Online Appendix

Descriptive Statistics and Visualizations

description	mean	median	sd	\min	\max
Leg. Majority Distance	3.59	4.55	7.72	-18.00	22.41
Gov. Win Distance	-0.26	-0.13	5.34	-15.14	11.25
Leg. Margin of Victory	23.19	21.88	15.12	0.00	65.52
Gov. Margin of Victory	11.44	8.11	8.36	0.55	28.30
Effective Number of Parties	2.49	2.39	0.37	1.85	3.76
Lame Duck Period	0.07	0.00	0.25	0.00	1.00
$\log \text{GDP}$	18.83	18.69	0.78	17.51	21.31
Log Population	14.62	14.66	0.75	12.96	16.43
GDP Growth	0.22	0.08	0.88	-1.01	7.56
Avg. Years Education	8.70	8.79	0.66	6.70	10.11
Corruption (Interpolated)	7.55	6.57	3.50	2.30	22.60
Neighboring States Adoption	0.26	0.12	0.31	0.00	1.00
Log Number of Universities	3.26	3.14	0.71	1.61	5.44
Log Number of CSOs	4.67	4.78	0.81	3.04	6.29
Log Number of Newspapers	1.94	1.95	0.75	0.00	3.09

Table 1. Summary statistics of continuous and binary variables, for all states from March 22, 2001 until each date of ATI law passage.

Variable	Levels	n	%
Gubernatorial Partisanship	PAN Governor	5247	14.3
	PAN-PRD Coalition Governor	4193	11.4
	PRD Governor	5058	13.8
	PRI Governor	22119	60.4
	Total	36617	100.0
Legislative Partisanship	No Majority	13487	36.8
	PAN Majority	2010	5.5
	PRD Majority	1077	2.9
	PRI Majority	20043	54.7
	Total	36617	100.0
Divided Government	Divided Government	9029	24.7
	Unified Majority Government	20648	56.4
	Unified Plurality Government	6940	18.9
	Total	36617	100.0

Table 2. Summary statistics of categorical variables, for all states from March 22, 2001 until each date of ATI law passage.



Figure 1. Histograms showing the distribution of continuous and binary variables, for all states from March 22, 2001 until each date of ATI law passage.



Figure 2. Legislative partisanship and the timing of ATI law passage. Each horizontal bar represents one state legislature, with the colors — red for the PRI, blue for the PAN, and yellow for the PRD — reflecting the party with the largest number of seats (either a plurality or a majority). Diagonal lines show cases where two parties were tied for the most seats in a state legislature. New parties are shown as of the dates that new legislators took office, not as of the dates of elections. Dots show the dates that each legislature first passed an ATI law.



Figure 3. The Mexican state of Hidalgo with its true survival curve (black line) and two simulated counterfactual survival curves. The x-axis shows the number of days from March 22, 2001, while the y-axis shows the expected probability of "survival" — equivalent to one minus the expected probability of passage. The dashed-and-dotted line shows the survival curve for a simulated Hidalgo in which the PRI won only 52 percent of the seats in the 2005 election. The dotted line shows the survival curve for a simulated rurve for a simulated Hidalgo in which the PRI won only 52 percent of the seats in both of the 2002 and 2005 elections. For both scenarios, all other independent variables are held at their true values.

Mexican State Access to Information Laws and the 2007 Constitutional Reforms

While Mexican states passed their own access to information (ATI) laws between December 2001 (the legislative approval of Jalisco's law) and February 2007 (the final publication of Tabasco's law), a 2007 constitutional reform process established minimum national standards for the design of state information regimes, enshrining a principle of maximum disclosure and requiring many states to reform their laws. The constitutional reform was passed by the two houses of Congress in March and April 2007, and officially published in July 2007 after being ratified by state legislatures (Bogado et al. 2007). The reform "promoted broad use of electronic tools to facilitate citizen access, conditions of anonymity in the use of FOI [freedom of information], and creation of autonomous bodies to supervise regulation and enforcement" (Bookman and Guerrero Amparán 2009, p.16). For example, many states initially lacked independent appeals and oversight agencies modeled after the federal Instituto Federal de Accesso a la Información (IFAI), but created such agencies in order to meet the new standards (Bogado et al. 2007).

One important potential critique of our argument is that state ATI laws prior to the 2007 constitutional reform simply did not matter, as their variable legal design made them too ineffective to be useful tools to monitor political actors and empower individuals and organizations. If this was the case, then state political actors could expect to pass them without imposing any future costs and constraints on themselves, rendering unnecessary any calculation of those costs compared with potential political benefits through insurance or re-election mechanisms.

Indeed, the 2007 reforms have been widely held as a watershed, a "great transformation in the Mexican constitutional order",¹ and "without a doubt, the most important development related to freedom of information in Mexico in the last three years".² It is thus important for us to evaluate the extent to which Mexican state ATI laws were used before the constitutional reforms.

In this appendix, we seek to show that despite the variation and frequent shortcomings in legal design of state ATI laws before the reforms, they were still used frequently, and often successfully, by significant numbers of individuals. Further, we seek to show that the 2007 reforms did not completely ameliorate the problems of legal design across Mexican states' ATI laws. Indeed, considerable variation and shortcomings continued to exist after the 2007 reforms as well. We emphasize the extent of continuity – rather than change – between the pre- and post-reform periods: in the steady growth

¹See http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/mexico/lujambio_eng.pdf.

²See http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/mexico/article6.htm

in numbers of requests over time, in the persisting variation in legal design, and in the ability of individuals to successfully make information requests and receive information despite often substantial barriers. Indeed, a cross-national perspective highlights that *de jure* legal design is often not the most important contributor to the *de facto* effectiveness of access to information regimes.

Thus we argue that the shortcomings in implementation and effectiveness of ATI laws prior to the 2007 reforms does not mean that state-level political actors deliberating their passage could automatically assume they would be toothless and thereby would conduct no evaluation of potential costs and benefits. In fact, we posit that despite these shortcomings, political actors would still find them unacceptably costly or risky under some sets of circumstances, while under others would find them useful mechanisms to lock in future access to information.

In particular, we wish to highlight five specific types of evidence which are inconsistent with an argument that the 2007 constitutional reforms were a major structural break before which state ATI laws were so ineffective and irrelevant as to be costless to political actors, and only after which they became meaningful.

 In many states substantial numbers of individuals successfully filed information requests and received information even before 2007. The 2010 Métrica de la Transparencia report (López-Ayllón 2010) includes data on numbers of requests made across states from 2005 to 2009, for states where data was available. These are presented graphically in Figure 4.

For 2005, there are twelve states where laws were already passed and data available, while for 2006 there are eighteen. The total numbers of state-level information requests filed across these states are 20,342 in 2005, and 42,854 in 2006.³ The 2010 report also compiled statistics, where available, on the results and timing of responses to requests. These show that among requests filed in 2005 and 2006 where data was available, individuals received the information they requested in 74.8% of instances in 2005 and 72.9% of instances in 2006. They also received responses in, on average, 7.4 days in 2005 and 8.7 days in 2006. The 2007 Métrica de la Transparencia report (Díaz Iturbe 2007) also reports the results of a survey of effectiveness across 28 states, compiling measures of the quality of attention paid to information requests, and the quality of responses to information requests, all for both executive and legislative branches of state governments. This data, collected in August and September of 2007, only shortly after the constitutional reforms

³By comparison, the national executive branch received 50,127 requests in 2005 and 60,213 in 2006. In 2005, 73% of these requesters received information in some form. See Fox and Haight (2007, p. 37, 43). Also, see Fox, Haight, and Palmer-Rubin (2011) for further evidence on the quality of responses to information requests by federal agencies

were passed and ratified in March and July 2007 respectively, also highlights that the majority state laws were functioning above minimal levels, although still far from perfect. For the quality of attention to requests, 23 out of 28 state executive branches and 26 out of 28 legislative branches received scores over 50%. For the quality of responses, 18 out of 28 executive branches and 18 out of 28 legislative branches scored over 50%. While these ratings obviously left tremendous room for improvement, they are not consistent with an argument that state ATI laws were almost entirely ineffective and irrelevant. Importantly, political actors choosing whether or not to pass ATI laws quickly could not have perfect information on the ex post levels of effectiveness, and so could not be certain of the ultimate quality of the resulting information regimes. Investigating and seeking to explain variation in effectiveness after passage must remain beyond the scope of this manuscript, for reasons of coherence and limited space.

2. If the 2007 reforms were a major structural break before which state ATI laws were mostly ineffective and irrelevant, and after which they were substantially more meaningful, then we should see evidence of this in the data on numbers of requests filed across states over time. To evaluate this possibility, we construct a quantitative model of the numbers of requests filed in each state in each year, using the data included in the 2010 Métrica de la Transparencia report for the years 2005 to 2009. Since many states were still passing their laws in 2005, 2006, and 2007, not all states have available data for all years. A few states that did already pass their laws also do not have available data. As such, we use data from the 18 states which have data available for either 2005 through 2009 or 2006 through 2009, allowing us to make comparisons before and after the 2007 reforms.

Using data across these states and years, we model the total number of requests filed with state officials each year as a function of two independent variables: a trend over time and an indicator for the post-reform period. Our argument is that, in most states, the numbers of requests increased relatively smoothly over time, without a major jump following the 2007 reforms. That is, we expect to see more continuity than change in the rate of growth of state-level information requests over time. If, instead, the 2007 reforms were a major structural break after which state ATI laws became substantially more meaningful, then we should see indicators for the post-reform period as statistically significant determinants of the numbers of requests, even after controlling for more basic trends over time. We show a series of models making several alternative modeling

choices, including using either the logged number of requests or total number of requests (in either case first divided by 1,000) as the dependent variable, using either linear time trends or both year and year-squared to allow for non-linear time trends, starting the indicator for the post-reform period in either 2007 or 2008 (since the reform was passed in March 2007 and published after being ratified by all states in July 2007, we may or may not expect to see its full effect in the 2007 data), and including either fixed effects or random effects for each state. We also include random effects models allowing for state-specific time trends. In none of these models are the indicators for the post-reform period statistically significant. That is, numbers of requests increased, for the most part, smoothly over time, without any major structural break in this process following the 2007 reforms. Figure 4 displays plots of the numbers of requests for each state included, while Tables 3, 4, and 5 show results of the models used.⁴

3. Even multiple years after the 2007 reforms, considerable variation remains in the design of ATI laws across Mexican states. Both the 2010 Métrica de la Transparencia report and a recently published Fundar report⁵ arrive at this conclusion. The 2014 report concludes, a full seven years after the 2007 constitutional reforms, that 19 state laws are "poor" in their design, while 13 were "average" and only one "good." These shortcomings, while important, do not stop hundreds of thousands of individuals from effectively using these laws to access government information. The 2010 report specifically compared the strength of state ATI laws on paper with their performance in practice, and found no clear correlation. The English-language summary of the report concluded that "having solid laws is no guarantee of positive results in websites and citizen requests" (p. 22). The full report also noted that (translated from Spanish) "a good ranking on the normative dimension does not necessarily mean that a given entity works properly, because this measurement tells us nothing about the actual operating conditions of the process of implementation or the effectiveness of the law. Even, as evidenced by the results of this study... poor or fair quality regulations may be supplemented with relatively good implementation" (p. 12). These conclusions further support our arguments that, first, the weaknesses of legal design

⁴There is some evidence that, at least in the state of Guerrero, these statistics were inflated to show more information requests than actually were made (Méndez Lara 2009a). However, we note that even if such manipulation were more widespread, this does not pose a major challenge to our characterization of these data as emphasizing continuity rather than change in the growth rates of requests in most states. If some of the states where there were, in fact, substantial jumps in request volumes following 2007 are actually subject to manipulation, then this would only serve to further highlight smooth rates of growth in the true numbers of requests as the main trend. In fact, it is apparent from Figure 4 that Guerrero exhibits one of the most unusual patterns in requests volumes.

⁵Available from http://idaim.org.mx/data/cuadernillo.pdf.

in state laws prior to 2007 did not necessarily stop individuals from being able to use them effectively in some cases, and second, that the 2007 constitutional reforms have not brought about complete standardization of the varying legal designs of ATI laws across Mexican states, many of which still fail to meet international standards, even as they are widely used in practice.

4. Cross-national comparison is also useful in demonstrating that ATI laws can play important functions even when they do not meet a "gold standard" of legal design. Many commentators on the 2007 constitutional reforms in Mexico highlighted one of their chief goals as addressing the lack of independent oversight and appeals agencies, modeled after the federal IFAI, in many states. A cross-national perspective, however, highlights that few countries have independent information commissions like IFAI. Some ATI laws have similar bodies, whereas in others there is no oversight agency and individual requesters are limited to internal agency appeals and time-consuming reliance on the court system. Both the United States and Bulgaria fall into this category, yet both have relatively robust (though still far from perfect) ATI regimes in practice. In some other countries, appeals proceed only internally or through the courts, but an ombudsmantype agency exists to assist them, and in some cases to issue non-binding opinions. This is the case in countries such as Poland, Peru, and South Africa, but such agencies still fall far short of IFAI model in practice, given the lack of binding authority and power to sanction. Across countries, many with laws near an international "gold standard," such as Liberia and El Salvador (see http://rti-rating.org/) face far greater challenges and shortcomings of implementation, while many countries with weaker laws on paper (not only most advanced industrialized countries but also transition countries like Bulgaria and Romania) have achieved relatively robust information regimes that, for all their flaws, are able to empower citizens, journalists, and civil society groups to hold their political principals to account. Michener (2011b) argues that "'minimally effective' is perhaps a more apt descriptor of a strong disclosure law [than 'strong' or 'weak'], such is the universal resistance of authorities to surrendering sensitive information" (p.149) The point of this discussion is that, if one of the major shortcomings of Mexican state ATI laws before 2007 was the lack of independent agencies modeled after IFAI, this is a problem suffered by numerous ATI regimes around the world which are still able to be used frequently by individual requesters and still able to function as sometimes and somewhat effective tools of holding political principals to account. But we live, of course, in a world where no mechanism of accountability is truly perfect.

5. Finally, we would argue that we let the data on the timing of initial passage speak for itself. If state-level political actors knew with certainty that state ATI laws would be ineffective and irrelevant, then why would so many states have delayed for so many years? If there were no potential future costs associated with passing the laws, then we would expect to see them passed much sooner, or at the very least to see no statistically significant relationship between the timing of passage and variables like political competition.

Party Unanimity in 2007

We also wish to address another potential critique of our analysis related to the 2007 constitutional reforms: the unanimity of support for them by political actors from the PAN, PRI, and PRD. Early calls for the reforms came from the governors of Aguascalientes, Chihuahua, and Zacatecas, one from each party. The reforms were supported by all three major political parties in Congress, and rapidly ratified by states governed by all three parties. In contrast with the political contention and frequent delay that characterized the processes of initial passage of state-level ATI laws, the constitutional reform process appears to have been characterized by unanimity and speed. This contrast poses important questions for our argument: If political competition is an important driver of transparency reforms, why did the constitutional reforms receive such broad support?

We argue the unanimous support of the three major political parties for the 2007 reforms do not demonstrate that political calculations were not behind initial decisions to adopt quickly or delay by state-level political actors. The broad support in 2007 was possible both because of the particular uncertain political context of the contested Fox-Calderón transition, and because of path-dependent processes whereby the 2002 law created a powerful policy entrepreneur for further change, in the form of IFAI itself. For example, Bookman and Guerrero Amparán (2009) write that "The successful passage of the amendment offers a glimpse into the deeply political nature of FOI reform. The waning days of Fox's term... were relatively inactive in a policy sense. Transition to the Calderón administration was mired in doubts over the presidential election results. In that setting 'access to information' was an issue on which broad political consensus could be achieved. In addition, IFAI, the 'behindthe-scenes' architect of the reform, had considerable political capital and the advantage of perceived political neutrality" (p. 15-16). Michener (2011b) highlights the crucial driving role of IFAI itself as more important than the actions taken by state governors, writing that "Although the initiative was originally from state governors, it is well known by experts that the entire endeavor was coordinated by the IFAI" (p. 176). Similarly, Bogado et al. (2007) write that "From the beginning of this process, and at each step of the way, IFAI played an integral role in bringing key players together to draft the proposal and submit the proposal to Congress" (p. 7). Thus the dynamics of political calculation, which we argue powerfully shape decisions by political actors to institutionalize new transparency reforms, took different forms in the particular events leading to the 2007 constitutional reforms.



Figure 4. Number of information requests filed each year from 2005 through 2009, for states which had already passed ATI laws and had data available. Based on data compiled by López-Ayllón (2010). Note that the vertical axes are on different scales to more clearly present variation over time for each state. A vertical dashed line marks 2007, the year in which a constitutional reform mandated standards for the design of state-level ATI laws. In some states, the increase in numbers of requests jumped sharply after this reform, while in others it proceeded relatively smoothly.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Year	0.34^{***}	0.46***	0.60	0.55	3.14^{*}	2.56
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.51)	(0.40)	(1.39)	(1.50)
Year Squared			-0.02	-0.01		
			(0.04)	(0.04)		
Indicator 2007+	0.11		0.03		-1.69	
	(0.24)		(0.28)		(3.92)	
Indicator $2008+$		-0.26		-0.23		0.24
		(0.25)		(0.28)		(4.07)
Dependent Variable	Log Requests	Log Requests	Log Requests	Log Requests	Requests	Requests
\mathbb{R}^2	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.78	0.52	0.52
Num. obs.	84	84	84	84	84	84
***************************************	0.0F					

 $p^{***} p < 0.001, p^{**} p < 0.01, p < 0.05$

Table 3. Models of the number of requests across eighteen states from 2005 to 2009, including state fixed effects. Constant term not shown to save space. Models 1, 2, 5, and 6 measure time as the number of years since 2002. Models 3 and 4 include both the number of years and its square, to capture a potential non-linear relationship. Models 1 through 4 use the logged number of requests as the dependent variable, where as Models 5 and 6 use the unlogged number of requests. Models 1, 3, and 5 include an indicator of years 2007 and after to capture the post-Constitutional reform period, whereas Models 2, 4, and 6 use an indicator of years 2008 and after.

	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12
Year	0.34^{***}	0.45^{***}	0.56	0.53	3.05^{*}	2.37
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.51)	(0.40)	(1.39)	(1.49)
Year Squared			-0.02	-0.01		
			(0.04)	(0.04)		
Indicator 2007+	0.11		0.04		-1.69	
	(0.24)		(0.28)		(3.92)	
Indicator 2008+		-0.26		-0.23		0.56
		(0.25)		(0.28)		(4.05)
Dependent Variable	Log Requests	Log Requests	Log Requests	Log Requests	Requests	Requests
AIC	192.55	191.63	198.73	198.10	629.73	629.83
Num. obs.	84	84	84	84	84	84

*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05

Table 4. Models of the number of requests across eighteen states from 2005 to 2009, including state random effects. Constant term not shown to save space. Models 7, 8, 11, and 12 measure time as the number of years since 2002. Models 9 and 10 include both the number of years and its square, to capture a potential non-linear relationship. Models 7 through 10 use the logged number of requests as the dependent variable, where as Models 11 and 12 use the unlogged number of requests. Models 7, 9, and 11 include an indicator of years 2007 and after to capture the post-Constitutional reform period, whereas Models 8, 10, and 12 use an indicator of years 2008 and after.

	Model 13	Model 14	Model 15	Model 16	Model 17	Model 18
Year	0.32^{***}	0.43^{***}	0.38	0.42	2.79^{*}	1.81
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.43)	(0.33)	(1.34)	(1.36)
Year Squared			-0.01	0.00		
			(0.04)	(0.03)		
Indicator $2007+$	0.11		0.09		-1.69	
	(0.19)		(0.23)		(1.88)	
Indicator 2008+		-0.21		-0.21		1.49
		(0.20)		(0.22)		(1.94)
Dependent Variable	Log Requests	Log Requests	Log Requests	Log Requests	Requests	Requests
AIC	183.24	182.38	189.98	189.29	550.74	550.89
Num. obs.	84	84	84	84	84	84

 $^{***}p < 0.001, \ ^{**}p < 0.01, \ ^*p < 0.05$

Table 5. Models of the number of requests across eighteen states from 2005 to 2009, including state random effects and state-specific coefficients for the Year variables. The Year coefficients presented here represent the means across all state-specific coefficients. Constant term not shown to save space. Models 13, 14, 17, and 18 measure time as the number of years since 2002. Models 15 and 16 include both the number of years and its square, to capture a potential non-linear relationship. Models 13 through 16 use the logged number of requests as the dependent variable, where as Models 17 and 18 use the unlogged number of requests. Models 13, 15, and 17 include an indicator of years 2007 and after to capture the post-Constitutional reform period, whereas Models 14, 16, and 18 use an indicator of years 2008 and after.

Political Competition and the Strength of ATI Laws

If political competition creates incentives for political actors to institutionalize new transparency reforms, then we should observe not just relationships between competition and the timing of adoption of those reforms, but also relationships with the strength of their institutional design. Political actors facing greater political uncertainty should have more reason to pass stronger reforms. When political actors facing less uncertainty do end up adopting them, whether for political or other reasons, they should be more likely to pass weak reforms or reforms intended to be 'window-dressing'. We offer a preliminary test of this empirical expectation in the case of Mexican states' ATI laws.

We use data from two assessments of Mexican state ATI laws conducted in 2010, one in the 2010 Métrica Transparencia report (López-Ayllón 2010), and the other by the NGO FUNDAR (FUNDAR 2010). These data reflect the strength of ATI laws after all states had adopted ATI laws, and some states had amended their laws once or even twice. By using data from 2010, we effectively bracket the process of states choosing to amend or not amend their ATI laws at each point in time. We model legal strength as a function of independent variables averaged over the entire 2000-2008 period. We expect that states that were more competitive over this period will, all else equal, have stronger ATI laws as of 2010, while states that were less competitive over this period will have weaker laws.

The first measure of ATI law strength we employ is the "Legal Framework" measure from the 2010 Métrica Transparencia study (López-Ayllón 2010). This measure captures the adherence of each state's law to the standards and principles in the 2007 constitutional amendment, including the scope of information and bodies covered, procedures for making requests and filing appeals, protections for personal data, and the institutions for appeals and oversight. The second measure we employ is the "Índice del Derecho de Acceso a la Información en México" (IDAIM), or the "Index of the Right to Access Information in Mexico") from (FUNDAR 2010). This measure also captures the adherence of state laws with constitutional principles, but lends robustness to our analysis by using an independently constructed measure. The third measure we employ focuses specifically on the characteristics of the institutions for appeals and oversight created by each state's law, using the "Institutional Capacities" measure from López-Ayllón (2010). This measure assesses the managerial, operational, and organizational attributes of these institutions, including their legal frameworks, relationships with other state institutions, and budgets. We multiply all measures by 100 so that their possible ranges run from zero to 100. Figure 5 shows the observed distributions of these three measures across the 32 Mexican states.

Since a model of the strength of ATI laws will be limited to only 32 observations, we have too few degrees of freedom to include all the independent variables included in the models of adoption. As such, we include only a main variable of interest capturing average political competition in state legislatures over the 2000-2008 period, and control variables capturing average GDP and population, plus key features of partisan control. These are the proportion of the 2000-2008 period with no legislative majority, the proportion with a PRI majority, the proportion with a PAN majority, and the proportion with a PRI governor. Table 6 presents the results of these models, using two different measures of political competition with each of the three dependent variables.

The two models using the Métrica Transparencia Legal Framework measure show that more competitive states, measured either by the seat shares of the largest parties in each legislature or by the effective number of parties, are associated with stronger ATI laws, although the coefficients are not statistically significant (p=0.18 and p=0.31). Using the FUNDAR index, on the other hand, yields statistically significant results for both competition variables. These results show that each additional percentage of seats in the legislature controlled by the largest political party in a given state is associated with a law roughly two points weaker on a 0-100 scale, or alternately that a state with two effective political parties is expected to have a law roughly nineteen points stronger than a state with only one. Turning to the models using the Métrica Transparencia measure of Institutional Capacities also shows significant relationships with political competition. Comparing the two measures from the Métrica Transparencia, political competition is much more strongly associated with the features of appeals and oversight institutions than with the adherence of ATI laws with constitutional principles. This supports our expectation that political competition can create incentives for political actors to seek to institutionalize transparency in ways that are likely to endure. However, it is also worth noting that there is far less observed variation in the Legal Framework measure than in either of the other two measures, potentially making it a less informative indicator of ATI law strength.

While these models use only a single cross-section at one point in time, they offer preliminary evidence that not only are political actors facing greater political competition more likely to adopt transparency reforms, but that when they do, they are likely to adopt stronger reforms than political actors facing less competition. Further research would be needed to fully explore these relationships in more detail.



Figure 5. Histograms of the three measures of the strength of Mexican state ATI laws.

	DV: Metrica-Legal Framework		DV: FUNDAR IDAIM		DV: Metrica	-Inst. Capacities
Leg. Majority Distance	-0.86		-2.08^{***}		-2.07^{**}	
	(0.62)		(0.48)		(0.90)	
Effective Number of Parties		9.36		19.31^{**}		29.39^{**}
		(9.04)		(8.24)		(12.77)
No Majority	-15.20	-4.03	-44.83^{***}	-16.29	-63.34^{**}	-39.72^{*}
	(19.06)	(16.19)	(14.67)	(14.75)	(27.37)	(22.88)
PRI Majority	10.04	13.91	5.35	13.63	-40.74	-29.21
	(18.14)	(18.66)	(13.96)	(17.01)	(26.05)	(26.38)
PAN Majority	-1.57	3.07	-7.81	1.86	1.61	15.98
	(14.57)	(15.39)	(11.21)	(14.03)	(20.92)	(21.76)
PRI Governor	-0.67	0.10	-12.90^{*}	-10.84	14.52	15.93
	(8.89)	(9.00)	(6.84)	(8.20)	(12.76)	(12.71)
$\log \text{GDP}$	4.11	5.92	2.11	6.31	-16.74^{**}	-12.01
	(5.46)	(5.49)	(4.20)	(5.00)	(7.84)	(7.76)
Log Population	-0.53	-1.69	2.40	-0.32	20.90^{***}	17.96^{**}
	(5.14)	(5.19)	(3.96)	(4.73)	(7.38)	(7.33)
\mathbb{R}^2	0.27	0.25	0.54	0.33	0.41	0.41
Num. obs.	32	32	32	32	32	32

****p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1

Table 6. Linear models of the strength of Mexican state ATI laws. Dependent variables come from the 2010 Métrica Transparencia Report (López-Ayllón 2010) and the 2010 FUNDAR Report (FUNDAR 2010). All independent variables are averages over the 2000-2008 period. Constant term not displayed.