

A Note on Data Sources

The statistical analyses in this article use three different datasets:

- A. A time-series cross-sectional dataset with 189 Kurdish populated districts of Turkey measured at six different periods as unit of analyses. The periods are 1) 1976-1984, the pre-insurgency period, 2) 1984-1989, the emergence of the insurgency, 3) 1990-1994, the peak years of the insurgency, 4) 1995-1999, the decline of the insurgency resulting in the capture of its leader, 5) 2000-2004, the ceasefire period with occasional clashes, 6) 2005-2012, the rekindling of the armed conflict before the ceasefire of 2013. This dataset is the basis of:
 - Table 1 showing variables used in Table 3
 - Table 2 showing the hypotheses and variables used to test them
 - Table 3 presenting five random coefficients models (RCM)
 - Figure 1 showing marginal effects of interaction variables based on RCMs in Table 3
 - Table A.3 showing marginal within and between effects based on Model I in Table 3
 - Figure A.4 showing marginal between effects based on Model I in Table 3
 - Table A.4 showing a structural equation model
- B. The Kurdish Insurgency Militants (KIM) dataset consists of bibliographical information of 8,266 militants (8,011 of whom killed between August 15, 1984 and December 31, 2012). Some of the sources are obtained from the Center for Research Libraries in Chicago, Widener Library at Harvard and International Institute of Social History in Amsterdam and from personal contacts in 2010-1. The following graphs and tables are based on this dataset:
 - Figure 2 showing temporal changes in the composition of the insurgency
 - Figure 3 showing the geographical distribution of the birth and death places of militants
 - Figure A.1 showing recruitment and death age, and birth countries of militants
 - Table A.1 summarizing the recruitment location, educational achievement, family socioeconomic status, and occupation of militants
 - Table A.5 presenting a logistic regression model
 - Figure A.5 showing the birth places of university educated militants
- C. A dataset consisting of bibliographical information of 74 insurgents and 14 non-insurgents based on in-depth interviews. This dataset is used to generate:
 - Table 4 presenting a logistic regression model
 - Figure 4 showing marginal effect of activism by education based on model at Table 4
 - Table A.2 detailing the characteristics of 74 insurgents
 - Figure A.2 summarizing the characteristics of 74 insurgents
 - Table A.6 detailing the characteristics of 14 non-insurgents

A Note on Fieldwork


During my fieldwork, I conducted 68 in-depth interviews, primarily with individuals whose close family members joined the insurgency and lost their lives. These interviews produced information about 74 recruits as well as 14 non-recruited individuals who share several characteristics with these recruits. The fieldwork had the approval of the Institutional Review Board of Loyola University Chicago (project number #942; application # 1251). Given the concerns for the safety of my interviewees, the Board determined that documented consent is not required for the participants in my research project. Instead, I obtained their verbal consent. I neither recorded nor videotaped my interviews, but took extensive notes. Given the tense and violent political situation, I did not want to carry any material that would expose the identity of my interviewees.

During my fieldwork, the armed clashes continued to claim victims. In fact, 2012 was the most violent year in the fighting between the Turkish state and the Kurdish insurgents since 1999. While the warring parties agreed to a truce in early 2013 and entered into negotiations, the process collapsed and violence restarted in summer 2015. Individuals who join or support the insurgency are subject to terrorism charges carrying heavy penalties. Many people were arrested for simply being active in the legal Kurdish political party or associations or expressing sympathy for the insurgency. In fact, some individuals I met during my fieldwork were later arrested. In this political context, I have decided not to post English translations of my interviews online. Even if I anonymize the interviews by omitting personal and location names, the detailed information provided in the interviews may compromise the confidentiality of my interviewees and unintentionally reveal their identities at significant risk to their well-being.


Almost all of my interviewees were ethnic Kurds (only one of them was a Circassian woman married to a Kurdish man). Most of them were born in villages, lacked educational achievements, had limited financial means, and experienced involuntary migration. With few exceptions, none of them received any professional assistance in dealing with their sufferings caused by political violence. Many of them were themselves subject to violent practices such as verbal humiliations, beatings, torture and forced evacuations at the hands of the state. In most cases, they were very willing to speak about their experiences of political violence and family members' involvement in the conflict. For them, speaking out was an opportunity to seek discursive justice and challenge the official narrative accusing them for supporting terrorism.

I conducted most of my interviews in Turkish and occasionally received the help of an informal translator when the respondent either speaks only Kurdish or better express her/himself in Kurdish (or in Zazaki). My ability to converse with my interviews in their native languages (i.e., Kurdish) helped me establish rapport. Interviews typically lasted from 45 minutes to 2 hours. In some cases, I had extended conversations with the same family members for several days. I aimed to collect information about militants recruited in different periods and localities, with different family structures and life stories. I conducted thirty-two interviews in Istanbul and thirty-four in Kurdish region of Turkey, and two interviews in the U.S.

Figure A.1. Kurdish Militancy Demographics



(a)



(b)

Source: KIM Dataset. Note: PKK militants (#255) who died before the onset of the guerilla warfare in September 1984 are not included.

Figure A.1 (a) demonstrates that a typical PKK militant recorded in the KIM dataset spends less than five years in the ranks before being killed. It provides strong evidence that joining the PKK is a decision entailing grave risks. While both the average recruitment and death ages increased significantly in the post-1999 period, becoming a PKK militant remains a highly risky choice. Figure A.1 (b) demonstrates that the PKK attracts a large number of recruits among the Kurds in Iran and Syria. Recruitment from Syria dropped in relative terms since 2004 ($p < 0.001$), as the Syrian Kurds mobilized for their own ethnic empowerment. In contrast, there was a proportional increase in the number of recruits from Iran in the post-1999 period reflecting the increasing PKK mobilization in the Kurdish areas of Iran ($p < 0.001$).

Table A.1. The Characteristics of Militants

Location of Recruitment (LOR)		Education	
Village	594 (22.6)	None	99 (8)
Kurdish City	1007 (38.3)	Primary	288 (22.5)
Big City	713 (27.1)	Middle	123 (9.5)
Europe	257 (9.8)	High	447 (34)
Middle East	58 (2.2)	University	362 (26)
LOR Known	2,629	Education Known	1,319
Family Socioeconomic Status (SES)		Occupation	
Low	630 (58.4)	Villager	454 (27.2)
Middle	319 (29.6)	Worker	481 (28.9)
Well-off	130 (12)	Student	547 (32.8)
Family SES Known	1,079	Professional	144 (8.6)
		Homemaker/Conscript	41 (2.5)
		Occupation Known	1,667
Militants with known political activism before joining the ranks: 1,018			

Source: KIM Dataset. N=8,011 (only militants killed after the onset of the guerilla war in 1984 included). Numbers in parentheses are percentages excluding militants with unknown characteristics.

This table additional demographic information about the PKK militants. While recruitment place, education, family SES, and occupation of most militants remain unknown, several patterns are visible. First, an overwhelming majority of the militants are recruited in the cities indicating the importance of the PKK's urban social networks. Next, a significant number of militants are well-educated suggesting the appeal of the PKK among Kurdish youth with good life opportunities. As discussed in the article, Hypotheses 5 about identity radicalization due to war, Hypothesis 6 about familial and social obligations, and Hypothesis 7 about collective threat perception are more relevant than other hypotheses to make sense of the motivations of these militants. At the same time, many militants come from families with limited means. Finally, a majority of the militants are either students or workers. These two later observations together point to the strong popularity of the PKK among lower classes of the Kurdish society.


Table A.2. Militants Identified in In-depth Interviews

Gender	Education	YOR	LOR	Previous family recruits	Family victimization	Family activism	Previous activism
M	Middle	1978	Kurdish city			X	
M	Low	1978	Village				
M	Middle	1978	Kurdish city			X	X
M	Low	1987	Europe				X
M	Middle	1987	Kurdish city			X	
M	Low	1988	Village				
M	Low	1989	Village				
M	Low	1990	Village				
F	Low	1990	Kurdish city	X	X	X	
M	Middle	1991	Kurdish city		X	X	
M	High	1991	Kurdish city		X	X	X
M	Middle	1991	Big city				
F	Low	1991	Village		X	X	
M	Low	1991	Village	X	X	X	
M	Middle	1992	Kurdish city		X	X	
M	Low	1992	Village				
M	Low	1992	Big city		X	X	X
M	Low	1992	Big city	X	X	X	
M	Low	1992	Village				
M	Middle	1992	Village	X			
M	Low	1992	Kurdish city	X	X	X	
M	Low	1992	Village		X	X	
M	Low	1992	Big city				
M	Middle	1992	Kurdish city				
M	Middle	1993	Kurdish city			X	
M	Low	1993	Village		X		X
M	Low	1993	Village	X	X	X	
F	Low	1993	Big city				X
F	Low	1993	Village		X		
F	Low	1993	Big city	X	X	X	X
M	Low	1994	Big city			X	X
M	Middle	1994	Kurdish city	X	X	X	X
F	Middle	1994	Kurdish city	X	X	X	X
F	Low	1994	Kurdish city	X		X	
M	Middle	1994	Kurdish city	X	X	X	X
F	Low	1994	Europe	X			X
F	Middle	1994	Big city	X	X	X	X
M	High	1994	Big city	X	X	X	X
M	Middle	1995	Europe		X	X	X

F	Low	1996	Big city	X	X		
M	Low	1996	Kurdish city	X	X		X
M	Low	1997	Big city		X	X	X
M	Low	1997	Big city	X	X	X	X
M	Middle	1999	Big city			X	
M	Middle	1999	Big city				X
F	Low	1999	Kurdish city		X		
F	Low	1999	Big city	X		X	X
M	Middle	1999	Kurdish city		X		X
M	Low	1999	Big city	X	X	X	X
M	Low	2000	Kurdish city	X	X		X
M	High	2001	Big city		X	X	X
M	Middle	2001	Kurdish city	X	X		X
M	Low	2002	Kurdish city	X	X	X	X
M	Low	2003	Big city				X
F	Middle	2003	Kurdish city		X	X	X
M	High	2004	Kurdish city	X		X	X
M	High	2004	Kurdish city	X	X		X
M	Middle	2004	Kurdish city		X		X
M	High	2004	Kurdish city	X	X		X
F	Low	2004	Kurdish city	X	X		
M	Middle	2005	Big city		X	X	X
M	Low	2005	Big city	X	X	X	X
M	Middle	2005	Kurdish city	X			
F	Middle	2005	Big city	X		X	X
M	Middle	2005	Big city	X	X		X
M	Middle	2005	Kurdish city	X	X	X	X
F	Low	2008	Big city	X		X	X
M	High	2008	Big city	X	X		X
F	High	2008	Kurdish city				X
M	Middle	2008	Big city	X	X	X	X
M	Low	2010	Big city	X	X	X	X
F	Middle	2010	Kurdish city	X	X	X	X
M	Middle	2011	Kurdish city	X	X	X	X
M	Low	2012	Big city	X		X	X

Education: None and primary school: low, middle and high school: middle, university: high.
 YOR: Year of recruitment. LOR: Location of recruitment. Previous family recruits include members of the nucleus family as well as members of the extended family such as cousins and nephews. Family victimization includes extrajudicial execution, torture and arrest of family members, enforced village evacuations, and home raids. Family activism includes any type of Kurdish political activism by family members before or by the time of recruitment. Previous activism includes any type of nonviolent Kurdish political activism such as working for the electoral party, participation in rallies and marches by the time of recruitment.

Figure A.2. The Characteristics of Recruits (in %)



Source: In-depth interviews. N = 74 (43 males and 31 females).

This graph reveals several patterns consistent with the discussion provided in the main text. First, the PKK's social base has moved from villages to cities in the post-1999 period. Next, most militants who joined the insurgency since 1990 has at least one family member who had been victim of state violence or had previously took arms. These patterns indicate the role of moral outrage and familial bonds in recruitment in the latter periods (supportive of Hypotheses 5, 6 and 7). Finally, almost all recruits who joined in the last periods (post-1999) had initially engaged in political activism. This indicates the role of collective threat perceptions formed through activism in inducing participation in the armed rebellion (supportive of Hypothesis 7).

Figure A.3. Kurdish Populated Districts Included in the Statistical Analysis (Tables 3 and Figure 2)





Table A.3. Marginal Within and Between Effects Estimated from Model I presented in Table 3

Recruits per 10,000 people at the district level			
	10 th percentile	50 th percentile	90 th percentile
Within Effects			
Previous Recruits	1.1 (0.01) (0.9-1.3)	1.2 (0.01) (1-1.4)	2 (0.01) (1.8-2.3)
Clashes	1.4 (0.01) (1.1-1.6)	1.5 (0.01) (1.3-1.6)	1.5 (0.01) (1.3-1.7)
Kurdish Vote	0.6 (0.01) (0.3-0.8)	1.4 (0.01) (1.2-1.6)	2.5 (0.02) (2.2-2.8)
Population Growth	2 (0.01) (1.7-2.2)	1.5 (0.01) (1.3-1.6)	1 (0.01) (0.8-1.3)
Literacy	2.6 (0.01) (2.4-2.9)	1.6 (0.01) (1.4-1.7)	0.1 (0.02) (0-0.4)
Between Effects			
Clashes	1.2 (0.01) (1-1.4)	1.2 (0.01) (1-1.4)	2 (0.01) (1.7-2.2)
Kurdish Vote	0.6 (0.2) (0.3-0.9)	1.2 (0.01) (1-1.4)	2.6 (0.02) (2.2-2.9)
Population Growth	2 (0.02) (1.7-2.4)	1.5 (0.01) (1.3-1.7)	0.9 (0.02) (0.6-1.3)
Literacy	2.1 (0.02) (1.7-2.5)	1.4 (0.01) (1.2-1.6)	0.9 (0.02) (0.5-1.3)


All other variables are held at their means. Numbers in parentheses next to coefficients show standard errors. Numbers in parentheses below show 95% confidence intervals.

Marginal effects shown in this table and Figure A.4 on the next page are estimated on the basis of Model I of Table 3 of the main text. The Literacy (supportive of Hypothesis 1) and Kurdish Vote (supportive of Hypotheses 6 and 7) variables have the highest magnitude effects on recruitment.


Figure A.4. Marginal Between Effects Estimated from Model I presented in Table 3




(a)



(c)



(b)



(d)

95% confidence intervals in gray.

Table A.4. The Onset of Clashes, Recruitment, and Nationalist Electoral Mobilization

Structural Equation Model	Onset of Clashes (1984-1989)	Onset of Recruitment (1984-1989)	Onset of Mobilization (1991 Elections)
Previous PKK recruitment	-1.96 (2.29)	0.1 (0.08)	-16.7** (4.9)
Previous Clashes			-0.10 (0.33)
Literacy	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.00* (0.00)	0.23 (0.14)
Rebellion	1.15* (0.58)	0.11** (0.04)	5.94* (2.62)
Kurdish Population	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.02* (0.00)	0.05 (0.08)
Forest villages	0.07** (0.02)	0.00* (0.00)	0.16 (0.09)
Border	2.62 (1.86)	0.27 (0.16)	-2.24 (4.21)
Altitude	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)
Distance to Capital	0.01* (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)	-0.02 (0.01)
Constant	-1.22 (3.37)	0.11 (0.14)	12.9 (12.52)
Log pseudolikelihood		-6510.36	
N		189	

Source: KIM Dataset. Robust standard errors clustered at districts in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Kurdish nationalist mobilization followed the onset of insurgency. The first Kurdish nationalist electoral party was established in 1990 by politicians elected to the parliament under the ticket of the center-left party, SHP, in 1987. This party entered into an electoral alliance with the SHP in the 1991 elections and gained 18 parliamentary seats.

One can argue that districts supportive of Kurdish nationalism for unobserved reasons would produce higher rates of insurgent recruitment and vote for Kurdish parties. In turn, these districts would be the target of state repression and experience higher ratio of clashes. In this regard, Clashes can be a source of Recruits, rather than vice versa. This structural equation model addresses this potential source of endogeneity.

The first column with numbers shows that the onset of Clashes in the second half of the 1980s is independent from the pre-1984 PKK recruitment. Rather, the armed conflict between the Turkish security forces and the PKK first occurred in remote areas populated with forest villages conducive to guerilla warfare. The second column suggests that the PKK recruitment in the initial guerilla warfare period was independent from the PKK recruitment during the period

preceding the armed conflict. The third column indicates that the initial Kurdish nationalist electoral mobilization (1991 elections) did not necessarily take place in districts with a history of PKK recruitment and clashes.

Table A.5. Commanders and Educated Militants


Ordinary Logistic Regressions	Dependent Variable	
	Command rank	Education level at recruitment
Male	0.39 (0.34)	-0.17 (0.22)
Education	-0.11 (0.06)	
Family SES		0.82*** (0.10)
Recruitment Age	-0.02 (0.26)	0.08** (0.03)
Clashes in Birth Province	-0.001 (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)
Born in Turkey	0.32 (0.20)	
Joined after 1999		0.49 (0.44)
Log pseudolikelihood	-492.36663	-783.8906
Pseudo R ²	0.00	0.07
N	1074	560

Source: KIM Dataset. Command ranks are no rank or squad commander (0), platoon commander or equivalent (1), company commander or equivalent (2), battalion commander or equivalent (3), regional commander or equivalent (4), and party central committee member or equivalent (5). Robust standard errors clustered at birth places in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

The first column with numbers show that education does not play a factor in climbing up the PKK ranks. This observation suggests that joining the PKK can be a source of social mobility for poor and uneducated villagers (supportive of Hypothesis 1).

The second column in this table and Figure A.5 on the next page indicates that educated PKK recruits tend to born into relatively well-off families in areas with lower levels of clashes and Kurdish electoral mobilization. Hence, the pursuit of social mobility (Hypothesis 1), security concerns (Hypothesis 2), and membership in tight-knit and homogenous ethnic communities (Hypothesis 3) are not very helpful in explaining the motivations of these educated recruits.

Figure A.5. Birth Provinces of Recruits with University Education



Source: KIM Dataset. Provinces colored blue have higher ratios of recruits with university education than provinces colored green.

Table A.6. Non-recruits with Similar Characteristics with Recruits

Gender	Education	Time Period	Family Recruits	Family Victimization	Family Activism	Activism	Family Responsibility
M	Middle	1970s	X	X	X	X	X
M	Middle	1980s	X	X	X	X	X
M	Middle	1980s	X	X	X	X	X
F	High	1990s	X			X	
M	High	1990s	X		X		
F	Low	1990s	X	X	X		X
M	Middle	1990s	X	X	X	X	
M	Middle	1990s		X	X	X	X
M	Middle	1990s	X	X	X	X	X
M	High	2000s	X	X	X	X	
M	High	2000s	X	X		X	
M	High	2000s	X	X			
M	High	2000s		X		X	
M	High	2000s		X	X	X	

Source: In-depth interviews.

This table lists fourteen non-recruits who share at least two characteristics with most of the recruits. These non-recruits are used as an approximate control group based on a most similar systems design.