.875)	(13.814)
	N	82	537	82	537	82	537	82	522
	Log-likelihood	-48.592	-323.276	-54.450	-371.427	-47.293	-323.210	-46.010	-313.293
	Variable	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
		MPs	GP	MPs	GP	MPs	GP	MPs	GP
CA									
	Loss Frame	2.07***	1.50***			2.01***	1.51***	3.39***	1.49***
		(0.707)	(0.190)			(0.715)	(0.190)	(1.225)	(0.192)
	Accountability			0.66	-0.28	0.34	-0.31*	-0.11	-0.32*
				(0.632)	(0.177)	(0.716)	(0.190)	(0.887)	(0.191)
	Gender							-2.53**	0.15
								(1.247)	(0.202)
	Age							-0.11	-0.00
								(0.047)	(0.005)
	Intercept	-0.69	-0.55	0.09	0.31**	-0.83	-0.39**	22.33	9.85
		(0.500)	(0.128)	(0.436)	(0.126)	(0.583)	(0.158)	(92.295)	(11.684)
	N	43	515	43	515	43	515	37	507
	Log-likelihood	-23.967	-321.501	-28.293	-353.839	-23.852	-320.116	-16.159	-314.795
	Variable	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
		MPs	GP	MPs	GP	MPs	GP	MPs	GP
IL									
	Loss Frame	0.74	1.09***			0.74	1.09***	0.75	1.08***
		(0.829)	(0.185)			(0.829)	(0.185)	(0.839)	(0.186)
	Accountability			-0.02	0.18	-0.00	0.18	0.24	0.14
				(0.765)	(0.178)	(0.776)	(0.185)	(0.867)	(0.187)
	Gender							-0.50	-0.37**
								(1.263)	(0.189)

Age							0.04	0.01**
							(0.057)	(0.006)
Intercept	0.10	-0.42***	0.35	0.02	0.10	-0.52***	-88.83	-26.88**
	(0.459)	(0.129)	(0.492)	(0.126)	(0.563)	(0.159)	(112.303)	(12.672)
N	29	505	29	505	29	505	29	505
Log-likelihood	-19.252	-330.925	-19.667	-348.688	-19.252	-330.430	-18.930	-326.852

Table 6: Estimation results: determinants of risk-seeking. BE - Belgium, CA - Canada, IL - Israel. All models reported are logistic regressions. Dependent variable is certain or risky choice in the Asian Disease experiment (coded 0 or 1, respectively). Loss frame is 0 for gains condition, 1 for losses condition. Accountability is 0 for low, 1 for high. Gender is coded 0 for male, 1 for female. Age is coded in years. Coefficient values are reported with standard errors in parentheses. $* = p \leq 0.1, ** = p \leq 0.05, *** = p \leq 0.01$.

3 Studies 2,3 and 4 Descriptives

3.1 MP Sample

Table 7: Summary Statistics - MPs Participating in Round II of The Study

	Belgium		Canada		Israel	
	Mean	Range	Mean	Range	Mean	Range
Year of birth	1968	[1937 - 1988]	1961	[1931 - 1990]	1962	[1943 - 1980]
Year of first election	2008	[1968 - 2014]	2007	[1981 - 2015]	2009	[1981 - 2015]
Gender (% Female)	36.2%		30.6%		26.4%	
Overall	254		75		53	

Country effects on age: $F = 15.71, p = .000$

Country effects on year of first election: $F = 2.16, p = .117$

Country effects on gender: $F = 1.14, p = .320$

3.2 General Population Sample

We obtained comparison groups of citizens in all three participating countries. In Canada, we obtained a representative sample of 623 Canadian adults (mean age 50, proportion female: 50.1%), proportionally distributed across provinces. In Belgium, we obtained a representative sample of 2,791 Belgian adults (mean age 43, proportion female 53%). In Israel, we obtained a representative sample of 1,005 Israel adults (mean age 41, proportion female 50.5%). In all countries, respondents participated in an online survey that included the three experimental modules administered to politicians in studies 2, 3, and 4. Phrasing and instructions were identical.

4 Study 2

4.1 Instrument

We included two independent treatments in the sunk cost module: we manipulated the scale of the sunk cost (either 10% or 40% of the original investment), and we manipulated the implied level of situational accountability. This results in a 2x2 design. Participants were randomly presented one of the four resultant vignettes. The full texts were as follows:

Low Accountability:

> Please consider the following scenario: five years ago the government invested $500 million in a small business loan program to help those businesses create more jobs a program that was projected to fully return the investment. The program is now about to end, and it turns out that after five years, the return has been only [$300 / $450] million. That is, [$200 / $50] million less than what was originally projected.
>
> The government department running the program now asks to extend the program in a year and invest another $100 million in government funds, in order to assist business facing difficulties returning their loans. The department officials project that by the end of the year, these measures will recover the remainder of the original investment ([$200 / $50] million), plus return the additional $100 million asked for.
>
> Based on this information, do you:
>
> 1. Vote for the proposal
> 2. Vote against the proposal

High Accountability:

Please consider the following scenario: five years ago the government invested $500 million in a small business loan program to help those businesses create more jobs a program that was projected to fully return the investment. The program is now about to end, and it turns out that after five years, the return has been only [$300 / $450] million. That is, [$200 / $50] million less than what was originally projected.

It is now a month before the coming elections, and the government department running the program now asks to extend the program in a year and invest another $100 million in government funds, in order to assist business facing difficulties returning their loans. The department officials project that by the end of the year, these measures will recover the remainder of the original investment ([$200 / $50] million), plus return the additional $100 million asked for.

Going into the elections, this becomes a public debate and reporters ask whether you will support the proposal to extend the program for another $100 million.

Based on this information, do you:

1. Declare to vote for the proposal
2. Declare to vote against the proposal

4.2 Principal Results

	Subgroup	Proportion	95% CI
Overall	MPs	0.84	[0.80 - 0.87]
	Citizens	0.71	[0.70 - 0.72]
Belgium	MPs	0.85	[0.80 - 0.89]
	Citizens	0.69	[0.67 - 0.71]
Canada	MPs	0.75	[0.65 - 0.85]
	Citizens	0.60	[0.56 - 0.64]
Israel	MPs	0.90	[0.80 - 0.96]
	Citizens	0.84	[0.81 - 0.86]

Table 8: Clarify estimates of proportion voting to extend the program in the Sunk Cost experiment, by sample type and country. Results are Clarify predictions from logit regression models with experimental treatments as independent variables. See Table 10 for full regression results; predictions derived from Model 3 results. Overall means are obtained by setting treatment likelihoods to 0.5.

Subgroup	Treatment	Proportion	95% CI
MPs	Low Sunk Cost ($50 Million)	0.86	[0.81 - 0.90]
	High Sunk Cost ($200 Million)	0.81	[0.74 - 0.86]
Citizens	Low Sunk Cost ($50 Million)	0.72	[0.70 - 0.73]
	High Sunk Cost ($200 Million)	0.70	[0.68 - 0.72]
MPs	Low Acc.	0.86	[0.80 - 0.91]
	High Acc.	0.81	[0.75 - 0.86]
Citizens	Low Acc.	0.72	[0.70 - 0.74]
	High Acc.	0.70	[0.68 - 0.71]

Table 9: Clarify estimates of proportion of MPs and citizens voting to extend the program in the Sunk Cost experiment, by sunk cost size and accountability treatments. Results are Clarify predictions from logit regression models with the experimental treatment as independent variable. See Table 10 for full regression results; predictions derived from Model 1 and Model 2 results.

	Variable	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
		MPs	GP	MPs	GP	MPs	GP	MPs	GP
All									
	Sunk Cost	-0.39	-0.05			-0.37	-0.53	-0.42	-0.05
		(0.277)	(0.066)			(0.278)	(0.066)	(0.284)	(0.067)
	Acc.			-0.34	-0.13**	-0.32	-0.13**	-0.38	-0.14**
				(0.280)	(0.066)	(0.282)	(0.066)	(0.287)	(0.067)
	Gender							-0.06	-0.11*
								(0.306)	(0.068)
	Age							-0.00	-0.00
								(0.140)	(0.002)
	Canada (D.)							-0.60*	-0.42***
								(0.342)	(0.092)
	Israel (D.)							0.53	0.83***
								(0.508)	(0.0.094)
	Intercept	1.82***	0.92***	1.81***	0.96***	1.99***	0.99***	18.16	6.84
		(0.203)	(0.047)	(0.215)	(0.048)	(0.257)	(0.058)	(27.667)	(4.547)
	N	382	4415	382	4415	382	4415	379	4415
	Log-likelihood	-170.027	-2657.854	-170.251	-2655.979	-169.356	-2655.658	-164.145	-2589.672
	Variable	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
		MPs	GP	MPs	GP	MPs	GP	MPs	GP
BE									
	Sunk Cost	-0.37	-0.01			-0.32	-0.01	-0.34	-0.01
		(0.347)	(0.081)			(0.351)	(0.081)	(0.352)	(0.081)
	Accountability			-0.58	-0.14*	-0.54	-0.14*	-0.53	-0.15*
				(0.358)	(0.082)	(0.360)	(0.820)	(0.361)	(0.082)
	Gender							-0.30	-0.14*
								(0.361)	(0.082)
	Age							-0.00	-0.00

								(0.018)	(0.002)
	Intercept	1.87***	0.80***	2.01***	0.87***	2.16***	0.88***	6.76	1.78
		(0.260)	(0.058)	(0.284)	(0.059)	(0.334)	(0.072)	(36.565)	(5.688)
	N	254	2791	254	2791	254	2791	254	2791
	Log-likelihood	-110.015	-1729.324	-109.247	-1727.708	-108.826	-1727.696	-108.436	-1726.06
	Variable	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
		MPs	GP	MPs	GP	MPs	GP	MPs	GP
CA									
	Sunk Cost	-0.46	-0.21			-0.46	-0.21	-0.56	-0.22
		(0.544)	(0.164)			(0.545)	(0.164)	(0.570)	(0.164)
	Accountability			-0.25	-0.01	-0.25	-0.00	-0.28	-0.01
				(0.543)	(0.164)	(0.545)	(0.164)	(0.578)	(0.164)
	Gender							1.05	0.18
								(0.790)	(0.173)
	Age							-0.02	-0.00
								(0.026)	(0.145)
	Intercept	1.35***	0.51***	1.28***	0.40***	1.48***	0.51***	43.62	15.38
		(0.373)	(0.116)	(0.399)	(0.115)	(0.475)	(0.141)	(51.659)	(10.247)
	N	75	619	75	619	75	619	72	619
	Log-likelihood	-40.967	-415.893	-41.217	-416.753	-40.859	-415.892	-37.628	-414.612
	Variable	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
		MPs	GP	MPs	GP	MPs	GP	MPs	GP
IL									
	Sunk Cost	-0.65	-0.07			-0.63	-0.07	-0.67	-0.06
		(0.958)	(0.170)			(0.963)	(0.170)	(1.003)	(0.171)
	Accountability			0.74	-0.27	0.71	-0.27	0.89	-0.26
				(0.958)	(0.171)	(0.962)	(0.171)	(1.008)	(0.172)
	Gender							-0.43	-0.24
								(1.110)	(0.173)

Age							-0.04	-0.01***
							(0.052)	(0.005)
Intercept	2.60***	1.66***	1.89***	1.77***	2.23***	1.80***	89.825	22.215*
	(0.732)	(0.121)	(0.619)	(0.127)	(0.845)	(0.154)	(103.318)	(11.822)
N	53	1005	53	1005	53	1005	53	1005
Log-likelihood	-16.320	-448.683	-16.253	-447.473	-16.034	-447.384	-15.352	-444.583

Table 10: Estimation results: determinants of escalation of commitment. BE - Belgium, CA - Canada, IL - Israel. All models reported are logistic regressions. Dependent variable is voting yes or no on extending the small business loan program in the Sunk Cost experiment (coded 0 for no, 1 for yes). Sunk cost is 0 for low ($50 million), 1 for high ($200 million). Accountability (Acc.) is 0 for low, 1 for high. Gender is coded 0 for male, 1 for female. Age is coded in years. Coefficient values are reported with standard errors in parentheses. $* = p \leq 0.1, ** = p \leq 0.05, *** = p \leq 0.01$.

5 Study 3

5.1 Principal Results

	Subgroup	Mean	95% CI
Overall	MPs	14.31	[13.89 - 14.73]
	Citizens	14.63	[14.44 - 14.83]
Belgium	MPs	14.03	13.50 - 14.56]
	Citizens	14.03	[13.78 - 14.28]
Canada	MPs	13.81	[12.99 - 14.60]
	Citizens	14.85	[14.34 - 15.39]
Israel	MPs	16.64	[15.40 - 17.81]
	Citizens	15.80	[15.45 - 16.14]

Table 11: Clarify estimates of mean future investment value for which respondents opt to wait two years in the time discounting experiment, by sample type and country. Results are Clarify predictions from linear regression models with the experimental treatment as the independent variable. See Table 13 for full regression results; predictions derived from Model 1 results. Overall means are obtained by setting treatment likelihoods to 0.5.

	Subgroup	Treatment	Mean	95% CI
All				
	MPs	No Election	14.00	[13.34 - 14.64]
		Election	14.65	[14.06 - 15.23]
	Citizens	No Election	14.53	[14.25 - 14.80]
		Election	14.74	[14.47 - 15.02]
Belgium				
	MPs	No Election	13.81	[13.10 - 14.56]
		Election	14.24	[13.51 - 14.96
	Citizens	No Election	14.16	[13.86 - 14.52]
		Election	13.89	[13.55 - 14.25]
Canada				
	MPs	No Election	13.50	[12.29 - 14.67]
		Election	14.14	[13.03 - 15.27]
	Citizens	No Election	14.40	[13.76 - 15.06]
		Election	15.30	[14.46 - 16.10]
Israel				
	MPs	No Election	16.46	[14.50 - 18.44]
		Election	16.81	[15.42 - 18.18]
	Citizens	No Election	15.46	[14.95 - 15.96]
		Election	16.15	[15.70 - 16.59]

Table 12: Clarify estimates of mean future investment value for which respondents opt to wait two years in the time discounting experiment, by treatment condition, sample type and country. Results are Clarify predictions from linear regression models with the experimental treatment as the independent variable. See Table 13 for full regression results; predictions derived from Model 1 results.

Country	Variable	Model 1		Model 2	
		MPs	GP	MPs	GP
All					
	Election	0.63	0.21	0.48	0.11
		(0.436)	(0.194)	(0.429)	(0.190)
	Gender			0.08	-0.36*
				(0.477)	(0.192)
	Age			0.00	0.02***
				(0.020)	(0.006)
	Canada (Dummy)			-0.28	0.89***
				(0.528)	(0.277)
	Israel (Dummy)			2.64***	1.71***
				(0.640)	(0.222)
	Intercept	14***	14.52***	8.94	-31.63**
		(0.318)	(0.133)	(40.892)	(12.994)
	N	211	1538	208	1538
	Variable	Model 1		Model 2	
		MPs	GP	MPs	GP
Belgium					
	Election	0.39	-0.26	0.42	-0.30
		(0.539)	(0.248)	(0.539)	(0.246)
	Gender			0.70	-0.49**
				(0.575)	(0.248)
	Age			-0.02	
				(0.027)	()
	Intercept	13.81***	14.16***	60.96	
		(0.384)	(0.168)	(54.398)	()
	N	130	899	130	899

	Variable	Model 1		Model 2	
		MPs	GP	MPs	GP
Canada					
	Election	0.63	0.98*	0.33	0.81
		(0.842)	(0.530)	(0.905)	(0.528)
	Gender			-1.50	-0.40
				(1.093)	(0.548)
	Age			0.05	0.03**
				(0.041)	(0.17)
	Intercept	13.48***	14.40***	-88.47	-58.51*
		(0.595)	(0.343)	(81.140)	(34.548)
	N	52	231	49	231

	Variable	Model 1		Model 2	
		MPs	GP	MPs	GP
Israel					
	Election	0.31	0.67*	0.44	0.70*
		(1.214)	(0.358)	(1.248)	(0.360)
	Gender			-1.21	-0.13
				(1.481)	(0.361)
	Age			0.040	-0.01
				(0.055)	(0.012)
	Intercept	16.5***	15.46***	-63.32	37.09
		(0.983)	(0.256)	(108.729)	(24.114)
	N	29	408	29	408

Table 13: Estimation results: determinants of future investment preference in the time discounting module. All models reported are linear regressions. Dependent variable is the value of the future investment for which the respondent first opted to wait two years instead of preferring the $10 million investment choice. Election is 0 for no election condition, 1 for election. Gender is coded 0 for male, 1 for female. Age is coded in years. Coefficient values are reported with standard errors in parentheses. $* = p \leq 0.1, ** = p \leq 0.05, *** = p \leq 0.01$.



Figure 1: Histograms of "switch values" for politicians and non-politicians in the time discounting experiment. Variable plotted is the first two-year amount allocated for a community centre for which the respondent chose to wait, rather than build the centre in six months for a guaranteed $10 million. Values are in $ million. Light gray - general population. Dark gray - MPs. Overall N, excluding inconsistent responses: MPs - 211, GP - 1,538. N including inconsistent responses: MPs - 300, GP - 3,083



Figure 2: Proportion of MPs and citizens choosing to wait two years for added funding for a community centre, by the two-year guaranteed investment. Left panel plots the results excluding inconsistent responses (appears in body of article); right panel plots the results inclusive of inconsistent responses. Diamonds - citizens. Circles - MPs. Results are split by election treatment. Solid line - no election prime. Dashed line - election prime. Exclusive of inconsistents: GP $N = 1,538$, MP $N = 211$. Inclusive: GP $N = 3,083$, MP $N = 300$

5.2 Re-Analysis Conditional on Electoral Safety

In order to control for the potentially conditional nature of the election treatment in this module on politicians with different re-election prospects, we report here a robustness check in which we compare the impact of the election treatment on MPs who are electorally 'safe' and MPs who are electorally more vulnerable. We create separate measures of electoral safety for MPs in each of our country cases, owing to the different electoral systems. They are all based on these MPs' electoral attainment in the election preceding the interviews.

In Canada, where MPs are elected from single-member ridings, we rank MPs based on the percentage point difference between their vote share and the first

runner-up in their riding. For example, if an MP won with 45% of the votes in a riding, and her first runner up won 30% of the votes, her safety score is 15%. If another politician won with 45% but the first runner up had 42% of the votes, the MP's safety score is 3%.

In Israel, MPs are elected in nation-wide party lists. We take as the electoral safety score the difference between and MP's position on the party list and her party's overall number of seats. That is, if a party won 15 seats and the MP is placed 3rd on the list, her safety score is 12. Another MP on that party who is placed in the 8th place on the list will have a safety score of 7. Here too, we rank all MPs on that scale.

In Belgium, parties run separate lists in each of the multi-member districts, and members receive preferential votes that largely determine their placement on the list. Therefore, we use the absolute number of preferential votes received by MPs as an indicator of their electoral safety. Again, we rank all MPs by that indicator.

We then separate MPs into those who are above or below the median rank value in their respective countries, and use the resulting binary variable for the analysis. Results are reported in Table 14.

Perhaps surprisingly, the overall effect of the election treatment is stronger for MPs who are relatively electorally safe (+1.00) than for MPs who are less protected (+0.34). However, these patterns do not replicate in a consistent way in each country case. The interaction term of electoral safety and the election treatment is never statistically significant when evaluating logic models with these two variables as explanatory factors.

	Subgroup	Treatment	Mean	95% CI
All				
	Electorally Safe MPs	No Election	13.59	[12.74 - 14.40]
		Election	14.59	[13.76 - 15.39]
	Electorally Unsafe MPs	No Election	14.34	[13.36 - 15.23]
		Election	14.68	[13.90 - 15.44]
Belgium				
	Electorally Safe MPs	No Election	13.25	[12.28 - 14.24]
		Election	13.99	[12.94 - 15.02
	Electorally Unsafe MPs	No Election	14.45	[13.26 - 15.63]
		Election	14.41	[13.27 - 15.43]
Canada				
	Electorally Safe MPs	No Election	14.03	[12.18 - 15.81]
		Election	13.84	[12.18 - 15.47]
	Electorally Unsafe MPs	No Election	12.83	[11.19 - 14.47]
		Election	14.34	[12.68 - 15.91]
Israel				
	Electorally Safe MPs	No Election	15.53	[12.45 - 18.62]
		Election	17.99	[15.76 - 20.34]
	Electorally Unsafe MPs	No Election	17.16	[14.47 - 19.90]
		Election	15.92	[14.03 - 17.72]

Table 14: Clarify estimates of mean future investment value for which respondents opt to wait two years in the time discounting experiment, by treatment condition, electoral safety rank, and country. Results are Clarify predictions from linear regression models with the experimental treatment as the independent variable.

6 Study 4

6.1 Principal Results

	Subgroup	Proportion	95% CI
Overall	MPs	0.67	[0.63 - 0.72]
	Citizens	0.64	[0.63 - 0.66]
Belgium	MPs	0.64	[0.58 - 0.70]
	Citizens	0.65	[0.63 - 0.67]
Canada	MPs	0.76	[0.64 - 0.86]
	Citizens	0.60	[0.56 - 0.64]
Israel	MPs	0.67	[0.52 - 0.80]
	Citizens	0.64	[0.61 - 0.67]

Table 15: Clarify estimates of proportion of MPs and citizens choosing the economic plan presented as the status quo, by sample type and country. Results are Clarify predictions from logit regression models with experimental treatments as independent variables. See Table 10 for full regression results; predictions derived from Model 3 results. Overall means are obtained by setting treatment likelihoods to 0.5.

Subgroup	Treatment	Proportion	95% CI
MPs	Status Quo: 3+3 Plan	0.69	[0.62 - 0.76]
	Status Quo: 5+5 Plan	0.66	[0.59 - 0.72]
Citizens	Status Quo: 3+3 Plan	0.68	[0.66 - 0.70]
	Status Quo: 5+5 Plan	0.60	[0.58 - 0.62]
MPs	Low Acc.	0.70	[0.63 - 0.75]
	High Acc.	0.65	[0.58 - 0.72]
Citizens	Low Acc.	0.64	[0.62 - 0.66]
	High Acc.	0.64	[0.62 - 0.66]

Table 16: Clarify estimates of proportion of MPs and citizens, choosing the economic plan presented as the status quo. Results broken down by the two treatments: the type of plan that is presented as the status quo (3% GDP growth + 3% deficit / 5% + 5%) and low/high accountability. Results are Clarify predictions from logit regression models with the experimental treatment as independent variable. See Table 10 for full regression results; predictions derived from Model 1 and Model 2 results.

	Variable	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
		MPs	GP	MPs	GP	MPs	GP	MPs	GP
All									
	SQ Plan	-0.15	-0.34***			-0.14	-0.34***	-0.07	-0.35***
		(0.221)	(0.063)			(0.221)	(0.063)	(0.226)	(0.063)
	Acc.			-0.20	-0.00	-0.20	-0.00	-0.21	-0.00
				(0.220)	(0.062)	(0.220)	(0.063)	(0.226)	(0.063)
	Gender							0.01	-0.07
								(0.242)	(0.063)
	Age							-0.01	-0.00
								(0.011)	(0.002)
	Canada (D)							0.53*	-0.23**
								(0.324)	(0.092)
	Israel (D)							0.15	-0.01
								(0.338)	(0.0.077)
	Intercept	0.80***	0.75***	0.81***	0.57***	0.89***	0.75***	25.19	7.78
		(0.165)	(0.045)	(0.151)	(0.044)	(0.194)	(0.055)	(22.458)	(4.274)
	N	377	4375	377	4375	377	4375	374	4375
	Log-likelihood	-237.838	-2845.724	-237.644	-2860.991	-237.420	-2845.721	-232.751	-2840.888
	Variable	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
		MPs	GP	MPs	GP	MPs	GP	MPs	GP
Belgium									
	SQ Plan	-0.08	-0.51***			-0.08	-0.50***	-0.06	-0.51***
		(0.265)	(0.080)			(0.265)	(0.80)	(0.266)	(0.080)
	Acc.			-0.02	-0.08	-0.02	-0.07	-0.04	-0.08
				(0.265)	(0.079)	(0.263)	(0.080)	(0.266)	(0.080)
	Gender							0.05	-0.07
								(0.277)	(0.081)
	Age							-0.00	-0.00

								(0.014)	(0.002)
	Intercept	-0.08***	0.87***	0.59***	0.64***	0.63***	0.91***	17.43	7.23
		(0.198)	(0.059)	(0.181)	(0.057)	(0.234)	(0.071)	(27.770)	(5.581)
	N	251	2751	251	2751	251	2751	251	2751
	Log-likelihood	-163.752	-1765.868	-163.795	-1785.547	-163.748	-1765.373	-163.560	-1764.231
	Variable	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
		MPs	GP	MPs	GP	MPs	GP	MPs	GP
Canada									
	SQ Plan	-0.82	-0.28*			-0.82	-0.28*	-0.66	-0.29*
		(0.562)	(0.164)			(0.564)	(0.164)	(0.581)	(0.165)
	Acc.			-0.00	0.29*	-0.07	0.29*	-0.28	0.29*
				(0.578)	(0.164)	(0.589)	(0.164)	(0.617)	(0.165)
	Gender							0.47	-0.14
								(0.739)	(0.172)
	Age							-0.01	0.00
								(0.027)	(0.489)
	Intercept	1.60***	-0.54***	1.21***	0.25**	1.63***	0.40***	36.55	-6.64
		(0.414)	(0.117)	(0.343)	(0.114)	(0.474)	(0.141)	(53.630)	(10.278)
	N	74	619	74	619	74	619	71	619
	Log-likelihood	-38.798	-415.242	-39.882	-415.184	-38.790	-413.638	-36.884	-413.159
	Variable	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
		MPs	GP	MPs	GP	MPs	GP	MPs	GP
Israel									
	SQ Plan	0.56	0.04			0.85	0.04	0.73	0.02
		(0.620)	(0.131)			(0.673)	(0.131)	(0.690)	(0.132)
	Acc.			-1.12*	0.01	-1.30*	0.01	-1.36*	0.00
				(0.636)	(0.131)	(0.672)	(0.131)	(0.708)	(0.132)
	Gender							-0.50	-0.05
								(0.719)	(0.133)

Age							-0.03	-0.01**
							(0.034)	(0.004)
Intercept	0.45	0.56*	1.43***	0.57***	0.99*	0.55***	69.46	21.48**
	(0.483)	(0.093)	(0.497)	(0.092)	(0.588)	(0.114)	(67.249)	(9.043)
N	52	1005	52	1005	52	1005		1005
Log-likelihood	-31.677	-655.592	-30.441	-655.638	-29.621	-655.588	-28.623	-652.679

Table 17: Estimation results: determinants of status-quo preference. All models reported are logistic regressions. Dependent variable is supporting the economic plan presented as the status-quo in the status quo experiment (coded 0 1 for supporting the status quo plan, 0 for the alternative). SQ Plan is 0 for the "3+3" plan, 1 for the "5+5" plan. Accountability is 0 for low, 1 for high. Gender is coded 0 for male, 1 for female. Age is coded in years. Coefficient values are reported with standard errors in parentheses. $* = p \leq 0.1, ** = p \leq 0.05, *** = p \leq 0.01$.

7 Additional Analysis Conditional on MPs' Substantive Preferences

Two of our experimental modules - the status quo and the sunk cost vignettes - are based on theoretical government plans / policies that may lend themselves to behavior that is motivated by preexisting ideological preferences on the role and scope of government intervention. We are able to test whether such effects exist by leveraging the fact that as part of the interviews, MPs were asked to state the degree to which they agree with different policy-related statements. In Canada and in Israel, the MPs were asked to indicated, on a 7-point scale, whether they agreed or disagreed with the following statement: *"When there is an economic problem, government spending usually makes it worse"*. This statement was not presented to Belgian MPs, but they were provided with two related statements: *"Government must intervene to reduce differences in income"*, and *"The government should impose*

as few regulations as possible". Both of these items also used the same 7-point agree-disagree scale.

We create a unified scale that uses the government spending item for Canada and Israel. For Belgium, we use the mean of both items, with the first item coded in reverse order. The resulting variable represents disagreement with government intervention in the economy. It has a mean of 3.24 on a scale of 1-7, with $SD = 1.53$ and is relatively normally distributed. For the majority of the analyses below we use a binary transformation of this variable, split at the median response value in each country separately: this value is 3 in Canada and Israel, and 4 in Belgium. The resulting variable is coded 0 for MPs below the median (i.e. exhibiting strong disagreement with the statement(s), meaning that they support government intervention; $N = 195, 48.87\%$ of the sample), and 1 for MPs above the median (non-interventionists; $N = 204, 51.13\%$ of the sample).

7.1 Sunk Costs

Our expectations with regards to the status quo module and the potential impact of ideological preference are as follows:

1. Politicians who oppose government intervention in the economy will be less likely to support the extension of the presented program given a sunk cost, regardless of the sunk cost size treatment.

2. The sunk cost treatment will have a stronger effect on politicians who oppose government intervention in the economy, in that a larger sunk cost should reduce escalation of commitment to a greater degree, compared to its effect on interventionist politicians.

Our first expectation is verified by the data. The likelihood tat politicians who oppose government intervention in the economy support the extension of the program is 80.8%, compared with 86.6% for politicians who support intervention. This difference meets standard levels of statistical significance in some of the models we estimate (see Table 18 below). Importantly, both subgroups are still substantially more likely to extend the program relative to the rate observed in the general populations of our sample countries, which stands at 71%. These results, then, do not have a clear implication for our main quantities of interest.

When examining this pattern by treatment condition, we see that most of this change is borne out by MPs who are assigned to the low sunk cost condition. There, 'non-interventionists' vote to extend the program 81.2% of the time, while interventionists extend it 89.5% of the time. In the high sunk cost condition these proportions are 79.1% and 80% respectively. This fits with our expectation, but does not represent a statistically significant interaction. Again, these quantities do not reflect a clear contrast to the pattern observed in general population respondents.

Variable	Model 3		Model 4	
	(A)	(B)	(A)	(B)
Sunk Cost	-0.36	-0.78*	-0.42	-0.70
	(0.280)	(0.438)	(0.286)	(0.444)
Accountability	-0.34	-0.75	-0.39	-0.85*
	(0.284)	(0.475)	(0.289)	(0.482)
Oppose Intervention	-0.33	-1.13**	-1.10*	
	(0.282)	(0.561)	(0.290)	(0.575)
Sunk Cost X Opp. Int.		0.72		0.49
		(0.572)		(0.588)
Acc. X Opp. Int.		0.66		0.77
		(0.600)		(0.615)

Gender			-0.11	-0.14
			(0.311)	(0.250)
Age			-0.00	-0.00
			(0.014)	(0.014)
Canada (D)			-0.59*	0.59*
			(0.346)	(0.355)
Israel (D)			0.57	0.55
			(0.509)	(0.509)
Intercept	2.15***	2.65***	14.43	18.33
	(0.308)	(0.466)	(27.910)	(28.125)
N	373	373	370	370
Log-likelihood	-166.993	-165.458	-161.869	-160.609

Table 18: Estimation results: determinants of escalation of commitment. All models reported are logistic regressions. Dependent variable is voting yes or no on extending the small business loan program in the Sunk Cost experiment (coded 0 for no, 1 for yes). Sunk cost is 0 for low ($50 million), 1 for high ($200 million). Accountability (Acc.) is 0 for low, 1 for high. Oppose Intervention is 1 for MPs above the median of opposting government intervention in the economy, 0 for below the median. Gender is coded 0 for male, 1 for female. Age is coded in years. Coefficient values are reported with standard errors in parentheses. $* = p \leq 0.1, ** = p \leq 0.05, *** = p \leq 0.01$.

7.2 Status Quo

Our expectations with regards to the status quo module and the potential impact of ideological preference are as follows:

1. MPs who oppose government intervention in the economy would exhibit the status quo bias to a greater degree, across treatments. This is so because the adoption of a plan that is departing from the existing state of affairs may be perceived as more 'interventionist' relative to the do-nothing alternative.

2. MPs who oppose government intervention in the economy would exhibit a stronger status-quo preference when the status quo is 3% growth and 3% budget deficit, relative to the 5% + 5% alternative. We make this assumption because arguably some respondents may perceive the "5+5" plan as representing a greater government impact on the current state of the economy relative to the "3+3" plan.

We do not have an expectation regarding support for government intervention in the economy and the accountability frame.

First, politician who oppose government intervention adhere more strongly to the status quo - 69.7% vs. 65.6% - but this effect is not significant when incorporated in the original logit models we estimate, as shown below in Table 19. Both subgroups of MPs are still somewhat more status-quo-adhering relative to citizens' overall status-quo preference rate (64%).

Second, while there is no substantial difference between 'interventionists' and 'non-interventionists' in status-quo preference when "5+5" is presented as the status-quo (65.3% and 66.2%, respectively), we do observe a difference when "3+3" is presented as the status quo and "5+5" is the alternative plan. In that case, 66.6% of MPs who support government intervention in the economy choose the status-quo. This proportion increases to 72.4% for MPs who oppose government intervention, in line with our expectation. However, this interaction effect is not statistically significant. The effect observed in the general population is closer to that seen in non-interventionist MPs - an increase in status-quo preference from 60% to 68% when the status quo changes from "5+5" to "3+3".

Third, a somewhat different pattern emerges for interventionists and non-interventionists in response to the accountability treatment. MPs who oppose government inter-

vention in the economy exhibit relatively similar rates of status-quo preference in the low accountability (67.9%) and high accountability (70.6%) conditions. MPs who support government intervention in the low accountability treatment adhere to the status-quo 70.4% of the time, but this figure drops to 59.7% in the high accountability treatment. As with the plan treatment, this potential interaction is not statistically significant when evaluated using our original logit model. Neither of these patterns correspond with the no-effect observed in the general population sample.

Variable	Model 3		Model 4	
	(A)	(B)	(A)	(B)
SQ Plan	-0.17	-0.37	-0.08	-0.00
	(0.225)	(0.320)	(0.231)	(0.325)
Accountability	-0.18	-0.47	-0.20	-0.52
	(0.224)	(0.316)	(0.229)	(0.325)
Oppose Intervention	0.15	0.04	0.24	0.03
	(0.224)	(0.395)	(0.231)	(0.403)
SQ Plan X Opp. Int.		-0.27		-0.14
		(0.452)		(0.460)
Acc. X Opp. Int.		0.58		0.64
		(0.449)		(0.460)
Gender			0.08	0.09
			(0.249)	(0.250)
Age			-0.01	-0.015
			(0.011)	(0.011)
Canada (D)			0.52	0.50
			(0.326)	(0.328)
Israel (D)			0.14	0.08
			(0.340)	(0.344)

Intercept	0.84^{***}	0.89^{***}	28.60	32.03
	(0.228)	(0.282)	(22.982)	(23.308)
N	369	369	366	366
Log-likelihood	-231.082	-230.058	-226.325	-225.308

Table 19: Estimation results: determinants of status-quo preference. All models reported are logistic regressions. Dependent variable is supporting the economic plan presented as the status-quo in the status quo experiment (coded 0 1 for supporting the status quo plan, 0 for the alternative). SQ Plan is 0 for the "3+3" plan, 1 for the "5+5" plan. Accountability is 0 for low, 1 for high. Oppose Intervention is 1 for MPs above the median of opposting government intervention in the economy, 0 for below the median. Gender is coded 0 for male, 1 for female. Age is coded in years. Coefficient values are reported with standard errors in parentheses. $* = p \leq 0.1, ** = p \leq 0.05, *** = p \leq 0.01$.

Overall then, we do not find significant differences in response to the status quo stimuli when differentiating by support for government intervention in the economy. Non-interventionists do tend to adhere more strongly to the status quo, and relative to their pro-government intervention peers, they are more reluctant to abandon the status quo for a more 'interventionist' plan. It is difficult to reach coherent conclusions from these patterns, other than their serving as suggestive evidence that ideology indeed plays into such choices, but does not transcend the choice anomalies themselves, which still dominate choice logic and result in strong preference for the status quo across treatments and policy preferences.

8 Additional Analysis Using Propensity Score Matching

To gain insight into the role that basic demographic differences between MPs and citizens play in explaining politician-voter differences, we conduct a propensity score matching analysis of our main results (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002). We use the PSMATCH2 package in Stata (Leuven et al., 2015). We match citizens to MPs in each country based on gender and age. This approach principally compensates for the fact that Members of Parliament in all country cases are overwhelmingly male, and on average older than the population average of voting-age citizens that comprise our general population samples. We use a 5-neighbor threshold for calculating the matched outcome for citizens.

Because this process matches citizens to MPs and not the other way around, the quantity change is always on the citizen side: instead of the original quantities observed for the full general population sample in a given country, the propensity matching process results in a quantity obtained solely from matched respondents.

The propensity score matching process reports raw observed quantities rather than the Clarify-obtained projected probabilities we report in the body of the paper and in other parts of the SI. Therefore, in order to contextualize the difference, we report, for each comparison, the raw general population value and the matching-generated value. We conduct this analysis separately for each country, to avoid cross-matching respondents and MPs from different countries.

Overall, we don't find consistent or large differences between the MP-matched subgroup of the general population samples and the citizens in general. In the large majority of cases, the differences we observe (or do not observe) between MPs and citizens remain similar under propensity matching.

8.1 Study 1

In the Asian Disease task, matching does not result in a clear pattern across country cases. In Belgium and Canada, the matched subgroup is somewhat closer to MPs in terms of risk preference, but is still noticeably less risk-seeking. In Israel, matched respondents are substantially less risk-seeking. Matching does little to change differences between MPs and citizens in terms of their responses to the gain/loss framing and the accountability treatment.

	Subgroup	Proportion
Belgium	MPs	0.56
	Citizens	0.53
	Citizens (Matched)	0.57
Canada	MPs	0.57
	Citizens	0.54
	Citizens (Matched)	0.55
Israel	MPs	0.59
	Citizens	0.53
	Citizens (Matched)	0.48

Table 20: Propensity score matching: proportion preferring the risky choice in the Asian Disease experiment, by sample type and country.

	Subgroup	Treatment	Proportion
Belgium	MPs	Gains	0.40
		Losses	0.83
	Citizens	Gains	0.33
		Losses	0.74
	Citizens (Matched)	Gains	0.35
		Losses	0.66
Canada	MPs	Gains	0.25
		Losses	0.81
	Citizens	Gains	0.37
		Losses	0.72
	Citizens (Matched)	Gains	0.39
		Losses	0.74
Israel	MPs	Gains	0.53
		Losses	0.70
	Citizens	Gains	0.39
		Losses	0.66
	Citizens (Matched)	Gains	0.37
		Losses	0.62

Table 21: Propensity score matching: proportion preferring the risky choice in the Asian Disease experiment, by gain/loss frame, sample type and country.

	Subgroup	Treatment	Proportion
Belgium	MPs	Low Acc.	0.65
		High Acc.	0.44
	Citizens	Low Acc.	0.53
		High Acc.	0.54
	Citizens (Matched)	Low Acc.	0.59
		High Acc.	0.54
Canada	MPs	Low Acc.	0.47
		High Acc.	0.66
	Citizens	Low Acc.	0.58
		High Acc.	0.51
	Citizens (Matched)	Low Acc.	0.57
		High Acc.	0.47
Israel	MPs	Low Acc.	0.59
		High Acc.	0.58
	Citizens	Low Acc.	0.51
		High Acc.	0.55
	Citizens (Matched)	Low Acc.	0.51
		High Acc.	0.52

Table 22: Propensity score matching: proportion preferring the risky choice in the Asian Disease experiment, by accountability treatment condition, sample type and country.

8.2 Study 2

In the Sunk Cost experiment, matching does not substantially change the overall pattern of MPs exhibiting an increased tendency to escalate commitment in face of sunk costs, and the changes between the matched citizen group and the overall citizen sample across countries are not in one particular direction. The sunk cost size manipulation has a similar impact on the matched group of citizens relative to the overall sample, and both are similar in direction to the effect observed with MPs. The accountability treatment reduces escalation of commitment in Belgium for both the matched subgroup and overall citizen sample. In Canada and Israel, the MP-matched groups exhibit increased agreement to the extension of the program under high accountability relative to low accountability, in contrast to no-effect (Canada) or reverse effect (Israel) observed with the non-matched general population. We are reluctant to draw inferences from these changes, seeing that they do not obtain in Belgium and, at least in Canada, do not match the treatment effect observed in MPs.

	Subgroup	Proportion
Belgium	MPs	0.84
	Citizens	0.69
	Citizens (Matched)	0.63
Canada	MPs	0.76
	Citizens	0.60
	Citizens (Matched)	0.59
Israel	MPs	0.91
	Citizens	0.84
	Citizens (Matched)	0.86

Table 23: Propensity score matching: proportion voting to extend the program in the Sunk Cost experiment, by sample type and country.

	Subgroup	Treatment	Proportion
Belgium	MPs	Low S.C. ($50 Million)	0.87
		High S.C. ($200 Million)	0.82
	Citizens	Low S.C. ($50 Million)	0.69
		High S.C. ($200 Million)	0.69
	Citizens (Matched)	Low S.C. ($50 Million)	0.65
		High S.C. ($200 Million)	0.65
Canada	MPs	Low S.C. ($50 Million)	0.80
		High S.C. ($200 Million)	0.71
	Citizens	Low S.C. ($50 Million)	0.62
		High S.C. ($200 Million)	0.57
	Citizens (Matched)	Low S.C. ($50 Million)	0.63
		High S.C. ($200 Million)	0.62
Israel	MPs	Low S.C. ($50 Million)	0.93
		High S.C. ($200 Million)	0.87
	Citizens	Low S.C. ($50 Million)	0.84
		High S.C. ($200 Million)	0.83
	Citizens (Matched)	Low S.C. ($50 Million)	0.89
		High S.C. ($200 Million)	0.86

Table 24: Propensity score matching: proportion voting to extend the program in the Sunk Cost experiment, by sunk cost size, sample type and country.

	Subgroup	Treatment	Proportion
Belgium	MPs	Low Acc.	0.88
		High Acc.	0.81
	Citizens	Low Acc.	0.71
		High Acc.	0.67
	Citizens (Matched)	Low Acc.	0.70
		High Acc.	0.65
Canada	MPs	Low Acc.	0.80
		High Acc.	0.73
	Citizens	Low Acc.	0.60
		High Acc.	0.60
	Citizens (Matched)	Low Acc.	0.56
		High Acc.	0.63
Israel	MPs	Low Acc.	0.87
		High Acc.	0.93
	Citizens	Low Acc.	0.85
		High Acc.	0.82
	Citizens (Matched)	Low Acc.	0.85
		High Acc.	0.89

Table 25: Propensity score matching: proportion voting to extend the program in the Sunk Cost experiment, by accountability treatment, sample type and country.

8.3 Study 3

In the future time discounting experiment, the propensity-matching process results in a matched subgroup that exhibits higher future discounting rate relative to MPs. That is, the mean value in which MP-matched citizens agree to wait two years is lower than the mean value for all citizens. In Canada and Israel, this further separates this group from MPs. In Canada, the MP-matched group behavior is closer to that of MPs, but not substantially different from the overall general population in that country. The election treatment does not have a visibly different effect on MP-matched individuals than what we observe with the entire sample of citizens.

	Subgroup	Mean
Belgium	MPs	14.02
	Citizens	14.04
	Citizens (Matched)	13.68
Canada	MPs	13.70
	Citizens	14.78
	Citizens (Matched)	14.51
Israel	MPs	16.70
	Citizens	15.81
	Citizens (Matched)	15.74

Table 26: Propensity score matching: mean future investment value for which respondents opt to wait two years in the time discounting experiment, by sample type and country.

	Subgroup	Treatment	Mean
Belgium	MPs	No Election	13.81
		Election	14.21
	Citizens	No Election	14.16
		Election	13.90
	Citizens (Matched)	No Election	13.81
		Election	13.65
Canada	MPs	No Election	13.34
		Election	14.08
	Citizens	No Election	14.40
		Election	15.29
	Citizens (Matched)	No Election	14.20
		Election	14.50
Israel	MPs	No Election	16.5
		Election	16.81
	Citizens	No Election	15.46
		Election	16.13
	Citizens (Matched)	No Election	15.45
		Election	15.82

Table 27: Propensity score matching: mean future investment value for which respondents opt to wait two years in the time discounting experiment, by treatment condition, sample type and country.

8.4 Study 4

In the Status Quo experiment, matching does not substantially change the overall pattern of MPs exhibiting a somewhat increased tendency to prefer the status quo relative to citizens. The changes between the MP-matched citizen group and the overall citizen sample across countries does not follow a clear pattern, with Belgium and Canada showing a reduced status-quo preference for the MP-matched subgroup, and Israel showing an increased preference that almost matches that of MPs.

The experimental treatments operate in a virtually identical way on both the MP-matched and the entire general population samples in each countries.

	Subgroup	Proportion
Belgium	MPs	0.64
	Citizens	0.65
	Citizens (Matched)	0.63
Canada	MPs	0.77
	Citizens	0.60
	Citizens (Matched)	0.58
Israel	MPs	0.69
	Citizens	0.64
	Citizens (Matched)	0.68

Table 28: Propensity score matching: proportion of MPs and citizens choosing the economic plan presented as the status quo, by sample type and country.

	Subgroup	Treatment	Proportion
Belgium	MPs	Status-Quo: 3+3 Plan	0.65
		Status-Quo: 5+5 Plan	0.63
	Citizens	Status-Quo: 3+3 Plan	0.71
		Status-Quo: 5+5 Plan	0.59
	Citizens (Matched)	Status-Quo: 3+3 Plan	0.71
		Status-Quo: 5+5 Plan	0.61
Canada	MPs	Status-Quo: 3+3 Plan	0.82
		Status-Quo: 5+5 Plan	0.71
	Citizens	Status-Quo: 3+3 Plan	0.63
		Status-Quo: 5+5 Plan	0.56
	Citizens (Matched)	Status-Quo: 3+3 Plan	0.63
		Status-Quo: 5+5 Plan	0.58
Israel	MPs	Status-Quo: 3+3 Plan	0.61
		Status-Quo: 5+5 Plan	0.64
	Citizens	Status-Quo: 3+3 Plan	0.64
		Status-Quo: 5+5 Plan	0.75
	Citizens (Matched)	Status-Quo: 3+3 Plan	0.66
		Status-Quo: 5+5 Plan	0.76

Table 29: Propensity score matching: proportion of MPs and citizens choosing the economic plan presented as the status quo. Results broken down by the type of plan that is presented as the status quo (3% GDP growth + 3% deficit / 5% + 5%), and by sample type and country.

	Subgroup	Treatment	Proportion
Belgium	MPs	Low Acc.	0.64
		High Acc.	0.64
	Citizens	Low Acc.	0.66
		High Acc.	0.64
	Citizens (Matched)	Low Acc.	0.64
		High Acc.	0.63
Canada	MPs	Low Acc.	0.78
		High Acc.	0.76
	Citizens	Low Acc.	0.56
		High Acc.	0.63
	Citizens (Matched)	Low Acc.	0.53
		High Acc.	0.57
Israel	MPs	Low Acc.	0.81
		High Acc.	0.58
	Citizens	Low Acc.	0.64
		High Acc.	0.64
	Citizens (Matched)	Low Acc.	0.70
		High Acc.	0.68

Table 30: Propensity score matching: proportion of MPs and citizens choosing the economic plan presented as the status quo, by accountability treatment, sample type and country.

References

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