**Online Appendix Supplementing**

**What Works in Human Rights Institutions?**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

1. **QUALITATIVE PROCESS AND FIELDWORK RELATED TO THE CASE STUDIES**
2. **EXPERT SURVEY DESIGN AND TEXT**
3. **DATA SOURCES, CODING AND OPERATIONALIZATION, AND ROBUSTNESS CHECKS**

## Qualitative process and fieldwork related to the case studies

The qualitative evidence presented in this project is the result of an exhaustive and continuing research program undertaken by the author(s) into the origins, performance and effects of NHRIs on human rights improvement. This research effort spans more than 10 years, has entailed in depth field research across diverse country cases (including multiple visits to Chile and Peru), and ongoing collaboration with human rights policymakers and NHRI practitioners. Much of the primary source data presented in this study is unique and has been obtained directly from NHRI practitioners personally known to the author(s). Similarly, interview citations constitute a small subsection of the 300-plus interviews with high-level UN officials, multiple NHRI heads and senior officials, NHRI technical experts, NGOs representatives and victims of human rights violations conducted over the past decade. The author(s) were also invited to present drafts of this project at several NHRI meetings in Europe and Latin America. We are particularly grateful to Silvana Lauzán and Stephanie Lagoutte for facilitating these opportunities.

The author(s) are extremely grateful to all those NHRI experts and practitioners who have generously given of their time during the course of this research. We hope that they will find this effort to advance a more systematic understanding of NHRI effectiveness useful in their own work. Their insights have been an invaluable resource throughout our research process. This project is testament to the immense value of collaboration aimed at bridging research and policy, building upon expert knowledge, and setting a course for further innovation in human rights scholarship and practice.

## Expert Survey Design and Text

The goal of our expert survey was to assess experts’ views on the effectiveness of individual NHRIs.

The survey was piloted with two experienced NHRI practitioners prior to general circulation, and their feedback was incorporated into the final document. An expert survey targeted at individuals with access to diverse sources of information is particularly appropriate for this study given the range of NHRIs we needed to evaluate. Notwithstanding the specialized nature of the inquiry, it was possible to identify a sufficiently large pool of individuals with relevant expertise. Expert selection included targeting academics with significant expertise on NHRIs, NHRI practitioners themselves, and governmental and non-governmental consultants, and officials engaged in monitoring NHRI activities and advising on their establishment or reform. The NHRI survey was conducted between 17 August and 14 October 2013. It was distributed to a total of 60 NHRI experts and achieved a total response rate of 60 percent, with 36 respondents.

It was also important to ensure a cross-section of regional expert representation to reduce referent group bias. Although the majority of respondents were experts based in Europe (50 percent), a good number of surveys were also received from the Americas (33 percent), with the remainder spread equally across Africa, Asia-Pacific and the MENA (6 percent respectively). Experts were instructed to evaluate only those NHRIs with which they were familiar.

After fielding the survey, we examined the standard deviations of the expert scores. Large standard deviations can invite questions about a survey’s validity – they can sometimes indicate that experts are “judging different objects, on different dimensions, at different times.”[[1]](#footnote-1) As opposed to indicating confusion over the object of measurement or insufficient information, large standard deviations could also indicate high levels of disagreement among experts about the question at hand – namely whether particular NHRIs were effective or not. We are reassured by the fact that experts generally agreed in their assessments of particular NHRIs. As we explain in part C below, we also re-run our analyses excluding those NHRIs on which we had few expert assessments or on which expert assessments diverged sharply, and results did not change.

Below are the instructions we offered experts as regards the assessment of individual NHRIs.

**Instructions for Part B: Effectiveness of Individual NHRIs**

The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights Handbook on NHRIs specifies that NHRI effectiveness should be “measured by reference to the extent to which a national institution positively affects the human rights situation of individuals and groups in a given society.”

Based on this definition of NHRI effectiveness, how would you rate the following NHRIs? On a scale of 1 (very ineffective) to 5 (very effective), how effective are NHRIs in each of the countries below? If you have insufficient information for any given country, please feel free to leave the associated box blank.

[List of NHRIs follows]

## Data Sources, Coding and Operationalization, and Robustness Checks

Data on NHRI institutional safeguards

Our dataset of NHRIs in 107 countries codes NHRI institutional structures at the time each NHRI was established. NHRI institutional design is quite stable over time; we examine some changes through qualitative case studies. The 22 features were selected based on the minutes of the Paris meeting, the text of the Paris Principles, an extensive review of NHRI scholarly and practitioner literature, as well as consultation with leading NHRI practitioners. Prior research examines NHRI adoption as a binary variable;[[2]](#footnote-2) our dataset is thus significantly more fine-grained. Data was coded by law students who were provided with a codebook and detailed guidance to ensure NHRI charters were coded in conformity with the coding rules. The data was drawn from a variety of sources, principally NHRI compendia and institutional charters contained on official websites and state outlets. Where necessary, historical records were identified and consulted.

We focused on institutional safeguards considered consequential for NHRI effectiveness. Many features we study protect NHRI independence, by limiting the power of the executive to disestablish the institution, fire its members, or pack it with pro-executive appointees. Other safeguards ensure that the agency has the formal power to take monitoring actions that governments could have otherwise blocked.[[3]](#footnote-3)

Our Independence Index (which could range from zero to five), represents a count of the safeguards an NHRI could have that contribute to its formal independence – namely whether it has been established by constitution or legislation (i.e. not by executive decree), whether its leaders are not designated by the executive, whether it contains no government representatives, whether its leaders enjoy immunity from prosecution, and whether they enjoy employment protections (and can be fired only for a good cause). Our Investigate Index (which could range from zero to six) represents a count of the safeguards an NHRI has that are related to the initiation, execution and completion of investigations, namely whether it has the power to initiate investigations on its own initiative, the power to receive individual complaints, the power to compel evidence or testimony, the ability to visit prisons, the power to refer cases to courts, and the power to enforce its own decisions.

Our Promotion Index (which could range from zero to three), represents a count of the safeguards of an NHRI that are related to human rights promotion, namely whether an NHRI has the mandate to advise on legislation, produce an annual report and serve education functions. Our Inclusiveness Index (which could range from zero to four) represents a count of NHRI features that enhance its inclusiveness, namely whether it has a broad mandate, civil society representation, the mandate to engage with international organizations and the mandate to harmonize domestic law with international human rights law. We have also collected data on four other safeguards that we do not include in any of the indices, because we do not have strong theoretical expectations about the direction of the effects, and our experts did not consider these especially important.[[4]](#footnote-4)

Data on NHRI Grades

Data for NHRI grades were drawn from the GANHRI reports on the accreditation status of NHRI around the world.[[5]](#footnote-5) The variable of interest is the average of the grade an NHRI received between its first review and 2015. We operationalize this by giving countries a score of 4 for an A (full compliance), 3 for an A(R) (reserved), 2 for a B (partial compliance), 1 for a C (non-compliance) and 0 if the NHRI was suspended or accreditation was revoked. For example, in 1999, Sweden received an A grade from the ICC but in 2011, its grade dropped to B, making Sweden's cumulative NHRI grade as 3.71. Where a country was reviewed twice in the same year, the grade received in the second review is recorded as the country’s grade for that year. Since April 2004, the ICC started reporting on the status of NHRIs around the world and also specified their grades from past reviews. This process is now undertaken by the GANHRI Sub-Committee on Accreditation (SCA).

The first two reports from 2004 and 2005 indicate that some countries received an A status for a particular review year, but later reports mark these countries as A(R) for the same year. This discrepancy has been recorded in reports from 2004 or earlier years. In our dataset, we have coded these observations as A(R) as we believe these very early reports to lack accurate information which was fixed by subsequent reports.

Quantitative Analysis – Robustness Checks

In this section, we replicate the main specifications in multiple ways, and find that they hold up to scrutiny. First, we examine whether removing outliers alters the results. Second, we examine the effect of alternative coding by coding questionable observations as A instead of A(R). Third, we examine whether the classification of certain transition countries as democracies alters results. Fourth, we take into account earlier reports of the ICC to see if this changes the results. Fifth, we introduce additional control variables such as civil conflict and population of a country to assess their effect on the result. Sixth, we examine whether limiting the control variables to those that are most important to an NHRI has an effect on the results. Lastly, we assess the outcomes of removing surveys with large standard deviations.

Appendix Table A1 and A2 demonstrate that the models presented in the paper still hold when excluding states that received a C or lower grade, including NHRIs that were suspended or lost their accreditation. It is a good practice to examine whether results hold up when outliers are excluded. We suspect that there should be no relationship between formal safeguards and NHRIS that have received Cs, been suspended, or have lost accreditation, because in these extreme situations, the executive has likely completely undermined the institution.

Appendix Table A1: NHRIs with More Safeguards Get Higher Average Grades (Appendix Table A1 replicates main Table 2 excluding NHRIs that ever received a C or lower)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Dependent Variable: NHRI Grade | | | Dependent Variable: Expert Survey Score | | |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | All | Dem | Auth | All | Dem | Auth |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Total No. of Safeguards | 0.05\*\* | 0.10\*\*\* | 0.01 | 0.02 | -0.01 | 0.04 |
|  | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.05) | (0.06) |
| Democracy Score | -0.00 | -0.01 | -0.07 | 0.04 | 0.18\*\* | -0.01 |
|  | (0.02) | (0.06) | (0.05) | (0.02) | (0.08) | (0.09) |
| Human Rights Score | -0.02 | 0.05 | -0.10 | 0.05 | 0.05 | -0.02 |
|  | (0.04) | (0.05) | (0.07) | (0.06) | (0.07) | (0.12) |
| Logged GDP per Capita | -0.05 | -0.09 | -0.02 | -0.10 | 0.08 | -0.27 |
|  | (0.08) | (0.12) | (0.13) | (0.11) | (0.16) | (0.21) |
| Naming and Shaming | 0.01 | 0.08 | -0.02 | 0.07 | 0.24\* | 0.02 |
|  | (0.04) | (0.09) | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.13) | (0.10) |
| Intl NGOs score | 0.32\*\* | 0.37 | 0.55\*\* | 0.30 | -0.25 | 0.49 |
|  | (0.15) | (0.22) | (0.24) | (0.22) | (0.32) | (0.41) |
| NHRI After 1992 | -0.24 | -0.18 | -0.19 | -0.41\* | -0.27 | -0.39 |
|  | (0.16) | (0.18) | (0.29) | (0.23) | (0.25) | (0.49) |
| Constant | 1.64\* | 0.66 | 0.28 | 1.53 | 3.18 | 1.33 |
|  | (0.94) | (1.23) | (1.81) | (1.45) | (1.92) | (3.05) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 59 | 37 | 22 | 58 | 36 | 22 |
| R-squared | 0.24 | 0.30 | 0.50 | 0.25 | 0.30 | 0.31 |
| Standard errors in parentheses | |  |  |  |  |  |
| \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 | |  |  |  |  |  |

Appendix Table A2: NHRIs with More InVESTIGATIVE Safeguards Get Higher Average Grades (Appendix Table A2 replicates main Table 3 excluding NHRIs that ever received a C or lower)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Dependent Variable: NHRI Grade | | | | | | Dependent Variable: Expert Survey Score | | | | | |
|  | (1) | | (2) | | (3) | | (4) | | (5) | | (6) | |
|  | All | | Dem | | Auth | | All | | Dem | | Auth | |
|  |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |
| Investigative Index | | 0.12\*\* | | 0.21\*\*\* | | 0.08 | | 0.18\*\* | | 0.24\*\* | | 0.13 | |
|  | | (0.05) | | (0.07) | | (0.08) | | (0.07) | | (0.09) | | (0.09) | |
| Independence Index | | 0.08 | | 0.13\* | | 0.11 | | -0.00 | | -0.10 | | 0.32\* | |
|  | | (0.06) | | (0.07) | | (0.12) | | (0.08) | | (0.09) | | (0.15) | |
| Promotional Index | | -0.08 | | -0.05 | | -0.26 | | -0.23 | | -0.22 | | -0.92\*\*\* | |
|  | | (0.10) | | (0.13) | | (0.22) | | (0.14) | | (0.15) | | (0.27) | |
| Inclusiveness Index | | 0.12 | | 0.24\*\* | | -0.04 | | -0.10 | | -0.18 | | -0.13 | |
|  | | (0.08) | | (0.10) | | (0.19) | | (0.11) | | (0.11) | | (0.24) | |
| Democracy Score | | 0.00 | | -0.04 | | -0.04 | | 0.05\*\* | | 0.24\*\*\* | | 0.09 | |
|  | | (0.02) | | (0.07) | | (0.06) | | (0.03) | | (0.08) | | (0.07) | |
| Human Rights Score | | -0.03 | | 0.04 | | -0.12 | | 0.03 | | 0.03 | | -0.08 | |
|  | | (0.04) | | (0.05) | | (0.07) | | (0.05) | | (0.06) | | (0.09) | |
| Logged GDP per Capita | | -0.01 | | 0.01 | | 0.11 | | 0.02 | | 0.25\* | | 0.08 | |
|  | | (0.08) | | (0.12) | | (0.15) | | (0.11) | | (0.14) | | (0.18) | |
| Naming and Shaming | | 0.01 | | 0.01 | | -0.00 | | 0.10\* | | 0.24\*\* | | 0.07 | |
|  | | (0.04) | | (0.10) | | (0.06) | | (0.06) | | (0.11) | | (0.08) | |
| Intl NGOs score | | 0.29\* | | 0.25 | | 0.65\*\* | | 0.22 | | -0.41 | | 0.75\*\* | |
|  | | (0.15) | | (0.23) | | (0.27) | | (0.21) | | (0.27) | | (0.33) | |
| NHRI After 1992 | | -0.19 | | -0.21 | | 0.09 | | -0.37\* | | -0.44\*\* | | 0.43 | |
|  | | (0.16) | | (0.18) | | (0.34) | | (0.22) | | (0.21) | | (0.42) | |
| Constant | | 1.26 | | 0.41 | | -0.95 | | 1.59 | | 2.96\* | | -1.19 | |
|  | | (0.97) | | (1.28) | | (2.16) | | (1.40) | | (1.64) | | (2.68) | |
|  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |
| Observations | | 59 | | 37 | | 22 | | 58 | | 36 | | 22 | |
| R-squared | | 0.31 | | 0.40 | | 0.62 | | 0.40 | | 0.60 | | 0.72 | |
| Standard errors in parentheses | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |
| \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 | | | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |

The ICC reports had discrepant grading for the same year for a handful of NHRIs introducing possible errors into the dataset. We resolved these discrepancies in the paper by adopting the reviewed grade and in a manner which has been explained above. In Tables A3 and A4, we adopt a counterfactual coding in context to the data we have so far relied upon. For example, where an NHRI received both A and A(R) in two contradictory observations and we coded it as A(R), we have now adopted A as an alternative code for tables A3 and A4.

Appendix Table A3: NHRIs with More Safeguards Get Higher Average Grades (Appendix Table A3 replicates main Table 2 including alternative coding where ICC reports had discrepancies)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Dependent Variable: NHRI Grade | | | Dependent Variable: Expert Survey Score | | |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | All | Dem | Auth | All | Dem | Auth |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Total No. of Safeguards | 0.06\* | 0.13\*\*\* | 0.01 | 0.03 | 0.02 | 0.03 |
|  | (0.03) | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.03) | (0.05) | (0.06) |
| Democracy Score | 0.01 | 0.01 | -0.03 | 0.04\* | 0.17\*\* | 0.00 |
|  | (0.02) | (0.07) | (0.08) | (0.02) | (0.07) | (0.09) |
| Human Rights Score | -0.05 | 0.06 | -0.12 | 0.05 | 0.06 | -0.02 |
|  | (0.06) | (0.07) | (0.10) | (0.06) | (0.07) | (0.12) |
| Logged GDP per Capita | -0.03 | -0.20 | 0.17 | -0.13 | -0.01 | -0.24 |
|  | (0.12) | (0.17) | (0.18) | (0.11) | (0.16) | (0.21) |
| Naming and Shaming | 0.07 | 0.14 | 0.03 | 0.08 | 0.24\* | 0.03 |
|  | (0.06) | (0.12) | (0.08) | (0.06) | (0.12) | (0.10) |
| Intl NGOs score | 0.26 | 0.44 | 0.66\* | 0.38\* | -0.02 | 0.53 |
|  | (0.22) | (0.33) | (0.36) | (0.22) | (0.32) | (0.41) |
| NHRI After 1992 | -0.25 | -0.27 | -0.05 | -0.40\* | -0.38 | -0.28 |
|  | (0.23) | (0.26) | (0.41) | (0.22) | (0.25) | (0.48) |
| Constant | 1.66 | 0.36 | -1.73 | 1.05 | 1.89 | 0.87 |
|  | (1.40) | (1.81) | (2.60) | (1.43) | (1.92) | (3.01) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 65 | 41 | 24 | 62 | 39 | 23 |
| R-squared | 0.18 | 0.29 | 0.42 | 0.27 | 0.31 | 0.29 |
| Standard errors in parentheses | |  |  |  |  |  |
| \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 | |  |  |  |  |  |

Appendix Table A4: NHRIs with More INVESTIGATIVE Safeguards Get Higher Average Grades (Appendix Table A4 replicates main Table 3 including alternative coding where ICC reports had discrepancies)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Dependent Variable: NHRI Grade | | | | | | Dependent Variable: Expert Survey Score | | | | | |
|  | (1) | | (2) | | (3) | | (4) | | (5) | | (6) | |
|  | All | | Dem | | Auth | | All | | Dem | | Auth | |
|  |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |
| Investigative Index | | 0.15\*\* | | 0.27\*\* | | 0.10 | | 0.16\*\* | | 0.22\*\* | | 0.14 | |
|  | | (0.08) | | (0.11) | | (0.11) | | (0.07) | | (0.11) | | (0.10) | |
| Independence Index | | 0.01 | | 0.13 | | 0.01 | | 0.01 | | -0.03 | | 0.29\* | |
|  | | (0.09) | | (0.11) | | (0.18) | | (0.08) | | (0.10) | | (0.16) | |
| Promotional Index | | 0.12 | | 0.12 | | -0.18 | | -0.17 | | -0.08 | | -0.89\*\*\* | |
|  | | (0.15) | | (0.19) | | (0.32) | | (0.14) | | (0.16) | | (0.28) | |
| Inclusiveness Index | | 0.12 | | 0.30\*\* | | -0.29 | | -0.07 | | -0.16 | | -0.19 | |
|  | | (0.12) | | (0.13) | | (0.28) | | (0.11) | | (0.12) | | (0.24) | |
| Democracy Score | | 0.01 | | -0.04 | | 0.01 | | 0.05\*\* | | 0.22\*\*\* | | 0.11 | |
|  | | (0.03) | | (0.08) | | (0.09) | | (0.03) | | (0.07) | | (0.07) | |
| Human Rights Score | | -0.04 | | 0.06 | | -0.14 | | 0.03 | | 0.05 | | -0.09 | |
|  | | (0.06) | | (0.08) | | (0.10) | | (0.06) | | (0.07) | | (0.09) | |
| Logged GDP per Capita | | -0.01 | | -0.14 | | 0.29 | | -0.03 | | 0.12 | | 0.11 | |
|  | | (0.12) | | (0.18) | | (0.20) | | (0.11) | | (0.15) | | (0.18) | |
| Naming and Shaming | | 0.05 | | 0.03 | | 0.06 | | 0.11\* | | 0.24\*\* | | 0.08 | |
|  | | (0.06) | | (0.14) | | (0.08) | | (0.06) | | (0.12) | | (0.08) | |
| Intl NGOs score | | 0.24 | | 0.44 | | 0.66 | | 0.30 | | -0.14 | | 0.76\*\* | |
|  | | (0.23) | | (0.33) | | (0.40) | | (0.21) | | (0.29) | | (0.34) | |
| NHRI After 1992 | | -0.25 | | -0.29 | | 0.20 | | -0.37\* | | -0.53\*\* | | 0.52 | |
|  | | (0.23) | | (0.27) | | (0.50) | | (0.22) | | (0.23) | | (0.43) | |
| Constant | | 1.16 | | -0.68 | | -1.35 | | 1.17 | | 1.66 | | -1.28 | |
|  | | (1.48) | | (1.93) | | (3.20) | | (1.44) | | (1.86) | | (2.77) | |
|  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |
| Observations | | 65 | | 41 | | 24 | | 62 | | 39 | | 23 | |
| R-squared | | 0.22 | | 0.37 | | 0.53 | | 0.37 | | 0.50 | | 0.68 | |
| Standard errors in parentheses | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |
| \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 | | | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |

In tables A5 and A6, we test the model against countries with a more conservative measure of democracy. These tables demonstrate that the results still hold when coding as democracies states that had a polity score of 6 or higher in the year prior to the establishment of its NHRI. In contrast, the model presented in the paper codes democracies as countries that had a polity score of 1 or higher for that year.

Appendix Table A5: NHRIs with More Safeguards Get Higher Average Grades (Appendix Table A5 replicates main Table 2 with changes to democracy cut point)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Dependent Variable: NHRI Grade | | | Dependent Variable: Expert Survey Score | | |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | All | Dem | Auth | All | Dem | Auth |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Total No. of Safeguards | 0.06\* | 0.11\*\* | 0.03 | 0.03 | -0.02 | 0.05 |
|  | (0.03) | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.03) | (0.05) | (0.05) |
| Democracy Score | 0.01 | -0.01 | 0.01 | 0.04\* | 0.27\*\* | 0.00 |
|  | (0.02) | (0.13) | (0.04) | (0.02) | (0.11) | (0.04) |
| Human Rights Score | -0.04 | 0.03 | -0.07 | 0.05 | -0.01 | 0.03 |
|  | (0.06) | (0.10) | (0.09) | (0.06) | (0.09) | (0.09) |
| Logged GDP per Capita | -0.02 | -0.09 | 0.08 | -0.13 | 0.02 | -0.25 |
|  | (0.11) | (0.21) | (0.16) | (0.11) | (0.18) | (0.17) |
| Naming and Shaming | 0.08 | 0.14 | 0.05 | 0.08 | 0.22 | 0.04 |
|  | (0.06) | (0.19) | (0.07) | (0.06) | (0.17) | (0.08) |
| Intl NGOs score | 0.26 | 0.32 | 0.51 | 0.38\* | -0.19 | 0.51 |
|  | (0.22) | (0.39) | (0.32) | (0.22) | (0.35) | (0.34) |
| NHRI After 1992 | -0.26 | -0.31 | -0.11 | -0.40\* | -0.32 | -0.30 |
|  | (0.22) | (0.31) | (0.34) | (0.22) | (0.26) | (0.37) |
| Constant | 1.50 | 0.97 | -0.25 | 1.05 | 2.82 | 0.77 |
|  | (1.35) | (2.11) | (2.27) | (1.43) | (2.04) | (2.43) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 65 | 32 | 33 | 62 | 30 | 32 |
| R-squared | 0.19 | 0.26 | 0.26 | 0.27 | 0.32 | 0.24 |
| Standard errors in parentheses | |  |  |  |  |  |
| \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 | |  |  |  |  |  |

Appendix Table A6: NHRIs with More INVESTIGATIVE Safeguards Get Higher Average Grades (Appendix Table A6 replicates main Table 3 with changes to democracy cut point)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Dependent Variable: NHRI Grade | | | | | | Dependent Variable: Expert Survey Score | | | | | |
|  | (1) | | (2) | | (3) | | (4) | | (5) | | (6) | |
|  | All | | Dem | | Auth | | All | | Dem | | Auth | |
|  |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |
| Investigative Index | | 0.14\* | | 0.29\*\* | | 0.06 | | 0.16\*\* | | 0.23\*\* | | 0.09 | |
|  | | (0.07) | | (0.11) | | (0.10) | | (0.07) | | (0.10) | | (0.11) | |
| Independence Index | | 0.04 | | 0.07 | | 0.07 | | 0.01 | | -0.12 | | 0.22 | |
|  | | (0.08) | | (0.11) | | (0.15) | | (0.08) | | (0.09) | | (0.15) | |
| Promotional Index | | 0.08 | | 0.06 | | -0.25 | | -0.17 | | -0.20 | | -0.47\* | |
|  | | (0.14) | | (0.24) | | (0.23) | | (0.14) | | (0.18) | | (0.24) | |
| Inclusiveness Index | | 0.15 | | 0.40\*\*\* | | -0.28 | | -0.07 | | -0.11 | | -0.15 | |
|  | | (0.11) | | (0.14) | | (0.22) | | (0.11) | | (0.11) | | (0.23) | |
| Democracy Score | | 0.01 | | -0.11 | | -0.01 | | 0.05\*\* | | 0.27\*\* | | -0.01 | |
|  | | (0.03) | | (0.13) | | (0.04) | | (0.03) | | (0.10) | | (0.04) | |
| Human Rights Score | | -0.03 | | 0.05 | | -0.11 | | 0.03 | | -0.01 | | -0.04 | |
|  | | (0.06) | | (0.09) | | (0.08) | | (0.06) | | (0.07) | | (0.09) | |
| Logged GDP per Capita | | 0.00 | | 0.02 | | 0.18 | | -0.03 | | 0.17 | | -0.04 | |
|  | | (0.12) | | (0.20) | | (0.16) | | (0.11) | | (0.15) | | (0.18) | |
| Naming and Shaming | | 0.07 | | -0.00 | | 0.05 | | 0.11\* | | 0.20 | | 0.06 | |
|  | | (0.06) | | (0.19) | | (0.07) | | (0.06) | | (0.14) | | (0.07) | |
| Intl NGOs score | | 0.26 | | 0.28 | | 0.61\* | | 0.30 | | -0.33 | | 0.70\* | |
|  | | (0.22) | | (0.37) | | (0.33) | | (0.21) | | (0.29) | | (0.34) | |
| NHRI After 1992 | | -0.24 | | -0.32 | | 0.26 | | -0.37\* | | -0.55\*\* | | 0.20 | |
|  | | (0.22) | | (0.30) | | (0.38) | | (0.22) | | (0.22) | | (0.39) | |
| Constant | | 0.87 | | -0.06 | | -0.55 | | 1.17 | | 2.87 | | -1.01 | |
|  | | (1.43) | | (2.12) | | (2.55) | | (1.44) | | (1.79) | | (2.65) | |
|  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |
| Observations | | 65 | | 32 | | 33 | | 62 | | 30 | | 32 | |
| R-squared | | 0.23 | | 0.46 | | 0.40 | | 0.37 | | 0.62 | | 0.43 | |
| Standard errors in parentheses | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |
| \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 | | | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |

Tables A7 and A8 take into account the early reviews of the ICC to test the model against higher grades of countries that adopted NHRIs early on. As noted above, ICC grading process has changed over the years. While the ICC exercised leniency in the 1990s to encourage buy-in from states, it subjected the later NHRIs to relatively greater scrutiny. As a result, states that joined early may have artificially high average NHRI grades compared to states that joined the system later on. Therefore, the NHRI’s first review is included to control these possible high scores of early adopters. We find that results do not change.

Appendix Table A7: NHRIs with More Safeguards Get Higher Average Grades (Appendix Table A7 replicates main Table 2 including the NHRI’s first review)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Dependent Variable: NHRI Grade | | | Dependent Variable: Expert Survey Score | | |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | All | Dem | Auth | All | Dem | Auth |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Total No. of Safeguards | 0.06\* | 0.12\*\*\* | 0.02 | 0.03 | 0.02 | 0.05 |
|  | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.05) | (0.03) | (0.05) | (0.06) |
| Democracy Score | 0.01 | 0.01 | -0.05 | 0.04 | 0.17\*\* | -0.01 |
|  | (0.02) | (0.07) | (0.08) | (0.02) | (0.07) | (0.09) |
| Human Rights Score | -0.04 | 0.06 | -0.11 | 0.05 | 0.06 | 0.00 |
|  | (0.06) | (0.07) | (0.11) | (0.06) | (0.08) | (0.13) |
| Logged GDP per Capita | -0.01 | -0.16 | 0.14 | -0.12 | -0.00 | -0.25 |
|  | (0.11) | (0.17) | (0.19) | (0.12) | (0.17) | (0.22) |
| Naming and Shaming | 0.08 | 0.16 | 0.03 | 0.08 | 0.24\* | 0.01 |
|  | (0.06) | (0.12) | (0.09) | (0.06) | (0.12) | (0.10) |
| Intl NGOs score | 0.25 | 0.42 | 0.64 | 0.33 | -0.02 | 0.50 |
|  | (0.22) | (0.32) | (0.38) | (0.23) | (0.37) | (0.42) |
| NHRI After 1992 | -0.23 | -0.32 | 0.08 | -0.33 | -0.38 | -0.09 |
|  | (0.24) | (0.27) | (0.51) | (0.24) | (0.27) | (0.59) |
| Year of First Review | -0.01 | 0.01 | -0.02 | -0.02 | -0.00 | -0.04 |
|  | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.06) | (0.03) | (0.05) | (0.06) |
| Constant | 22.33 | -10.87 | 30.27 | 49.78 | 6.24 | 74.89 |
|  | (60.68) | (73.39) | (111.58) | (68.19) | (101.76) | (126.55) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Obersvations | 65 | 41 | 24 | 62 | 39 | 23 |
| R-squared | 0.19 | 0.30 | 0.40 | 0.27 | 0.31 | 0.31 |
| Standard errors in parentheses | |  |  |  |  |  |
| \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 | |  |  |  |  |  |

Appendix Table A8: NHRIs with More INVESTIGATIVE Safeguards Get Higher Average Grades (Appendix Table A8 replicates main Table 3 including the NHRI’s first review)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Dependent Variable: NHRI Grade | | | | | | Dependent Variable: Expert Survey Score | | | | | |
|  | (1) | | (2) | | (3) | | (4) | | (5) | | (6) | |
|  | All | | Dem | | Auth | | All | | Dem | | Auth | |
|  |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |
| Investigative Index | | 0.15\*\* | | 0.26\*\* | | 0.16 | | 0.17\*\* | | 0.23\*\* | | 0.15 | |
|  | | (0.08) | | (0.11) | | (0.14) | | (0.07) | | (0.11) | | (0.12) | |
| Independence Index | | 0.05 | | 0.17 | | -0.02 | | 0.01 | | -0.03 | | 0.28 | |
|  | | (0.08) | | (0.11) | | (0.20) | | (0.08) | | (0.10) | | (0.18) | |
| Promotional Index | | 0.08 | | 0.08 | | -0.16 | | -0.16 | | -0.07 | | -0.87\*\* | |
|  | | (0.15) | | (0.18) | | (0.35) | | (0.14) | | (0.16) | | (0.31) | |
| Inclusiveness Index | | 0.16 | | 0.34\*\* | | -0.28 | | -0.07 | | -0.17 | | -0.19 | |
|  | | (0.11) | | (0.13) | | (0.29) | | (0.11) | | (0.12) | | (0.25) | |
| Democracy Score | | 0.01 | | -0.04 | | -0.01 | | 0.05\* | | 0.22\*\*\* | | 0.11 | |
|  | | (0.03) | | (0.08) | | (0.09) | | (0.03) | | (0.07) | | (0.08) | |
| Human Rights Score | | -0.03 | | 0.06 | | -0.11 | | 0.03 | | 0.07 | | -0.08 | |
|  | | (0.06) | | (0.07) | | (0.11) | | (0.06) | | (0.07) | | (0.10) | |
| Logged GDP per Capita | | 0.02 | | -0.09 | | 0.26 | | -0.02 | | 0.09 | | 0.10 | |
|  | | (0.12) | | (0.18) | | (0.20) | | (0.12) | | (0.16) | | (0.19) | |
| Naming and Shaming | | 0.07 | | 0.05 | | 0.05 | | 0.10\* | | 0.25\*\* | | 0.08 | |
|  | | (0.06) | | (0.13) | | (0.09) | | (0.06) | | (0.12) | | (0.08) | |
| Intl NGOs score | | 0.24 | | 0.42 | | 0.57 | | 0.26 | | -0.03 | | 0.74\* | |
|  | | (0.22) | | (0.33) | | (0.44) | | (0.22) | | (0.33) | | (0.38) | |
| NHRI After 1992 | | -0.18 | | -0.29 | | 0.48 | | -0.32 | | -0.59\*\* | | 0.55 | |
|  | | (0.25) | | (0.27) | | (0.58) | | (0.24) | | (0.25) | | (0.50) | |
| Year of First Review | | -0.02 | | -0.01 | | -0.05 | | -0.02 | | 0.03 | | -0.01 | |
|  | | (0.03) | | (0.04) | | (0.06) | | (0.03) | | (0.05) | | (0.06) | |
| Constant | | 36.72 | | 14.15 | | 92.32 | | 42.27 | | -67.90 | | 17.16 | |
|  | | (61.18) | | (74.42) | | (130.50) | | (66.20) | | (93.42) | | (115.90) | |
|  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |
| Observations | | 65 | | 41 | | 24 | | 62 | | 39 | | 23 | |
| R-squared | | 0.24 | | 0.40 | | 0.53 | | 0.37 | | 0.51 | | 0.68 | |
| Standard errors in parentheses | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |
| \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 | | | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |

Tables A9 and A10 demonstrate that the model is robust to the inclusion of alternative control variables such as civil wars and size of population. Civil wars can have disastrous consequences for human rights in a country. To control for this, a dummy variable is included based on the Uppsala Armed Conflict Dataset which indicates whether the state experienced a civil war within ten years after the establishment of its NHRI. Additionally, countries with larger populations may be more likely to witness human rights abuses. The models below include the civil conflict variable and the country’s total population the year before the NHRI was established. Results are largely unchanged.

Appendix Table A9: NHRIs with More Safeguards Get Higher Average Grades (Appendix Table A9 replicates main Table 2 including additional controls such as civil conflict and population)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Dependent Variable: NHRI Grade | | | Dependent Variable: Expert Survey Score | | |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| VARIABLES | All | Dem | Auth | All | Dem | Auth |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Total No. of Safeguards | 0.08\*\* | 0.12\*\* | 0.03 | 0.03 | 0.00 | -0.02 |
|  | (0.04) | (0.05) | (0.08) | (0.04) | (0.05) | (0.06) |
| Democracy Score | 0.01 | 0.02 | -0.06 | 0.04 | 0.18\*\* | 0.03 |
|  | (0.03) | (0.07) | (0.15) | (0.03) | (0.08) | (0.10) |
| Human Rights Score | 0.02 | 0.11 | -0.11 | 0.07 | 0.09 | -0.37\* |
|  | (0.07) | (0.08) | (0.25) | (0.07) | (0.09) | (0.16) |
| Logged GDP per Capita | -0.11 | -0.13 | 0.08 | -0.22 | 0.09 | -0.70\*\* |
|  | (0.16) | (0.22) | (0.41) | (0.17) | (0.24) | (0.27) |
| Naming and Shaming | 0.12\* | 0.25\* | 0.07 | 0.10 | 0.29\*\* | 0.16 |
|  | (0.07) | (0.13) | (0.14) | (0.07) | (0.14) | (0.09) |
| Intl NGOs score | 0.34 | 0.22 | 1.05 | 0.58\* | -0.22 | 2.39\*\*\* |
|  | (0.30) | (0.41) | (0.89) | (0.32) | (0.46) | (0.57) |
| NHRI After 1992 | -0.17 | -0.13 | -0.05 | -0.28 | -0.31 | 0.66 |
|  | (0.25) | (0.28) | (0.88) | (0.27) | (0.31) | (0.70) |
| Trade as a % of GDP | -0.00 | -0.01\*\* | 0.01 | -0.00 | -0.00 | -0.02 |
|  | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.02) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.01) |
| Civil War | -0.04 | -0.16 | 0.27 | -0.07 | 0.01 | -1.83\* |
|  | (0.31) | (0.49) | (1.12) | (0.33) | (0.53) | (0.93) |
| Population | -0.00 | 0.00 | -0.00 | -0.00 | 0.00 | -0.00\*\* |
|  | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Constant | 1.37 | 1.48 | -4.32 | 0.39 | 2.77 | -3.73 |
|  | (1.56) | (1.89) | (5.09) | (1.79) | (2.28) | (3.36) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 55 | 37 | 18 | 52 | 35 | 17 |
| R-squared | 0.26 | 0.44 | 0.38 | 0.24 | 0.36 | 0.79 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Standard errors in parentheses | |  |  |  |  |  |
| \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 | |  |  |  |  |  |

Appendix Table A10: NHRIs with More INVESTIGATIVE Safeguards Get Higher Average Grades (Appendix Table A10 replicates main Table 3 including additional controls such as civil conflict and population)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Dependent Variable: NHRI Grade | | | | Dependent Variable: Expert Survey Score | | | |
|  | | (1) | (2) | (3) | | (4) | (5) | (6) | |
| VARIABLES | | All | Dem | Auth | | All | Dem | Auth | |
|  | |  |  |  | |  |  |  | |
| Investigative Index | | 0.16\* | 0.24\*\* | 0.30 | | 0.15\* | 0.20 | -0.17 | |
|  | | (0.08) | (0.11) | (0.28) | | (0.09) | (0.13) | (0.25) | |
| Independence Index | | 0.01 | 0.08 | -0.26 | | -0.01 | -0.06 | 0.14 | |
|  | | (0.11) | (0.12) | (0.33) | | (0.12) | (0.14) | (0.15) | |
| Promotional Index | | 0.27 | 0.30 | 0.13 | | -0.11 | 0.01 | -0.22 | |
|  | | (0.21) | (0.26) | (0.67) | | (0.23) | (0.31) | (0.47) | |
| Inclusiveness Index | | 0.13 | 0.27\* | -0.47 | | -0.09 | -0.21 | -0.32 | |
|  | | (0.13) | (0.15) | (0.48) | | (0.14) | (0.17) | (0.26) | |
| Democracy Score | | -0.00 | -0.04 | 0.07 | | 0.05 | 0.22\*\* | 0.04 | |
|  | | (0.03) | (0.07) | (0.20) | | (0.03) | (0.08) | (0.11) | |
| Human Rights Score | | 0.05 | 0.14 | -0.01 | | 0.05 | 0.08 | -0.39 | |
|  | | (0.07) | (0.09) | (0.30) | | (0.07) | (0.09) | (0.21) | |
| Logged GDP per Capita | | -0.09 | -0.09 | 0.29 | | -0.12 | 0.09 | -0.76 | |
|  | | (0.17) | (0.22) | (0.54) | | (0.18) | (0.23) | (0.41) | |
| Naming and Shaming | | 0.10 | 0.16 | 0.13 | | 0.12\* | 0.28\* | 0.15 | |
|  | | (0.07) | (0.13) | (0.17) | | (0.07) | (0.14) | (0.08) | |
| Intl NGOs score | | 0.30 | 0.28 | 0.32 | | 0.47 | -0.21 | 2.42\* | |
|  | | (0.30) | (0.39) | (1.16) | | (0.32) | (0.42) | (0.86) | |
| NHRI After 1992 | | -0.14 | -0.05 | -0.21 | | -0.28 | -0.52\* | 0.49 | |
|  | | (0.25) | (0.29) | (1.04) | | (0.27) | (0.30) | (0.74) | |
| Trade as a % of GDP | | -0.01 | -0.01\*\* | 0.02 | | -0.00 | -0.00 | -0.02 | |
|  | | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.02) | | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.02) | |
| Civil War | | -0.04 | -0.10 | 0.62 | | -0.08 | -0.16 | -1.62 | |
|  | | (0.31) | (0.50) | (1.32) | | (0.32) | (0.52) | (1.62) | |
| Population | | -0.00 | -0.00 | 0.00 | | -0.00 | 0.00 | -0.00 | |
|  | | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | |
| Constant | | 0.97 | 0.14 | -0.56 | | 0.83 | 2.40 | -2.23 | |
|  | | (1.64) | (1.88) | (6.38) | | (1.83) | (2.21) | (2.98) | |
|  | |  |  |  | |  |  |  | |
| Observations | | 55 | 37 | 18 | | 52 | 35 | 17 | |
| R-squared | | 0.31 | 0.55 | 0.59 | | 0.33 | 0.53 | 0.94 | |
| Standard errors in parentheses | |  |  |  | |  |  |  | |
| \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 | | |  |  | |  |  |  | |

Tables A11 and A12 exclude unnecessary control variables that might be artificially inflating the significance of other independent variables. Below we check our specifications against a minimal number of variables which we believe to be the most important control variables. Results are very similar.

Appendix Table A11: NHRIs with More Safeguards Get Higher Average Grades (Appendix Table A11 replicates main Table 2 with minimal controls)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Dependent Variable: NHRI Grade | | | Dependent Variable: Expert Survey Score | | |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| VARIABLES | All | Dem | Auth | All | Dem | Auth |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Total No. of Safeguards | 0.03 | 0.10\*\* | -0.02 | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.05 |
|  | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.05) | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.05) |
| Democracy Score | 0.04\*\* | 0.05 | -0.04 | 0.05\*\*\* | 0.17\*\*\* | 0.05 |
|  | (0.02) | (0.06) | (0.07) | (0.02) | (0.05) | (0.07) |
| Human Rights Score | -0.09\* | 0.02 | -0.19\*\* | 0.01 | 0.06 | -0.08 |
|  | (0.05) | (0.06) | (0.09) | (0.05) | (0.06) | (0.09) |
| Naming and Shaming | 0.09 | 0.18 | 0.04 | 0.11\* | 0.24\*\* | 0.08 |
|  | (0.06) | (0.12) | (0.08) | (0.06) | (0.11) | (0.09) |
| NHRI After 1992 | -0.20 | -0.31 | -0.04 | -0.47\*\* | -0.38 | -0.53 |
|  | (0.22) | (0.25) | (0.39) | (0.22) | (0.24) | (0.42) |
| Constant | 3.57\*\*\* | 2.17\*\*\* | 3.99\*\*\* | 2.99\*\*\* | 1.73\*\* | 2.99\*\*\* |
|  | (0.53) | (0.79) | (0.93) | (0.52) | (0.79) | (0.94) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 69 | 41 | 28 | 65 | 39 | 26 |
| R-squared | 0.16 | 0.27 | 0.27 | 0.19 | 0.31 | 0.20 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Standard errors in parentheses | |  |  |  |  |  |
| \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 | |  |  |  |  |  |

Appendix Table A12: NHRIs with More INVESTIGATIVE Safeguards Get Higher Average Grades (Appendix Table A12 replicates main Table 3 with minimal controls)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Dependent Variable: NHRI Grade | | | | | | Dependent Variable: Expert Survey Score | | | | | |
|  | (1) | | (2) | | (3) | | (4) | | (5) | | (6) | |
|  | All | | Dem | | Auth | | All | | Dem | | Auth | |
|  |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |
| Investigative Index | | 0.13\* | | 0.21\*\* | | 0.12 | | 0.14\* | | 0.19\*\* | | 0.14 | |
|  | | (0.07) | | (0.09) | | (0.12) | | (0.07) | | (0.09) | | (0.12) | |
| Independence Index | | -0.04 | | 0.11 | | -0.23 | | -0.05 | | -0.02 | | 0.03 | |
|  | | (0.08) | | (0.10) | | (0.15) | | (0.08) | | (0.09) | | (0.15) | |
| Promotional Index | | 0.09 | | 0.02 | | 0.18 | | -0.11 | | -0.04 | | -0.31 | |
|  | | (0.14) | | (0.17) | | (0.24) | | (0.14) | | (0.15) | | (0.25) | |
| Inclusiveness Index | | 0.17 | | 0.28\*\* | | -0.19 | | -0.11 | | -0.17 | | -0.36 | |
|  | | (0.11) | | (0.12) | | (0.27) | | (0.11) | | (0.11) | | (0.26) | |
| Democracy Score | | 0.04\* | | 0.02 | | -0.04 | | 0.06\*\*\* | | 0.22\*\*\* | | 0.08 | |
|  | | (0.02) | | (0.06) | | (0.08) | | (0.02) | | (0.06) | | (0.07) | |
| Human Rights Score | | -0.07 | | 0.02 | | -0.19\* | | 0.02 | | 0.07 | | -0.11 | |
|  | | (0.05) | | (0.06) | | (0.09) | | (0.05) | | (0.06) | | (0.09) | |
| Naming and Shaming | | 0.07 | | 0.10 | | 0.03 | | 0.12\* | | 0.24\*\* | | 0.10 | |
|  | | (0.06) | | (0.12) | | (0.08) | | (0.06) | | (0.11) | | (0.08) | |
| NHRI After 1992 | | -0.21 | | -0.34 | | 0.00 | | -0.47\*\* | | -0.52\*\* | | -0.16 | |
|  | | (0.22) | | (0.26) | | (0.42) | | (0.21) | | (0.23) | | (0.43) | |
| Constant | | 2.81\*\*\* | | 1.70\* | | 4.05\*\*\* | | 3.29\*\*\* | | 1.53\* | | 4.65\*\*\* | |
|  | | (0.64) | | (0.83) | | (1.34) | | (0.61) | | (0.77) | | (1.24) | |
|  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |
| Observations | | 69 | | 41 | | 28 | | 65 | | 39 | | 26 | |
| R-squared | | 0.22 | | 0.35 | | 0.36 | | 0.28 | | 0.49 | | 0.40 | |
| Standard errors in parentheses | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |
| \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 | | | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |

Tables A13 and A14 exclude expert scores with the standard deviations of experts’ assessments of a given country where two standard deviations larger than the average deviation between experts (or cases with only one expert respondent) results did not change. Large standard deviations can sometimes be an indication that experts are “judging different objects, on different dimensions, at different times.”[[6]](#footnote-6) Again, results do not change.

Appendix Table A13: NHRIs with More Safeguards Get Higher Average Grades (Appendix Table A13 replicates main Table 2 excluding observations with large survey standard deviations)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Dependent Variable:  NHRI Grade | | | Dependent Variable:  Expert Survey Score | | |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | All | Dem | Auth | All | Dem | Auth |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Total No. of Safeguards | 0.06\*\* | 0.18\*\*\* | -0.01 | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.02 |
|  | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.05) | (0.08) |
| Democracy Score | -0.01 | -0.05 | -0.04 | 0.02 | 0.11 | 0.01 |
|  | (0.02) | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.03) | (0.07) | (0.11) |
| Human Rights Score | -0.04 | 0.11\* | -0.14 | 0.06 | 0.09 | -0.05 |
|  | (0.05) | (0.06) | (0.08) | (0.06) | (0.07) | (0.15) |
| Logged GDP per Capita | -0.08 | -0.29\*\* | -0.02 | -0.16 | -0.09 | -0.28 |
|  | (0.09) | (0.13) | (0.13) | (0.11) | (0.15) | (0.23) |
| Naming and Shaming | 0.02 | 0.11 | -0.01 | 0.07 | 0.21\* | 0.02 |
|  | (0.05) | (0.10) | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.11) | (0.11) |
| Intl NGOs score | 0.39\* | 0.87\*\*\* | 0.32 | 0.59\*\* | 0.38 | 0.30 |
|  | (0.20) | (0.30) | (0.35) | (0.24) | (0.34) | (0.62) |
| NHRI After 1992 | -0.32\* | -0.29 | -0.17 | -0.44\* | -0.41\* | -0.41 |
|  | (0.19) | (0.20) | (0.31) | (0.22) | (0.23) | (0.56) |
| Constant | 1.29 | -2.40 | 2.27 | -0.36 | -0.23 | 3.07 |
|  | (1.38) | (1.72) | (2.88) | (1.66) | (1.98) | (5.11) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 54 | 34 | 20 | 54 | 34 | 20 |
| R-squared | 0.28 | 0.52 | 0.49 | 0.31 | 0.39 | 0.30 |
| Standard errors in parentheses | |  |  |  |  |  |
| \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 | |  |  |  |  |  |

Appendix Table A14: NHRIs with More INVESTIGATIVE Safeguards Get Higher Average Grades (Appendix Table A14 replicates main Table 3 excluding observations with large survey standard deviations)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Dependent Variable: NHRI Grade | | | | | | Dependent Variable: Expert Survey Score | | | | | |
|  | (1) | | (2) | | (3) | | (4) | | (5) | | (6) | |
|  | All | | Dem | | Auth | | All | | Dem | | Auth | |
|  |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |
| Investigative Index | | 0.11\* | | 0.25\*\* | | 0.06 | | 0.15\* | | 0.20 | | 0.08 | |
|  | | (0.07) | | (0.10) | | (0.09) | | (0.08) | | (0.12) | | (0.11) | |
| Independence Index | | 0.15\* | | 0.30\*\*\* | | 0.05 | | 0.10 | | 0.04 | | 0.32 | |
|  | | (0.08) | | (0.10) | | (0.15) | | (0.09) | | (0.12) | | (0.18) | |
| Promotional Index | | -0.06 | | 0.02 | | -0.25 | | -0.21 | | -0.04 | | -1.01\*\*\* | |
|  | | (0.13) | | (0.16) | | (0.24) | | (0.15) | | (0.19) | | (0.29) | |
| Inclusiveness Index | | 0.26\*\* | | 0.42\*\*\* | | -0.12 | | -0.02 | | -0.10 | | -0.17 | |
|  | | (0.10) | | (0.11) | | (0.23) | | (0.12) | | (0.13) | | (0.27) | |
| Democracy Score | | -0.01 | | -0.08 | | -0.02 | | 0.03 | | 0.15\* | | 0.13 | |
|  | | (0.02) | | (0.07) | | (0.07) | | (0.03) | | (0.08) | | (0.09) | |
| Human Rights Score | | -0.03 | | 0.10 | | -0.15 | | 0.04 | | 0.08 | | -0.14 | |
|  | | (0.05) | | (0.06) | | (0.09) | | (0.06) | | (0.07) | | (0.11) | |
| Logged GDP per Capita | | -0.06 | | -0.19 | | 0.11 | | -0.05 | | 0.02 | | 0.07 | |
|  | | (0.10) | | (0.14) | | (0.15) | | (0.11) | | (0.17) | | (0.19) | |
| Naming and Shaming | | 0.00 | | 0.05 | | 0.01 | | 0.09 | | 0.21\* | | 0.06 | |
|  | | (0.05) | | (0.10) | | (0.07) | | (0.06) | | (0.12) | | (0.08) | |
| Intl NGOs score | | 0.42\*\* | | 0.83\*\*\* | | 0.45 | | 0.54\*\* | | 0.19 | | 0.47 | |
|  | | (0.20) | | (0.29) | | (0.39) | | (0.24) | | (0.35) | | (0.46) | |
| NHRI After 1992 | | -0.26 | | -0.24 | | 0.09 | | -0.40\* | | -0.53\*\* | | 0.35 | |
|  | | (0.18) | | (0.21) | | (0.37) | | (0.22) | | (0.25) | | (0.44) | |
| Constant | | 0.27 | | -3.17\* | | 0.95 | | -0.44 | | 0.10 | | 1.57 | |
|  | | (1.42) | | (1.74) | | (3.43) | | (1.70) | | (2.06) | | (4.12) | |
|  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |
| Observations | | 54 | | 34 | | 20 | | 54 | | 34 | | 20 | |
| R-squared | | 0.36 | | 0.61 | | 0.59 | | 0.40 | | 0.48 | | 0.74 | |
| Standard errors in parentheses | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |
| \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 | | | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |

1. Marco R. Steenbergen & Gary Marks, *Evaluating Expert Judgments*, 46 European J. of Pol. Research 347, 351 (2007). [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. *See* Dongwook Kim, *International Nongovernmental Organizations and the Global Diffusion of National Human Rights Institutions*, 67 Int’l Org. 505 (2013); Wade M. Cole & Francisco O. Ramirez, *Conditional decoupling assessing the impact of national human rights institutions, 1981 to 2004*, 78 Am. Soc. Rev. 1 (2013). [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. For more details and for access to the data please see Katerina Linos & Thomas Pegram, *The Language of Compromise in International Agreements*, 70 Int’l Org. 587 (2016). [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. These include term limits and the possibility for reappointment; the administrative law literature is divided on whether term limits contribute to more effective institutions. We also collected data on whether the NHRI was headed by a single individual or a committee; again, there is debate in the literature and no strong theoretical prior. We collected data on whether the NHRI could contribute amicus briefs in judicial proceedings; this is a relatively rare feature that we could (but have not) included in our Investigate Index, or our Promotion Index. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. *See* Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions (GANHRI): ICC Accreditation, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR),

   http://nhri.ohchr.org/EN/AboutUs/ICCAccreditation/Pages/default.aspx [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Katerina Linos & Thomas Pegram, *The Language of Compromise in International Agreements*, 70 Int’l Org. 587, 615-16 (2016). [↑](#footnote-ref-6)