Online Appendix for:

"**Can Descriptive Representation Change Beliefs About a Stigmatized Group? Evidence From Rural Rajasthan"**

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Appendix A: Methodological Note on Ethnographic Research

The ethnographic research on which this article draws took place in eight villages of Jaipur district (Rajasthan). This research took place over a period of twelve months, which allowed me to make repeated observations in each of these villages and to have repeated interactions with a variety of interlocutors.

The objective of this brief methodological appendix is to provide additional details on the choices and procedures that guided this first phase of my research.

Objective(s)

The objective of this first phase of my research was threefold. Given that no detailed and documented account of the role of sarpanch existed at the time this study took place, the first objective of this research was to observe and document the daily functioning of gram panchayats, with a focus on the specific role that sarpanchs (as opposed to other local actors such as secretaries, council members and block-level officials) play in this institution. What are the specific functions and powers of sarpanchs? The second objective was to observe and get a sense of relations between members of the scheduled castes and others in a sample of Rajasthani villages. What does untouchability concretely mean on the ground in contemporary Rajasthan and how do villagers speak about caste relations? The third objective was to make inferences on the changes that take place i when the office of sarpanch is for the first time reserved for a member of the scheduled castes. What are the tangible (distributive, political, social, etc…) changes that take place when the sarpanch is an SC villager? What can the psychological effects of these changes be? What are the potential effects on the practice of untouchability?

How Were Villages Chosen?

Because I was residing in Jaipur throughout 2009, I opted for villages located near Jaipur so that I would be able to visit easily and repeatedly. Because I was concerned that Jaipur district may not be representative of the state, I first selected the two panchayat samitis (block-level panchayats) that were the farthest away from the state capital, and that appeared to lag behind other parts of the district in terms of development (as per basic census estimates). I finally decided to focus on *Phagi* once I realized that a number of untouchability-related disputes happening in the Phagi tehsil had hit the headlines of national news websites during the 2000s (including the well-known Chakwada incident[1], in which caste-related clashes took place after SC villagers protested their de facto barring from the local pond). Insofar as untouchability-related behaviors persisted in the area and development indicators were comparable to the indicators for many other parts of Rajasthan, Phagi provided me with a welcome compromise both in terms of practicality (2 to 3 hours by road from Jaipur) and "representativeness".

[1] On the Chakwara incident, see for instance http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl1921/stories/20021025005811500.htm

Within this tehsil, I randomy selected 3 gram panchayats headed by a member of the SCs and 5 headed by villagers from other castes (either OBCs or upper-castes).

Research Assistance/Translation/Logistics

Not being a native Hindi (let alone Rajasthani) speaker, I was accompanied by an Indian research assistant during these visits. When possible, but never on my first meeting with my interlocutors, I recorded these interviews, which my collaborator and I then spent time translating and discussing.

What did we do during those visits?

This ethnographic phase of my fieldwork was equally divided among observations and interviews.

In order to make inference on the role played by sarpanchs in village life and on the changes that may derive from the accession of a member of the scheduled castes to that office, I first followed 6 of the sarpanchs for days at a time (I spent *at least* 4 days with each of them, but a much longer period than that in three cases). This led me to attend a number of official and informal meetings, transactions and interactions between the sarpanch and various local officials and citizens. This allowed me to understand the way in which sarpanchs concretely spend their time, their relations with villagers of different caste groups, the administrative and politicsl actors they interact with through their function, and the benefits they derive from being in that position. This in turn led me to follow a number of officials sarpanchs interact with on an almost daily basis: gram panchayat secretaries (known as "gram sevaks" in Rajasthan), village council members, as welll as various officials and institutions located outside their village, at the block or panchayat samiti level, and in a few cases at the district level. I interviewed each of these officials (including sarpanchs) repeatedly, both in isolation and along with other officials. Finally, in order to make inferences about the social perception of these officials among their constituents, I also conducted semi-formal interviews in each village with a handful of villagers from each of the four biggest caste groups. These interviews allowed me to make inference on the specific reasons that led villagers to approach their GP, and to learn about the different ways in which sarpanchs and GPs can concretely impact the living conditions of their constituents. In those villages that had a SC sarpanch, those interviews often took a chronological bend, with the emphasis being placed on the changes that had taken place in the functioning of the GP and beyond, in caste relations, since the SC sarpanch had arrived in office.

In order to make inference on caste relations in these villages, on the practice of untouchability in the region, and on the evolution of untouchability in each village, my collaborator and I mostly relied on interviews with members of the scheduled castes.[2] In order to facilitate the discussion and to spur a debate on this potentially sensitive question,

[2] Although we also carried interviews with members of the upper-castes on this question (we used many of the declarations made during these interviews later on, when building the audio instrument), we placed the emphasis on members of the scheduled castes during these collective interviews due the frequent lack of cooperation of upper-caste villagers on these questions.

these interviews often – though not always - took the form of focus groups in which we encouraged participants to respond to one another and to react to each other's statement. Due to the topic of these discussions, we went to great length to ensure that only members of the scheduled castes were attending these discussions (usually held in the house of one of them).

While these discussions did not leave me with strong intuitions as to the impact of reservation on untouchability-related practices, they provided me with a number of hypotheses, which the quantitative survey presented in the rest of the article then tested. More importantly, they gave me a sense of the current state of untouchability in rural Rajasthan, information which was also used in order to design context-relevant questions in the quantitative survey.

Appendix B: Additional Details on the Implementation of the Reservation Process in Rajasthan.

This appendix provides additional information on the implementation of the reservation process (for members of the scheduled castes) in rural Rajasthan.

As the following paragraphs detail, this appendix shows that there were remarkably few deviations from this rule on the ground at the implementation stage. While a small minority of gram panchayats should theoretically have been reserved during a different electoral period, I argue that these misassignments are much more likely to have been caused by data limitations on the ground, rounding errors, or redistricting, rather than by intentional manipulations that would allow some GPs to dodge reservation.

The following paragraphs build upon this argument, and present relevant data about each of the 16 panchayat samitis sampled in this study.

The Rule

As explained in the article, reservations for sarpanchs are governed by a rule that is based on the share of SC population at the panchayat samiti level (a subdivision of district-level rural institutions, containing 25-50 gram panchayats). In the state of Rajasthan, the total number of gram panchayats (GPs) reserved within each panchayat samiti for the duration of each electoral period is proportional to the share of the SC population in the panchayat samiti area. However, GPs reserved for the SCs rotate from one electoral period to the next.

Theoretically, after having ranked gram panchayats (hereafter GPs) according to their share of SC population, electoral officers are supposed to progress down the list, reserving GPs with increasingly small SC populations at each successive electoral period, from 1995 on. Following this rule, the sets of reserved GPs during each electoral period should differ from one another in terms of their SC population, and the reserved GP with the smallest proportion of SCs in a given electoral period should have a larger proportion of SCs than the reserved GP with the largest proportion of SCs in the subsequent period.

Checking For Manipulations: Methodology

With these general principles in mind, one can check that the reservation procedure was implemented correctly. Checking that there were no manipulations in the implementation of this procedure should *theoretically* be straightforward. One simply needs to determine the ranking of GPs (by % of SCs) in each panchayat samiti. Following the algorithm, one can then straightforwardly determine when each GP should theoretically be reserved.

Unfortunately, verifying that there were no manipulations is not that straightforward, since small uncertainties remain as to the way this procedure was implemented *in practice*, on the ground.

It is, first, unclear what demographic data electoral officers have relied on while creating the rankings on which this procedure relies. Since the Panchayati Raj Act contained no clear instructions to district-level electoral officers regarding the specific body of demographic data that should be used to established these rankings, local authorities in charge of declaring reservations statuses prior to each election have relied on one (or several) possible bodies of data: 1. Population data from the 1991 census of India aggregated at the GP level, 2. Population data from the 2001 census of India aggregated at the GP level, and 3. Household-level (rather than individual-level) data from either of these sources. Through the course of interviews with the election offices of district authorities that I have carried over the last few years, I have encountered officers who use each of these three bodies of data in order to establish their rankings. This is potentially problematic, since minor differences in ranking are to be expected from one body of data to the next. For example, small changes in the share of SCs living in a given village from 1991 to 2001 may affect a ranking. Similarly, officers relying on the number of SC *households* (rather than the number of SC *individuals*) for their calculations may also produce slightly different rankings. Since it is virtually impossible to know which data electoral officers used in each case, prior to each election[3], it can be difficult to figure out the exact ranking electoral officers *should* have followed.

Second, it is unclear how electoral officers dealt with rounding issues. Two GPs which counted, respectively, 18.07% and 18.76% of SCs, could have been listed them as counting 18% of SCs. Similarly, it is possible that two GPs counting, respectively, 17.67% and 18.16% of SCs, could have also been listed as counting 18% o SCs. In which case, the ranking may have lacked precision.

Third, it is unclear how electoral officers dealt with redistricting, mergers and break-ups of Panchayat Samitis, which have occurred in many districts of Rajasthan since the onset of the reservation clock in 1995 (for instance, in Bikaner and Jalore district, sampled in this study). This is especially problematic in the case of Panchayat Samitis that have *received* additional GPs after 1995. Assuming that the Panchayat Samiti from which these GPs originated did not count an identical number of GPs and the same proportion of SCs – which is very unlikely to be the case – the ranking-based assignment to reservation in the Panchayat Samitis receiving new GPs could also have been muddied.

In sum, while the theoretical principles of the rule are clear, several practical details pertaining to its implementation on the ground are not transparent. As a result, there are several reasons why detecting potential manipulations is not straightforward.

Taking these issues into account, this appendix presents two statistics regarding the implementation of the procedure in each of the 16 panchayat samitis sampled in this study. I rely throughout on data from the 2001 census of India about the share of SC individuals (rather than household) within each gram panchayat. Relying on this data, I first present the count and percentage of GPs that were "misassigned" during the reservation procedure. By the term "misassigned", I refer to the count and percentage of GPs that were not reserved *precisely* when they should have been, as predicted by the 2001 data. In light of the above remarks, not all of these "misassignments" may however be conclusively attributed to intentional manipulations. Since the 2001 data I rely on here may not be the data electoral officers have used, and since rounding errors are to be expected, this statistic would likely exaggerate the proportion of GPs that may have been intentionally misassigned. To deal

[3] Note that they may have used one source (say, the 1991 data) prior to some elections, before relying on the 2001 data for subsequent elections.

with this issue, I also provide a second set of statistics: the count and percentage of GPs that were "misassigned" during the reservation procedure by more than 1% (I refer to those as "suspicious misassigned GPs"). In other words, those GPs which were *not* reserved during the predicted electoral period AND whose percentage of SCs is more than 1% away from the local threshold for reservation in that predicted electoral period. These GPs, misassigned by more than 1%, are much more likely to have been misassigned due to a form of intentional manipulation.

The Example of Jalore Panchayat Samiti

Before I present data on each of the 16 panchayat samitis sampled in this study, let us re-examine the example presented in table 1 of the article (reproduced here as table B.1). As can be seen from the table, the GPs of *Jalore* Panchayat Samiti that counted the largest SC population were reserved first (in 1995), before reservation rotated towards GPs with decreasingly large SC population shares. Since there are a little less than 20% of members of the SCs in the Jalore Panchayat Samiti, 5.5 (that is, either 5 or 6[4]) GPs are supposed to be reserved at each electoral period, as is the case here. Assignment to reservation then unfolded in decreasing order, starting with GPs with the largest SC population share and ending with the GPs with the smallest SC population share.

In this case, the procedure was implemented almost perfectly as the algorithm would predict – assuming that the algorithm was based on demographic data from the 2001 Census of India. As is apparent from the table, GP number 15 (*Bagra*) should technically have been reserved in 2005, rather than in 2010. The % SCs in GP number 15 is however very close to the % SCs in the subsequent GP on the list (a difference of *less than 1%*), and there are good reasons to believe that such a misassignment would be due to a data or rounding issue rather than due to intentional manipulation.

As a result, I list Jalore Panchayat Samiti as having 1 (out of 28) misassigned GP and 0 out of 28 *suspicious* misassigned GPs (i.e. GPs misassigned by *more* than one percent).

[4] Whether it should be 5 or 6 is left entirely to the discretion of district-levels electoral officers, since the acts do not provide guidelines on this point.

Table B.1: Reservations for the Scheduled Castes in Jalore Panchayat Samiti (Jalore district).

GP Name	**% SC*** (Ranked from largest to smallest)	**Reserva-tion in 1995** (First GP elections)	**Reservation in 2000**	**Reservation in 2005**	**Reservation in 2010**	**Not Yet Reserved** (Likely reserved in 2015)
1. Bakra Road	29.96	1				
2. Chura	28.28	1				
3. Revat	25.46	1				
4. Sivana	25.13	1				
5. Bhagli Sindhlan	24.95	1				
6. Madgaon	24.75		1			
7. Meda Uperla	23.94		1			
8. Chandan	23.88		1			
9. Unan	23.75		1			
10. Bibalsar	23.73		1			
11. Badanvadi	23.43			1		
12. Siyana	21.7			1		
13. Dudsi	20.29			1		
14. Narnavas	20.07			1		
15. Bagra	18.77				1	
16. Debavas	18.07			1		
17. Dechu	17.49				1	
18. Godan	17.26				1	
19. Sankrna	17.15				1	
20. Noon	16.79				1	
21. Santhu	16.69				1	
22. Digaon	15.46					1
23. Samtipura	15.24					1
24. Samuja	14.97					1
25. Akoli	14.86					1
26. Leta	14.36					1
27. Odvada	13.41					1
28. Devki	13.27					1

*** Based on 2001 Census of India Data**

Results Across Panchayat Samitis

Based on data from the census of India 2001, reservation data collected in panchayat samitis (and double checked by calling panchayat secretaries) and a number of interviews with electoral officers at the district level (the officials in charge of making decisions regarding the reservation status of GPs), table B.2 below provides key statistics regarding the implementation of this procedure in all 16 Panchayat Samitis sampled in this study.

Table B.2: Checking the Implementation of the Reservation Process in Sampled Panchayat Samitis.

Sampled *Panchayat Samitis*	**Total Number of GPs**	**Number and % of GPs Whose %SCs Implies that Reservation Should Have Occurred during a Different Electoral Period**	**"Suspicious" Misassigned GPs** **(Number and % of GPs Whose %SCs Implies that Reservation Should Have Occurred during a Different Electoral Period *AND* whose %SCs is > 1% away From the Correct Reservation Threshold)**
1. Jalore 1	**28**	**1 (3.57%)**	**0 (0.00%)**
2. Jalore 2	36	2 (5.55%)	1 (2.77%)
3. Jalore 3	41	8 (19.51%)	3 (7.31%)
4. Jalore 4	29	2 (6.89%)	0 (0.00%)
5. Bikaner 1	31	4 (12.90%)	1 (3.22%)
6. Bikaner 2	37	3 (8.11%)	1 (2.70%)
7. Bikaner 3	52	7 (13.46%)	2 (3.84%)
8. Bikaner 4	36	5 (13.88%)	2 (5.55%)
9. Jhunjhunu 1	37	2 (5.40%)	2 (5.40%)
10. Jhunjhunu 2	34	3 (8.82%)	0 (0.00%)
11. Jhunjhunu 3	29	1 (3.44%)	0 (0.00%)
12. hunjhunu 4	35	3 (8.57%)	0 (0.00%)
13. Tonk 1	40	7 (17.50%)	3 (7.50%)
14. Tonk 2	41	3 (7.31%)	2 (4.80%)
15. Tonk 3	31	4 (12.90%)	1 (3.22%)
16. Tonk 4	33	6 (18.18%)	3 (9.09%)
ALL PS (Pooled)	**570**	**61 (10.70%)**	**21 (3.68%)**

What can we conclude from these analyses? Looking at the third column of the table, it first appears that only a small minority (an average of 10.70%) of GPs had been assigned to reservation during an electoral period that differed from the electoral period that was predicted from the 2001 census of India data. This suggests that while some GPs were indeed misassigned, this was not the case for a large proportion of them.

Besides, as explained above, not all of these misassigned GPs listed in column 3 should be suspected to result from a form of manipulation. Accordingly, the last column of table B.2 presents a count and a percentage of misassigned GPs that may be labeled as "suspicious misassigned GPs" (i.e. GPs which were *not* reserved during the predicted electoral period AND whose percentage of SCs is *more* than 1% away from the local threshold for reservation in that predicted electoral period).

As can be seen from the table, there were extremely few of these "suspicious misassigned GPs" across the 16 Panchayat samitis sampled in this study (a meager average of 3.68%). This suggests that when potential rounding and data-related issues are put aside (1% is in that regard *conservative*), extremely few GPs can in fact be classified as misassigned.

Among "suspicious GPs", additional elements suggest that many cases of misassignment are unlikely to be due to intentional manipulation. Since the boundaries of several Panchayat samitis have changed since 1995, these panchayat samitis received additional GPs that disturbed their original schedule for reservation (which could have inflated the numbers in column 4). Note, finally, that only 3 of the total of 21 misassigned GPs in column 4 were misassigned by more than one electoral period.

Given this generally low rate of misassignment, and given the fact that none of my sampled GP are on this small list of "suspicious misassigned GPs", I read in these results no convincing evidence that my results could have been biased by intentional manipulations of the reservation procedure.

Is There Even a Rationale for Manipulation?

While the estimates above will hopefully help clear the reviewer's doubts, let me conclude this appendix with a more theoretical point regarding potential manipulations. Simply put, it is unclear that manipulating the system would be worth the effort of potential manipulators.

The reviewer is right in suspecting that powerful local elites may try to influence block and district-level officers. But note first that manipulating the system would require great effort. In order to "prevent" reservation, mobilized villagers would first have to be *aware* that their GP is about to be reserved (since it would presumably be too late once it has been *declared* as reserved). This, in my experience, is not the case. Not a single village council head that I met and interviewed during the ethnographic component of this project even vaguely knew or understood the rules that govern the reservation process. Many, in fact, believed that reserved GPs rotated *randomly*, as is the case for gender-based reservations. After having consulted my Excel spreadsheets, I personally broke the news to at least two distinct upper-caste village council heads that their GP was about to be reserved for SCs; judging from their expression, they had no idea this would be the case!

Besides being *aware* of the likelihood of reservation, potential manipulators would also have to be *able* to manipulate. This would also require great effort. This would entail persuading electoral officers in the *district collectorate* rather than at the block level. While this is not impossible, the price for this manipulation would likely be high, since the district collector herself would need to sign on this manipulation (he or she is the legal authority in all matters related to the organization of elections), and since the reservation schedule may be audited by the State Election Commission at a later point in time. This is to say that

authorities that are not easy (or cheap) to influence oversee the reservation process. Hence the great effort (and cost) likely necessary for a potential manipulation to be successful.

Now consider the likely *benefits* of organizing such a manipulation. These are rather low. At best, and as is confirmed by the data above, this would *delay* reservation for a member of the SCs for one (or in very few cases, two) electoral periods. As rightly suggested by the reviewer, even a delay would be valuable if powerful local elites managed to retain office in the meantime. But delaying reservation for a member of the SCs does not mean that whichever individual or group is in office would remain in office. For one, elections are extremely competitive, and incumbents are far from guaranteed to remain in office in India, including at the GP level. Second, such powerful elites may not be legally *allowed* to remain in office. Even if a group of villagers managed to delay reservation *for members of the SCs*, they would not altogether be done with reservation. While reservations for members of the SCs take precedence, reservations for three other categories (OBCs, Women, STs) also exist. Given the frequency of each of these types of reservation, delaying reservation for SCs would thus likely increase the likelihood that the GP is reserved for another category. Hence the benefits of this delay would be very uncertain. The fact that many village elites have now realized that reservation does not fundamentally threaten their material interests AND the fact that village council heads from disadvantaged groups can on the other hand be influenced (or serve as proxies) should further limit the incentive to manipulate the reservation schedule.

In light of these various arguments, I thus see no clear rationale for why we should even *expect* manipulations to be common. While there is room for random errors in the computation of the relatively complex reservation algorithm (as explained above), it is not obvious that the benefits of a potential manipulation would outweigh its potential costs.

Appendix C: The Pair-Matches

District	Pair number	Treatment	Distance city	Population	SC percent GP	caste make -up	Non-SC caste	main SC caste
Jhunjhunu	1	1	14	3092	11.58	1		meghwal
Jhunjhunu	1	0	8	2671	11.54	1		meghwal
Jhunjhunu	2	1	13	3972	13.72	1		meghwal
Jhunjhunu	2	0	12	3226	13.37	1		meghwal
Jhunjhunu	3	1	12	1057	15.25	1		meghwal
Jhunjhunu	3	0	10	1198	16.36	1		meghwal
Jhunjhunu	4	1	10	2998	18.21	0	jat	meghwal
Jhunjhunu	4	0	18	2592	17.03	0	jat	meghwal
Jhunjhunu	5	1	15	1621	18.27	1		meghwal
Jhunjhunu	5	0	18	3535	15.50	1		meghwal
Jhunjhunu	6	1	35	2855	16.21	1		meghwal
Jhunjhunu	6	0	15	3958	13.99	1		meghwal
Jhunjhunu	7	1	22	1989	22.39	0	rajput	meghwal
Jhunjhunu	7	0	10	1347	17.86	0	rajput	meghwal
Jhunjhunu	8	1	17	1663	22.08	1		meghwal
Jhunjhunu	8	0	10	1095	19.83	1		meghwal
Bikaner	9	1	100	1297	21.09	1		meghwal
Bikaner	9	0	45	1203	19.16	1		meghwal
Bikaner	10	1	104	2533	20.07	0	jat	meghwal
Bikaner	10	0	109	2820	20.03	0	jat	meghwal
Bikaner	11	1	35	4023	19.44	0	jat	meghwal
Bikaner	11	0	90	2586	18.71	0	jat	meghwal
Bikaner	12	1	40	3044	19.4	0	jat	meghwal
Bikaner	12	0	30	4947	15.56	0	jat	meghwal
Bikaner	13	1	45	4014	19.99	1		meghwal
Bikaner	13	0	30	3640	16.32	1		meghwal
Bikaner	14	1	14	2655	23.53	0	jat	meghwal
Bikaner	14	0	24	2033	20.26	0	jat	meghwal
Bikaner	15	1	36	4039	18.67	1		meghwal
Bikaner	15	0	30	4131	16.45	1		meghwal
Bikaner	16	1	30	2368	21.68	1		nayak
Bikaner	16	0	95	3022	19.46	1		nayak
Tonk	17	1	22	913	15.13	1		bairwa
Tonk	17	0	24	853	14.27	1		bairwa
Tonk	18	1	12	1146	15.47	0	jhakad	bairwa
Tonk	18	0	21	1092	14.08	0	jhakad	bairwa
Tonk	19	1	48	1801	16.58	1		regar
Tonk	19	0	35	3068	15.24	1		regar
Tonk	20	1	30	2192	20.04	1		bairwa
Tonk	20	0	19	3570	18.21	1		bairwa
Tonk	21	1	9	1196	19.28	1		bairwa
Tonk	21	0	28	1095	18.70	1		bairwa

Tonk	22	1	25	1145	21.59	1		bairwa
Tonk	22	0	30	3911	17.08	1		bairwa
Tonk	23	1	22	1113	20.20	0	gujjar	bairwa
Tonk	23	0	17	1936	19.77	0	gujjar	bairwa
Tonk	24	1	13	1790	24.17	1		bairwa
Tonk	24	0	10	1032	22.83	1		bairwa
Jalore	25	1	17	1364	22.31	1		meghwal
Jalore	25	0	29	1188	20.23	1		meghwal
Jalore	26	1	14	3720	22.55	1		meghwal
Jalore	26	0	15	3249	16.11	1		meghwal
Jalore	27	1	29	2415	23.43	1		meghwal
Jalore	27	0	40	2520	21.65	1		meghwal
Jalore	28	1	25	3417	20.15	1		meghwal
Jalore	28	0	25	2681	19.64	1		meghwal
Jalore	29	1	45	2734	21.70	1		meghwal
Jalore	29	0	50	4499	18.77	1		meghwal
Jalore	30	1	14	1666	17.35	1		meghwal
Jalore	30	0	13	2966	17.26	1		meghwal
Jalore	31	1	15	3476	21.59	1		meghwal
Jalore	31	0	17	1671	18.38	1		meghwal
Jalore	32	1	36	1597	19.74	1		meghwal
Jalore	32	0	38	2583	17.30	1		meghwal

Appendix D: Additional Balance Tests

This appendix contains two tables. In table D.1, I provide additional tests showing that Reserved and Unreserved GPs targeted are statistically indistinguishable on an additional set of covariates drawn from the 2001 Census of India.

In table D.2, in order to address reviewer 2's comment, I show that respondents living in Reserved and Unreserved GPs are comparable on all key demographic characteristics measured by the survey (as described in Appendix G below).

Table D.1: Additional Balance Tests on Pre-Treatment Covariates

	Reserved GPs (N=32)	Unreserved GPs (N=32)	Difference (N=64)	P-value (2-sided)
Mean Number of Households	763.68	758.65	-5.03	0.95
(st. error)	-54	-67.75	-86.64	
Mean Population	4931.71	4782.25	-149.46	0.78
(st. error)	-309.75	-437.35	-535.82	
Mean Number *Males*	2524.28	2444.5	-79.78	0.77
(st. error)	-158.97	-225.76	-276.11	
Mean Number of *Females*	2407.43	2337.75	-69.68	0.79
(st. error)	-151.64	-212.27	-260.87	
Mean Population aged 0-6	985.28	951	-34.28	0.75
(st. error)	-69.9	-83.73	-109.07	
Mean *Male* Population aged 0-6	511.09	498.18	-12.9	0.82
(st. error)	35.25	45.95	57.91	
Mean *Female* Population aged 0-6	474.18	452.81	-21.37	0.67
(st. error)	34.84	38.01	51.56	
Mean *Male* SC Population	477.03	428.59	-48.43	0.34
(st. error)	35.99	35.38	50.47	
Mean *Female* SC Population	443	400.43	-42.56	0.35
(st. error)	34.21	30.62	45.91	
Mean ST Population	278.68	248.81	-29.97	0.74
(st. error)	62.05	65.18	90	
Mean *Male* ST Population	142.4	130.43	-11.96	0.79
(st. error)	31.37	33.72	46.05	
Mean *Female* ST Population	136.12	118.37	-17.15	0.68
(st. error)	30.77	31.49	44.03	

NOTE: The unit of analysis is the GP. All data are from the 2001 census of India. The **p**-values in the final column give the probability of observing a **t**-statistic as large in absolute value as the observed value, if Group (reserved) and Group (unreserved) have equal means.

Table D.1: Additional Balance Tests on Pre-Treatment Covariates (*Part 2*)

	Reserved GPs (N=32)	Unreserved GPs (N=32)	Difference (N=64)	P-value (2-sided)
Mean *Male* Illiterate Population	1095.34	1041.12	-54.21	0.66
(st. error)	85.69	92.18	125.86	
Mean *Female* Illiterate Population	1696.87	1642.37	-54.5	0.78
(st. error)	133.85	144.54	197	
Mean Total *Male* Worker Population	1211.93	1178.62	-33.31	0.8
(st. error)	84	102.79	132.75	
Mean Total *Female* Worker Population	946.71	925.93	-20.78	0.85
(st. error)	68.13	87.39	110.81	
Mean Main Worker Population	1560.31	1529.62	-30.68	0.86
(st. error)	120.04	133.38		
Mean *Male* Main Worker Population	1064.93	1026.15	-38.78	0.75
(st. error)	78.24	93.54	121.95	
Mean *Female* Main Worker Population	495.37	503.46	8.09	0.91
(st. error)	58.97	52.12	78.7	
Mean *Male* Main Cultivator Population	699.9	610.96	-88.93	0.34
(st. error)	62.95	68.54	93.06	
Mean *Female* Main Cultivator Population	403	405.4	2.4	0.97
(st. error)	52.8	49.73	72.74	
Mean *Male* Agricultural Laborer Population	75.84	68.62	-7.21	0.63
(st. error)	11.23	9.99	15.03	
Mean *Female* Agricultural Laborer Population	39.06	37.03	-2.03	0.9
(st. error)	13.34	9.28	16.25	
Mean Household Industry Workers	34.62	44.37	9.75	0.34
(st. error)	-5.24	-8.63	-10.09	

NOTE: The unit of analysis is the GP. All data are from the 2001 census of India. The **p**-values in the final column give the probability of observing a **t**-statistic as large in absolute value as the observed value, if Group (reserved) and Group (unreserved) have equal means.

Table D.1: Additional Balance Tests on Pre-Treatment Covariates (*Part 3*)

	Reserved GPs (N=32)	Unreserved GPs (N=32)	Difference (N=64)	P-value (2-sided)
Mean *Male* Household Industry Workers	26.59	35.28	8.68	0.31
(st. error)	4.5	7.16	8.46	
Mean *Female* Household Industry Workers	8.03	9.09	1.06	0.67
(st. error)	1.51	2.05	2.55	
Mena Number of "Other Workers"	307.87	363.21	55.34	0.41
(st. error)	44.02	50.3	66.84	
Mean Number of *Male* "Other Workers"	262.59	311.28	48.68	0.4
(st. error)	38.21	43.81	58.14	
Mena Number of *Female* "Other Workers"	45.28	51.93	6.65	0.6
(st. error)	9.04	8.86	12.66	
Mean Number of *Male* Marginal Workers	152.46	147	5.46	0.86
(st. error)	26.09	19.36	32.49	
Mean Number of *Female* Marginal Workers	451.34	422.46	-28.87	0.71
(st. error)	51.31	60.73	79.51	
Mean Number of Marginal Cultivators	385.93	348.53	-37.4	0.67
(st. error)	56.5	67.47	88	
Mean Number of *Male* Marginal Cultivators	85.53	80.65	4.875	0.85
(st. error)	21.99	14.51	26.35	
Mean Number of *Female* Marginal Cultivators	305.28	263	-42.28	0.56
(st. error)	45.5	56.69	72.7	
Mean Number Marginal Agricultural Workers	129.18	131.28	2.09	0.94
(st. error)	18.94	20.97	28.26	
Mean *Male* Marg. Agricultural Workers	36.4	36.53	0.125	0.99
(st. error)	-6.38	-6.38	-8.81	

NOTE: The unit of analysis is the GP. All data are from the 2001 census of India. The **p**-values in the final column give the probability of observing a **t**-statistic as large in absolute value as the observed value, if Group (reserved) and Group (unreserved) have equal means.

Table D.1: Additional Balance Tests on Pre-Treatment Covariates (*Part 4*)

	Reserved GPs (N=32)	Unreserved GPs (N=32)	Difference (N=64)	P-value (2-sided)
Mean *Female* Marg. Agricultural Workers	92.78	94.75	1.96	0.93
(st. error)	15	18.22	23.6	
Mean Number Marginal HH Industry Workers	16.9	11.48	-5.43	0.37
(st. error)	5.26	3.03	6.07	
Mean *Male* Marginal HH Industry Workers	4.09	2.43	-1.65	0.24
(st. error)	1.26	0.61	1.4	
Mean *Female* Marginal HH Industry Workers	12.81	9.03	-3.78	0.44
(st. error)	4.14	2.58	4.88	
Mean Number Marginal "Other Workers"	83.65	66.31	17.43	0.44
(st. error)	19.15	11.56	22.37	
Mean *Male* Marginal Other Workers	27.96	25.84	2.125	0.77
(st. error)	5.28	4.99	7.26	
Mean *Female* Marginal Other Workers	55.68	40.46	15.21	0.4
(st. error)	15.91	8.77	18.17	
Mean Number *Male* Non-Workers	1261.719	1265.87	4.15	0.97
(st. error)	80.68	126.2	149.79	
Mean Number *Female* Non-Workers	1416.84	1411.81	-5.03	0.97
(st. error)	119.34	150.68	192.22	

NOTE: The unit of analysis is the GP. All data are from the 2001 census of India. The **p**-values in the final column give the probability of observing a **t**-statistic as large in absolute value as the observed value, if Group (reserved) and Group (unreserved) have equal means.

Table D.2: Characteristics of Villagers Sampled in Reserved and Unreserved GPs.
(Based on survey data)

	Reserved GPs (group 1)	Unreserved GPs (group 2)	Difference of Means (Group 1- 2)	P-value (two-sided)
Proportion of BJP Supporters	.36 (.024)	.37 (.024)	.007 (.034)	.82
Mean Self-reported Level of Religiosity (on a scale from 1 to 5, 1 being most religious)	1.51 (.046)	1.56 (.047)	.042 (.066)	.51
Index of Goods (count from 1 to 12)	4.74 (.155)	4.56 (.161)	-.174 (.224)	.43
Mean Age ***(in years)*** ***(st. error)***	36.23 (.671)	36.45 (.661)	.213 (.942)	.82
Mean Education ***(in years of schooling)*** ***(st. error)***	9.44 (.246)	9.36 (.216)	-.07 (.327)	.81
Mean Education of Father ***(in years of schooling)*** ***(st. error)***	3.51 (.221)	3.47 (.215)	-.04 (.309)	.90
Proportion of Respondents that lived in a caste-homogenous neighborhood ***(st. error)***	.71 (.023)	.73 (.023)	-.02 (.033)	.42
Proportion of Respondents Belonging to the Other Backward Castes ***(st. error)***	.64 (.02)	.63 (.02)	.01 (.03)	.65
Mean Number of Persons Living at Respondent's Residence ***(st. error)***	7.70 (.217)	7.53 (.233)	.172 (.319)	.59
Mean Number of Rooms in Residence ***(st. error)***	3.88 (.137)	3.69 (.109)	-.190 (.175)	.28
Proportion of Respondents living in a *Paka* House. ***(st. error)***	.58 (.03)	.60 (.03)	.02 (.03)	.55
Proportion of Respondent Whose Household Owns a Two-wheeler or a four-wheeler vehicle. ***(st. error)***	.42 (.03)	.43 (.04)	.01 (.05)	.81
N	384	384	768	

NOTE: The unit of analysis is the individual. Standard errors are in parentheses. The **p**-values in the final column give the probability of observing a **t**-statistic as large in absolute value as the observed value, if Group (1) and Group (2) have equal means.

Appendix E: Preparing the audio instrument(s)

To prepare the audio instrument these results are based on, I first used a series of semi-directed focus groups on the general topic of "the evolution of social relations in this village" led by my local collaborators to record and classify a number of statements villagers frequently made about caste relations. These statements made by villagers during long and repeated interviews during which my collaborator and I had time to build a certain amount of trust with respondents are central to this methodology. A number of relevant statements in Rajasthani or Hindi heard during these preparatory interviews and focus groups were then translated to me, following which we selected a limited number of theoretically relevant items for inclusion on the final questionnaire. Based on this material, I wrote an English version of the audio questionnaire including the "statement-based" questions as well as a number of instructions. Different professional translators translated and back-translated this questionnaire from Hindi to English. Speakers of the various Rajasthani dialects in which we subsequently recorded the survey used this final Hindi version as the basis for the various recordings in four different Rajasthani dialects. In order to enhance the realism of the recording and guarantee that all respondents would understand the statements, villagers from each different district of rural Rajasthan that we surveyed recorded the instructions and "acted" the statements in a culturally relevant way, all of which was done under the supervision of a Rajasthani theatre director who was fluent in all of these dialects and was charged with ensuring that the meaning and the tone remained the same from one version to another.

The recording of this audio instrument did not require the purchase of any sophisticated material. An internet-phone microphone, a basic music software – Apple's *GarageBand* - and a simple laptop were used to produce, edit and mix recordings.

Appendix F: The Interview Process

Because the audio self-administered methodology that was at the core of the survey relied on simple MP3 players, respondents were contacted and interviewed at their homes (that is, according to our survey rules: past the gate of their house, but often outdoors). When contacted, they were asked to participate to a survey about "social changes in village life". If they were willing to participate, they were given an exam pad containing an answer sheet as well as a locked ballot box in which they were asked to place their completed answer sheet at the end of the audio interview. They were then trained by the interviewer on how to provide responses to the questions heard in the earphones. Upon making sure that the respondent understood the methodology[5] – which was done by asking each respondent to answer a few easy and non-controversial questions on a mock answer-sheet -, interviewers asked the respondent to isolate himself, played the recording and sat as far away as possible from the respondent. At this point, the interview started and respondents were asked to self-enter their responses on the answer sheet provided by the interviewer at the onset of the interview. The answer sheet counted as many lines as there were questions in the audio component of the survey, and each line presented respondents with different response choices to the question they simultaneously heard in the earphones.

The instrument was organized as a succession of recordings (each of which was a statement and the relevant set of instructions) intertwined with 5-seconds long breaks, designed to leave respondents sufficient time to answer. Accordingly, listening to the recording did not require any intervention from the field investigators, a feature that was key in enhancing the total privacy of the interview process. After convincing respondents to participate and after having explained them the methodology, field investigators simply pushed the "play" button, used the "lock" function of the MP3-player and waited at some distance (in another room if there was one, but most frequently outside the house) for the length of the audio instrument. When the audio instrument was completed, respondents folded their anonymous answer sheets and placed it, as instructed, in the bolted ballot box. At the end of the audio interview, the "second voice" said: "your audio interview is now over. Please ask the field investigator to come back into the room. If you have missed any question, please ask him to replay them for you". In less than 5% of the cases, respondents asked interviewers to replay a question for them, a task which was however done in no time thanks to the MP3-player's "skip forward" function.

To provide responses, respondents were asked to mark an X on one of the cells present on each line. If they did not know what to answer or did not want to answer, they were instructed to skip the item without marking any cell. In order for illiterate (or partially literate) respondents to be able to self-enter the degree to which they agreed with statements heard in the earphones, I associated each "statement-based question" with a symbol that the "second voice" mentioned after each statement. Once the audio-survey was over, respondents detached their answer sheet from the exam pad and placed it in the sealed ballot box, at which point the interviewer came back and a 15-minutes-long face-to-face background questionnaire was administered. Finally, in the minutes or hours following the

[5] Very few respondents initially understood the meaning of the thumbs up and thumbs down logos, as these are not widely used in India. Note in addition that the methodology was nonetheless explained in details for the second time in the recording.

interview, a supervisor met *each* respondent to double check that the response methodology had been correctly understood before he "validated" the questionnaire.

Crucially, in this process, neither respondents nor interviewers (during training) were told that they were responding to a survey about attitudes towards SCs. The survey, presented by the interviewer as a survey about "social changes in village life", contains sections about different topics such as gender relations, intergenerational relations, the development of the village, attitudes towards politicians and technological changes in villagers' lives.

Appendix G: Description of Covariates used in Multivariate Models

In this appendix, I briefly describe each of the variables used in the multivariate regressions described in the article and presented below in appendices 7 and 10.

Population: total population of the village in actual numbers, as per the 2001 census of India. I include the variable in all models, insofar as village size determines the degree to which respondents know their sarpanch and have a chance to interact with him.

% SC: percent of members of the scheduled castes in the GP, as per the 2001 census of India. Included in all models. I control for the proportion of SCs at the GP level insofar as larger SC populations may be better treated and respected by others.

% literate: percent of inhabitants of the GP level that were classified as literate by the 2001 census of India. Also included in all models, as a measure of the average level of education in respondents' direct social environment.

% marg: percent of inhabitants of the GP level that were classified as "marginal workers" by the 2001 census of India. Also included in all models, as a measure of the average socioeconomic status in respondents' direct social environment.

Rel. practice: Five-point scale indicative of the frequency of the respondent's religious practice. Based on the following question, included in the from the background questionnaire: How often do you worship (Puja etc.)? (Daily, once a week, occasionally, only during festivals, never). Daily is coded 5, while Never is coded 1.

BJP: a dummy variable coded 1 when the respondent described himself as a BJP supporter and 0 otherwise. Based on respondent's answer to the question: Which Party do you usually support? (BJP, Congress, Other____, none).

Education: number of years of schooling of respondent, as self-reported in the background survey.

Educ. father: number of years of schooling of respondent's father, as self-reported in the background survey.

Age: age of respondent, as self-reported in the background survey.

Index of goods: count of goods owned by the respondent's household, as self-reported in the background survey. The survey asked about the following items: Bicycle, LPG, Number of telephones, Electric fan/cooler, Television, scooters, motorcycles, mopeds, cars/jeeps/vans, Tractor, Fridge. Used in all models as a control for respondent's socio-economic status.

Type of home: type of home in which the respondent lived (choice among the following three categories: pucca (coded 1), mix pucca/kutcha (coded 2), kutcha (coded 3). Based on response to the following background question.

Subcaste: a dummy variable indicating the subcaste of the respondent, based of self-reports of the respondent's subcaste. The variable was coded 1 when the respondent belonged to an OBC subcaste, and 0 when he was upper-caste among non-SC villagers.

Segregated: a dummy variable coded 1 when the respondent lived in a subcaste-homogenous neighborhood and 0 otherwise.

Profession: a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent was a farmer (coded 1 when the respondent was a farmer), or whether he exercised any other profession (coded 0. The three most other frequent professions were: laborer, shopkeeper and student). Based on self-reports.

Appendix H: The Effect of Reservation on Beliefs About Norms: Additional Models and Figures.

This appendix presents a series of multivariate ordered probit models that provide additional evidence of the effect of reservation on beliefs about social and legal norms.

For each survey item analyzed, I present full regression results for multivariate models including two types of fixed effects: district-level or Panchayat Samiti-level effects.

This appendix also includes figures describing the effect of *reservation* on each type of beliefs about norms, *across different subpopulations*. Namely, these figures graphically represent the effect of reservation on "perceived social norms of interaction" and on "perceived legal norms of interaction" across *age, education, subcaste,* and *type of home*.[6] [7]

[6] Across *age* and *education*, I split the sample in two at the mean value.

[7] In order to present my results in a more compact format, these graphical analyzes are based on scales composed of the two items measuring beliefs about social norms (figure A7.1) and the two items measuring beliefs about legal norms (figure A7.2), respectively.

Table H.1: The Effect of Reservation on Perceived Social and Legal Norms.

	"If a member of the upper castes says positive things..."		"If upper castes invite SCs to [his] marriage, …"		"If a member of the upper castes gets into a dispute…"		"If a member of the upper castes opposes SC…"	
	(1)	**(2)**	**(1)**	**(2)**	**(1)**	**(2)**	**(1)**	**(2)**
Reservation	-.324***	-.338***	-.222***	-.171**	.491***	.509***	.430***	.440***
	(.103)	(.096)	(.076)	(.068)	(.071)	(.071)	(.097)	(.086)
Population	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000**	.000**	.000	.000
	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
% SC	.016	.027	.024*	-.010	.007	-.006	-.002	-.013
	(.023)	(.023)	(.013)	(.018)	(.012)	(.015)	(.018)	(.021)
% literate	-.005	-.001	-.007	-.010	-.000	.002	-.001	.006
	(.010)	(.011)	(.008)	(.007)	(.006)	(.006)	(.009)	(.009)
% marg.	.003	.005	-.015***	-.021***	.011**	.008	.017	.010
	(.009)	(.008)	(.006)	(.006)	(.005)	(.005)	(.007)	(.008)
Rel. practice	-.035	-.051	-.000	-.001	-.041	-.041	-.021	-.027
	(.040)	(.043)	(.044)	(.044)	(.048)	(.048)	(.057)	(.057)
BJP	.112	.135	.080	.092	.201**	.237**	.120	.166*
	(.084)	(.088)	(.092)	(.095)	(.090)	(.096)	(.085)	(.088)
Education	-.015	-.018	.004	.004	.020*	.021*	.034**	.031**
	(.012)	(.011)	(.013)	(.013)	(.011)	(.012)	(.014)	(.015)
Father Educ.	.005	.007	-.000	.003	.017	.015	-.016	-.015
	(.010)	(.010)	(.010)	.011	(.012)	(.013)	(.011)	(.011)
Age	-.007**	-.008**	-.005	-.005	.010**	.010**	.004	.004
	(.003)	(.003)	(.004)	(.003)	(.004)	(.004)	(.004)	(.004)
Segregated	.212	.220	.146	.135	-.009	-.022	.064	.036
	(.093)	(.090)	(.095)	(.099)	(.113)	(.114)	(.088)	(.090)
Index Goods	-.040***	-.040***	-.047**	-.049***	.026	.028*	-.019	-.017
	(.014)	(.014)	(.016)	(.016)	(.016)	(.016)	(.018)	(.018)
Type of Home	-.099	-.112	-.074	-.074	.123*	.138*	-.067	-.057
	(.067)	(.067)	(.067)	(.068)	(.073)	(.074)	(.068)	(.068)
Subcaste	-.115	-.142*	-.018	-.026	-.044	-.054	-.012	-.031
	(.084)	(.086)	(.087)	(.090)	(.096)	(.097)	(.092)	(.086)
Profession	-.165*	-.193**	-.092	-.069	.156*	.164**	-.032	-.032
	(.085)	(.080)	(.092)	(.096)	(.083)	(.080)	(.100)	(.103)
Fixed Effects	*Distri.*	*PS*	*Distri.*	*PS*	*Distri.*	*PS*	*Distri.*	*PS*
N	761	761	761	761	761	761	761	761
Log Like'd	-994.67	-983.39	-999.51	-992.63	-845.17	-839.95	-812.67	-804.26
Pseudo R2	.022	.033	.022	.029	.039	.045	.032	.042

Figure H.1: Mean Responses to Items Measuring Beliefs about Social Norms of Interaction, by subgroups (by education, type of house, subcaste, and age). Based on a scale composed of the 2 items included in Table 4 of the article.









Figure H.2: Mean Responses to Items Measuring Beliefs about Legal Norms of Interactions with SCs," by subgroups (by education, type of house, subcaste, and age). Based on a scale composed of the 2 items included in Table 5 of the article.









Appendix I: The Effect of Reservation on SC Respondents

This appendix presents results from a second audio self-administered survey that targeted villagers from the scheduled castes in the same GPs. These results - described and analyzed at greater length in a book manuscript – confirm that some of the key psychological effects detected among members of the upper-castes also exist among members of the scheduled castes.

Table I.1 below shows that being exposed to a SC sarpanch significantly improved SC villagers' perceptions of the way upper castes treat them. In other words, SC villagers who have lived under a SC sarpanch for the five years preceding the survey are more likely to feel that other villagers treat them with equal respect than villagers who are not from former "untouchable" groups. They are also more likely to feel that how they are treated has *improved* over the past years.

Table I.1: The effect of Exposure to a SC *Sarpanch* on beliefs about the behaviors of non-SC villagers (among SC villagers)
(1=Strongly Disagree, …. , 4=Strongly Agree)

	Average Response in *Reserved* Villages (N=384; Village N= 32)	Average Response in *Unreserved* Villages (N=384; Village N= 32)	Difference in Means across Reserved and Unreserved Villages	P-value for the Difference of Sample Medians (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test)
"People in this village address (speak to) people from my community with the same respect than any other group"	2.83 (.07)	2.47 (.10)	.36 (.12)	.00***
"The way people in this village address (speak to) people from my community has improved recently"	3.28 (.06)	2.91 (.08)	.37 (.09)	.00***
"The way people in this village treat people from my community has improved over the past few years"	3.19 (.06)	2.86 (.08)	.33 (.10)	.00***

*** significant at the .01 level in a two-sample t-test of cluster means, ** significant at the .05 level in a two-sample t-test of cluster means, * significant at the .10 level in a two-sample t-test of cluster means.

Table I.2 reports positive effects on items measuring beliefs about the consequence of hostile behaviors. In other words, the experience of a SC sarpanch appears to have infused SC villagers living in SC-led villages with the belief that they were more likely to have the police and local authorities on their side if a conflict with another villager or another caste group was to occur. This finding suggests that the "fear of punishment" expressed by non-SC villagers finds a translation among members of the scheduled castes: they themselves appear to believe that hostile behaviors are more likely to be punished under a SC *sarpanch*.

Table I.2: The effect of Exposure to a SC *Sarpanch* on Descriptive Beliefs About the Consequences of Hostile Behaviors Towards the Scheduled Castes (among SC villagers) (1=Strongly Disagree, 4=Strongly Agree)

	Average Response in *Reserved* Villages (N=384; Village N= 32)	Average Response in *Unreserved* Villages (N=384; Village N= 32)	Difference in Means across Reserved and Unreserved Villages	P-value for the Difference of Sample Medians (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test)
"In this village, if a member of the upper castes says positive things about SCs, then other upper castes men speak about him badly"	3.37 (.07)	3.16 (.10)	.21* (.12)	.01**
"In this village, if a member of the upper castes invites SCs to his marriage, then other members of the upper castes are mad at him".	3.25 (.06)	3.05 (.10)	.20* (.10)	.02*

*** significant at the .01 level in a two-sample t-test of cluster means, ** significant at the .05 level in a two-sample t-test of cluster means, * significant at the .10 level in a two-sample t-test of cluster means.

Appendix J
Making Inferences about Behaviors: Why Focus on Behavioral Intentions?

In the second part of the article, I have recourse to "behavioral intention" measures. Given my interest in the behavioral repercussions of reservation, why not straightforwardly measure discriminatory behaviors?

A combination of theoretical, practical and ethical reasons explains this choice.

My theoretical focus in this article is on everyday forms of discrimination: common, repeated, sometimes "minor" behaviors that members of the scheduled castes may face at the interpersonal level on a daily basis. These everyday behaviors are, arguably, more prone to change that relatively fixed outcomes, such as patterns of settlements or patterns of intermarriage. In other words, these everyday behaviors would be expected to change *before* more fixed outcomes such as patterns of settlements do. The intuition here is simple: assuming that reservation changed non-SC villagers' outlook on members of the SCs, they would start by saluting them or accepting their invitation to tea before they potentially, if ever, made the decision to move in their hamlet.[8] Given this theoretical focus, behavioral measures such as patterns of settlement would not be very informative. It is almost certain that patterns of settlement would not evolve as a result of reservation for one single position during less than a term, but this would not readily imply that reservation has no effect on interpersonal relations.

Given this focus, I argue that behavioral intentions measures simply constitutes the single most credible way to make inferences about the everyday forms of discriminatory behaviors this article is interested in. Collecting *systematic individual-level* field data on *common* discriminatory behaviors is more challenging than it may seem. The rest of this appendix details why.

While generating data on other types of behaviors may be done, generating realistic quantitative data on *common* discriminatory behaviors at the individual level is in practice difficult, and this for a number of reasons. First and foremost, there is often no reliable authority collecting data on these incidents, as is certainly the case in rural India. The common behaviors on which this study is interested are very often not the object of formal complaints. In spite of extremely repressive laws criminalizing untouchability, it is rarely the case that villagers from the scheduled castes file a complaint after having been denied entry into a public building or after having been served tea in a special cup. Second, even if they were, it is unlikely that I would be able to find a reliable record of those incidents. In the case of Rajasthan, neither police sources nor NGO sources systematically record the type of "minor" incidents on which this study is interested. Third, even if some researchers have measured the prevalence of common discriminatory behaviors *at the village-level* (see Macwan et al 2010 and Shah et al 2006), they have not measured it at the individual level.[9]

[8] Assuming that such decision was free and unconstrained, which is far from being the case in practice.

[9] Note in addition the problematic methodological questions raised by this feature of these studies: for a practice to be classified as "persistent" at the village-level, do 1%, 10%, 51% or 100% of villagers need to engage in it? Both studies do not clearly answer this presumably central question.

Individual-level data on discriminatory behaviors or everyday forms of hostility is in turn almost impossible to generate from scratch, for reasons that pertain to both validity and ethics. For one, it is almost certain that any observation of these practices would change the behavior of the individuals observed. This problem might be circumvented if the researcher spends months with each individual and builds a long-term relationship with the potential discriminators she/he is willing to observe, but this would clearly not be feasible on a systematic or quantitative basis. Besides, important ethical concerns derive from the position that collecting such data would place the researcher in. In order to collect unbiased data, the researcher would likely have to appear to condone these practices, a step that neither myself nor other researchers working on untouchability would easily be ready to take.[10]

These various reasons lead me to rely on behavioral intention measures. While the limitations of this approach are clear (intentions precede but are not behaviors), the fine-grained and systematic nature of the data generated by this project hopefully compensates for this limitation.

[10] In that regard, it is important to note that the landmark study of Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) is able to collect data on discriminatory behaviors only because it observes the consequence of discrimination (in their case, the absence of a call back) and not the discrimination itself (they themselves have no contact with the discriminators). It is however simply difficult to think of a such a design – measuring the *consequences* of discrimination - in this case.

Appendix K: The Effect of Reservation on Behavioral Intentions: Additional Models and Figures.

This appendix presents a series of multivariate probit models that provide additional evidence of the effect of reservation on untouchability-related intentions (detected on items 1, 2 and 5 of table 6 of the article). For each survey item analyzed, I present full regression results for multivariate models including two types of fixed effects: district-level or Panchayat Samiti-level effects.

Table K.1: The Effect of Reservation on Untouchability-related Intentions.

	1. "I saw [SC] villagers seating in the middle …."		2. "Some [SCs] were protesting that they weren't allowed…"		5. "A SC villager invited me in his house …"	
	(1)	**(2)**	**(1)**	**(2)**	**(1)**	**(2)**
Reservation	-.380***	-.378***	-.267**	-.311***	.326***	.387***
	(.092)	(.070)	(.105)	(.095)	(.107)	(.078)
Population	.000	-.000	-.000	-.000*	.000	-.000
	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
% SC	.020	.006	.008	.055*	-.036	-.041
	(.015)	(.024)	(.017)	(.029)	.022	(.023)
% literate	.000	-.006	-.011	-.005	.031***	.027***
	(.008)	(.008)	(.011)	(.011)	(.010)	(.009)
% marg.	-.017**	-.020*	-.001	.008	.010	.011
	(.008)	(.010)	(.009)	(.010)	(.008)	(.009)
Rel. practice	.002	-.000	-.057	-.060	.098**	.127***
	(.068)	(.069)	(.045)	(.049)	(.044)	(.045)
BJP	.159	.161	-.100	-.161	.150*	.134
	(.130)	(.131)	(.109)	(.106)	(.092)	(.096)
Education	-.053***	-.051**	.048***	.054***	.037***	.049***
	(.022)	(.021)	(.013)	(.013)	(.014)	(.014)
Father Educ.	.006	.006	.015	.015	-.007	-.006
	(.015)	(.015)	(.013)	(.012)	(.013)	(.013)
Age	.010	.010	.002	.002	-.005	-.002
	(.006)	(.006)	(.004)	(.004)	(.005)	(.005)
Segregated	-.137	-.120*	.076	.096	-.105	-.125
	(.123)	(.126)	(.089)	(.093)	(.101)	(.107)
Index Goods	-.032	-.032	.022	.022	-.040**	-.043**
	(.021)	(.021)	(.018)	(.019)	(.019)	(.019)
Type of Home	.097	.072	.069	.051	-.040	-.054
	(.085)	(.085)	(.066)	(.066)	(.076)	(.077)
Subcaste	-.151	-.137	.154	.160	.040	.111
	(.120)	(.123)	(.104)	(.109)	(.096)	(.091)
Profession	-.172	-.188	.069	.025	-.145	-.155
	(.130)	(.130)	(.116)	(.116)	(.091)	(.102)
Fixed Effects	*Distri.*	*PS*	*Distri.*	*PS*	*Distri.*	*PS*
N	761	761	761	761	761	761
Log Like'd	-375.38	-369.34	-495.13	-479.80	-493.73	-475.44
Pseudo R2	.093	.108	.052	.082	.051	.086

Appendix L: Did Members of the Scheduled Castes Self-Select into Reserved Villages?

This appendix addresses concerns that my results may stem from the self-selection of members of the SCs in reserved villages.

If SC villagers commonly moved to GPs in which non-SC villagers are more tolerant, if they were less likely to migrate to cities from locations in which non-SC villagers are more tolerant, or if their fertility was higher in more tolerant locations, then the proportion of SCs in more tolerant GPs should increase. If this were the case, more tolerant GPs would have been *more* likely to be reserved in 2005. Following this argument, the results presented in this article may simply stem from the fact that reserved GPs were "more tolerant" in the first place, rather than from the fact that they were reserved.

In the absence of credible out-of-sample historical data on untouchability-related behaviors, convincingly knocking down these concerns is difficult. In this appendix, I however do my best to address these concerns, while acknowledging potential limitations.

This leads me to make two series of points. Relying on a within-sample comparison, I first show (section 1 below) that the correlation implied by these alternative explanations - that the proportion of members of the SCs would be correlated with more positive attitudes - does not exist in my sample. Although based on a limited sample, this suggests that the proportion of SCs in a given location is not necessarily associated to more tolerant attitudes towards members of the SCs, which in turn suggests that reservation may be a better explanation for my results than all these alternative explanations.

In a second series of points (section 2), I specifically focus on dispelling one of these alternative explanations on which some data is available (the idea that SC villagers may have commonly *moved* to GPs in which non-SC villagers are more tolerant). This appendix provides various elements that jointly allow me to show that this alternative explanation is implausible. In points a to c, I show that this scenario is generally unlikely, given migration patterns to rural areas (as described by the NSSO[11]). In points d and e, I specifically show that this scenario is unlikely to cause the variation in untouchability-related attitudes detected in my sample.

[11] National Sample Survey Office (2010). *NSS report No. 533: Migration in India*. Ministry of Statistics and Program Implementation. New Delhi.

Section I/ The correlation implied by these alternative explanations - that the proportion of members of the SCs would be correlated with more positive attitudes - does not exist in my sample.

Given that the local threshold for reservation differs in each of the 16 *Panchayat Samitis* from which my data is drawn, my sample actually contains a fair bit of variation in terms of the share of SC villagers at the GP level. In other words, when pulling data *across Panchayat Samitis*, reservation status is far from being perfectly correlated with SC share at the GP level. This allows me to provide rough tests of the effect of SC share at the GP level.

A first form of test comes from the multivariate models presented in Appendix 10. SC share at the GP level is almost never a significant factor of untouchability-related attitudes in these models, including in more parsimonious models or in models excluding the treatment variable (available from the author).

Second, table L.1 below reproduces the main results presented in table 6 of the article but compares responses in the 32 GPs counting the largest share of SC population (only 18 of which are reserved) with responses in the 32 GPs with the smallest proportion of SCs (14 of which are reserved) instead of comparing GPs according to their reservation status.

Table L.1: Untouchability-related "Behavioral Intentions" by Proportion of SCs at the GP level. (1=Yes, 0=No)

	Average Response in GPs With a Low Proportion of SCs (N=384; Village N= 32)	Average Response in GPs With a High Proportion Of SCs (N=384; Village N= 32)	Difference in Means across the two groups
INTIMIDATION			
1. "I saw [SC] villagers seating in the middle of other villagers on plastic chairs at village meetings. It made me really angry and I told them they should leave the chairs for others to sit".	.22 (.02)	.24 (.02)	.02 (.03)
2. "Some [SCs] were protesting that they weren't allowed to enter the temple; I threatened them that if they continued to protest villagers would organize and give them a lesson".	.45 (.03)	.43 (.03)	.02 (.05)
NON-COOPERATION			
3. "One day I was at the police station, and I saw that officers were refusing to file an FIR *[a complaint] for a village SC that I knew for a fact had been badly cheated by some merchant from the city; I came forward to plead the man's case and help him get his FIR recorded"*	.83 (.02)	.84 (.02)	.01 (.03)
4. "Some village SC needed to borrow money in order to buy new machines for his farm; I happened to have some savings at that time so I lent him what I could"	.90 (.01)	.87 (.02)	-.03 (.03)
SEGREGATION			
5. "A SC villager invited me in his house to thank me for my help. I went there and drank tea with him"	.60 (.03)	.53 (.03)	.07* (.04)
6. "Children from my family were playing in the street with SC children; when they came back home I told them that they should rather play with children from their own caste"	.25 (.02)	.28 (.02)	.03 (.03)

Significant at the .1 level in a two-sample t-test of cluster means.

This analysis shows that the 32 GPs with the largest share of SCs (which on average count 20.88% of SCs) are *not* significantly more tolerant than the 32 GPs with the smallest proportion of SCs (which on average only count 15.73% of SCs). While respondents living in reserved villages are significantly more tolerant on a number of items (table 6 of the article), respondents living in the subsample of GPs with the highest proportion of members of the SCs do *not* display more tolerance towards members of the scheduled castes. The only significant difference in mean in table L.1 (on item 5) actually implies that respondents living in villages with a higher proportion of members of the SCs are *less* tolerant towards members of the SCs.

Because these two sets of GPs do not contain the same number of GPs from each of Panchayat Samitis from which the study sampled, table L.1 admittedly constitutes an imperfect test. Similar results however emerge when running specific tests within each of the four districts sampled.[12] In other words, the 8 GPs that count the largest share of SCs in each district are not associated with more positive attitudes when compared to the 8 GPs with the smallest share of SCs. While the N is likely too small to allow me to detect any significance difference in these analyses (once my sample is divided in four, the N in each group is 96; the village N is 8), the average responses themselves do not suggest that a bigger sample would have led me to detect any significant difference in the direction suggested.

Take the example of Jhunjhunu district (table L.2 below). Because the threshold for reservation in Jhunjhunu was wildly different across each of the four Panchayat Samitis selected, my sample for that state contains large variations in terms of SC share of the population. As a result, Jhunjhunu is particularly interesting since only 4 of the 8 GPs with the largest share of SCs selected in this district were reserved in 2005 (the correlation between reservation status and SC share of the population is, in other words, almost null when pulling across Panchayat Samitis within this district). Comparing, in table L.2, responses in the 8 GPs counting the largest share of SC population (counting on average 18.74% of SCs) with responses in the 8 GPs with the smallest proportion of SCs (counting on average 13.62% of SCs), I similarly do not find that GPs counting the largest share of SC population are "friendlier" or more tolerant. Although most difference-in-means remain insignificant, the average response on the first, seventh and eighth items actually suggest that GPs with large SC population may be less rather than more tolerant (in the case of item 7, the difference in mean is even large and significant). This, once again, suggests that respondents living in GPs with a higher proportion of SCs are not friendlier or more tolerant.

While these analyses cannot dissipate the possibility that respondents living in GPs with a much larger share of SCs (that is, those GPs that were reserved in 1995 and 2000) might be "more tolerant", they at the very least allow me to reject the hypothesis that the GPs of my sample that count a larger share of SCs are more

[12] Three-quarters of migrations to rural areas originate from a place in the same district (NSS 2010, cited above), so running these comparisons within each district makes sense.

tolerant, and hence the possibility that my results may be attributed to the proportion of SCs rather than to reservation.

Table L.2: Untouchability-related "Behavioral Intentions" by Proportion of SCs at the GP level *in Jhunjhunu district* (1=Yes, 0=No)

	Average Response in GPs With a Low Proportion of SCs (N=96; Village N= 8)	Average Response in GPs With a High Proportion Of SCs (N=96; Village N= 8)	Difference in Means across the two groups
INTIMIDATION			
1. "I saw [SC] villagers seating in the middle of other villagers on plastic chairs at village meetings. It made me really angry and I told them they should leave the chairs for others to sit on".	.17 (.02)	.20 (.04)	.03 (.05)
2. "Some [SCs] were protesting that they weren't allowed to enter the temple; I threatened them that if they continued to protest, villagers would organize and give them a lesson".	.51 (.04)	.50 (.06)	.01 (.07)
NON-COOPERATION			
3. "One day I was at the police station, and I saw that officers were refusing to file an FIR *[a complaint] for a village SC that I knew for a fact had been badly cheated by some merchant from the city; I came forward to plead the man's case and help him get his* FIR *recorded"*	.87 (.03)	.91 (.03)	.04 (.04)
4. "Some village SC needed to borrow money in order to buy new machines for his farm; I happened to have some savings at that time so I lent him what I could"	.93 (.03)	.90 (.02)	.03 (.04)
SEGREGATION			
5. "A SC villager invited me into his house to thank me for my help. I went there and drank tea with him"	.75 (.07)	.59 (.04)	.15* (.08)
6. "Children from my family were playing in the street with SC children; when they came back home I told them that they should rather play with children from their own caste"	.18 (.05)	.20 (.04)	.02 (.06)

Significant at the .1 level in a two-sample t-test of cluster means.

II/ My Results are Unlikely to be Due to Migrations Towards More Tolerant Villages.

Building on within-sample and out-of-sample data, points a. to e. below provide a series of arguments as to why this is unlikely to be the case.

a. Discounting marriage-related female migrations and short-term, partial or seasonal migrations (neither of which would presumably increase the recorded population of GPs[13]), migrations *to* rural areas are extremely rare in India, especially so in the state of Rajasthan. This is especially true among members of the SCs.

The National Sample Survey, which collects data on the proportion of migrants at the village/town level, provides evidence about the frequency of migrations *to* rural areas in India. According to the latest NSS report on migrations in India[14] (NSSO 2010[15]), "the proportion of migrant households in rural areas is very low, nearly 1 per cent". In other words, given the definition of a "migrant household" in the NSS survey, an average of less than 1% of all rural households have moved to their current place of residence during the year preceding the survey. In the rural areas of Rajasthan, the number is however smaller than at the national level, at 0.7%. A separate indicator (at the individual rather than at the household level) shows that SCs as a caste group count the smallest proportion of migrants of all caste groups (SC, ST, OBC, general), both in rural and urban areas. In other words, it can be inferred that *less* than 0.7% of members of the SCs living in the rural areas of Rajasthan have moved to their current place of residence during the year preceding the NSS survey. NSSO (2010) in addition presents estimates from previous rounds of the NSS that suggest that these estimates have been extremely stable over time.

Given the average number of households in the GPs of my sample, the Rajasthan migration rate of 0.7% - once again, an overestimation among SCs - suggests that an average of less than one SC household per GP would have been defined as a "migrant household" by the NSS in 2007. Given much higher migration rates to urban areas (NSS0 2010), this suggests that the average net annual growth in the number of SC households at the GP level would be close to zero, if not negative (there are, generally speaking, about twice more out-

[13] In rural India, women traditionally move into the household of their husband. One may however reasonably expect "marriage-related female migrations" to even out at the village-level, and hence not to increase the population. One may also expect short-term, partial or seasonal migrants not to increase a given village's population given census rules.

[14] The 64th round NSS survey on Employment & Unemployment and Migration Particulars was conducted during July, 2007 to June, 2008. The survey covered a sample of 125,578 households (79,091 in rural areas and 46,487 in urban areas) and a sample of 572,254 persons (374,294 in rural areas and 197,960 in urban areas).

[15] National Sample Survey Office (2010). *NSS report No. 533: Migration in India*. Ministry of Statistics and Program Implementation. New Delhi.

migrants than in-migrants in the rural areas of Rajasthan, as shown in NSSO 2010).

Since this is an average across all GPs, this does not necessarily dispel the possibility that these results could be due to migrations of SCs, since a few GPs could receive many SC migrants while most do not. But it probably makes this scenario less plausible. Migrations to rural areas are on average very uncommon among SCs in Rajasthan, and large migration fluxes between GPs are thus generally quite unlikely.

Rosenzweig and Munshi (2009)[16] provide one possible explanation for this low spatial mobility. In an article titled "Why is Mobility in India so Low? Social Insurance, mobility and Growth", the authors argue that extremely low spatial mobility in rural India is due to the existence of sub-caste networks that provide mutual insurance to their members. Since migrating implies reduced access to the local caste networks that provide households with a mean to smooth consumption over several years, spatial mobility remains very limited.

b. It can be assumed that only a small share of migrants to rural areas is driven by differences in the quality of caste relations across GPs.

To the best of my knowledge, no systematic analysis of the motivations of migrations to rural areas exists in the literature on migrations in rural India, let alone among SCs or among SCs in Rajasthan. Figuring out the extent to which the quality of intercaste relations is a factor of migrations is thus difficult. The reason for this lack of research likely lies in the fact that the main source of data available on the issue (the NSS data) is not suited to answering this question. While NSSO (2010) presents data on the self-reported motivations of migrant households, the categories are too large and imprecise to allow researchers to make inferences on the question of the relationship between discriminations/untouchability and migrations.[17]

This being said, I see several theoretical reasons to assume that only a very small share of the 0.7% of SC migrant households in the rural areas of Rajasthan owes to differences in the quality of caste relations across GPs.

i. If differences in the quality of caste relations across GPs played a major role in shaping the migratory patterns of SC villagers, one may expect to observe more migrations among SCs than among members of all those groups that

[16] Rosenzweig, M. and Munshi, K (2009). Why is Mobility in India So Low? Social Insurance, Inequality and Growth. NBER Working Paper 14850.
http://www.nber.org/papers/w14850

[17] Suppose that a respondent declares having migrated for "employment-related reasons", "to open a business", "to study" or because he or she "bought a house" (all of which are categories of the NSS), it remains difficult to ascertain whether caste discrimination played a role in each of these actions. Note however that one of the answer categories of the motivation question of the NSS is "social or political problems", which is the reason provided by 0.7% of the migrant households at the national level.

are *not* the victims of untouchability-related practices. Yet, members of the SCs are *less* likely to be migrants than members of the ST, OBC, and General categories. This holds when income or education are taken into account: SC households are less likely to be migrants to rural areas at all levels of income or education (NSS 2010), which shows that it is not simply that SCs lack the *ability* to move.

ii. Even if differences in the quality of caste relations across GPs cause *some* migrations among SCs, one may assume that many other reasons cause migrations, and hence that only a very small share of those 0.7% of migrants move for reasons that pertain to caste relations. While untouchability can play a role in the unemployment of SCs (Shah et al 2006), it is for instance difficult to argue that the 5% of migrant households in rural areas that the NSS records as having moved because they were transferred by their employer, or the 27% that moved in order to attend a school, or to study, have anything to do with caste relations.
Moreover, it can be assumed that an important share of SCs that move to rural areas "in search of employment", "in search of better employment", or "to take up better employment" do so for reasons that have nothing to do with caste relations, and that purely derive from differences in employment opportunities across GPs. The development of a mine or a quarry – as is frequently the case in rural Rajasthan – may for instance attract laborers who are unemployed in their village. This may certainly be because they are discriminated against in their village, but also simply because there is much more unemployment (across castes) for daily laborers in their village. The point here is that in the total absence of variation in caste relations across GPs, one would still expect to obverse some work-related migrations among SCs, at a rate that could not be much smaller than the negligible rate suggested by the NSS (once more, less than 0.7% of households according to NSSO 2010).
As a result, it can be argued that a small share of the small number of migrations to rural areas among SCs is prompted by differences in the quality of caste relations across GPs, and hence, that a scenario that would involve major migrations towards GPs in which the quality of caste relations is superior would be rather implausible.

iii. More than 70% of migrations to rural areas originate in the rural areas of the very same district, including among SCs (NSSO 2010). Given that migrations to cities – in which SCs can hope to be treated marginally better - are commonplace and twice as frequent as migrations to rural areas, it is difficult to understand why caste relations would prompt these migrations to rural areas. It is theoretically puzzling that SC villagers seeking to leave a place in which the upper-caste are hostile would move to another village of the same district, in which caste relations are unlikely to be significantly different--,when moving to cities is such a commonplace possibility. More generally speaking, it can be assumed that the bigger share of villagers that try to escape untouchability in their village would move to a city – and not to a village - if they could.

c. Even if some villages attracted SC migrants because their upper-castes are less hostile to SCs, this would only affect their reservation status under certain conditions.

To put it simply, in order for the proportion of SCs in villages receiving SC migrants to increase, SCs would need to move to those villages at a higher rate than non-SCs.

Given that many of the employment opportunities that potentially attract SC villagers would presumably attract comparable workers from other groups (most of whom are *not* classified as SC), the arrival of SC migrants may only have a minor effect on the proportion of SCs in the village. The proportion of SCs should only increase when a village receives proportionally more SCs than non-SCs, which would presumably not be the case in all villages that attract SC migrants. This implies that discrimination-related migrations of SCs – when they occur – may not have a major effect on the proportion of SCs across GPs.

d. Points a-c above provided empirical and theoretical arguments that suggest that migrations of SCs villagers towards less discriminatory villages, and hence self-selection into less hostile villages are generally unlikely to be common. Assuming, for the sake of the argument, that discrimination-based migrations were frequent, and that the proportion of SC villagers was, as a result, correlated to levels of discriminations, these migrations may not, however, impact my sample.

Villages in my sample (both reserved and unreserved villages, given that the difference in the proportion of SCs between the two groups is overall not statistically significant) have a proportion of SCs that is very close to the median proportion of SCs in their respective districts. This implies two things:

i. If the proportion of SCs at the village level was correlated to the number of SC villagers having migrated to those villages, we should expect reserved villages in my sample to have received only a few more migrants than unreserved villages in my sample (although this difference should be expected not to be statistically significant!).

ii. More importantly, even if migrations played an important role in the proportion of SCs at the village level, we should expect inward migrations to have been much more frequent in those villages which count a much higher proportion of SCs (and were reserved at previous rounds in 1995 and 2000), and outward migrations to have been much more likely in those villages that count a much smaller proportion of SCs (and will be reserved in 2 or 3 electoral rounds). In other words, the fact that the villages in my sample have a proportion of SCs that is very close to the median proportion of SCs in their respective districts may suggest that the net balance of inward and outward migrations in those villages would be smaller than in villages with larger or smaller proportions of SCs.

e. Using village-level data from the 1961 census of India (the oldest disaggregated data I could find), I can show that the proportion of members of the SCs in reserved villages was already higher than in the proportion of members of the SCs in unreserved villages in 1961.

This implies that the relative share of SCs in reserved vs. unreserved villages only changed marginally since 1961 (it increased in both cases, as it did in the rural areas of Rajasthan overall during this period). This pattern also clearly undermines the hypothesis according to which members of the SCs were drawn to villages reserved in 2005.

If anything, the fact that the proportion of SC population of unreserved villages grew slightly faster since 1961 suggests that unreserved villages may have been more "attractive" in this period.

Table L.3: Proportion of SC Villagers in surveyed villages in my sample

	Reserved Villages in my sample N=32	**Unreserved Villages in my sample N=32**
Proportion of SC villagers in 1961 (based on 1961 census of India)	18.00 (1.16)	16.32 (1.05)
Proportion of SC villagers as of 2001 (based on 2001 census of India)	19.34 (1.06)	18.69 (.92)

Source: village-level statistics from the Censuses of India 1961 and 2001.