Supplementary Materials 3

We begin Supplementary Materials 3 with a more detailed outline of the rationale behind our data structure. Then, we provide a set of additional analyses and robustness checks that further support our argument and findings of the main article. These include:

- Figure 1 **plotting the effect of economic globalization conditional on the median** voter based on the main text's Model 4.

- Tables 1 and 2 re-estimating the empirical models in the main text using **Spatial Maximum Likelihood Techniques (S-ML) instead of Spatial Ordinary Least Squares (S-OLS)**.

- Table 3 **excluding cases with highly uncertain party positions**.

- Table 4 evaluating **diffusion within individual ideological blocs** (left, center, right, and social democrats individually).

- Tables 5, 6, and 7 using **alternative lag structures for incumbency**.

- Table 8 evaluating **diffusion** of policies **conditional** on **countries' similarities in political systems**.

- Table 9 evaluating **diffusion** of policies **from** parties in **coalition governments**.

- Table 10 evaluating **diffusion** of policies **from** parties in **single-party governments**.

- Table 11 evaluating **diffusion** of policies **conditional** on **countries' similarities in political history**.

- Table 12 evaluating **diffusion** of policies **conditional** on **countries' geographic proximity**.

- Table 13 evaluating **diffusion** of policies **conditional** on **countries' similarities in population size**.

- Table 14 evaluating **diffusion** of policies **conditional** on **countries' trade ties**.

- Table 15 evaluating **diffusion** of policies **from electorally successful parties instead of governing parties**.

- Table 16 evaluating **diffusion** of policies **from electorally successful parties within governing coalitions**.

- Table 17 evaluating **diffusion** of policies **from domestic incumbents, domestic incumbents of the same ideological bloc, all foreign parties, and all foreign party bloc members**.

- Table 18 examining whether parties are indeed **more likely to be successful when learning from and emulating foreign parties' positions**.


Detailed Rationale for Data Structure

As described in the main text, cases in our data set are party-years. In principle, we could have adopted an alternative structure where cases are party-election-years only. As discussed in the main text, however, there are good reasons for including the temporally lagged dependent variable in the model; and these reasons are equally valid for our alternative data structure. The effect of including the temporally lagged dependent variable is implicitly to estimate a model with a geometrically declining lag on other right-hand-side variables, including the positions of other relevant parties (Plümper, Troeger, and Manow 2005). But here, the "time" variable defining this lag would be the number of elections in i's system, not calendar time. In general, it is not plausible that the effect of the right-hand-side variables geometrically declines with the number of elections for systems where elections do not always occur at fixed intervals. Thus, there is further substantive justification for a research design based on party-years rather than party-elections years.

The Effect of Economic Globalization Conditional on the Median Voter

The first figure of these Supplementary Materials 3 graphs the interactive relationship between *Lagged Economic Globalization* and *Lagged Median Voter*. We observe a negative slope for the marginal-effects curve, leading to a negative impact of *Lagged Economic Globalization* for high levels of *Lagged Median Voter*.

Figure 1. Economic Globalization Conditional on the Median Voter

Notes. The solid line depicts coefficient estimates and the dashed lines depict 90 percent confidence intervals. The results are based on the parameter estimates from Model 4 in the main text. The rug plot (vertical tics) along the horizontal axis indicates the observed frequency distribution of *Lagged Median Voter*. Coefficient value of 0 is marked with horizontal grey solid line.

Estimating Models using Spatial Maximum Likelihood Techniques

Our results presented in the main text are based on S-OLS. We followed Williams (2015; see also Williams and Whitten 2015) who employs S-OLS regression models in his work as well. However, Franzese and Hays (2007) assess different specification and estimation choices both in terms of their asymptotic properties and small sample performance. The problem with S-OLS models might be that simultaneity bias (i.e., $\rho W y_{e-1}$ influences y_t and vice versa) is present due to the inclusion of the spatial lag (Franzese and Hays 2008), although temporally lagging the variable can address this problem if the first observation in the data is fixed in repeated samples, i.e., there is no stochastic element to it.

That said, Franzese and Hays (2007) show that the S-ML directly corrects for simultaneity bias and that "S-ML seems to offer weakly dominant efficiency and generally solid performance in unbiasedness and SE [standard error] accuracy" as compared to other estimation procedures (Franzese and Hays 2007: 163; Franzese and Hays 2008). In order to ensure that the type of estimator does not affect our findings, we re-estimated our models of the main text using spatial maximum likelihood (S-ML) approaches. The tables below report our findings: while the first table here replicates the main single spatial lag models (i.e., Table 2 in the main text) with maximum likelihood, the second table uses the maximum-likelihood variant of the main multiparametric spatiotemporal autoregressive (m-STAR) models, i.e., Table 3 in the main text (Hays, Kachi, and Franzese 2010).

Table 1. The Diffusion of Party Policy Positions – Single Spatial Lag Models (S-ML)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	$\mathbf{W}y^{\text{Domestic}}$	$\mathbf{W}y^{\text{Domestic Bloc}}$	$\mathbf{W}y^{\text{Foreign Incumbent}}$	$\mathbf{W}y^{\text{Foreign Incumbent Bloc}}$
Constant	-0.848	-0.738	-1.361	-0.857
	(0.787)	(0.789)	(0.789)*	(0.790)
Lagged Party Position	0.747	0.749	0.751	0.751
	(0.012)***	(0.012)***	(0.012)***	(0.012)***
Lagged Median Voter	0.419	0.416	0.472	0.439
	(0.150)***	(0.150)***	(0.150)***	(0.150)***
Lagged Economic Globalization	0.027	0.026	0.030	0.028
	(0.011)**	(0.011)**	(0.011)***	(0.011)***
Lag Median Voter *	-0.006	-0.006	-0.006	-0.006
Lagged Economic Globalization	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***
Spatial Coefficient ρ	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.001
	(0.000)***	(0.000)***	(0.000)***	(0.000)***
Observations	2,718	2,718	2,718	2,718
Year and Party FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Log Likelihood	-659.506	-663.648	-663.468	-667.261

Notes. Table entries are coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; year- and party-fixed effects included in all models, but omitted from presentation; the scale for party position (dependent variable) is recalibrated from the left-right estimates reported by the CMP, which is from -100 (left) to +100 (right), to fit on the 1-10 median voter scale; all explanatory variables are one-year lags, the spatial lags capture parties' policy positions of the year before the last election.
* $p<0.10$; ** $p<0.05$; *** $p<0.01$

Table 2. The Diffusion of Party Policy Positions – m-STAR Models (S-ML)

	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Constant	-1.850	-1.764	-1.748
	(0.835)**	(0.840)**	(0.840)**
Lagged Party Position	0.738	0.737	0.737
	(0.012)***	(0.012)***	(0.012)***
Lagged Median Voter	0.448	0.436	0.435
	(0.151)***	(0.151)***	(0.151)***
Lagged Economic Globalization	0.030	0.029	0.029
	(0.011)***	(0.011)***	(0.011)***
Lag Median Voter *	-0.006	-0.006	-0.006
Lagged Economic Globalization	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***
$\mathbf{W}y^{Domestic}$	0.006	0.005	0.005
	(0.001)***	(0.001)***	(0.001)***
$\mathbf{W}y^{Domestic\ Bloc}$		0.002	0.002
		(0.002)	(0.002)
$\mathbf{W}y^{Foreign\ Incumbent}$	0.004	0.004	0.004
	(0.001)***	(0.001)***	(0.001)***
$\mathbf{W}y^{Foreign\ Incumbent\ Bloc}$			0.000
			(0.000)
Observations	2,718	2,718	2,718
Year and Party FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes
Log Likelihood	-647.321	-646.908	-646.795

Notes. Table entries are coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; year- and party-fixed effects included in all models, but omitted from presentation; the scale for party position (dependent variable) is recalibrated from the left-right estimates reported by the CMP, which is from -100 (left) to +100 (right), to fit on the 1-10 median voter scale; all explanatory variables are one-year lags, the spatial lags capture parties' policy positions of the year before the last election.
* $p<0.10$; ** $p<0.05$; *** $p<0.01$

Excluding Cases with Highly Uncertain Party Positions

Benoit, Laver, and Mikhaylov (2009) estimate the uncertainty surrounding the party-policy position data of the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP), i.e., the data we use for our dependent variable and the construction of the spatial lags. By simulating the data's underlying error-generating processes via bootstrapping analyses of coded quasi-sentences, Benoit, Laver, and Mikhaylov (2009) then provide precise levels of nonsystematic errors for the left-right party position (among other variables in the CMP).

In order to ensure that this process does not drive our findings, we assessed the uncertainty surrounding each party's policy position using the left-right standard error estimate in Benoit, Laver, and Mikhaylov (2009). In turn, we omitted all observations from the sample and the corresponding weighting matrices if their standard error estimate was above the 75th percentile of the standard-error variable's distribution. Table 3 of this document summarizes our findings from this analysis, where our core results are unchanged: parties learn from and emulate foreign parties that have recently been in the government.

Table 3. Excluding Cases with Highly Uncertain Party Positions

	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10
Constant	-1.770	-1.680	-1.677
	(0.919)*	(0.926)*	(0.926)*
Lagged Party Position	0.724	0.725	0.724
	(0.014)***	(0.014)***	(0.014)***
Lagged Median Voter	0.456	0.447	0.450
	(0.166)***	(0.167)***	(0.167)***
Lagged Economic Globalization	0.031	0.030	0.030
	(0.012)***	(0.012)***	(0.012)***
Lag Median Voter *	-0.006	-0.006	-0.006
Lagged Economic Globalization	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***
$\mathbf{W}y^{\text{Domestic}}$	0.003	0.003	0.003
	(0.001)***	(0.001)*	(0.001)*
$\mathbf{W}y^{\text{Domestic Bloc}}$		0.002	0.002
		(0.003)	(0.003)
$\mathbf{W}y^{\text{Foreign Incumbent}}$	0.005	0.005	0.005
	(0.002)***	(0.001)***	(0.001)***
$\mathbf{W}y^{\text{Foreign Incumbent Bloc}}$			0.000
			(0.001)
Observations	2,395	2,395	2,395
Year and Party Fes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R^2	0.867	0.867	0.867
RMSE	0.313	0.313	0.313

Notes. Table entries are coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; year- and party-fixed effects included in all models, but omitted from presentation; the scale for party position (dependent variable) is recalibrated from the left-right estimates reported by the CMP, which is from -100 (left) to +100 (right), to fit on the 1-10 median voter scale; all explanatory variables are one-year lags, the spatial lags capture parties' policy positions of the year before the last election.
* $p<0.10$; ** $p<0.05$; *** $p<0.01$

Diffusion within Individual Ideological Blocs

It has been suggested that some ideological blocs may interact more than others. In line with some of the examples of the main text, for example, "left" parties are usually perceived as having "stronger" international ties, e.g., within the Socialist International, than centrist or right-wing ideological bloc parties, and these interactions may not necessarily be tied to incumbency. To assess this possibility, we re-estimated our full m-STAR S-OLS models based on "disaggregated" weighting matrices. That is, we modified the foreign-party spatial lags so that an element $w_{i,j}$ of the underlying connectivity matrix for the spatial lag $\mathbf{W}\mathrm{y}^{\text{Foreign Party}}$ receives a value of 1 if parties i and j do not compete in the same country for office, but come from (1) the leftist-party ideological bloc (Model 11), (2) the centrist-party ideological bloc (Model 12), and (3) the right-wing ideological bloc (Model 13), respectively. Otherwise, a value of 0 is used for the respective weighting matrices' elements. In a second step, we created three spatial lags for a respective ideological bloc again, but took into account if j has recently been part of the government (or the governing coalition) during the year before the last election in its own system before time t (0 otherwise) ($\mathbf{W}\mathrm{y}^{\text{Foreign Party Incumbent}}$).

Table 4 summarizes our findings from these disaggregated analyses. When introducing the conditional element of a *specific* ideological bloc into our spatial lags, the foreign-party spatial lags become insignificant, the only exception being $\mathbf{W}\mathrm{y}^{\text{Foreign Party}}$ for the right-wing ideological bloc. While these results do suggest that it is particularly right-wing parties that are less inclined to learn from and emulate other right-wing parties abroad, we do not find evidence that it is particularly left-wing parties that learn from and emulate other left-wing parties in foreign countries. This is supported by the insignificant estimates of $\mathbf{W}\mathrm{y}^{\text{Foreign Party}}$ and $\mathbf{W}\mathrm{y}^{\text{Foreign Party Incum-}}$

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bent in Model 11, although the coefficient signs are positive there. Note, as we only introduce a conditional effect by incorporating the disaggregated ideological bloc element into the spatial lags, the findings in Table 4 simply suggest that a specific ideological bloc does not drive our results presented in the main text. In fact, all foreign-party spatial lags that consider joint ideological bloc membership are also insignificant in the main text. Table 4 thus lends further support to the notion that it is the incumbency status of a foreign party that matters most.

That said, when further disaggregating "left" parties and looking at social-democratic parties only (Model 14), we obtain a positive and significant estimate for $\mathbf{W}\mathbf{y}^{\text{Foreign Party Incumbent}}$. In other words, while "left" parties *per se* or, even more disaggregated, social-democratic parties as such are not more likely to learn from and emulate other left or social-democratic parties, some evidence does exist that it is particularly *social-democratic parties that learn from and emulate foreign social-democratic incumbents*.

Table 4. The Diffusion of Party Policy Positions within Ideological Blocs

	Model 11 – Left Parties	Model 12 – Center Parties	Model 13 – Right Parties	Model 14 – Social Democrats
Constant	-0.711	-0.876	-0.851	-0.928
	(0.834)	(0.846)	(0.832)	(0.831)
Lagged Party Position	0.737	0.738	0.736	0.732
	(0.013)***	(0.013)***	(0.013)***	(0.013)***
Lagged Median Voter	0.365	0.379	0.393	0.404
	(0.158)**	(0.159)**	(0.158)**	(0.158)**
Lagged Economic Globalization	0.023	0.025	0.026	0.026
	(0.011)**	(0.011)**	(0.011)**	(0.011)**
Lag Median Voter *	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005
Lagged Economic Globalization	(0.002)**	(0.002)**	(0.002)**	(0.002)**
$\mathbf{W}y^{\text{Domestic}}$	0.005	0.006	0.005	0.006
	(0.001)***	(0.001)***	(0.001)***	(0.001)***
$\mathbf{W}y^{\text{Domestic Bloc}}$	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
$\mathbf{W}y^{\text{Foreign Bloc}}$	0.000	0.001	-0.001	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.002)	(0.000)**	(0.001)
$\mathbf{W}y^{\text{Foreign Bloc Incumbent}}$	0.000	-0.000	0.001	0.004
	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.001)***
Observations	2,718	2,718	2,718	2,718
Year and Party FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R^2	0.878	0.878	0.878	0.878
RMSE	0.323	0.323	0.323	0.322

Notes. Table entries are coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; year- and party-fixed effects included in all models, but omitted from presentation; the scale for party position (dependent variable) is recalibrated from the left-right estimates reported by the CMP, which is from -100 (left) to +100 (right), to fit on the 1-10 median voter scale; all explanatory variables are one-year lags, the spatial lags capture parties' policy positions of the year before the last election.
* $p<0.10$; ** $p<0.05$; *** $p<0.01$

Alternative Lag Structures for Incumbency

We use the positions of parties in the year before the last election held in their country before time *t* for the construction of the spatial lags. We deliberately opted for the temporal lag structure for the spatial-lag variables, since developing party manifestos is a "time-consuming process [...] which typically takes place over a two-three year period during which party-affiliated research departments and committees draft sections of this manuscript, which are then circulated for revisions and approval upward to party elites and downward to activists" (Adams and Somer-Topcu 2009: 832). Hence, simply lagging the spatial lags by one year would not address this process adequately, particularly as elections in our sample's countries are not in the same year. Similarly, while parties then, of course, are likely to follow what other parties are currently doing, this will only translate into their manifestos after a certain temporal lag. However, given the way we have defined the between-election year values of party positions (a party's position in the year before an election at time *t* is the position from the election at time *t-1*), this might – only in extreme cases – be the party's position from two elections prior.

This may seem like a long lag and the question may arise why parties would not be looking at the more recent past (such as the most recent election prior to its own country's most recent election) when seeking to learn from/emulate successful foreign parties? We realize that this is an important point and, hence, spent a large amount of time in addressing this issue comprehensively. On one hand, we sought to estimate the average time lag that is in fact given with our temporal lag structure relying on the positions of parties in the year before the last election held in their country before time t for the construction of the spatial lags. According to our data, when comparing the election dates for all pairs of parties in our data set, the effective temporal

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lag structure inherent in our spatial lags' weighting matrices is on average about five years only. That is, effectively, the spatial lags we use rely on the positions of parties about five years (on average) before time t. The standard deviation of the temporal lag is 1.684, while the 75th percentile lies at six years.

On the other hand, we then re-estimated our models using the party position (and, if appropriate, the incumbency status for some of our spatial lags) of (1) the year before the year under study (*t-1*), (2) two years before the year under study (*t-2*), and (3) three years before the year under study (*t-3*). As expected, however, the results turn out to be insignificant or negative. While these results then further underline that there is a significant time lag in party positions travelling from one party to another, our research suggests that the time lag of "two to three years" proposed by Adams and Somer-Topcu (2009: 832) may even underestimate this.

Table 5. The Diffusion of Party Policy Positions – Party Abroad was Incumbent Last Year

	Model 15	Model 16	Model 17
Constant	-0.208	-0.098	-1.787
	(0.872)	(0.882)	(0.883)**
Lagged Party Position	0.737	0.737	0.736
	(0.013)***	(0.013)***	(0.013)***
Lagged Median Voter	0.351	0.338	0.442
	(0.158)**	(0.159)**	(0.159)***
Lagged Economic Globalization	0.024	0.023	0.030
	(0.011)**	(0.011)**	(0.011)***
Lag Median Voter *	-0.005	-0.005	-0.006
Lagged Economic Globalization	(0.002)**	(0.002)**	(0.002)***
$\mathbf{Wy}^{\text{Domestic}}$	0.006	0.005	0.005
	(0.001)***	(0.002)***	(0.001)***
$\mathbf{Wy}^{\text{Domestic Bloc}}$		0.002	0.002
		(0.002)	(0.002)
$\mathbf{Wy}^{\text{Foreign Incumbent}}$	-0.003	-0.003	0.004
	(0.001)**	(0.001)**	(0.001)***
$\mathbf{Wy}^{\text{Foreign Incumbent Bloc}}$			-0.001
			(0.000)**
Observations	2,718	2,718	2,718
Year and Party FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes
R^2	0.878	0.878	0.878
RMSE	0.323	0.323	0.322

Notes. Table entries are coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; year- and party-fixed effects included in all models, but omitted from presentation; the scale for party position (dependent variable) is recalibrated from the left-right estimates reported by the CMP, which is from -100 (left) to +100 (right), to fit on the 1-10 median voter scale; all explanatory variables are one-year lags, the spatial lags capture parties' policy positions of the year before the last election.
* $p<0.10$; ** $p<0.05$; *** $p<0.01$

Table 6. The Diffusion of Party Policy Positions – Party Abroad was Incumbent Two Years Ago

	Model 18	Model 19	Model 20
Constant	-0.359	-0.279	-0.302
	(0.910)	(0.919)	(0.920)
Lagged Party Position	0.736	0.735	0.735
	(0.013)***	(0.013)***	(0.013)***
Lagged Median Voter	0.345	0.336	0.339
	(0.159)**	(0.160)**	(0.160)**
Lagged Economic Globalization	0.022	0.022	0.022
	(0.011)**	(0.011)*	(0.011)*
Lag Median Voter *	-0.005	-0.004	-0.004
Lagged Economic Globalization	(0.002)**	(0.002)**	(0.002)**
$\mathbf{W}y^{\text{Domestic}}$	0.006	0.006	0.006
	(0.001)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***
$\mathbf{W}y^{\text{Domestic Bloc}}$		0.001	0.001
		(0.002)	(0.002)
$\mathbf{W}y^{\text{Foreign Incumbent}}$	-0.001	-0.002	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
$\mathbf{W}y^{\text{Foreign Incumbent Bloc}}$			-0.000
			(0.000)
Observations	2,718	2,718	2,718
Year and Party FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes
R^2	0.878	0.878	0.878
RMSE	0.323	0.323	0.323

Notes. Table entries are coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; year- and party-fixed effects included in all models, but omitted from presentation; the scale for party position (dependent variable) is recalibrated from the left-right estimates reported by the CMP, which is from -100 (left) to +100 (right), to fit on the 1-10 median voter scale; all explanatory variables are one-year lags, the spatial lags capture parties' policy positions of the year before the last election.
* $p<0.10$; ** $p<0.05$; *** $p<0.01$

Table 7. The Diffusion of Party Policy Positions – Party Abroad was Incumbent Three Years Ago

	Model 21	Model 22	Model 23
Constant	-0.444	-0.368	-0.386
	(0.920)	(0.930)	(0.931)
Lagged Party Position	0.737	0.737	0.737
	(0.013)***	(0.013)***	(0.013)***
Lagged Median Voter	0.351	0.342	0.344
	(0.159)**	(0.160)**	(0.160)**
Lagged Economic Globalization	0.023	0.022	0.022
	(0.011)**	(0.011)*	(0.011)*
Lag Median Voter *	-0.005	-0.004	-0.004
Lagged Economic Globalization	(0.002)**	(0.002)**	(0.002)**
$\mathbf{W}y^{\text{Domestic}}$	0.006	0.006	0.006
	(0.001)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***
$\mathbf{W}y^{\text{Domestic Bloc}}$		0.001	0.001
		(0.002)	(0.002)
$\mathbf{W}y^{\text{Foreign Incumbent}}$	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
$\mathbf{W}y^{\text{Foreign Incumbent Bloc}}$			-0.000
			(0.000)
Observations	2,718	2,718	2,718
Year and Party FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes
R^2	0.878	0.878	0.878
RMSE	0.323	0.323	0.323

Notes. Table entries are coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; year- and party-fixed effects included in all models, but omitted from presentation; the scale for party position (dependent variable) is recalibrated from the left-right estimates reported by the CMP, which is from -100 (left) to +100 (right), to fit on the 1-10 median voter scale; all explanatory variables are one-year lags, the spatial lags capture parties' policy positions of the year before the last election.
* $p<0.10$; ** $p<0.05$; *** $p<0.01$

Diffusion Conditional on Countries' Similarities in Political Systems

Based on the main article, in the Supplementary Materials 2, we thus also developed the claim that similar political institutions are one path for information to travel between political parties. Parties may have greater incentives to search for information about party programs in states that are "structurally similar" from an institutional perspective (see Cao 2012). Ultimately, this is because the road to power is conditioned by the nature of the system, e.g., considerations of potentially having to work with coalition partners are generally lower in majoritarian systems. Certainly, the costs of construal will increase when the system is less culturally familiar or less structurally similar, just as the relevance of the information is likely to be lower.

To illustrate this, a common political ancestry, a common electoral system, or even the same structure of chambers could facilitate learning and emulation. In the Supplementary Materials 2, we focused on a joint electoral system to this end, but we present two additions here that follow the excellent guidelines suggested by the anonymous reviewers. On one hand, we sought to incorporate the information on the structure of chambers into our weighting matrices using the World Bank's Database on Political Institutions (DPI) (Beck et al. 2001). These data provide rich information on dozens of institutional variables since the early 1970s, and cover all 26 countries included in our sample. The DPI provides information on the number of chambers per country, although additional data are provided in the "checks" variable we rely on.

That is, "checks" equals one if the data's "Legislative or Executive Indices of Electoral Competitiveness" indicate that a basic level of competitiveness is given in a country – states where legislatures are not competitively elected are considered countries where only the executive wields a check. In states with a basic level of legislative or executive electoral competitive-

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ness, "checks" is incremented by one if (1) there is a chief executive, (2) the chief executive is competitively, or (3) the opposition controls the legislature. In presidential systems, "checks" is incremented by one for each chamber of the legislature unless the president's party has a majority in the lower house and a closed list system is in effect. In presidential systems, "checks" is also incremented by one for each party coded as allied with the president's party and which has an ideological (left-right-center) orientation closer to that of the main opposition party than to that of the president's party. In turn, in parliamentary systems, "checks" is incremented by one for (1) every party in the government coalition as long as the parties are needed to maintain a majority and (2) every party in the government coalition that has a position on economic issues (right-left-center) closer to the largest opposition party than to the party of the executive. In parliamentary systems, the prime minister's party is not counted as a check if there is a closed rule in place – the prime minister is presumed in this case to control the party fully. We incorporated this information into the elements $w_{i,j}$ of the foreign-parties weighting matrices in the form of party-countries' absolute distance in the DPI's "checks" variable.

This operationalization allows us to examine the effect of foreign incumbents and foreign incumbents from the same ideological bloc conditional on a similar structure of checks and veto players. However, Table 8 shows that the findings become inconclusive when incorporating the DPI's information. Our foreign-party based spatial lags are not statistically indistinguishable from 0, which leads to two conclusions. First, checks and veto players, including the structure of legislative chambers, hardly condition the foreign-incumbent effect we argue for in the main text. Instead, and as demonstrated with Table 1 in the Supplementary Materials 2, it is more like-

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ly that it is simply a joint electoral system that matters for facilitating learning from and emulating foreign successful parties.

Table 8. The Diffusion of Party Policy Positions Conditional on Countries' Similarities in Political Systems

	Model 24	Model 25	Model 26
Constant	-1.144	-1.061	-1.047
	(0.848)	(0.855)	(0.856)
Lagged Party Position	0.739	0.739	0.739
	(0.013)***	(0.013)***	(0.013)***
Lagged Median Voter	0.394	0.383	0.382
	(0.158)**	(0.158)**	(0.158)**
Lagged Economic Globalization	0.026	0.025	0.025
	(0.011)**	(0.011)**	(0.011)**
Lag Median Voter *	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005
Lagged Economic Globalization	(0.002)**	(0.002)**	(0.002)**
$\mathbf{Wy}^{Domestic}$	0.006	0.006	0.006
	(0.001)***	(0.001)***	(0.001)***
$\mathbf{Wy}^{Domestic\ Bloc}$		0.002	0.002
		(0.002)	(0.002)
$\mathbf{Wy}^{Checks\ Foreign\ Incumbent}$	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
$\mathbf{Wy}^{Checks\ Foreign\ Incumbent\ Bloc}$			0.000
			(0.000)
Observations	2,718	2,718	2,718
Year and Party Fes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R^2	0.878	0.878	0.878
RMSE	0.323	0.323	0.323

Notes. Table entries are coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; year- and party-fixed effects included in all models, but omitted from presentation; the scale for party position (dependent variable) is recalibrated from the left-right estimates reported by the CMP, which is from -100 (left) to +100 (right), to fit on the 1-10 median voter scale; all explanatory variables are one-year lags, the spatial lags capture parties' policy positions of the year before the last election.
* $p<0.10$; ** $p<0.05$; *** $p<0.01$

Diffusion from Parties in Coalition Governments and Single-Party Governments

The considerations of potentially having to work with coalition partners might not only crucially be influenced by the type of the electoral system or the structure of checks and veto players both at home and abroad, but also by the type of government we have in a foreign country. That is, we defined "success" of foreign parties as incumbency – while incumbency and votes are correlated, incumbency should be stronger as incumbents receive substantially more media attention than opposition parties, even if these opposition parties received similar levels of popular support in the previous election. Hence, we argue that it is the participation in a foreign government that matters for a party to be learnt from and be emulated.

However, a reasonable objection to our treatment is that the incumbency status could, in principle, imply two different observable implications regarding "foreign success." First, in a single-party government, incumbents have enjoyed recent electoral success and the incentives for emulation are obviously given. On the other hand, in a coalition government, the relationship between electoral success and being in government, and thus the incentives for learning and emulation, could be less direct. In fact, it might be that a governing party lost votes in the last election, but was an attractive coalition partner, because of its position ideologically and/or the success of other parties. These two cases might be different in terms of the incentives they provide for parties "watching from the outside to imitate them."

In order to address this potential concern, we revised the foreign-party spatial lags by incorporating the information on the type of government abroad. That is, to the original operationalization of $\mathbf{W}y^{\text{Foreign Incumbent}}$ and $\mathbf{W}y^{\text{Foreign Incumbent Bloc}}$, we added the condition that the "other" party j in a dyad of parties i and j must have been also in a coalition government (Table 9) or in a

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single government (Table 10) so that an element $w_{i,j}$ of the weighting matrix receives a value of 1. Similar to our treatment of incumbency, we focus on whether there was a coalition government or a single-party government in the last year before the last election in *j*'s country. The data on governmental type stem from Döring and Manow (2012).

Tables 9 and 10 then summarize our findings. As indicated above, a reasonable expectation might be that a focus on *incumbency* as a measure of foreign success only applies to *single-party governments* abroad. Contrary to this expectation, however, the findings in Tables 9 and 10 suggest that parties are particularly likely to learn from and emulate foreign incumbency parties if they were part of a *coalition government*. This lends support to our claim that incumbency should be stronger as incumbents receive substantially more media attention than opposition parties, even if these opposition parties received similar levels of popular support in the previous election. In fact, when focusing on Table 10, i.e., single-party governments abroad, the results are largely inconclusive as the associated coefficient estimates of the foreign-party spatial lags are mainly statistically insignificant and/or negatively signed. That said, this may well be due to the fact that there are (1) fewer single party governments than coalition ones, so in effect we are trying to estimate what happens off few cases, and (2) that both single-majority and single-minority governments are clustered in the former category. In, it may also be that, in Europe, a lot of single-party governments are minority ones; hence, in a way they are less relevant if you want to win *power* as opposed just to office.

Table 9. The Diffusion of Party Policy Positions from Parties in Coalition Governments

	Model 27	Model 28	Model 29
Constant	-1.815	-1.725	-1.726
	(0.865)**	(0.871)**	(0.871)**
Lagged Party Position	0.737	0.737	0.737
	(0.013)***	(0.013)***	(0.013)***
Lagged Median Voter	0.443	0.430	0.430
	(0.158)***	(0.159)***	(0.159)***
Lagged Economic Globalization	0.030	0.029	0.029
	(0.011)***	(0.011)***	(0.011)***
Lag Median Voter *	-0.006	-0.006	-0.006
Lagged Economic Globalization	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***
$\mathbf{Wy}^{\text{Domestic}}$	0.006	0.005	0.005
	(0.001)***	(0.001)***	(0.001)***
$\mathbf{Wy}^{\text{Domestic Bloc}}$		0.002	0.002
		(0.002)	(0.002)
$\mathbf{Wy}^{\text{Foreign Coalition Incumbent}}$	0.004	0.004	0.004
	(0.001)***	(0.001)***	(0.001)***
$\mathbf{Wy}^{\text{Foreign Coalition Incumbent Bloc}}$			-0.000
			(0.001)
Observations	2,718	2,718	2,718
Year and Party FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes
R^2	0.878	0.878	0.878
RMSE	0.322	0.322	0.322

Notes. Table entries are coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; year- and party-fixed effects included in all models, but omitted from presentation; the scale for party position (dependent variable) is recalibrated from the left-right estimates reported by the CMP, which is from -100 (left) to +100 (right), to fit on the 1-10 median voter scale; all explanatory variables are one-year lags, the spatial lags capture parties' policy positions of the year before the last election.
* $p<0.10$; ** $p<0.05$; *** $p<0.01$

Table 10. The Diffusion of Party Policy Positions from Parties in Single-Party Governments

	Model 30	Model 31	Model 32
Constant	-0.639	-0.552	-0.454
	(0.836)	(0.848)	(0.845)
Lagged Party Position	0.739	0.738	0.737
	(0.013)***	(0.013)***	(0.013)***
Lagged Median Voter	0.365	0.354	0.348
	(0.158)**	(0.159)**	(0.158)**
Lagged Economic Globalization	0.024	0.023	0.022
	(0.011)**	(0.011)**	(0.011)**
Lag Median Voter *	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005
Lagged Economic Globalization	(0.002)**	(0.002)**	(0.002)**
$\mathbf{Wy}^{\text{Domestic}}$	0.006	0.005	0.005
	(0.001)***	(0.001)***	(0.001)***
$\mathbf{Wy}^{\text{Domestic Bloc}}$		0.002	0.002
		(0.002)	(0.002)
$\mathbf{Wy}^{\text{Foreign SM Incumbent}}$	-0.008	-0.008	-0.010
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)*
$\mathbf{Wy}^{\text{Foreign SM Incumbent Bloc}}$			0.003
			(0.002)*
Observations	2,718	2,718	2,718
Year and Party FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes
R^2	0.878	0.878	0.878
RMSE	0.323	0.323	0.323

Notes. Table entries are coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; year- and party-fixed effects included in all models, but omitted from presentation; the scale for party position (dependent variable) is recalibrated from the left-right estimates reported by the CMP, which is from -100 (left) to +100 (right), to fit on the 1-10 median voter scale; all explanatory variables are one-year lags, the spatial lags capture parties' policy positions of the year before the last election.
* $p<0.10$; ** $p<0.05$; *** $p<0.01$

Diffusion Conditional on Countries' Similarities in Political History

Another extension, as indicated above, pertains to "a common political ancestry." While we have not considered this possibility empirically in the main text, the importance of this condition is derived from the claims on information relevance, costs, and incentives. We sought to empirically account for the condition of a common political history by incorporating the information on the durability of a political regime in the elements of the foreign-party spatial lags. Specifically, we take the Polity IV Project's (Marshall and Jaggers 2013) indicator that counts the number of years since a country entered the Polity IV dataset in 1800 or had a three-point change ("most recent regime change") in the *polity2* score in either direction of the scale over a period of three years or less (Marshall and Jaggers 2013: 17). This coding rule also applies to the end of a transition period, i.e., "the lack of stable political institutions" (Marshall and Jaggers 2013: 17). As soon as such a change occurs, this count item is reset to 0 and the count starts again. For implementing this information into our weights matrices and, thus, the elements $w_{i,j}$ of the weighting matrix, we calculated the inverse of the absolute distance between the two countries' durability score of parties i and j. We then multiplied this matrix with either the underlying matrix of $\mathbf{W}y^{\text{Foreign Incumbent}}$ or $\mathbf{W}y^{\text{Foreign Incumbent Bloc}}$. In other words, this treatment introduces the condition of a common or similar political history into our foreign-party spatial lag variables.

Table 11 presents our findings with this change in the research design. While our results for the domestic-level spatial lags remain unchanged (we did not change their operationalization either), the foreign-party spatial lags are no longer statistically significant. In other words, although our results in the main article suggest that information relevance, costs, and incentives

matter in some circumstances and under some conditions, a common political history is not one

of them. But this insignificant finding may also be driven by our focus on European states.

Table 11. The Diffusion of Party Policy Positions Conditional on Countries' Political History

	Model 33	Model 34	Model 35
Constant	-0.856	-0.774	-0.756
	(0.826)	(0.833)	(0.834)
Lagged Party Position	0.739	0.738	0.739
	(0.013)***	(0.013)***	(0.013)***
Lagged Median Voter	0.382	0.371	0.372
	(0.158)**	(0.158)**	(0.158)**
Lagged Economic Globalization	0.025	0.024	0.024
	(0.011)**	(0.011)**	(0.011)**
Lag Median Voter *	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005
Lagged Economic Globalization	(0.002)**	(0.002)**	(0.002)**
$\mathbf{Wy}^{\text{Domestic}}$	0.006	0.005	0.005
	(0.001)***	(0.001)***	(0.001)***
$\mathbf{Wy}^{\text{Domestic Bloc}}$		0.002	0.002
		(0.002)	(0.002)
$\mathbf{Wy}^{\text{Foreign History Incumbent}}$	0.000	0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
$\mathbf{Wy}^{\text{Foreign History Incumbent Bloc}}$			0.000
			(0.000)
Observations	2,718	2,718	2,718
Year and Party FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes
R^2	0.878	0.878	0.878
RMSE	0.323	0.323	0.323

Notes. Table entries are coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; year- and party-fixed effects included in all models, but omitted from presentation; the scale for party position (dependent variable) is recalibrated from the left-right estimates reported by the CMP, which is from -100 (left) to +100 (right), to fit on the 1-10 median voter scale; all explanatory variables are one-year lags, the spatial lags capture parties' policy positions of the year before the last election.
* $p<0.10$; ** $p<0.05$; *** $p<0.01$

Diffusion Conditional on Countries' Geographical Proximity

As elaborated thoroughly in the main text, transaction costs of gathering information about foreign parties matter for resource-constrained parties, while, historically, these costs increase with geographical distance. Although, this is likely to have become less important with modern communications, we still examined this possibility with the models in Table 12. In Models 36-38, we modified the foreign spatial lags as we replaced the binary information in the weighting matrix on whether two parties i and j do not compete in the same country (i.e., whether two parties do not belong to the same country) by the inverse capital-to-capital distance between i and j. The data on the capital-to-capital distance, i.e., the great circle distance between capital cities in kilometers, have been taken from Gleditsch and Ward (1999).

Table 12 then summarizes our models based on these modifications of the foreign-party spatial lags. While the results for the domestic level are unaffected by this change in research design, the foreign-party spatial lags are no longer statistically significant at conventional levels. There are three reasons for this. First, as indicated above, the importance of geographic distance decreased with the introduction of modern communication technologies, and the latter are a striking feature of the time period of our sample, i.e., 1977-2010. Second, the geographical context of our analysis focuses on Europe, which implies that the distances between states and capitals (as captured by our data modification) are not that large. This may differ, however, when examining our theory with data on all countries in the world. Third, this finding is in line with other policy diffusion research that finds no or very limited evidence for policy diffusion based on geographic proximity (Karch 2007: 58; Neumayer et al. 2014): "space is more than geography" (Beck, Gleditsch, and Beardsley 2006).

Table 12. The Diffusion of Party Policy Positions Conditional on Countries' Geographic Proximity

	Model 36	Model 37	Model 38
Constant	-0.904	-0.804	-0.797
	(0.884)	(0.895)	(0.895)
Lagged Party Position	0.739	0.738	0.738
	(0.013)***	(0.013)***	(0.013)***
Lagged Median Voter	0.386	0.374	0.372
	(0.159)**	(0.160)**	(0.160)**
Lagged Economic Globalization	0.025	0.024	0.024
	(0.011)**	(0.011)**	(0.011)**
Lag Median Voter *	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005
Lagged Economic Globalization	(0.002)**	(0.002)**	(0.002)**
$\mathbf{Wy}^{\text{Domestic}}$	0.006	0.005	0.005
	(0.001)***	(0.001)***	(0.001)***
$\mathbf{Wy}^{\text{Domestic Bloc}}$		0.002	0.002
		(0.002)	(0.002)
$\mathbf{Wy}^{\text{Inv. Distance Incumbent}}$	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
$\mathbf{Wy}^{\text{Inv. Distance Incumbent Bloc}}$			0.000
			(0.000)
Observations	2,718	2,718	2,718
Year and Party FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes
R^2	0.878	0.878	0.878
RMSE	0.323	0.323	0.323

Notes. Table entries are coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; year- and party-fixed effects included in all models, but omitted from presentation; the scale for party position (dependent variable) is recalibrated from the left-right estimates reported by the CMP, which is from -100 (left) to +100 (right), to fit on the 1-10 median voter scale; all explanatory variables are one-year lags, the spatial lags capture parties' policy positions of the year before the last election.
* $p<0.10$; ** $p<0.05$; *** $p<0.01$

Diffusion Conditional on Countries' Similarity in Population Size

In the main article, we examine whether parties from smaller countries are more likely to learn from and emulate parties from larger countries using the difference in GDP. While the results on this were inconclusive, we also considered the possibility that the size of a country may not necessarily be driven by its economic power, but rather its population. To this end, Table 13 replaces our foreign-party spatial lags by ΔPopulation: $\mathbf{W}y^{\text{Foreign Incumbent}}$ and ΔPopulation: $\mathbf{W}y^{\text{Foreign Incumbent Bloc}}$. While both items capture the rationale of our original foreign spatial lags, we also introduce the difference in countries' annual mean population (Gleditsch 2002). Specifically, these two spatial lags must meet the condition of a foreign-incumbent party or a foreign-incumbent party from the same ideological bloc, respectively, to receive a value of 1 in the weighting matrix, but we also introduce the following as well now: for $i{\neq}j$, $w_{i,j}$=(population$_j$ − population$_i$) if population$_j$ > population$_i$ and 0 otherwise (Ward and John 2013: 16). The elements $w_{i,j}$ of the weighting matrix thus become continuous.

Table 13 summarizes our findings based on the difference in countries' population size, but we obtain coefficient estimates that fail to achieve significance at conventional levels. This mirrors our results from the Supplementary Materials 2 that are based on the difference between countries' GDP.

Table 13. The Diffusion of Party Policy Positions Conditional on Population Size

	Model 39	Model 40	Model 41
Constant	-0.853	-0.774	-0.764
	(0.835)	(0.842)	(0.842)
Lagged Party Position	0.739	0.738	0.739
	(0.013)***	(0.013)***	(0.013)***
Lagged Median Voter	0.383	0.372	0.373
	(0.157)**	(0.158)**	(0.158)**
Lagged Economic Globalization	0.025	0.024	0.024
	(0.011)**	(0.011)**	(0.011)**
Lag Median Voter *	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005
Lagged Economic Globalization	(0.002)**	(0.002)**	(0.002)**
$\mathbf{Wy}^{\text{Domestic}}$	0.006	0.005	0.005
	(0.001)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***
$\mathbf{Wy}^{\text{Domestic Bloc}}$		0.002	0.002
		(0.002)	(0.002)
ΔPopulation: $\mathbf{Wy}^{\text{Foreign Incumbent}}$	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
ΔPopulation: $\mathbf{Wy}^{\text{Foreign Incumbent Bloc}}$			0.000
			(0.000)
Observations	2,718	2,718	2,718
Year and Party FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes
R^2	0.878	0.878	0.878
RMSE	0.323	0.323	0.323

Notes. Table entries are coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; year- and party-fixed effects included in all models, but omitted from presentation; the scale for party position (dependent variable) is recalibrated from the left-right estimates reported by the CMP, which is from -100 (left) to +100 (right), to fit on the 1-10 median voter scale; all explanatory variables are one-year lags, the spatial lags capture parties' policy positions of the year before the last election.
* $p<0.10$; ** $p<0.05$; *** $p<0.01$

Diffusion Conditional on Countries' Trade Ties

However, we obtain positive and significant coefficient estimates when incorporating data on countries' trade ties. In more detail, the arguments on both information relevance and transactions costs highlight that parties are more likely to learn from and emulate each other if they come from structurally similar countries and states with closer ties. In the Supplementary Materials 2, we examined this possibility primarily with additional data on the cultural distance between countries in our sample. Here, we also consider the trade ties between two states as we modified the foreign-party spatial lags by incorporating in an element $w_{i,j}$ of the connectivity matrices the total trade flows from i's country to j's country plus total trade flows (imports plus exports) from j's country to i's country (Barbieri, Keshk, and Pollins 2009).

Models 42-44 summarize our findings and, mirroring what we report for culture in the Supplementary Materials 2, show that parties learn from and emulate each other when coming from states with a high joint trade volume while the second party has recently been successful, i.e., was part of the government.

Table 14. The Diffusion of Party Policy Positions Conditional on Countries' Trade Ties

	Model 42	Model 43	Model 44
Constant	-1.056	-0.979	-0.928
	(0.826)	(0.834)	(0.836)
Lagged Party Position	0.735	0.735	0.734
	(0.013)***	(0.013)***	(0.013)***
Lagged Median Voter	0.438	0.428	0.421
	(0.158)***	(0.159)***	(0.159)***
Lagged Economic Globalization	0.027	0.026	0.025
	(0.011)**	(0.011)**	(0.011)**
Lag Median Voter *	-0.006	-0.005	-0.005
Lagged Economic Globalization	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)**
$\mathbf{Wy}^{\text{Domestic}}$	0.006	0.005	0.005
	(0.001)***	(0.001)***	(0.002)***
$\mathbf{Wy}^{\text{Domestic Bloc}}$		0.002	0.002
		(0.002)	(0.002)
$\mathbf{Wy}^{\text{Trade Ties Incumbent}}$	2.85e-08	2.84e-08	2.18e-08
	(0.000)***	(0.000)***	(0.000)***
$\mathbf{Wy}^{\text{Trade Ties Incumbent Bloc}}$			0.000
			(0.000)
Observations	2,718	2,718	2,718
Year and Party FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes
R^2	0.878	0.878	0.878
RMSE	0.323	0.323	0.323

Notes. Table entries are coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; year- and party-fixed effects included in all models, but omitted from presentation; the scale for party position (dependent variable) is recalibrated from the left-right estimates reported by the CMP, which is from -100 (left) to +100 (right), to fit on the 1-10 median voter scale; all explanatory variables are one-year lags, the spatial lags capture parties' policy positions of the year before the last election.
* $p<0.10$; ** $p<0.05$; *** $p<0.01$

Diffusion from Electorally Successful Parties

As indicated above, we also replaced our measure of success, "foreign incumbency," by vote share. We rely on the vote share data from the CMP (Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 2006; Volkens et al. 2013). Specifically, we replaced the incumbency element in the foreign-party spatial lags by the vote share of a specific foreign party in the year before the last election in that country abroad. Hence, while we keep the lag structure as outlined in the main text, this robustness check examines which "success measure" is more likely to matter for parties willing to learn and emulate from abroad – vote share or, as we claim, incumbency status.

Table 15 presents our findings when incorporating the data on vote share of a foreign party into the spatial lags of $\mathbf{W}y^{\text{Foreign Incumbent}}$ or $\mathbf{W}y^{\text{Foreign Incumbent Bloc}}$ (instead of incumbency). Somewhat surprisingly perhaps, the results become insignificant, suggesting that vote share is an *insufficient* measure for electoral success. Again, incumbents gain more media attention than opposition parties, and it may well be the case that a party does well in a national election in terms of votes received, but may ultimately not be part of the governmental coalition. Primarily in multi-party systems, parties face a trade-off between gaining votes by taking a more radical position on the one hand, and choosing moderate positions that allow for government participation on the other (Schofield 1993).

Table 15. The Diffusion of Party Policy Positions Based on Vote Share

	Model 45	Model 46	Model 47
Constant	-1.751	-1.672	-1.613
	(1.095)	(1.100)	(1.112)
Lagged Party Position	0.740	0.740	0.740
	(0.013)***	(0.013)***	(0.013)***
Lagged Median Voter	0.365	0.354	0.348
	(0.158)**	(0.159)**	(0.159)**
Lagged Economic Globalization	0.024	0.024	0.023
	(0.011)**	(0.011)**	(0.011)**
Lag Median Voter *	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005
Lagged Economic Globalization	(0.002)**	(0.002)**	(0.002)**
$\mathbf{Wy}^{\text{Domestic}}$	0.007	0.006	0.006
	(0.001)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***
$\mathbf{Wy}^{\text{Domestic Bloc}}$		0.002	0.002
		(0.002)	(0.002)
$\mathbf{Wy}^{\text{Foreign Vote Share}}$	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
$\mathbf{Wy}^{\text{Foreign Vote Share Bloc}}$			0.000
			(0.000)
Observations	2,718	2,718	2,718
Year and Party FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes
R^2	0.878	0.878	0.878
RMSE	0.323	0.323	0.323

Notes. Table entries are coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; year- and party-fixed effects included in all models, but omitted from presentation; the scale for party position (dependent variable) is recalibrated from the left-right estimates reported by the CMP, which is from -100 (left) to +100 (right), to fit on the 1-10 median voter scale; all explanatory variables are one-year lags, the spatial lags capture parties' policy positions of the year before the last election.
* $p<0.10$; ** $p<0.05$; *** $p<0.01$

Diffusion from Electorally Successful Parties within Governing Coalitions

Although the previous analyses (Table 15) do not find much evidence for a diffusion effect based on vote share, we examined this issue further. Specifically, as we established in the main text, incumbency matters and may well be the primary heuristic for learning from and emulating success. However, perhaps vote share matters, but primarily *within* a governing coalition? Put differently, do parties learn from and emulate first and foremost the larger parties in a governing coalition?

The intuition behind this argument is simple: based on our theoretical claims in the main article, it is primarily incumbency matters. Still, one can further disaggregate the parties of a coalition as it is likely that *within that coalition*, larger parties, i.e., those parties with the bigger vote share, receive more media attention and are generally perceived as the more successful parties in that coalition. This would extend the well-known Powell and Whitten (1993) study that emphasizes the importance of "clarity of responsibility" for accountability mechanisms. In our setup, the expectation that follows from Powell and Whitten is that signals from larger parties of the governing coalition will be stronger than signals from smaller parties in the coalition. Thus, we extend the Powell-Whitten concept of "clarity of responsibility" to, within the current context, "clarity of success." Under this expectation, parties employing a "look abroad" heuristic will receive cleaner signals from larger parties in a governing coalition. Put differently, vote share conditions the effect of foreign incumbency and a focal party will learn from and emulate stronger parties, from which the prime minister typically comes from, more than junior coalition partners.

Table 16 presents our findings when incorporating the data on vote share of a foreign party into the spatial lags of $\mathbf{W}y^{\text{Foreign Incumbent}}$ or $\mathbf{W}y^{\text{Foreign Incumbent Bloc}}$. In more detail, while we replaced the information on incumbency by vote share for the models in Table 15, here we *combine* the information on (1) foreign parties, (2) incumbency status (i.e., if j has recently been part of the government (or the governing coalition) during the year before the last election in its own system before time t) and (3) vote share (i.e., what was the percentage in votes that j has recently had during the year before the last election in its own system before time t).

While our results for the controls at the domestic level are virtually unchanged, we now obtain a positive and, at conventional levels, statistically significant impact for $\mathbf{W}y^{\text{Foreign Vote Share Incumbent}}$. In other words, incumbency still matters, but within a foreign governing coalition it is primarily the larger parties, from which the prime minister typically comes from, that are the focal point for learning and emulation. While the absolute coefficient of $\mathbf{W}y^{\text{Foreign Vote Share Incumbent}}$ may be smaller than the coefficients for $\mathbf{W}y^{\text{Foreign Incumbent}}$ in the main text, note that the former spatial lag is now based on continuous elements in the weighting matrix, no longer binary (1/0) elements. This implies that the 0.0001 effect of $\mathbf{W}y^{\text{Foreign Vote Share Incumbent}}$ (that is based on a continuous weighting matrix) is actually larger than the impact of $\mathbf{W}y^{\text{Foreign Incumbent}}$.

Ultimately, we thus obtain evidence that vote share does matter – albeit only in some circumstances, which are highly related to the primary criterion of success: a foreign party's incumbency status.

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Table 16. The Diffusion of Party Policy Positions Based on Vote Share of Parties within a Governing Coalition

	Model 48	Model 49	Model 50
Constant	-1.463	-1.381	-1.294
	(0.885)*	(0.892)	(0.893)
Lagged Party Position	0.739	0.739	0.738
	(0.013)***	(0.013)***	(0.013)***
Lagged Median Voter	0.399	0.388	0.384
	(0.158)**	(0.158)**	(0.158)**
Lagged Economic Globalization	0.026	0.025	0.025
	(0.011)**	(0.011)**	(0.011)**
Lag Median Voter *	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005
Lagged Economic Globalization	(0.002)**	(0.002)**	(0.002)**
$\mathbf{W}y^{Domestic}$	0.006	0.005	0.005
	(0.001)***	(0.001)***	(0.001)***
$\mathbf{W}y^{Domestic\ Bloc}$		0.002	0.002
		(0.002)	(0.002)
$\mathbf{W}y^{Foreign\ Vote\ Share\ Incumbent}$	0.0001	0.0001	0.0001
	(0.000)*	(0.000)*	(0.000)*
$\mathbf{W}y^{Foreign\ Vote\ Share\ Incumbent\ Bloc}$			0.000
			(0.000)
Observations	2,718	2,718	2,718
Year and Party FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes
R^2	0.878	0.878	0.878
RMSE	0.323	0.323	0.323

Notes. Table entries are coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; year- and party-fixed effects included in all models, but omitted from presentation; the scale for party position (dependent variable) is recalibrated from the left-right estimates reported by the CMP, which is from -100 (left) to +100 (right), to fit on the 1-10 median voter scale; all explanatory variables are one-year lags, the spatial lags capture parties' policy positions of the year before the last election.
* $p<0.10$; ** $p<0.05$; *** $p<0.01$

Diffusion from Domestic Incumbents, Domestic Incumbents of the Same Ideological Bloc,

All Foreign Parties, and All Foreign Party Bloc Members

Our theoretical argument focuses on foreign successful parties and foreign successful parties from the same ideological bloc. In addition, a core element of our theory emphasizes that different mechanisms are likely to be at work at the domestic and international level, respectively. That is, while we argue that it is primarily competition that drives policy diffusion at the domestic level (see, e.g., Adams and Somer-Topcu 2009), learning from and emulating other parties is the predominant form of diffusion in terms of parties abroad. Due to this focus on foreign parties and the different mechanisms at work, we merely control for the domestic-level spatial influences via $\mathbf{W}y^{\text{Domestic}}$ and $\mathbf{W}y^{\text{Domestic Bloc}}$ as suggested in Adams and Somer-Topcu (2009), and also consider differently operationalized spatial lags for the foreign-party level.

However, to ensure consistency and as indicated in the main text, we also present models for $\mathbf{W}y^{\text{Domestic Incumbent}}$, $\mathbf{W}y^{\text{Domestic Incumbent Bloc}}$, $\mathbf{W}y^{\text{Foreign}}$, and $\mathbf{W}y^{\text{Foreign Bloc}}$. First, $\mathbf{W}y^{\text{Domestic Incumbent}}$ captures the connectivity to domestic parties that were recently part of the governing coalition irrespective of the ideological bloc, i.e., each element $w_{i,j}$ of their underlying connectivity matrices receives a value of 1 if a two party-dyad does compete in the same country and if j has recently been part of the government (or the governing coalition) during the year before the last election in its own system before time t (0 otherwise). Second, $\mathbf{W}y^{\text{Domestic Incumbent Bloc}}$ captures the connectivity to domestic parties that were recently part of the governing coalition and belong to the same ideological bloc, i.e., each element $w_{i,j}$ of their underlying connectivity matrices receives a value of 1 if a two party-dyad does compete in the same country, if i and j belong to the same ideological bloc, and if j has recently been part of the government (or the governing coali-

tion) during the year before the last election in its own system before time t (0 otherwise). $\mathbf{W}\mathbf{y}^{\text{Foreign}}$ captures the connectivity to foreign parties, irrespective of incumbency the ideological bloc, i.e., each element $w_{i,j}$ of their underlying connectivity matrices receives a value of 1 if a two party-dyad does not compete in the same country. Finally, $\mathbf{W}\mathbf{y}^{\text{Foreign Bloc}}$ captures the connectivity to foreign parties from the same ideological bloc, i.e., each element $w_{i,j}$ of their underlying connectivity matrices receives a value of 1 if a two party-dyad does not compete in the same country, but belongs to the same ideological bloc.

Table 17 presents our findings. For $\mathbf{W}\mathbf{y}^{\text{Domestic Incumbent}}$, we obtain a negative and significant effect, which suggests that parties seek to obtain party positions that differ from those parties that they compete with and have recently been in office. In fact, this result matches findings by Bawn and Somer-Topcu (2012) who argue that government parties take more radical positions to compensate the dilution of their ideology, while opposition parties moderate their policy to appear "fit to govern."

Second, $\mathbf{W}\mathbf{y}^{\text{Domestic Incumbent Bloc}}$ is insignificant, i.e., the effect of $\mathbf{W}\mathbf{y}^{\text{Domestic Incumbent}}$ becomes indistinguishable from 0 as soon as we consider the joint ideological bloc membership of two parties in a dyad. Note that this specification captures the special cases that some members of an ideological bloc govern, whereas some are in opposition at the same time. It is not surprising that these opposition parties do not try to move away from what appears to be their "natural" partners for a future coalition. At the same time, moving closer is not necessarily a good choice either because it may harm the party's vote share.

Third, $\mathbf{W}\mathbf{y}^{\text{Foreign}}$ is also negatively signed and significant, which can also be seen as further support for our theory: Specifically, parties do not learn from and emulate *any* foreign party

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– there simply is no incentive for that. Instead, they look for characteristics and indicators that "may make it worth" investing resources into learning from and emulating other, foreign parties. As we argue in the main text, having recently been part of the government can be such an indicator, and parties use this characteristic then mainly when deciding to invest the resources for learning and emulating foreign parties. The last spatial lag, $\mathbf{W}y^{\text{Foreign Bloc}}$, mirrors the effect of $\mathbf{W}y^{\text{Foreign}}$, although it is larger in substance. In fact, these findings are essentially the mirror image of our results for $\mathbf{W}y^{\text{Domestic}}$ and $\mathbf{W}y^{\text{Domestic Bloc}}$ in Models 1-2 of the main article. For instance, the implicit counterfactual comparison in Model 1 of the main text is with all foreign parties' influence.

Again, therefore, there is some evidence that joint party membership has a positive effect on learning and emulating foreign parties, although joint ideological bloc membership is insufficient for that. First and foremost, it is the recent success of a foreign party that matters.

Table 17. The Diffusion of Party Policy Positions – Additional Spatial Lag Models

	Model 51 $\mathbf{Wy}^{\text{Domestic Incumbent}}$	Model 52 $\mathbf{Wy}^{\text{Domestic Incumbent Bloc}}$	Model 53 $\mathbf{Wy}^{\text{Foreign}}$	Model 54 $\mathbf{Wy}^{\text{Foreign Bloc}}$
Constant	-1.083	-0.887	2.120	-0.906
	(0.834)	(0.835)	(1.072)**	(0.830)
Lagged Party Position	0.750	0.752	0.739	0.750
	(0.013)***	(0.013)***	(0.013)***	(0.013)***
Lagged Median Voter	0.487	0.447	0.389	0.462
	(0.159)***	(0.159)***	(0.158)**	(0.158)***
Lagged Economic Globalization	0.031	0.028	0.025	0.029
	(0.011)***	(0.011)**	(0.011)**	(0.011)***
Lag Median Voter *	-0.006	-0.006	-0.005	-0.006
Lagged Economic Globalization	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)**	(0.002)***
Spatial Coefficient ρ	-0.003	-0.001	-0.005	-0.001
	(0.001)**	(0.002)	(0.001)***	(0.000)*
Observations	2,718	2,718	2,718	2,718
Year and Party FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R^2	0.877	0.877	0.877	0.877
RMSE	0.324	0.325	0.324	0.325

Notes. Table entries are coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; year- and party-fixed effects included in all models, but omitted from presentation; the scale for party position (dependent variable) is recalibrated from the left-right estimates reported by the CMP, which is from -100 (left) to +100 (right), to fit on the 1-10 median voter scale; all explanatory variables are one-year lags, the spatial lags capture parties' policy positions of the year before the last election.
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

Probability of Success When Learning from and Emulating Foreign Parties' Positions

Parts of our theoretical argument rest on the claim that parties learn from and emulate foreign parties in order to be more successful at home. The main article does not provide an empirical analysis of this as our focus is on parties' policy positions, and how they are influenced by policy positions of parties abroad. That said, shedding more empirical light on the main assumption of our theory is not only interesting, but also straightforward to implement. To this end, we replaced the main article's dependent variable by the binary item on whether a party is in power at time t (coded as 1) or not (coded as 0). The data on incumbency status are reported in Döring and Manow (2012). Note that due to this change in the dependent variable, we also replaced the estimator: instead of a S-OLS model, Table 18 relies on S-logistic regression models.

In light of this, we also control for temporal dependencies in this new binary time-series cross-section framework by including an incumbency-years variable (time in years elapsed since party i has been in the government the last time) and different sets of cubic splines (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998). Other settings of the research design remain unchanged, i.e., the control covariates remain the same. However, we report models with and without the lagged party position of party i (i.e., our lagged dependent variable in the main article's models) due to endogeneity concerns. Ultimately, a positive and significant coefficient estimate for $\mathbf{W}y^{\text{Foreign Incumbent}}$ would imply that foreign parties' positions indeed influence whether a party "at home" is in power or not, i.e., whether learning from and emulating parties abroad does in fact matter for success.

Table 18 summarizes the findings from four spatial logistic regression models – while the first two models include the lagged party position, the last two models (Models 57 and 58) omit this item. In addition, Models 55 and 57 focus on $\mathbf{W}y^{\text{Foreign Incumbent}}$ only, but Models 56 and 58

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incorporate all spatial lags next to our control variables. Note that the drop in the number of observations is caused by the use of party-fixed effects: parties that do not change their incumbency behavior over time (i.e., parties that are constantly in the opposition in 1977-2010) are omitted from fixed-effects binary-dependent variable models.

Several interesting findings emerge from Table 18. First, as expected, $\mathbf{W}y^{\text{Foreign Incumbent}}$ is indeed constantly positively signed in all models of that table and statistically significant at conventional levels. This means that the positions of foreign parties do indeed affect domestic parties' chances of electoral success. Due to the lack of competition between the domestic setup and the international level, such an association can only be reasonably explained with the existence of some learning and emulation mechanisms, i.e., this correlation only makes sense when subscribing to the claim that parties at home do indeed learn from an emulate parties abroad. Substantively, unreported estimations suggest that the chances of party i being in power at time t increase by about 0.2 percentage points when raising $\mathbf{W}y^{\text{Foreign Incumbent}}$ by one unit. Eventually, this result crucially underlines the significance and importance of our theoretical arguments and findings in the main text.

Put differently, however, we find that the further to the right foreign incumbents are, the more likely a given party is to be in power. If we combine this with our finding that the position of foreign incumbents influences parties, we get that parties are influenced by foreign incumbents; and the further to the right foreign incumbents are, the more likely a party is to be in power. This suggests that copying positions of foreign incumbents increases the chances of success to the extent that foreign incumbents are to the right, on average. This is in line with the general electoral success of neo-liberal parties and their policies over the time period in our sample.

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Second, $\mathbf{W}y^{\text{Domestic}}$ is negatively signed and significant, while the other spatial lags mirror their estimated coefficients in the main text. However, what is equally interesting are the temporal controls suggested by Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998), which highlight that the likelihood of being in power substantially decreases with the time elapsed since the last time in office.

Table 18. The Success of Parties Determined by Foreign Policy Positions – Spatial Logistic Regressions

	Model 55	Model 56	Model 57	Model 58
Constant	-15.714	-14.927	-15.225	-14.854
	(9.308)*	(9.431))	(9.293)	(9.413)
Lagged Party Position	-0.118	-0.017		
	(0.129)	(0.132)		
Lagged Median Voter	2.296	2.828	2.091	2.800
	(1.635)	(1.654)*	(1.619)	(1.640)*
Lagged Economic Globalization	0.175	0.212	0.161	0.210
	(0.120)	(0.122)*	(0.119)	(0.121)*
Lag Median Voter *	-0.030	-0.039	-0.027	-0.039
Lagged Economic Globalization	(0.022)	(0.022)*	(0.022)	(0.022)*
$\mathbf{W}y^{\text{Domestic}}$		-0.070		-0.070
		(0.015)***		(0.015)***
$\mathbf{W}y^{\text{Domestic Bloc}}$		0.004		0.004
		(0.023)		(0.023)
$\mathbf{W}y^{\text{Foreign Incumbent}}$	0.023	0.021	0.022	0.021
	(0.012)*	(0.013)*	(0.012)*	(0.013)*
$\mathbf{W}y^{\text{Foreign Incumbent Bloc}}$		-0.003		-0.003
		(0.005)		(0.005)
Observations	1,924	1,924	1,924	1,924
Year and Party FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Log Likelihood	-733.966	-717.135	-734.384	-717.143

Notes. Table entries are coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; year- and party-fixed effects and variables for temporal correction in binary time-series cross-section models (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998) included in all models, but omitted from presentation; all explanatory variables are one-year lags, the spatial lags capture parties' policy positions of the year before the last election. * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

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