

Online Appendix for Policy Uptake as Political Behavior: Evidence from the Affordable Care Act

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Table A1. Separate Logistic Models of Insurance Uptake and Private vs. Marketplace

	Insured vs. Uninsured		Marketplace vs. Private (conditional on insured)	
Marginal Effects	Estimate	SE	Estimate	SE
Party (vs. Democrat)				
Republican	-0.0569	0.0143	-0.2270	0.0245
Education (vs. HS or less)				
Some college or ass. degree	0.0594	0.0174	0.0352	0.0311
College degree	0.1916	0.0190	0.0667	
Race (vs. White)				
Black	-0.0974	0.0227	-0.0055	0.0397
Hispanic	-0.1612	0.0203	0.0237	0.0391
other	-0.0376	0.0311	-0.0042	0.0495
Income (vs. >\$20k)				
\$20k-\$30k	0.0431	0.0218	-0.0163	0.0446
\$30k-\$40k	0.0785	0.0238	0.0102	0.0463
\$40k-\$50k	0.1516	0.0261	-0.0347	0.0451
\$50k-\$75k	0.1449	0.0255	-0.1168	0.0433
\$75k-\$90k	0.2406	0.0351	-0.1330	0.0525
\$90k-\$100k	0.1657	0.0470	-0.1746	0.0644
\$100k+	0.3125	0.0288	-0.2148	0.0419
Sex (vs. male)				
Female	0.0329	0.0136	0.0026	0.0225
Employment (vs. working)				
retired	0.0839	0.0324	-0.0317	0.0413
unemployed	-0.1249	0.0199	0.0443	0.0434
other	-0.0068	0.0186	-0.0837	0.0316

Note: Table presents marginal effects from logistic regression estimating, in the left column, the effect of partisanship on overall insurance enrollment amongst individuals without employer-sponsored or prior source of insurance (N = 3728). In the right column, we estimate the effect, conditional on insuring (N = 1619), of partisanship on the decision to use the marketplace as opposed to purchasing plans directly from insurers. The model controls for age, race and ethnicity, gender, state of residence, employment, education, income, as well as the date of the poll. Education is coded as high school or less (1), some college (2) or college + (3); income is coded as an eight-level categorical variable ranging from less than \$20k to \$100k+. Data are compiled Kaiser Family Foundation Health Tracking Surveys after 2014.

Table A2. Marginal Effects of Partisanship and Covariates on Being Uninsured, Enrolling in the Marketplace, or Purchasing Private Insurance

Marginal Effects	Uninsured		Marketplace		Private	
	Estimate	SE	Estimate	SE	Estimate	SE
Party (vs. Democrat)						
Republican	0.056	0.014	-0.123	0.012	0.067	0.013
Education (vs. HS or less)						
Some college or ass. degree	-0.059	0.017	0.043	0.015	0.016	0.016
College degree	-0.190	0.019	0.126	0.017	0.064	0.017
Race (vs. White)						
Black	0.094	0.023	-0.052	0.019	-0.042	0.021
Hispanic	0.160	0.020	-0.077	0.017	-0.083	0.018
other	0.039	0.031	-0.022	0.027	-0.018	0.028
Income (vs. >\$20k)						
\$20k-\$30k	-0.043	0.022	0.020	0.020	0.023	0.019
\$30k-\$40k	-0.077	0.024	0.047	0.022	0.029	0.021
\$40k-\$50k	-0.152	0.026	0.068	0.024	0.084	0.023
\$50k-\$75k	-0.146	0.025	0.029	0.022	0.117	0.022
\$75k-\$90k	-0.238	0.035	0.056	0.031	0.182	0.032
\$90k-\$100k	-0.167	0.047	0.002	0.036	0.165	0.042
\$100k+	-0.309	0.029	0.031	0.024	0.277	0.027
Sex (vs. male)						
Female	-0.033	0.014	0.025	0.012	0.008	0.012
Employment (vs. working)						
retired	-0.086	0.032	0.019	0.027	0.066	0.029
unemployed	0.127	0.020	-0.041	0.018	-0.085	0.018
other	0.005	0.019	-0.041	0.016	0.035	0.018

Note: Table presents marginal effects and standard errors from multinomial regression model (N = 3519) that relates insurance status to a number of individual-level covariates. State residence and date of poll are not presented in table due to space constraints. Data are compiled Kaiser Family Foundation Health Tracking Surveys after 2014.

Table A3. Models with Ideology Only, Party Only, and Both Party and Ideology Predicting Insurance Enrollment

		Uninsured		Marketplace		Private	
		Estimate	SE	Estimate	SE	Estimate	SE
Model 1	Ideology (vs. liberal)						
	Moderate	-0.002	0.014	-0.041	0.013	0.043	0.013
	Conservative	0.060	0.014	-0.102	0.013	0.043	0.013
Model 2	Party (vs. Democrat)						
	Republican	0.056	0.014	-0.123	0.012	0.067	0.013
Model 3	Ideology (vs. liberal)						
	Moderate	-0.016	0.018	-0.023	0.016	0.038	0.016
	Conservative	0.042	0.019	-0.070	0.018	0.028	0.018
	Party (vs. Democrat)						
	Republican	0.041	0.016	-0.097	0.015	0.056	0.015

Note: Table presents marginal effects and standard errors from multinomial regression model (N = 3519) that relates insurance status to a number of individual-level covariates. The model controls for age, race and ethnicity, gender, state of residence, employment, education, income, as well as the date of the poll. Education is coded as high school or less (1), some college (2) or college + (3); income is coded as an eight-level categorical variable ranging from less than \$20k to \$100k+. Data are compiled Kaiser Family Foundation Health Tracking Surveys after 2014.

Table A4. OLS Regression Relating County-Level Presidential Vote in 2012 to Marketplace Enrollment Share in 2015

Variables	(1) Bivariate	(2) Linear Model	(3) Quadratic Model
Democratic vote share	0.22960*** (0.03009)	0.19180*** (0.06072)	0.12372 (0.13630)
Dem Vote Sq			0.07823 (0.15091)
% Black		-0.03180 (0.05379)	-0.03537 (0.05480)
% Hispanic		-0.07548 (0.06898)	-0.07481 (0.06910)
Years of college		-0.02236 (0.06269)	-0.02674 (0.06365)
HH median income		0.00000*** (0.00000)	0.00000*** (0.00000)
Urbanicity		-0.00470** (0.00211)	-0.00466** (0.00211)
Unemployment rate		0.00872** (0.00432)	0.00885** (0.00435)
Percent uninsured		-0.00056 (0.00158)	-0.00076 (0.00160)
% Reporting fair or poor health		-0.00112 (0.00111)	-0.00114 (0.00111)
Number of plans offered in 2014		0.00040* (0.00024)	0.00041* (0.00024)
Silver-level premium 2014		0.00031 (0.00019)	0.00031 (0.00019)
Population		0.00000** (0.00000)	0.00000** (0.00000)
Population < 18		0.43398* (0.22167)	0.43162* (0.22190)
Population over 65		0.90098*** (0.16119)	0.90194*** (0.16129)
State Fixed Effects		X	X

Observations	852	849	849
R-Squared	0.05912	0.62125	0.62140

Note: standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$, * $p < .1$. Urbanicity based on 2013 rural-urban continuum code from USDA. State fixed effects included. Table presents regression coefficients and standard errors from linear models relating Democratic 2012 vote share at the county-level to the percent of the marketplace-eligible population (observed at the PUMA level) enrolling in the ACA through marketplace plans. Column 1 presents the simple bivariate relationship. Column 2 controls for a set of covariates associated with enrollment. Column 3 estimates a quadratic model. We estimate the marginal effect of a 1 point swing in Democratic vote share in the quadratic model at the median to be .18 ($t=3.01$)

Table A5. Demographic Characteristics of Field Experiment Analysis Sample

	Full Sample	Democrats	Independents	Republicans	Other
Age	44.5	44.7	43.6	47.2	43.3
Income ¹	2.42	2.02	2.03	2.33	3.18
College ²	0.69	0.66	0.59	0.66	0.83
Male ³	0.63	0.66	0.58	0.47	0.62
<i>N</i> ⁴	1830	674	393	178	585

¹Income is coded by quartile from 1 (lowest income) to 4 (highest income).

²College is coded 1 if respondent has college experience and 0 otherwise.

³Male is coded 1 if respondent identifies as male and 0 otherwise.

⁴Number of respondents varies by question, total number is reported.

Table A6. Multinomial Logistic Regression Results of Healthcare.gov Treatment on Decisions Amongst Marketplace, Uninsured, or ESI

	Democrats	Independents	Republicans
Uninsured	0.01	-0.05	0.19
SE	0.03	0.03	0.06
Marketplace	-0.03	0.03	-0.18
SE	0.03	0.03	0.06
ESI	0.02	0.02	-0.01
SE	0.02	0.02	0.05
N	878	901	250

Table A7. Multinomial Logistic Regression Results of Healthcare.gov Treatment on Decisions Amongst Marketplace, Uninsured, or Other/Off-marketplace

	Democrats	Independents	Republicans
Uninsured	0.01	-0.05	0.18
SE	0.04	0.03	0.06
Marketplace	-0.02	0.03	-0.21
SE	0.04	0.03	0.06
Other (off-marketplace)	0.01	0.02	0.02
SE	0.02	0.02	0.04
N	801	843	234

Table A8. Estimated Average Treatment Effect of Healthcare.gov (Relative to Healthsherpa.com) on Binomial Decisions by Party

	All	Democrats	Independents	Republicans
Uninsured vs. Off-marketplace	-0.02	-0.01	-0.04	0.03
SE	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.07)
Uninsured vs. ESI	-0.03	-0.02	-0.04	0.11
SE	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.08)
ESI vs. Marketplace	0.05	0.04	0.01	0.07
SE	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.08)
Marketplace vs. Off-marketplace	-0.04	-0.02	-0.02	-0.10
SE	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.07)

Figure A1: Fitted Values Versus Residuals in Regression of Marketplace Enrollment on County-level 2012 Presidential Vote




Figure A2: Marginal Effects of 2012 Democratic Presidential Vote Share on Marketplace Enrollment Conditional on Covariates




Figure A3. Page from Healthcare.gov




Figure A4. Page from Healthsherpa.com




Figure A5. Field Experimental Design






Figure A6: Randomization Check



Note: Figure presents mean values for covariates in treatment and control groups. P-values correspond to t-tests comparing means across groups. *Income* is measured one 5-point scale. *Party* is measured on three point scale (Democrat = 1, Independent = 2, Republican = 3). *Government waste* and *Government regulation* measure the degree to which subjects 1) think government is wasteful, and 2) think government regulation is necessary, with the value 1 corresponding to the pro-government position (and 0 the opposite).

Figure A7: Balance Amongst Republicans Only



Note: Figure presents mean values for covariates in treatment and control groups amongst Republicans. P-values correspond to t-tests comparing means across groups. *Income* is measured one 5-point scale. *Party* is measured on three point scale (Democrat = 1, Independent = 2, Republican = 3). *Government waste* and *Government regulation* measure the degree to which subjects 1) think government is wasteful, and 2) think government regulation is necessary, with the value 1 corresponding to the pro-government position (and 0 the opposite).