## Remittances and Social Spending

## Supplementary Materials File

Table A: Summary Statistics for Main Models

| Variable | Obs. | Mean | Std. Dev. | Min | Max |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Social Security (CEPAL) | 303 | 4.4014 | 3.8741 | 0.03 | 15.38 |
| Remittances | 335 | 3.3205 | 4.3832 | 0.00003 | 21.684 |
| Left Government | 358 | 0.2291 | 0.4208 | 0 | 1 |
| Inflation (ln) | 327 | 0.9906 | 0.5968 | -0.807 | 3.8739 |
| Trade | 360 | 64.965 | 34.093 | 13.753 | 198.76 |
| Capital Openness | 324 | 0.6746 | 1.4490 | -1.811 | 2.5318 |
| GDP per Capita (ln) | 360 | 7.8536 | 0.7369 | 5.4970 | 9.3503 |
| Polity 2 | 324 | 7.5030 | 2.0587 | -3 | 10 |
| Dependency Ratio | 360 | 40.119 | 4.0869 | 31.59 | 49.069 |

Table B: The Relationship between Remittances and Belief in the Fairness of Income Distribution (Figure 3)

|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Do you receive remittances ( $\mathrm{Y} / \mathrm{N}$ )? | 0.444*** | 0.386*** | 0.397*** | 0.289** |
|  | (0.135) | (0.126) | (0.126) | (0.118) |
| Risk of unemployment ( $\mathrm{Y} / \mathrm{N}$ ) ? |  |  | -0.156** | -0.207*** |
|  |  |  | (0.0609) | (0.0647) |
| Remittances*Risk |  |  |  | 0.280*** |
|  |  |  |  | (0.0963) |
| Rich |  | 0.710*** | 0.693*** | 0.692*** |
|  |  | (0.108) | (0.113) | (0.114) |
| Middle Income |  | 0.449*** | 0.438*** | 0.436*** |
|  |  | (0.0652) | (0.0678) | (0.0673) |
| Very Poor |  | -0.229* | -0.203 | -0.202 |
|  |  | (0.129) | (0.127) | (0.127) |
| Self Employed |  | -0.103 | -0.000224 | -0.00325 |
|  |  | (0.101) | (0.0913) | (0.0907) |
| State Employee |  | -0.0971 | -0.00557 | -0.00873 |
|  |  | (0.161) | (0.173) | (0.174) |
| Private Employee |  | -0.101 | -0.00391 | -0.00813 |
|  |  | (0.119) | (0.136) | (0.134) |
| Unemployed |  | -0.0936 | -0.101 | -0.0996 |
|  |  | (0.127) | (0.127) | (0.127) |
| Retired |  | -0.181 | -0.177 | -0.183 |
|  |  | (0.185) | (0.186) | (0.183) |
| Housewife |  | -0.0891 | -0.0939 | -0.0920 |
|  |  | (0.0866) | (0.0861) | (0.0861) |
| Right |  | -0.524** | -0.514** | -0.513** |
|  |  | (0.218) | (0.216) | (0.216) |
| Center |  | -0.318* | -0.307 | -0.307 |
|  |  | (0.191) | (0.187) | (0.187) |
| Female |  | -0.0441 | -0.0471 | -0.0491 |
|  |  | (0.0449) | (0.0448) | (0.0445) |
| Adult |  | -0.0882 | -0.0854 | -0.0874 |
|  |  | (0.0580) | (0.0592) | (0.0594) |
| Middle Age |  | -0.0897 | -0.102 | -0.102 |
|  |  | (0.0834) | (0.0813) | (0.0812) |
| Old |  | -0.0578 | -0.0666 | -0.0661 |
|  |  | (0.0912) | (0.0876) | (0.0870) |
| University |  | $-0.352 * * *$ | $-0.358 * * *$ | $-0.358 * * *$ |
|  |  | (0.103) | (0.101) | (0.101) |
| High School |  | -0.0616 | -0.0630 | -0.0641 |
|  |  | (0.0698) | (0.0691) | (0.0699) |
| Constant | -1.364*** | -0.846*** | -0.843*** | -0.821*** |
|  | (0.144) | (0.286) | (0.288) | (0.283) |
| Observations |  |  |  |  |

Note: Robust standard errors, clustered by country, in parenthesis. Omitted categories: young (17-34
years old), poor, lowest education and students. ${ }^{* * *} \mathrm{p}<0.01,{ }^{* *} \mathrm{p}<0.05$, ${ }^{*} \mathrm{p}<0.1$

Table C: The Relationship between Remittances and Belief in the Fairness of Income Distribution (without Political Attitudes)

|  | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Do you receive remittances ( $\mathrm{Y} / \mathrm{N}$ )? | 0.408*** | $0.420^{* * *}$ | 0.308*** |
|  | (0.127) | (0.126) | (0.119) |
| Risk of unemployment (Y/N)? |  | $\begin{aligned} & -0.161^{* *} \\ & (0.0687) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.214 * * * \\ (0.0720) \end{gathered}$ |
| Remittances*Risk |  |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.289^{* * *} \\ (0.0945) \end{gathered}$ |
| Rich | $\begin{gathered} 0.723 * * * \\ (0.110) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.704 * * * \\ (0.116) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.704 * * * \\ (0.116) \end{gathered}$ |
| Middle Income | $\begin{gathered} 0.461 * * * \\ (0.0690) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.449 * * * \\ (0.0713) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.447 * * * \\ (0.0708) \end{gathered}$ |
| Very Poor | $\begin{aligned} & -0.230^{*} \\ & (0.126) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.205^{*} \\ & (0.124) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.203 \\ (0.124) \end{gathered}$ |
| Self Employed | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0835 \\ & (0.100) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0217 \\ (0.0913) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0186 \\ (0.0907) \end{gathered}$ |
| State Employee | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0721 \\ & (0.175) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0230 \\ & (0.189) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0197 \\ & (0.190) \end{aligned}$ |
| Private Employee | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0865 \\ & (0.121) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0144 \\ & (0.141) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0102 \\ & (0.139) \end{aligned}$ |
| Unemployed | $\begin{array}{r} -0.0773 \\ (0.129) \end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0853 \\ & (0.129) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0837 \\ & (0.129) \end{aligned}$ |
| Retired | $\begin{gathered} -0.174 \\ (0.190) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.170 \\ (0.191) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.175 \\ & (0.188) \end{aligned}$ |
| Housewife | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0883 \\ & (0.0913) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0936 \\ & (0.0907) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0914 \\ (0.0907) \end{gathered}$ |
| Female | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0534 \\ & (0.0457) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0563 \\ & (0.0456) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0583 \\ & (0.0453) \end{aligned}$ |
| Adult | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0844 \\ & (0.0596) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0820 \\ & (0.0607) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0842 \\ & (0.0609) \end{aligned}$ |
| Middle Age | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0926 \\ & (0.0843) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.105 \\ (0.0822) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.105 \\ (0.0822) \end{gathered}$ |
| Old | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0742 \\ & (0.0863) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0851 \\ & (0.0817) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0845 \\ & (0.0811) \end{aligned}$ |
| University | $\begin{gathered} -0.328^{* * *} \\ (0.105) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.335 * * * \\ (0.103) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.336^{* * *} \\ (0.103) \end{gathered}$ |
| High School | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0513 \\ & (0.0710) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0532 \\ (0.0701) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0544 \\ & (0.0709) \end{aligned}$ |
| Constant | $\begin{gathered} \hline-1.232^{* * *} \\ (0.176) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \hline-1.219^{* * *} \\ (0.178) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \hline-1.195^{* * *} \\ (0.173) \end{gathered}$ |

Observations
Note: Robust standard errors, clustered by country, in parenthesis. Omitted categories: young (17-34 years old), poor, lowest education and students. ${ }^{* * *} \mathrm{p}<0.01,{ }^{* *} \mathrm{p}<0.05$, * $\mathrm{p}<0.1$

Table D: The Relationship between Remittances and Attitudes Towards Taxation (Figure 5)

|  | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Do you receive remittances (Y/N)? | $\begin{gathered} 0.548^{* * *} \\ (0.122) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.558^{* * *} \\ (0.121) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \hline 0.511^{* * *} \\ (0.117) \end{gathered}$ |
| Risk of unemployment ( $\mathrm{Y} / \mathrm{N}$ ) ? |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.0461 \\ (0.0612) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0257 \\ (0.0652) \end{gathered}$ |
| Remittances*Risk |  |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.122^{*} \\ (0.0721) \end{gathered}$ |
| Rich | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0446 \\ & (0.116) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0345 \\ & (0.113) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0348 \\ & (0.113) \end{aligned}$ |
| Middle Income | $\begin{gathered} -0.0508 \\ (0.0635) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0514 \\ (0.0641) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0522 \\ (0.0642) \end{gathered}$ |
| Very Poor | $\begin{gathered} 0.211 * * * \\ (0.0410) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.207 * * * \\ (0.0406) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.207 * * * \\ (0.0407) \end{gathered}$ |
| Self Employed | $\begin{gathered} 0.0200 \\ (0.0730) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0134 \\ & (0.0793) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0146 \\ & (0.0790) \end{aligned}$ |
| State Employee | $\begin{aligned} & -0.130^{*} \\ & (0.0753) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.149^{*} \\ & (0.0904) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.151^{*} \\ & (0.0896) \end{aligned}$ |
| Private Employee | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0186 \\ & (0.0821) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0444 \\ & (0.0922) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0459 \\ (0.0917) \end{gathered}$ |
| Unemployed | $\begin{gathered} 0.143 \\ (0.103) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.146 \\ (0.103) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.146 \\ (0.103) \end{gathered}$ |
| Retired | $\begin{aligned} & -0.193 \\ & (0.128) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.195 \\ (0.128) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.197 \\ (0.128) \end{gathered}$ |
| Housewife | $\begin{aligned} & 0.169 * * \\ & (0.0690) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.174^{* *} \\ & (0.0688) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.175^{* *} \\ & (0.0686) \end{aligned}$ |
| Right | $\begin{gathered} 0.389 * * * \\ (0.0940) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.378 * * * \\ (0.0950) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.379^{* * *} \\ (0.0948) \end{gathered}$ |
| Center | $\begin{gathered} 0.504 * * * \\ (0.132) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.499 * * * \\ (0.132) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.500^{* * *} \\ (0.132) \end{gathered}$ |
| Female | $\begin{gathered} -0.112 * * * \\ (0.0314) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.115 * * * \\ (0.0323) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.116 * * * \\ (0.0325) \end{gathered}$ |
| Adult | $\begin{aligned} & -0.124^{* *} \\ & (0.0487) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.124^{* *} \\ & (0.0495) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.124 * * \\ & (0.0495) \end{aligned}$ |
| Middle Age | $\begin{gathered} -0.262 * * * \\ (0.0501) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.268 * * * \\ (0.0516) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.268 * * * \\ (0.0516) \end{gathered}$ |
| Old | $\begin{gathered} -0.294 * * * \\ (0.0923) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.280 * * * \\ (0.0953) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.280 * * * \\ (0.0952) \end{gathered}$ |
| University | $\begin{gathered} -0.304 * * * \\ (0.0619) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.303^{* * *} \\ (0.0634) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.304 * * * \\ (0.0635) \end{gathered}$ |
| High School | $\begin{gathered} -0.0954^{* *} \\ (0.0477) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.102^{* *} \\ & (0.0473) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.102 * * \\ & (0.0470) \end{aligned}$ |
| Constant | $\begin{gathered} \hline-0.880^{* * *} \\ (0.154) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \hline-0.873^{* * *} \\ (0.155) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.864^{* * *} \\ (0.154) \end{gathered}$ |
| Observations | 19,100 | 18,888 | 18,888 |

Note: All models are logit models, with robust standard errors, clustered by country, in parenthesis. Omitted categories: young (17-34 years old), poor, left, lowest education and students. ${ }^{* * *} \mathrm{p}<0.01$, ${ }^{* *}$ $\mathrm{p}<0.05$, * $\mathrm{p}<0.1$

Table E: The Relationship between Remittances and Attitudes Towards Taxation (without Political Attitudes)

|  | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Do you receive remittances (Y/N)? | $\begin{gathered} \hline 0.554 * * * \\ (0.129) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \hline 0.565 * * * \\ (0.128) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.520^{* * *} \\ (0.125) \end{gathered}$ |
| Risk of unemployment ( $\mathrm{Y} / \mathrm{N}$ ) ? |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.0546 \\ (0.0611) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0351 \\ (0.0653) \end{gathered}$ |
| Remittances*Risk |  |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.116 \\ (0.0724) \end{gathered}$ |
| Rich | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0427 \\ & (0.121) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0313 \\ & (0.119) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0316 \\ & (0.119) \end{aligned}$ |
| Middle Income | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0522 \\ & (0.0658) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0518 \\ & (0.0661) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0526 \\ & (0.0662) \end{aligned}$ |
| Very Poor | $\begin{gathered} 0.197 * * * \\ (0.0420) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.193 * * * \\ (0.0419) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.193 * * * \\ & (0.0419) \end{aligned}$ |
| Self Employed | $\begin{aligned} & 0.00677 \\ & (0.0689) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0307 \\ & (0.0769) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0319 \\ & (0.0765) \end{aligned}$ |
| State Employee | $\begin{aligned} & -0.146^{*} \\ & (0.0750) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.170^{*} \\ & (0.0908) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.171^{*} \\ & (0.0899) \end{aligned}$ |
| Private Employee | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0289 \\ & (0.0810) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0600 \\ & (0.0917) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0616 \\ & (0.0912) \end{aligned}$ |
| Unemployed | $\begin{gathered} 0.124 \\ (0.103) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.127 \\ (0.104) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.127 \\ (0.103) \end{gathered}$ |
| Retired | $\begin{aligned} & -0.196 \\ & (0.130) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.199 \\ & (0.131) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.201 \\ & (0.130) \end{aligned}$ |
| Housewife | $\begin{aligned} & 0.158 * * \\ & (0.0662) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.163 * * \\ & (0.0663) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.163^{* *} \\ & (0.0661) \end{aligned}$ |
| Female | $\begin{gathered} -0.111 * * * \\ (0.0308) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.114 * * * \\ (0.0316) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.114 * * * \\ (0.0318) \end{gathered}$ |
| Adult | $\begin{aligned} & -0.122 * * \\ & (0.0494) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.122 * * \\ (0.0504) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.123 * * \\ (0.0504) \end{gathered}$ |
| Middle Age | $\begin{gathered} -0.259 * * * \\ (0.0503) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.264 * * * \\ (0.0519) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.264 * * * \\ (0.0519) \end{gathered}$ |
| Old | $\begin{gathered} -0.289 * * * \\ (0.0910) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.273 * * * \\ (0.0945) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.273 * * * \\ (0.0944) \end{gathered}$ |
| University | $\begin{gathered} -0.293 * * * \\ (0.0625) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.291 * * * \\ (0.0640) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.291 * * * \\ (0.0641) \end{gathered}$ |
| High School | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0942 * \\ & (0.0499) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.100^{* *} \\ & (0.0494) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.101 * * \\ & (0.0491) \end{aligned}$ |
| Constant | $\begin{gathered} -0.471 * * * \\ (0.113) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.473 * * * \\ (0.114) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \hline-0.464 * * * \\ (0.113) \end{gathered}$ |


| Observations | 19,100 | 18,888 | 18,888 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |

Note: All models are logit models, with robust standard errors, clustered by country, in parenthesis. Omitted categories: young (17-34 years old), poor, left, lowest education and students. ${ }^{* * *} \mathrm{p}<0.01,{ }^{* *}$ $\mathrm{p}<0.05$, * $\mathrm{p}<0.1$

Figure A: Remittances and Preferences for Taxation by Country


Note: Both graphs are based on logit models, where the dependent variable is the belief that it is justifiable to avoid paying taxes. Remittances are represented by a dichotomous variable. Each point represents the coefficient from the logit model. The black lines represent 95 per cent confidence intervals.

Figure B: Remittances and Preferences for Redistribution and Taxation (without Political Attitudes) and 90 per cent Confidence Intervals


Note: Both graphs are based on logit models, where the dependent variable is the belief in the fairness in the income distribution (left-hand pane) and the belief that it is justifiable to avoid paying taxes (right-hand pane). Remittances are represented by a dichotomous variable. Each point represents the coefficient from the logit model. The black lines represent 90 per cent confidence intervals.

Table F: Multi-Level Models -Remittances and the Income Distribution

|  | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Do you receive remittances (Y/N)? | 0.0738*** | 0.0697*** | 0.0742*** |
|  | (0.0118) | (0.00878) | (0.0118) |
| Rich | 0.0960*** | 0.117*** | 0.0957*** |
|  | (0.0144) | (0.0123) | (0.0144) |
| Middle Income | 0.0654*** | 0.0746*** | 0.0657*** |
|  | (0.00808) | (0.00700) | (0.00808) |
| Very Poor | -0.0260** | -0.0337*** | -0.0268** |
|  | (0.0118) | (0.00940) | (0.0118) |
| Self Employed | -0.0322* | -0.00667 | -0.0314* |
|  | (0.0168) | (0.0149) | (0.0168) |
| State Employee | -0.0257 | -0.0174 | -0.0256 |
|  | (0.0196) | (0.0175) | (0.0196) |
| Private Employee | -0.0208 | -0.00901 | -0.0205 |
|  | (0.0173) | (0.0153) | (0.0173) |
| Unemployed | -0.0300 | -0.0137 | -0.0308 |
|  | (0.0210) | (0.0180) | (0.0210) |
| Retired | -0.0409* | -0.0138 | -0.0409* |
|  | (0.0218) | (0.0196) | (0.0218) |
| Housewife | -0.0231 | -0.00808 | -0.0232 |
|  | (0.0175) | (0.0154) | (0.0175) |
| Right | -0.0861*** | -0.0686*** | -0.0869*** |
|  | (0.0124) | (0.0103) | (0.0124) |
| Center | -0.0791*** | -0.0401*** | -0.0792*** |
|  | (0.0120) | (0.0100) | (0.0120) |
| Female | -0.0176** | -0.0109 | -0.0175** |
|  | (0.00802) | (0.00688) | (0.00802) |
| Adult | -0.00557 | -0.0101 | -0.00583 |
|  | (0.00882) | (0.00745) | (0.00882) |
| Middle Age | -0.00975 | -0.0160* | -0.0100 |
|  | (0.0107) | (0.00919) | (0.0107) |
| Old | -0.00205 | -0.0126 | -0.00237 |
|  | (0.0154) | (0.0133) | (0.0154) |
| University | -0.0595*** | -0.0539*** | -0.0595*** |
|  | (0.00992) | (0.00809) | (0.00992) |
| High School | -0.0249*** | -0.0175** | -0.0242** |
|  | (0.00941) | (0.00755) | (0.00941) |
| Years of left government (since 1870) | 0.000381 |  | 0.00189 |
|  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.00112) |  | (0.00134) |
| Years of democracy |  | 0.00282 | 0.00268 |
|  |  | (0.00258) | (0.00208) |
| lns1_1_1 | $-5.715^{* * *}$ | -5.882*** | -6.336*** |


|  | $(0.232)$ | $(0.172)$ | $(0.211)$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| lnsig_e | $-0.928^{* * *}$ | $-0.920^{* * *}$ | $-0.928^{* * *}$ |
| Constant | $(0.00632)$ | $(0.00534)$ | $(0.00632)$ |
|  | $0.302^{* * *}$ | $0.194^{* * *}$ | $0.187^{* * *}$ |
| Observations | $(0.0239)$ | $(0.0696)$ | $(0.0662)$ |
| Number of groups | 12,529 | 17,523 | 12,529 |

Note: All models are multi-level logit models. Omitted categories: young (17-34 years old), poor, lowest education and students. ${ }^{* * *} \mathrm{p}<0.01,{ }^{* *} \mathrm{p}<0.05,{ }^{*} \mathrm{p}<0.1$

Years of left government: Count of the number of years since 1870 of left government in country $i$. Based on data from Brambor, Lindvall and Stjernquist (2013).

Years of democracy: Count of number of years under democracy since most recent wave of democratization.
Survey Questions for Individual-Level Models - Latinobarómetro 2009

P35ST. If elections were held this Sunday, which party would you vote for? All those who stated they would spoil their vote (95); would not vote (96); not registered (97); DK (98); or NA (00) were not considered.

P14ST. How fair you think that income distribution is in (country)? (1) Very fair (2) Fair (3) Unfair (4) Very Unfair

Q61ST. On a scale of 1 to 10 , where " 1 " means "not at all justifiable" and " 10 " means "totally justifiable", how justifiable do you believe it is to evade paying taxes?

P86N. How often do you receive remittances from relatives or friends from abroad, or you do not receive remittances? (1) Once a month (2) At least every three months (3) At least every six months (4) At least once a year (5) No, I do not receive any remittances

S1. How concerned would you say you are that you will be left without work or unemployed during the next twelve months or you don't have a job? (1) very concerned; (2) concerned; (3) a little concerned; (4) not at all concerned; (5) don't have a job; DK (0) not considerd

S2. Does the salary you receive and your total family income allow you to cover your needs in a satisfactory manner? Which of the following statements describes your situation? (1) it is sufficient and we can save (2) It is just sufficient and we do not
have major problems (3) It is not sufficient and we have problems (4) It is not sufficient and we have major problems

S14A. What is your current employment situation? (1) Self-employed (2) Salaried employee in a state company (3) Salaried employee in a private company (4) Temporarily out of work (5) Retired/pensioner (6) Housework (7) Student

P69ST. In politics, people normally speak of "left" and "right". On a scale where 0 is left and 10 is right, where would you place yourself?

S6. What is your age?

S5. Sex of interviewee (1) Male (2) Female

S12. What level of education do you have? What was the last year you completed? What sort of technical school, what sort of institute, etc.?

Table G: Preference by Remittance Recipients and Non-Recipients in Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua

|  |  | Receive Remittances |  |  | No Remittances |  |  | Ins. ${ }^{\text {b }}$ | Pen. | Cont. |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Country | Income Quintiles ${ }^{\text {a }}$ | 2008 | 2010 | 2012 | 2008 | 2010 | 2012 |  |  |  |
| Guatemala | < \$50 | 32.8 | 48.6 | 41.5 | 35.6 | 39.9 | 24.9 | 1.8 | 3.8 | 2.6 |
| Guatemala | $>\$ 50$ \& < \$150 | 23.7 | 32.8 | 68.0 | 36.8 | 36.8 | 30.5 | 4.9 | 10 | 7.8 |
| Guatemala | $\begin{aligned} & >\$ 150 \&< \\ & \$ 300 \end{aligned}$ | 35.3 | 35.5 | 27.6 | 49.1 | 37.7 | 33.8 | 13.2 | 12.3 | 21.1 |
| Guatemala | $\begin{aligned} & >\$ 300 \&< \\ & \$ 500 \end{aligned}$ | 100.0 | 42.9 | 23.1 | 41.4 | 28.9 | 31.3 | 24.4 | 26.6 | 33.2 |
| Guatemala | > \$500 | 50.0 | 60.0 | 15.4 | 52.9 | 46.2 | 34.7 | 43.7 | 32.3 | 46.4 |
| El Salvador | < \$50 | 46.2 | 30.5 | 45.5 | 47.5 | 26.7 | 42.8 | 6.8 | 2.6 | 9 |
| El Salvador | $>$ \$50 \& < \$150 | 49.0 | 29.9 | 57.9 | 46.2 | 28.2 | 40.7 | 13.8 | 2.6 | 16.2 |
| El Salvador | $\begin{aligned} & >\$ 150 \&< \\ & \$ 300 \end{aligned}$ | 50.4 | 25.5 | 46.8 | 46.3 | 32.4 | 49.6 | 22.6 | 10.4 | 25.2 |
| El Salvador | $\begin{aligned} & >\$ 300 \&< \\ & \$ 500 \end{aligned}$ | 54.5 | 43.6 | 59.1 | 55.8 | 35.1 | 44.5 | 32.4 | 18 | 31 |
| El Salvador | > \$500 | 42.9 | 38.9 | 36.2 | 50.0 | 38.6 | 46.8 | 48.4 | 32.3 | 45.3 |
| Honduras | < \$50 | 0.0 | 50.0 |  | 40.0 | 33.4 | 33.4 |  | 0.9 | 0.6 |
| Honduras | $>\$ 50$ \& $<\$ 150$ | 33.3 | 39.1 | 58.3 | 39.9 | 30.9 | 30.9 |  | 2.4 | 6.4 |
| Honduras | $\begin{aligned} & >\$ 150 \&< \\ & \$ 300 \end{aligned}$ | 35.2 | 33.3 | 64.3 | 28.7 | 20.1 | 20.1 |  | 3.3 | 16.4 |
| Honduras | $\begin{aligned} & >\$ 300 \&< \\ & \$ 500 \end{aligned}$ | 20.9 | 23.8 | 47.5 | 18.1 | 30.9 | 30.9 |  | 7.2 | 24.2 |
| Honduras | > \$500 | 36.4 | 25.0 | 51.3 | 23.1 | 36.7 | 36.7 |  | 13.7 | 25.2 |
| Nicaragua | < \$50 | 64.6 | 52.0 | 28.6 | 65.9 | 58.8 | 60.6 | 3.5 | 9.2 | 4.4 |
| Nicaragua | $>\$ 50$ \& $<\$ 150$ | 45.9 | 56.3 | 54.2 | 56.4 | 56.2 | 55.2 | 9.2 | 16.4 | 12.8 |
| Nicaragua | $\begin{aligned} & >\$ 150 \&< \\ & \$ 300 \end{aligned}$ | 58.1 | 51.9 | 60.9 | 59.6 | 55.9 | 61.6 | 15.9 | 18.6 | 19.9 |
| Nicaragua | $\begin{aligned} & >\$ 300 \&< \\ & \$ 500 \end{aligned}$ | 75.0 | 50.0 | 48.6 | 69.2 | 45.2 | 69.6 | 24 | 29.2 | 29.8 |
| Nicaragua | > \$500 | 100.0 | 75.0 | 54.5 | 66.7 | 53.3 | 65.8 | 29.9 | 27.3 | 36.1 |

[^0]Table H: The Relationship between Remittance and Support for Individual (as opposed to state) Responsibility for Welfare (LAPOP 2008, 2010 and 2012)

|  | $\begin{gathered} \hline 2008 \\ \text { (Base) } \end{gathered}$ | 2008 | $\begin{gathered} 2010 \\ \text { (Base) } \end{gathered}$ | 2010 | $\begin{gathered} 2012 \\ \text { (Base) } \end{gathered}$ | 2012 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Do you receive remittances ( $\mathrm{Y} / \mathrm{N}$ )? | $0.297^{* * *}$ | $0.240^{* * *}$ | $0.399^{* * *}$ | $0.325^{* * *}$ | $0.074$ | $0.0632$ |
| Rich | (0.068) | $\begin{gathered} (0.0761) \\ 0.000414 \\ (0.110) \end{gathered}$ | (0.083) | $\begin{gathered} (0.0940) \\ 0.0941 \\ (0.137) \end{gathered}$ | (0.085) | $\begin{gathered} (0.0938) \\ 0.0909 \\ (0.127) \end{gathered}$ |
| Middle Income |  | $\begin{aligned} & -0.142 * \\ & (0.0839) \end{aligned}$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0416 \\ & (0.103) \end{aligned}$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & -0.178^{*} \\ & (0.103) \end{aligned}$ |
| Poor |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.126 \\ (0.0835) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0307 \\ & (0.103) \end{aligned}$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0681 \\ & (0.103) \end{aligned}$ |
| Right |  | $\begin{aligned} & 0.203 * * \\ & (0.0952) \end{aligned}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.133 \\ (0.111) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & -0.201 * * \\ & (0.0914) \end{aligned}$ |
| Center |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.277 * * * \\ (0.0874) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.163 \\ (0.103) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0899 \\ & (0.0847) \end{aligned}$ |
| University |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.127 \\ (0.0832) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.191 * \\ (0.0979) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0175 \\ & (0.0975) \end{aligned}$ |
| High School |  | $\begin{aligned} & -0.120^{*} \\ & (0.0655) \end{aligned}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.0572 \\ (0.0788) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.0124 \\ (0.0761) \end{gathered}$ |
| Female |  |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0874 \\ & (0.0652) \end{aligned}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.206^{* * *} \\ (0.0638) \end{gathered}$ |
| State Employee |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.188 * * \\ (0.0910) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.294^{* * *} \\ (0.109) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.00631 \\ (0.103) \end{gathered}$ |
| Self Employed |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.184 \\ (0.133) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & -0.112 \\ & (0.183) \end{aligned}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.265 \\ (0.168) \end{gathered}$ |
| Private Employee |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.0194 \\ (0.0618) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & -0.148 * * \\ & (0.0736) \end{aligned}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.0152 \\ (0.0723) \end{gathered}$ |
| Constant | -1.999*** | $-2.021^{* * *}$ | $-2.202^{* * *}$ | $-2.154^{* * *}$ | $-2.124^{* * *}$ | $-1.801^{* * *}$ |


|  | $(0.027)$ | $(0.107)$ | $(0.083)$ | $(0.135)$ | $(0.031)$ | $(0.122)$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Observations | 14,795 | 12,385 | 12,096 | 10,242 | 12,288 | 10,549 |

Note: Logit models with standard errors in parenthesis. Omitted categories: young (17-34 years old), poor, lowest education and students. ${ }^{* * *} \mathrm{p}<0.01,{ }^{* *} \mathrm{p}<0.05,{ }^{*} \mathrm{p}<0.1$

Table I: The Relationship between Remittance and Support for Individual (as opposed to state) Responsibility for Welfare (LAPOP 2008, 2010 and 2012) Without Political Attitudes

|  | 2008 | 2010 | 2012 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Do you receive remittances | $0.308^{* * *}$ | $0.370^{* * *}$ | 0.0540 |
| (Y/N)? | $(0.0685)$ | $(0.0840)$ | $(0.0862)$ |
|  | -0.0424 | 0.0151 | 0.112 |
| Rich | $(0.102)$ | $(0.127)$ | $(0.118)$ |
|  | $-0.140^{*}$ | -0.0671 | $-0.187 *$ |
| Middle Income | $(0.0770)$ | $(0.0950)$ | $(0.0967)$ |
|  | -0.0753 | -0.0498 | -0.0736 |
| Poor | $(0.0763)$ | $(0.0945)$ | $(0.0963)$ |
|  | -0.119 | $0.220^{* *}$ | -0.0180 |
| University | $(0.0755)$ | $(0.0907)$ | $(0.0904)$ |
|  | $-0.138^{* *}$ | $0.125^{*}$ | -0.0355 |
| High School | $(0.0597)$ | $(0.0727)$ | $(0.0707)$ |
|  |  | -0.0786 | $-0.214^{* * *}$ |
| Female |  | $(0.0599)$ | $(0.0591)$ |
|  | $-0.253 * * *$ | $-0.285^{* * *}$ | 0.00522 |
| State Employee | $(0.0832)$ | $(0.101)$ | $(0.0947)$ |
| Self Employed | 0.179 | 0.00727 | $0.301 * *$ |
| Private Employee | $(0.120)$ | $(0.162)$ | $(0.150)$ |
|  | -0.0276 | -0.101 | -0.0107 |
|  | $(0.0566)$ | $(0.0675)$ | $(0.0677)$ |
| Constant |  |  |  |


| Observations | 14,795 | 12,096 | 12,288 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |

Note: Logit models with standard errors in parenthesis. Omitted categories: young (17-34 years old), poor, lowest education and students. ${ }^{* * *} \mathrm{p}<0.01,{ }^{* *} \mathrm{p}<0.05,{ }^{*} \mathrm{p}<0.1$

## Survey Questions used Above (LAPOP 2008, 2010, and 2012)

ROS2: The State, more than individuals, should be primarily responsible for the welfare of the people. Dependent variable above is all those who strongly disagreed with this statement (LAPOP 2008, 2010, 2012).

Q10A: Do you, or anyone else in your family, receive remittances from abroad?

OCUP1A: Your principal occupation is?

Q10D: Does the salary you receive and your total family income allow you to cover your needs in a satisfactory manner? Which of the following statements describes your situation? (1) it is sufficient and we can save (2) It is just sufficient and we do not have major problems (3) It is not sufficient and we have problems (4) It is not sufficient and we have major problems

ED: What is the last year of schooling that you received?

L1: On this sheet is a scale from 1 to 10 , where 1 means left and 10 means right. Today when we speak of political leanings, we talk about people who sympathize more with the left and people who sympathize more with the right. According to the sense that you have of the terms 'left' and 'right', where would you place yourself on this scale?

Table J: Preferences for Government Welfare by Income Quintile between 2008 and 2012

|  |  | Receive Remittances |  |  | No Remittances |  |  |
| :--- | :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Country | Income Quintiles | 2008 | 2010 | 2012 | 2008 | 2010 | 2012 |
| Brazil | $<\$ 50$ |  | 42.9 |  | 41.3 | 41.3 | 38.5 |
| Brazil | $>\$ 50 \&<\$ 150$ | 50.0 | 66.7 |  | 39.1 | 39.1 | 36.4 |
| Brazil | $>\$ 150 \&<\$ 300$ | 33.3 | 100.0 |  | 31.8 | 31.8 | 47.9 |
| Brazil | $>\$ 300 \&<\$ 500$ |  |  |  | 43.3 | 43.3 | 39.9 |
| Brazil | $>\$ 500$ |  |  |  | 33.3 | 33.3 | 30.4 |
| Brazil | DK/DR |  | 100.0 |  | 36.9 | 36.9 | 28.2 |
| Colombia | $<\$ 50$ | 50.0 | 50.0 |  | 41.8 | 37.8 | 35.6 |
| Colombia | $>\$ 50 \&<\$ 150$ | 39.3 | 26.3 |  | 40.6 | 44.9 | 40.6 |
| Colombia | $>\$ 150 \&<\$ 300$ | 40.9 | 40.0 | 42.9 | 44.1 | 41.8 | 41.4 |
| Colombia | $>\$ 300 \&<\$ 500$ | 70.0 | 33.3 | 37.5 | 40.8 | 48.1 | 47.2 |
| Colombia | $>\$ 500$ |  |  | 40.0 | 33.3 | 39.1 | 39.1 |
| Colombia | $\mathrm{DK} / \mathrm{DR}$ | 70.0 | 25.0 |  | 45.9 | 40.6 | 43.8 |
| Costa Rica | $<\$ 50$ | 72.2 | 31.6 |  | 50.6 | 70.7 |  |
| Costa Rica | $>\$ 50 \&<\$ 150$ | 63.3 | 38.5 |  | 51.6 | 69.8 |  |
| Costa Rica | $>\$ 150 \&<\$ 300$ | 76.9 | 72.7 |  | 43.7 | 63.3 |  |
| Costa Rica | $>\$ 300 \&<\$ 500$ |  | 42.9 |  | 57.3 | 56.7 |  |
| Costa Rica | $>\$ 500$ |  |  |  | 65.0 | 64.3 |  |


| Costa Rica | DK/DR | 33.3 | 50.0 |  | 51.8 | 55.6 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Dominican Republic | < \$50 | 80.0 | 45.2 | 85.7 | 60.0 | 51.1 | 62.8 |
| Dominican Republic | $>\$ 50$ \& $<\$ 150$ | 55.1 | 34.8 | 61.5 | 52.1 | 45.3 | 49.5 |
| Dominican Republic | $>$ \$150 \& < \$300 | 69.6 | 42.6 | 68.5 | 53.8 | 49.1 | 55.0 |
| Dominican Republic | $>$ \$300 \& < \$500 | 49.1 | 53.1 | 54.0 | 62.6 | 42.2 | 53.8 |
| Dominican Republic | > \$500 | 61.7 | 60.0 | 55 | 64.2 | 58.5 | 58.2 |
| Dominican Republic | DK/DR | 48.6 | 41.4 | 61.8 | 59.6 | 39.8 | 47.9 |
| Ecuador | < \$50 | 31.8 | 38.1 |  | 30.5 | 41.5 | 48.5 |
| Ecuador | $>\$ 50$ \& $<\$ 150$ | 30.8 | 44.3 | 33.3 | 31.7 | 42.5 | 41.2 |
| Ecuador | $>$ \$150 \& < \$300 | 34.8 | 44.0 | 57.9 | 32.0 | 45.5 | 44.0 |
| Ecuador | $>$ \$300 \& < \$500 | 38.5 | 47.1 | 33.3 | 26.7 | 44.5 | 36.0 |
| Ecuador | > \$500 | 20.8 | 57.1 | 46.4 | 66.7 | 51.5 | 38.7 |
| Ecuador | DK/DR | 5.0 | 42.9 | 84.6 | 27.5 | 49.7 | 33.8 |
| El Salvador | < \$50 | 46.2 | 30.5 | 45.5 | 47.5 | 26.7 | 42.8 |
| El Salvador | $>\$ 50$ \& $<\$ 150$ | 49.0 | 29.9 | 57.9 | 46.2 | 28.2 | 40.7 |
| El Salvador | $>$ \$150 \& < \$300 | 50.4 | 25.5 | 46.8 | 46.3 | 32.4 | 49.6 |
| El Salvador | $>$ \$300 \& < \$500 | 54.5 | 43.6 | 59.1 | 55.8 | 35.1 | 44.5 |
| El Salvador | > \$500 | 42.9 | 38.9 | 36.2 | 50.0 | 38.6 | 46.8 |
| El Salvador | DK/DR | 46.2 | 33.3 | 54.3 | 52.3 | 40.3 | 53.2 |
| Guatemala | < \$50 | 32.8 | 48.6 | 41.5 | 35.6 | 39.9 | 24.9 |
| Guatemala | $>$ \$50 \& < \$150 | 23.7 | 32.8 | 68.0 | 36.8 | 36.8 | 30.5 |
| Guatemala | $>$ \$150 \& < \$300 | 35.3 | 35.5 | 27.6 | 49.1 | 37.7 | 33.8 |
| Guatemala | $>$ \$300 \& < \$500 | 100.0 | 42.9 | 23.1 | 41.4 | 28.9 | 31.3 |
| Guatemala | > \$500 | 50.0 | 60.0 | 15.4 | 52.9 | 46.2 | 34.7 |
| Guatemala | DK/DR | 32.1 | 72.7 | 25.0 | 50.7 | 48.7 | 32.1 |
| Honduras | < \$50 | 0.0 | 50.0 |  | 40.0 | 33.4 | 33.4 |
| Honduras | $>\$ 50$ \& < \$150 | 33.3 | 39.1 | 58.3 | 39.9 | 30.9 | 30.9 |
| Honduras | $>$ \$150 \& < \$300 | 35.2 | 33.3 | 64.3 | 28.7 | 20.1 | 20.1 |
| Honduras | $>$ \$300 \& < \$500 | 20.9 | 23.8 | 47.5 | 18.1 | 30.9 | 30.9 |
| Honduras | > \$500 | 36.4 | 25.0 | 51.3 | 23.1 | 36.7 | 36.7 |
| Honduras | DK/DR | 28.6 | 87.5 | 60.0 | 25.5 | 24.4 | 24.4 |
| Mexico | < \$50 | 41.7 | 60.0 | 58.3 | 41.1 | 37.3 | 36.9 |
| Mexico | $>\$ 50$ \& < \$150 | 34.5 | 38.1 | 28.6 | 32.7 | 34.0 | 29.2 |
| Mexico | $>$ \$150 \& < \$300 | 30.6 | 40.0 | 53.8 | 40.5 | 32.9 | 36.2 |
| Mexico | $>$ \$300 \& < \$500 | 12.5 | 40.0 | 38.5 | 32.4 | 29.0 | 36.9 |
| Mexico | > \$500 | 75.0 | 37.5 | 37.5 | 56.3 | 41.3 | 30.8 |
| Mexico | DK/DR | 48.5 | 20.0 | 58.3 | 53.2 |  | 35.9 |
| Nicaragua | < \$50 | 64.6 | 52.0 | 28.6 | 65.9 | 58.8 | 60.6 |
| Nicaragua | $>\$ 50$ \& $<\$ 150$ | 45.9 | 56.3 | 54.2 | 56.4 | 56.2 | 55.2 |
| Nicaragua | $>$ \$150 \& < \$300 | 58.1 | 51.9 | 60.9 | 59.6 | 55.9 | 61.6 |
| Nicaragua | $>$ \$300 \& < \$500 | 75.0 | 50.0 | 48.6 | 69.2 | 45.2 | 69.6 |
| Nicaragua | > \$500 | 100.0 | 75.0 | 54.5 | 66.7 | 53.3 | 65.8 |
| Nicaragua | DK/DR | 53.8 | 63.6 | 63.6 | 50.0 | 66.2 | 64.3 |
| Panama | < \$50 | 71.4 | 50.0 |  | 35.0 | 52.3 |  |
| Panama | $>\$ 50$ \& $<\$ 150$ | 33.3 | 37.5 |  | 37.6 | 42.3 |  |
| Panama | $>$ \$150 \& < \$300 | 37.5 | 38.7 |  | 35.9 | 42.1 |  |


| Panama | $>\$ 300 \&<\$ 500$ | 60.0 | 58.3 |  | 47.5 | 46.5 |  |
| :--- | :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | :--- |
| Panama | $>\$ 500$ |  |  |  | 55.6 | 55.6 |  |
| Panama | DK/DR |  | 50.0 |  | 40.5 | 45.5 |  |
| Paraguay | $<\$ 50$ | 75.0 | 50.0 | 63.6 | 63.6 | 53.9 | 61.0 |
| Paraguay | $>\$ 50 \&<\$ 150$ | 48.6 | 46.4 | 58.8 | 66.7 | 58.0 | 67.9 |
| Paraguay | $>\$ 150 \&<\$ 300$ | 67.3 | 59.0 | 76.2 | 67.4 | 55.4 | 65.5 |
| Paraguay | $>\$ 300 \&<\$ 500$ | 84.6 | 67.9 | 61.8 | 63.6 | 63.4 | 61.7 |
| Paraguay | $>\$ 500$ | 75.0 | 65.4 | 56.5 | 66.7 | 70.1 | 53.0 |
| Paraguay | $\mathrm{DK} / \mathrm{DR}$ | 66.7 | 60.0 | 63.6 | 57.8 | 59.9 | 67.9 |
| Peru | $<\$ 50$ |  |  |  | 27.4 | 25.0 | 26.8 |
| Peru | $>\$ 50 \&<\$ 150$ | 13.3 | 33.3 |  | 35.9 | 27.2 | 23.6 |
| Peru | $>\$ 150 \&<\$ 300$ | 34.0 | 36.4 |  | 31.9 | 30.1 | 21.9 |
| Peru | $>\$ 300 \&<\$ 500$ | 22.2 | 24.0 | 11.1 | 31.6 | 30.2 | 24.8 |
| Peru | $>\$ 500$ | 20.0 | 31.3 | 33.3 | 9.7 | 20.9 | 29.3 |
| Peru | $\mathrm{DK} / \mathrm{DR}$ | 50.0 | 14.3 | 33.3 | 37.9 | 28.9 | 26.3 |
| Uruguay | $<\$ 50$ | 50.0 | 66.7 |  | 54.9 | 63.5 | 51.4 |
| Uruguay | $>\$ 50 \&<\$ 150$ | 71.4 | 66.7 |  | 58.4 | 59.6 | 61.7 |
| Uruguay | $>\$ 150 \&<\$ 300$ | 80.0 | 66.7 | 66.7 | 55.1 | 61.7 | 59.5 |
| Uruguay | $>\$ 300 \&<\$ 500$ | 70.0 | 69.2 | 75.0 | 55.3 | 58.2 | 70.1 |
| Uruguay | $>\$ 500$ | 80.0 | 50.0 | 40.0 | 40.0 | 45.4 | 65.2 |
| Uruguay | $\mathrm{DK} / \mathrm{DR}$ | 50.0 | 50.0 |  | 49.0 | 64.1 | 76.2 |

Table J above, must be interpreted with caution, not only because this data is not panel data, but also because for some income quintiles, we only have a very small number of observations. The number of observations also changes by income quintile and by year for some countries. To provide a sense of this distribution, Figure B below graphs the number of observations by income quintile and by year for each country.

Figure C: The Number of Observations by Income Quintile and by Year


Figure D: The Evolution of Attitudes Towards the Unfairness of the Income Distribution (Latinobarómetro 2001-2009).


Note: Each bar represents the percentage of respondents who believe that the income distribution in their country is unfair. This question was not asked between 2003 and 2006. The remittance question was first asked only in 2009 , so this represents attitudes towards income by all respondents.

Table K: Electoral Support of Remittance Recipients for Left-Leaning Parties, Latinobarómetro 2009 (Individual-Level) Controlling for Left and Right Self-

Identification

|  | $($ Left $)$ | $($ Center $)$ | $($ Right $)$ | (Left) |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Remittances Once a Month | $-0.628^{* * *}$ | 0.203 | $0.332^{* * *}$ |  |
|  | $(0.134)$ | $(0.156)$ | $(0.126)$ |  |
| No Remittances |  |  |  | $0.451^{* * *}$ |
|  |  |  | $(0.0815)$ |  |
| Right | $-0.551^{* * * *}$ | -0.0340 | $0.467^{* * *}$ | $-0.566^{* * *}$ |
|  | $(0.101)$ | $(0.0819)$ | $(0.0754)$ | $(0.101)$ |
| Left | $1.351^{* * *}$ | $-0.822^{* * *}$ | $-1.034^{* * *}$ | $1.355^{* * *}$ |
|  | $(0.102)$ | $(0.107)$ | $(0.129)$ | $(0.103)$ |
| Rich | -0.130 | 0.0738 | -0.0333 | -0.136 |
|  | $(0.103)$ | $(0.106)$ | $(0.101)$ | $(0.103)$ |
| Middle Income | -0.0612 | 0.0687 | -0.0355 | -0.0590 |
|  | $(0.0615)$ | $(0.0644)$ | $(0.0651)$ | $(0.0620)$ |
| Very Poor | $-0.301 * * *$ | 0.0385 | $0.206^{* *}$ | $-0.295^{* * *}$ |
|  | $(0.0902)$ | $(0.0848)$ | $(0.0875)$ | $(0.0902)$ |
| High School | -0.0515 | 0.00245 | -0.0206 | -0.0492 |
|  | $(0.0840)$ | $(0.0749)$ | $(0.0718)$ | $(0.0840)$ |
| University | 0.0204 | -0.0702 | -0.0241 | 0.00922 |
|  | $(0.0920)$ | $(0.101)$ | $(0.0824)$ | $(0.0919)$ |
| Middle Age | 0.0200 | -0.000322 | -0.0509 | 0.0202 |
|  | $(0.0623)$ | $(0.0680)$ | $(0.0645)$ | $(0.0627)$ |
| Old | -0.0466 | -0.0336 | 0.0603 | -0.0569 |
| State Employee | $(0.0903)$ | $(0.122)$ | $(0.106)$ | $(0.0895)$ |
|  | $0.186^{* *}$ | 0.148 | $-0.315 * * *$ | $0.185^{*}$ |
|  | $(0.0945)$ | $(0.0993)$ | $(0.0962)$ | $(0.0952)$ |
| Observations |  |  |  |  |
|  | $-0.431^{* * *}$ | $-0.780^{* * *}$ | $-0.620^{* * *}$ | $-0.817^{* * *}$ |
| Constant | $(0.119)$ | $(0.105)$ | $(0.120)$ | $(0.135)$ |
|  | 9,057 | 9,057 | 9,057 | 9,057 |

Note: Logit regression with robust standard errors, clustered by region, in parentheses. Omitted categories: young (17-34 years old), poor, and lowest education; *** $\mathrm{p}<0.01,{ }^{* *} \mathrm{p}<0.05,{ }^{*} \mathrm{p}<0.1$

Table L: Electoral Support of Remittance Recipients for Left-Leaning Parties,

Latinobarómetro 2009 (Individual-Level) Wieshomeier and Benoit (2009) Coding

|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (3) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Receive Remittances Once a Month | $\begin{gathered} -0.946 * * * \\ (0.304) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.947 * * * \\ (0.306) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.917 * * * \\ (0.304) \end{gathered}$ |  |
| Receive no Remittances at all |  | $\begin{aligned} & -0.132 \\ & (0.249) \end{aligned}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.459 * * \\ (0.197) \end{gathered}$ |
| Rich |  | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0677 \\ & (0.166) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.241 \\ (0.245) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.255 \\ (0.245) \end{gathered}$ |
| Middle Income |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.448^{* *} \\ (0.225) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.00384 \\ & (0.159) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.00386 \\ & (0.160) \end{aligned}$ |
| Very Poor |  |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.389^{*} \\ (0.222) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.383^{*} \\ & (0.222) \end{aligned}$ |
| High School |  |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.114 \\ (0.202) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.119 \\ (0.202) \end{gathered}$ |
| University |  |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.383 \\ (0.237) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.377 \\ (0.236) \end{gathered}$ |
| Middle Age |  |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.185 \\ (0.158) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.188 \\ (0.158) \end{gathered}$ |
| Old |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0630 \\ & (0.224) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0733 \\ & (0.222) \end{aligned}$ |
| State Employee |  |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.612 * * * \\ (0.221) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.616^{* * *} \\ (0.221) \end{gathered}$ |
| Constant | 10.46*** | 10.51*** | 10.23*** | 9.821*** |
|  | (0.247) | (0.257) | (0.299) | (0.343) |
| Observations | 9,057 | 9,057 | 9,057 | 9,057 |
| R-squared | 0.002 | 0.003 | 0.005 | 0.005 |

Note: OLS regression with robust standard errors, clustered by region, in parentheses. Omitted categories: young (17-34 years old), poor and lowest education; ${ }^{* * *} \mathrm{p}<0.01,{ }^{* *} \mathrm{p}<0.05,{ }^{*} \mathrm{p}<0.1$

Table M: Electoral Support of Remittance Recipients for Left-Leaning Parties, Latinobarómetro 2009 (Individual-Level) Wieshomeier and Benoit (2009) Coding and Controlling for Left and Right Self-Identification

|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (3) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Receive Remittances Once a Month | $\begin{gathered} -1.035^{* * *} \\ (0.269) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -1.029 * * * \\ (0.270) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -1.005^{* * *} \\ (0.269) \end{gathered}$ |  |
| Receive no Remittances at all |  |  |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.586^{* * *} \\ (0.178) \end{gathered}$ |
| Right | $\begin{gathered} -1.442 * * * \\ (0.224) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -1.423 * * * \\ (0.221) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -1.407 * * * \\ (0.222) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -1.424 * * * \\ (0.222) \end{gathered}$ |
| Left | $\begin{gathered} 3.292 * * * \\ (0.225) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 3.312 * * * \\ (0.223) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 3.313 * * * \\ (0.223) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 3.310 * * * \\ (0.224) \end{gathered}$ |
| Rich |  | $\begin{aligned} & -0.215 \\ & (0.238) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.275 \\ (0.236) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.289 \\ (0.236) \end{gathered}$ |
| Middle Income |  | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0587 \\ & (0.154) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0951 \\ & (0.148) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0940 \\ & (0.149) \end{aligned}$ |
| Very Poor |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.489^{* *} \\ (0.211) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.460 * * \\ (0.212) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.452 * * \\ (0.211) \end{gathered}$ |
| High School |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0454 \\ & (0.185) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0511 \\ & (0.185) \end{aligned}$ |
| University |  |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.196 \\ (0.214) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.185 \\ (0.214) \end{gathered}$ |
| Middle Age |  |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.194 \\ (0.147) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.196 \\ (0.147) \end{gathered}$ |
| Old |  |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.158 \\ (0.210) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.146 \\ (0.208) \end{gathered}$ |
| State Employee |  |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.550^{* *} \\ (0.215) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.553 * * \\ (0.216) \end{gathered}$ |
| Constant | $\begin{gathered} 10.49 * * * \\ (0.268) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 10.59 * * * \\ (0.277) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 10.40 * * * \\ (0.316) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 9.890^{* * *} \\ (0.346) \end{gathered}$ |
| Observations | 9,057 | 9,057 | 9,057 | 9,057 |
| R -squared | 0.091 | 0.092 | 0.093 | 0.093 |

Note: OLS regression with robust standard errors, clustered by region, in parentheses. Omitted categories: young (17-34 years old), poor, lowest education and center; *** $\mathrm{p}<0.01,{ }^{* *} \mathrm{p}<0.05,{ }^{*} \mathrm{p}<0.1$

Table N: Electoral Support of Remittance Recipients for Parties on the Taxes vs. Spending Dimension (from Wieshomeier and Benoit 2009)

|  | $(1)$ | $(2)$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |
| Receive Remittances Once a Month | $-0.244^{*}$ |  |
| Receive no Remittances at all | $(0.154)$ | $0.212^{* *}$ |
|  |  | $(0.100)$ |
| Rich | 0.114 | $(0.112$ |
|  | $(0.174)$ | 0.131 |
| Middle Income | 0.129 | $(0.0828)$ |
|  | $(0.0829)$ | $-0.230^{*}$ |
| Very Poor | $-0.233^{* *}$ | $(0.118)$ |
|  | $(0.118)$ | $-0.164^{* *}$ |
| High School | $-0.166^{* *}$ | $(0.0826)$ |
| University | $(0.0826)$ | $-0.298^{* * *}$ |
|  | $-0.294^{* * *}$ | $(0.108)$ |
| Middle Age | $(0.108)$ | $-0.173^{*}$ |
|  | $-0.173^{*}$ | $(0.0947$ |
| Old | $(0.0945)$ | $-0.587^{* * *}$ |
|  | $-0.581^{* * *}$ | $(0.160)$ |
| State Employee | $(0.159)$ | $0.358^{* * *}$ |
|  | $0.358^{* * *}$ | $(0.125)$ |
| Constant | $(0.125)$ |  |
| Observations | $12.80^{* * *}$ | $12.62^{* * *}$ |
| R-squared | $(0.148)$ | $(0.168)$ |

Note: OLS regression with robust standard errors, clustered by region, in parentheses. Omitted categories: young (17-34 years old), poor, lowest education and center; *** $\mathrm{p}<0.01,{ }^{* *} \mathrm{p}<0.05,{ }^{*} \mathrm{p}<0.1$

Taxes vs. Spending Dimension: Promotes raising taxes to increase public services. (20) - Promotes cutting public services to cut taxes. (1) ${ }^{1}$

[^1]Table O: Electoral Support of Remittance Recipients for Parties on the Taxes vs. Spending Dimension (from Wieshomeier and Benoit 2009) Controlling for Left-Right Self-Identification

|  | $(1)$ | $(2)$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |
| Receive Remittances Once a Month | $-0.280^{*}$ | $0.263^{* * *}$ |
| Receive no Remittances at all | $(0.148)$ | $(0.0971)$ |
|  |  | $-0.584^{* * *}$ |
| Right | $-0.576^{* * *}$ | $(0.103)$ |
|  | $(0.103)$ | $1.302^{* * *}$ |
| Left | $1.302^{* * *}$ | $(0.113)$ |
|  | $(0.113)$ | 0.0982 |
| Rich | 0.0994 | $(0.174)$ |
|  | $(0.174)$ | 0.0919 |
| Middle Income | 0.0897 | $(0.0814)$ |
|  | $(0.0815)$ | $-0.256^{* *}$ |
| Very Poor | $-0.260^{* *}$ | $(0.115)$ |
|  | $(0.116)$ | $-0.192^{* *}$ |
| High School | $-0.193^{* *}$ | $(0.0792)$ |
|  | $(0.0792)$ | $-0.376^{* * *}$ |
| University | $-0.370^{* * *}$ | $(0.111)$ |
|  | $(0.110)$ | $-0.170^{*}$ |
| Middle Age | $-0.169^{*}$ | $(0.0932)$ |
|  | $(0.0930)$ | $-0.499^{* * *}$ |
| Old | $-0.493^{* * *}$ | $(0.156)$ |
| State Employee | $(0.155)$ | $0.333^{* * *}$ |
|  | $0.334^{* * *}$ | $(0.125)$ |
| Observations | $(0.125)$ | $(0.177)$ |
| R-squared |  | 9,057 |
| Constant | $12.88^{* * *}$ | 0.051 |

Note: OLS regression with robust standard errors, clustered by region, in parentheses. Omitted categories: young (17-34 years old), poor, lowest education and center; ${ }^{* * *} \mathrm{p}<0.01,{ }^{* *} \mathrm{p}<0.05,{ }^{*} \mathrm{p}<0.1$

Table P: The Relationship between Remittance Flows and Electoral Support for the Right and Center in Presidential and Legislative Elections Across Latin America (Macro-Level)

|  | Presidential |  | Elections | Legislative Elections |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Right Vote | Center Vote | Right Vote | Center Vote |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Remittances | 0.0259 | 0.00110 | 0.00289 | 0.0216 |  |
|  | $(0.0190)$ | $(0.0229)$ | $(0.0129)$ | $(0.0134)$ |  |
| Age of Democracy | 0.157 | 0.0433 | -0.0761 | 0.243 |  |
|  | $(0.271)$ | $(0.326)$ | $(0.168)$ | $(0.174)$ |  |
| GDP Growth | 0.00517 | 0.00927 | 0.00606 | 0.00190 |  |
|  | $(0.00945)$ | $(0.0114)$ | $(0.00726)$ | $(0.00754)$ |  |
| Inflation (ln) | 0.0213 | -0.0355 | 0.00656 | -0.0297 |  |
|  | $(0.0303)$ | $(0.0364)$ | $(0.0193)$ | $(0.0200)$ |  |
| GINI Coefficient | 0.0215 | -0.00759 | $0.0225^{* *}$ | -0.00164 |  |
|  | $(0.0150)$ | $(0.0181)$ | $(0.00889)$ | $(0.00923)$ |  |
| Urban Population | -0.00265 | 0.0110 | $-0.0546^{* *}$ | 0.0252 |  |
|  | $(0.0369)$ | $(0.0445)$ | $(0.0201)$ | $(0.0209)$ |  |
| Left Incumbent | 0.0140 | -0.00980 | 0.0864 | -0.0684 |  |
|  | $(0.0858)$ | $(0.103)$ | $(0.0561)$ | $(0.0582)$ |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | -1.582 | -0.425 | 5.898 | -7.386 |  |
|  | $(3.769)$ | $(4.537)$ | $(4.308)$ | $(4.472)$ |  |
| Observations | 62 | 62 | 59 | 59 |  |
| R-squared | 0.857 | 0.799 | 0.930 | 0.917 |  |

Note: OLS regression with robust standard errors in parentheses. Estimated with country and year fixed-effects, which are not reported for the sake of presentation; *** $\mathrm{p}<0.01,{ }^{* *} \mathrm{p}<0.05$, * $\mathrm{p}<0.1$

Table Q: First-Stage Results from the 2SLS Regression

|  | Social Security DV: Remittances |
| :---: | :---: |
| Inflation (ln) $)_{\text {t-1 }}$ | -0.130 |
|  | (0.397) |
| Trade $_{\text {t-1 }}$ | -0.002 |
|  | (0.006) |
| Capital Openness ${ }_{\text {t-1 }}$ | 0.137 |
|  | (0.171) |
| GDP per capita $(\ln )_{t-1}$ | 0.299 |
|  | (0.490) |
| Democracy ${ }_{\text {t-1 }}$ | -0.020 |
|  | (0.093) |
| Left Government ${ }_{\text {-1 }}$ | -0.952 |
|  | (0.548) |
| Dependency ${ }_{\text {t-1 }}$ | 0.397*** |
|  | (0.078) |
| Receiver Growth | -0.064 |
|  | (2.75) |
| Instrumental Variable | 34.52*** |
|  | (4.49) |
| Constant | -3.844 |
|  | (6.785) |
| Observations | 254 |
| R-squared | 0.35 |

Note: Instrumental variable regression; robust standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses; first-stage results only shown; ${ }^{* * *} \mathrm{p}<0.01,{ }^{* *} \mathrm{p}<0.05$, ${ }^{*} \mathrm{p}<0.1$

Table R: All IV Models without Control for Growth of Host Countries

|  | Main IV <br> Model | Global Sample | Global Sample (Without LA) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Remittances $_{\text {t-1 }}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.980 * * * \\ (0.150) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -2.049 * * * \\ (0.542) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -1.479^{* * *} \\ (0.294) \end{gathered}$ |
| Inflation $(\ln )_{\mathrm{t}-1}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.443 \\ & (0.458) \end{aligned}$ |  |  |
| Trade $_{\text {t-1 }}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0328^{* * *} \\ (0.00684) \end{gathered}$ |  |  |
| Capital Openness ${ }_{\text {t-1 }}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.309 \\ (0.200) \end{gathered}$ |  |  |
| GDP per capita $(\ln )_{\text {t-1 }}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.564 \\ (0.563) \end{gathered}$ |  |  |
| Democracy ${ }_{\text {t-1 }}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.424 * * * \\ (0.108) \end{gathered}$ |  |  |
| Left Government ${ }_{\text {t-1 }}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.477 \\ (0.645) \end{gathered}$ |  |  |
| Dependency ${ }_{\text {t-1 }}$ | $\begin{array}{r} -0.0117 \\ (0.105) \end{array}$ |  |  |
| Constant | $\begin{gathered} 1.767 \\ (7.931) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 11.48^{* * *} \\ (2.392) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 9.657 * * * \\ (1.486) \end{gathered}$ |
| F-Statistic | 59 | 15 | 28 |
| Observations | 254 | 1,809 | 1,350 |
| R -squared | 0.013 | -11.355 | -5.929 |

Table S: Alternative Instrumental Variables - Big10 from Singer (2012) and Acosta, Calderon, Fajnzylber, and Lopez (2008) and Distance Weighted by GDP of all other Receiving Countries (see Barajas et al. 2009)

|  | IV - Big10 | IV - Distance/GDP of all other Remittance Receiving Countries |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Remittances (Instrumented) | $-0.683 * * *$ | -1.693*** |
|  | (0.109) | (0.392) |
| Inflation $(\ln )_{\text {t-1 }}$ | -0.275 | -0.932 |
|  | (0.365) | (0.742) |
| Trade $_{\text {t-1 }}$ | -0.0353*** | -0.0190 |
|  | (0.00546) | (0.0122) |
| Capital Openness ${ }_{\text {t-1 }}$ | 0.237 | 0.520 |
|  | (0.159) | (0.323) |
| GDP per capita $(\ln )_{t-1}$ | 0.505 | 0.348 |
|  | (0.451) | (0.936) |
| Democracy $_{\text {t-1 }}$ | $0.411^{* * *}$ | 0.471*** |
|  | (0.0864) | (0.171) |
| Left Government ${ }_{\text {t-1 }}$ | 0.727 | -0.0669 |
|  | (0.514) | (1.055) |
| Dependency ${ }_{\text {t-1 }}$ | -0.115 | 0.232 |
|  | (0.0819) | (0.198) |
| Growth of Trading Partners ${ }_{\text {t-1 }}$ |  | 0.559 |
|  |  | (0.418) |
| Constant | 5.697 | -6.026 |
|  | (6.314) | (13.36) |
| Observations | 254 | 254 |

I also create an instrument based on the distance from the host countries weighted by the GDP of all other remittance recipient countries in the region (Column 2). This will reflect systematic changes in the microeconomic determinants of remittances, but by excluding the GDP of the recipient country in question, it removes a direct causal link with domestic macroeconomic variables (see also Barajas et al. 2009).

Table T: Alternative Measure of the Dependent Variable from IFPRI (2013) and Huber et. al. 2008

|  |  | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \hline \text { LAC } \\ & \text { ECM } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \hline \hline \text { IV } \\ \text { IFPRI } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \hline \text { ECM } \\ & \text { IFPRI } \end{aligned}$ | LRM | IV <br> Huber et al. | ECM <br> Huber et al. | LRM |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 4.Remittances |  |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & \hline-0.0222 \\ & (0.0813) \end{aligned}$ |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & \hline-0.00783 \\ & (0.00795) \end{aligned}$ |  |
| Remittances $_{\text {t-1 }}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.314^{* * *} \\ (0.073) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -3.542^{* *} \\ (1.586) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.623^{* * *} \\ (0.112) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{array}{r} -0.0356 \\ -(0.0498) \end{array}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.151^{* * *} \\ (0.0527) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -1.275 \\ & (0.983) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0105^{*} \\ (0.00536) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.390^{* * *} \\ (0.016) \end{gathered}$ |
| $\Delta$.Trade |  |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & 0.000942 \\ & (0.00767) \end{aligned}$ |  |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.00199 \\ (0.00140) \end{gathered}$ |  |
| Trade $_{t-1}$ |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0151^{* *} \\ & (0.00624) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.00381 \\ & (0.00620) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.016^{* *} \\ (0.006) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.083 \\ (0.069) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.000186 \\ & (0.000907) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.006^{* * *} \\ (0.001) \end{gathered}$ |
| 4.Capital Openness |  |  |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.127 \\ (0.108) \end{gathered}$ |  |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.0830 \\ (0.0589) \end{gathered}$ |  |
| Capital Openness ${ }_{\text {t-1 }}$ |  |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.223 \\ (0.192) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0305 \\ (0.0806) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.129 \\ (0.079) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.333 \\ (0.431) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{array}{r} -0.0166 \\ (0.0208) \end{array}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.615 * * * \\ (0.034) \end{gathered}$ |
| A.GDP per capita ( ln ) |  |  |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.703 \\ (0.777) \end{gathered}$ |  |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.274 \\ (0.183) \end{gathered}$ |  |
| GDP per capita $(\ln )_{\text {t-1 }}$ |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & 1.044^{* *} \\ & (0.526) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.277 \\ (0.349) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -1.173 * * * \\ (0.346) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.279 \\ (1.506) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0815 \\ (0.0859) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 3.014 * * * \\ (0.152) \end{gathered}$ |
| A.Inflation (ln) |  |  |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.863 * * * \\ (0.307) \end{gathered}$ |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0182 \\ & (0.0995) \end{aligned}$ |  |
| Inflation ( $\ln )_{\text {t-1 }}$ |  |  | $\begin{gathered} -1.054^{* * *} \\ (0.400) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.412^{*} \\ & (0.240) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -1.742^{* * *} \\ (0.159) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.298 \\ (0.638) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.00522 \\ & (0.0808) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.193 * * \\ & (0.082) \end{aligned}$ |
| 4.Dependency |  |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & -1.241^{*} \\ & (0.731) \end{aligned}$ |  |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.194 \\ (0.168) \end{gathered}$ |  |
| Dependency $_{\mathrm{t}_{\text {- }}}$ |  |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.0400 \\ (0.0915) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0104 \\ (0.0866) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.043 \\ (0.085) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.407 \\ (0.436) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0127 \\ (0.0150) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.471^{* * *} \\ (0.020) \end{gathered}$ |
| 4.Left Government |  |  |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.263 \\ (0.261) \end{gathered}$ |  |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.125^{*} \\ (0.0667) \end{gathered}$ |  |
| Left Government ${ }_{\text {t-1 }}$ |  |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.784 \\ (0.528) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.395^{* *} \\ & (0.199) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.671 * * * \\ (0.180) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.071 \\ (0.691) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0939 \\ (0.0851) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 3.474 * * * \\ (0.153) \end{gathered}$ |
| A.Democracy |  |  |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.0597 \\ (0.0455) \end{gathered}$ |  |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.0161 \\ (0.0114) \end{gathered}$ |  |
| Democracy $_{\text {til }}$ |  |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.111 \\ (0.114) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0417 \\ (0.0340) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.176^{* * *} \\ (0.042) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.174 \\ (0.141) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.00331 \\ (0.00692) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.124 * * * \\ (0.011) \end{gathered}$ |
| Spending ${ }_{\text {t- }-1}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.113 * \\ (0.061) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.236^{* *} \\ (0.109) \end{gathered}$ |  |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.0270 \\ (0.0384) \end{gathered}$ |  |
| Receiver Growth $_{\text {t-1 }}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 6.265^{*} \\ & \text { (3.427) } \end{aligned}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} 1.500 \\ (2.807) \end{gathered}$ |  |  | $\begin{gathered} -41.23 \\ (67.64) \end{gathered}$ |  |  |
| Constant | $\begin{gathered} 3.436^{* * *} \\ (0.264) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \hline 82.34^{* *} \\ (38.67) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \hline-5.054 \\ (7.531) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 4.228 \\ (5.536) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} \hline-9.861 \\ (23.24) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.128 \\ (1.356) \end{gathered}$ |  |
| F-Statistic | 110 |  | 60 |  |  | 1.5 |  |  |
| Observations | 457 | 447 | 205 | 192 |  | 313 | 295 |  |
| R-squared | 0.546 | 0.215 | -0.182 | 0.390 |  | 0.789 | 0.196 |  |

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; estimated with country fixed-effects (not shown); robust standard errors for the long-run multipliers are generated with the Bewley (1979) transformation; *** $\mathrm{p}<0.01,{ }^{* *} \mathrm{p}<0.05,{ }^{*} \mathrm{p}<0.1$

Table U: Controlling for Good Governance (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2010)

|  | I.V. <br> Analysis | ECM | LRM |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\Delta$. Remittances |  | $\begin{aligned} & \hline-0.00738 \\ & (0.0589) \end{aligned}$ |  |
| Remittances $_{\text {t-1 }}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.947 * * * \\ (0.240) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0837 * * \\ (0.0421) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.142 * * * \\ (0.045) \end{gathered}$ |
| D.Trade |  | $\begin{aligned} & -0.00932 \\ & (0.00986) \end{aligned}$ |  |
| Trade $_{\text {t-1 }}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0302 * * * \\ (0.00969) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.00617 \\ (0.00980) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.010 \\ (0.009) \end{gathered}$ |
| \.Capital Openness |  | $\begin{aligned} & 0.187 * * \\ & (0.0861) \end{aligned}$ |  |
| Capital Openness ${ }_{\text {t-1 }}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0698 \\ & (0.242) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.140^{*} \\ (0.0787) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.237 * * * \\ (0.075) \end{gathered}$ |
| $\Delta$. GDP per capita (ln) |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.532 \\ (0.782) \end{gathered}$ |  |
| GDP per capita $(\ln )_{t-1}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.172 \\ (0.854) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.310 \\ (0.406) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.528 \\ (0.401) \end{gathered}$ |
| ©.Inflation (ln) |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.249 \\ (0.208) \end{gathered}$ |  |
| Inflation (ln) $)_{\text {t-1 }}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.873 \\ (0.655) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.351 \\ (0.216) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.597 * * * \\ (0.221) \end{gathered}$ |
| $\Delta$. Dependency |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.206 \\ (0.712) \end{gathered}$ |  |
| Dependency ${ }_{\text {t-1 }}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0541 \\ & (0.152) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0627 \\ & (0.128) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.106 \\ (0.127) \end{gathered}$ |
|  |  | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0542 \\ & (0.163) \end{aligned}$ |  |
| Left Government ${ }_{\text {t-1 }}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 1.783 * * \\ & (0.851) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.467 * * \\ (0.200) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.795 * * * \\ (0.218) \end{gathered}$ |
| $\Delta$. Democracy |  | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0420 \\ & (0.0540) \end{aligned}$ |  |
| Democracy ${ }_{\text {t-1 }}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.275 \\ (0.188) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.00148 \\ & (0.0335) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.002 \\ (0.033) \end{gathered}$ |
| $\Delta$.Governance |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.641 \\ (0.515) \end{gathered}$ |  |
| Governance $_{\text {t-1 }}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0780 \\ & (1.067) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.652 \\ (0.481) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.110^{* * *} \\ (0.000) \end{gathered}$ |
| Spending $_{\text {t-1 }}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.587 * * * \\ (0.0965) \end{gathered}$ |  |
| Receiver Growth ${ }_{\text {t-1 }}$ | $\begin{gathered} 5.888 \\ (3.732) \end{gathered}$ |  |  |
| Constant | $\begin{gathered} 6.207 \\ (11.46) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 6.348 \\ (5.939) \end{gathered}$ |  |


| F-Statistic | 20 |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| Observations | 171 | 162 |
| R-squared | 0.047 | 0.465 |

Observations 0.047

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; estimated with country fixed-effects (not shown); robust standard errors for the long-run multipliers are generated with the Bewley (1979) transformation; *** $\mathrm{p}<0.01,{ }^{* *} \mathrm{p}<0.05,{ }^{*} \mathrm{p}<0.1$

Table V: Panel-Corrected Standard Error Model: The Effect of Remittances on Social Spending in Latin America

|  | Prais-Winsten Models |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Social Security | Education | Health |
| Remittances $_{\text {t-1 }}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.111 * * * \\ (0.0238) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0270 \\ (0.0266) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0167 \\ & (0.0160) \end{aligned}$ |
| Trade $_{\text {t-1 }}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.00855 * * \\ (0.00351) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0158 * * * \\ (0.00395) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.00566 \\ (0.00370) \end{gathered}$ |
| Capital Openness ${ }_{\text {t-1 }}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.104 \\ (0.0723) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0360 \\ & (0.0496) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0259 \\ (0.0277) \end{gathered}$ |
| GDP per capita $(\ln )_{t-1}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.519^{*} \\ & (0.289) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.872 * * * \\ (0.238) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.726 * * * \\ (0.136) \end{gathered}$ |
| Dependency ${ }_{\text {t-1 }}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.111 * * \\ & (0.0550) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0835 \\ & (0.0550) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0348 \\ & (0.0463) \end{aligned}$ |
| Inflation (ln) ${ }_{\mathrm{t}-1}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0178 \\ (0.105) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0654 \\ (0.0697) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0506 \\ (0.0553) \end{gathered}$ |
| Left Government ${ }_{\text {t-1 }}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.283 * * \\ (0.132) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.215 \\ (0.142) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.226^{* * *} \\ (0.0736) \end{gathered}$ |
| Democracy $_{t-1}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0165 \\ & (0.0219) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.00100 \\ & (0.0171) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0235^{*} * \\ (0.0101) \end{gathered}$ |
| Observations | 265 | 273 | 273 |
| R-squared | 0.913 | 0.728 | 0.877 |

Note: Panel corrected standard errors in parentheses; estimated with country and year fixed effects (not shown); *** $\mathrm{p}<0.01,{ }^{* *} \mathrm{p}<0.05$, * $\mathrm{p}<0.1$

Table W: Remittances and Enduring Public Goods: Health and Education Spending

|  | Health | Education | Health | Health LRM | Education | Education LRM |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\Delta$.Remittances |  |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.0171 \\ (0.0208) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.0413 \\ (0.0395) \end{gathered}$ |  |
| Remittances $_{\text {t-1 }}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.354^{* * *} \\ (0.108) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.315 * * * \\ (0.0925) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0150 \\ & (0.0146) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.033^{* *} \\ (0.014) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{array}{r} -0.00347 \\ (0.0211) \end{array}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.008 \\ (0.021) \end{gathered}$ |
| $\Delta$. Trade |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & 0.000515 \\ & (0.00247) \end{aligned}$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & 0.000241 \\ & (0.00386) \end{aligned}$ |  |
| Trade $_{\text {t-1 }}$ | $0.00191$ | $\underset{*}{0.00815 *}$ | 0.000691 | 0.002 | 0.00565* |  |
|  | (0.00391) | (0.00334) | (0.00247) | (0.002) | (0.00301) | (0.003) |
| \.Capital Openness |  |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.0147 \\ (0.0341) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.0462 \\ (0.0672) \end{gathered}$ |  |
| Capital Openness ${ }_{\text {t-1 }}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.157 \\ (0.111) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.177 * \\ (0.0948) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0131 \\ & (0.0250) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.029 \\ (0.025) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0417 \\ & (0.0443) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.092 * * \\ (0.042) \end{gathered}$ |
| $\Delta . G D P$ per capita (ln) |  |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.566^{* *} \\ (0.245) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.816^{* *} \\ (0.387) \end{gathered}$ |  |
| GDP per capita (ln) $)_{\text {t-1 }}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.144 \\ (0.284) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.879 * * * \\ (0.294) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.300^{* *} \\ (0.143) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.662 * * * \\ (0.140) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.595 * * \\ (0.231) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.319^{* * *} \\ (0.215) \end{gathered}$ |
| ©.Inflation (ln) |  |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.139 \\ (0.0936) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.00440 \\ (0.130) \end{gathered}$ |  |
| Inflation (ln) $)_{\text {t-1 }}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.260 \\ (0.230) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.298 \\ (0.197) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0882 \\ & (0.0769) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.195 * * \\ (0.076) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0671 \\ (0.122) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.149 \\ (0.124) \end{gathered}$ |
| $\Delta$. Dependency |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & -0.476 \\ & (0.292) \end{aligned}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.971 * * \\ (0.406) \end{gathered}$ |  |
| Dependency ${ }_{\text {t-1 }}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0745 \\ (0.0528) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0431 \\ (0.0452) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0244 \\ & (0.0385) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.054 \\ & (0.038) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0330 \\ & (0.0452) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.073 \\ (0.045) \end{gathered}$ |
|  |  |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.0894 \\ (0.0872) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0998 \\ & (0.163) \end{aligned}$ |  |
| Left Government ${ }_{\text {t-1 }}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0451 \\ & (0.323) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.390 \\ (0.277) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.138 \\ (0.0887) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.305 * * * \\ (0.091) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.222 \\ (0.138) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.492 * * * \\ (0.143) \end{gathered}$ |
| $\Delta$. Democracy |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0159 \\ & (0.0208) \end{aligned}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.0203 \\ (0.0200) \end{gathered}$ |  |
| Democracy ${ }_{\text {t-1 }}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.195 * * * \\ (0.0552) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.156 * * * \\ (0.0473) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0137 \\ & (0.0138) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.030 \\ & (0.014) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.000468 \\ (0.0159) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.001 \\ (0.158) \end{gathered}$ |
| Spending $_{\text {t-1 }}$ |  |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.453 * * * \\ (0.0765) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.451 * * * \\ (0.0751) \end{gathered}$ |  |
| Growth of Partners ${ }_{t-1}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.193 \\ (0.129) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.107 \\ (0.111) \end{gathered}$ |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | $\begin{gathered} -2.275 \\ (3.728) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 4.767 \\ (3.192) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.383 \\ (1.996) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} \hline-2.463 \\ (2.718) \end{gathered}$ |  |
| F-Statistic | 24 | 24 |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 262 | 262 | 250 |  | 250 |  |
| R-squared | -0.690 | -0.309 | 0.350 |  | 0.350 |  |

Note: Instrumental variable regression; robust standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses; second-stage results only shown; ECM models include country and year fixed-effect (not shown). robust standard errors for the long-run multipliers are generated with the Bewley (1979)
transformation; *** $\mathrm{p}<0.01,{ }^{* *} \mathrm{p}<0.05, * \mathrm{p}<0.1$

Table X: Remittances and Belief in the Fairness of Income Distribution (without Bolivia, Nicaragua and Venezuela)

|  | Income | Income | Income | Tax |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Do you receive remittances (Y/N)? | $\begin{gathered} \hline 0.611 * * * \\ (0.128) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \hline 0.618^{* * *} \\ (0.128) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \hline 0.502^{* * *} \\ (0.121) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.613 * * * \\ (0.137) \end{gathered}$ |
| Risk of unemployment (Y/N)? |  | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0767 \\ & (0.0848) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.139 \\ (0.0899) \end{gathered}$ |  |
| Remittances*Risk |  |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.289 * * * \\ (0.108) \end{gathered}$ |  |
| Right | $\begin{gathered} 0.149 \\ (0.0991) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.164 * \\ (0.0927) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.166^{*} \\ (0.0928) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.454^{* * *} \\ (0.111) \end{gathered}$ |
| Center | $\begin{gathered} 0.230 \\ (0.141) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.245^{*} \\ & (0.134) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.246^{*} \\ & (0.134) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.599 * * * \\ (0.141) \end{gathered}$ |
| Rich | $\begin{gathered} 0.680 * * * \\ (0.153) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.674 * * * \\ (0.159) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.674 * * * \\ (0.160) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0667 \\ & (0.120) \end{aligned}$ |
| Middle Income | $\begin{aligned} & 0.391 * * * \\ & (0.0821) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.380 * * * \\ & (0.0858) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.379 * * * \\ (0.0854) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0213 \\ & (0.0721) \end{aligned}$ |
| Very Poor | $\begin{aligned} & -0.184 \\ & (0.162) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.172 \\ & (0.159) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.170 \\ & (0.159) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.199 * * * \\ & (0.0494) \end{aligned}$ |
| Self-Employed | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0364 \\ & (0.142) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0152 \\ & (0.140) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0139 \\ & (0.138) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0187 \\ (0.0819) \end{gathered}$ |
| State Employee | $\begin{gathered} -0.204 \\ (0.131) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.161 \\ (0.151) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.165 \\ & (0.149) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.131 * \\ & (0.0769) \end{aligned}$ |
| Private Employee | $\begin{gathered} -0.0802 \\ (0.155) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0249 \\ & (0.173) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0272 \\ & (0.171) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0291 \\ (0.0819) \end{gathered}$ |
| Unemployed | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0251 \\ & (0.174) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0267 \\ & (0.174) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0241 \\ & (0.173) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.224 * * \\ & (0.104) \end{aligned}$ |
| Retired | $\begin{aligned} & -0.200 \\ & (0.217) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.191 \\ (0.217) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.195 \\ (0.216) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.142 \\ & (0.136) \end{aligned}$ |
| Housewife | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0417 \\ & (0.130) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0425 \\ & (0.128) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0395 \\ & (0.128) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.183 * * \\ & (0.0794) \end{aligned}$ |
| Female | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0607 \\ & (0.0556) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0602 \\ & (0.0563) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0620 \\ & (0.0557) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.106^{* * *} \\ (0.0369) \end{gathered}$ |
| Adult | $\begin{gathered} -0.157 * * * \\ (0.0536) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.159 * * * \\ (0.0551) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.162 * * * \\ (0.0551) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.135 * * \\ (0.0535) \end{gathered}$ |
| Middle Age | $\begin{aligned} & -0.151 * * \\ & (0.0765) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.160^{* *} \\ & (0.0732) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.159 * * \\ & (0.0726) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.242 * * * \\ (0.0545) \end{gathered}$ |
| Old | $\begin{aligned} & -0.158^{* *} \\ & (0.0683) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.170^{* *} \\ (0.0673) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.169 * * \\ (0.0666) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.270^{* *} \\ (0.105) \end{gathered}$ |
| University | $\begin{gathered} -0.334 * * * \\ (0.106) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.331^{* * *} \\ (0.105) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.332 * * * \\ (0.106) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.328 * * * \\ (0.0743) \end{gathered}$ |
| High School | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0577 \\ & (0.0660) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0515 \\ & (0.0665) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0526 \\ & (0.0674) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0815 \\ & (0.0511) \end{aligned}$ |
| Constant | $\begin{gathered} -1.570^{* * *} \\ (0.218) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -1.584^{* * *} \\ (0.216) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -1.559 * * * \\ (0.207) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.948 * * * \\ (0.171) \end{gathered}$ |
| Observations | 14,376 | 14,256 | 14,256 | 15,030 |

## Variables used in Table 3

Age of democracy is a count variable that captures the number of years since country $i$ democratized at election year $t$. Political parties of the left were frequently persecuted during the military dictatorships of the late 1970s and early 1980s and many left-leaning parties entered the period of democratization as very weak political actors. Over time, and with consolidation, parties of the left in Latin America may increase their support in society (Huber, Mustillo and Stephens 2008).

GINI Coefficient in order to capture the level of inequality in country $i$ before election year $t$, I include the Gini coefficient. This data is taken from United Nations University's World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER) database (UNU-WIDER 2008). I follow Debs and Helmke and take the closest measure of inequality one year before a given election in country $i$ (Debs and Helmke 2010). Where no coefficient is available, I take the closest available year after the election. Where more than one value for Gini exists, I take the average.

Urban is the percentage of the popluation living in urban areas in a given country one year before an election (World Bank 2013).

GDP Growth is the annual percentage change in GDP in country $i$ one year before a given election (World Bank 2013).

Inflation is the rate of inflation in country $i$ one year before the election, logged (World Bank 2013).

Left incumbent all incumbents of the left are coded as 1, while all other classifications are coded as 0 .

Table Y: Summary Statistics for Table 3

| Variable | Obs. | Mean | Std. Dev. | Min | Max |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Left Vote | 68 | 0.260 | 0.224 | 0 | 0.9728 |
| Right Vote | 68 | 0.516 | 0.244 | 0 | 0.9999 |
| Center Vote | 68 | 0.271 | 0.260 | 0 | 0.9431 |
| VRL Presidential | 68 | 8.711 | 2.096 | 4.879 | 16.143 |
| VRL Legislative | 65 | 8.276 | 1.587 | 5.237 | 12.290 |
| Remittances | 72 | 3.129 | 3.925 | 0.003 | 18.214 |
| GDP Growth | 78 | 4.096 | 3.857 | -11.70 | 12.821 |
| Inflation (ln) | 76 | 2.267 | 1.417 | -0.937 | 8.1311 |
| Left Incumbent | 78 | 0.217 | 0.415 | 0 | 1 |
| GINI | 78 | 51.77 | 4.386 | 39.80 | 59.60 |
| Urban Population | 78 | 66.15 | 14.71 | 40.72 | 92.30 |

Table Z: Electoral Support of Remittance Recipients for Left-Leaning Parties (without Bolivia, Nicaragua and Venezuela)

|  | Without Political Attitudes |  |  | With Political Attitudes |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | (Left) | (Right) | (Left) | (Left) | (Right) | (Left) |
| Remittances Once a Month | $\begin{gathered} -0.625^{* * *} \\ (0.148) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.270^{* *} \\ (0.112) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.703 * * * \\ (0.238) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.306^{* * *} \\ (0.234) \end{gathered}$ |  |
| No Remittances |  |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.407 * * * \\ (0.0810) \end{gathered}$ |  |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.514^{* *} \\ (0.207) \end{gathered}$ |
| Right |  |  |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.660^{* * *} \\ (0.132) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.390^{* * *} \\ (0.114) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.681^{* * *} \\ (0.129) \end{gathered}$ |
| Left |  |  |  | $\begin{gathered} 1.013 * * * \\ (0.191) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.877 * * * \\ (0.171) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.029 * * * \\ (0.184) \end{gathered}$ |
| Rich | $\begin{gathered} -0.221^{*} \\ (0.114) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0207 \\ & (0.102) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.223 * \\ (0.114) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.198 \\ (0.235) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.00301 \\ & (0.162) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.200 \\ & (0.236) \end{aligned}$ |
| Middle Income | $\begin{gathered} -0.180^{* * *} \\ (0.0679) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.00762 \\ & (0.0616) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.176 * * * \\ (0.0680) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.172 * * \\ (0.113) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.00198 \\ & (0.0985) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.168^{*} \\ & (0.114) \end{aligned}$ |
| Very Poor | $\begin{aligned} & -0.169^{*} \\ & (0.0903) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0627 \\ (0.0792) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.167^{*} \\ & (0.0904) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.216^{* *} \\ (0.120) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0900 \\ & (0.105) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.216^{* *} \\ (0.120) \end{gathered}$ |
| High School | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0692 \\ & (0.0727) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.117^{*} \\ & (0.0644) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0623 \\ & (0.0731) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.103 \\ & (0.103) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0983 \\ & (0.106) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0970 \\ & (0.105) \end{aligned}$ |
| University | $\begin{aligned} & 0.180^{* *} \\ & (0.0753) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.159 * * \\ & (0.0672) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.179 * * \\ & (0.0756) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.103 \\ (0.131) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.106 \\ & (0.123) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0964 \\ & (0.131) \end{aligned}$ |
| Middle Age | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0666 \\ & (0.0829) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0615 \\ & (0.0740) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0636 \\ & (0.0830) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0392 \\ & (0.108) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0825 \\ & (0.0991) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0354 \\ & (0.109) \end{aligned}$ |
| Old | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0802 \\ & (0.114) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.193^{*} \\ & (0.0999) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0811 \\ (0.114) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0112 \\ (0.140) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.240 \\ (0.151) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0120 \\ & (0.140) \end{aligned}$ |
| State Employee | $\begin{gathered} 0.290^{* * *} \\ (0.108) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.469 * * * \\ (0.109) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.294 * * * \\ (0.109) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.264^{* *} \\ (0.111) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.454 * * * \\ (0.117) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.266^{* *} \\ (0.112) \end{gathered}$ |
| Constant | $\begin{gathered} \hline-0.927 * * * \\ (0.0801) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.225^{* * *} \\ (0.0706) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -1.299 * * * \\ (0.106) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.745 * * * \\ (0.206) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.350 * * * \\ (0.204) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -1.200^{* * *} \\ (0.275) \end{gathered}$ |
| Observations | 5,921 | 5,921 | 5,921 | 5,921 | 5,921 | 5,921 |

Note: Logit regression with robust standard errors, clustered by region, in parentheses. Omitted categories: young (17-34 years old), poor, and lowest education; ${ }^{* * *} \mathrm{p}<0.01,{ }^{* *} \mathrm{p}<0.05,{ }^{*} \mathrm{p}<0.1$

Table AA: The Relationship between Remittance and Support for Individual (as opposed to state) Responsibility for Welfare Without Honduras, Mexico and the Dominican Republic

|  | 2010 | 2012 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| Do you receive remittances | $0.407^{* * *}$ | 0.148 |
| (Y/N)? | $(0.106)$ | $(0.104)$ |
|  | 0.0192 | 0.0328 |
| Rich | $(0.156)$ | $(0.148)$ |
|  | -0.0716 | -0.197 |
| Middle Income | $(0.118)$ | $(0.121)$ |
| Poor | -0.00303 | -0.0323 |
|  | $(0.118)$ | $(0.121)$ |
| Right | -0.111 | -0.0353 |
|  | $(0.123)$ | $(0.106)$ |
| Center | 0.104 | 0.0198 |
|  | $(0.114)$ | $(0.0982)$ |
| University | $0.286^{*}$ | 0.162 |
|  | $(0.109)$ | $(0.110)$ |
| High School | 0.0694 | 0.0737 |
|  | $(0.0904)$ | $(0.0891)$ |
| Female | -0.0178 | 0.00567 |
|  | $(0.0737)$ | $(0.0742)$ |
| State Employee | $-0.245^{* *}$ | 0.0346 |
|  | $(0.119)$ | $(0.115)$ |
| Self Employed | -0.118 | $0.322^{*}$ |
|  | $(0.204)$ | $(0.181)$ |
| Private Employee | -0.136 | 0.00616 |
|  | $(0.0830)$ | $(0.0825)$ |
|  |  |  |
| Constant | $-2.2588^{* * *}$ | $-2.209^{* * *}$ |
| Observations | $(0.153)$ | $(0.146)$ |

Note: Logit models with standard errors in parenthesis. Omitted categories: young (17-34 years old), very poor, lowest education and students. ${ }^{* * *} \mathrm{p}<0.01,{ }^{* *} \mathrm{p}<0.05,{ }^{*} \mathrm{p}<0.1$

Table AB: The Relationship between Remittance and Support for Individual (as opposed to state) Responsibility for Inequality Reduction

|  | With Political Attitudes |  |  | Without Political Attitudes |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 2008 | 2010 | 2012 | 2008 | 2010 | 2012 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Do you receive remittances (Y/N)? | $0.299^{* * *}$ | $0.532^{* * *}$ | $0.498^{* * *}$ | $0.333^{* * *}$ | $0.527^{* * *}$ | $0.537^{* * *}$ |
|  | $(0.0991)$ | $(0.132)$ | $(0.113)$ | $(0.0896)$ | $(0.121)$ | $(0.103)$ |
| Rich | $0.321^{* *}$ | -0.00845 | $0.443^{* * *}$ | $0.352^{* * * *}$ | 0.0744 | $0.511^{* * *}$ |
|  | $(0.145)$ | $(0.210)$ | $(0.164)$ | $(0.132)$ | $(0.197)$ | $(0.152)$ |
| Middle Income | -0.0304 | 0.0114 | -0.0970 | -0.0413 | 0.0955 | -0.131 |
|  | $(0.118)$ | $(0.156)$ | $(0.140)$ | $(0.108)$ | $(0.148)$ | $(0.131)$ |
| Poor | 0.0799 | -0.0571 | -0.233 | 0.0976 | 0.0151 | $-0.223^{*}$ |
|  | $(0.116)$ | $(0.157)$ | $(0.143)$ | $(0.106)$ | $(0.149)$ | $(0.133)$ |
| Right | $0.273 * *$ | 0.0685 | $-0.237^{*}$ |  |  |  |
|  | $(0.125)$ | $(0.160)$ | $(0.122)$ |  |  |  |
| Center | 0.128 | -0.0641 | $-0.194^{*}$ |  |  |  |
|  | $(0.117)$ | $(0.155)$ | $(0.114)$ |  |  |  |
| University | -0.132 | 0.180 | -0.103 | -0.146 | 0.109 | -0.140 |
| High School | $(0.112)$ | $(0.145)$ | $(0.135)$ | $(0.102)$ | $(0.134)$ | $(0.126)$ |
| Female | -0.0874 | -0.0626 | -0.0129 | -0.117 | -0.0868 | -0.0563 |
|  | $(0.0874)$ | $(0.120)$ | $(0.105)$ | $(0.0798)$ | $(0.110)$ | $(0.0973)$ |
| State Employee |  | 0.106 | $-0.221^{* *}$ |  | 0.0803 | $-0.198^{* *}$ |
|  |  | $(0.0996)$ | $(0.0875)$ |  | $(0.0917)$ | $(0.0813)$ |
| Self Employed | $-0.343^{* * *}$ | -0.179 | -0.126 | $-0.325 * * *$ | -0.176 | -0.197 |
|  | $(0.125)$ | $(0.167)$ | $(0.141)$ | $(0.113)$ | $(0.153)$ | $(0.134)$ |
| Private Employee | 0.0988 | 0.382 | -0.0477 | 0.137 | 0.262 | 0.133 |
|  | $(0.174)$ | $(0.239)$ | $(0.240)$ | $(0.156)$ | $(0.226)$ | $(0.203)$ |
| Constant | $-0.145^{*}$ | 0.0530 | $-0.182^{*}$ | $-0.140^{*}$ | -0.0203 | $-0.197^{* *}$ |
| Observations | $(0.0833)$ | $(0.111)$ | $(0.101)$ | $(0.0762)$ | $(0.103)$ | $(0.0946)$ |

Note: Logit models with standard errors in parenthesis. Omitted categories: young (17-34 years old), very poor, lowest education and students. ${ }^{* * *} \mathrm{p}<0.01$, ${ }^{* *} \mathrm{p}<0.05$, * $\mathrm{p}<0.1$

Dependent Varioable in Table AC Above (LAPOP 2008, 2010, and 2012)

ROS4: The State, more than individuals, should be responsible for implementing policies to reduce inequality between the rich and the poor. Dependent variable above is all those who strongly disagreed with this statement (LAPOP 2008, 2010, 2012).

Figure E: Variation in Social Spending across Latin America (1990-2009)


Note: All lines represents changes in social spending (from CEPAL 2014) between 1990 and 2010.

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[^0]:    ${ }^{\text {a }}$ Data for income quintiles is taken from the LAPOP survey waves.
    ${ }^{\mathrm{b}}$ Date on the coverage of social security is taken from Martínez Franzoni's (2013) reports on 'Social
    Protection Systems' for Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua.

[^1]:    1 Original scale ran in opposite direction, but I flipped it for ease of interpretation.

