Supplementary Materials for

Presidential Influence in an Era of Congressional Dominance

American Political Science Review

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A Robustness Checks and Empirical Extensions Extensions

Independent Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
President's party and majority party (β_1)	0.024 ^{***} (0.002)	0.027*** (0.002)	0.023*** (0.002)	0.022 ^{***} (0.003)
Majority party only (β_2)	0.030*** (0.012)	0.003 (0.011)	0.001 (0.012)	0.021* (0.012)
President's party only (β_3)	0.129 ^{***} (0.012)	0.116*** (0.018)	0.114*** (0.012)	0.116 ^{***} (0.012)
County population (ln)	0.432*** (0.019)	0.528*** (0.026)	0.525*** (0.027)	0.515 ^{***} (0.027)
Population density	0.008 (0.006)	-0.159^{***} (0.049)	-0.159*** (0.049)	-0.150^{***} (0.048)
Post Office and Post Roads Committee		0.022*** (0.006)	0.017*** (0.006)	0.018 ^{***} (0.006)
Appropriations Committee		-0.015** (0.007)	-0.017** (0.006)	-0.016** (0.007)
Ways and Means Committee		0.000 (0.007)	0.000 (0.007)	0.001 (0.007)
Committee chair or ranking member		-0.008 ^{***} (0.002)	-0.012*** (0.003)	-0.012*** (0.003)
Democrat		0.018 ^{***} (0.004)	0.016*** (0.004)	0.007 (0.005)
Close presidential election			-0.034^{***} (0.004)	-0.033*** (0.004)
Marginal district			-0.010^{***} (0.003)	-0.011*** (0.003)
First term			-0.005^{*} (0.003)	-0.006** (0.003)
President aligned with county				0.088 ^{***} (0.017)
MC aligned with county				-0.082*** (0.014)
N (total)	26473	22329	21344	21052
N (unique)	2535	2383	2314	2306
Log-likelihood	-58371.936	-48289.185	-46075.173	-45396.99
$ \begin{aligned} \beta_1 &= \beta_3 \\ \beta_2 &= \beta_3 \end{aligned} $	74.73*** 588.70***	59.68*** 615.75***	57.47*** 587.15***	55.82*** 276.65***

Table A.1: Explaining the Distribution of Post Offices, 1876–1896

Entries are poisson coefficients and standard errors, clustered by county. The dependent variable is the number of post offices per county. County and year fixed effects were estimated but not reported. The last two rows report *F*-statistics from Wald tests for the equality of the coefficients associated with the partisan affiliation of a county's congressional representative.

*** indicates p < 0.01; ** indicates p < 0.05; * indicates $p \triangleleft 0.10$ (all two-tailed tests).

Independent Variables	
President's party and majority party	0.032***
	(0.012)
Majority party only	-0.083^{**}
	(0.041)
President's party only	0.122**
	(0.046)
Party size	0.016^{**}
	(0.004)
President's party and majority party $ imes$	-0.035**
Party size	(0.009)
Majority party only ×	0.008^{*}
Party size	(0.004)
President's party only ×	-0.031**
Party size	(0.009)
(Intercept)	-1.538**
	(0.459)
N (total)	21057
N (unique)	2311
R^2 (within)	0.654

Table A.2: Party Size and the Distribution of Post Offices, 1876–1896

Entries are linear regression coefficients and standard errors, clustered by state. The dependent variable is the number of post offices per county (logged). County and year fixed effects were estimated but not reported. All other control variables included in model (4) of Table 1 were also included but not reported in the interest of space. *Party size* describes the percentage of seats held by the legislator's party, and is demeaned (centered at zero). *** indicates p < 0.001; ** indicates p < 0.01; * indicates p < 0.05 (all two-tailed tests).

Independent Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
President's party and majority party (β_1)	0.110*** (0.024)	0.144 ^{***} (0.028)	0.147*** (0.028)	0.131*** (0.033)
Majority party only (β_2)	0.174 ^{**} (0.069)	0.177 ^{**} (0.074)	0.136* (0.076)	0.116 (0.077)
President's party only (β_3)	0.329 ^{***} (0.071)	0.330 ^{***} (0.075)	0.302*** (0.077)	0.302 ^{***} (0.077)
Increase in county population (ln)	0.000 (0.001)	0.075 ^{***} (0.018)	0.051*** (0.015)	0.047 ^{***} (0.015)
Population density	0.211*** (0.040)	0.810*** (0.169)	0.793*** (0.168)	0.786*** (0.168)
Post Office and Post Roads Committee		0.013 (0.041)	-0.011 (0.041)	-0.017 (0.044)
Appropriations Committee		-0.031 (0.052)	-0.052 (0.052)	-0.050 (0.053)
Ways and Means Committee		0.011 (0.051)	-0.027 (0.052)	0.029 (0.053)
Committee chair or ranking member		-0.008 (0.019)	-0.039* (0.022)	-0.038* (0.022)
Democrat		-0.070^{**} (0.031)	-0.079** (0.032)	-0.069** (0.033)
Close presidential election			-0.127*** (0.031)	-0.126*** (0.031)
Marginal district			-0.032 (0.026)	-0.034 (0.026)
First term			-0.074^{***} (0.021)	-0.075*** (0.021)
President aligned with county				-0.049 (0.095)
MC aligned with county				-0.074 (0.115)
N (total)	20232	17130	16526	16297
N (unique)	2481	2266	2207	2197
Log-likelihood	-26874.267	-21543.943	-20616.504	-20275.435
$ \begin{aligned} \beta_1 &= \beta_3 \\ \beta_2 &= \beta_3 \end{aligned} $	8.89*** 32.13***	5.72** 19.68***	3.73* 21.63***	4.34^{**} 22.24 ^{***}

Table A.3: Explaining the Increase in the Number of Post Offices, 1876–1896

Entries are poisson coefficients and standard errors, clustered by county. The dependent variable is the increase in the number of post offices per county. County and year fixed effects were estimated but not reported. The last two rows report *F*-statistics from Wald tests for the equality of the coefficients associated with the partisan affiliation of a county's congressional representative.

*** indicates p < 0.01; ** indicates p < 0.05; * indicates p < 0.10 (all two-tailed tests).

Independent Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
President's party and majority party (β_1)	0.032*** (0.008)	0.031*** (0.006)	0.024*** (0.007)	0.021** (0.009)
Majority party only (β_2)	0.041 (0.033)	-0.002 (0.031)	0.001 (0.034)	0.021 (0.039)
President's party only (β_3)	0.158*** (0.042)	0.123*** (0.039)	0.124*** (0.039)	0.126*** (0.046)
County population (ln)	0.438*** (0.043)	0.406*** (0.050)	0.407*** (0.052)	0.400*** (0.053)
Population density	0.023** (0.011)	-0.030 (0.055)	-0.039 (0.071)	-0.034 (0.068)
Post Office and Post Roads Committee		0.023 (0.018)	0.019 (0.018)	0.018 (0.018)
Appropriations Committee		-0.019 (0.019)	-0.020 (0.017)	-0.019 (0.017)
Ways and Means Committee		0.001 (0.012)	0.003 (0.012)	0.003 (0.012)
Committee chair or ranking member		-0.006 (0.005)	-0.010 (0.007)	-0.009 (0.007)
Democrat		0.027* (0.015)	0.021 (0.013)	0.013 (0.012)
Close presidential election			-0.048** (0.018)	-0.047** (0.018)
Marginal district			-0.016 (0.009)	-0.015 (0.009)
First term			-0.002 (0.007)	-0.003 (0.007)
President aligned with county				0.085** (0.040)
MC aligned with county				-0.067^{**} (0.029)
(Intercept)	-1.833*** (0.387)	-1.325*** (0.456)	-1.313*** (0.477)	-1.252^{**} (0.478)
N (total)	26392	22334	21348	21057
N (unique)	2531	2388	2318	2311
R^2 (within)	0.568	0.636	0.640	0.646
$ \begin{aligned} \beta_1 &= \beta_3 \\ \beta_2 &= \beta_3 \end{aligned} $	8.28*** 45.40***	5.97** 53.08***	6.50** 52.71***	5.12** 37.36***

Table A.4: Explaining the Distribution of Post Offices, 1876–1896 (Fourth Class post offices only)

Entries are linear regression coefficients and standard errors, clustered by state. The dependent variable is the number of post offices per county (logged). County and year fixed effects were estimated but not reported. The last two rows report *F*-statistics from Wald tests for the equality of the coefficients associated with the partisan affiliation of a county's congressional representative.

*** indicates p < 0.001; ** indicates p < 0.01; * indicates p < 0.05 (all two-tailed tests).

Independent Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
President's party and majority party (β_1)	0.014 ^{**} (0.006)	0.015** (0.006)	0.012* (0.006)	0.025* (0.013)
Majority party only (β_2)	0.030 (0.039)	0.032 (0.039)	0.040 (0.036)	0.029 (0.041)
President's party only (β_3)	0.099 ^{***} (0.038)	0.103 ^{***} (0.038)	0.111 ^{***} (0.034)	0.111*** (0.038)
County population (ln)	0.474 ^{***} (0.017)	0.474 ^{***} (0.017)	0.475 ^{***} (0.018)	0.487 ^{***} (0.019)
Population density	-0.044* (0.023)	-0.044* (0.023)	-0.044* (0.023)	-0.045* (0.023)
Post Office and Post Roads Committee		0.019 (0.023)	0.015 (0.026)	0.015 (0.025)
Appropriations Committee		-0.015 (0.017)	-0.016 (0.018)	-0.017 (0.019)
Ways and Means Committee		0.005 (0.014)	0.004 (0.014)	0.005 (0.014)
Committee chair or ranking member		-0.004 (0.007)	-0.007 (0.009)	-0.001 (0.008)
Close presidential election			-0.023** (0.011)	-0.021* (0.012)
Marginal district			-0.015^{*} (0.009)	-0.017^{*} (0.010)
First term			-0.007 (0.007)	-0.000 (0.007)
President aligned with county				-0.090 (0.078)
MC aligned with county				0.016 (0.038)
(Intercept)	-1.964*** (0.167)	-1.968*** (0.165)	-1.964^{***} (0.165)	-2.073*** (0.180)
N (total)	21534	21534	21438	21057
N (unique)	1365	1365	1359	1358
R^2 (within)	0.460	0.460	0.461	0.463
$ \begin{aligned} \beta_1 &= \beta_3 \\ \beta_2 &= \beta_3 \end{aligned} $	4.41** 50.40***	4.67** 51.20***	7.37** 55.89***	4.11^* 16.86***

Table A.5: Explaining the Distribution of Post Offices, 1876–1896

Entries are linear regression coefficients and standard errors, clustered by state. The dependent variable is the number of post offices per county (logged). Member and year fixed effects were estimated but not reported. The last two rows report *F*-statistics from Wald tests for the equality of the coefficients associated with the partisan affiliation of a county's congressional representative.

*** indicates p < 0.01; ** indicates p < 0.05; * indicates p < 0.10 (all two-tailed tests).

Independent Variables	(1)
President's party and majority party	-0.076*** (0.018)
Majority party only	0.014 (0.02)
President's party only	-0.029 (0.043)
Swing state	-0.071*** (0.026)
President's party and majority party \times swing state	0.092*** (0.021)
Majority party only × swing state	0.047* (0.024)
President's party only × swing state	0.150 ^{***} (0.047)
Core state	0.042 (0.039)
President's party and majority party \times core state	0.072 (0.043)
Majority party only × core state	0.027 (0.069)
President's party only × core state	0.177** (0.066)
(Intercept)	-1.312^{***} (0.462)
N (total) N (unique) R^2 (within)	21057 2311 0.658

Table A.6: Electoral Context, Presidential Targeting and the Distribution of Post Offices,1876–1896

Entries are linear regression coefficients and standard errors, clustered by state. The dependent variable is the number of post offices per county (logged). County and year fixed effects were estimated but not reported. All other control variables included in model (4) from Table 2 are also included but not reported for space considerations. *Swing state* is an indicator for counties in states where the margin of victory in the previous presidential election was less than 10 percentage points. *Core state* is an indicator for counties in states where the margin of victory in states where the president's party won by more than 10 percentage points in the previous presidential election.

*** indicates p < 0.01; ** indicates p < 0.05; * indicates p < 0.10 (all two-tailed tests).

Independent Variables	(1)	(2)
President's party and majority party	0.023** (0.010)	0.039** (0.017)
Majority party only	0.017 (0.036)	-0.002 (0.036)
President's party only	0.146 ^{***} (0.044)	0.129 ^{**} (0.051)
Marginal district	-0.005 (0.011)	
President's party and majority party × Marginal district	-0.008 (0.016)	
Majority party only × Marginal district	0.020 (0.017)	
President's party only × Marginal district	-0.070** (0.028)	
Distance from House median		0.028 (0.056)
President's party and majority party × Distance from House median		0.052 (0.091)
Majority party only × Distance from House median		-0.148 (0.097)
President's party only × Distance from House median		-0.042 (0.084)
(Intercept)	-1.312*** (0.462)	-1.290 ^{***} (0.478)
N (total)	21057	21057
N (unique) R ² (within)	2311 0.648	2311 0.647

Table A.7: Presidential Targeting and the Distribution of Post Offices, 1876–1896

Entries are linear regression coefficients and standard errors, clustered by state. The dependent variable is the number of post offices per county (logged). County and year fixed effects were estimated but not reported. All other control variables included in model (4) from Table 2 are also included but not reported for space considerations. *Marginal district* is an indicator for legislators who won their last election by five percentage points or fewer. *Distance from House median* is measured by the difference between the legislator's first-dimension DW-NOMINATE score and the median legislator in that House, and is demeaned (centered at zero).

*** indicates p < 0.01;** indicates p < 0.05;* indicates p < 0.10 (all two-tailed tests).